6
Hume and the Debate on 'Motivating Reasons'

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> It is a heuristic maxim that the truth lies not in one of the two disputed views but in some third possibility which has not yet been thought of, which we can only discover by rejecting something assumed as obvious by both disputants.
>
> (Ramsey, 1931, pp. 115–6)

Introduction

This essay offers a new interpretation of Hume's account of motivation before relating it to certain disputes in modern moral psychology. The essay is divided into three parts. First, I lay down some general distinctions in the so-called theory of motivation (TOM), introducing two related but distinct ongoing debates. Next, in the middle and largest parts of the essay, I focus on what Hume has to say on these matters, concluding that the standard map of available positions leaves no space for his view, as it rejects an assumption shared by all concerned. Finally, I demonstrate how the disputes most central to the debates we began with evaporate once we follow Hume in rejecting this shared assumption, taking this to count in his favour.

6.1 The motivational map

The term 'motivation' is most widely used to refer to either:

(a) *Whatever it is that motivates us* (often misleadingly termed our 'motives' or 'motivators').
or
(b) *Our being motivated* (*by* (a)).

Accordingly, TOM is, at least *prima facie*, a central part of what used to be called 'philosophical psychology' whose principle focus is the provision of a satisfactory account of (b) in terms of (a). While this project is more closely

tied to moral psychology than to the philosophy of cognitive science which currently passes as 'philosophy of psychology' it is *not* concerned with the normative question of what *ought* to motivate us to act, but only with what possibly *could* and/or actually *does*.

There are numerous debates within TOM but I shall here restrict myself to just two, both concerning the nature of (a). The first of these is between Humeanism and Anti-Humeanism (cf. Smith, 1994), the second between what has been called Psychologism and Non-Psychologism (cf. Dancy, 2000). What I shall argue will, for the most part, be of mere passing interest to the causalism/anti-causalism controversy and the disputes between various forms of internalism and externalism. The definitions that follow are fairly standard:

Humeanism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting that are constituted by our desires and beliefs. Proponents include Mele (1992), Smith (1994) and Lenman (1996).

Anti-Humeanism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting that need only be constituted by beliefs. For example Nagel (1970), Foot (1972*b*), McDowell (1978 &1979) and McNaughton (1988).

Pure Anti-Humeanism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting that are constituted purely by beliefs. Proponents include Parfit (1997) and Dancy (1993 & 2000).

Psychologism: The view that we are motivated by reasons for acting that are *psychologically* real, and therefore, of an entirely different ontological category to normative reasons which are conceived of as truths, facts, states of affairs, or propositions. Proponents include Nagel (1970), and Mele (1992), Smith (1994) and Brink (1997).

Non-Psychologism: We are motivated by reasons for acting that are *not psychologically* real but, rather, of the same ontological category as normative reasons. Proponents include Dancy (1995 & 2000) and Collins (1997); hints of this view may also be found in Williams (1980) and Nagel (1997). The non-psychologism about normative reasons plugged into this view is defended by Broome (1997), Raz (1986), Scanlon (1999), Dancy (2000) and Quinn (1993).

Throughout these disagreements all disputants share a common assumption, namely the view that the things that motivate us are (at times by definition) *reasons* for which we act. Hence TOM is thought to be a theory of motivating *reasons* for action. We might characterise this assumption as follows:

The Common View (CV): TOM is a theory about the reasons we act for.

I shall eventually conclude that Hume cannot partake in either of the two aforementioned debates within TOM precisely because he rejects CV. Still I begin by trying to place him there.

6.2 Hume on reason and influence

If Hume is to at all resemble a Humean, he will insist that desires are a constitutive part of what motivates us. Belief alone, so the official Humean line goes, is inert. Here are the passages most commonly quoted in defence of this understanding of Hume (*pace* most modern interpreters Hume only ever capitalises the word 'reason' when it starts a new sentence):

> [R]eason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will (T, 2.3.3.1/413); Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects (T, 2.3.3.2/414); impulse arises not from reason but is only directed by it (T, 2.3.3.3/414); reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition … the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition (T, 2.3.3.4/414 5); reason has no influence on our passions (T, 3.1.1.7/457); I have prov'd, that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action of affection (T, 3.1.1.8/458); Reason is wholly inactive (T, 3.1.1.10/458); The action may cause a judgment, or may be *obliquely* caused by one, when the judgment concurs with a passion (T, 3.1.1.11/459).

