

THE POONA ORIENTALIST

*A quarterly journal devoted to Oriental studies
published in April, July, October, and January*

Edited by

Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.

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[No. 1

INDO-ARYAN LEXICOGRAPHY

(S. M. Katre)

The present decade in Oriental Studies, and particularly in Indology, is witnessing an increasing activity in the field of Lexicography. The object of the present paper is to pass under review some of the most important contributions to Indo-Aryan Lexicography that have appeared within the last ten years or so. If we are under the impression that the days of the Petersburg Lexicon are over the appearance of these new dictionaries in an allied field belies that impression. Lexicographical activity there has always been, but on the scale moderated to practical purposes and subordinated to classroom activity. Of truly scholarly aids on comprehensive lines there was not much to speak of until the appearance of these new publications. If I were not to limit myself to the Indo-Aryan field the scope of this essay would widen to cover the whole of Dravidian and Muṇḍa and the Austro-Asiatic field, which is not desirable in justice to the works mentioned below. The great *Tamil Lexicon* of Madras or the *Mundāri Encyclopaedia* require detailed reviews by themselves, and it is not desirable that these different issues should be mixed up in the same paper.

At the peak of these lexicographical activities comes Prof. R. L. TURNER's unique work on the Nepali language¹—unique on two counts at least—firstly because of adopting phonetic Devanāgarī Orthography and secondly on account of the comparative etymological notes on each Nepali word with reference to Old, Middle and New Indo-Aryan languages. This last feature is above all the first scientific attempt at a comprehensive etymology

1. *A Comparative and Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language* by Ralph Lilley Turner, M.C., M.A., Professor of Sanskrit in the University of London, with Indexes of all words quoted from other Indo-Aryan Languages compiled by Dorothy Richards Turner, M.A. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1931. Pp. 654, 655, 932, 933-935.

of New Indo-Aryan, a worthy successor to Sir GEORGE GRIERSON'S monumental *Linguistic Survey of India*. The result of 16 years' deep study not only of Nepali, but of the whole modern Indo-Aryan field also, with a linguistic approach which is as critical as it is severe and judicious, has naturally paved the way for a first general scientific outline of the Modern Indo-Aryan etymology.

Nepali is an interesting language of an interesting people. It offers to the Linguist many peculiarities for study, and despite the small amount of literature available, is sufficiently developed for literary culture. In undertaking a study of this language for lexical purposes, Prof. TURNER has done great service firstly to Nepal itself and secondly to Indo-Aryan in general. The tradition of the Gūrkhās is so well known as to make them liked in all parts of India. And Prof. TURNER had one of the closest associations with them during the last Great War, resulting in the collection of a vast body of words which now forms the major part of the Dictionary. It is surprising that without having been able to visit Nepal Prof. TURNER has eminently succeeded in presenting to us the most comprehensive work on this language. This is but an index to the energy, perseverance and scholarship of the Lexicographer.

As an etymological dictionary of Indo-Aryan we see here but the first general fascicle of what is yet to come from Prof. TURNER'S unrivalled knowledge of Modern Indo-Aryan—*A Comparative Etymological Dictionary of Modern Indo-Aryan* as a crowning volume to the *Linguistic Survey of India*. The progress of this great work of necessity must be slow, but all those who are interested in the scientific study of languages are expectantly waiting for the publication of this work.

The entries are given first in Devanāgarī followed by a transcription in Roman and the semantic contents. Lastly at the end of each article there is an etymological disquisition on the word, with comparison from cognate or allied languages. Though some of these etymologies may have to be revised in the light of Prof. TURNER'S further research, the general accuracy and trustworthiness of the work as a whole is something which should excite wonder. This work alone is sufficient to mark out Prof. TURNER as one of the most learned and competent Linguists of Indo-Aryan.

Not the least interesting part of this great work is the final one containing the indexes of all words quoted from other Indo-Aryan languages, compiled by Mrs. TURNER. Covering over 5000 entries in Sanskrit and about the same number for each of the principal Indo-Aryan languages, and occupying just under half the number of pages of the Dictionary proper itself, we have an apparatus for use in the scientific study of these allied Indo-Aryan speeches. We miss in the general body of abbreviations some names which find a place in these indexes, cf. Tuḷu.

In the etymological equations we miss some of the Western dialects such as Koṅkaṇī, while equally small dialects from the NW. side have been given due place. This is probably due to the absence of standard works of reference to these missing languages. Unless a study of these missing links proceeds along lines similar to that of Marāṭhī by Jules BLOCH and Bengali by Suniti Kumar CHATTERJI or Panjabi by Banarsidas JAIN, some of the intricate problems of Indo-Aryan Linguistics will remain unsolved. It is expected that Prof. TURNER's *magnum opus* which is yet to come will cover every possible field.

For scholars in India interested in Indo-Aryan Linguistics this Dictionary is of capital importance. Written in English, it will be intelligible to the University Students and scholars not acquainted with other European Languages. Of course, the general theory of Indo-Aryan developments may be gathered from various books published in India, but a general account like that of Jules BLOCH's *L'Indo-Aryen du Vēda aux temps modernes*, being slightly outside the pale of students in India, it is necessary to have a new work in this field, written by an authority like Prof. TURNER, to cover the entire field in all its details and ramifications. This is perhaps the best occasion to remind the learned Professor that India is still waiting for his work on this subject.

Turning in a different direction we notice a work¹ which is appearing in fascicules at indifferent intervals of two or three years or even one year, which, when completed, will easily be

1. *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, begun by V. Trenckner, revised, continued and edited by Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith, published by the Royal Danish Academy, Copenhagen; Vol. I, Parts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII—1924-26, 1929, 1131, 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1935.

called the greatest work in the field of Pāli Studies. The late TRENCKNER was justly renowned for his ripe scholarship, keen intellect and untired perseverance. His first-hand acquaintance with some of the principal branches of Oriental Linguistics qualified him for the magnificent task of working at a detailed but critical dictionary of Pāli on scientific lines, which he commenced somewhere in 1870. But unfortunately he was unable to finish the work which he had so ably begun. The burden of its continuation has now fallen on worthy shoulders. The history of Pāli Lexicography in Europe has been one full of tragedies and half-done work. The plan of an international dictionary first mooted by the late Professor RHYS DAVIDS was unfortunately given the death-blow by the Great War and utterly disheartened the founder of the Pali Text Society. It was later with the assistance of a younger scholar and "by the exertion of incredible energy"¹ that the Society's own Lexicon was brought out between the four or five odd years (1921-25) of the last decade. In the meantime the present editors of the Critical Pāli Dictionary were busy with the material left by TRENCKNER; not only that, they prepared themselves for the task by critical editions of *Dhātupāṭhas* and *Saddanīti*,² and by adding on to TRENCKNER's material from the *editio princeps* of many Pāli Texts published from time to time.

From the very history of PTS. Pali-English Dictionary it will be apparent that the object of its editors was to supply a temporary need, and this fact they emphasised by repeatedly calling their work as a Provisional Dictionary. This defect is now rectified in the appearance of the Critical Dictionary; here we have a work which has been in regular progress since 1870, neither hurried by provisional needs nor marred by philological notes from the Indo-European field so unnecessary to Pāli studies, which in fact is related to Middle Indo-Aryan, but dealing scientifically with the raw material in all its completeness. Thus every entry is critically evaluated with reference to not only the PTS. editions, but also Singhalese and Burmese as well as Siamese

1. CPD. I-i. p. X.

2. *The Pāli Dhātupāṭha and the Dhātumañjūṣā*, edited with indexes by Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith, Copenhagen, 1921, p. 6.—The *Saddanīti* of Aggavaṃsa was subsequently published by Helmer Smith in 3 volumes during 1928-30.

ditions and original Mss. Moreover all *nomina propria* are included in the list. Again words beginning with the privative *-a (n)* have a separate entry. Native Grammatical works are frequently quoted in the case of the roots or root formations; senses not noticed by these Grammarians are pointed out. The meanings are given scientifically according to their semantic development. Etymology with respect to Sanskrit and where necessary other Middle Indo-Aryan languages, is briefly indicated. One of the chief characteristics is the use of metrical tests in dealing with the orthography of words. In every sense the Dictionary bespeaks of that critical approach which has always marked the work of these two learned editors. The second members of compounds are also given a separate entry (where these do not occur independently) to indicate the first members of which they form the second part. This is done also in the case of those words which have an independent existence. Thus at a glance we can know how many words there are of which a given word is the final member in a compound group.

It would perhaps be useful if a similar treatment of verbs is indicated under the main root, with regard to the prepositions with which it is joined in the whole field to Pāli studies. This would increase the value of the Dictionary in the same way as in the case of these second members of compounds mentioned above. From the point of Morphology and Semantics and perhaps even Syntax, this cross reference under the pure root would be of inestimable value.

The more one uses this work the more is one charmed with it; it is like wandering in a well-kept garden and admiring not only the wonderful flowers and fruits, but also the neatness and orderliness in the arrangement of the different items. The eye is not tired and the brain receives an electric thrill and there is a very satisfying intellectual feast. It would not be wise to compare this work with its predecessors without being able to prevent comment which might cause ill-feeling. Great though the effort has been in the previous works and great the result also, we have no hesitation to say that when this magnificent work is completed, they will pale into insignificance in comparison. It is all the more regrettable in this sense that the fascicules are not appearing in a more regular succession and offering us more matter in each.

Evidently the editors believe in the principle of more perfection than more speed, and there are none better in the field of Pāli studies to reach this almost ideal but unattainable goal. HELMER SMITH has done work in other fields too, including Singhalese, and with DINES ANDERSEN as his friend, philosopher, guide and collaborator, intends giving us a perfect lexicon.

The Royal Danish Academy has shown a remarkable far-sightedness in financing this venture, and the printers have reason to be proud of their artistic work, for they have risen on this occasion to produce a work which is as beautiful in external appearance as it is in its scholarly content. The errors are so few that one wonders sometimes; I may point out just two to show how carefully the whole work is done and how neatly it is produced: Part i, p. VII, line 31, read "title" for "titel"; pt. ii, p. 53, line 50 read "solicitation" for "sollicitation". Such examples are so rare as to be negligible. One would have wished that the editors had introduced the system followed by Prof. TURNER: to divide the two columns on each page with two lines instead of one, and give the line number for every 5 lines or so within the space enclosed by these for all future reference to the lines. This would help for instance in making use of the correction and additions to Parts 5-6, given on page 3 of the cover to fasciculus 6, with some facility. It is perhaps not too late to introduce this system in the subsequent fasciculi; the Editors have done so much for facilitating Pāli studies by the methods they have pursued in this work that they can add yet another facility for their readers.

The first fasciculus of this great work appeared (in 1924-26) to commemorate the centenary of the birth of TRENCKNER (February 26, 1824). It is a fitting monument not only to the scholarship of TRENCKNER, but also to that of his admirers, the present Editors. And within that "lower criticism"¹ they have eminently succeeded. This is a proper occasion to wish them a speedy success in their monumental venture, and to express our desire to see the volumes coming out in rapid succession. The work of 10 years (so far as the published fasciculi are concerned) covers only a part of the first vowel *a-*, the last entry on p. 330

¹ CPD, I, p. X.

being *abbhu(m)*. In the Pāli Text Society's Dictionary the whole of this letter occupies only 92 pages. Moreover, for this published part the Editors have already collected over 500 additions and corrections (to be exact, for parts i-v. only, i. e. for the first 234 pages), an indication to the possible extent of the completed and definitive edition. We can easily compare this work with Boehtlingk and Roth's *Petersburg Lexicon* of the Sanskrit Language, but on a wider and more scientific scale, for the Editors have taken advantage of the progress in scientific lexicography as a whole. Just as the Petersburg Lexicon became the source of inspiration for many important works in the field (e. g. Wackernagel's *Altindische Grammatik*), it is hoped that this *Critical Pali Dictionary* will also be a perennial source of inspiration to scholars working in that field for everwidening researches.

From time immemorial Ceylon has been culturally a part of India. It is here that Pāli Buddhism found a lasting abode, and gave Ceylon not only its religion and culture, but also its language. From early times the relationship commercially and culturally between Ceylon and South India has naturally given a substratum of Dravidian words to the national language of Ceylon, but at its core and in its genius it retains its Indo-Aryan characteristics. Unlike in India the language of Ceylon has had a continuous tradition, and its inscriptions from the 2nd century before Christ give us an idea of its development for over two milleniums. It is therefore of interest to scholars engaged in Linguistics as well as Eastern studies that there is at last an authoritative, comprehensive and critical Dictionary of this language with exact references.¹ As in the case of CPD discussed above this also is appearing in the form of fasciculi, and in its general get-up, method of work and presentation, it follows the model set by the Copenhagen Editors.

There is here, besides, an attempt to give etymologies on the words. Where these words are already dealt with in TURNER'S

1. *A Dictionary of the Sinhalese Language*, compiled under the direction of Professor Wilhelm Geiger (and for the second part: Professor Helmer Smith also), by Hon. Sir D. B. Jayatilaka, Editor-in-Chief, Vol. I, parts 1 and 2, The Royal Asiatic Society/Ceylon Branch, Colombo, 1935-36;—pp. lxiv, 30; 31-78.

Nepali Dictionary, an indication is given to the Nepali word where all the cognates and the full etymology are to be found.

From the point of Lexicography this work has entailed tremendous labour. Not only early works had to be published in critical editions (cf. *Dhampiyā Aṭuvā-Gaṭapadaya*, a work of the X century, edited by Sir D. B. Jayatilaka), but forms had to be collected from various spoken dialects.

Considering the extent of the material the progress of the printing has not been slow. One part for one year brings the entries from *a-1* to *aṅgura* (covering only 78 pages of the dictionary proper itself). The unique characteristic of this work is in the use of the Roman Transliteration not only for the main entry (where the Sinhalese script is also used as is Devanāgarī in TURNER'S work on Nepali) but also for quotations from texts used to illustrate the particular sense.

In the words of the Editors: "The PLAN of the Dictionary is simple and easy to follow. Single words are given in thick type and compounds in light type. Every head-word is given in Sinhalese characters followed by its transliteration in Roman letters, while illustrative passages are given in italics." (p. lxiii). Thus the Editors have done a great service not only to people who read the Sinhalese characters, but also to scholars not acquainted with this script but yet interested in the language.

The history of this venture is briefly as follows. In 1881 the Director of Education Sir Charles BRUCE had made reference to a scientifically compiled dictionary as the greatest need felt in Ceylon. This idea was first mooted by Dr Reinhold ROST in his letter to the Ceylon Branch of the R. A. S. and this idea took its root there after a detailed discussion. But the first outburst of energy stopped with the production of a "Specimen Vocabulary." After a lapse of 40 years or so, the subject was again brought to the forefront by the late Vāsala Mudaliyar A. M. GUNASEKARA in the year 1923. The R. A. Society with characteristic generosity appointed a committee to consider the question, whose report was submitted in 1925; the Society decided to undertake the work in 1926 and an editorial board was appointed with Sir JAYATILAKA as the Editor-in-Chief (Honorary). On an appeal the Government generously offered Rs. 35000 as an annual grant under certain

conditions to the R. A. S. (C. B.), since reduced to half on account of financial depression. In 1927 the office of the Dictionary was opened, and the work has been proceeding continuously ever since. It is also a fortunate event which has brought in Professor GEIGER as the Director of the Editorial Board three decades after the publication of his "*Etymologie der Singhalesischen*" in 1897. Another event is the inclusion of Professor Helmer SMITH as Co-Director (part 2); we have already made the acquaintance of Prof. SMITH in connection with the *Critical Pali Dictionary*. His scholarship in the field of Pāli and Sinhalese has elicited the following admiring appreciation of Jules BLOCH, Master of Indo-Aryan studies: "Et toutd'abord à M. Helmer Smith. Peut-être un chercheur aussi exigeant, un critique aussi sévère du détail . . . il y a abondamment collaboré: et ceci, pas seulement en revisant avec un soin particulier tout ce qui concerne le pali et le singhalais, langue dont il a une connaissance unique- (*L'Indo-Aryen*, p. 22). Thus it is expected that with the collaboration of these two eminent scholars Sir JAYATILAKA will find himself in a position to complete this monumental work—a herculean labour of love on his part indeed.

The Times of Ceylon Press has finished the printing of the various diacritical and complicated type with a rare artistry; the general get-up, the beautiful paper and print, and the ease with which one can wade through the different articles, all combine to make the two parts an irresistible attraction to the scholar.

That this Dictionary will form a sort of a complementary part of the Critical Pāli Dictionary so far as Pāli studies are concerned will be easily apparent to those who care to use both these works. Thus the word *aggavāladhi* occurring in the *Māha-Bodhi-Vamsa* (p. 47, line 8) mentioned as the origin of Sinhalese *ak-vala* the end or tip of a tail, is found missing in CPD. In connection with this word the Editors might have pointed out some cognates in Marāṭhī and Koṅkaṇī. For instance we have in Mar. *āgoḷ*, *āgvaḷ* a braid of hair, Koṅkaṇī; s. gs. *āggaḷu*, nx. *āgvaḷ*, sv. *āgoḷ*, *aggōḷu* a tress of hair¹, showing the *ur*-form for these two as Sk. **agra-vala*-cf. Sk. *valāgra*-tip of the tail; the order of words in compounds being rather indeterminate in MI-A. the form **agra-valaḥ* is the re-

1. See *Comparative Glossary of Koṅkaṇī*, p. 62, s. v. *āgvaḷ*.

constructed form from MI-A *agga-vala-*. Although we realize the difficulty of the Editors to give more attention to this part in view of their heavy responsibility within the Sinhalese field itself, it would add immensely to the value of these philological notes if they are made more comprehensive; for in this way alone can the actual relation of Sinhalese with other Modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars be determined.

As an immediate result of this magnificent work we are promised a new scientific Grammar of Sinhalese by Professor GEIGER; a revised enlarged English edition of his Sinhalese Etymology will also be soon published. The value of these two for a scientific understanding of Sinhalese will be inestimable, based as they will be on the material sifted and presented to us in definitive form in this great Dictionary. Besides these activities the Dictionary Managing Committee is also issuing a Sinhalese edition of this dictionary for the use of Sinhalese scholars working through their national medium. Thus with one stroke the work on the dictionary has resulted in scholarly activity in the direction of bringing out critical editions of all Sinhalese classics, collections of folk-songs and literature enriching the vocabulary from various sources and in the writing of the first all comprehensive linguistic grammar of the language.¹

Before we take leave of this work we must wish all success to the Managing Committee in the completion of their responsible task and the speedy appearance of the fascicules in regular succession. One wishes in such cases that the whole work be published in whole volumes instead of in parts; but perhaps it is better to have the parts early than to wait indefinitely for the complete volumes.

This brings us to the last part of our task and one of the happiest also. Sanskrit has wielded such a great influence in the field of modern culture that in many directions it has opened out new sciences. Among such one of the most important is that of Comparative Philology or Linguistics; before the discovery of Sanskrit by Europe all philology was a movement in the dark; but with the impetus that Sk. gave to all philological studies and particularly with the advent of the Junggrammatiker in Germany

1. Notwithstanding Prof. Geiger's excellent work: *Literatur und Sprache der Singhalesen* (in Buehler's Grundriss), 1900.

the science of Comparative Philology was born, a science which could claim its place along with other sciences with its laws, etc. Linguistics having established a relationship between some of the chief classical languages of Europe, Persia and India, the concordances observed between the members of this Indo-European family of languages enabled scholars to determine the correct etymology of words of any one of these languages. The work of earlier scholars in the direction of Etymological Dictionaries on this comparative basis dealt with the *ur*-Indo-European to which all the words of the different languages were then related, cf. FICK: *Vergleichendes Woerterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen*. This was followed later by comparative etymological dictionaries of individual members of this family, but unfortunately Sanskrit did not play a great rôle in this. The LEUMANN brothers had prepared for their dissertation in 1892 an outline etymology of Sanskrit, but in its published form the presscopy was ready in 1897 and the work was actually published in 1907¹. Before this C.C. UHLENBECK actually published his small work without bibliographical indications on an etymological dictionary of Sanskrit in an abridged form². A third attempt in this direction was made by the Italian scholar Ermenegildo LA TERZA, but with no better success³. A fourth attempt, representing the lifework of the late Prof. K. F. JOHANSSON of Upsala, has formed the pivot of some personal discussion between scholars for the publication of this posthumous work. We are not in a position to judge the value of this work since it is remaining only in Ms. form, and that too in an unfinished form. The late Prof. J. CHARPENTIER was supposed to edit and complete the work for publication, but so far nothing has come out of it. It is precisely in this connection that the controversy between Prof. Walther WUEST of Munich and the late Prof. CHARPENTIER arose, clouding the scholarly issue of an

1. *Etymologisches Woerterbuch der Sanskrit-Sprache*, Lieferung I: Einleitung und *a* bis *jū*, Leipzig 1907.

2. *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Woerterbuch der Altindischen Sprache*, Amsterdam 1898-99.

3. *Primo Saggio di un lessico etimologico dell' Antico Indiano stato degli studie lessicografici e comparativi in Rivista Indo-Greco-Italica di filologia-lingua-antichità*, vols. 8-13, pp. 139-46; 109-21, 265-76; 247-56; 275-83; 205-17; 41-62 respectively; 1924-29. From *a* to *āp* only.

edition of an etymological dictionary on comparative lines of Sanskrit.

While these attempts were either halfhearted or premature other sister languages were receiving better attention from Indo-Europeanists; thus we have WALDE'S *Lateinisches, etymologisches Woerterbuch* (2nd edition in 1910), Boisacq's *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue greque* (1916) etc. To the eternal shame of Sanskrit which had really given the first solid shape to the science of Linguistics in Europe, Latin and Greek had their comparative etymological dictionaries much earlier and in a more completed form. The above four attempts were tentative ones only, without giving any definite shape to these studies.

This need was felt by Professor Walther WUEST of Munich. Having had his training from Prof. Wilhelm GEIGER and inspired by the work of Prof. Hannes OERTEL, WUEST set before himself the object of working at a comprehensive comparative etymological dictionary of Old Indo-Aryan, and thoroughly prepared himself for this task by his many smaller and greater publications such as the *Stilgeschichte und Chronologie des Rgveda or Indisch*, and particularly by the thorough study of individual words in the Rgveda, especially the *hapax legomena*. As a preliminary to this he prepared an up-to-date bibliography of all works bearing on this subject and evolved a complicated and yet very effective system of indexing. Each science has its methods of work, and WUEST evolved his workshop rules after a great deal of thinking. In this he has done signal service to his fellow workers, for in a complicated work of this nature running from year to year (for how many years God alone knows), it is very essential that each fact must be within easy reach of the editor.

As a result of infinite labour and enduring perseverance Prof. WUEST has at last brought out the first fascicule of his Comparative Etymological Dictionary of Old Indo-Aryan.¹ The Vorrede or Introduction covers the first 124 pages, the list of abbreviations the next eight pages (126-33) and the bibliography the next 61 pages. Of the actual dictionary we have only 12 pages, dealing with 3 complete articles and part of the fourth, viz. *a* as the base

1. *Vergleichendes und Etymologisches Woerterbuch des Alt-Indoarischen (Alt-indischen)* von Walther Wuest, Lieferung 1-3 (Titelbogen und Bogen 1-13), Heidelberg 1935.—Carl Winters Universitaetsbuchhandlung.

of the 3rd personal pronoun, *a* as the verbal augment in the Imperfect etc., *a(n)* as the privative particle and *a* as an interjection. The bibliographical indications are of the most exhaustive type.

On page 2 of the cover the Publisher announces that the entire work will be ready in 3 volumes of about 1000-1100 pages each, and that the entire matter is so far ready that he assures us of a regular appearance of each fascicule. If this statement envisages the full possibilities of this great work, then the shame of not having had sufficient attendance bestowed upon it from the comparative etymological view will be wiped away for ever. In this sense the name of WUEST will have to be inscribed in immortal letters as the champion of Old Indo-Aryan in the West.

The Introduction deals at great length with the object and ideals of WURST and the comparison of his work with that of his predecessors. With painful detail the Prof. plods on; much of the controversial points might have been easily omitted with advantage to the work as a whole; in that case more of the dictionary proper would have been printed in the first fascicule itself. But it is his method which we admire most. He is thorough-going in all his activities, and even here he does not spare himself or the others who have come into contact with him with unfavourable results. But controversies apart, to the student of Linguistics a study of this Introduction will not be without its value as a peep into the work-shop and its methods in the Linguistic laboratory perfected by WUEST. A similar observation holds good for his essay : *Wortkundliche Beitræge* (pp. 86-112), illustrating the method he intends adopting for all his entries in the Dictionary. Besides all this he is so full of ideas on the work that has yet to be done and for students these will be of the very greatest value. Every major work of this type will of necessity have some problems awaiting solution by a special study, and if these problems are properly formulated, students will have a good guide for the work that remains to be done.

Like the two works mentioned and described elsewhere in this paper, WUEST's work will also appear in fascicules; this first fascicule contains 3 Lieferungen of 4 forms each at the subscription price of 3 RM. each for a Lieferung. When this work will see its completion is very difficult to foretell at the present moment. It

is almost 2 years since the appearance of this fascicule. If we assume an interval of 2 years for each fascicule of this type (containing about 200 pages) the time required will be about 30 years for the whole work to be in print. Even at this rate we shall have a speedier publication than that for LA 'TERZA'S work computed by WUEST as 360 years (p. 18).

We have no hesitation in saying that when completed this work will be the most comprehensive and the most accurate for any classical I-E. language. It has been divided by WUEST into three parts of which the first is the Introduction and abbreviations, bibliography, etc.; the second is the major part, the actual comparative dictionary of Old Indo-Aryan ; the last will include a system of direct and reverse indexes comprising all possible concepts in Linguistics as well as referring to all cognate or other languages martialled by the editor in the course of his dictionary proper, that it is possible to regard this part from the pure Linguist's point of view as perhaps the most useful and important.

It is then with the greatest pleasure that we extend to Prof. WUEST our hearty good wishes for the speedy publication of his *magnum opus*, which will make all other works of a similar nature in the I-E. field pale into insignificance by its magnitude, sureness and critical approach. Though as yet we do not have sufficient material in the first fascicule to judge what is WUEST's actual contribution to the subject he is dealing with, we cannot hesitate in accepting the fact that he is fully competent to deal with the subject, more perhaps than any other scholar in Europe today. Every lover of the Sanskrit heritage to India will find this work a constant source of inspiration as well as of information.

ON THE DATE OF THE ALAMKĀRA-SECTION OF THE AGNI-PURĀṆA

(S. K. De)

In *IHQ*, x, no. 4 (1934), p. 767f, Dr. V. Raghavan, as a rejoinder to Dr. P. C. Lahiri's article (*IHQ*, ix, no. 2), has raised the question of the date of the Alamkāra-section of the *Agni-purāṇa*. As Dr. Lahiri is doubtless capable of fighting his own battle, it is not my intention to intervene in the controversy; but since both Dr. Lahiri and Dr. Raghavan have honoured me by referring to my opinion on the point, the one accepting my view and the other disputing it, it is necessary to make my point of view clear, especially as Dr. Raghavan does not seem to have fully appreciated my position.

I must say at the outset that the question is not free from any difficulty, and I therefore welcome the re-examination of the question by Dr. Raghavan. Dr. Raghavan does not dispute the upper limit, proposed by me, of the date of this section of the Purāṇa, viz., that its extensive borrowings clearly show that it must have been compiled sometime after Daṇḍin's work was recognised as authoritative. It is with regard to the lower limit that he does not agree with me, and proposes a post-Bhoja date for this complication. His main argument, apart from details, is that it has definitely borrowed from Bhoja's works. He brings forward some evidence to show similarity of treatment, ideas and terminology between the Alamkāra-topics of the Purāṇa and those of Bhoja. He maintains that since the Purāṇa is a compilation, while Bhoja's work is original, the probability is the compiler of the Purāṇa borrowed from Bhoja, and not *vice versa*.

It is difficult to dogmatise on the question of borrowing; but Dr. Raghavan appears to think that I have expressed the opinion that Bhoja borrows or plagiarises from the Purāṇa. I have never done so. What I have suggested is that both the Purāṇa and Bhoja follow a tradition of opinion which stands apart from that of the orthodox Kashmirian writers. This tradition might not have been systematic, but it can hardly be disputed that it is distinctive in both. It is possible that both might have borrowed from the same (to us, unknown) source. Both the Purāṇa and

Bhoja have borrowed a great deal directly from Bharata and Daṇḍin ; opinions and theories which are common to both they might have likewise borrowed from a common source representing the distinctive tradition which both of them follow. The very similarity of their ideas, wording and treatment, which is rightly emphasised by Dr. Raghavan, is an argument as much in favour of their mutual borrowing as of their following a common source or tradition.

But Dr. Raghavan thinks that the Purāṇa section on Alaṃkāra is a hopelessly loose compilation, and the probability is that it borrows from the more systematic work of Bhoja. No one denies that the Alaṃkāra-section of the Purāṇa is a compilation, but what Dr. Raghavan ignores or would not admit is that Bhoja's work is also more or less, a compilation ; and this fact takes away a great deal from the force of his argument. As I have already expressed my views on this point in *JRAS*, 1923, p. 537f, as well as in my *Sanskrit Poetics* (ii, p. 254f), I may be pardoned for refraining from repetition ; but there can be hardly any doubt that Bhoja's voluminous and ambitiously cyclopaedic treatises are not such original works as Dr. Raghavan would have us believe, but that they are essentially of the same eclectic and uncritical character (even if a little more systematic) as the loosely joined and eclectic epitome compiled by the cyclopaedic *Agni-purāṇa*. Bhoja does not hesitate to appropriate extensively lines, phrases and verses, even definitions and illustrations, bodily from the works of his predecessors. He makes a good use of Daṇḍin's work, from whom he takes no less than one hundred and sixty passages, while six of the Kārikās of the *Dhvanyāloka* are literally plagiarised. All these traits are also found in the *Agni-purāṇa* compilation, which is briefer but no more eclectic than Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharāṇa*. If Bhoja's works possess an interest and importance from their having a novel and somewhat orthodox standpoint, which follows a peculiar line of speculation different in many respects from the accepted views of the various established schools, they have this characteristic in common with the Alaṃkāra-section of the Purāṇa. Even the theory of Rasa and prominence given to Śṛṅgāra, which is considered to be an unique trait of Bhoja's works, are also found in the Purāṇa in a somewhat undeveloped form. Bhoja is undoubtedly more elaborate ; and if he is more systematic, the

probability is that he developed the same line of speculation further. If the Purāṇa-compiler copied from Bhoja as Dr. Raghavan presumes to the contrary, it is indeed too strange that he should present as undeveloped and unsystematic what was already developed and systematic in his presumed source.

The following facts, therefore, are clear from a comparison of the works of Bhoja and the Purāṇa-section on Alamkāra :

1. Both are compilations.
2. As compilations both are eclectic, but not very well assorted and critical.
3. But both follow a peculiar line of speculation which is distinctive and unorthodox.
4. Bhoja is more systematic and elaborate, and the common and distinctive topics are found in Bhoja in a more developed form. These considerations led me to believe that there was no question here of mutual borrowing but that both were drawing from a common source, and that the more elaborate and systematic Bhoja was probably a later writer. /It would hardly make any difference if the Agni-purāṇa section is proved to be later than Bhoja; but as the present evidence is at best uncertain the question must still be left open.

I must confess that I have not studied, as Dr. Raghavan appears to have done, the entire *S'rngāra-prakāśa* of Bhoja, a part of which only is available to me and that most of my conclusions are based chiefly upon my study of Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā-bharaṇa*. I shall be glad if Dr. Raghavan can bring forward some *independent* proofs to support his contention, and finally settle the vexed question of the date of the Alamkāra-section of the *Agni-purāṇa*.

A PUZZLE IN THE ŚABARABHĀṢYA

(Dr. Saileswar Sen)

The following passage which occurs in the *S'abarabhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I. i. 5 has puzzled a number of scholars both in India and in Europe :—*Na cā'rtha vyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpo' palāmbhanam. Tasmān na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ avyapadeśyam ca nā' pratyakṣam. Tasmād apratyakṣā buddhiḥ* (*Benares Ed.* pp. 7-8).

Whilst Mahesha Chandra Nyayaratna who is of the opinion that the third sentence is incorrect suggests the reading *avyapadeśyam ca na pratyakṣam* (*Bib. Ind. Ed.* p. 10); Jacobi according to whom the second as well as the third sentence requires emendation prefers to read *tasmān nā'vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyūm ca nāma pratyakṣam* (*JAOS xxxi*, p. 20.)

Mahesha Chandra Nyayaratna's reading is accepted by Randle who translates the passage thus (*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, pp. 95-96):—"Nor can we apprehend the precise character ... of the thought without designating the thing (which is the object of the thought ...). Therefore thought cannot be designated ...; and what cannot be designated is not the object of perception. Therefore thought is not the object of perception". It is to be noted that Mahesha Chandra Nyayaratna's reading derives support also from Ganganath Jha's translation (*Gaekwad Oriental Series LXVI*, p. 14).

Keith's interpretation of the *Mīmāṃsuka* viewpoint which is contained in the passage is in consonance with Jacobi's reading. " Ideas," says Keith (*The Karmamīmāṃsā*, p. 45), " are essentially connected with names, while perception is essentially immediate knowledge, in which naming is not involved."

As against Jacobi's reading, Randle remarks that it is "questionable from the point of view of textual criticism and gives a meaning inconsistent both with the present passage and with the parallel passage in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* " which contains an explanation of the *avyapadeśya* nature of *pratyakṣa* as defined in *Nyāyasūtra* I. i. 4. According to Jacobi and Keith, *pratyakṣa* as used in the *S'abarabhāṣya* passage denotes a kind of cognition and

it differs from *buddhi* as used in the same passage in being immediate and non-ideational. This interpretation is, however, wrong. Whilst by *buddhi* Śabara means cognition of any kind whatsoever; by *pratyakṣa* an object that is immediately apprehended by a cognition, and not a cognition that immediately apprehends an object. Randle is, therefore, right in saying that there is no inconsistency between Śabara's proposition (as emended by Mahesha Chandra Nyayaratna) *avyapadeśyam na pratyakṣam* and Gautama's *avyapadeśyam pratyakṣam* where *pratyakṣa* is used in the sense of immediate cognition.

Whilst associating myself with Randle's criticism of Jacobi, I, however, venture to think that the passage requires no emendation whatsoever. The proposition that is finally established in the passage is that cognition is unperceivable; and the rationale of it will be best understood if we proceed regressively from the conclusion to the premises.

Cognition is unperceivable, because it is not indescribable from the description of the object.

It is not indescribable from .., because it is indescribable save from the description of the object.

It is indescribable save from..., because it is uncognizable save from the description of the object (of which it is the cognition).

There would be no inconsistency between the second and the third sentence, if the second be construed as *tasmād arthavyapadeśam antareṇa na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ*; and the third as *arthavyapadeśād anantaram avyapadeśyam ca yan na, tad apratyakṣam*. Accordingly the passage may be translated thus:— And the cognition of the specific nature of a cognition is not [possible] save from the description of the thing. Therefore cognition is indescribable [save from the description of the thing]. That which is, however, not indescribable [from the description of the thing] is unperceivable. Therefore cognition is unperceivable.

ARE THE GAUḌAPĀDA KĀRIKĀS ŚRUTI? A REJOINDER*

(B. N. Krishnamurti Śarmā)

In Vol. I nos. 1 and 2 of this Journal, Dr. A. Venkatasubbiah criticised my views respecting the status of the Kārikās said to form part of the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* of Gauḍapāda. The following is my reply to him.

At the outset Dr. Iah refers patronisingly to a conclusion reached by him in the *I.A.* for Oct. 33, that there was no such thing as a *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* at the time of Śaṅkara. This stands exploded by the fact of Sureśvara citing the *Mān.* as an Upaniṣad. in his *Vārtika* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.¹

I.

My quotations from the *Vc.*, *Nr. Up.* commentary and *Vsnb.*, were addressed to such as recognise them as the genuine works of Ś. Modern scholars, even if they won't recognise these as the genuine works of Ś., must allow them a certain amount of value in determining the issue before us. For, it is really too much to dismiss them all as the effusions of "pseudo Śaṅkaras," as does Dr V. We have also the spectacle of a great many makers of Advaitavedānta like Advaitānanda, Sāyaṇa, Mādhyama, and Appayya Dīkṣita, following Madhva and sharing his belief in the *श्रुतित्व* of the kārikās of the first Prakaraṇa. And among the predecessors and contemporaries of M. holding similar views, attention has been drawn to Sv., R. and Ā. The critic has not faced these witnesses squarely.

II.

He has advanced some arguments to disprove the genuineness of the *Vsnb.* etc. as works of Śaṅkara. They are good so far as they go; but I would leave it an open question. The different levels of thought and expression betrayed in the works (attributed to) of Ś., are no doubt interesting; but no valid

* The following abbreviations have been used :—Ā. Ānandagiri ; Ā. P. Āgama Prakaraṇa ; G. Gauḍapāda ; Ś. Śaṅkara ; R. Rāmānuja ; M. Madhva ; Dr. V. Venkatasubbiah ; Vc. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* ; Vsnb. *Viṣṇusahasranāma-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara ; Nr. Up. Nṛsiṃhatāpani Up. ; Mān. *Māṇḍūkya* ; Yg. *Yogacūḍāmaṇi* ; NP. *Nārada Parivrājaka* (Up.) ; Sv. Sureśvara.

1. See Vol. I No. 2 of this Journal p. 29.

conclusions can be drawn from them until ampler proofs are forthcoming. Even a "master-mind" is not made in a day; nor does it function always at 'top-level' or exhibit the same profundity of thought and grace of expression throughout. A comparison *passim* of the *Gītābhāṣya* and the c. on the *Sūtras* by Ś. would be eno' to convince one of the truth of this observation.² The former is undoubtedly "commonplace" and does often recall Bhoja's caustic comment on glossators:—

स्पष्टार्थेष्वपि विस्तृतिं विदधति व्यर्थैः समासादिकैः ।

अस्थानेऽनुपयोगिभिश्च बहुभिर्जल्पैर्भ्रमं तन्वते

श्रोतृणामिति वस्तुविप्लवकृतः सर्वेऽपि टीकाकृतः । (Vṛtti on Yoga Sūtras.)

Yet it is admitted to be a genuine work of Ś. both by Dr. V. and Prof. Winternitz. What can this mean if not that style is after all a very misleading and vagarious criterion of authorship? Even Homer nods. If the critic has been able to discover flaws in the *Vsnb* etc., another may say that the Ādi-Ś. himself was not any the less "elastic" in his views of what is to be meant by a 'mantra'; For, in his c. on *Gītā* ii, 19, he calls the passage य एनं वेत्ति हन्तारम् also, a *ṛk*³ side by side with न जायते त्रियते वा (*Kaṭha* 1, 2, 18)⁴. But only the second half is identical in the *Kaṭha* (1, 2, 18) and *Gītā* (ii, 19cd), the first half being entirely different in both. Another instance of 'elasticity' in Ś. has been pointed out by me on an earlier occasion.⁵ As for inferiority of expression, mention may be made of the use of the feminine form 'छागा' by both Ś. and Vācaspati under B. S. i, 4, 8, "which tho' not incorrect", is (yet) "decidedly inferior to" छागी⁵ Sv. confounds Jaimini and

1. See my paper on Śaṅkara's Authorship of the *Gītābhāṣya* Annals B.O.R.I. Vol. xiv, 1-2, (1933).

2. इत्येतस्यार्थस्य साक्षिभूते ऋचावानिनाय भगवान्—(ii, 19) कथमविक्रिय आत्मेति—द्वितीयो मन्त्रः—' न जायते.. ' (2, 20).

3. There is discrepancy here too. *Gītā* ii, 20 ab is found only in a slightly different form in *Kaṭha*. None of the two verses of the *Gītā* are thus actual quotations from the *Kaṭha*. R. is more careful than either Ś or M. He says nothing about ii, 19-20 being quotations from the *śruti*.

4. *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 34 f. n. 1.

5. अजा छागी शुभछागबस्तछागलका अजे (*Amarakośa* ii, 9, 76) Ś. has of course been defended by later commentators. See *Brahmavidyābharāṇa* p. 388 (Kumbakonam).

Bādarāyaṇa and ascribes to the former the first two sūtras of the latter, in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*.¹ He is also guilty of using Un-Pāṇinian forms.² Are we to set up a plurality of Ś-s and Sv-s, in these cases? The great Advaitic commentator Śrīdhara Svāmin³ is 'oblivious' of the correct (?) meaning of लुक् प्रवोचम् (R. V, i, 154, 1) which he renders as कः प्रवोचत् instead of as " अतिशीघ्रं प्रवोचं प्रब्रवीमि as rightly (?) interpreted by Sāyaṇa and the modern scholars. All this must show that arguments from language, style and thought have their obvious limitations.

Dr. V. argues that the use of the word श्लोक instead of the *rightful* "मन्त्र" by the *Nr. Up.* commentator, only goes against my theory and proves that "he too thought that the ślokas were the work of a human author." (P.8, f. n. 3). But he forgets that in that case, these ślokas could have no place in the text of the *Mān.* as required by that commentator. The fact is that Dr. V. has not understood the drift of the commentary.

As for the use of the term श्लोक "instead of the rightful मन्त्र", we may explain it as an instance of speaking in the words of the original. If Dr. V. has "not so far come across any passage in the writing of human authors in which the word śloka is used to denote metrical śruti passages" (P. 8, f. n. 3) it only proves that there are limits even to his studies. Ś. under B. S. 1, 4, 15, uses the word श्लोक to denote a metrical śruti passage" and

1. यत्तु जैमिर्नायं वचनमुद्धाटयसि, तदपि तद्विवक्षापरिज्ञानादेवोच्यते । किं कारणम् ? यतो न जैमिनेरयमभिप्रायः—' आम्नायः सर्व एव क्रियार्थ' इति । यदि ह्यमभिप्रायोऽभविष्यत्—“ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, ॥ जन्माद्यस्य यतः ” इत्येवमादि ब्रह्मवस्तु-स्वरूपमात्रयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपरं गम्भीरन्यायसंदेहं सर्ववेदान्तार्थमीमांसनं श्रीमच्छारीरकं नासूत्रविष्यत् ; असूत्रयञ्च ॥

(By Skt. and Prākṛt Series, 38, P. 52) Many explanations have been offered for this curious mistake ; but none has been convincing.

2. एष संसारपन्था व्याख्यातः (P. 29); 3, 35, i, 14; ईक्षाण p. 663 Var. 115, *Bṛhadvārtika*; सत्पन्थानम् P. 136 v. 453.

3. Under *Bhāgavata* ii, 7, 40.

4. I don't grant this.

5. तदप्येष श्लोको भवति (Taitt. Up.) इति तस्मिन्नेव प्रकृतेऽर्थे श्लोक-मिसुदाहरन्ति—' असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ' इति ॥

Sv. on two occasions in his *Bṛhadvārtika* :—

इत्येतस्मान्मयाद्राजा श्लोकशुश्रूषयेरितः ।

प्रादात्सहस्रमेवास्मै शुश्रूपालिङ्गवित्तये ॥ iv, 4, 537.

अक्षय्येव यतः पूर्वं व्याख्यातो देवतागणः ।

श्रोत्रादिकरणार्थोऽयं श्लोकस्तस्मादुदाहृतः ॥ ii, 2, 25.

III.

Why should आगममात्रम् used by Ś. be interpreted only as a scriptural statement? Why should it not be applied to the utterances of a reliable person like G.—asks the critic. The answer is that the views of a mortal however eminent, are not by themselves sufficient to establish a metaphysical truth.¹ The Doctor himself unconsciously admits as much when he says that “ Ś. had to cite here a śruti passage as authority for the statement that there is no dualism.” [Italics mine]. (P. 13). What is taught by scripture is admitted with implicit belief. Reason also may afterwards be made to augment or clarify the thesis so established. Such is the tradition of Vedāntic Dialectics.² The presence moreover of Upaniṣadic texts like एकमेवाद्वितीयम्; प्रपञ्चोपशमः, in both the sets of passages re-cited by the Doctor, must also show him that the term आगम ought, in fairness, to apply to them also, in which case, the contention falls to the ground that आगम here means nothing more than an authoritative proposition of G. The paraphrasing of प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण by आगममात्रेण is also another indication that what has throughout been meant was an आगमरूपप्रतिज्ञा, a proposition laid down in the words of the śruti. The reference to तर्क immediately afterwards, also shows that the partnership is between Reason and Revelation: तर्क and आगम (*Manu*, xii, 105-6) and not between Reason and the words of a man in the street.

1. नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् । यस्माच्चिरागमाः पुरुषो-
त्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्काः अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति; उत्प्रेक्षायाः निरङ्कुशत्वात् । तथाहि
कैश्चिदाभियुक्तैः यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्काः अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते—
Śaṅkara, B. S. B. 2, 1. II.

2. सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु तदर्थग्रहणदाढ्यं अनुमानमाप वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि
प्रमाणं भवन्न निवार्यते—op. cit 1. 1. 2.

IV.

As for the *Vsnb.*, I cannot follow the reasoning that because a writer has made a few mistakes of fact and textual interpretation, *whatever* he says must, forever, remain suspect. Under such circumstances none can pass the ordeal. The critic, moreover, is needlessly confusing the question of the statement of one's belief by a writer, with its truth. The author of the *Vsnb.* has said that certain of the disputed *kārikās* are *śruti*. He may be right or wrong in having done so. That is a different matter altogether. To dismiss inconvenient Ś-s as "bogus" ones is easy. But even a mistake needs explanation.

V.

As for the antiquity of the three kinds of लक्षणाः जहलक्षणा etc., it may interest Dr. V. and the Compiler of the *Nyāyakośa* to hear that they are as old as the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* (1. 157) of Sarvajñātma—10 th century—and that allusion to them in the *Vc* is perfectly understandable even as a work of Ś.

VI.

Where the entire *adhikaraṇa* in B. S. ii, 1, 33, turns upon the question of Creation and its purpose, I fail to see anything "disingenuous" in connecting the आसकामश्रुति mentioned by Ś. with Creation. Even granting that it need not necessarily be coupled with the act of creation, Dr. Iah would be no nearer his escape from identifying it with a G. K. For, even according to his own showing, the आसकामश्रुति must be one which describes the God of Creation as an Āpta-kāma. But in Advaitic metaphysics, the Supreme Brahman (Nirguṇa) is neither really आसकाम nor ever does create. It is the Lower Brahman, Īvara or Parameśvara, as Ś. advisedly calls Him, that is actually responsible for creation. It is certainly *not* this Lower Brahman that is called an Āpta-kāma in Brh. Up. iv, 4, 6 summoned to his aid by Dr. Iah. On the contrary, *that* text applies the term Āptakāma to the Individual soul on the eve of release. It is only by a metaphysical *tour de force* that Ś. secures its application to the Supreme Brahman also. But that is neither here nor there. While Ś. himself has not specified the full text he has in view, we have the indirect approval of Advaitānanda and Appayya Dīkṣita to equate it with G. K. where Creator-God is given by the context.

VII.

It is only a special pleading, not any convincing explanation that we have from Dr. V. as to why Śv. has been so particularly careful *not* to make use of such terms of eulogy as वेदान्तोक्ति, आगमशासनम् in referring to the kārīkās from the undisputed portion of G.'s work. He tells us that "stanza 744 ac of Sv. is paralleled by Yg. Up. 72 ac. and by certain statements in the NP etc., and that therefore, it cannot be surely asserted that the reference in Sv. is necessarily to a G. K., answering to the passage cited by Sv. But our knowledge of the fact that Sv. was acquainted with the Mān. Up. and the Kārīkās of G., coupled with the absence of proof that he was similarly acquainted with such patently "late" Ups, as the Yg., NP. etc., should, I think, be enough to render the latter identification more acceptable.

No doubt, Sv. is not quoting the exact words of the śruti but is only referring to its purport in *Bṛhadvārtika* 5, 1, 81. But this neither warrants the generalisation that *he must always be so doing*, nor proves yet that he has never once made a verbatim quotation from the śruti with the words आगमशासनम् or the like.

Until a law is made that Sv. *must do as is done by the S'āṭhyāyani* and other (late) Upaniṣads, Dr. Iah's laborious extracts from them can only be dismissed as irrelevant to the issue before us. Had he really wanted to find out what Sv. meant to indicate by such epithets as वेदानुशासनम्, वेदान्तोक्ति, आगमशासनम्, and so on, Dr. V. must have gone to the *Bṛhadvārtika* itself and not to the *S'āṭhyāyani N. P. etc.*, collected all those passages which appear to be quotations from the Śruti, examined them and then have declared that in all such cases, "Sv. is *not* quoting the exact words of the śruti", but is merely referring to their purport, or that the references in such cases are "not to any particular text of the śruti, but to the teachings of the Advaita-vedānta" (P. 16). Instead of this, he has taken the path of pseudo-research, quoting from irrelevant sources and making use of spurious arguments. I wish, before closing, to draw attention to the fact that Sv. *has made* a number of quotations from the *S'ruti* under such titles as श्रुतिशासनम्, आगमशासनम्, आगमोक्ति, आगमिकं वचः । A majority of these are *actual* Śruti texts, while one or two are arthānuvādas. But in no case is there any

room for doubt that *only* śrutis, express or implied, are meant by these epithets, and not merely the teachings of individual teachers of the Advaitavedānta:—

१.	मुक्तेर्विभ्यत इत्यादि तथाच श्रुतिशासनम्	1. 4.	14
२.	यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त इति च श्रुतिशासनम्	1. 4.	518
३.	नह्यन्योऽतोऽस्ति ब्रूहेति—	1. 4.	117
४.	विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति श्रुतेः	1. 4.	1393
५.	यत्र वान्यदित्यादि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम्	1. 4.	1560
६.	ब्रह्मैवेदं विश्रमिति साक्षादात्मनायशासनम् [विद्या विनयसंपन्न इति च स्मृतिशासनम्]	1. 4.	1691
७.	नाविरतो दुश्चरितादिति चागामिकं वचः	1. 4.	1791
८.	बह्वर्थबद्धधिषणः प्रत्यग्याथात्म्यवित्तये नालं विरोधात्पुरुषः “ पराञ्ची ” त्यागमोक्षिततः	1. 6.	5
९.	यः पृथिव्यामिति तथा नेति नेती ति चागमः	2. 1.	445
१०.	शश्वद्वै रेतस इति तथाच श्रुतिशासनम्	2. 3.	, 71
११.	एतदालंबनं श्रेष्ठमिति च श्रुतिशासनम्	4. 4.	997
१२.	स्वतस्तस्य च संप्राप्तेर्विनाप्यागमशासनात् । एकधैवानुविज्ञेयमिति च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥	5. 1.	81

And *Bṛhadvārtika*, i, 29, 30; ii, 4, 7; i, 4, 802; and p. 89 verse 288; p. 165, V. 562; p. 85, V. 275; and ii, 3, 137. There is thus enough justification to hold that the passages from the first chapter of G. quoted in the *Bṛhadvārtika* under such titles as आगमशासनं etc. were certainly meant to be from the śruti.

VIII.

Touching Ā. the glossator on the *Bṛhadvārtika*, Dr. V. says that “ not even he has said that the passage cited is from the Ā. P. ” (P. 18). How could he when Ā. has already made it clear that he looks upon it as a Śruti ?

I take my stand on Ā.’s plain statement that the ślokas explanatory of the *Mān. Up.* : माण्डूक्योपनिषदर्थविष्करणपराः श्लोकाः were “ received ” by G. from Nārāyaṇa, which simply means that in the opinion of Ā, they were *not* the compositions of G. This is no guess but what follows from the actual words of Ā. There is nothing “ obscure or unintelligible ” about him. Elsewhere, the critic does *not believe* that Ā. is right ” when he says that विश्वोहि स्थूलमुद्गन्तियं (G. K. I, 3) quoted by Sv. is a śruti. (i. P. 18).

We really have nothing to do with the beliefs and disbeliefs of the Dr. interesting as they might be. The question is one of textual facts. In the light of Ā.'s introductory statement, his subsequent one आचार्यैर्मण्डूक्योपनिषदं पठित्वा तद्व्याख्यानलोकावतरणम् ... can only mean that it is these very ślokas received from Nārāyaṇa that were incorporated by G. into his work with the words: अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति. Of course, it would follow that in Ā's opinion, the words: अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति were G.'s. There can be no doubt however, that he did regard the विवरण-ślokas themselves as 'quotations' made by G. from Nārāyaṇa. The two other passages cited from his gloss on st. 10 and 19, also admit of the same explanation. There is nothing subversive of the Upaniṣadic theory in the phrase: तद्विवरणरूपान् श्लोकान् used by Ā. That they were looked upon as "quotations" is plain from Ā's comment on G. K. 1, 4:—उदाहृतश्लोकयोर्व्याख्यानापेक्षां वारयति, उक्तेति ॥ which has naturally escaped the Dr's. eyes!

It would be impossible to deny that Ā. has cited G. K. I. 16 *ab*, as a śruti, in his gloss on the *Sambandha-vārtika*. Dr. V. chuckles at the thought of Ā's "citation of *Gītā* xiii, 19. immediately after G. K. 1, 16 and of *Manu* 1, 5, before *Svet. Up.*" (ii. p.3).—circumstances which to him indicate that Ā. had no idea of the order in which the quotations from the Śrutis and Smṛtis had to be given, nor any "thoughts of the priority of Śruti over Smṛti but *has merely cited passages from both as they came to his mind*" (11. P. 3.). A little thought would have shown him that far from having no idea of the order of texts, Ā. had for a very good reason quoted texts from the Śrutis and Smṛtis alternately, in *four* groups, so as to illustrate four points that he seeks to stress in order:—¹

	<i>S'ruti</i>	<i>Smṛti</i>
१. अविद्यानादित्वम्	(a) अनादिमायया सुप्तः (G K. i. 16)	(b) प्रकृति पुरुषं चैव (<i>Gītā</i>)
२. तदनिर्वचनीयत्वम्	(a) नासदासीन्नो सदासीत् (R. V.)	(b) आसीदिदं तमोभूतम् (<i>Manu</i> i, 5)

1. Cf. अविद्यानादित्वानिर्वचनीयत्वबन्धकत्वज्ञानापेक्षत्वादीनां ' अनादिमायया सुप्तः ' ।इत्यादि श्रुतिस्मृतिभिरेव सिद्धेः, न तान्यविद्यायाः कल्प्यत्वेपि कल्प्यानीति भावः ॥ (A. on *Bṛhadvārtika*)

३. तस्याः बंधकत्वम् (a) मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् (b) माया ह्येवा मया रष्ट्रा
(S'vet Up.) (Mbh.)
४. तस्याः विद्यापोषत्वम् (a) भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमाया- (b) मायामितां तरन्ति ते
निवृत्तिः (S'vet.) (Gītā)

There is thus no fear of our having to " declare the *Gītā* to be Śruti, were one follow " my reasoning. On the contrary, we may have to recognise the *Gaudapāda-Kārikās*, as a *Smṛti*, if we allow ourselves to be guided by Dr. V.'s line of reasoning !

IX.

When one is referring to the opposition of *G. K.* 1, 18-19, as *Kārikās*, to the dogmas of Advaitism, it is irrelevant to say that M's explanation of the *Kārikās* in Chap. I, is also forced and unnatural. In the latter case the difficulty is unavoidable as the text is not a composition of M. but Śruti, in the interpretation of which every philosopher has his own difficulties. But in the case of the Advaitin, it is certainly avoidable (i. e. assuming the authorship of G.) in that it has been entirely self-created. That makes the difference between M. and G.

X.

I need not go on repeating the fact that the *Mān.* as an *Up.* was known to Sv. and ergo to Ś. Dr. V. agrees that " the words अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति are not newly added by a later commentator but must be regarded as forming part of the *Mān.* itself." (P. 7). It must follow from this that G. was not the author of the first *Prakarāṇa* at all. It is quite possible that Dr. Iah considers both Ś. and Śv. to have *perpetuated the error* first committed by Śānta rakṣita (750 A. D.). What I fail to see in that case, is the special propriety of flamboyantly levelling a charge against Madhva alone. I still repeat my view that the circumstances are really suspicious when Ś. does not even once mention the name of G anywhere in his c. *not even where the context requires it or where there is every chance and necessity for him to do so as under the headlines : अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति* ! occurring four times ! The reference to the परमगुरु at the end is not enough as it may merely be an acknowledgment of G. as the ' compiler ' of the *Āgama-śāstra* as it stands. (See Dr. V. ii, P. 10-11) without committing

1. Cf. पूर्ववदत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति (Cf. G.K. C. 1. 24.)

us to the necessity of attributing the words : अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति and the Kārikās following them to him. The words employed by Ś. do not differ from those used by him to introduce Scriptural quotations in his comm. on other Ups. :—

तत्तस्मिन्नेवार्थे प्राणमयात्माविषये एव, श्लोको भवति; तदप्येव श्लोको भवति पूर्ववत्; तदेतस्मिन्नप्यर्थे एव श्लोको भवति—‘असन्नेव स भवति ’ ॥ (Taittirīya Up. Bhāṣya)

As for tradition, it does not seem to have prevented Vācaspati Miśra from mentioning Śaṅkara by name, in his *Bhāmati* (introd. verse).

Parallelisms from Caraka and Vātsyāyana are not relevant to our purpose. To be sure, there are parallels *also* in the well-known Ups. of ślokas being introduced in the words of the original. Why should the later ones be preferred to the earlier parallels ?

XI.

I still think that some of the Kārikās *qua* Kārikās, are out of tune with the dogmas of the Advaita Vedānta. The critic has said nothing to meet the difficulties raised by Dvaitins. One's allegiance apart, it is clear from Ś's comment on G. K. 1, 17, तस्मान्न कश्चित् प्रपञ्चः प्रवृत्तो निवृत्तो वा अस्तीत्यभिप्रायः that he is prepared to face the situation boldly and accept the result of the विपर्यय-पर्यवसान made by the Dvaitins : न निवर्तते तस्मान्नास्ति प्रपञ्चः । There is no question of World-disappearance, for the very simple reason that it has never been there :—

वन्ध्यापुत्रो न तस्त्वेन मायया वापि जायते (G. K. iii, 28).

सतो ह्युत्पत्तिः प्रलयो वा स्यात्, नासतः शशविषाणादेः (C. on III, 32).

It would be more difficult to interpret the propositions : स्वप्नसरूपा सृष्टिः and मायासरूपा सृष्टिः realistically than to differentiate them effectively from the Advaitic view of Creation. No Realist would feel flattered by the description of Creation as “ resembling ’ a Dream or a Magical show. The view on the other hand, bears a strong family resemblance to those of the Mādhyamika Buddhists:—

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नः गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पादः तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतः ॥

and of Advaitins:—

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥ (G. K. II, 31).

वितथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः (G. K. II, 6).

अतो मन्यामहे—तेषां (i. e. जाग्रद्दृश्यानां) अप्यसत्त्वं स्वप्नदृश्यवत्. (Śaṅkara *ibid*) ननु, जाग्रद्वस्तुनां न स्वप्नवद्वस्तुत्वम् । सत्यमेवमविवेकिनां स्यात्—¹ (C. on IV. 38).

असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः (G. K. IV. 39).

So too, in the case of मायासरूपा सृष्टिः :—

जन्म मायोपमं तेषां, साच माया न विद्यते (G. K. iv, 58).

There is thus no point in the objection that creation on the Advaitic view is माया but not मायासरूप. The addition of the term सरूप would not make the world real any more than the presence of such suffixes as वत्, सदृश, सरूप, यथा, उपम etc. in the passages cited above. G. K. i. 9 cd, is however anxious to put down creation as almost the second nature of God: देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽप्यम् and say that there can be no motive behind such spontaneous activity which can hardly be lowered to the rank of a random illusion :—
नहि रज्जादीनामविद्यास्वभावव्यतिरेकेण सर्पाद्याभासत्वे कारणं शक्यं वस्तुम् ! (Śaṅkara on G. K. i, 9 cd.) The rift in the analogy is that whilst सर्पावभास may be due to अविद्यास्वभाव the creative activity of God is due to देवस्वभाव not देवाविद्यास्वभाव !

I am glad Dr. Iah has seen his way to admit frankly that Advaitin writers like Madhusūdana Sarasvati, Appayya Dikṣita, Vidyāraṇya, Sāyaṇa, Advaitānanda etc. "belong to the same class as Madhva" (ii. p. 12). Had he examined the evidences cited by me a little more dispassionately he would have admitted that Sureśvara, Ānandagiri, Vimuktātman and Rāmānuja also "belong to the same class as Madhva." There is thus no rhyme or reason in the charge against Madhva.

In conclusion, I should like particularly to repeat my remarks in the last two paragraphs of my Rejoinder to Mr. V. Subrahmanya Sarma, in Vol. i. no. 2. P. 38, of this Journal. I think that light must dawn upon Dr. V. if only he would keep clear of irrelevant issues, such as the true and original status of the disputed Kārikās during Pre-Śāṅkarite times.

1. Cf. ज्योतिष्टोमादिश्रुतिबोधितानुष्ठातृनिफलासिद्धिः स्वप्नश्रुतिबोधितानुष्ठानप्रयुक्त-फलसंवादतुल्या—Appayya Dikṣita *Siddhāntaleṣa Saṅgraha*.

IDENTIFICATION OF RAṄGA JYOTIRVID,
THE AUTHOR OF VICĀRASUDHĀKARA,
A MEDICAL TREATISE COMPOSED
IN A.D. 1765,
BY ORDER OF RAGHUNĀTHRAO PESHWA

(By P. K. Gode)

In my note¹ on the "*Date of Vicārasudhākara* of Raṅga Jyotirvid" I pointed out that this treatise on Piles was composed in A. D. 1765 by order of Raghunathrao Peshwa. The author was a resident of Junnar in the Poona district. He mentions the following physicians of the Peshwa period in his treatise:—

1. Bagāji Vaidya, resident of Junnarapura
2. Balavantrāya Vaidya
3. Bābā Bhiṣagvarya
4. Jaya Śaṅkara

He also refers to the surgical operation of piles, a method current among the Yavana or English physicians residing on the sea-coast.

When I wrote my note on this work I was not able to identify the author of the treatise viz. Raṅga Jyotirvid. Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, the Editor of the Peshwa Daftar, who was consulted by me in the matter of this identification suggested that I should write to some member of the Joshi family of Junnar. I acted on this suggestion but without any direct acquaintance with the person concerned I could get neither information nor any response.

Recently in the *Chandrachud Daftar*² published by the Bharata Itihasa Sam. Mandal, Poona, I came across the following references to a person called RANGA JOSI Junnarkar:—

Pp. 3-10—Here a partition-deed of the members of the Chandrachud family is reproduced. It is dated *Saka 1701* Vikāri nāma Samvatsara, Pauṣa Śudda 10, which corresponds to Monday, 17th January, A. D. 1780.

1. Vide *Annals*, Vol. XII, pp. 287-289.

2. Bha. Iti. Sam. Mandal Series No. 22. Edited by D. V. Apte, *Saka* 1842 (A. D. 1920) Poona.

This document contains the signatures of witnesses, among which the following is found :—

“ *RANGA JOSI Shahar Junnar* ” in Devanāgarī characters.

In the 3rd line of this partition-deed from commencement “ *RANGA JOSI Junnarkar* ” is also mentioned.

Pp. 90-91—Here we find reproduced a letter of “ *RANGA JOSI Junnarkar* ” dated *June 16, 1765* addressed to Gangoba Tatya Chandrachud, who later died in A.D. 1773.

This letter is written in Marathi (Devanāgarī characters) and is addressed to Gangoba Tatya, who was then near about Delhi.¹ The letter refers to the Karnatak expedition of the Peshwa, mentions Dādāsaheb or Raghunāthrao Peshwa and implores the addressee to free his son from the serious financial difficulties in which he was then involved. This letter also hints the defeat of Holkar by the English near the river Jamna.

I now propose to identify Raṅga Jyotirvid, the author of the work *Vicārasudhākara* with Raṅga Josi of the *Chandrachud Daftar*. The points of identification as revealed by documents on both the sides may now be compared as under:—

Raṅga Jyotirvid	Raṅga Josi
1. He is called <i>Raṅga Jyotirvid</i> or <i>Raṅganātha Jyotirvid</i>	1. He is called <i>Raṅga Josi</i>
2. He calls himself “ <i>gaṇita-vaidyaka-śāstra-viśārada</i> ” (proficient in Astronomy & Medicine)	2. <i>Josi = Jyotirvid</i>
3. He wrote his treatise in A.D. 1765.	3. He wrote his letter in June 1765 and signed as a witness a deed in A.D. 1780.
4. He wrote by order of Raghunāthrao Peshwa	4. He mentions Dādāsaheb or Raghunathrao Peshwa.
5. He calls himself s resident of Junnar (<i>Junnara-pura-sthita</i>)	5. He signs as “ <i>Raṅga Josi Shahar Junnar</i> ” and is called “ <i>Junnarkar</i> ”
6. The only Ms. of <i>Vicāra-sudhākara</i> comes from the Viśrāmbag Collection of the Peshwas.	6. Documents re. <i>Raṅga Josi</i> come from the <i>Chandrachud Daftar</i> found at Nimbgaon, a few miles from Poona.

1. Mr. Apte in his footnote on p. 91 reproduces an extract from Gangoba's own letter dated *Caitra suddha 9, Śaka 1687 (A. D. 1765)*. From this extract the whereabouts of Gangoba in June 1765 are perfectly clear.

The details regarding the indentification of *Raṅga Jyotirvid* with *Raṅga Joṣī* are so convincing that they need no further search for facts to prove them.

It would, however, be interesting to identify some names of physicians mentioned in the *Vicārasudhākara*, viz. *Bagājl Vaidya*, *Balvantrāya Vaidya*, *Bābā Bhiṣagvarya* and *Jaya S'aṅkara*.

"*Bābā Bhiṣagvarya*" mentioned by Raṅga Jyotirvid on folio 20 of the Ms of *Vicārasudhākara* (No. 307 of Viś. I in the Govt. Mss. Library) can be identified with the celebrated "*Bābā Vaidya*" of the Peshwa period. I shall here record the following dated references to this physician from contemporary records :—

(1) Mr. V. V. Khare presented before the Second Sammelan of the Bharata Iti. Sams. Mandal, Poona, 1914, eight original letters of Madhavrao Peshwa. Letter No. 5 (in the 27 letters exhibited by Mr. Khare on the occasion) is written by Sadashivrao Bhau to his wife, Pārvatibāi. This letter contains an endorsement by "*Bābā Vaidya*" in three lines, on the reverse as recorded in the Proceedings of this Sammelan on p. 280. This letter we are informed was written by the Peshwa on the eve of his departure for the battle of Paniput (1760).