There is much tension between these varied formulations of the first premise of his Influence Argument which seem to range from the claim that reason is wholly inactive to the suggestion that it can (albeit obliquely) cause action. Critics are divided over the issue of whether or not Hume is contradicting himself (cf. Botros, 2006, Chapter 1 for various exegetical positions, including her own arguments in favour of the 'contradiction' view; in what follows I shall retain neutrality here by keeping the term 'alone' in brackets). They all agree, however, that by 'reason' Hume means the same thing as 'belief' or 'judgment' (cf. Mackie, 1980, p. 53 for a typical example of this near-universal assumption). Yet how true is this? Beliefs, for Hume, are lively ideas, which in turn are *copies* of impressions:

> An opinion or belief is *nothing but a strong and lively idea deriv'd from a present impression related to it.*
>
> (T, 1.3.8.16/119; cf. T, 1.1.1.1/1–2)

Accordingly, in the section 'Of the Influence of Belief' Hume assigns the same effects to them, abeit in a lesser degree:

> [T]he ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions,

> which are immediately present to the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a *like* influence on the passions.
>
> (T, 1.3.10.3/119)

The context makes it clear that by 'like influence' Hume means 'brings about the *same* effect to a lesser degree', the degree in question being proportionate to the degree to which the idea in question is fainter to the impression it is a copy of, beliefs being the *most lively* of all ideas. Moreover, while Hume contrasts *reason* with sentiment (for example in EPM, 1.3/134) he clearly identifies *belief* with a kind of sentiment:

> Belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling … or sentiment. … 'Tis felt rather than conceived, and approaches the impression, from which it is deriv'd, in its force and influence … it is something *felt* by the mind which distinguishes the ideas of judgments from the ideas of the imagination … and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.
>
> (T, App. 3/624; cf. Korsgaard, 1997*a*, p. 24)

There is nothing non-cognitivist in this construal of belief. On the contrary, Hume clearly states that beliefs are capable of being true or false (T, 3.1.1.12/459, quoted further below). More importantly, we have not yet seen anything which suggests that Hume thought that *no* belief could motivate, whether alone or otherwise. Indeed, I shall later be claiming that this is precisely what Hume takes *moral* beliefs to be capable of doing.

Hume's claim that *reason* cannot motivate (alone), it would begin to appear, cannot be as straightforward as the thesis that *beliefs* cannot motivate, let alone the Humean variety which specifies desires or pro-attitudes of some related kind as the missing ingredient (cf. Snare 1991:55). We might therefore do better to understand it as the (sometimes doubly) qualified claim that (only) those beliefs *derived from reason* (alone) cannot motivate (alone). So understood, it states that there is a subset of beliefs – viz. those derived from reason (alone) – whose motivational power is at best constrained and at worst nil.

Yet even this interpretation may be restricting the role of belief further than Hume intended, for two related reasons. The first is that it remains neutral on the issue of whether Hume takes all action to be *produced* by passions, or whether he allows that, at least sometimes, beliefs may be said to *move* us to action by exciting a passion that is not derived from reason (alone). In the latter kind of case, desires need not be anything more than *enablers* of action (cf. Dancy 2000:127ff.). We should, after all, take care not to conflate the claim that we cannot only be moved to act *unless* we already have certain passions with the claim that the passions in question are always *part* of our motivation.

Plato's Socrates warns against the basic fallacy that such a conflation would involve:

> τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον
>
> (*Phaedo*, 99b, translated by R. Hackforth as 'fancy not being able to distinguish between the cause of a thing and that without which the cause would not be a cause!' and by D. Gallop as 'fancy being unable to distinguish between two things: the reason proper and that without which the reason could never be a reason!'; cf. Dancy 2004: 45)

Is Hume guilty of such a fallacy? The answer partly depends on how we disambiguate his phrase 'concurs with a passion'. A clue is offered in the following passage:

> [T]he impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object.
>
> (T, 2.3.3.3/414)

The impulse in question may not *arise* from reason yet this does not preclude the idea that once it is there, reason may move us to take various means as ways of satisfying it. Korsgaard describes such cases as ones where Hume makes it clear that 'we can be moved by a judgement about a probable passion' (Korsgaard 2009: 64, n.6). To *this* extent, even beliefs derived from reason *alone* may be said to motivate us (alone), though Hume would not himself have put it this way, not least because he takes this to be a case of directing action rather than producing it, which renders the causation in question *oblique*.