(2) In a letter dated 1st November 1766 from Moro Ballal to Gopalrao Patvardhan, the writer makes the following reference to "*Bābā Vaidya*" :—

"*Bābā Vaidya* will start for Miraj within 5/6 days. Our guard of five or six soldiers will escort him there, hence please send some soldiers from that place to replace these soldiers."

The above contemporary references to *Bābā Vaidya* clearly prove him to be a court physician of the Peshwa in and about A.D. 1766. As Raṅga Jyotirvid mentions *Bābā* as *BHIṢAGVARYA* or a pre-eminent physician in 1765 A.D. I have no doubt that he is identical with *Bābā Vaidya* at the court of Madhavrao Peshwa proved by documentary references almost contemporaneous with the author of the *Vicārasudhākara*, the treatise on Piles composed in 1765.

1. Khare; *Aitihāsik Lekha Saṅgraha*, Letter No. 626, p. 1167.

The identification of other physicians whose opinions have been mentioned by Raṅga Jyotirvid or Joshī of Junnar must await further inquiry and search in contemporary Peshwa records.

Since this paper was sent to the press I have been able to trace in the Peshwa Daftar selections the following references to Bābā Vaidya and *Balvantrāy Vaidya* :—

P. D. Selection No 32-Letter No 141 dated 8-3-1767 The Peshwa asks Nana Fadnis to make inquiries about सुरांबा and च्यवनप्राज्ञा at Baba Vaidya's house and then send these articles to him.

Letter No 152 dated 19-3-1769—This letter refers to *Balvantrāy Vaidya*, who was preparing some medicinal oil for the Peshwa. I have no doubt that this Balvantrāya Vaidya is indentical with his namesake mentioned by Ranga Jyotirvid in his work *Vicārasudhākara*.

MORIZ WINTERNITZ

In Memoriam

(O. Stein)

Though age and serious illness had weakened the physical constitution, the sudden death of Prof. Moriz Winternitz which occurred on the night of the 8th of January, 1937, was a heavy blow not only to his family, but also to the community of Indologists in which he occupied a place like that of a father. In 1934 he retired from his academical chair after a splendid service of 35 years. After that, although he never enjoyed perfect health, yet his literary activities and critical acumen never flagged. He planned ever new papers or books; few editors of Journals or Commemorative Volumes asked in vain for his collaboration; and besides his active interest in questions of humanity, he did not lose sight of his *magnum opus*, the third volume of the English version of "A History of Indian Literature," the progress and completion of which was his cherished aim. In him India has lost one of the most competent interpreters of her ancient literary heritage, sincere admirer of her great men, in modern times and one who wished her a glorious future. All those who met him will never forget his gentle and imposing personality as a man; and those who ever applied for his advice or help will thankfully remember the readiness with which he complied with their requests.

Moriz Winternitz belonged by his birth to the pre-war Austria where he was born in the year 1863, in Horn, a small town of Lower Austria. Even in his childhood he showed signs of extraordinary intellectual capacities, for in his father's home he learned the art of reading and writing Hebrew even before he entered the elementary school. In 1880 he entered the University of Wien (Vienna), where he in his first terms studied Comparative Philology, Classics, Philosophy, Ethnology and Indology (the last two under the "linguistical ethnologist" Friedrich Mueller); he was not yet decided as to the turn his future studies would take. In 1881 George Bühler returned from India after a splendid career of 17 years in education as well as in

research and was appointed Professor of Indology in Vienna University. Winternitz became one of his most promising pupils since 1881. But that did not prevent the student from following his interest in Semitic languages, or Cuneiform inscriptions, Avesta, philosophy or ethnology. It may be interesting to mention that the late Professor Eugen Hultzsch was in these years as "Privatdozent", the tutor of Winternitz who introduced him to Pāli and Pañcatantra. At the early age of about 22 years he took his degree of Ph. D. in 1886.

The subject of his thesis was, "Ancient Indian Marriage Ritual according to Āpastamba; compared with the marriage customs of the Indo-European peoples" and was printed in an enlarged form in the "Denkschriften der kaiserl Akademie der Wissenschaften" (Transactions of the Imperial Academy of Sciences) Wien, Philos.-hist. Cl. 40, 1892. To-day, when the *Kalpa* is familiar to every student, when the texts of *S'rauta*- and *Gṛhyasūtras* are accessible not only in handy editions, but also in one or more translations, and when there exists even a masterly work on the *Ritual Literatur* by the late Prof. Hillebrandt the thesis by Winternitz may not appear as something fresh and original. But it will be readily admitted that in the last decades of the 19th century the comparative study of Indo-European religion and customs was in its infancy, and only hopes were entertained of a reconstruction of the common, at least Aryan, facts in religious life; these scholars had to work on Mss., and to edit the texts first, and so did Winternitz in 1887. This his edition of the "*Āpastambiya Gṛhyasūtra* with Extracts from the Commentaries of Haradatta and Sudarśanārya" (Vienna) must be considered as the *first critical edition* of that not easily intelligible text, as in 1885 only an edition in Grantha characters was published at Tanjore to which the value of a modern Manuscript could be attributed but not more. An addition to that Sūtra is the *Mantrapāṭha*, published again by the late scholar in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, ten years later (1897) under the title "The Mantrapāṭha or Prayer Book of the Āpastambins". These three publications, forming one unit, proved the interest which Winternitz took in the domestic ritual of ancient India, on a comparative basis not only confined to the family of Indo-European peoples, but also

extended to other cultures from an ethnological point of view; and, last but not the least, they showed the place which he assigned to the woman in *religion* and *morals*, the two trends which the scholar Winternitz never ceased to follow in his life. His mode of working was objective,—a solid ground-work of texts, comparing them with each other, critical inquiry, stating the facts, and drawing careful conclusions, *sine ira et studio*.

These three publications were not the only work done by him during this period; ¹.

Thus apart from reviews and lectures, the paper "Der Sarpabali, ein altindischer Schlangenkult" (Mitteil d. Anthropol. Ges. Wien, 18, 1888, issued also separately) touched not only a religious and folklorist theme which he still in his last years of life planned to revise, but brought him into contact with the Epic to which he in the future was ready to devote a good deal of time and work. And his "Notes on Śrāddhas and Ancestral worship among the Indo-European Nations"², show once more his tendency to combine Indology and research with Indo-European religion which was his favourite theme before he was urged to Literary History where he was destined to achieve greatness.

Shortly after, an honourable invitation came to Winternitz. F. M. Müller asked Prof. Bühler to send him one of his pupils to assist him in the second edition of the Ṛgveda. That Bühler's choice fell on Winternitz is based on objective and subjective qualities of the latter; his profound knowledge of Sanskrit, ancient religion, his acquaintance with

1. A detailed Bibliography was published on the occasion of the 50th birth-day of the now deceased Professor in Archiv Orient. VI, 1934, p, 275-91 to which additions will be made in one of the next issues of that Journal. Here only the more important pieces of his life's work will be mentioned.

2. Apart from the Preface in the edition of the Āpastambīya-Gṛhya-sūtra this paper was the first one, written in English. Therewith Winternitz as other pupils of Bühler followed their teacher's advice as the knowledge of German was very limited at that time among Indian scholars. As further instances may be quoted Kirste, Zachariae (Quellenwerke der Altindischen Lexikographie). The mastering of English enabled Winternitz to take up his stay in England with which he retained mental relations also after his return to the Continent. He was familiar with the life and literature of England and had friends there.

Indian Mss., his exactness and soundness of judgment. In the years 1888-92 Winternitz was Amanuensis of Müller at Oxford; his was the main work in verifying all the quotations in the first edition, adding many references to texts published since, collating and recollating several Mss. (along with Strong), removing old misprints, helping Müller in determining the adoption of new readings for the second edition of the *R̥gveda*;¹ the eulogistic words of Müller about Winternitz are not undeserved.

During his stay at Oxford till 1898 his interest in Epic studies took root; it must be stressed that Winternitz always acquainted himself with the original sources of his work. As with the domestic ritual on which he edited texts and compared all the available *Gr̥hyasūtras*, as with the Veda where he became acquainted with the most important *R̥gveda* the intricacies of which were familiar to him in his capacity as an editorial assistant of F. M. Müller, just so with the *Mahābhārata*. It is, however, interesting to note that already the young student, who published his first papers in 1884 and 1885, in the former year wrote a review of Holtzmann's "Grammatisches aus dem *Mahābhārata*", showing the results of his learning in Sanskrit Grammar. When he took up the *Mhbh.* in a bigger paper for the first time in 1897 (*JRAS.* p. 713-59) it is not to be astonished at that Winternitz took the ethnological point of view in discussing the custom of polyandry in India, as alleged in his "*Mahābhārata*" by the late Joseph Dahlmann. The following year, 1898, brought that important contribution to the critique of the *Mhbh.* in which Winternitz laid stress on the Southern Mss. of the Epic. (*Ind. Ant.* 27, p. 67ff.; 92ff.; 122ff.). To the same year belongs a paper "On the *Mhbh.*-Mss. in the Whish Collection of the RAS" (*JRAS.* p. 147ff.) and one on "Gaṇeśa in the Maha." *ibid.* p. 380ff.). All these papers are the output of his cataloguing work of Mss. while

1. *Rig-Veda-Saṃhitā*, second edition, Vol. I, Preface p. LIV. The proof-sheets with corrections of this edition were kept by the late Professor Winternitz for use in his lectures and Seminar-Uebungen, where his pupils became acquainted also with Sāyaṇa's commentary. After his retirement he presented these proof-sheets to the Seminar fuer Indologie at the German University, Prague, where they are kept as all his lectures, writings in manuscript, numbering over fasciculi.

the Catalogues were published some year later. His activity in that period of ten years (1888-98) was not absorbed in this work only. Apart from that paper in the Vienna Academy of 1892, mentioned above, and the edition of the Mantrapāṭha in 1897, apart from reviews and lectures—he translated Müller's "Anthropological Religion" into German (1894, Leipzig), and one year later the same scholar's "Theosophy or Psychological Religion" (1895, Leipzig). But even that was not enough for his energy and zeal. In 1891 Winternitz became a tutor at the Oxford High School for Girls; in 1891-98 he was appointed Lecturer in German at the Association for the Promotion of Higher Education of Woman in Oxford; in the years 1892-98 he acted temporary private tutor and Examiner in German and Sanskrit for the Indian Civil Service. One of his pupils was the well-known Japanese scholar J. Takakusu. In 1895 Winternitz was appointed Librarian of the Indian Institute at Oxford. It can be easily realised how these various fields of work broadened his mental horizon; only a wide-reaching intellect like his could spare also the time for social and friendly intercourse with scholars like Joseph Wright, Müller's successor to the chair of Comparative Linguistics. In March 1899 Winternitz was appointed "Privatdozent" for Indo-Aryan Philology and general ethnology at the German University, Prag. These subjects were allotted to him in his professorship since 1902. The results of his work at Oxford appear now. In the first place must be mentioned his "Catalogue of South Indian Skt. Mss. (especially those of the Whish Collection) belonging to the RAS of Great Britain and Ireland" issued in 1902 (London, Asiatic Society Monographs 2), as the preparation of that Catalogue laid, no doubt, the foundation to all his foregoing and future enterprise on Mhbh.—research. For, on account of his intimate knowledge of the South Indian Mss., esp. of the Malayalam Ms. of the Sabhāparvan to the importance of which he had directed attention in his paper "Notes on the Mhbh.", he perceived the necessity of a critical edition of the Mhbh. In 1899 he submitted, for the first time, to the Indian Section of the XII International Congress of Orientalists at Rome "A Proposal for the Formation of a Skt. Epic. Text Society" (printed in the Congress-Bulletins No. 3, p. 46-49), a

plan which he had explained in a lecture, held at the XI Congress at Paris in 1897 printed for the public in *Ind. Ant.* 30, 1901, p. 117ff. He re-interated the plan in a "Promemoria" to the Academy of Sciences at Vienna (*Almanach* 1901, p. 206ff.), till on the base of the "Promemoria" by Jacobi, Lüders, and Winternitz; the International Association of Academies at its session in London 1904 decided to enlist among its enterprises the Critical edition of the Mhbh.¹ Collections of Mhbh.-Mss. in European Libraries and Classifications were prepared, when the war (1914-18) put an end not only to the Association itself but also to that planned Critical edition of the Mhbh. On the occasion of the 80th birth-day of that great scholar whose name was revered in India as much as in the West, the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute was founded; on the 18th of June 1918 Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar after whom the Institute has been named was in the chair when the decision was made to undertake a Critical edition of the Mhbh. In 1923 was published the *Virāṭaparvan* by the late N. B. Utgikar, and the editorship, is now in the hands of Dr. V. S. Sukthankar since 1925; under his editorship today the big volume of the first book of the Epic is in the hands of the students. It must have filled the ever modest Winternitz with pride when he saw the beloved work take this shape, as his first steps in 1897 had not met with great encouragement.

The list of papers in which Winternitz dealt with problems of the Mhbh. is long; from that paper on Gaṇeśa, mentioned above together with his previous contributions, he returned again to a question on principle, raised by the same scholar Joseph Dahlman in his book "Genesis des Mhbh." In the paper under the same title (*WZKM* 14, 1900, 51-77) Winternitz refuses to accept the main thesis of Dahlman about one man's authorship of the Mhbh. In 1903 he deals with the *Sabhāparvan* in the *Southern Recension* (*ibid.* 17, p. 70-75), calls attention to data in the paper "The Mhbh. and the Drama" (*JRAS* 1903, p. 571 f.) and in 1906 his paper "Bṛhaddevatā und Mhbh." (*WZKM* 20, p. 1-36) shows how he wanted to throw light on the Epic as well as

1. A short historical review was published by Winternitz himself in "Forschungen und Fortschritte" 8, 1932, p. 427f.

on certain chapters of Indian Literature from all sides. He wrote on the serpent-sacrifice of the Mhbh. (Prag, 1904, in the Publication : Kulturgeschichtliches aus der Tierwelt, p. 68-80) also from religious and ethnological point of view. In the meantime he had written the encyclopaedic chapter on the Epics of India in his "Geschichte der indischen Litteratur," vol. I. When he came to India, his first visit on Indian soil he paid to the Bhandarkar Institute at Poona (cf. Annals of the Bh. O. Res. Inst-4, p. 145-52), to ascertain the methods of work on the collation of Mss. and edition of the text ; he held classes with his pupils at Santiniketan to teach them the Western methods of textual criticism while collating Mhbh. Mss.; and he reviewed the Virāṭaparvan (AbhI 5, 1924, p. 19-30), the first and the last issue of the Ādiparvan (Indolog. Prag. I, p. 58-68 ; ABhI 15, 1934, p. 159-75). He showed his never diminishing zeal for the Mhbh. till in the last days of his life when he discussed the Specimen of the 5th Parvan. But he was not interested in criticism only, he wanted to take an active part in the editorial work. He and his pupils had collected material for an edition of the Sabhāparvan which was always delayed due to other pressing work, mostly due to his English version of the " History of Indian Literature "; and he planned a critical edition of the Nalopākhyāna too. No European scholar, it may be stated, has taken such a living interest in that great Epic of India as the late Prof. Winternitz.

During his stay at Oxford, Winternitz had prepared Indexes to the translation of the Vedāntasūtras by G. Thibaut in the SBE 34. 38, 48 ; and during all these years till its publication in 1910 he had worked out that voluminous Index of the whole set of the SBE. One who wants to ascertain the view of Winternitz on the research into the history of religions may read the pages of the " Introductory Note " (SBE 50, p. XIII f.). He called that General Index " a sort of Manual of the History of Eastern Religions " and it was printed under a similar title (A Concise Dictionary of Eastern Religions). Finally, the " Catalogue of Skt. Mss. in the Bodleian Library vol. II ", was begun during the period of his stay in England, but had to be continued and completed by A. B. Keith when Winternitz had left England.

With his settling down at Prag the third period in his life and work began: the History of Indian Literature. Although he

was mainly interested in the religious problems of ancient India, yet the choice of the publishers of the collection "Die Litteraturen des Ostens" of Winternitz for the contribution dealing with Indian literature was a happy one. He was at home in the Veda, in the ritual, in the Epic, in religious and philosophical literature. Though the first volume which was published in two parts in 1905 and 1908 respectively, comprising the Vedic literature, Epics and Purāṇas, was intended for a wider public, the soundness of judgment on the one side, and the completeness of materials on the other side made that volume already a first class hand-book for all students. With the second volume, dealing with the Buddhist Literature (published in 1913) and the Jinist literature (in 1920) the changed plan became evident: the general reader had to give way to the specialist, though the copious extracts of important or interesting passages in translation made it attractive also to the former. His masterly work reached a climax in the third volume, where (in about 700 pages) the fine and scientific literature of India found a representation hardly to be surpassed; a bird's eye view on the vernacular literature of modern India completed that volume, published in 1922 (Leipzig). Nobody was more aware than the author himself of the deficiencies of his work. But it must be evident to anyone acquainted with the problems of Indian Literature that the idea of a Literary history of India cannot be measured by congruent measures adopted with regard to the literary histories of other peoples. There is no fixed chronology; from the earliest times the historian has to say the first word, before the student of style and aesthetics can be satisfied. The analysis of such compositions like the Ṛgveda, Upaniṣads, the Epics, the Tipiṭaka is still in its infancy; it is easier to advance theories than to state facts, unbiased by dogmatism. That was the attitude of Winternitz : let us keep to facts. But the facts in Indian history of literature are so few that none can find fault with the historian when, to quote the most sad and known instances only, her greatest masters like Kālidāsa, or even a Śaṅkara cannot be absolutely dated. The value of the work is enhanced by the completeness of materials embodied in the Notes, so that the reader hardly looks in vain for any author or his work and the literature upon them. The English translation, published by the Univer-

sity of Calcutta, was a welcome occasion for Winternitz to bring the first volume (Calcutta 1927) to the same level as the others. In 1933 the second volume was issued, again with improvements on nearly every page; the treatment of Buddhist Skt. literature and the Jinist literature in the English translation represents a new edition. Only the beginning of the third volume was sent to the Press when the sudden death interrupted the continuation.

In these years in which Winternitz prepared his literary History he cleared the way by papers. As with the Epic so he did with Buddhism. In 1908 he published an anthology of Buddhism (in Berholet's Religionsgeschichtl. Lesebuch, p. 214-322) which was enlarged in 1929 ("Der aeltere Buddhismus nach Texten des Tipiṭaka in the same Collection, 2nd ed. No. 11) and in 1930 supplemented by a special book on Mahāyāna ("Der Mahāyāna-Buddhismus nach Sanskrit-und Prākrittexten." No. 15). His researches into the Buddhist Skt. literature are embodied in two papers (WZKM 26, 1912, p. 237-52 and 27, 1913, p. 33-47) both under the title "Beitraege zur buddhistischen Sanskrit-literatur". Further, he having given such an admirable analysis of the Jātakas from their literary point of view in his "History" treated them in a paper in the "Ostasiatische Zeitschrift" also from a broader cultural point of view ("Die Jātaka in ihrer Bedeutung fuer die Geschichte der indischen und ausser-indischen Literatur und Kunst"); he was the author of the article "Jātaka" in the ERE 7, 1914, p. 491-94. And in the same way one can observe how the preparation of the third volume of the "History" is foreshadowed by contributions to various Journals. A paper on "Dialog. Ākhyāna und Drama in der indischen Literatur" (WZKM 23, 1909, p. 102 ff.), a big review on the narrative literature of India with regard to Hertel's Pañcatantra (Deutsche Literatur-Zeitung 1910, col. 2693-2702 ;, 2757-67), on the late Charpentier's "Paccekabuddhageschichten" (WZKM 24, 1910, p. 104 ff.) and his paper on the Tantrākhyāyikā ("Bemerkungen zum T." WZKM 25, 1911, p. 49-62) are ample proofs of his method of working, of his consciousness with which he studied every part of Indian literature.

Whenever there was a new problem of Indian literature Winternitz was among the first to discuss it and to "keep to

facts". The problem of "Bhāsa" was always alive for him, when he first compared the episode of Draupadi's harsh handling by Duḥśāsana in "Mhbh. II, 68, 41 ff. und Bhāsas Dūtavākya" (Festschrift E. Kuhn, München 1916, p. 299-304); he took up the "Kṛṣṇa-Dramen" (ZDMG 74, 1920, p. 118-144); in the Calcutta Review he gave in 1924 (Dec. p. 329-49) a survey of the problem with which he grappled in his third volume of the "History" (p. 184 ff.). To Bhāsa he devoted his last papers which were sent to the Publishers few weeks before his death, because he wanted to throw overboard unnecessary discussions in the English version of the 3rd volume of his "History". In 1922 the German edition of that volume was published, but Winternitz was already at sea to India.

It is remarkable how he returned to his cherished themes as soon as he could spare some time for them. No mention has been made as yet of his ethnological studies, though they go back to the years 1886 when he reviewed books, or to 1898, when he wrote on "Witchcraft in Ancient India" (New World, Boston, and reprinted in Ind. Ant. 28, 1899, p. 71-83). In a paper on "Völkerkunde, Volkskunde and Philologie" (i. e. ethnology, folklore and philology; Globus 78, 1900, p. 345ff., 370 ff.) he draws the boundaries between these three subjects in which he worked himself. And further it must be remarked that Winternitz never lost sight of Indology even in his ethnological studies. When he deals with the myth of the deluge ("Die Flutsagen des Alterthums und der Naturvoelker", Mitteilungen der Anthropolog Gesellschaft Wien 31, 1901, p. 305-33) one may suggest that he was inspired by the myth found on Indian soil, and he compared not less than 73 myths, classifying them and trying to find the natural fact behind the myth, quite in accordance with his attitude in matters of religion or literature. Religion formed the contents of a paper on Malayan popular beliefs ("Bemerkungen zur malaischen Volksreligion", WZKM 14, 1900, p. 243-264); he wrote for a wider circle on the idea of fate with Indians ("Das Schicksal im Glauben- und Denken der Inder", Allgem. Zeitung, Muenchen, 1902, Beil. No. 102 f.). And one of his popular papers (ibid. 1903 x, No. 238f. 246, 252 f., 258 f., 264) "Was wissen wir von den Indogermanen?" does not indulge in theories on the home and culture of the "Indo-

European people", but, as unmistakably announced in the question-form of the title, Winternitz tries again to collect and state the facts, from which cautious conclusions could be drawn.

Since the beginnings of his scholarly life he had assigned in his studies a great place to the woman. That is to be seen already from his thesis, as mentioned above; to that purely scientific interest was added practical experience gained by him when he witnessed the fight of English women for their and their sisters' emancipation. He wanted to teach the women of his country the lesson he had learned in England. In 1899 he wrote on the academical studies of women in England in a newspaper. Winternitz was a man who fought for the women, publicly, in newspapers and in lectures; he was a leading brain in women's associations, and he never left the question of progress of women outside his interests. But from a psychological as well as scientific point of view it is interesting how Winternitz combined in his papers the ethnologist, the historian of religions, the Indologist with the friend of women's emancipation, all that united by his moral instinct. If the titles alone are quoted, the reader will get an insight into the inner connection, of that remarkable unity of personality. "Die Frau in der Voelkerkunde" (Oesterreich. Rundschau I, 1905, 621ff.), "Die Witwe im Veda" (WZKM 29, 1915, p. 172-203), and those papers in the Archiv for Frauenkunde und Eugenik (2, 1916; 3, 1917), published in 1920 as a book under the title "Die Frau in den indischen Religionen", the first part of which dealt with the woman in Brahmanism, a continuation of which he planned, but never published.

When he was the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the German University, Prag, he had the pleasure to welcome in 1921 in the big Aula the man in whom he saw a symbol of India, old and new, the poet Rabindranath Tagore. As Winternitz never confined his interests to the narrow—though so vast—field of ancient India, he had devoted to the poet a paper already in 1913 (in: Die Geisteswissenschaften I, p. 840ff.), designing the latter's picture as poet and philosopher of religions. His admiration for the poet was as great as his love for Indian wisdom. He gladly accepted the invitation to follow the poet to India and to act as the visiting professor at his Viśva Bhāratī University at Śanti-

niketan. In 1922–1923 Prof. Winternitz lectured not only there, but also at many Indian Universities, specially at Calcutta; these lectures, first printed in the Calcutta review, appeared later on (1925) under the title "Some Problems of Indian Literature", dealing with the most vexed and interesting questions, e.g. the Age of the Veda, the Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra, Bhāsa etc. The days spent in India were filled with travels, personal meetings, and also with a busy activity for the Mhbh.-work and other publications which he contributed from India to European Journals. He kept a diary, and it is a great pity that only one part of it has been printed, dealing with his stay in Shivpuri where he partook in the ceremonies held on the occasion of the erection of a temple of the great Jaina saint and scholar Vijaya Dharma Sūri ("Erinnerungen an Indian. Eine Woche bei den Jaina-Moennen in Shivapuri," Zeitschrift f. Buddh. 7, 1926, p. 349–77). By his stay in India he got insight into the political struggles, but he admired most the moral side of the fight. Already within the great war he had published a short paper on England, Russland und Indien—einst und jetzt" (Oesterr. Monatsschrift f. d. Orient 42, 1916, p. 15–17). He returned in booklets over and over again to Tagore and Gandhi in whom he saw the apostles of modern India, of love, of humanity. But he made a wider public acquaintance also with the Ahimsā, with Sarojinī Naidu, and the like. Besides these and smaller contributions to various Journals may be mentioned his publication on Gandhi "Mahatma Gandhi" (1930, in : Schriften d. Deutschen Gesellschaft f. sittl. Erziehung, No. 11), on Tagore ("Rab. Tagore," Hochschulwissen 8, 1931, 423–307), and in 1936 he published a booklet of 52 pages on "Rab. Tagore, Religion und Weltanschauung des Dichters" (Prag) on the celebration of the 75th birth-day of the poet.

An event like the great war could not pass without impressing a man like Winternitz. From his conviction as an ethnologist and from his consciousness as a human being and from his never fading moral instinct he condemned war as well as nationalism. But again the scholar Winternitz got the upper hand when he in 1917 wrote his pamphlet "Die Frau und der Krieg im Lichte der Voelkerkunde" (Sammlung gemeinnuetziger Vortraege Nos. 467–

69). And after the war all that had only slumbered in him awakened, namely his fight for humanity, which had to start with moral education in schools. Thus he was one of those few men who founded a "German Society for Ethical Education" in Prag, where he collected people around that idea of humanity, where he lectured, and in the Publications of which society he issued some of his papers on Gandhi and Tagore, mentioned already before in "Religion und Moral" (No. 2, 1922). One of his latest papers, published in the *Visva-Bharati Quarterly* (N. S. I, 1935) under the title "Unity of mankind" was again the fruit of his studies on subjects of ethnology; he wanted to publish a book on race, on which he had lectured long and had collected an enormous material on that vast subject, and made excerpts from books and papers, to leave them as they are,

This rich work was done besides his further research into Indian Literature. With his return from India he started to revise his "History" for the English translation. And again he contributed papers, dealing with various problems of that work to Journals. He was as well a contributor to Collections like the "Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart" where he wrote the entries on Buddhism, and in 1929 he edited in the "Indologica Pragensia" in collaboration with the writer of these lines. In the same year another Journal, the "Archiv Orientalni", of the Oriental Institute, began to be published in which he became a frequent contributor; he wrote on various subjects; one which occupied him much in connection with the preparation of the second volume of his "History" was the authenticity of the Pāli canon (See: *Arch. Or.* I, 1929, p. 235-46; *Studia Indo-Iranica*, Festgabe Geiger, München 1931, p. 63 ff.; *Orientalist. Literaturzeitung* 1933, 665 ff.; *Visva-Bharati Quarterly* II, Part 1, 1936). In 1933 he was glad to see his second volume out.

The same year he celebrated his 70th birth-day. Many learned societies, among them Indian too, had honoured him before by conferring on him their honorary membership. His reputation as scholar was recognised by the Hardy prize, which he got in 1913. The services he had done to science found adequate expression of thankfulness and recognition by those who partook in the "Festschrift" dedicated to him (Leipzig 1923) and

in a big number of the "Archiv Orientalni" (VI. 1934), dedicated to him by the Institute

Winternitz felt it his duty to lecture not only before his students, but before a wider audience. Great is the number of his University extension lectures; in many Associations he was an ever ready lecturer; as he delivered lectures on the International Congress of Orientalists.

Although the work of this man was—so rich, yet he never forgot his teachers and friends to whom he devoted obituaries, biographies, etc.; he also never denied his help or advice to anyone who applied for it. He was a man whose hours of day were devoted to work, not only for himself, but also for others. Without sentimentality he had a deep feeling for the shortness of his fellow-men but also love for them. Indian students can tell how kind he was in personal contact. Like his work his gentle personality will not be forgotten by his friends and pupils.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PRATIHĀRAS

(Dasharatha Sharma)

The origin of the Pratihāras forms one of the most controversial questions in the field of Indian History. Jackson, Bhandarkar and Smith regard them as Gūjars, a tribe believed to have poured into India along with Huns somewhere in the fifth or sixth century of the Christian Era. Mr. C. V. Vaidya thinks that they are pure Kṣatriyas. Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaurishankar Hirachand Ojha adopts the *via media* by regarding some Pratihāras as Kṣatriyas and the others as Gūjars. To be more accurate, he regards the word as a mere professional title, and would not in the least feel surprised, if he were to find Pratihāras in all the four castes of India. Dr. D. C. Ganguly, the latest writer on the subject, tries to controvert altogether their Gurjara origin, and incidentally establishes the Brahman origin of the Pratihāras of Kanauj. The subject being of no mean importance for students of Indian History, we propose to deal *seriatim* with all these theories in this paper, and to see which of them stands best the chance of being accepted without doing any violence to reason as well as historical evidence.

Mr A. H. T. Jackson was perhaps the first writer to propound the theory of the Gurjara origin of the Pratihāras. Finding it mentioned in *Pampābhārata* that Cālukya Arikesarin's father defeated the *Gurjararāja* Mahīpāla, and inferring that this person could be none other than the Pratihāra ruler Mahīpāla, he concluded that all the Pratihāras were Gūjars.¹ Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar supported Jackson's view by referring to Rājor inscription of V. S. 1016 which states that Mahārajādhirāja Parameśvara Mathanadeva of the *Gurjara Pratihāra lineage*, residing at Rājyapura, granted to a temple the village Vyāghrapātaka with 'all its income, 'together with all the fields cultivated by the the Gurjaras.' The mention herein of Mathanadeva as a Gurjara-Pratihāra, i. e., a Gurjara of the Pratihāra family was regarded as evidence enough to prove that

1. Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 465-9.

the Pratihāras of Kanauj too were Gūjars.¹ Subsequent writers on this side, with the solitary exception of Mr. J. C. Ghose who makes rather a droll attempt at proving their non-Kṣatriya origin on the grounds that Hariścandra was married to a *rājñī* (interpreted by him to mean widowed queen)² and that he had by her sons who were drinkers of wine which in his opinion none of the Kṣatriyas of the period actually were, have just been content to reiterate the two arguments of Jackson and Bhandarkar noticed above, and to begin with them their accounts of the Imperial Pratihāras of Kanauj.

Jackson's theory hinges on the interpretation of the word 'Gurjararāja.' Does it actually mean 'a king of the Gurjara family' as proposed by him, or merely 'a king of the Gurjara country' as contended by some other writers? In my opinion it is the latter that is its normal meaning. The following examples may be quoted in favour of this viewpoint :—

- (a) गदामतल्लिकां सोथ दैत्यमतल्लकोऽमुचत्
अष्टाश्वगभिणीगर्भं गर्जन् गूर्जरभूपती ।

(Hemachandra's *Dvyāśrayamahākāvya*, v. 92.)

Here the word गूर्जरभूपति refers not to any Gurjara or Pratihāra ruler, but to the Caulūkyā king Mūlarāja I. He is given this title merely because he is a king of Gujarat.

- (b) (i) संप्रत्यस्मरं तं गूर्जेश्वरं राजर्षिम् ।

(ii) कस्यासौ न विदितो गूर्जरपतिश्चौलुक्यवंशजः

(iii) सर्वथा प्रतापक्षयोऽस्मत्स्वामिनः । प्रतापवृद्धिर्गूर्जेश्वरस्य

(ix) स एष गूर्जरनरेश्वरोद्दम

(*Moharājaparājaya*, pp. 16, 129, 132)

In the above extracts the words in bold type refer to the Caulūkyā ruler Kumārapāla.

(c) भो मतिशालिन्, साधु साधु त्वया लपितम् । मया गूढपुरुषत्वं प्राप्तेन ' गूर्जरराजः युष्माकं भारिततुरुष्कदेशमपि सकलं दास्यति । तद् युष्मानिः

1. Journal of the Bombay branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905, pp. 413-33.

2. That *rājñī* means nothing more than a *Kṣatriyā* will be clear from v. 5 of Bāuka's inscription. A reference to any standard Sanskrit Dictionary too will convince Mr. J. C. Ghosh of the same fact.

समरसमये न योद्धव्यमिति " वचनैः तोपयित्वा भेदितः कुमारपालप्रतापसिंहप्रभृति-
गूर्जरमणलेश्वरसमूहः

(*Hammīramadamardana*, P. 35)

Here the word गूर्जरराज refers to the Caulūkyā ruler Bhīma II. The *maṇḍaleśvaras* mentioned as Gūrjaras probably belong to various clans.

Such instances can easily be multiplied. But these will perhaps suffice to show that the words '*Gurjararāja*,' '*Gurjarabhūpati*' '*Gurjaranareśvara*,' and '*Gurjarapati*' could one and all be used for even non-Gurjaras if they were just kings of Gujerat. That the Pratihāras ruled Gurjaratrā before they went to Kanauj is now generally admitted. Uddyotana Sūri states that Vatsarāja ruled at Jalor in 778 A. D.,² and Jinasena makes him the the king of the western quarter in A. D. 783.³ Hence, if we find the Pratihāras called '*Gurjareśvaras*' should not we, before rushing head-long to the conclusion that they were undoubtedly rulers belonging to the Gūjar caste pause for a moment and consider that here too, as in the case of the Chaulukyās the word might mean nothing more than a king of Gurjara country.

It might perhaps, however, be replied that the Rāṣṭrakūṭa inscriptions use the word '*Gurjara*' for the Pratihāras. Hence the word '*Gurjareśvara*' obviously means a ruler belonging to the Gūjar caste. At first sight argument appears convincing. But its specious character is revealed, if we refer to inscriptions and literature for the right interpretation of the term, Gurjara Vira Ballāla's Gadag inscription refers to a certain Gujara,⁴ As he cannot be either a Pratihāra or Gūjar but only a Caulūkyā ruler

1. Dr. D. C. Ganguly, however, thinks otherwise. For criticism of his view see our paper entitled '*Gurjara and Gurjareśvara*' to be published shortly in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*.

2. अपभ्रंशकाव्यज्ञयी (G. O. S.) Introduction, p. 89. See also our paper '*the original home of the Pratihāras of Kanauj*' to be published shortly in the ABORI.

3. शकैष्वब्दशतेषु सप्तसु दिशं पञ्चोत्तरेषूत्तराम् ।
पातीन्द्रायुधनाम्नि कृष्णनृपजे श्रीवल्लभे दक्षिणाम् ।
पूर्वा श्रीमदवन्तिभूभृति नृपे वत्साधिराजे परां
सौराणामाधिपण्डलं जययुते वीरे वराहेऽवर्ति ॥

4. E. I. Vol. VI, p. 96, verse 34.

of Anhilwād, the word 'Gurjara' here means the same thing as *Gurjararāja* i. e. a ruler of the Gurjara country. The Chirwa inscription of Jaitrasimha of Mewar too mentions a 'Gurjara'.¹ He is surely not a Pratihāra or Gurjar but the ruler of Gujerat, the Caulūkyā Bhima II. At other times the word 'Gurjara' means merely an inhabitant of the Gurjara country. This was the sense in the text which Abhayatilakagaṇi, the learned commentator of the *Dvyāśrayamahākāvya*, explained by saying 'गूर्जराणां गूर्जरदेशोद्भववृणां of the Gurjaras, i. e. the people born in Gurjara country.' Again, there are occasions when the word signifies nothing more than a person connected in some way or other with Gujerat. A good instance of this use is the word 'Gūrjarabhaṭāḥ'³ employed by the Jain scholar Hemachandra for the soldiers of the Caulukya army even though they were neither Gurjaras, nor Pratihāras, nor even all of them Caulūkyas, as they are known to have hailed from such distant places as the Sālvadeśa, Añjanagiri, and Kotāraṇa." So we might reasonably conclude that there is after all not much sense in dubbing one a Gūjar on the ground that he has been called a Gurjara or Gurjararāja in some inscription, unless there be some other and independent testimony to prove the truth of such an assertion. The weakness of Jackson's theory lies in the fact that it has unhesitatingly accepted the words 'Gūrjara' and 'Gūrjararāja' as signifying a 'Gūrjar' or 'a king of the Gūjars' without stopping to see whether it can bear some other and better interpretation more in consonance with the statements regarding their origin contained in their own inscriptions.

As regards Bhandarkar's view, it must be admitted that he has some ground for regarding a certain section of the Pratihāras as Gūjars. King Mathanadeva belonged to the Gurjara-Pratihāra lineage, and granted a field, cultivated by the Gurjaras, though he was ruling at Rājore, most probably a place outside the boundaries of ancient Gurjartrā. This King's being called a Gūrjar does not, therefore, surprise us. But Dr. Bhandarkar clearly goes beyond his evidence

1. G. H. Ojha, *Rājputānā kā Itihāsa*, Vol. I, 156.

2. Commentary on VI. 7.

3. I have mislaid the reference. It is perhaps V. 31 or so.

when he dubs the Imperial Pratihāras of Kanauj too as Gujars. His only ground for doing so is obviously the common appellation Pratihāra borne by the dynasty of Rājore as well as Kanauj. But Pratihāra, it should have been noticed, is an occupational title. As the members of all the four castes could be appointed to this important post, there is obviously no reason as to why the surname should have been confined to only one class or clan. A parallel example for the non-restriction of such occupational titles to one caste can, I believe, be found in the use of surnames like Mehtā, Sarkār, Chaudhari, Majumdār, and Modī. Hence, as our knowledge that a certain Mehtā is a Brahman does not entitle us to assume that all the other Mehtās too are Brahmans, so should not our information about the caste of Mathandeva embolden us to assert that the Pratihāras of Kanauj too belonged to Mathandeva's clan, unless we be first sure that there was and could be only one clan having the right to bear the surname Pratihāra. ✓ Bhandarkar and those of his view have apparently this confidence in full measure. But that it is hardly justified will be seen from the following extracts, culled from various sources :

- (1) ; श्रीमदुत्पलराजादिवंशे प्रामारभूभुजा ।
 अस्ति त्रैलोक्यविख्यातो धारावर्षी महीपतिः ॥ ३ ॥
 द्वाः स्थः तस्याभवत् पूर्वं वीरो वारडवंशजः ।
 नरपा [लस] मुद्भूतो हरिपाल इतिश्रुतः ॥ ४ ॥
 पुत्रस्तस्यास्ति विख्यातो भुवने लब्धविक्रमः ।
 श्रीमत्साहणपालाहः वैरिवर्गक्षयंकरः ॥ ५ ॥
 चारुस्तंभावलीयुक्तो रूपकैः विश्वतो महान् ।
 तेन श्रीवैद्यनाथस्थ निर्ममे मंडपः शुभः ॥ ६ ॥
 चंद्राकौ भुवने यावद् यावदास्ते वसुंधरा ।
 कृतिः साहणपालस्य तावद् राजतु मंडपः ॥ ७ ॥

संवत् १२६४ वर्षे चैत्र शुदि १३ गुरौ । म० जालकप्रेरितेन स्वश्रेयोर्थे प्रती०
 (प्रतीहार) साहणपालेन देवश्रीवैद्यनाथस्य मंडपः कारितः etc. १

In this extract we find a clear mention of the Pratihāras of the Bārāḍa clan. V. १ speaks of a Pramāra ruler Dhārāvarṣa. He had *formerly* a Bārāḍa द्वाःस्थ named Haripāla. His son Sāhaṇa-

1. VI. probably verse 52 or 53.

2. The *Purātattva*, p. 281.

pāla does not seem to have held this place. He called himself a Pratihāra none the less, most assuredly because he felt himself entitled to the surname because of his father having once been actually a द्वास्थ or Pratihāra. Thus was laid the beginning of a new Pratihāra clan. If the descendants of some other Pratihāra too, belonging to such different clans as the Chāpotakatas, Takkas etc, followed this very procedure, and there is no ground to assert that they did not at all do so, there is every probability that there existed in the eleventh century a number of Pratihāra clans which had nothing but their name in common with the clan ruling at Rājore.

(b) विप्रः श्रीहरिचंद्राख्यः पत्नी भद्रा च क्षत्रिया ।
 ताभ्यान्तु ये सुता जाता प्रतीहारांश्च तान्विदुः ॥ ५ ॥
 बभूव रोहिल्लद्वयङ्को वेदशास्त्रार्थपारगः ।
 द्विजः श्रीहरिचंद्राख्यः प्रजापतिसमो गुरुः ॥ ६ ॥
 तेन श्रीहरिचंद्रेण परिणीता द्विजात्मजा ।
 द्वितीया क्षत्रिया भद्रा महाकुलगुणान्विता ॥ ७ ॥
 प्रतीहारा द्विजाभूता ब्राह्मण्यां ये भवन् सुताः ।
 राज्ञी भद्रा च यान् सूते ते भूता मधुपायिनः ॥ ८ ॥¹

Here again we find the mention of two non-Gūjar Pratihāra clans. The inscription recording the fact is 132 years earlier than that at Rājore, and hence no whit inferior to it as a historical record. The Brahman Pratihāras mentioned herein are still found in the Jodhpur State. We might, therefore, be sure that the writer of the inscription invented no historical fiction, but merely recorded the facts as they were. Rejecting its testimony as mere trash, and calling Harichandra and his descendants Gūjars on no more substantial grounds than their preconceived notions on the subject shows how even eminent historians can be led astray by their love of novelty and unreasoning partiality for theories that they might have once enunciated.

(c) श्लाघ्यस्तस्मानुजोसौ मधवमदमुपो मेघनादस्य संख्ये
 सौमित्रिस्तीव्रदण्डः प्रतिहरणविधेर्यः प्रतीहार आसीत् ॥
 तद्वंशो प्रतिहारकेतनभृति त्रैलोक्यरक्षास्पदे
 देवो नागभटः पुरातनमुनेर्मूर्तिर्भूवाद्भुतम् ॥²

1. E. I. Vol. XVIII, p. 95.

2. Gwalior Bhoja prasasti, *Archaeological Survey of India*, 3-4, p. 280.

The above extract mentions a line of the *Raghuvamśin* Pratihāras. The inscription from which it is taken is about a century earlier than that at Rājore. Rājaśekhara, the court-poet of the Pratihāra rulers Mahendrapāla and Mahīpāla, confirms its testimony by calling the former '*Raghugrāmaṇi*,' and the latter *Raghuvamśamuktāmaṇi*.¹ The Haras inscription of the Chauhān ruler Vighraharāja II mentions a certain *Raghukulabhūchakravartī*.² The reference is obviously to some Pratihāra ruler of Kanauj, and even Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar has to recognize it as such. That even a record of a partly hostile dynasty should regard the Imperial Pratihāras as Raghuvamśins is remarkable indeed. Further the Haras inscription, being incised in V. S. 1030, is almost contemporary with the Rajore inscription of V. S. 1016. Had the Imperial Pratihāras been regarded as Gūjaras in Mathanadeva's time the writer of the Haras inscription would not have, just fourteen years later, gone out of his way to mention them as scions of the Raghu family. That it explicitly calls them so, and the contemporary Rājore inscription does not contradict its statement by saying anything different,³ should have, I think, even before this administered a quietus to the arguments of those who are determined to make the Imperial Pratihāras Gujars merely on the ground that a member of some other dynasty, namely Mathanadeva, the feudatory ruler of Rājore, has been called a Gujara Pratihāra i. e. a Pratihāra of the Gurjara family. ✓

The above extracts, and the Rājore inscription prove the existence of at least the following Pratihāra clans (1) the Gurjara Pratihāras of Rajore (2) ✓ the Raghuvamśin Pratihāras of Kanauj, (3) ✓ the Bāraḍa Pratihāra of Īḍar, (4) ✓ the Brahman Pratihāras of Mandore, (5) and the Kṣatriya Pratihāras of the same place. That many more clans like that might have existed can be easily inferred, for the word Pratihāra has, after all, got an occupational sense, and belongs to the same class of terms

1. *Bālabhārata*, I, 11, and the prologue of the drama.

2. V. 19.

3. The words of the inscription are :

परमभट्टारकमहाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरश्रीक्षितिपालदेवपादानुभ्यात्परमभट्टारक-
महाराजाधिराजपरमेश्वरश्रीविजयपालदेवानामभिप्रवर्धमानकल्याणविजयराज्ये संव-
त्सरशतेषु दशसु etc.

as Mehtā, Chaudhari, Majumdār etc., noted above. So there is obviously not much truth in Dr. Bhandarkar's theory that all the Pratihāras are Gūjars.

We now pass on to the theory of Mr. C. V. Vaidya. He goes just to the other extreme, and regards all the Pratihāras as Kṣatriyas of one clan. That the position is indefensible will be seen from what has been said in the last paragraph.

Dr. D. C. Ganguly contends strongly against the alleged connection of the Pratihāras with the Gūjars. That his arguments regarding the Gurjara-Pratihāras of Rājore are rather weak has been shown elsewhere.¹ For the rest we can in some measure agree with his views. He recognizes the existence of three branches of the Pratihāra dynasty one ruling in Malva and Kanauj, the second in Vallamaṇḍala, and the third in Gurjara. The third, he has on later considerations identified with the Guhila kingdom of Chāṣṣū. As regards the other two, he regards their rulers as descendants of a Brāhmaṇa. His view, as regards the origin of the Pratihāras of Vallamaṇḍala is testified as correct by the Ghaṭiyālū inscription of Bauka. But as regards the Imperial Pratihāras of Kanauj, it has to be rejected as going against the testimony of the works of Rajaśekhara, the Gwalior Praśasti of the Pratihāras and the Haras inscription of the Chāhamāna ruler Vighraha II noticed above.

We have now only one theory more to consider. Our discussion of the views of the other writers on the subject has already led us to the following conclusions:—

- M. M. Gauri-Shankar Hīrachand Ojha's Theory.
- (i) That there were at least five or six Pratihāra clans.
 - (ii) That these belonged to different castes.
 - (iii) That the word *Pratihāra* is only an occupational title preserved by the descendants of the members of various castes and clans who originally held it.

These are exactly the views of Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Gauri-shankar Hīrachand Ojha. His theory is thus the only one that accords, according to our findings, with historical evidence and non-biased reasoning, and can, for that reason, be accepted unreservedly by every student of history.

1. See our paper 'Dr. Ganguly on the Gurjars and Gurjaratrā', to be published shortly in the *Indian Culture*.

2. See Dr. Ganguly's 'History of the Gurjara Country'. I. H. Vol. X, pp. 613 ff.

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REVIEWS

The Child in Ancient India by Kamalabai Deshpande, G.A., Ph. D., Principal S. N. D. T. Women's College, Poona 4. Venus Stores, Booksellers and Publishers, Poona 4. Demi, pp. xv, 226. Price Rs. 2.

The book under review is a revised form of the Thesis submitted by the author for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at the German University of Prague. Dr. Kamalabai Deshpande had the privilege of sitting at the feet of the world-renowned scholar, the late Professor Dr. M. Winternitz. The work is an important contribution to the history of Indian religion and social life.

The life of a Hindu is accompanied by religious rites right from his conception until after his death. These rites go under the name of *samskāras*. A *samskāra*, according to the author, is a socio-religious rite by the performance of which the life of the present Hindu or Brāhmanical Ārya is sanctified. Although ethnological parallels to these rites can easily be traced in various ancient races, yet it seems that the ancient Aryans viewed even the worldly life of a man from the point of view of the realisation of the Supreme. Hence, they regulated even this *pravṛttipradhānā samsārayātrā* and brought it under the hard and fast discipline of the *samskāras*. Whatever their original form might have been, it is clear that with the advancement of time these rites became elaborate and assumed different shapes. The present work deals with nine of them, beginning with *Garbhādhāna* and ending with *Upanayana*. The treatment is mainly based on all the fourteen printed *Gr̥hyasūtras* with occasional references to the relevant parts of the *Dharmśāstras* and the Vedic texts. The method adopted in the study is thoroughly scientific. Each *samskāra* is chronologically traced in *Gr̥hyasūtras* belonging to different ages and after a careful analysis and description, the author has tried to interpret its origin and its sociological significances. The author has spared no pains in making her expositions exhaustive and clear and it "throws a considerable light on the mutual relation of the *Gr̥hyasūtras* and the Vedic schools to which they belong."

She divides the *sūtras* into four groups :—

1. *R̥gveda-sūtras* viz., *Āśvalāyana S'āṅkhāyana* and *Kaus'itaki*. It is considered to be the oldest group.

2. The first group of the black *Yajurveda-sūtras*, viz., *Baudhāyana*, *Āpastamba*, *Hiraṇyakeśin*, *Bhāradvāja* and *Pāraskara*.

3. The second group of the Black *Yajurveda-sūtras*, viz., *Mānava*, *Kāṭhaka* and *Varāha*.

4. *Sāmaveda-sūtras*, viz. *Gobhila*, *Khādira* and *Jaimini*

Of the remaining two Vedas, namely, the White *Yajurveda* and the *Atharvaveda* the former is represented by *Pāraskara* only (which is included in no. 2 above) and the only representative of the latter is *Kausika* (which is left out of consideration because it is more of a hand book of magic rites than a *Gṛhyasūtra*).

The last chapter of the book is very interesting and deals with the exact time of beginning of the custom of child marriage in India. The author has discussed the question at length and after examining the internal and external evidences, has come to the conclusion that the custom must have arisen between the 7th and 11th centuries A. D.

At the end of the book we find an Appendix giving the *pratikas* of the *mantras* in the nine rites discussed in the book and their sources, a synopsis of the texts which describe the nine rites, a Bibliography of Reference Books, a Bibliography of the *Gṛhyasūtras* and an Index. The only thing which is very badly wanting in this book is a list of abbreviations.

The book is very well done and we recommend it to every student of religion and sociology.

The Editor.

Brahmavidyā : The Adyar Library Bulletin. Edited by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M. A., D. Phil. (Oxon). Vol. I Part 1, Adyar, Madras. 17th of February, 1937. Demi. pp. 195. Annual Subscription Rs. 6/—.

We welcome this Quarterly. It was in 1901 that Col. Olcott, the President Founder of The Theosophical Society expressed a desire establishing a monthly Sanskrit Journal similar to the "Pandit" of Benares. For some reason or the other, as explained by the Editor, the idea had to be postponed until now. The

honour of starting it has fallen upon the worthy head of so eminent a scholar as Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. We congratulate the Theosophical Society for the choice, for it could not have hit upon a fitter person.

The Adyar Library is one of the biggest and the best equipped oriental libraries in the world. It is in the fitness of things that the Directors of the Library have launched the project of bringing into light the hidden treasures of Eastern Wisdom. Apart from its service to the cause of Spiritualism, the Journal will give a great impetus to humanistic studies. This Journal (or Bulletin as it is named) will be issued four times a year, on the 17th of February (in memory of Col. Olcott, President Founder of the Theosophical Society), the 8th of May (in memory of Madame Blavatsky, co-Founder), the 1st of October (in memory of Dr. Annie Besant, the 2nd President of The Theosophical Society) and the 1st of December (in honour of Dr. G. S. Arundale, the present President of the Theosophical Society). The size of the Bulletin will be about twenty forms per issue, and between 72 and 80 forms for the whole year.

The First issue before us contains *Messages* from Dr. G. S. Arundale and Mr. C. Jinarajadasa; the Editorial *Ourselves*; *How the Adyar Library was founded* by the Editor; *The name Kalki (n)* by Prof. F. Otto Schrader; and *Notes on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dīpnāga* by N. Aiyaswami Sastri. It has got three Serial publications, viz., *R̥gvedavyākhyā Mādhvakṛitā* and *Āśvalāya nagrhyasūtra with Devasvāmibhāṣya* edited by the Editor of the Bulletin and *The Yoga Upaniṣads translated into English* by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Śāstrī and T. R. Srīnivās Ayyangar. The Bulletin has notes about two mss. by the Editor and Dr. V. Raghavan and one Review. Printing, paper and the get-up leave nothing to be desired.

We once more welcome this excellent Journal.

The Editor.

The Karnāṭaka Historical Review. A Quaterly Journal devoted to Indian History, specially Karnāṭaka History. Edited by Dr. B. A. Saletore, M.A., Ph. D. (London et Giessen), Professor of History and Politics, S. P. College, Poona. Published by the

Secretary, Karnāṭaka Historical Research Society, Dharwar. Vol. III, Nos. 1 and 2 Jan.-July, 1936; pp. 60. Annual Subscription Rs. 3.

It is with very great pleasure that we welcome the reappearance of this important Journal. For a long time the publication of the Review was irregular. But now having come in the able hands of Dr. Saletore, it will, we hope, appear regularly. The service which this Journal has been doing to the cause of Indology is not unknown to Scholars. In spite of many Historical periodicals, South Indian History has not received the attention at the hands of historians which it so very richly deserves. The Editor has very ably traced in his Notes the history of development of research in Vijayanagara kingdom. The following scholars who might be called the pioneers in the field deserve special mention :—Major Dixon, Dewan Sir C. Seshadri Iyer, Lewis Rice (who prepared the *Gazetteer of Mysore and Coorg*, published the *Coorg Inscriptions* and *Epigraphia Carnatica*), MM. Narasimhacharya, Dr. Sham Sastri, Sir Walter Eliot, Hope, Dr. M. H. Krishna and G. Yazdani of the Nizam Government. The part played by the Mysore and Hyderabad Durbar in giving impetus to the study is very commendable.

We have before us the first two numbers of volume 3. The volume contains the following articles: *Lakṣmaṇotsava—An important work on medicine*, by Dr. Har Dutt Sharma; *Local organisation in the Cālukyan Karnāṭaka*, by Dinkar Desai; *Date of Vis'valocanakoṣa of S'ridharasena* by P. K. Gode, *The Karnāṭaka, Conquest of Cakroṭṭā* and a *Note on Jakkaṇācārya*, by the Editor and *Jakkaṇācārya—The forgotten Architect of India*, by A. Padmanabhan. Besides these articles, the volume contains Editorial Notes, Reviews of books, etc.

We wish the Journal a long and prospering career under the able editorship of Dr. Saletore.

—The Editor.

EDITORIAL NOTE

As we enter into the second year of our existence, it is our first duty to greet our customers and contributors who have so kindly helped us in the continuance of our Journal. We pray most fervently the Almighty to bless them with every blessing and prolonged life and request them in return to continue the same help and patronage as have been hitherto tendered to us.

As promised in our last issue No. 4 of Vol. I, we have been able to include Prof. O. Stein's article about life and work of the late lamented famous Indologist Moritz Winternitz, giving all his activities in the field of Indology, who worked hard in wiping out many prejudices harboured by the so-called civilized world re. our ancient civilization and bringing home the sublime truths of the Aryan Religion. His help to India in unfolding India's hidden treasures is incalculable and it would not be possible to make full amends for it by writing a few lines in this Journal. The editor is deeply grateful for all the help he gave him in teaching critical methods while studying for the Ph. D. examination at his feet in Prague.

We have been fortunate enough to have received till now enough material of sterling worth for publishing in our subsequent issues of the Poona Orientalist which we hope, will commend itself to the scientific workers in Indology. We have a more ambitious plan than last year which we are sure will satisfy our patrons.

THE POONA ORIENTALIST

A quarterly journal devoted to Oriental studies

Vol. II]

JULY 1937

[No. 2

THE MISSING KĀRIKĀ IN THE SĀNKHYASAPTATI

(S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri)

The search for a single Sāṅkhya-kārikā alleged to be now missing seems to have lost nothing of its fascination. It was started by the late Lokamānya Tilak, on a consideration of two factors—the existence of only 69 verses in the text of Gauḍapāda, while his own colophon refers to seventy āryās, and the existence of a rather extensive commentary discussing such alleged causes of the universe, as Īśvara and Kāla, while there is no verse original to which it could conceivably apply. It is now well-known that Tilak proposed to read a kārikā in the following terms, immediately after the 61st verse, in the commentary on which occurs the now apparently irrelevant discussion :

kāraṇam īśvaram eke bruvate kālam pare svabhāvam vā |
prajāḥ katham nirguṇato vyaktaḥ kālaḥ svabhāvaś ca ||

The verse was suggested in this form in the *Gītārahasya* but subsequently in an article in the *Sanskrit Research* (a magazine now defunct) the first quarter was changed to “kāraṇam īśvaram eke puruṣam,” presumably on the ground that the commentary both in the *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣya* and the *Māṭhara-vṛtti* mentions puruṣa as an alleged cause. Professor Har Dutt Sharma, not knowing this, suggested the identical change for the same reasons in an article contributed to the *Indian Historical Quarterly*.¹ The present writer in both his editions of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* suggested that there was no need for postulating a lost kārikā, that the commentary under verse 61 is not so unintelligible at least in the Chinese version of it, and that the number, seventy, may be arrived at by a process of subtraction (from the seventy-two or seven-

1. V, iii, 421 et seq.

ty-three recognised by other commentators) rather than by a process of addition. Some of those arguments were noticed and a refutation attempted by Prof. Har Dutt Sharma in his own edition of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* with Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya*.¹ The present writer's conclusion based on a study of Paramārtha's version were published in an article on 'Māṭhara and Paramārtha.'² And now comes Mr. Ledrus with an entirely new suggestion as to the lost āryā.³ What he says has the merit of novelty, but suffers from the disadvantage of ignoring the suggestions of at least two workers in the field. Thus, he is aware of Tilak's suggestion, but brushes it aside with a light criticism, though that criticism had been made by the present writer⁴ and replied to with some success by Prof. Har Dutta Sharma.⁵ And though he refers to Paramārtha he fails to see the significance of Paramārtha's omission of a verse⁶ that is reckoned in other texts. It seems therefore worth while to restate briefly the present writer's position while considering the suggestion of Mr. Ledrus.

I

At the commencement of the *Māṭhara-vṛtti* are found three verses, the first and the third in anuṣṭup and the second in āryā. They are as follows :

1. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1933.

2. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1931.

3. *Indian Culture*, October, 1936.

4. See *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 1st edition, Madras University, p. 118. The criticism urged is that it is difficult to imagine three commentators missing out the verse, but faithfully copying the commentary thereon. The answer of Prof. Har Dutt Sharma calls attention to the possibility of text and commentary forming independent Mss., so that the theistic vandal who interfered with the text had no access to or ignored the commentary, and the copyists of the commentary might have been ignorant scribes who noticed no intrusion. This is not convincing; for we have yet to know by what process or fiat a complete erasure of the verse could have been effected in all the Mss. available in the country; if the erasure had been effected by such a thoughtful theist would he have forgotten the commentaries? But Prof. Sharma's suggestion is plausible and deserves to be noticed instead of being ignored as by Mr. Ledrus,

5. P. 56, fn. of his Sanskrit text.

6. Verse 63 in the Indian texts.

sarvavidyāvidhātāram ādityastham sanātanam |
 nato 'smi parayā bhaktyā kāpilam jyotir īśvaram || (1)
 kapilāya namas tasmai yenā 'vidyodadhau jagati magne |
 kāruṇyāt sāṅkhyamayī naur iha vihitā pratarañāya || (2)
 namaskṛtya tu tam tasya vaksye jñānasya kāraṇam |
 hitāya sarva-śiṣyāṇām alpa-grantha-samuccayam || (3)

Then comes what we now know as the first of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās. The second of the three verses cited above occurs at the commencement of the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* too, where 'naur iha' appears as 'naur iva'; and it is followed by this verse in āryā metre;

alpAGRANTHAM SPAṢṬAM PRAMĀṆA-SIDDHĀNTA-HETUBHIR YUKTAM |
 ŚĀSTRAM ŚIṢYA-HITĀYA SAMĀSATO 'HAM PRAVAKṢYĀMI ||

It will be seen that this verse expresses the same idea as that of verse 3 above mentioned, the metre alone being different. The Chinese commentary, which belongs probably to the same period and most likely derives from the same original, does not have any of these verses, but the ideas of verse 2 are found in the introduction, which speaks of Kapila experiencing great compassion 'seeing humanity plunged in blind darkness.' It is permissible, therefore, to suppose that the verse 'Kapilāya namaḥ' formed part of the original work of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa himself, instead of being a commentator's invocation. The supposition is strengthened by two other considerations: the author of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, following *śiṣṭācāra*, should have composed an invocation; the lack of an invocation is noticed by Vācaspati who tries to explain it away in his *Tattvakaumudī*.¹ Further, a commentator would be expected to offer obeisance if at all, to the author of the work commented on, instead of stopping short with a homage to the remote founder of the system; we find this, for instance, in Vācaspati who mentions in his second invocatory verse not only Kapila, but also Āsuri, Pañcaśikha and Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. It is true that no reference to the

1. Thus says Mr. Ledrus, basing himself on the following words of Vācaspati: "Yadyapi duḥkham amaṅgalam, tathā 'pi tatparihārārthatvena tadapaghāto maṅgalam eve 'ti yuktam śāstrādaḥ tatkīrtanam iti." But surely this has nothing to do with offering an invocation. Should a śāstra begin with an inauspicious word like "misery"? And the answer is that as there is mention not merely of misery, but also of its extirpation (apaghāta) the commencement is certainly auspicious.

teachers following Kapila is found in the three early commentators Māthara, Gauḍapāda and Paramārtha. This negative feature coupled with their agreement in essentials would suggest that they all derived from an original commentary by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa himself. In such a case, of course, there would be no reference to himself in an invocatory verse. One may, however, expect an introductory verse mentioning the composition of a commentary; and this (according to Mr. Ledrus) is just what we have in the anuṣṭup verse "namaskṛtya tu tam" etc. The relative pronouns here necessarily refer to an antecedent in a preceding verse; what is more natural than to suppose it to be Kapila, mentioned in the second verse? Hence verses 2 and 3 should have been by the same hand; the former in āryā metre is an integral part of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, bringing the number to seventy, when reckoned along with the sixty-nine known to Gauḍapāda; the latter verse is part of the original commentary which was variously plagiarised by Vedāntins (as represented by Gauḍapāda), Bauddhas (as represented by Paramārtha) and Bhāgavatas (as represented by Māthara). The last-mentioned, as having most in common with the Sāṅkhya, tampered least with the commentary; hence we have even Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's introductory verse preserved; Māthara has (in consonance with his general policy of supplementation) but added an introductory verse of his own, the first of the three cited above. Gauḍapāda (in consonance with his policy of plagiarism and mutilation) recast Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's introductory verse into a different form, in āryā metre, to make the commentary appear his own. From all these considerations it would seem clear that the verse 'Kapilāya namaḥ' etc. is the first kārikā of the *Sāṅkhyasaptati*.

II

It will be readily conceded that the argument of Mr. Ledrus is both ingenious and intriguing. The metre and sentiments of the verse in question are worthy of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. It is difficult to concede, however, that anything like a conclusive case has been made out.

(1) The need for an invocation has not been established. As noted earlier, what Vācaspati says about "maṅgalam" relates not to any invocation, but to the auspiciousness of the initial

word in the work. And the very fact of his attempting a justification would seem to show that in his time the clear tradition was that "duḥkatraya" etc. was the first verse of the work. Works are known which are begun and successfully finished without any invocation.¹

(2) The fact that two commentators agree in citing that verse is of little probative value, especially when, on other grounds, the conclusion is necessitated that they derive from a common source. The possibility of a common source is admitted by Mr. Ledrus himself. Whether the original commentator was Īsvara Kṛṣṇa or not, it is not unintelligible that an invocatory verse of that commentator was taken over by both Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara.

(3) The occurrence of words like 'blind darkness' in Paramārtha's introduction proves nothing, since corresponding words are found in Māṭhara's prose-introduction (upodghāta) too: "andhe tamasi majjaj jagad idam adrākṣīt." Whether the commentator was expanding here what was contained in his own verse or in the original author's verse cannot be decided without very much further evidence.

(4) It is not correct, therefore, to say that the invocation "Kapilāya namaḥ" etc., finds a place in all the "synoptic (sic) commentaries" prior to Vācaspati. Prof. Har Dutt Sharma has made out a very plausible case² for considering the *Jayamaṅgalā* as having preceded the *Tattvakaumudī*. This *Jayamaṅgalā* has only one invocatory verse:

adhigatatattvālokam lokottaravādinam praṇamya munim |
kriyate saptatikāyāṣṭikā jayamaṅgalā:nāma ||

No one is mentioned by name; the reference to 'muni' would most appropriately relate to Kapila, as the term does not appear to have been applied to Īsvara Kṛṣṇa and we do not even know if he was at any time an ascetic. If a commentary of that antiquity could omit all reference to the author of the *Kārikās*, it calls for no great effort of imagination to hold that both Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara composed (or made use of an extant and well-

1. Readers will be familiar with the discussion in the *Tarkadīpikā* as to the necessity for a maṅgala.

2. *IHQ*. V, iii, 421 et seq.

known) invocatory verse to Kapila and left Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in the cold. The hypothesis that the invocation to Kapila should have come only from the author of the *Kārikās* seems hardly necessary.

(5) Scholars have maintained that the ultra-rational non-theistic (if not atheistic) system propounded in the *Kārikās* derives not directly from Kapila but through Pañcaśikha. The atheistic colouring is indeed what is supposed to be meant in the statement "tena ca bahudhā kṛtam tantram" in the seventieth verse.¹ Whatever the merits of this conjecture, there can be no doubt that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa must have owed a considerable debt to Pañcaśikha's work. By reckoning in the āryā "Kapilāya namaḥ" and necessarily leaving out of reckoning the verses now numbered 70-72, the work will be deprived of all reference to the mighty sāṅkhyatīrthas who succeeded Kapila.

(6) The verse beginning with "namaskṛtya tu tam" does not necessarily proceed from a commentator. Assuming that it comes from Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, it may well refer to the work itself, not to a commentary, since no word specifically denoting a commentary occurs in that verse. On the contrary, the word "vakṣye" (in contrast with the "pravakṣyāmi" of Gauḍapāda) would seem to indicate the original in preference to the commentary. The hypothesis of a commentary by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa must stand therefore on other grounds than this anuṣṭup verse ascribed to him.

(7) The construction of that verse itself, with its ugly "tasya jñānasya kāraṇam" (meaning "the cause of knowledge according to him") and the repetition of the obeisance (compare "kapilāya namaḥ" and "namaskṛtya tu tam") is not such as to favour the view of its composition by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.