This brings us to the second reason for being cautious in our interpretation which is that Hume does not employ modern psychological terms such as 'motivation', 'motivating' and 'motivate(s)'. He only talks of 'motives' which he introduces as things that 'produce' or 'influence' action. The *motivation* of action, however, is a different phenomenon from its *production* (cf. Sandis, 2008*a*). Indeed, we are frequently motivated to perform actions that never take place. Strictly speaking, then, Hume's view is closer to the claim that only beliefs derived from reason (alone) cannot (alone) produce an action, a thesis which is relatively weak given his presumption that actions may be caused by anything which regularly precedes them so long as it is true that 'if the first object had not been, the second never had existed' (EHU, 8.2.4/76; cf. T, 1.3.14.21/166).

So what is it for a belief to be derived from reason (alone)? To answer this we must return to our initial question which was 'what does Hume mean by "reason?"' Here is what 'Hume's Fork' tells us:

> Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the *real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason.
>
> (T, 3.1.1.9/458; cf. T, 2.3.2/413)

So portrayed, reason is *concerned* with beliefs and not desires. Hume rejects the Aristotelian account of emotion as a cognitive phenomenon, hence his claim that 'passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion' which swiftly leads him to the infamous remark about it not being contrary to reason 'to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger' (T, 2.3.3.6./416). Yet this is not to say that the objects of reason (i.e. beliefs) are inert but only that a subset of them, viz. those beliefs that are themselves reached through reason (alone), do not influence action (alone).

In sum, beliefs for Hume are all sentiments, some of which are derived from reason *alone* and some from reason *combined with* some other sentiment(s). This helps to explain those instances of the doubly qualified claim that it is only beliefs derived from reason *alone* that cannot influence *alone*. *Mutatis mutandis*, it could also account for the reasoning of Influence Argument:

> Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent *in this matter*. The rules of morality therefore, are not *conclusions of* our reason.
>
> (T, 3.1.1.6/457, my emphasis; cf. EPM, 1.5–9/135–7)

This passage is standardly interpreted as an argument for moral non-cognitivism, the form of non-cognitivism usually attributed to Hume being one which asserts that moral judgements are *expressions* of our desires (cf. Blackburn 1996, p. 180). On such readings, the conclusion of the argument is meant to be that moral judgements are not beliefs but, rather, *expressions* of desire. We have already seen, however, that Hume allows that beliefs *can* can excite passions and actions (alone or otherwise). It would make no sense for Hume to consequently suggest that since moral judgements can influence the passions on their own they cannot be cognitive (i.e. beliefs).

I propose, instead, to reconstruct the Influence Argument as follows:

> (P1) Moral beliefs produce action (alone).
> (P2) Beliefs that are conclusions of reason (alone) do not produce action (alone).
>
> ---
>
> (C) Moral beliefs are not derived from reason (alone).

So conceived, the argument aims only to show that since (P1) moral judgements can move us (alone) and (P2) beliefs derived from reason (alone) cannot *produce* action (alone) we should conclude that (C) moral judgements are not derived from reason (alone), whatever that turns out to mean. But why should this amount to anything more than the claim that it 'is in vain to pretend, that morality is *discovered* only by a deduction of reason'? (T, 3.1.1.7/457) since 'reason … can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals' (T, 3.1.1.10/458)? There is nothing non-cognitivist in these remarks. As Francis Snare (1991: Ch. 2) has pointed out it could, for example, be read as an anti-realist remark and indeed – for all he has said so far – Hume may even be some kind of intuitionist realist (Snare ultimately interprets Hume as a non-cognitivist but rejects the notion that this position is conclusively established by any formulation of the Influence Argument).