(8) The need for an antecedent for the relative pronouns 'tam' and 'tasya' may be satisfied by a relation to the first verse which is also in anuṣṭup metre and expresses homage to the Light that is Kapila. Incidentally it may be noted that "Īśvaram" at the end of that verse is probably a reference to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa; the homage in the third verse (as at present arranged) would appropriately proceed in this case from the author of the com-

1. See Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 221.

mentary to the author of the *Kārikās*. The metre would suggest grouping of verses 1 and 3 together, the intrusion of verse 2 being due to scribal error. The occurrence of that āryā in more than one commentary does not compel us to assume that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa composed it, as it may well have been taken over from what was the original for both *Māṭhara* and *Gauḍapāda*; in the alternative it may have been a well-known form of obeisance to Kapila which was bodily taken over by both commentators even because of being well-known at that time.

(9) If anything, Gauḍapāda's second verse "alpagantham" etc. has a greater likelihood of being Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's composition, since it reads better. It is, however, in āryā metre and cannot be recognised as Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's by those who would make out that he composed no more and no less than seventy āryās. If certain āryās, in spite of being his composition, are to be treated as falling outside the main *Saptati*, there is nothing to prevent us from recognising some of the kārīkās, subsequent to the sixty-ninth in the reckoning of Gauḍapāda, and neglecting kārīkās like "Kapilāya namaḥ" even assuming the ascription of these to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa to be correct. The word "pravakṣyāmi" presents a difficulty, but it is not insuperable; it does not necessarily mean something other than "vakṣye"; even if it did, this āryā would square better with the hypothesis that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa wrote the original commentary too. It is both unwarranted and uncharitable to assume that Gauḍapāda wanted to pass off the commentary as his own and therefore deliberately tampered with Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's verse "namaskṛtya tu tam" etc.

(10) The suggestion that Māṭhara was more faithful because of being a Bhāgavata, and so on, merits no special consideration, since no evidence is adduced for it.

(11) The justification for Tilak's conjectural verse has not been adequately considered. As noted earlier, the one criticism urged by Mr. Ledrus was anticipated by the present writer and met in a way by Prof. Har Dutt Sharma.

(12) Some other points of criticism urged by the present writer have, however, to be repeated. What is now verse 61 states there is nothing which can be reckoned "sukumārataram (more sukumāra)" than Prakṛti. The suggested verse discussing

Īśvara, Kāla etc. is said to follow on this. At the end of this long discussion, however, both Māṭhara and Gauḍpāda hark back to the word "sukumārataram."¹ This would be unintelligible should another verse intervene. Prof. Sharma's reply is that some scribe finding the discussion of Īśvara etc. under verse 61, and finding no occasion for it there, committed the officious blunder of trying to link up the commentary with verse 61. The hypothesis requires too many assumptions—that some one mischievously erased the verse about Īśvara etc., that some other or others failed to realise that the commentary related to the missing verse and that these same or others again interpolated passages to exhibit the commentary as relating to verse 61. Surely we must have much more justification than at present for such a mass of assumptions.² We have yet to get a single copy of the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* or *Māṭharavṛtti* which departs from the text as we have it. How are we to explain the uniformity in what are alleged to be acts of omission and commission? Is there any evidence of organised vandalism? The objection is not conclusive. But no more is the original position.

(13) The verses now numbered 56 to 62 form a continuity. The first states that creation is the work of Prakṛti; the next gives us the analogy of the secretion of milk in the cow for the sake of the calf; in the next verse we are told that Prakṛti functions for the release of puruṣa, just as, in the world, one undertakes action in order to be rid of desire; then comes the analogy of the *danseuse* who desists from dancing after having exhibited herself; in verse 60 the selflessness of Prakṛti is extolled by a comparison with a faithful woman-servant; verse 61 tells us that, after having been seen, Prakṛti no longer serves to bind the puruṣa, since being *sukumāratara*, it no longer comes within the puruṣa's ken; *therefore*, says verse 62, the puruṣa is of a certainty neither bound nor liberated, nor does

1. Māṭhara says: "sukmārataram ity etad vākyaśeṣaḥ kṛtaḥ yasmāt sukumārataram pradhānam tasmād ucyate" etc.; and Gauḍapāda "ataḥ prakṛteḥ sukumārataram subhogyataram na kiñcid īśvarādi kāraṇamastī 'ti me matir bhavati."

2. The difficulty becomes all the greater when we see that quite a long passage relating to verse 61 succeeds the discussion of Īśvara etc., in the *Māṭharavṛtti*. This is the case in the Chinese commentary too.

he migrate. Why imagine that this entirely natural sequence was interrupted by a verse about God and time? Assuming that the sixty-second verse discussed these topics, what would be the propriety of "tasmāt (therefore)" in the succeeding verse about the puruṣa not being really bound or released?

(14) The discussion of Īśvara etc., in the commentary on verse 61, does not seem so inappropriate, on a consideration of Paramārtha's version. "Sukumāratva" has then been rendered as delicacy and treated as synonymous with being subtle. The *Jayamaṅgalā* (which, as said earlier, appears to be an old commentary) also renders the word as "sūkṣmataram itarat." Only the ultimate cause of the entire universe can claim to be subtler than all else. It is therefore open to an objector to say: "How is Prakṛti the subtlest? She is not the cause of the world, but Īśvara or puruṣa or kāla or svabhāva." An early commentary—which probably served as basis for Māṭhara, Gauḍapāda and Paramārtha—foresaw such an objection and attempted to meet it. The commentator's line of thought is fairly clear in Paramārtha, whereas there appears a jump in the versions of Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara. The author of the *Jayamaṅgalā* probably followed the older commentator in his interpretation of sukumāratatva, but discarded the subsequent discussion as irrelevant to, though deducible from, what is expressly found in the *Kārikās*. The evidence of the *Jayamaṅgalā* and of Paramārtha deserve greater consideration than they have received in this connection.

(15) Paramārtha's version of the *Saptati* is also important for its omission of what is now reckoned as verse 63. The omission was known to Tilak, who, however, following Takakusu, concluded that it must have been due to oversight since the idea of the verse is found even in the *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, III, 73. This consideration should have had no weight. The occurrence of certain ideas and expressions in the *Sūtra* can give at best a remote probability of their having occurred in the *Kārikās* too; where, however, a verse seems merely repetitive and out of place, and there is evidence of its omission in one text, the argument for its omission from other texts too gains strength. Verse 62 says that puruṣa is never bound, that Prakṛti alone binds itself through itself. Verse 64 says "From the repeated study of the truth thus (that the

puruṣa is never bound, etc.), there results the wisdom 'I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not' which leaves no residue (to be known), is pure, being free from Ignorance, and is absolute." The word "evam" in verse 64 naturally relates to what was stated in verse 62, not to the content of verse 63, about Prakṛti binding itself through seven forms and releasing itself through one form. Further, verses 44 and 45, which recount the eight forms and the effects of each, have already indicated release to come from jñāna and bondage from the other seven; verse 63 but restates this in a summary form; it is inconceivable that Īśvara Kṛṣṇa would have resorted to idle repetition in a compendious work. Nothing can be lost by cutting out verse 63. It is true that all commentators (with the exclusion of Paramārtha) have commented on it; the commentary, however, amounts to little more than a repetition of the text in other words. One may hazard the guess that, faced with a needless āryā, they yet did not care to ignore it and so gave it the honour of a few words of comment. It is not easy to explain how or when this verse was allowed to intrude; but the difficulties are not greater than in explaining how a verse came to be left out of all texts including the Chinese; the hypothesis of intrusion has at least the evidence of the omission from the Chinese text.

(16) On the assumption that verse 63 is an intruder, the problem of reckoning seventy āryās is simplified. The usually admitted number is seventy-two. This gets reduced to seventy-one by the omission recommended. The last of these beginning with the words "saptatyām kila," is, again on the evidence of Paramārtha, not the composition of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa; for we are told, "An intelligent man of this (school) has composed this verse."¹ It is on the face of it probable that the assessment of the *Saptati* in relation to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* was made by a later student of both, than by the author of the former work. This leaves us with seventy verses beginning with "duḥkhatraya" and ending with "samkṣiptam āryamatinā samyag vijñāya siddhāntam"; the last verse would be in the nature of a colophon indicating the authorship, the purpose (viz., condensation) and the fidelity of the work to the original teaching; and indebtedness to all teachers of note would also have been expressed in verses 68 and 69 (or 69 and 70 as at present reckoned). We shall thus have a brief treatise of the system indulging in no unnecessary discussions or repetitions. Is it not then a more worthy and profitable attempt to look for a superfluous than for a missing āryā?

1. That later writers composed āryās tacking them on to the *Saptati* is evident from the 73rd verse in the *Māṭharavṛtti*.

SOME IMPORTANT DATES FROM THE KHARATARA
GACCHA PAṬṬĀVALĪ COMPILED
BY JINAPĀLA, ETC.

(Dasharatha Sharma)

Some time back I contributed a short paper to the *Indian Historical Quarterly* showing the importance of this *Paṭṭāvalī* for historical purposes. On going through it once more I find the following additional extracts containing important dates :—

1. (a) ' संवत् १३१० वैशाख सुदि ११ श्रीजाबालिपुरे...पञ्चदश साधवः कृताः ... तस्मिन्नेव वैशाखे १३ स्वातिनक्षत्रे शनौ चारे श्रीमहावीरदेवविधिचैत्ये राजश्रीउदयसिंहदेवादिराजलोकसमागमे...नानाप्रतिमानां महामहोत्सवेन प्रतिष्ठा जज्ञे "। (p. 476)

(b) ' संवत् १३१४ माघसुदि कनकगिरि उपरिनिर्मापितप्रधानप्रासादो-परिध्वजारोप श्रीउदयसिंहराजप्रमोदपूर्वकं निर्विघ्नं संजातम् । (p. 48)

The latest date hitherto discovered for Udayasimha, the Chāhamāna ruler of Jālor, is V. S. 1306.¹ The above extracts prove that he was reigning in both the V. S. years 1310 and 1314.

2. ' संवत् १३१६ श्रीजाबालिपुरे माघसुदि १४ धर्मसुंदरिगिन्या प्रवर्तनीपटं माघसुदि ३ पूर्णेश्वरकनककलशयोः प्रव्रज्या माघ सुदि ६ सुवर्णगिरौ श्रीशातिनाथप्रासादे स्वर्णकलशस्वर्णदण्डारोपणं पद्मूलिगाभ्यां श्रीचाचिगदेवराज्ये कारितं (p. 48 a)

The earliest inscription of Chāchigadeva, the son and successor of Udayasimha of Jālor, bears the date akṣaya-tṛtīyā of the month Vaiśākha of the (Vikrama) year 1319². Our extract gives a date more than two years earlier than this. Chāchigadeva must have, therefore, succeeded to the throne somewhere between this date, i. e. V. S. 1316 and V. S. 1314, the last date supplied by our manuscript for Udayasimha.

3. (a) सं. १३३५...फाल्गुण वदि श्रीसमरासिंहमहाराज रामराज्ये प्रत्यासन्ननगरग्रामसमुदायमेलके समस्तब्राह्मणलोकजटाधरराजप्रधानक्षेत्रसिंहकर्ण-राजपुत्रप्रमुखराजलोक नागरिकलोकेषु मध्येभूय महोत्सवं कुर्वाणेषु ... बहूनां प्रतिमानां...प्रतिष्ठामहोत्सवः संजातः । (p. 52 b)

1. Bhandarkar—The Chāhamānas of Marwar, E. I., XI, p. 76.

2. Ibid.

(b) काव्युण सुदि ५...चकरहट्टी अंबिकायाश्च ध्वजारोपमहोत्सवः
राज्यधुराधरणधैर्यराजपुत्रश्रीधरसिंहसाम्निध्यात् तीर्थप्रोत्सर्पणकारी संज
(p. 52 b)

These two extracts supply not merely V. S. 1335 as a date for Rāwal Samarasimha of Chitore but also give some additional information about him. The first of these extracts, for instance, tells us that Kṣetrasimha was Samarasimha's chief minister, and Karṇasimha probably one of his sons or relatives. The second extract is equally important. It tells us about *Rājaputra* Arsimha, most probably the father of the celebrated Rāṇā Hamir. He seems to have been in charge of affairs in Samarasimha's time. The compound word सकलराज्यधुराधरणधैर्य clearly implies that all power in the kingdom really rested with this all-powerful kinsman of the Rāwal.

4. ' संवत् १३४२...ज्येष्ठकृष्णनवम्यां...बहूनां बिंबानां महता विस्तारेण श्रीसामंतसिंहविजयराज्ये... प्रतिष्ठामहामहोत्सवो विहितः । (p. 55 b)

The extract gives V. S. 1342 as a date for Sāmantasimha, the Chāhamāna ruler of Jālor.

5. ' संवत् १३७१ ज्येष्ठ बदि दशम्यां मं. भोजराज ... देवसिंहप्रमुख-सकलश्रीजाबालिपुरीयसमुदायकारितः... महामहोत्सवः श्रीपूज्यैः कृतः । तस्मिन् महोत्सवे... साध्वीनां च दीक्षा प्रदत्ता । ततो म्लेच्छकृतो भंगः । '

Mūta Nensi gives V. S. 1368 as the date of the capture of Jalore. Jinaprabhasūri gives V. S. 1367 as the date of the pollution of the temple of Sāuchor by Alauddin's army.² Taking this fact into consideration, Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar regards Nensi's date as correct.³ But more authoritative than this is our Paṭṭāvalī which being completed in V. S. 1393, and compiled from records very carefully kept, is an invaluable source of history for the fourteenth century of the Vikram era. It gives V. S. 1371 as the date of the capture of Jalor. The year is *Kārttikādi*.

We shall deal with the remaining important dates from the manuscript in a further instalment to be contributed in near future to this journal.

1. Ibid, p. 78.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

A VEDĀNTIC TREATISE AND ITS
UNPUBLISHED COMMENTARY:
A NOTICE

(Sadāshiva L. Kātre)

The Manuscript

No. 3074 of our Institute, viz., the Oriental Manuscripts Library (Prāchya-Grantha-Saṅgraha) of Ujjain, maintained by the government of His Highness Mahārājā Jivājīrāo Scindiā of Gwalior, is a Ms. of a metrical work on Vedānta entitled *Svabodharatna* with a detailed commentary in prose entitled *Prabhābhānu*. The Ms. which is in tolerably good condition contains 132 bluish paper folios of the size $12\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ inches, with a margin of about an inch left on all sides. Each side of the folios contains 11 to 13 lines on the average, with about 50 letters in each line. The letters are somewhat small and the handwriting, though legible, is not good. The Ms. abounds in mistakes which are due to the scribe's carelessness as also to his ignorance of Sanskrit, although the impression is left on the reader's mind that his prototype must have been a very correct Ms.

Folio 68 is not there ; but as possibly no breach of matter can be traced between folios 67 and 69, the scribe seems to have inadvertently inserted the figure 69 instead of 68 on the folio.¹ Further, the figure 94 appears on two consecutive folios. Minute perusal of the Ms. detects a serious blunder of the scribe on folio 96 : Verse 126 is there but an abrupt breach of matter is noticed in the Commentary whereafter we are introduced suddenly to the second half of verse 129 on the same folio. This means that the scribe has missed or left out a good deal of matter (viz., a part of com. on verse 127 ; verses 127 and 128 with their com.; and the first half of verse 129), which could not have been less than one or two folios of his prototype Ms., without leaving any mark to suggest his blunder to the haphazard reader !

1. Folio 67 closes with "...मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यादित्यादिश्रुतिरप्येतदभि-
प्रार्थैव न तु स्वातंत्र्येण त-" and folio 69 begins with "-दुपादनत्वपराऽन्यथा
सांख्यसिद्धांतापत्तिर्भवेदतो etc."

The name and the date of the scribe are not found given in the Ms. However the water-marks of the paper used decidedly assign the Ms. to a very recent age and as such remove it by about a century from the original composition of the Commentary (vide below).

The Original Text

The original treatise, consisting of 215 verses of various metres,¹ is entitled *Svabodharatna* as well as *Svānubhavādarśa*² and was published, along with the author's own commentary, in two issues at Benares.³ Only a very brief summary of the outlines of its philosophy is possible in the short space permissible to this paper.

Its Philosophy, etc.

Realisation of Ātman (i.e. the Individual Soul), ultimately leading to the sense of identity with Brahman (i.e. the Supreme Soul), the only real, uniform and surviving entity, is most essential to those desirous of salvation. The process, though extremely difficult, becomes possible to those possessing the requisite qualifications⁴ with the help of constant thinking on the lines prescribed by the Upaniṣads or the Vedānta Śāstra under the guru's directions. Numerous doubts, misgivings, etc., baffling the progress of right reasoning, occur in the process due to Ignorance

1. उपजाति (94), शालिनी (48), भुजङ्गप्रयात (24), इन्द्रवज्रा (13), वसन्त-तिलका (10), औपच्छंदसिक (10), शार्दूलविकीर्णित (6), द्रुतविलम्बित (3), उपेन्द्रवज्रा (3), इन्द्रवंशा (2) and मालिनी (2).

2. “निर्मथ्य वेदान्तसमुद्रमेतस्त्वबोधरत्नं सुलभं मनोज्ञं ॥ प्रकाशितं साधव-मिक्षुणा तन्मुमुक्षुभिर्धार्यमतिप्रयत्नात् ॥ २१४ ॥.....इति श्रीमन्नारायणाश्रम-शिष्यसाधवाश्रमयतिना विरचितं स्वबोधरत्नापरपर्यायं स्वानुभवादर्शाख्यं प्रकरणं सम्पूर्णम् ॥” Our Ms. No. 2769, containing the original only, terms this work as *Svātmānubhavādarśa*.

3. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Nos. 171 and 256.

4. A 'मुमुक्षु', besides undergoing the purification of body and mind, ought to possess the four Sādhanas (viz., कर्मणि कर्मफले च दोषदृष्टिः, विराग-लेशः, मुमुक्षुता and शमादिषट्कं), should give up the sense of identity with body, etc., and attachment to wife, son, property etc., should cherish a sense of aversion to worldly objects, etc.

(Avidyā), positive or negative, and it is primarily necessary to dispel the same in the light of the statements of the Veda (constituting the Upaniṣads, etc.), which is a self-evident proof when viewed with the eye of correct thinking. Striking against Jaimini's view that the Veda prescribes action (Karman),¹ our author, in agreement with Vyāsa, establishes that the Veda really stands for the supreme knowledge of Brahman². This Brahmavidyā cuts at the root of Ignorance, originating from Māyā and responsible for the appearance of the really non-existent material world (Samsāra) as also for the sense of dualism (Dvaita), and gives rise to a direct consciousness of self-experience (Śvānubhava) wherein the material world loses its existence, the sense of dualism vanishes and that of oneness (Advaita) with Supreme Self arises. This stage of self-experience, termed as Samādhi, is in itself the stage of salvation.

In the course of his various discussions the author defines or explains the Vedāntic terms like अपरोक्षत्व, विद्या, अविद्या, अध्यास, बाध, उपाधि, समाधि, प्रतिभास, माया, बन्ध, संवित्, आवरणशक्ति, विक्षेपशक्ति, आत्मस्वरूप, ब्रह्मस्वरूप, जीवनानात्व, विवर्तवाद, etc. He also describes how Brahman alone is real, existent, sentient, blissful, omnipresent, self-luminous, without qualities, etc., and everything else false or unreal; how the non-existent material world makes its appearance due to Māyā and Avidyā and how the same submerges into Brahman on the rise of the real knowledge; how Ātman, which is really identical with Brahman, is quite distinct from प्राण, बुद्धि, मनस् and other इन्द्रिय, from the स्थूलदेह, the सूक्ष्मदेह, the कारणदेह, etc.; how the sense of its identity with, or attachment to, these or alike foreign objects gives birth to various desires (Vāsanās) leading to the ghastly process of rebirth, death etc., and how it vanishes and gives place to the sense of identity with Brahman when the real knowledge is achieved and the stage

1. आमनायसूत्रे सकलं हि वेदं क्रियापरं जैमिनिराह यत्नात् ॥ न तन्मत्तं चारु निषेधवाक्ये क्रियापरत्वे न हि तद् घटेत् ॥ १४ ॥ आत्मस्वरूपा हि विमुक्तिरक्ताऽ-निद्यानिवृत्त्या ह्युपलक्षिता या ॥ ज्ञानेन लभ्या न च कर्मसाध्या ज्ञानं न लभ्यं क्रियया कदापि ॥ १५ ॥ वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्था इति श्रुतिर्वक्ति यथार्थभानात् ॥ ब्रह्मैव लोकं समवाप्नुवन्ति क्रियापरत्वं न ततोऽस्ति वेदे ॥ १६ ॥

2. चेतःशुद्धौ चेतसः स्थैर्यकार्ये ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ चारु काण्डत्रयं तत् ॥ आमनायस्यानु-क्रमाद्वेदेत्ता वेद व्यासस्त्वेकवाक्यत्वसिद्धौ ॥ १७ ॥ etc.

of perfection reached ; how the Vedāntavākyas (*viz* : 'तत्त्वमसि', etc.) are to be explained with the help of the Lakṣaṇāvṛtti to give their correct sense ; how the artificial and hard-earned pleasures of the heaven, etc., are limited in respect of time and space and as such do not amount to real happiness or salvation ; how the various Vidyās, Upāsanās, Tantric worships, Tīrthayātrās, Bhaktis, etc., cannot lead to real salvation which is possible only through real knowledge ; how a really enlightened person becomes Jīvanmukta and as such free from all passions, fears, desires, etc.; how the knowledge of self is essential to a real Brāhmaṇa and to a true ascetic, etc., etc.

The author incessantly harps on the necessity of the destruction of Karman (action) without which the real salvation is not possible. The fruits of Karman accompany the person throughout, during consciousness (Jāgrti), dream (Svapna) and even sound sleep (Susupti). The कर्मफलभोगत्वं depends upon past action and as such occurs alike to the ignorant and to the enlightened, of course, with the difference that it causes pleasure, pain, etc., to the former but has no effect whatsoever on the latter. It is also said that Karman, though performed through ignorance, if dedicated to God Kṛṣṇa, purifies those desirous of salvation and that a man ought to do¹ his appointed duty disinterestedly avoiding the Kāmya and the Niṣiddha which lead to rebirth. The sentient and blissful soul is really actionless (Akartṛ) and quite free from the effects of Karman. The acquirement of the knowledge of Brahman puts an end to Karman. If an enlightened person continues to do his duty even subsequently, he, like God: Kṛṣṇa, does it simply with a view to the welfare of the masses. In fact he has no purpose of his own left to be served by his performance of duties.

The author, following the Bhagavadgītā, even rejects the authority of the Karmakāṇḍa portion of the Veda, as it prescribes action involving the three guṇas and thereby postpones the real salvation. His main ground for rejecting the views of the other systems of Philosophy is that what they prescribe as the means to salvation is really Karman which, in fact, can never lead to salvation.

1. The Commentary says that this is prescribed only for the ignorant.

We meet in this work with some interesting discussions of which one or two may be slightly noticed here. Ancient authorities have said that death at Benares invariably leads to salvation. Our author does not deny their statement but says that as God Viśvanātha imparts the knowledge of the Tāraka mantra to the person prior to his death at Benares, in this case, too, the salvation results from knowledge and not from death as such.¹ Further, in the course of the author's attempt to establish the falsity or unreal character of everything material in the stage of perfection, an objection steps forth as to why even the Vedāntavākyas ('तत्त्वमसि') etc., forming the author's main support, should not be dismissed as false or unreal for the same reason! The author replies² that they are true and real at least so far as the stage of perfection is not reached and that once the Supreme Knowledge is attained with their help it does not matter if they are regarded subsequently as false or unreal. Further, the author says,³ truth or reality can be established even from proofs which are in themselves false or unreal!

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The author quotes several passages⁴ from the Vedic Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads to prove his own statements and to refute those of others. He also deals with the correct sense of some Vedic passages forwarded by others in support of contrary views. He quotes and refutes the views of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya

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द्विश्वनाथस्तस्माज्ज्ञानं मोक्षदं नैव मृत्युः ॥ १८६ ॥

2. सर्वं चैतद्वाधितं चेत्त्वदुक्त्या मिथ्याभूतं सर्ववेदान्तवाक्यम् । मिथ्याभूताद्ब्रह्म-
वित्ता न सिध्येदित्याक्षेपे मद्रचस्त्वं वृणुष्व ॥ १६८ ॥ बोधात्पूर्वं तन्मृषा चोत्तरं वा
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प्रभूयात् ॥ १६९ ॥

3. मिथ्याभूतादन्यतो बिम्बतो धीर्बिम्बस्यैवं दृष्टमस्तीह लोके ॥ मिथ्याभूताद्धे-
दवाक्यात्स्वरूपेणैवं ब्रह्माप्यस्तु बोद्धुं सुशक्यम् ॥ १७० ॥ शुभाशुभानां किल सूचकः
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2. सर्वं चैतद्वाधितं चेत्त्वदुक्त्या मिथ्याभूतं सर्ववेदान्तवाक्यम् । मिथ्याभूताद्ब्रह्मवित्ता न सिध्येदित्याक्षेपे मद्ब्रह्मत्वं शृणुष्व ॥ १६८ ॥ बोधात्पूर्वं तन्मृषा चोत्तरं वा पूर्वं तच्चेन्नास्ति मिथ्येति वादः । बोधादूर्ध्वं तन्मृषात्वं वदेथा इष्टं तन्नस्ते चिरायुः प्रभूयात् ॥ १६९ ॥

3. मिथ्याभूतादन्यतो बिम्बतो धीर्बिम्बस्यैवं दृष्टमस्तीह लोके ॥ मिथ्याभूताद्देववाक्यात्स्वरूपेणैवं ब्रह्माप्यस्तु बोद्धुं सुशक्यम् ॥ १७० ॥ शुभाशुभानां किल सूचकः स्यात्स्वप्नः स्वरूपेण मृषापि सन्न्यथा ॥ तथा गुरुः शाल्मिहास्तु बोधने स्वप्नोऽनुभूतिः श्रुतितस्तु न स्मृतिः ॥ १७१ ॥, etc.

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Yoga and Pūrvamīmāṃsā (including the Bhāṭṭa section) systems¹ on several points and establishes² the view of Advaita Vedānta. Among other works, authors, etc., mentioned in the work, we find Janaka (mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad), Kṛṣṇa and the Bhagavadgītā, Vyāsa and his Brahmasūtra, the Dvaitavādins, the Tantras promulgated by Śiva, previous authors and works of the Vedānta schools, the author's guru, etc., etc. He also refers to some of his predecessors under the general terms एक, सत्, वेदविद्, महासूरि, पूर्वाचार्य, etc. in some of which the Commentary finds allusions to Śaṅkarācārya and other teachers of the Advaita school of Vedānta.

The Author, His Guru and Date

The author's name is Mādhavāśrama. He is an ascetic and disciple of one Nārāyaṇāśrama. He claims to have derived his Knowledge of Supreme Self from his guru in the strange Vedāntic manner and to have subsequently become Jīvanmukta. Whether this guru, to whom he makes obeisances at several places in the work, is identical with the above-mentioned Nārāyaṇāśrama, who must have invested him with the robes of a Saṁnyāsin, or is somebody else, it is difficult to say. From verses 120 and 121,³ how-

1. ये कारणात्कार्यमिदं विभिन्नं वदन्ति तेषां न मतं विशुद्धम् ॥ ये तन्तवः स्युस्तुलितास्तु तज्जं पटे गुरुत्वं द्विगुणं कुतो न ॥ ७९ ॥, ... किं गौतमीयैः कणभुग्व-
चोभिर्नात्मा गुणी नापि गुणा यथार्थाः ॥ सच्चित्सुखात्मन्यथ निर्विशेषे गुणा न सन्त्येव सुखादयो ये ॥ १३३ ॥ etc.; सांख्यास्तु सत्त्वपुरुषान्यतया हि मोक्षं ज्ञानेन चाहुरिति तन्न मतं विमानम् ॥ तत्त्वम्पदार्थपरिशोधनसाधनाय युक्तं भविष्यति न मुक्तिसुसाधनाय ॥ १३९ ॥ श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायजनेषु सिद्धं सर्वेश्वरं ये न भजन्ति सांख्याः ॥ मीमांसकाः कर्मरताश्च तेषामनीश्वराणां न सुखं विलोक्यम् ॥ १४० ॥ जाने न जानेऽहमिति प्रतीतेर्जडाजडात्मानमुवाच भाट्टः ॥ द्विरूपतैकस्य न वस्तुनः स्यात्कदापि कुत्रापि न दृष्टमेतत् ॥ १४१ ॥ (Vide also verses 14-16, quoted above in footnote 1, page 107 for the additional refutation of Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā termed as Āmnāyasūtra); पातञ्जलं योगमृते समस्तं सांख्येन तुल्यं परिहार्यमेव ॥ यो योग उक्तः स तु चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधरूपः खलु कर्म चैतत् ॥ १४२ ॥, etc.

2. ज्ञानेन मोक्षः श्रुतिलोकसिद्धो न कर्मणा जन्यतया ह्यनित्यः ॥ शिष्टैः समस्तैर-
परिग्रहेण दुस्तार्किकाणां तु मतं न चाह ॥ १४३ ॥ etc.

3. जानन्नैवं नास्ति वैराग्यलेशः केयं भ्रान्ती राजसी वृत्तिरग्रा ॥ आस्तामेत-
द्भ्रामकृष्णप्रसादान्नित्यानन्दः कृष्ण एवाहमस्मि ॥ धिक् संसारमिमं न यत्र परमं

ever, it appears, rather indistinctly, that the author's Jñānaguru was possibly one Rāmakṛṣṇa. It is not possible to fix the author's exact date, but there is nothing in this work that goes against placing him five or six centuries back.

An Appreciation, etc.

Evidently the author has generally adopted the Advaita Philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya in this work which, he says,¹ he has composed on the lines of his predecessors for strengthening his own conviction and not for displaying his vast learning. In fact, he has admirably compressed, and in a very vivid, forceful and authoritative style, almost all the doctrines of that school in such a small compass. Every line speaks for his vast learning, command over the extant systems of Philosophy and unchallengable conviction in the principles of his own school.² The strain of the Bhagavadgītā, which identifies Kṛṣṇa, the scion of the Yadu race, with Brahman or Supreme Self, is conspicuous throughout and the author's devotion to God Kṛṣṇa breaks through his conviction in the Advaita principles at many places³ in the work.

(To be continued)

शर्मास्ति यल्लभ्यते यद्यत्पश्यति जिघ्रतीह सकलं दुःखं न संभियते ॥ किं मे तादृश-
शर्मणाथ परमानन्दो गुरोः (सं) स्मृतेः संप्राप्तोऽस्त्यधुना ह्यसौ श्रुतिगतो मत्तोऽत्र
नो भियते ।

1. पूर्वाचार्योच्छिष्टलेशोऽयमुक्तो बुद्धिस्थेभ्यो स्वस्य न प्रौढिवादः ॥ विद्वांसो
येऽनुग्रहार्थं समर्थास्तेभ्यो भक्त्या मे प्रणामोऽयमस्तु ॥ २१५ ॥

2. Our Commentator thus refers to the author in his Introduction ;
इह खलु सांख्ययोगपारंगतो माधवाख्यो यतिः कृष्णानिधिर्मुमुक्षुहितार्थं निखिल-
वेदान्तशास्त्रजन्यस्वानुभवप्रकटीकरणकामो निखिलशास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यश्रीकृष्णाख्यस्वेष्ट-
देवतानमस्कारात्मकं चिकीर्षितग्रन्थनिर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्तिप्रचयगमनशिष्टाचारपरिपालन-
फलकं शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिबोधितकर्तव्यताकं मङ्गलमाचरन् प्रकरणप्रतिपाद्यमर्थं
संक्षेपेण दर्शयति ॥ Vide also verses 8-11 in the Prologue of the commentary
quoted below.

3. Vide, “ यस्मात्परं किमपि नास्ति नमोऽस्तु तस्मै सच्चित्सुखाय विभवे
पुरुषोत्तमाय ॥ नो यत्र वागपि मनो न विबोधनाय कृष्णाय पूर्णमहसे यदुनन्दनाय
॥ १ ॥ ”, “ अघटनघटनापटीयसीयं यदुपतिदेववरस्य शक्तिरुच्चैः ॥ २९ ॥ ”,
“ यद्द्वादशारं किल कालचक्रं त्रिणाभि यच्चाप्यजरं परिभ्रमत् ॥ गोपालकृष्णस्य
करस्थितं यत्स एव कृष्णोऽस्मि कुतो भयं ततः ॥ ८७ ॥ ”, “ यथा स्वाभ्रयं मोहयेन्नैव
माया विशुद्धं परं ब्रह्म गोपालकृष्णं ॥ ११५ ॥ ”, etc.

SOME CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS FROM THE RĀMĀYAṆA

(Miss P. C. Dharma)

SEC. 1

ETIQUETTE OF THE PERIOD

The word used for welcoming guests in Sanskrit "*svāgatam*" literally means "well come" (II-50-38). "Guests should always be gladly welcomed by the wise even if they be common personages" (V-I-118). The rites of hospitality were called *atithisatkāra* or *ātithya*. Guests (especially Brahmins and elders) were welcomed (See II-54-17, VII-1-12 &c., and VII-33-9) by the offer of:-

Welcoming
Friends and
Relations

1. *Pādya* (water for washing the feet).
2. *Arghya* (respectful offering of water for sipping).
3. *Madhuparka* (a mixture of honey, curd, ghee, water and sugar).
4. A cow (The cow was only presented and not killed; II-54-17, VII-1-15 &c., and VII-33-9).
5. *Āsana* or Seat (*Br̥ṣī* or Mat in the case of Brahmans. Sages and Sannyāsins. *Sītā* offered a *Br̥ṣī* to *Rāvana*—Sannyāsi when welcoming him III-46-33. *Rāma* offered seats covered with deer skin and *Darbhā* Mat to *Agastya* and other sages (VII-1-12 &c.). Welcome enquiries followed the presentation of these items (VII-33-7).