In his splendid book, Snare also notes that – though valid (and possibly also true) – this syllogism is question-begging. He offers the following 'sentimental zoology' by analogy, noting that 'if we substitute "whale" for "trout" in the parody we get a valid argument with true premises and conclusion, but an argument just as question-begging' (1991, p. 51):

(P1*) No sort of fish interests me.
(P2*) Trout do interest me.
———————————
(C*) Trout are not fish.

Unless (P1*) is an *a priori* truth, we cannot dismiss the possibility that (P2*) is not a counter-example to it. The same logic holds for the preceding syllogism regarding moral beliefs (above) and yet (P1) appears to be an *empirical* proposition. In fact so does (P2), but if Hume is to reach the conclusion that *no* moral belief can be cognitive (as opposed to the considerably weaker thesis that all the moral beliefs he happens to have observed – or, at best, that we all happen to have had so far – are non-cognitive) (P2) must be a *necessary* truth. This would only be plausible if we could somehow conceive of it as a logical remark concerning the limits of reason (perhaps resulting from the narrow scope that Hume restricts it to) rather than as a statement regarding the observed motivational inertness of belief. Either way, there are independent reasons for thinking that the Influence Argument is compatible with *cognitivist internalism* concerning the relation of moral judgements to the *production* of action (of which (P1) could even be a weak statement of), It is to these that I now turn.

Beliefs for Hume, we have already seen, are 'felt sentiments', so it would be prudent to read the Influence Argument in the light of this general 'sentimentalism'. On this picture to have a belief is not to merely *assent* to a proposition but to *feel* that it is true (cf. Owen, 2003). *Eo ipso*,

to have a *moral* belief would be to feel that something is morally right or wrong. This strengthens the case for an internalist reading of (P1), and could possibly explain why Hume may have taken (P1) to be a *universal* truth of some kind. Given that Hume's sentimentalism does not lead him to a non-cognitivist characterisation of beliefs in general, there is no reason to suppose he takes morality to be any different when he claims that it 'is more properly felt than judg'd of' (T 3.1.2/470) and that 'to have a sense of virtue is nothing but to *feel* satisfaction of a particular kind' (T 3.1.2/471). Vice and virtue are *discoverable* 'by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion' (T 3.1.2/470), but this is not to say that the resulting beliefs are impressions. And even if they were, their effects would be no different in kind to those of ideas, besides which our moral feelings are said to be 'so soft and gentle' that we are 'apt to confound' them with ideas (T 3.1.2/470), which only differ from impressions in their vivacity).

If not the lack of a non-cognitive component, then what is it that makes beliefs derived from reason (alone), inert? The obvious candidate would be the actual cause or origin of the judgements. But what exactly is it *about* their origin that makes the beliefs in question inert? It cannot simply be that reason *itself* just happens to be inert since this would be clearly at odds with Hume's more general views regarding causation (which, incidentally, is in tension with the Humean theory of motivation in general:

> [A]ny thing may produce any thing. … Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine … *the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation* … 'tis possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other.
>
> (T, 1.3.15.1–2/173, emphasis in the original)

Jonathan Dancy, who voices a similar concern (1993, p. 15), qualifies it by noting that this point is not so strong since there are many inconsistencies in Hume. Be that as it may, the name of the game is to offer the most consistent interpretation possible, and nothing in Hume's argument so far suggests that actions do not (let alone cannot) follow beliefs with appropriate regularity, this being all that Hume's notion of causation appears to require (cf. T 2.3.1/403ff, Korsgaard 2009:64, & Sandis 2010*a* and 2010*b*). Indeed as far as the *Treatise* is concerned we can assign Hume the view that the inertness in question is attributable to a further fact about judgements derived from reason (alone), namely that their intentional objects are limited to the two alternatives provided by his fork (see p. 147 above). In his later *Dissertation on the Passions* (5.1-2/161ff.) Hume explicitly distinguishes between a strict and a popular sense of 'reason' with the aim of equating the former with the judgement of truth and falsehood (which can only influence to the degree

that they touch some passion or affection) and the latter with the aforementioned 'calm' passion (which 'actuates the will').