The *Atithisatkāra* done by hermits (III-1-16 F) consisted in the offer of fruits, roots, flowers, water (generally) and of shelter in their cottages (as in the case of *Rāma* in *Daṇḍakāraṇya*)—practically—welcome, board and lodging.

When offering welcome to *Rāma*, Sage *Bharadvāja* presented a cow, water for *Arghyam* and *Pādyam*, different kinds of eatables, fruits and roots, lodging (or shelter) and welcomed him by saying "Swāgatam" or "Welcome" (II-54-17 &c.). The commentators understood by "Go" a bull.

Agastya welcomed *Rāma* with *Arghya*, *Pādya* and *Āsana* and then made welcome enquiries (III-12-25). *Vasiṣṭha* wel-

comed *Viśvāmitra*, with a seat, roots and fruits and then made the usual welcome enquiries (I-52-2 &c.). *Guha*, King of the *Niṣādas*, offered *Anna* &c. (various kinds of edibles), *Arghya*, a *bed*, for him and *Fodder* for his horses (II-20-36 &c.). Again on meeting *Bharata* on the banks of the *Ganges*, he offered him shelter, roots, fruits, meat and various kinds of forester's food (II-84-17 F).

King *Daśaratha* on the arrival of the Sage *Viśvāmitra* at his palace, went out with his Purohita, offered him Welcome by Kings *Arghya* &c., according to the usual rules, and welcomed him (I-18-40 F and 48). When *Rāma* after his coronation, was visited by various Sages, he got up from his throne with *Añjalibandha*, offered them respectfully *Pādyā*, *Arghya*, cows, and seats (covered with grass mats and deer skins), and then made the usual welcome enquiries (VII-1-12 &c.).

The rites of hospitality were offered even to male guests by the lady of the house in the absence of her husband (III-46-33). *Rāma* had warned *Sītā* about this duty before allowing her to accompany him to the forest (II-28-14). *Sītā* in the absence of *Rāma* and *Lakṣmaṇa* offered welcome to *Rāvāṇa* in the disguise of a *Sanyāsī* (III-46-33). *Vedavati*, the female ascetic, performed the rites of hospitality to *Rāvāṇa* who met her in her hermitage in the *Himālayas* (VII-17-8). *Ahalyā* in the absence of *Gautama*, her husband, offered the rites of hospitality to *Rāma* (I-49-20).

The nature of the welcome enquiries varied with the status of the guest and that of the host. When *Ṛṣis* or Sages made enquiries of kings, the enquiries were about their personal welfare, righteous administration, adherence to the duties of kings, obedience of their subordinates, subjugation of foes, the army, the treasury, the welfare of friends and relations, and of the welfare of their subjects (I-52-7 &c., I-18-42 &c., I-18-42 F and II-90-8). The hospitable Sage, *Bharadvāja* made enquiries of *Bharata* about the army, treasury, ministers, friends &c. (II-90-8).

When kings met the sages they made enquiries about their success in penance, the un-interrupted worship of the fire

(Agnihotra) and about their disciples (I-52-4). On meeting Ṛṣi *Bharadvāja* at Citrakūṭa, *Bharata* enquired about his personal health—sacrificial fire, the fruit trees, birds and beasts in the hermitage, and his disciples (II-90-8). When welcomed by *Guha*, *Rāma* embraced *Guha* and enquired in return about the health of *Guha* and his family, wealth, friends and kingdom—the main points on which enquiries were made when meeting princes or royal guests (II-50-42).

Friends used to embrace each other, on meeting, if they be of equal age or status. Rāma after accepting the hand of *Sugrīva* embraced him (IV-5-12 etc.).
 Etiquette between friends
 On meeting his friend *Guha* (though of a lower caste) he embraced him (II-50-42). Friendship was contracted by grasping each others' hands. The expression, "He extended his hand in offer of friendship"—was literally correct. *Sugrīva* extended his hand to *Rāma* and offered his friendship if he cared to accept it and *Rāma* grasped *Sugrīva's* hand and squeezed it (IV-5-12 F). Vows of friendship were sealed by swearing before the fire.

In offering and accepting welcome, care was taken to note the relative status of guests. *Viśvāmitra* when addressing *Daśaratha*, *Vasiṣṭha* and other sages who welcomed him at *Ayodhyā*, spoke to them according to their status *Yathā Nyāyam* (I-18-44). When *Janaka* offered welcome to *Viśvāmitra* and the other Ṛṣis, and *Rāma*, the guests took their seats according to precedence (I-50-9 etc.). When *Bharadvāja* met *Bharata* and his retinue, he made welcome enquiries with due regard to precedence (*Anupūrvyācca Papraccha Kuśalam*-11-90-6). In accepting the princely hospitality of *Bharadvāja*, Prince *Bharata* and his retinue took their seats according to precedence (II-91-38 F). When the Sages *Bhārgava*, *Cyavana* etc., went to visit *Rāma* they were requested to sit according to precedence by *Rāma* (VII-60-10).

The usual method of saluting Kings was to bow and to lift up the folded palms (*Añjali-bandha*) to the level of the head and above. Kings accepted the *Añjali-bandha* salute by lifting up their folded palms *Añjali* (II-3-1). In the case of Ṛṣis, Elders,
 Salutation—Different methods

Preceptors etc., the usual form of the salutation was prostration followed by the announcement of one's name (II-54-12 etc.). *Rāma's* party prostrated itself before *Bharadvāja* and informed the Ṛṣi about its members. Salutations and prostrations were due both when meeting and departing (II-55-10). The princes used to fold up their palms, bow and prostrate themselves before the feet of the parents, announcing their names at the same time (II-3-32 and II-4-10).

When the kings were visited by Ṛṣis and Purohitas they used to get up from their seats, advance towards the Ṛṣis (I-18-39) and offer welcome with *Añjalibandha* (I-47-20 and I-50-10). They prostrated themselves before saintly Ṛṣis like *Vasiṣṭha*, *Bharadvāja*, *Agastya* etc. (VI-30-59, II-54-12, III-12-23 etc.). The famous female ascetic *Ahalyā* (wife of *Gautama*) was honoured by *Rāma* with prostration (1-49-19). *Añjali* was never offered by kings to their wives (II-13-18). When people met friends (II-102-48) relations etc., they used to prostrate themselves before the elders and superiors ; they embraced their equals in age, while they received the prostrations of the younger people.

When the king drove along the thoroughfares, the citizens on the road, used to bow with folded hands (*Añjalibandha*). Kings used to bow or perform *Añjalibandha* according to the status of the people saluting them. *Daśaratha* is stated to have reciprocated the *Añjali* of the members of the *Sabhā* (II-3-1). *Rāvāṇa* who drove in a car to the Council Hall was blessed and saluted by the citizens with bowing and *Añjalibandha* (VI-11-13 and VI-11-14). The Counsellors summoned by *Rāvāṇa* held the feet of *Rāvāṇa* seated on his throne and were honoured in return (VI-11-24).

Prostration was a common form of salutation, not only in the case of elders and preceptors but also of kings. The *Vānara* *Sugrīva* saluted *Rāma* by prostration and *Añjalibandha* (IV-12-6). He saluted his elder brother *Vālī* when he returned after killing *Dundubhi* by prostration (IV-9-26). The subjects of *Rāvāṇa* caught hold of his feet respectfully on entering the Council Chamber (VI-11-24). Prince *Vibhīṣaṇa* caught hold of the feet of King *Rāvāṇa* and announced his name (VI-11-30). Subjects

used to prostrate themselves before kings as well as Queens. *Hanumān*, on first seeing *Sītā* in *Aśokavana*, when taking leave of her, and when communicating *Rāma*'s message after *Rāvaṇa*'s slaughter prostrated himself before *Sītā* (V-33-1, V-56-22 and VI-116-3). On return from *Lankā*, he prostrated himself before Prince *Aṅgada* on the sea-coast (V-57-34) and on returning to *Kiṣkindhā* prostrated himself before *Sugrīva* (IV-65-1). The Queen mother was entitled to special respects (II-12-48) from the subjects. *Kaikeyī* swore that she would not see even for one day *Kausalyā* receiving the *Añjali* salutes, paid to her by the people after the coronation of *Rāma*.

The correct form of saluting the parents, parents-in-law, and elder brothers, was prostration or catching hold of the feet after circum-ambulation (I-77-13, II-3-31-47 II-25-46 F, II-40-1 &c., II-99-37 & 40, IV-9-25 & VII-44-17). *Vibhiṣaṇa* used to prostrate himself before *Rāvaṇa* (VI-10-10 and VI-11-29 F). *Kumbhakarna* did the same (VI-62-8). Parents and elders used to lift up their children, embrace them, smell them on the top of the head and bless them (II-3-22, II-25-40, II-40 II-39-19, II-118-13, VII-44-18, I-22-2, II-25-46, II-112-26 and 30). As the wife of an elder brother was considered to be equal to one's mother in status, the correct form of salutation was prostration or catching hold of the feet of the lady (IV-6-21 and VII-48-18). When taking leave, parents and elders were circumambulated with *Añjali* and adored by prostration (II-25-47 and II-40-1 etc.). When bidding goodbye to their wives, *Vālī* and *Rāvaṇa* embraced their wives (IV-16-11 and VI-58B-16). Evidently it was not considered indecorous to embrace their wives in the presence of others.

Wives used to address (or refer to) their husbands as *Ārya-putra* (II-27-4 and VI-117-36), their fathers-in-law as *Ārya*, their brothers-in-law as *Ārya*, and their mothers-in-law as *Āryā* (II-39-28 and III-47-6). *Daśaratha* was addressed as *Mahābhāga* and also as *Rāghava*, one descended from *Raghu*, by *Kausalyā* (II-50-29 F). *Sītā* referred to *Rāma* as *Rāghava*, one descended from *Raghu*,

when talking to *Anasūyā* (II-118-44) and also as *Rāma* (II-118-50 and 52).

Mothers used to be addressed as *Ambā* (II-34-48), Fathers as *Tāta* (II-34-48), Elder brothers as *Ārya* (II-99-38), and Younger brothers as *Tāta* (II-100-5 etc.), Sons were addressed as *Tāta* (II-64-8) or *Putra* (II-34-36) or *Vatsa* (II-64-31 and 36). Husbands used to address their wives simply as woman, or daughter of so and so, or one born in the race of so and so, one born in such and such a country, the beautiful one, the dear one, one resembling a deer, the timid one, the weak one etc.

Youngsters used to be blessed with Mantras and have auspicious ceremonies performed by the father, the mother and the priest before departing from the house (I-22-2). The whole of Canto 25 in Book II deals with *Kausalyā's* Svastyayana or blessing ceremony, for *Rāma*.

When people departed on long voyages, it was usual for the relations and friends to follow them for some distance (II-55-2 and V-1-46). *But Departing Relations* and friends should not be followed too far, if their safe return be desired. The ministers of *Daśaratha* advised him not to follow outgoing *Rāma*, *Sītā* and *Lakṣmaṇa* too far, if he wished for their safe return (II-40-51).

Visits to kings were usually announced by the *Pratihārī* the Door-keeper or Royal Chamberlain. Even *Ṛṣis* and the princes could not enter the Royal palace without being announced. When *Viśvāmitra* called on *Daśaratha* to request for a loan of the services of *Rāma*, he told the *Dvārādhyakṣas* to speedily announce his arrival to the King (I-18-3 F). Similarly *Agastya* (VII-1-8), *Cyavana* (VII-60-3), *Gārgya* (VII-100-4) etc., had to announce their arrival to *Rāma* through the door-keeper. Even the king's son, and the king's brothers could not enter the father's or brother's palace without announcing their arrival (II-33-30 and VII-44-11). The visitors could enter only after the formal permission of the King. The custom of announcing visitors was not confined to the palaces of Kings. In the palace of Prince *Rāma*, the same custom prevailed (II-16-5).

The door-keepers of the Zenana were females (II-10-20). It was considered highly improper to enter the Zenana without previous intimation. *Lakṣmaṇa* on entering the Zenana of *Sugrīva*, and hearing the tinkling sounds of women's ornaments was ashamed to go further into the Zenana, and so twanged his bow string to announce his arrival (IV-33-24 &c.). To the present day in Mohammedan houses, male visitors clap their hands so as to give notice to the women-folk to retire.

Visitors had always to be announced. When visiting *Agastya*, *Rāma* told *Lakṣmaṇa* to go to the hermitage and request the disciples of *Agastya* to announce his arrival to Sage *Agastya* (III-12-1 &c.). Well-bred men avoided staring at women, and walked with down cast eyes. *Lakṣmaṇa* on seeing *Tārā* in disorder hung down his head (IV-33-38). It was considered impolite to stare at other's wives. When *Vālmiki* took deserted *Sītā* to his hermitage, it is stated that he walked in front of *Sītā* (VII-49-17). *Lakṣmaṇa* never looked at *Sītā's* face (IV-6-20 F & VII-48-19 F).

On occasions of Public Festivities—Coronation, Horse Sacrifice &c., invitation was extended to all and sundry to enjoy the festivities, with friends and relations. The King's invitation was sent usually through ordinary messengers. But invitations to close relations, and intimate Royal friends, were sent through a minister. Letters were evidently not written during the Rāmāyaṇa period. Arrangements for board and lodging of all the visitors high and low (of all castes, in all stations in life, and of all the workmen) were made during the public festivities (I-13-9 &c. and 18 &c., VII-91-9 &c., and VII-92-4 &c.). Provision was always made for the luxurious accommodation in special camps or buildings for the distinguished guests. Separate accommodation was provided for Brahmans. When the public was invited, dining halls with plenty of various kinds of food, delicacies and drinks were provided. Extreme courtsey was shown to all visitors. Nobody was ignored or slighted even through ignorance. Ample provision for gifts of wealth to visitors was also made during the sacrificial festivities.

Messages to kings were always sent together with presents (II-68-9 & VII-100-2). Kings always used to make presents to departing guests. The King

of *Kekaya* when sending his grandson *Bharata*, sent him with an escort and many valuable presents (II-70-19 &c.). The Kings who had assembled for his Coronation were allowed to depart by *Rāma* with many valuable presents and escorts (VII-38-5 &c., and 9 &c.).

People were very polite in those days. They used to apologise for faults committed consciously or unconsciously. When going on exile, *Rāma* requested all the queens of the harem to forgive him for any fault he might have committed consciously or unconsciously, on account of his familiarity with them (II-39-37).

When *Kausalyā* was begged by *Daśaratha* with *Añjalibandha* for mercy, (when she reprimanded him, in a fit of grief, for the banishment of *Rāma*), she was terribly ashamed of her unjust accusations. She fell down at *Daśaratha's* feet and humbly apologised for her fault (II-62-11). *Tārā* apologised to dying *Vāli*; for all the faults she might have committed unconsciously (IV-20-25). *Vibhīṣaṇa* before deserting *Rāvāṇa* apologised to him for daring to give him unpleasant (though salutary) advice (VI-16-25). *Rāma* apologised to *Mātali* for offering him advice in charioteering (VI-108-12).

People not only apologised for mistakes but also rendered thanks for favours received. The expression of gratitude has always been very common amongst the Hindus, though we meet with no single word equivalent to the word 'thanks' in the English language, the expressions used when people have to be thankful are sufficiently indicative and unmistakable.

When his son *Rāma* was elected Crown Prince by the *Sabhā* (the Representative Assembly) King *Daśaratha* expressed his thankfulness by telling the *Sabhā* "I am exceedingly pleased with your decision and feel myself greatly honoured." (II-3-2). When *Sītā* gave valuable advice to *Rāma* on the eve of the slaughter of the *Rākṣasas* in the *Daṇḍakāvāna*, he acknowledged her kindness (III-10-2). In the same way *Vāli* also acknowledged his indebtedness to *Tārā* for her valuable advice (IV-16-6 & 9); when going out to fight with *Sugrīva*. *Rāma's* gratitude and the acknowledgment of the invaluable services rendered by *Haṇumān*, *Sugrīva* and other *Vānaras* are well described (VI-49-24 & 27 F.).

The Āryans were in the habit of producing fire by friction. Fire in those days was made by the churning of the *Araṇi* sticks. *Araṇi* was the fire-producing stick made of *S'amī* wood (II-103-26 & VII-57-18).

The Āryans used to keep a firepot in the house and feed it perpetually (perform *Aupāsana* or fire-worship twice a day). *Agni-Hotra* or *Aupāsana* fire had to be fed by the wife in the absence of the husband. The faggots called *Samit* were used to feed the fire. Besides faggots, cattle-dung cakes were also used for producing the domestic fire, and heat. *Rāma* utilized the dung of the buffalo and the deer in the forest as fuel to produce fire and to keep off cold (II-99-7).

For lighting purposes, lamps (*Pradīpa-s* or *Dipika-s*) were used and were fed with oil or *Taila*. The streets were lighted by lamp posts or *Dīpavṛkṣa-s* (II-6-18). *Ulkā-s* or Torches were also in use for lighting when going out in the dark.

At every stage of life the Āryans had to perform various religious rites, beginning with the *Jāta Karma* (done immediately after birth), *Nāma-karma* (on the 12th day after birth), *Anna-Prāśana* (1st eating of Rice), *Tonsure*, *Upanayana* or Initiation, *Vivāha* or marriage rite. All these religious ceremonies were conducted by the family priest or *Purohita* as at the present day (1-18-18 & 20). *Dāśaratha's* *purohita Vasiṣṭha* went over to *Rāma's* palace to initiate *Rāma* and his wife through the fasting ceremony on the eve of the coronation (II-5-2 etc.). The ceremonies for the coronation of *Rāma* as *Yuvarāja* were entrusted to *Vasiṣṭha*. He was also in charge of *Rāma's* coronation ceremonies. An important part of all the ceremonies was the feeding of *Brāhmaṇas* as well as the citizens. The *Brāhmaṇas* were invariably presented with plenty of money, gems, cows and clothes.

When anybody had to perform an important ceremony, it was obligatory on him and his wife to fast and sleep on *Darbha* grass with controlled senses, the previous night (II-4-23). He had to be initiated. Auspicious decorations (*Kautuka Maṅgala* or *Maṅgala*) before festive ceremonies e.g. marriage, coronation etc., were

done by the mother, elderly women or the priest (I-22-2, I-73-8 and II-4-37). The whole house was decorated on auspicious occasions, e.g. the day fixed for *Rāma's* coronation, *S'atrughna's* coronation etc. These decorations were invariably done by the women (II-6-5 and VII-63-16).

Reference has been made already to Svastyayana. This ceremony consisted of Pūjā, Homa and gift or *Dakṣiṇā* (money present) to Brahmans. The Brahmans at the end of the ceremony used to bless the party and scatter unbroken rice grains over the head of the party to be blessed. *Svastyayana* was performed for *Rāma*, before departing with *Viśvāmitra* and before departing to the forest when exiled (II-25-30 etc., and I-22-2). *Svastyayana* was also performed by *Tārā* with mantras for *Vāli* when he set out for his last fight (IV-16-12).

Kausalyā blessed a root with mystic Mantras and tied it on *Rāma's* wrist before he set out for the forest (II-25-38). *Vālmiki* gave two talismans of *Darbha* to the nurse to be tied on the wrists of *Kuśa* and *Lava* immediately after their birth to ward off evil spirits (VII-66-3 etc.). The Gold *Mālā* of *Vāli*, which he used to wear round his neck when fighting with his foes was a famous talisman. To prevent the loss of its magic power by coming in contact with a dead body, it was handed over by *Vāli* to *Sugrīva* before he died (IV-22-15). *Viśvāmitra* taught *Rāma*, two charms, *Balā* and *Atibalā* which rendered the wearer invincible, intelligent, beautiful, free from disease or exhaustion and free from hunger and thirst (I-22-12 etc.). Serpents were supposed to be restrained and confined by charms, herbs, the stick, and mantras (III-29-31 and II-12-4).

Swearing and cursing were common vices of the day. *Kaikayī* made *Daśaratha* swear that he would grant her wishes when mentioned, and called on all the gods to witness his oath (II-11-3 etc. and 13 etc.) and when she found him reluctant to grant her boons she swore on *Bharata* (II-12-48). *Lakṣmaṇa* swore on his bow and his virtuous deeds, when he insisted on following *Rāma* (II-21-16). When begging his mother to permit him to go to the forest and to give him her blessings before departure, *Rāma* swore

on his life (II-21-45). Almost every character in the poem swore at one time or the other. The instances are all too numerous to be detailed. *Vālmiki* swore by his penance and his lineage that he was telling the truth, that *Sītā* was perfectly chaste and that *Kuśilavau* were born to *Rāma* (VII-96-17 etc.).

The *R̥ṣis Agastya, Vasiṣṭha, Gautama, Viśvāmitra* etc., were all given to cursing people for misbehaviour (VII-55-17, VII-65-28, I-48-26 and 29, I-59-17 etc., I-62-16 and I-64-11 F). King *Anaranya* cursed *Rāvaṇa* with death at the hands of one of his descendants i.e. *Rāma* (VII-19-28 F). The efficacy of the curse depended on the asceticism and the meritoriousness of the curser. Even women like *Vedavatī*, and the chaste maidens captured by *Rāvaṇa* used to curse (VII-17-30 F and VII-24-20).

An oath was strengthened by being made in the presence of fire (VII-23-14). *Rāvaṇa* sealed his friendship with the *Nivāta Kavacas* in the presence of fire (VII-23-14). In the same way *Rāvaṇa* vowed eternal friendship before fire when contracting friendship with *Kārttavīrya Arjuna* (VII-33-18) and with *Vālī* (VII-34-41). *Rāma* and *Sugrīva* also swore eternal friendship with each other in the presence of fire (IV-5-15 F and III-72-16). When insulted and disgraced by *Rāma*, *Sītā* swore before the fire before entering it, to prove her chastity (VI-119-23 etc.). The marriage compact and vows of friendship made in the presence of the glowing fire, were binding on both parties (I-73-28, VII-12-18, IV-5-15 F and III-72-16).

This custom must certainly have been prevalent. A Brahman subject threatened *Rāma* that he would commit suicide at the gates (unless *Rāma* restored his dead child to life) and make *Rāma* reap the effects of the sin of *Brahmahatyā* (VII-73-12 etc.).

When *Bharata* performed *Pratyupaveśa* (practically *Dharnā*) before *Rāma* to compel him to return to *Ayodhyā*, *Rāma* protested and told him that a Kṣatriya could never perform it (II-111-16 etc.) and that the practice was confined to Brahmans.

Whenever the king returned to town, after a temporary sojourn elsewhere, the citizens used to give him a royal welcome. The whole town-roads, houses, temples, Caityas, and cross-ways, used to be swept, watered, fumigated with fragrant incense

and decked with flags and buntings tied on all the tall buildings, trees, spires, temples, and turrets. When the royal processions passed through the main roads, the ladies used to scatter flowers from the windows of the upper stories on either side and Brahman maidens used to present flowers and fruits to the princes and kings after circum-ambulating them on the roads. Brahmans with sweetmeats and flowers in their hands, musicians, dancing girls, and all the citizens used to march with the procession (I-11-25, II-43-12, VI-130-7 &c., and VI-131-36 &c.).

The present day 'hartal' is not without precedent. When *Rāma* was banished at the instance of *Kaikeyī*, the merchants did not set out from their houses and open the shops. The people did not rejoice or make merry, the householders did not cook, and nobody cared for loss or gain (II-48-4). There was a cessation of *Vedā-dhyayana* and learned disputations, and a cessation of all festivities, such as music and dancing in the city. The shops were closed ; and the queen was cursed (II-48-22 &c., 24, 37).

The death of Kings caused a general mourning all over the town. Roads, parks, and gardens were deserted by pleasure-seekers, and free from the noise and bustle of men, women, carriages, horses etc. The absence of flags and buntings, the absence of music, and the forlorn dusky appearance of houses kept untidy and unswept were noticeable features. The deserted appearance of the roads and crossways, the cessation of sacrifices and religious ceremonies, the fasting of citizens, the cheerlessness of people, the neglected courtyards of the temples devoid of worshippers, the stoppage of worship of idols in temples, and the closure of the shops were all indicatives of the general mourning (II-71-51 &c.).

The death lament of women in India has been the same for centuries. Immediately on hearing that her husband had been fatally wounded, *Tārā* ran weeping to the spot where *Vāli* was lying, beating her head and breast (IV-19-20). On seeing the dying husband, she embraced his body and set up a wail. *Tārā*'s wail and the consolations offered to her by *Hanumān* are literally

repeated even at the present day (IV-19-20 and IV-21-1 &c.), Reference might also be made to the death lament of the Rākṣasī women and *Mandodarī* (VI-96-25 &c., 44, and VI-114-2 &c.).

(1) Amongst the Āryans and Vānaras, *cremation* was the usual method of disposal of the dead. *Daśaratha*, the blind Vaiśya ascetic, and *Vāli* were all cremated. *Rāvāṇa* was cremated, as he was a Brahman by birth.

(2) Burial was one of the methods of disposal of the Rākṣasas like *Virādha*. *Virādha*'s burial pit was covered by a stone by *Rāma* and *Lakṣmaṇa* (VII-4-81).

(3) The corpses of the common soldiers on the battlefields were allowed to be eaten up by vultures and beasts of prey. Rākṣasa heroes vowed that they would offer the bodies of their enemies to the vultures.

(4) Many of the dead Rākṣasas in *Laṅkā* were thrown into the sea ; while the rest were probably disposed off by vultures.

The performance of funeral rites by sons, on the death of their father, was considered meritorious, and the sons who performed the funeral rites of the father were supposed to be lucky (II-51-20). *Daśaratha* forbade *Bharata* to do his funeral rites in case he consented to reign in place of *Rāma* (II-12-94). As *Daśaratha* considered the prohibition of the performance, a great punishment, it must have been a highly valued privilege of the sons (II-12-94). On hearing of the death of *Daśaratha* from *Kaikeyī* *Bharata* exclaimed that his brothers were lucky inasmuch as they would have participated in the funeral rites (II-72-29). Funeral rites could be done by anybody for people who died childless (III-68-31 &c.). *Jaṭāyu*'s funeral rites were performed by *Rāma* according to Vedic rites. But as a rule, the son had to perform the cremation. Cremation and funeral was postponed till the arrival of the son. *Daśaratha*'s ministers preserved his corpse in oil till the arrival of *Bharata* (II-66-15 and 27).

(To be continued)

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REVIEWS

Varadāmbikā-pariṇaya-campū of Queen Tirumalāmbā, edited with an Introduction by LAKSHMAN SARUP, M.A., D. PHIL. (Oxon), with a Commentary in Sanskrit by Mahāmahopādhyāya GIRIDHAR SHARMA CHATURVEDA and HARIDATTA SHARMA. Pub. by Motilal Banarsi Dass, Lahore. Date and Price not mentioned. Pp. 5 + 34 + 4 + 22 + 182.

This **Campū** depicting the romance of the wedding of Princess Varadāmbikā was first noticed by Dr. SARUP in 1924 at Tanjore, and he announced his discovery at the Fourth Oriental Conference in Allahabad in 1926. At the Lahore conference in 1928 he read a paper on it. In May 1932 he edited and published it for the first time in the Oriental College Magazine, Lahore, based as it was on a single Ms. of the work available at the Tanjore Mss. Library.

The romance here edited is the work of a talented queen, who along with Sītā, Vijayā, Subhadrā and Rāmabhadrāmbā etc., has vindicated the honour of Indian womanhood in the field of Sanskrit literature. Dr. SARUP believes that the **Campū** was written between 1529 and 1540 A.D., as the regal authoress was the queen of Emperor Acyutarāya who was crowned in 1529. The romance centres round the love at first sight of Acyutarāya with Varadāmbikā, and it is thus probable that it is an autobiographical poem. For according to Dr. SARUP Tirumalāmbā "was the confidante and the be-all and the end-all of the deepest love of Emperor Acyutarāya" (p. 11).

The style of the poem shows what an accomplished lady Queen Tirumalāmbā was. "She has shown a remarkable mastery of Sanskrit language." Her mastery of vocabulary is only equalled by her command over the figures of speech. Her imagery is ever fresh, though loaded with unending compounds, and the music of the passages matches their intrinsic worth. But the style is encumbered from the point of view of modern scholarship with long compounds and involved sentences, and without the aid of a commentary few people may be expected to go through it patiently.

This the Editor has remedied by getting the help of two scholars Mahāmahopādhyāya GIRIDHAR SHARMA CHATURVEDA, Principal of Jaipur Sanskrit College, and Pandit HARIDATTA SHARMA, Principal of the Agra Sanskrit College. The commentary which is by Pandit Haridatta Sharma does full justice to the text, and the explanations are so natural and so clearly given that even First Year students in Sanskrit in the Universities may follow the love of Acyutarāya and Varadāmbikā. The commentator has done the greatest service to the student world by simple and clear style and its commentator.

It is the ardent wish of all scholars to discover such other works and bring them to light ; Indian literature will certainly be enriched by them ; besides, these contributions to world literature by Indian womanhood will enable India to take her rightful lead in the comity of nations. The work here reviewed is only a precursor of what may be achieved still in Indian literature, and is by no means a small achievement for its modern editor.

S. M. KATRE

OBITUARY

It is with deepest regret and sorrow that we have to announce the sad demise of Dr. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, M.A. (oxon.), Hon. Ph. D. (Patna), Bar-at-law, which happened on the 4th of August, 1937. Dr. Jayaswal was one of the foremost scholars in the domain of Ancient Indian History. He was the organizer of Bihar and Orissa Research Society and edited its Journal. He presided over the Seventh Session of the All-India Oriental Conference at Baroda in 1933. His works and articles are too well-known to be enumerated. His unexpected and untimely death has been a very serious shock to all Indologists. We offer our most sincere condolence to the relatives of the late Dr. Jayaswal.

The Editor.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE ACTIVISM OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

(R. Mahadevan)

It has been the fashion among western critics¹ to treat the Bhagavad Gītā as a work bristling with interpolations, and in consequence, as utterly lacking in unity. Textual criticism of a spurious type has helped these foreign scholars to establish their thesis that there are three, if not more, unreconciled and irreconcilable philosophical doctrines in the Gītā. Even such a sympathetic student of Hindu culture as Hopkins says that the poem is 'an ill-assorted cabinet of primitive philosophical opinions'. But enlightened western opinion is slowly grasping the inner unity of the great poem, and it is refreshing to find Mr. Hill saying that 'the poem is less a medley than a reconciliation of beliefs, while many apparent inconsistencies of doctrine are only regarded as such, owing to a misapprehension of their significance'.² We find unmistakable evidence in the Gītā for the belief that the author was deliberately setting out to combine the conflicting tenets of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta schools into a higher unity. Arjuna, now and then, draws the attention of the great Teacher to the apparently conflicting doctrines that he propounds, and Śrī Kṛṣṇa immediately gives a discourse in which the deep-lying unity is disclosed.

Of all the doctrines that puzzle the modern student of the Gītā, the doctrine of action preached therein seems to puzzle him most. Hopkins says, 'It (the Gītā) is uncertain in its tone in regard to the comparative efficacy of action and inaction.'³ At the commencement of the third chapter Arjuna cries out:—

1. Garbe, Farquhar and Hopkins.

2. W. D. P. Will; The Bhagavad Gītā, p. 15.

3. Hopkins: The Great Epic of India, p. 400.

Hill.

' If, O Janārdana ! devotion is deemed by you to be superior to action, then, why, O Keśava ! do you prompt me to this fearful action ? You seem, indeed, to confuse my mind by equivocal words. '

ज्यायसी चेत्कर्मणस्ते मता बुद्धिर्जनार्दन ।
 तत्किं कर्मणि घोरे मां नियोजयसि केशव ॥
 भ्यामिश्रेणेव वाक्येन बुद्धिं मोहयसीव मे ।
 तदेकं वद निश्चित्य येन श्रेयोऽहमाप्नुयाम् ॥ २

On the basis of utterances similar to these it is concluded that the Gītā preaches inconsistent and contradictory doctrines regarding the origin and purpose of human action. It is rather preposterous to assume that the Master Teacher was unaware of the contradictions in his own teachings, and that it was left to the critics of the Twentieth Century to point them out to the world. In the fourth chapter Śrī Kṛṣṇa Says :—

' Even sages are confused as to what is action and what is inaction. Therefore I will speak to you about action, and learning that you will be free from (this world of) evil.' The Sāṃkhya and Yoga are at variance with each other in their respective teachings on the value of action. The simple devotee is puzzled. So Śrī Kṛṣṇa takes upon himself the task of reconciling the contradictions by an exposition of the (psychological) nature of the human mind.

Our contention in this paper is that the activism preached in the Gītā is based on the recognition of the hormic nature of the human mind. A superficial survey of the views of action, inaction and desireless action as set forth in the Gītā may bewilder our intelligence ; but if we get behind these and grasp the psychological truth on which they are based, we find that they are but so many parts which fit nicely into one another to compose the grand unity of the doctrine of the Horme.

Professor McDougall asserts that every human action is an instance of purposive behaviour. By purposive behaviour we mean that all activity is striving towards a goal however vaguely the goal may be thought of. " The theory that all organic behaviour is purposive in however vague and lowly a degree, and that purposive action is fundamentally different from mechanical

process, may be conveniently called the Hormic Theory". The word Hormic is from the Greek '*horme*' meaning 'a vital impulse' or 'urge to action'. This may be considered to be synonymous with Bergson's '*elan vital*', Jung's '*libido*' and Schopenhauer's '*will-to-live*'. In every activity there is this hormic urge. Professor T. P. Nunn says, 'To this element of drive or urge, whether it occurs in the conscious life of men and the higher animals or in the unconscious activities of their bodies and the (presumably) unconscious behaviour of lower animals, we propose to give a single name *horme*'.¹ This conation is present in some degree or other from the very beginning of life.

We have said that every action is an outcome of some 'urge' or motive. Now, this motive, when truly assessed will be found to be some instinctive impulse or some conjunction of two or more such impulses. Professor Mc-Dougall recognises thirteen instincts; the instinct of escape, (self-preservation) of combat, and of repulsion; the parental instinct, the instinct of appeal, the pairing instinct, instinct of curiosity, of assertion, the gregarious, food-seeking, and constructive instincts, and to satisfy the superstition, laughter is taken as the fourteenth instinct. We can trace every action to one or more of the instinctive impulses.

"We may say, that directly or indirectly, the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity. By the conative or impulsive force of some instinct, (or of some habit derived from an instinct) every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained: and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfaction, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means. Take away these instinctive dispositions; with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would be inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed

1. T. P. Nunn's 'Education, Its Data and Principles' quoted in McDougall's 'Outlines', page 73.

or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will."¹

This quotation states clearly the main thesis of Professor McDougall's hormic theory. This, in brief, is the hormic theory of action. Every action in all living organisms can be traced to some one of the instinctive impulses; conation is at the root of all action.

Desires are the conative tendencies of our instincts working on the plane of imagination. The organised system of these tendencies, directed upon many things towards realising many goals, connected with those objects, is character. "Character is the system of directed conative tendencies." The nature of this system depends upon the intellect of man, or his cognitive organisation which again is brought forth only to carry out his desires. So the character of a man depends upon the nature of his desires.

According to the Hormic theory of action, desire is the only factor which is like the 'starting handle' of behaviour. Without any desire, humanity would have come to a stand-still, long ago. A study of abnormal psychology tells us how, seemingly meaningless organic convulsions and muscle twitchings are the result of frustrated desires. Tics, as such movements are called, can be traced to latent desires. Even sleep cannot be had without the desire to sleep. No amount of physical and mental exhaustion alone would do to make one sleep. Even after the last ounce of energy is spent, we see one work with vigour on a new problem. This he can do by drawing upon his reserve store of energy, if the new problem is to satisfy any one of his desires. So also, one can go to sleep at any time if he desires to do so. McDougall has, by analysing his own dreams and those of others, proved that dreams also have a conative basis.

So far, a general survey of hormic theory of action has been given showing how desire is the basis of all action, conscious, unconscious, physical or mental.

1. McDougall's Social Psychology, p. 44.

To a superficial critic the Hormic theory and the teaching of the Gītā, may seem to be diametrically opposed. If he prides himself on being a Sanātānist, he would say that this theory is sacrilegious. Lord Kṛṣṇa says that we should be desireless, and how can we be so if every action has a desire at its root. But, here it is hoped to prove that the Gītā idea of action is in no way antagonistic to the Hormic theory.

Since the question rests upon whether it is possible to do desireless action, as alleged to have been urged by Gītā, it would be better to understand clearly what we mean by 'desire'. "Desire is conative impulse working on the plane of imagination." "When a tendency is stirred to action by the mere thought of an object that is distant, we feel the stirring within us as an impulse to action. It becomes what we call a desire and we formulate in thought the goal of our desire."¹ Instinctive impulses are roused by stimuli, but they are sustained and carried out till the goal is reached by desire. The working of this desire rests upon the nature of the man and his character. The confusion arising out of a misunderstanding of Gītā's desireless action is not a genuine confusion. The difficulty arises when we confuse desire for action with desire for the fruit of action. Here again there is a mistake in talking about a desire for action. Action is but a means to an end and there is no desire for any action. We have only a goal in mind and there is desire to reach that. That urge to attain something is desire. So far, the definition of desire is common to both the theories. Let us now see whether they disagree when they talk about the control of this desire.

Arjuna is a reputed warrior and upon him rests a great responsibility. But on seeing that he has to fight his own friends and relatives, he draws back. He cries out that he would rather be shot unawares than fight his own kin to gain his kingdom. Now the Divine Charioteer interposes and exhorts him not to lose courage. Then follows the brilliant discourse on Karma Yoga.

The Lord says :—

न हि कश्चिदक्षणमपि जातु तिष्ठत्यकर्मकृत् ।
कार्यते ह्यवज्ञः कर्म सर्वः प्रकृतिजैर्गुणैः ॥

1. McDougall : ' Character and Conduct of Life ', p. 14.

“ Verily, none can ever rest for even an instant without performing action ; for all are made to act, helplessly indeed, by the Guṇas, born of Prakṛti.”

“ Know thou that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are both beginningless ; and know thou also that all modifications and Guṇas are born of Prakṛti. In the production of the body and the senses, Prakṛti is said to be the cause, in the experience of pleasure and pain, Puruṣa is said to be the cause. Puruṣa seated in Prakṛti experiences :the Guṇas born of Prakṛti ; the reason of the birth in good and evil wombs is its attachment to the Guṇas. And he sees who sees Prakṛti alone doing all actions, and that the self is actionless.”

“ Even a wise man acts in accordance with his own nature ; beings follow nature ; what can restraint do ? ”
(III, 33).

In all these ślokas and in various other places in the Gītā we find described the tremendous nature of Prakṛti which is likened to Śakti or McDougall's Horme.

“ The three Guṇas are Sattva, Rajas, Tamas ; these Guṇas, O Mighty-armed, born of Prakṛti bind fast the indestructible embodied in the body.” These three Guṇas which are, in some degree or other, inherent in all human nature can be traced to McDougall's fourteen instincts.

In Chapter XVII, verses 2 to 22 clearly define the nature of men who possess the three Guṇas. The Guṇas indicate the action of a man, or conversely, by one's behaviour, we can infer the Guṇa which he possesses. These Guṇas are born of Prakṛti. So an ordinary man cannot overcome the works of Prakṛti.

“ The Guṇas of Prakṛti perform all action. With the understanding deluded by egoism, a man thinks, ‘ I am the doer ’ ”
(III 27)

“ For all are made to act helplessly indeed, by the Guṇas, born of Prakṛti.” (III. 5).

“ If filled with self-conceit, thou thinkest, ‘ I will not fight, ’ vain is this thy resolve ; thy Prakṛti will constrain thee.”
(XVIII. 59)..

Such is the compelling nature of Prakṛti. The power of Prakṛti makes Arjuna consider his weakness on the battle-field to be of a nobler type.

Let us now come to Lord Kṛṣṇa's theory of action. We have seen how the power of Prakṛti has been recognised. We shall now consider whether we should let Prakṛti exercise its power. The will of man seems to be determined by past nature, heredity, training and environment. The whole world seems to converge in the nature of the individual.

“ Even a wise man acts in accordance with his own nature ; beings follow nature ; what can restraint do ? ” (III. 33)

‘ Yet the Gītā recognises the soul-as superior to the mechanically determined will.’ What is the nature of this soul ?

Soul : “ An eternal portion of myself having become a living soul in the world of life, draws (to itself) the five senses with mind for the sixth abiding in Prakṛti.”

समैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः ।

मनः षष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति ॥ (XV. 7)

Thus the Supreme spirit as manifested, is the Jīva. When He presides over the senses, He experiences objects. He is united with the Guṇas and so the ignorant do not know Him. Only the Yogis who strive for it find Him in themselves,

This individual soul is eternal, affected by nothing. It is deathless. The body which it occupies has beginning and end because of the nature of Prakṛti. One should realise the truth of this eternal Soul and only then can he rise above the normal life and be free from the clutches of Prakṛti and Guṇas.

How can one realise the soul ? To know the reality of soul and incidentally its identity with the Supreme Spirit, Lord Kṛṣṇa teaches the Karmayoga as a means.

S/. “ In the beginning of creation, O sinless one, the two-fold path of devotion was given by me to this world ; the path of knowledge for the meditative and the path of work for the active.”

लोकेऽस्मिन्द्विविधा निष्ठा पुरां प्रोक्ता मया नृप ।

ज्ञानयोगेन सांख्यानं कर्मयोगेन योगिनाम् ॥ (III 3)

S/. One cannot rest from work. He should be always be working. "Do thou perform obligatory action; for action is superior to inaction, and even the bare maintenance of thy body would not be possible if thou art inactive."

नियतं कुरु कर्म त्वं कर्म ज्यायो ह्यकर्मणः ।

शरीरयात्रापि च तेन प्रसिद्धयेदकर्मणः ॥ (III 8)

In the same chapter in verse 19 he says, "Therefore do thou always perform actions which are obligatory, *without attachment*; by performing action without attachment, one attains to the highest." Again in Śloka 47 Chapter II He, tells us :—

"Thy right is to work only; but never to the fruits thereof. Be thou not the producer of the fruits of (thy) actions; neither let they attachment be towards inaction."

Herein lies the crux of the problem. How is it possible to be without attachment and how to renounce the fruits of our action? "Possession may be, as it is said, nine points of the law but is certainly ninety-nine points of human nature".¹ This would mean desireless action, which is impossible, since every action conscious and unconscious is born of some desire whether vague or explicit.

Now we are faced with the following contradictions.

- (i) We should be ceaselessly acting.
- (ii) There are Prakṛti and its Guṇas which are all powerful to a certain extent.
- (iii) We should be desireless.

Self-surrender and the cultivation of a spiritual angle of vision are urged by the Lord. Let us now turn to McDougall before considering the Gītā's solution to the above problems. McDougall recognises four levels of conduct.

- (1) The stage of instinctive behaviour modified only by the influence of the pains and pleasures that are incidentally experienced in the course of instinctive activities.
- (2) The stage in which the operation of the instinctive impulses is modified by the influence of rewards and punishments administered more or less systematically by the social environment.

1. Wadia : Message of Kṛṣṇa.

- (3) The stage in which conduct is controlled in the main by the anticipation of social praise and blame.
- (4) The highest stage, in which conduct is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in the way that seems to him right regardless of the praise or blame of his immediate social environment.¹

This last approaches Gītā's desireless action. Further, commenting on the saying of Thomas a Kempis, "Forsake all and thou shalt find all. Leave desire and thou shalt find rest. Unless a man be disengaged from the affections of all creatures he cannot with freedom of mind attend unto divine things." McDougall writes, "Its injunction, 'leave desire,' is an exhortation to make one desire and one purpose dominant over all others, if possible to the point of their exclusion or extinction; namely the desire for self-perfection. It will be found that all systems of moral cultivation which leave a man a responsible moral being, necessarily are alike in that respect. The only alternative is a system of discipline which gives an authoritative ruling for every situation and thus deprives its followers of all moral responsibility save that of obedience alone."²

Coming back to the Gītā, the whole discourse arises out of a particular situation. Arjuna, a great warrior, is to fight his cousins who misbehave. On the battlefield, at the prospect of the impending carnage of his own blood relations and friends, his heart fails him. The problem here is, in the words of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, "It (Gītā) sets out with an ethical problem raised by a conflict in which we have on one side the Dharma of the man of action, a prince and warrior and leader of men, protagonist of a great crisis, of a struggle on the physical plane, the plane of actual life between the powers of right and justice and the powers of wrong and injustice, the demand of destiny of the race upon him that he shall resist and give battle and establish even though through a terrible physical struggle and a giant slaughter, a new era and reign of truth and right and justice, and on the other side the ethical sense which condemns the means and the action as a sin, recoils from the price of

1. McDougall : Social Psychology, p. 181.

2. McDougall : Character and Conduct of Life, p. 116.

individual suffering and social strife, unsettling and disturbance, and regards abstention from violence and battle as the only way and the one right moral attitude."¹

Lord Kṛṣṇa offers an excellent solution,

"So let the Śāstras be thy authority in ascertaining what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. Having known what is said in the ordinances of the Śāstras, thou shouldst act here (in this world)."

तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ।

ज्ञात्वा शास्त्रविधानोक्तं कर्म कर्तुमिहार्हसि ॥ (XVI. 24)

The safest guide then would be the Śāstras which advocate the following of Svadharma. Arjuna being of the fighting caste must fight since it is his duty. When he thinks of the immediate future he is swayed by his emotions and so his moral perspective is distorted and he talks of crime and sin. It is why the Lord says

"Verily you talk words of wisdom, but the truly wise grieve neither for the living nor for the dead."

Then the Lord soars into the philosophical heights gradually lifting Arjuna from the depths of Prakṛti-ridden misery to the highest bliss. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the pranks of ignorance etc., need not be repeated here. Let us see what means the Lord suggests for performing desireless action, for action we must do. Inaction is impossible and even if possible is unworthy of man. "Be always acting but renounce all actions in Him, with mind centered on the self, getting rid of hope and selfishness (fight) free from (mental) fever. Never attach yourselves to the immediate effects of actions, have Śraddhā and with your mind always centred on Him you will be rid of desires." (III. 33).

"From whom is the evolution of all beings, by whom all this is pervaded, worshipping Him with his own duty, a man attains perfection. "

That Supreme Spirit to whom we should surrender all our actions is described by the Lord Himself as follows : "Though I am unborn, of changeless nature and Lord of beings yet subjugating my Prakṛti, I come into being by my own Māyā."

1. Essay on the Gītā : 2nd series, p. 453.

अजोऽपि सन्नन्ययात्मा भूतानामीश्वरोऽपि सन् ।

प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय संभवाग्यात्ममायया ॥ (IV. 6)

“Unaware of my higher state as the Lord of Beings, fools disregard Me, dwelling in the human form.” (IX. 11)

“For I am the Abode of Brahman, the immortal and immutable, of everlasting Dharma and of Absolute Bliss.”(XIV.27)

“I am the self, O Guḍākeśa. Existent in the heart of all beings, I am the beginning, the middle and also the end of all beings.” (X. 20).

“Beyond me, O Dhanañjaya, there is nought. All this is strung in Me, as a row of jewels on a thread.” (VII. 7)

Such is the universal Spirit in whom you should centre your desires. McDougall tells us : “He can find some one distant goal that seems worth striving for with steady purpose..... He can subordinate to this purpose all trivial seductions. With this in view, let him adopt the practice of being alone for some-time, in order that he may commune with himself.”¹

If one is so whole-heartedly devoted to Him, he cares not for the immediate results of his action. He does the action at the dictate of his Svadharma, but he is only concerned with the supreme goal. The object of his desire has changed and so he does not care for the intermediary opposites of qualities. If he sacrifices his actions at the feet of the Highest he becomes one with Him. Then he can live in oneness with God and his true self being perfected, become a faultless instrument of living action in the freedom of the immortal Dharma.

Now the aspirant gets an asakta Buddhi towards everything. We can now understand the Gītā doctrine of non-attachment and renunciation. Renunciation here means renunciation of the fruits of our action, for we can never renounce our actions. The fruits of our actions are now become worthless since our goal has been fixed at a higher level, that of realising Him. Here one is taught renunciation IN action rather than renunciation OF action,

“He who does actions forsaking attachment, resigning them to Brahman, is not soiled by evil, like unto lotus leaf by water.” (V. 10).

1. McDougall : Character and Conduct of Life, p. 170.

“When a man, completely casts away, O Partha, all the desires of mind satisfied in the self alone by the self, then is he said to be one of steady wisdom.”

प्रजहाति यदा कामान् सर्वान्पार्थ मनोगतान् ।

आत्मन्येवात्मना तुष्टः स्थितप्रज्ञस्तदोच्यते ॥ (II. 53)

S/. He who maketh Brahman alone as the object of his works obtains Brahman, when such a goal is in view, is it impossible to forsake the fruits of action? To one who is always striving to attain that, is non-attachment a difficulty? Never. When the conative tendencies have been directed towards another channel, the motive power exhausts itself in that supreme goal and it has nothing to do with the baser levels of desires. With the one master-desire that of attaining Brahman, will it not be possible to do,

“That which is like poison at first, but like Nectar at the end.”?

The recognition of the worthlessness of our outward nature that it is only a passive instrument, is made possible by the True knowledge. Bhakti, Śraddhā and self-surrender at the feet of the God-head will give you true knowledge. For, has He not said,

“To them, ever steadfast and serving Me with affection, I give the Buddhi Yoga, by which they come unto Me.”

“This upward transference of our centre of being and the consequent transformation of our whole existence and consciousness, with a resultant change in the whole spirit and motive of our action, the action often remaining precisely the same in all its outward appearances, makes the gist of Gītā’s Karma Yoga.”¹

Reverting to Hormic psychology as propounded by McDougall we find a similar theory of action.

“For the essence of moral conduct is the performance of one’s social duty, the duty prescribed by society, as opposed to the mere following of the promptings of egoistic impulses.”²

This passage from McDougall, suggests the doctrine of Svadharma. Human conduct is the behaviour of self-conscious and rational beings; it is the highest type of purposive behaviour.

1. Ghosh : Essays on the Gītā, 1st series.

2. McDougall : Social Psychology, p. 313.

Again McDougall shows how we can have actions, whose immediate results may be ignored.

“The conations, the desires and aversions arising within this self-regarding sentiment are the motive forces which, adding themselves to the weaker ideal motive in the case of moral effort, enables it to win the mastering over some stronger, coarser desire of our primitive animal nature and to banish from consciousness the idea of the end of this desire.”¹

McDougall is not interested in the metaphysical aspect of the self as much as he is interested in the psychological aspect of it. Herein he tells us the necessity for self-perfection.

“The habit of self-criticism is required and this implies and arises from a strong self-regarding sentiment. The special moral sentiments must be brought into connection with and organised within, the system of a more comprehensive sentiment—what may be called the master sentiment among all the moral sentiments, namely, the sentiment for a perfected or completely moral life.”²

“Self-knowledge is the best and surest way to the understanding of others ; and to each of us it is indispensable for the guidance of his own little bark through the troubled waters of modern life.”³

Regarding God, McDougall writes: “.....nothing is more miserable than the state of that man whose character, having been integrated by the religious sentiment, collapses through the destruction of the belief in God.”

Further, when asked the question, what master sentiment can we cultivate whose object cannot be destroyed so long as life endures and whose desires will govern conduct to noble ends alone and never lead us to lasting unhappiness, McDougall answers: “It is possible by cultivating the one sentiment of self-regard from which arises the purpose of attaining to nobility of

1. McDougall : Social Psychology, p. 248.

2. McDougall : Social Psychology, p. 226.

3. McDougall : Character and Conduct of Life, p. 4.

character. He whose character has developed along this line can say,

“ In the fell clutch of circumstance,
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance,
My head is bloody, but unbound.
It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishment the scroll,
I am the master of my fate ;
I am the captain of my soul ”.¹

About the way to attain detachment McDougall has something to say : “ Any intellectual contemplation of our emotions detaches us in some degree from them, weakens their power over us, even if it be merely the contemplation of scientific curiosity.” Then talking about that “ noblest invention of nature,” the parental instinct, McDougall cites it as a case of disinterested protective impulse.

If we give a richer connotation to McDougall’s advice to men, we hear the Lord’s voice, though faintly, for he says,

“ Make a plan of life and pursue it steadily ; but be flexible in your means, though inflexible in your main purpose, remember that joy is in the pursuit, rather than in the attainment of your goals ; therefore, set them high, lest you attain them too easily.

“ The worldly hope men set their hearts upon
Turn ashes—or it prospers and anon,
Like snow upon the desert’s dusty face,
Lighting a little hour or two—is gone ”²

1. McDougall’s Character and Conduct of Life, p. 114.
2. McDougall’s Character and Conduct of Life, p. 213.

A VEDĀNTIC TREATISE AND ITS
UNPUBLISHED COMMENTARY :
A NOTICE

(Sadāshiva L. Kātre)

(Continued from p. 111)

The Commentary

It is, however, the Commentary Prabhābhānu that forms the main bulk and importance of our present Ms. It is an elaborate and lucid exposition of the original treatise. The Commentator, like others of his class, makes a great display of his vast erudition and learning and of his mastery of different systems of Hindu Philosophy, Grammar, Poetics, etc. He, while establishing the points of the original author or refuting those of others, enters into numerous, though usual, Sāstric discussions, raises doubts and dismisses them with arguments.

Quotations, etc., in the Commentary

He never spares an opportunity to quote, with his own remarks, some ancient authority for or against some view. Among the works, the authors, etc., quoted in his Commentary we meet with the following :—Numerous passages¹ from the Vedic Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, of which the ऋग्वेदसंहिता, the अथर्ववेदसंहिता and the ऐतरेय, श्वेताश्वतर, बृहदारण्यक (including the सप्तमब्राह्मण portion, कठबल्ली and छान्दोग्य Upaniṣads are distinctly named ; numerous passages² from the Epic, Purāṇic, Philosophical and Dharmaśāstra literature whereof the महाभारत, the भगवद्गीता, the विष्णुपुराण, etc., are distinctly named ; the आश्वलायनगृह्यसूत्र ; मनु, वामदेव, जनक, भरत, देवल, वशिष्ठ,³ व्यास, शुक्र (along with his unnamed preceptors and disciples) etc., as also the Smṛtis and other works

1. These passages are generally named as श्रुति and sometimes as वैदिक वचस्, etc. The श्रुतिस are sometimes also specified as द्वैतश्रुति, अद्वैतश्रुति, लयश्रुति, भेदश्रुति, गौरवश्रुति, etc.

2. These passages are generally named as स्मृति, वचन, etc. and the works are called इतिहास, पुराण, शास्त्र, स्मृति, etc. The quotations from the भगवद्गीता are designated as स्मृति, भगवदुक्त, भगवद्वचन, कृष्णवाक्य etc.

3. Vasiṣṭha is here said to have founded the most ancient school of Vedānta.

ascribed to them; the सांख्य system, the सांख्यसूत्र¹ and the followers of the school named as the सांख्यअनीश्वरवादिन्s, etc.; पतञ्जलि, his योग school and its adherents called the पातञ्जलs etc.; गौतम, his न्यायसूत्र and the followers of his school called the गौतमीयs, नैयायिकs, तार्किकs, पीलुपाकवादिन्s, etc.; कणाद, his वैशेषिक system (also called the उपाङ्ग) and its adherents called the वैशेषिकs etc.; some of the combined न्याय-वैशेषिक schools and their followers called उपाङ्गपठितन्यायशास्त्रविद्स, etc.; जैमिनि, his पूर्वमीमांसासूत्र, the Mīmāṃsā sub-schools founded by कुमारिलभट्ट, प्रभाकरगुरु, सुरारिमिश्र, etc., and their respective adherents called the भाट्टs, the प्रभाकरs etc.; व्यास's वेदान्तसूत्र (also called the ब्रह्मसूत्र or शारीरिक) and his followers called the वेदान्तिन्s, अद्वैतवादिन्s, मुख्यसिद्धान्तिन्s, etc.; नंकराचार्य, his भाष्यs, and other works like the वाक्यवृत्ति; सुरेश्वर (designated as वार्तिकाचार्य, etc.) and his वार्तिकs; हस्तामलकाचार्य, विवरणाचार्य, संक्षेपशारीरकाचार्य, वाचस्पतिमिश्र, विद्यारण्यस्वामिन्, वेदान्तनिपुणाचार्य (possibly the renowned वेदान्ताचार्य), and their works; numerous anonymous works and authors; four schools of the चार्वाकs; three schools of the त्रिदण्डिन्s; two schools of the बौद्धs; two schools of the हैरण्यगर्भs; various एकजीववादिन्s, the पाशुपतs, the औपनिषदs, the अतिप्राकृतs and others; the कादम्बरी, the किरणावली,² etc.; the Tantras promulgated by Śiva, etc., etc.

Other Features of the Commentary

The commentary explains at length several additional Philosophical terms and views like अनुमान, अर्थापत्ति, उपमिति, प्रत्यभिज्ञा, प्रमा

1. On folio 100, the com. on verses 139 and 140 says: "...सत्त्व-पुरुषान्यतया प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्यत्वेन विवेकेन यज्ज्ञानं तेन मोक्षो भवतीति सांख्याः, प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकनिष्ठा आहुर्वदन्तीत्यर्थः । तथा च सांख्यसूत्रं तद्विपरीतः श्रेयानिति । तस्माद्दृष्टानुश्रविकात् औपघादेज्योतिष्टोमादेश्च दुःखनिवृत्तिहेतोर्विपरीतो भिन्नो व्यभिचारातिशयक्षयादिदोषरहितः शास्त्रैकगम्यप्रकृतिपुरुषभेदसाक्षात्कारोऽत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्तिहेतुः श्रेयान् एकान्तात्यन्तिकदुःखोच्छेदक्षम इत्यर्थः etc. Obviously, the Commentator has in his mind the verse² (दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः । तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's सांख्यकारिका which he secures to designate as सांख्यसूत्र.

2. The Com. has alluded to the कादम्बरी and the किरणावली while discussing the propriety of Maṅgala in the beginning of a work on folio 3 b. Unluckily the scribe has committed several serious blunders in this portion as elsewhere !

etc., and अवच्छेदवाद, दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद, सर्वशरीरसजीवस्ववाद, four अद्वैतवादs, various एकजीववादs, etc. It discusses, in the manner of similar commentaries, the application of various Lakṣaṇās in explaining the Vedāntavākyas. It also refers to several popular or Philosophical maxims¹ in the course of various discussions. The commentary on verses 183 and 184, dealing with the eighteen Vidyās and the theory of Rasa in Poetry, shows, like several other passages, the commentator's admirable grasp of different branches of learning.

Criticism, etc. in the Commentary

The Commentary is further marked by the Commentator's justness and generosity of mind as also by his critical faculty. He never puts in a quotation blindly, but almost always supplements it with his introduction, explanation, conclusion, summary, etc. Even with those opposed to the Advaita Vedānta school he deals most generously. He attacks and refutes their views only after explaining them thoroughly. His critical mind makes its appearance in several ways in the Commentary. He notices² variant readings of the text at several places. He also points out³ why a common Vedic passage has undergone modification in a particular Vedic text. At some places⁴ he tries to establish

1. E. g., “ प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेन।” (folio 100 b), “ त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थं इति न्यायेन ” (104 b), “ सावकाशनिरवकाशयोर्मध्ये निरवकाशं बलीय इति न्यायात् ” (104 b), “ अथ कैमुतिकन्यायेनापि ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वं दर्शयति ” (112 b), “ निमित्तापाये नैमित्तिकस्याप्यपाय इति न्यायेन ” (118 a), “ ऐहिकभविकन्यायेन ” (120 b), “ सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्वदिति न्यायात् ” (125 b), “ उत्तरपूर्वाद्योरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशादिति न्यायात् ” (127 b), etc.

2. E. g., folio 3 b “ स्पर्शोपलं संपतितं ” and “ स्पर्शोपलभ्यं पतितं ”, “ प्रपश्यतां ” and “ प्रपत्स्यतां ” (Verse 6), folio 63 b “ अव्ययनिदानन्दं ” and “ अव्ययचिदानन्दं ” (Verse 65), folio 94 b “ तदलं ” and “ सकलं ” (Verse 120), etc.

3. Vide, for instance, folio 21 b “ अत एवारमा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीदित्यस्य स्थाने सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदिति छन्दोगाः पठन्ति. ”

4. E. g., folio 46 a “इदमेव सांख्यैर्महत्तत्त्वमित्युच्यते etc. ”

the unity of different Śāstras on some points. At other places¹ he exposes the differences among some authors of the same school.

An Appreciation, etc.

Thus it will appear that the *Prabhābhānu* (lit. Brilliance-marked-Sun) is a very learned Commentary and that it justifies its title, although it does not make any new or original contribution to the Vedānta literature. It reminds the reader of the two well-known commentaries on Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra*, viz., Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī's *Subodhinī* and Rāmatīrtha's *Vidvanmanorañjanī* which might have served as models to our Commentator. It is to be regretted that our Ms. is marked, as shown in the beginning of this paper, with the absence of some original matter.

The Commentator and his Environments, etc.

I may quote below in full the Introduction and the concluding Colophon of the Commentary as they attach considerable historical importance to the Commentator and his work :—

Folio 1 b (Introduction)

॥ श्रीगणेशायनमः ॥ शक्तिब्रह्मचिदानन्दौ पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ ॥

लयोत्पत्तिस्थितिकरौ वन्दे तौ जगतां गुरु ॥ १ ॥

सच्चिदानन्दरूपाय कृष्णायाक्लिष्टकारिणे ॥

नमो वेदान्तवेद्याय गुरवे बुद्धिसाक्षिणे ॥ २ ॥

आशाप्रपूर्णाणि (= आशाः प्रपूर्णापि) विचित्रकृत्यैः कुमोदकत्वं क्षयितुं क्षमायाम् ॥

विन्यस्य (?) कुं तां क्षमताविहीनं (?) ज्ञात्वावतीर्णो निखिलार्थदाता ॥ ३ ॥

धर्मस्य गुप्त्यै यशसामुदन्वान्प्रतापमानुर्भगवान्वरेण्यः ॥

मानुष्यमास्थाय सुतत्त्वमाप श्रीमाधवस्यामितविक्रमस्य ॥ ४ ॥

स साम्प्रतं दौलतरावनाज्ञा ख्यातो जगन्त्यां जगतीशराजः ॥

1. B.g., folio 53 b ff ".....इति काम्यं त्वाचार्यमते त्याज्यमेव सांसारिक-फलकत्वात् । वार्तिककारमते तु काम्यमपि कामनां त्यक्त्वा ज्योतिष्टोमादीश्वराराधनार्थ-त्वेनानुष्ठितं सद्विदिषां जनयेदेवेति तत्कर्तव्यमन्यथा ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेदि-त्यादित्तद्विधायकश्रुतीनां वैयर्थ्यं स्यादित्याकरे विस्तरः" (Verse 39), etc. Vide also folio 88 b ff., where the Com. marks at great length the divergences among वार्तिककार, विवरणाचार्य, संक्षेपशारीरकाचार्य, वाचस्पतिमिश्र, etc. regarding Śaṅkarācārya's view of the correct sense of the Vedāntavākyas and other allied topics.

दूर्वादलश्यामलकान्तकान्तिर्हुताशनः शत्रुगणस्य वीर्ये ॥ ५ ॥
 शौरिर्धृतौ मेरुमेश एव क्रोधे कृतौ विक्रम एव दाने ॥
 कर्णः स्मरो रम्यसुकामिनीनां यशोब्धिचन्द्रः सुकृतस्य सिन्धुः ॥ ६ ॥
 ज्ञाने समाधावपरो हि रामश्चसूपभूपैः कृतिभिः सदस्यैः ॥
 राष्ट्रस्य कोशस्य बलस्य नीतिर्महैधकैः स्वामिपरैरुदारैः ॥ ७ ॥
 परावरज्ञैर्धिषणासमुद्गैरमात्यवर्गैः सहितः सभायाम् ॥
 सतां मुदे बालविदे च भिक्षोः स्वबोधरत्नस्य तु माधवस्य ॥ ८ ॥
 व्याख्यां प्रभाभान्वभिधां विधातुं मामादिशद्ग्रन्थवरं च कर्तुम् ॥
 वेदान्तरत्नं लघुचारुपद्यं सिद्धान्तसारं चिदचिद्विचारम् ॥ ९ ॥
 ततः प्रवृत्तः पदयोगधर्मवेदान्तशास्त्रादिषु च प्रवीणः ॥
 नारायणस्यात्मजबालकृष्णो राजैकजीवी पितरं सुधीरम् ॥ १० ॥

वयासमालक्ष्यभिधां (=वयःसमां लक्ष्म्यभिधां ?) च धार्त्रीं नत्वा पुरो ग्रन्थवरं विधाय ॥
 वेदान्तरत्नं विमलाशयोऽहं व्याख्यां करोमि प्रब्रुवाः क्षमध्वम् ॥ ११ ॥

Folio 132 b (Conclusion)

वेदव्यासादिरूपेण स्वात्मतत्त्वप्रकाशकम् ॥
 नौमि साम्बं परात्मानं सच्चिदानन्दरूपिणम् ॥ १ ॥
 प्रभाभान्वभिधा व्याख्या बोधरत्नस्य कारिता ॥
 श्रीमता सार्वभौमेण दौलत्रावेण धीमता ॥ २ ॥
 सा कृता बालकृष्णेन द्विद्वीपवसुचन्द्रके (१८७२) ॥
 संवद्वर्षे व्यथे मासि ज्येष्ठे शुक्ले तिथौ दिशि ॥ ३ ॥
 शुक्ले समाप्तिमगमत्तया श्रीभगवान् हरः ॥
 सोमः सराधः कृष्णश्च भगवान्प्रीयतामिति ॥ ४ ॥

इति श्रीमद्राजाधिराजमहाराजसार्वभौमदौलतरावकारिता बालकृष्ण-
 कृता प्रभाभान्वभिधा माधवकृतस्वबोधरत्नस्य व्याख्या समाप्ता ॥

The Commentator's Personal Details, etc.