6.3 Hume's error theories of reasons

Any judgement derived from reason alone, can only pertain to the kind of relations described in the fork. These relations, Hume states, tell us nothing about how we ought to act and are consequently incapable of moving us on their own. There is an obvious analogy here with Hume's remarks concerning the powers of theoretical reason (for example T, 1.3.6/16) which aim to show that we cannot infer from any relation discovered by reason that the future will resemble the past. Judgements about these relations cannot (alone) cause us to make the transition from an impression of constant conjunction to the idea of necessary connection, anymore than they can produce action. Rather we are determined to do so 'by a certain association and relation of perceptions' (T 1.3/88-9); no 'ought' is derived from reason (alone).

To recap: if we have no reason to form a certain belief and/or be moved to action in a certain way, then our beliefs and actions cannot be the result of a judgement derived from reason (alone). In each case there is a missing principle which reason (alone) cannot provide. In the *theoretical* case, reason cannot provide us a principle that would confirm that the future must necessarily continue to resemble the past. This is why Hume attributes our belief to custom, though he arguably takes it to be in with 'reason' in the popular sense given above. In the *practical* case, Hume's reason cannot tell us whether or not we ought to satisfy our desires, it can only tell us how to go about doing so. Given the absence of a suitable impression, Hume would have arguably claimed that we cannot have a meaningful idea of a normative reason insofar as this is thought to amount to anything more than a description of our natural propensities and aversions (see further below). But we might also call him a *nihilist* with regard to the practicality of pure reason: no consideration derived from reason (alone) could (alone) count in favour of an action.

Indeed, Christine Korsgaard (1986 & 1997*a*), Elijah Millgram (1995) and Jean Hampton (1995) have all suggested, for a diversity of reasons too complicated to repeat here, on Hume's view the hypothetical imperatives generated by means-end reasoning cannot even provide us with *instrumental* reasons (consequently Hume either never generates imperatives, or does so as a kind of proto-Kantian or empirical revisionist (see further below).

On such understandings of the 'reason is, and ought only to be the *slave* of the passions' passage (T, 2.3.3.4./415), reason ought to be a slave of the passions in the sense that it can only tell you what you should do in order to satisfy your desires. Whether or not you ought to satisfy them it cannot

comment on. Practical reasoning thus reduces to means-end reasoning. The alternative, more common, interpretation of Hume is he takes desire to command in the sense of it (alone) being able to tell us what we have reason to do, namely whatever will satisfy them (but see Schroeder 2007 for a more subtle version of the Humeanism theory of reasons). Yet if this interpretation is correct, not only would Hume be making a logical fallacy which he seems to have been sensitive to (that of detaching an ought from the conjunction it applied to in one of the premises and applying it to just one of the conjuncts in the conclusion), he would also be breaking his own law (that you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is').

Let us call the view that practical reason cannot transcend the means-end relation *Hume's error theory of normative reasons*. This theory maintains that no judgement or desire (or combination of both) could ever tell us (unconditionally) how we ought to act (cf. Mackie, 1977, pp. 18 and 35). It entails that when beliefs produce action, they do not do so by giving us (what we take to be) a good reason for acting. One's *taking* something to be a good reason could, of course, have the appropriate influence. The thesis merely states is that the (normative) judgement that X is a good reason for action cannot be derived from reason (alone). Consequently, no judgement can move us to action purely *qua* any reason-giving capacity it might have because such capacities are an illusion. This leads to what we might call *Hume's error theory of motivating reasons*: our actions are *never* produced by reasons, for there are no such reasons around: influencing *reasons* do not exist, only influencing *sentiments* (which may include one's taking something to be a reason).

One might object here that *moral* on this view moral judgements cannot give us any reason to act either, Hume should not allow that *they* can influence action any more than judgements derived from reason (alone) can. Moral judgements are practical in their concern: they are judgements about how we ought to act. Hume takes them to be capable of moving us (alone) precisely *because* they are concerned with *ends* rather than with means.

As anticipated above, neither error theory prevents Hume from subsequently redefining normative reasons in a strongly naturalised light according to which passions might be thought to be defective if they fail to conform to some norm or standard of nature. We might even be said to not be as we 'should' be, so long as this means no more than that we do not function in a standard fashion and thereby fall short of what happens to be the natural *norm*. Indeed Hume arguably *constructs* such an account of naturalistic 'reasons' for acting in (T, 3.1.2–3.2–2/468–84) (cf. Baier 2009 & Sandis 2010*a*), having first tested this revisionist tack in his account of necessary connexions:

> Necessity then is the effect of this observation and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind.
>
> (T, 1.3.4.18/165)

> It is the constant conjunction of objects, along with the determination of the mind, which constitutes a physical necessity.
>
> (T, 1.3.4.30/171)

He thus becomes a realist about naturalised reasons (for various references to such entities in both his philosophical and his historical work see Baier, 2008), as he is regarding necessity. In both cases, it is not *reason* that produces our judgements but *human nature*, in virtue of all the sentiments, habits, instincts, and other dispositions it bestows on us (phenomena upon which Hume will ultimately ground his virtue and consequentialist normative ethics (in a move later mimicked by Mackie and Hare).

6.4 The motivational map revisited

Returning to the map introduced in 6.1, Hume most closely resembles the weak anti-Humean since he allows that at least some beliefs can do the motivating 'on their own'. As for the psychologism/non-psychologism debate, although at times he appears like a psycholog*ist* it is difficult to know just what to say about him since it is far from obvious that he makes a state-content distinction. What *is* obvious however is that in denying that influencing reasons (under a certain conception) exist, he rejects CV (the view that TOM is a theory about the reasons we act for).

Interestingly, both the psychologism/non-psychologism and the Humean/anti-Humean debates arise (largely) because of CV. Non-psychologism takes its cue from two truisms: that it is possible to act for a normative reason (viz, a reason that counts in favour of an action), and that normative reasons are non-psychologistic. From this it infers that what moves us to action cannot be a psychological state (or, for that matter, any other feature of our psychology). Psychologism takes its cue from two different truisms: that we are – at least sometimes – motivated by psychological states and that motivation is causal notion (which is not to say that it need treat action explanation as being causal).

Psychologism and non-psychologism both appeal in ways that make one feel foolish not to accept them. If we reject non-psychologism we are faced with two horns of a dilemma: either we cannot ever act for good reasons or the good reasons we act for are (necessarily) psychological phenomena. Conversely, if we reject psychologism we are left with an account that claims that (it is necessarily true that) we are never motivated by either our beliefs or our desires, or indeed the two combined together. What counts in favour of the former view is precisely what counts against the latter, and vice versa. The trouble, then, is that each of the two positions have irresistible selling points (+) which we cannot buy into without also committing ourselves to accepting an unwanted consequence (–) of having adopted the position in

question. In rejecting either unwanted consequence (as each rival view does) we find ourselves having to deny the obvious.

	Claims counting for (+)	**Claims counting against (−)**
Psychologism	**T**: We are (at least sometimes) motivated by our psychological states.	**F**: Good reasons (we act for) are not psychologically real.
Non-psychologism	**T**: Good reasons (we act for) are not psychologically real.	**F**: We are (at least sometimes) motivated by our psychological states.

This is problematic because it is natural to side with psychologism with regard to motivation and non-psychologism as far as normative reasons are concerned. The motivational map, being drawn by the assumption that we are motivated by the reasons for which we act, has no theoretical space for such a position. By contrast Hume, having rejected CV, is free to do just this.

Be that as it may, Hume nonetheless seems committed to the thought that any *successful* explanation of action *will* lie within TOM. That is to say, he thinks of action explanation as motive-giving explanation. Moreover, he understands this as a species of causal explanation, introducing the 'influencing motives of the will' as the particular causes of actions (T, 2.3.2.8/412 and 2.3.3/413 ff.). So his view on action causation is one and the same with his view on the motives of action.

If we reject Hume's causalism, however, we are free to side with psychologists on motivation, and non-psychologists on reasons for action. A similar conclusion might be reached regarding the Humeanism/anti-Humeanism debate, as illustrated:

	Claims counting for (+)	**Claims counting against (−)**
Humeanism	**T**: We are (at least sometimes) partly motivated by desires.	**F**: Desires are not parts of reasons we act for.
Anti-Humeanism	**T**: Desires are not parts of the reasons we act for.	**F**: We are (at least sometimes) partly motivated by desires.

To paraphrase House M.D.: they're both right, in the sense that they've convinced me that they're both wrong.

Notes

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