The Commentator's name is Bālakṛṣṇa. He is son of Nārāyaṇa and Lakṣmī who are said to be of equal age and seem to be alive when the Commentary was written. It seems to be a family of Mahārāṣṭra Brāhmaṇas, possibly Ṛgvedins, migrated to Gwalior, although its surname is not mentioned. About his learning the Commentator simply says that he is well-versed in Grammar, Yoga, Dharma, Vedānta and other Śāstras. From his salutations to Śiva, Pārvatī and Kṛṣṇa (who is also associated with Rādhā in the concluding colophon), both in the beginning and in the end, he appears to be an unbigoted and liberal-minded Śaiva and an

adherent of the school of Śaṅkarācārya. He describes himself to be dependent for his livelihood solely on his royal patron Mahārāja Daulatrāo Scindiā, under whose directions he, with a clear or unbiassed mind, composed the present extensive Commentary *Prabhābhānu* on the ascetic Mādhava's Vedāntic gem *Svabodharatna* for the delight of the good and for the understanding of the beginners and completed it on Friday, the tenth day of the bright fortnight of Jyeṣṭha in Saṁvat 1872 named as Vyaya (Saṁvatsara) i. e., about June, 1815 A. C.

The Commentator's Patron : Mahārāja Daulatrāo Scindiā

Thus the Commentary takes its additional importance from its association with an important figure in the history of India. Daulatrāo Scindiā is here identified with Supreme God Viṣṇu, who, for relieving the afflicted Earth of her miseries and for protecting Dharma, incarnated himself on the earth as a man, (subsequently) became the (adopted?) son of Mādhava (i. e. Mahādajī Scindiā) of limitless valour and is now (i. e. at the time of the composition of the Commentary) renowned in the world as King of Kings under the name Daulatrāo. He is said to possess a charming dark complexion, is described as fire to the host of enemies, as Cupid to handsome damsels, as the moon born from the ocean of glory, as an ocean of meritorious deeds, and is compared to Kṛṣṇa, Meru, Śiva, Vikrama, Karṇa and Rāma in respect to his valour, patience, fury, deeds, liberality and combination of Knowledge and perseverance. His Court, where he directed the Commentator to compose the requisite Commentary on the particular Vedāntic treatise, is said to have among its members successful field-m Marshals and feudatory chiefs as also his band of loyal and liberal ministers, possessing a vast intellect, well-versed in History and in the Śāstras and having immensely added to his Kingdom (or Empire), treasure, force and statesmanship. In the end, again, Daulatrāo, possessing immense wealth and intelligence, is said to have caused the Commentary to be written and is described as Rājādhirāja (= a king of kings or paramount sovereign) and Mahārāja-Sārvabhauma (= an Emperor).

Historical Gleanings

Daulatrāo, born in 1780 and adopted in 1794 by Mahādajī's widow, tried to follow in the footsteps of his celebrated adopted

father with greater vigour and enthusiasm and almost ruled the politics of Poona and Delhi for some years in the beginning. Several martial victories, a few of them involving some ignoble feats actually committed by his infamous ministers, are attributed to him during this period, although in political matters he generally proved a failure. He was actuated by a keen desire to retain or even increase the vast dominions earned by Mahādajī, to keep other Indian states under the sway of the Marathas and to ward off all chances of foreign intervention with the supremacy of his own kingdom and of the Maratha Empire in general. Still, unluckily he failed in the long run and, by the Treaty of Surji Añjangāon in 1803, lost the major portion of his limitless territories to the British, had to surrender his claims over several other states and also had to acknowledge the partial supremacy of the British in respect to foreign relations. Although he kept on trying to mend the situation during subsequent years, ultimately he, in a state of helplessness, made a permanent allegiance with the British in 1817 and had to see with his own eyes the destruction of the Maratha Empire of the Peshwās in 1818 before he died in 1827.

Remarks

As such the praise showered on him, especially the divine character attributed to him, in the Commentary might appear to students of History as extravagant and befitting only the pen of a dependent. Yet it is possible to find for it some justification in facts. In the first place, there is the age-long Hindu belief in the divine character of all Kings expressed in the well-known maxim "नविष्णुः पृथिवीपतिः" and we need not be surprised at its application in the case of Daulatrāo, who, despite his undeserved failures, was certainly a prince of high order on account of his personality, spirit of enterprise, numerous martial achievements, education and love of letters. Secondly, prior to 1817, it had appeared for some time as if Daulatrāo's attempts for the revival of his lost supremacy were being crowned with considerable success. By the Treaty of 1805 arranged by Lord Cornwallis, Daulatrāo had regained some of his lost territories from the British and had also been granted a free hand over the states of Rajputana and Malwa. His shifting of the Scindiās' permanent camp from Ujjain to Gwalior, ultimately

leading to the creation of the Capital City of Lashkar in 1810, is also one of his remarkable achievements of this period. Possibly it was some time after 1810 that Daulatrāo directed our Commentator to compose the present Commentary, completed in 1815, at one of his enthusiastic Durbars held to celebrate the foundations of the new capital. It is no wonder, therefore, if the subjects in general, not to speak of the Commentator who confesses himself to be wholly dependent on his royal patron, had begun to feel the revival of Mahādajī's supremacy and glory in Daulatrāo at this stage and the titles "Rājādhirāja" and "Mahārāja Sārva-bhauma" were applied to his name.¹

Daulatrāo's Addiction to Spiritualism

Daulatrāo's educational attainments and literary habits are well-known to history and are also evinced in his patronisation of several poets and Śāstrins of which our Commentator seems to be one. The Commentary, besides corroborating these facts, throws a flood of light on Daulatrāo's love and study of Philosophy. The very fact that he selected the particular Vedāntic 'gem' and prescribed it for a learned and extensive commentary speaks for his deep knowledge of the subject.

Nor is this factor in Daulatrāo's personality quite unknown to people. During my recent visit to Lashkar-Gwalior a few months ago, I met some reliable aged friends, conversant with local history and tradition, who definitely informed me that Mahārājā Daulatrāo had cultivated a spiritual temperament through several years and had during late years become very anxious for his permanent spiritual welfare and salvation through mystic self-experience. He requested Anṇāmahārāja, a highly respected local saint, to administer to him the requisite *guru-mantra* and thereby secure his permanent spiritual welfare. Anṇāmahārāja, however, refused saying that a Haṭhayogin like himself was not properly authorised to make the king his spiritual disciple. At his own suggestion further Daulatrāo invited the saint Mahāpatinātha, a Rājayogin of Paiṭhaṇa, to Lashkar, underwent

1. Possibly Mahādajī Scindia never used these titles with his name and continued to call himself the Peshwā's representative or the Moghul Emperor's Vazir even after 1782 when he attained equal rank with the Peshwā and the British by the Treaty of Salbei.

the due *gurumantra* ceremony at his hands and thereby had his object of mystic self-realisation and spiritual welfare fulfilled. Subsequently Mahīpatinātha, now Daulatrāo's spiritual guru, settled and built a Maṭha at Lashkar-Gwalior and was succeeded by his disciple surnamed Purandare whose descendants, under the title Dholibuvā, continue to exercise spiritual influence in the local high circles even to this day.

Its Probable Causes

As to what exactly led Mahārāja Daulatrāo, a prince and general of a high order, to cultivate an addiction to spiritualism, it is difficult to say. Possibly, his loss, despite his best efforts for several years, of supremacy and of the considerable portion of the vast dominions earned by Mahādajī, side by side with the gradual destruction of the father empire of the Peshwās, led him to cherish a belief in the transitory character of material objects and worldly glory. Again, his remorse for the ferocious and heart-rending deeds committed under his name actually by his cruel minister Sarjerāo Ghaṭge at Poona and at Indore might have further urged him for spiritual purification as the necessary means to real salvation for which he was growing anxious.

SOME CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS FROM THE RĀMĀYANA

(Miss P. C. Dharma)

(Continued from page 124)

The Purohita (Chief Priest) was the master of the funeral ceremonies. As soon as *Bharata* gave the word, the priest brought out the " fire " from the rooms where it was kept and worshipped, as the same was to be used for setting fire to the pyre. The corpse was placed on a litter (Śibikā) and carried on the shoulders of weeping attendants to the cremation ground. During the funeral procession, gold and silver coins and cloths were profusely scattered on the road, evidently for poor people to pick up, all along the route.

A pyre was soon formed on the cremation ground on the *Banks of the River Sarayū* with faggots of fragrant wood like Sandal, Agarū, Sarala, Padmaka, Devadāru etc., and various kinds of incense. After placing the corpse on the funeral pyre, and setting fire to it, the priests chanted the Vedic Mantras. The widowed queens who had followed the corpse in carriages and palanquins surrounded by the old servants of the palace, went round the pyre with loud lamentations ; and then performed the water rites together with *Bharata*. The queens, *Bharata*, the priests etc., subsequently returned to the city and slept on the ground for 10 days till the period of pollution was over.

On the 12th day after cremation, *Bharata* performed *S'rāddha* ceremony and distributed various gifts to the Brahmans—gems, money, food, and clothing (II-77-1 etc.). On the 13th day, *Bharata* went to the cremation ground to collect the bones and perform the rest of the rites (II-77-8 and 26). The only difference in the present day custom is the collection of bones and ashes on the 2nd day i.e. the day after cremation. In the case of *Jaṭāyus*, *Rāma* cremated him, offered funeral oblations, of balls of roasted

venison, with Vedic Mantras and then performed the water rites in the river Godāvarī (III-68-31 etc.).

Vāli was cremated by his son *Aṅgada*. His body ornamented and clothed was carried in a litter to the cremation ground. The male *Vānaras* marched in front. The women folk went behind the corpse, weeping. The corpse-bearers were picked strong men. The litter was carried on the shoulders of *Vānaras*. On reaching the *Sandy Bed of a River* the litter was placed on the sand. The funeral pyre was prepared on the sandy bed. (To the present day this custom is said to be prevalent in South India). After dragging wailing *Tārā* (*Vāli's* wife) from the corpse, *Vāli's* body was placed by the attendants, on the funeral pyre which was lighted by his son *Aṅgada*. After the lighting of the funeral pyre, all the relations went to the river and performed the water rites for the dead and then returned home. These ceremonies have been continued up to the present day for 5000 years with very little change. These can be witnessed in *India* even today (IV-25-13).

Vibhīṣaṇa first brought out from the palace, *Rāvaṇa's* sacred fire, carts, brass utensils, fragrant faggots (like sandal wood etc.), fragrant incense, gems, pearls and corals. Then *Rāvaṇa's* body was covered with a silken cloth and placed in a golden litter, adorned with flowers. The litter was carried to the cremation ground *with the Music of Trumpets* and the chanting of priests. The priests preceded the corpse, while *Vibhīṣaṇa* and others followed with faggots in their hands. The damsels of the *Seraglio* followed the corpse on foot. The pyre was made of fragrant faggots on which was spread an Antelope skin. The corpse being placed on it, the fire was placed on the South-east corner of the pyre. *Prṣadājya* (curd and ghee) was poured on the shoulders of the corpse, and the various sacrificial wooden vessels were placed on the legs, thighs etc. Then slaying the beasts according to Śāstraic injunctions the *Rākṣasas* dipped a coverlet in their fat and ghee and placed the coverlet on the face of the corpse which was adorned with garlands and clothes. *Vibhīṣaṇa* and others scattered fried paddy (or popped rice) (*Lāja*) over the corpse, and duly lighted

the funeral pyre. Then *Vibhīṣaṇa* bathed, and with wet clothes performed the *Water-rites* with *Sesamum*, *Darbha-Grass* and *Water*. Subsequently the women consoled by *Vibhīṣaṇa*, returned to the city (VI-114-100 etc.).

Water rites—*Nivāpa* (II-102-28) or *Udaka* (II-101-7 and II-102-25) had to be done by the sons immediately after hearing of the death of the father, if they had not participated in the original cremation ceremony (II-101-7 F). Water rites were faithfully performed to procure the salvation of the father (II-101-8). As pointed out already, the son who had an opportunity to perform the cremation rites of his father was considered particularly lucky by his brothers (II-102-10). Funeral rites were always performed by the river side. On hearing of the death of *Daśaratha*, *Rāma* told *Lakṣmaṇa* to bring the *Īṅgudī* cake and the upper cloth and went to the river side with *Sītā* in the front. At the present day the upper cloth is not worn (II-102-20 F). *Rāma* took water in his *Añjali* (i.e. joined hands), faced the south and weeping offered it to his deceased father (II-102-25). It is stated that *Rāma* squeezed the water (*Vāsodaka*). The water rite was later on followed by the rite of *Offering the Piṇḍa* (or offering the bolus of food to the Manes). The bolus used to be made of the food which the individuals used to eat. *Rāma* offered a ball of *Īṅgudī* cakes mixed with *Jujubes*, on *Darbha* grass spread on the ground (II-102-29F).

It was a funeral rite in honour of the spirit of the deceased relation. The important part of it was feeding a Brahman, supposed to represent the spirit of the dead, and presenting him with cloth and *Dakṣiṇā* (money gift). The first *Śrāddha* was performed on the 12th day after death (the cremation being done on the first day) (II-77-1). Subsequently *Śrāddhas* came to be performed at specific periods and at least once a year on the anniversary day. Every son was expected to perform the *Śrāddha* once at least at *Gayā*. The sanctity of *Gayā* has continued upto the present day. The belief in the virtues of a *Śrāddha* and especially of one performed at *Gayā** by a Son has evidently existed from time immemorial.

* *Rāma* told *Bharata* that people wish for many sons, so that one at least might go to *Gayā* and perform *Śrāddha* (II-107-11).

Goats' flesh was offered as food to the Brahman guests invited for the *S'rāddha* during the epic period (III-11-57 F).

There was a widespread belief in auspicious moments for commencing business, e.g. marching for battle, entering a new house, commencing a sacrifice, performing marriages, crowning kings, setting out for a journey etc. (I-73-8, II-4-22 and VI-4-3). *Hanumān* suggested to *Rāma* that he would do well to start the expedition in an auspicious Muhūrta (VI-3-33). *Rāma* told *Sugrīva* that the *Abhijit-Muhūrta* was suitable for marching to *Lañkā* which was situated South-east (VI-4-3 etc.). Great importance was attached to the occurrence of good and evil portents when beginning any business, especially when setting out for battle.

The first entrance into a new house used to be made in an auspicious moment, after worshipping the Deities called the *Vāstudevatās* with offerings of cooked food (II-56-22). After the construction of a cottage by *Lakṣmaṇa*, *Rāma* asked *Lakṣmaṇa* to quickly get ready some roasted venison for offering to the presiding Deities, as he was anxious not to miss the auspicious time for sacrificing and entering the newly erected residence. *Daśaratha's* march to the sacrificial camp (I-13-38), and his journey to Mithilā to attend *Rāma's* marriage (I-71-23 and I-73-8) commenced at auspicious moments.

People believed in an auspicious time even for stealing. *Jaṭayus* pointed out to *Rāma* that *Rāvaṇa* stole *Sītā* in an inauspicious moment and that he could therefore never enjoy her (IV-68-13). *Sumantra* placed *Rāma's* car with its face northwards before starting from *Tamasā's* southern bank to the forest. It was considered inauspicious to have the conveyance facing the south when starting (II-46-34).

The belief in dreams was very common. *Daśaratha* on seeing evil omens in his dreams, indicative of his approaching death before the Coronation of *Rāma*, was very much troubled (II-4-17). *Trijaṭā* told *Sītā* that her dreams were an indication of the course of future events (VI-27-8 etc., and VI-27-55). *Bharata* also believed in dreams and was distressed by bad dreams while at *Rājagṛha* (II-69-8 etc.).

The signs of impending disaster were :—

Plunging from the peak of a mountain into a dirty pool of cow dung, with dishevelled hair ;

Floating in a pool of cow dung ;

Drinking oil with laughter, anointing oneself with oil and diving into oil, head downwards ;

Eating sesamum rice, sitting on an iron seat clad in black clothing, laughed at by black and yellow women ;

Wearing a red garland and hurrying on an ass-drawn chariot towards the south ; and being dragged by a red clad frightful demones.

Other signs of impending disaster were the drying up of the Ocean ; falling of the Moon on the earth ; withering of the trees ; cracking of the earth ; universal darkness ; issue of smoke from mountains ; the sudden extinction of flaming fire etc. (II-69-8 etc.). The sight of a monkey in a dream was indicative of disaster, according to *Sītā* (V-32-9).

The belief of the people in good and evil portents or omens was widespread. The whole poem is full of references to omens and portents. *Rāma* met with evil portents when returning home after killing *Mārīca*, and was filled with anxiety about *Sītā* (III-57-10 etc.). *Rāma* at the time of march noticed auspicious omens such as the throbbing of the right eye, and therefore anticipated success (VI-4-7). *Lakṣmaṇa* noted various good omens during the march and assured *Rāma* of success. *Sītā* who wanted to hang herself noticed auspicious omens (throbbing of her left eye, left arm, and left thigh) and became cheerful (V-29-1 etc.). *Vibhīṣaṇa* who dissuaded *Rāvaṇa* from fighting with *Rāma* gave him a list of bad omens noted by him, as indicative of impending disaster (VI-10-14 etc.).

The cultivation of the sciences of Astrology and Palmistry is revealed by the use of many astrological and astronomical terms (I-18-8 &c.). There are numerous references to Palmistry (V-35-15 &c.). The Astrologers, and Palmists (including the

Belief in astrology, Palmistry and Sāmudrika

professors of Sāmudrika) were called:—*Lakṣaṇin* (II-29-9 and VI-48-2); *Kārtāntika* (VI-48-4); *Gaṇaka* (I-13-7); or *Daivajña* (II-4-18). The belief in *Astrology* and *Palmistry* and *Sāmudrika S'āstra* was widely prevalent. *Sitā* who lamented for *Rāma* on his supposed death stated that all the predictions of astrologers about herself and *Rāma* had proved false (VI-48-2 etc.). *Daśaratha* who had been told by astrologers that his Natal Star had been invaded by Malevolent Planets (indicating approaching death) was very anxious to see *Rāma* crowned as speedily as possible before his death (II-4-18 etc.). *Sitā* told *Rāma* that her future residence in the forest had been foretold in her father's house by astrologers (II-29-8).

By the use of the so-called Divine Vision or *Jñāna-dṛṣṭi* or *Jñāncakṣus* (Television in a broad sense) it was considered possible, to divine unseen things. *Vālmīki* is said to have witnessed all the incidents in the life of *Rāma*, past, present and future by such a power and then composed the Song of *Rāmāyaṇa* (I-3-6). When *Vālmīki* met deserted and pregnant *Sitā*, crying near his hermitage, he divined all the circumstances connected with her banishment by such powers and knew her to be innocent and chaste (VII-49-14). *Sampātī* saw by his "Jñāna" vision or Television that the *Vānaras* would succeed in getting scent of *Sitā* (IV-58-25 and 29). *Budha*, on meeting king *Ila* transformed into a female, was able to divine his precedents by his Yogic knowledge (VII-88-20). *Nalakūbara*, by such powers, was able to divine the ravishment of *Rambhā* by *Rāvaṇa* (VII-26-50 F). Sage *Bharadvāja* divined all the adventures of *Rāma* by such powers (VI-127-7 etc.)

Sins and crimes were supposed to be partly expiated by being punished by the king. The Brahman beggar *Sarvārtha-Siddha* requested *Rāma* to punish him as he thought fit, for the crime of hitting an innocent being, so that the sin might be expiated and the fear of Hell removed (VII-59L-29). *Rāma's* aged ministers told him that sinners would be pardoned in the future world if punished by the king here (VII-59M-39).

People believed that the misfortunes of the subjects were due to maladministration by the kings. To cite an instance the Brahman who went to *Rāma* with his dead child, told *Rāma* that in the neighbouring kingdoms children did not die before their fathers and that therefore the death of the child must have been due to *Rāma*'s maladministration (VII-73-10 etc.).

✓ Misfortunes of the subjects believed to be due to the king's faults

Rākṣasas were supposed to increase in strength after the evening twilight (I-26-13). *Viśvāmitra* asked *Rāma* to kill *Tāṭakā* before sunset as she might otherwise become invincible.

Belief in the invincibility of demons at night time

Belief in "Possession by evil spirit" must have been common during the Epic period just as at the present day in South India. *Daśaratha*, on seeing *Kaikeyī* sulking on the floor, told her that she appeared like one possessed (II-10-30), as she asked for unreasonable boons (II-12-57). *Sumantra* reported to *Daśaratha*, that *Sītā* in the forest stood like one possessed (II-58-34). *Kausalyā* is described as trembling like one possessed with a *Bhūta* (II-60-1).

Belief in evil Spirits

The Hindus believed that various *Spirits* presided over the natural elements, trees, rivers etc. [The natural forces were all attributed to the *Spirits*.] *Kausalyā* called upon all these presiding *Spirits* to protect *Rāma* (See the 25th Chapter of *Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa*) in the forest.

Belief in good Spirits

Bharadvāja told *Sītā* to salute the great *Nyagrodha* or Banyan tree on the banks of the *Ganges* and pray for blessings (II-55-25). Sylvan Deities were supposed to reside in the sacred trees (II-55-25).

Belief in the sanctity of particular trees

The *Saṅgama* or confluence of two rivers, e.g. *Sarayū* and *Gaṅgā*, was always considered to be a sacred spot (I-24-10). River *Gaṅgā* was considered sacred even in those days. It was supposed to purify not only the persons who bathed in it but also the people whose ashes were washed by its water, and lead them to salvation (I-43-32, 1-41-20 and

Belief in the sanctity of the confluences of rivers and in the sanctity of the Ganges

I-42-18) *Ganges* water was used in the Coronation ceremony (II-14-34). Water rites for the dead, performed with the waters of the *Ganges* were supposed to lead to the salvation of the Pitṛs (II-83-24 and II-50-24). *Bharata* before crossing the *Ganges* performed the water rites for *Daśaratha* (II-83-24). *Rāma* on getting into the boat when crossing the *Ganges* on his way to the forest prayed to *Gaṅgā* for his welfare. *Lakṣmaṇa* and *Sītā* sipped water and saluted "*Gaṅgā*" on getting into the boat (II-52-77 &c.). While crossing the river *Ganges* and the river *Jumna*, *Sītā* prayed to the presiding Deities, for favour, and a safe return with *Rāma* and *Lakṣmaṇa* after the completion of the exile (II-52-82 &c., II-55-19 &c.).

Belief in sacred hills & Hermitages

Particular spots were considered sacred e.g. *Gayā*, *Siddhāśrama*, *Himālayas*, *Naimiṣa forest* &c. The mere sight of *Citrakūṭa Hill* was supposed to purify a man from his sins (II-54-30).

Belief in the Sacredness of the Cow

Cows were held in great respect (VII-23-21&c.). Even unprincipled *Rāvaṇa* respected the Cow *Surabhi* by circumambulating her (VII-23-21 &c.). Cow's milk, curd and butter, were valuable and indispensable articles of diet in the vegetarian diet of Brahmins, and curd, butter and ghee were in requisition for the daily oblations in the fire. The Brahmin's diet and the religious rites entirely depended on the cow (I-53-13 F). Further the cow was very valuable in an agricultural country. Bulls were also required for ploughing, and drawing *Gorathas* and *Śakaṭas*. But for the sanctity attached to cows in India, they would have been exterminated by indiscriminate slaughter for food.

Belief in the possibility of understanding the language of animals

People believed in the possibility of understanding the speech of animals in exceptional cases. *Kaikeyi's* father was credited with such knowledge (II-35-18).

Various Superstitious Beliefs

Various superstitious beliefs were held during the period about eclipses, death vision, insects, geography etc. The eclipses of the sun and the moon were supposed to be due to the planets *Rāhu* and *Ketu* who were supposed to swallow the Sun and the

Moon. The scorpion was supposed to be killed by its young ones (III-43-40) as soon as they were born. People before death were supposed to see golden trees (III-53-18). The Universe was supposed to be supported by eight big elephants stationed in the eight quarters, and earthquakes were attributed to the shaking of the heads of elephants out of weariness (I-40-13 etc.).

Belief in Fate and Karma has always been one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Hindu race, right up to the present moment. Hindus believe that every man reaps what he had sown in his previous births and that Destiny or Fate is all-powerful and cannot be conquered by any amount of human effort. King *Anarāya* told *Rāvaṇa*, when he was fatally wounded, that Time or Fate was invulnerable (VII-19-25). Fate or providence was supposed to spare none (III-69-41 etc.). *Rāma* consoled *Tārā* by telling her, that nobody could overcome fate and that griefs and joys were ordained by the Creator (IV-24-42 F). *Rāma* comforted *Bharata* by telling him: "No creature is endowed with the power of control over the course of events. Man is not independent of nature. The destroyer (Time) draws him hither and thither (II-105-15)". *Sītā* told *Hanumān* that everybody was at the mercy of fate and that fate was invincible (V-57-3 F). *Rāma* who had never made any distinction between his own mother and *Kaikeyī*, wondered why she inflicted misery on him, and came to the conclusion that it was *Destiny* that made her press for the Coronation of *Bharata* and his own banishment with harsh and cruel words (II-22-16 etc.). *Rāma* pointed out to *Lakṣmaṇa*, when cancelling the arrangements for his Coronation, "Destiny is above comprehension. It is beyond the powers of any creature to avoid the consequences of destiny. No one can withstand destiny, hidden from our view, until it is realised by the consequences. Nobody can fight with destiny. Destiny is the cause of happiness, misery, fear, anger, profit and loss, birth and death. Even sages of great austerity under the influence of destiny renounce their discipline and succumb to the attacks of anger and desire. The hindrance to the completion of works undertaken, and the origination of un-thought-of events, is nothing but the action of destiny. If the mind be brought under discipline by this rationale there is no

cause for sorrow regarding my thwarted coronation." *Rāma* asked *Lakṣmaṇa* not to find fault with his father or *Kaikeyī* as the whole thing had been ordained by destiny (II-22-20 &c.).

Kausalyā told *Rāma*, when she was unable to divert him from his resolution, that it was impossible to withstand Destiny (II-24-32) and that "Destiny was incomprehensible" (II-24-35). *Sumantra* thought that there could be no merit in *Brahmacarya Vrata*, in *Vedādhayana* (Recitation of the Sacred Scriptures) or in the practice of virtuous acts, as even *Rāma* possessing those merits had come to grief on account of "Fate" (II-52-17). The *Rākṣasī* women in weeping over the dead *Rāvaṇa*, pointed out that the slaughter of many *Vānaras* and *Rākṣasas* had been brought about, solely by *Fate* and that nothing was capable of withstanding it (VI-113-23).

The opposite view was also held by some like *Lakṣmaṇa*, who asserted that *only weak people talked of destiny*, and that Destiny was weak and powerless with brave people and that *only cowards talked of destiny* (II-23-6 F and 16 F). *Lakṣmaṇa* was of opinion that too much fear of the censure of the world and too high an ideal of what example one should set, were disastrous to one's personal interests (II-23-5). *Lakṣmaṇa* was in the minority. The great majority of Hindus have always believed in "Destiny".

Rāma was of opinion, that this world was the *Karma-Bhūmi* (II-109-28) for performing good and bad actions, the fruits of which were to be enjoyed later on. *Daśaratha* thought that the calamity of *Rāma's* exile had befallen him on account of sins committed in previous births (II-39-4) such as depriving the mother cows of their calves, or thoughtlessly slaying living things (II-39-11). He told *Kausalyā* that he was only reaping the effects of his own Karma (II-63-6).

Kausalyā told *Rāma* that destiny was all-powerful, as even he had to be banished to the forest for no fault (II-24-5). She lamented that she must have cut off the paps of cows when the calves were hungering after mothers' milk, in some former birth and that therefore she was paying for her past sin, by

suffering the loss of her son (II-43-17). *Sītā* attributed her misfortune to her previous Karma (VII-48-4). She wondered what sin she could have committed in her former birth to deserve the torments of the *Rākṣasīs* (V-25-18). *Sītā* on seeing the magic-created dummy of *Rāma*, killed in her presence, lamented that she must have prevented the gift of a bride in her previous birth and therefore was reaping the results of her past sinful deed.

When *Hanumān* told *Sītā* of his desire to torment and kill the *Rākṣasī* guards, *Sītā* replied that her sufferings were only due to her own past Karma and that the *Rākṣasī* guards were only carrying out the orders of their master (VI-116-37 FF). The innumerable damsels captured by *Rāvaṇa* wondered what evil deeds they had done in their former lives (VII-24-14). The Brahman with the dead child who came to *Rāma*'s city gate wondered what sin he had committed in his previous birth for the loss of his only child (VII-73-4). King *Nṛga* believed in fate and Karma and accepted his curse (VII-54-15 F). *Rāma* attributed all his troubles and the loss of *Sītā* to his past sins (III-63-3 F). *Kubera* told *Rāvaṇa* that one would certainly reap the fruit of his Karma, and that the fruit would be in accordance with one's deeds (VII-15-26).

The various *Vānara* heroes are said to have inherited the special strength, skill and virtues, of their powerful fathers although born of an inferior race of mothers (I-17-18). *Kaikeyī* is said to have inherited the mother's vices. Girls were supposed to take after the mother and boys were supposed to take after the father (e.g. *Kaikeyī* and *Bharata* II-35-27). *Nala*, the *Vānara* Engineer is said to have inherited his Engineering skill from his father *Viśvakarmā*, the famous Architect (VI-22-49). *Hanumān* is said to have inherited his fleetness and strength from the Wind God *Vāyu* (IV-66-30).

Sampāti enunciated a theory similar to the modern theory of adaptation of the body of animals to their needs and environment (IV-58-26 etc.). He told the *Vānaras*, who wondered at his sharp sight, that "the sharpness of vision of birds depended on the distance at which their natural food could be seen—as the

cocks (land birds) find their food on the ground, they need not see far, when searching for food. Hence their vision is not very sharp. The crows feeding on the fruits of trees have to see farther when flying and have better vision. The sharpness of sight is greater in the hawks; and the vision of vultures still sharper, as they have to spot food at very great distances when flying in the higher regions of the atmosphere. The Garuḍa or the Brahmaṇi Kite flies highest and it has to spot its food from a still greater height and hence its sight is very sharp." *Sampāti* belonged to the class of Garuḍas. So he could see *Laṅkā*, 100 leagues away. Each age has got its own beauty and own Culture. A survey of the Rāmāyana age reveals a state nursed in princely lore though clouded by the mist of superstition.

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE NUMERAL 18*

(O. Stein)

P. 6 note 2 and p. 8, note 2: For a list of the Purāṇas and Smṛtis cf. G. J h a , Hindu Law in its Sources, vol. I, Allahabad 1930, p. 30-32.

P. 7 line 9: Though there are later lists of 13, 16, 25, 40 *saṃskāras* the *śārīrāḥ saṃskārāḥ* are 18 in number from *niṣeka* up to *pāṇigrahaṇa*, see Hillebrandt, Ritual-Literatur p. 4lf.; cf. Kamalabai Deshpande, The Child in Ancient India, Poona 1936, p. 11 ff.

P. 8 line 22: 36 ṛṣis as authors of Smṛtis are enumerated in Devaṇabhaṭṭa's Smṛticandrikā vol. III, part 1, p. 2 (ed. Mysore), where other lists occur, also 16 or 17 Upasṁtis (not 18, as Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra I, p. 118, says; nor in the Sarasvatīvilāsa p. 13, but in both books follow 18 Purāṇas).

P. 10 note 1: Vīramitrodaya by Mitramiśra and Mitākṣarā on Y. III, 240, referred to by Aparārka too.

P. 11, line 14: Bṛhadār. Up. II, I, 19 (cf. Brahmavidyā Up. 12; Kṣurikā Up. 17) says that there are 72,000 veins, called *hitā*; the number, however, is not given in the parallel passage Kauṣīt. Up. IV, 19; cf. Bṛhadār. Up. IV, 3, 20.

P. 12, line 5: On 18 means for direct knowledge which lead one to release according to Madhva cf. R. G. B h a n d a r k a r Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivaism etc. p. 60f., who refers (p. 59, n. 5) to the Madhvasiddhāntasāra of Padmanābhasūri.

P. 20, line 1: The 18 *āveṇikadharmas* are enumerated in the Uttaratantra, a work ascribed to Maitreya and preserved only in Tibetan, translated into English by Obermiller, Acta Orientalia IX, 1931, Pp. 261-63.

P. 27, 2nd line from bottom: For an *Aṣṭādaśaśūnyatāsūtra* cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques I, p. 397; the number of 18 Arhats in China and Tibet is to be found in an inscription of 959 A.D.; to the number of 16 the two Taoistic symbols of East and West, the Tiger and the Dragon, have been added, the names of which are rendered as Nandimitra and Piṇḍola, or Kāśyapa and Nandimitra; cf. Waddell, JRAS 1898, p. 329ff.; S. Lévi et E. Chavannes, JA XI, t. 8., 1916, p. 1ff., esp. 275ff. In Mil. 35lf. first 28 good qualities in the are enumerated, then 18 good qualities with whom become completely endowed whosoever carry out the vows.

*First published in the Poona Orientalist, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 1-37. The references are to these pages.

Editor.

P. 23, line 8: Tod, Annals of Rajasthan (ed. London 1832, II, p. 757; 2nd ed. Calcutta 1979, II, p. 658; 3rd ed. Oxford 1920, III, p. 1814) quotes from the Khoman Rasa a passage about the 18 varieties of artisans in Chittorgarh.

P. 28, line 3: Influenced by Indian Buddhism the number 18 is to be found in the Tibetan "History of the Existences of Padmasambhava" the Padma thang yig¹ Uḍḍiyāna i.e. the Swāt valley, is said to comprise 5 big provinces, 21 small provinces, 18 big villages, and 96 big towns.² Vajradhara makes 18 Tantras raining down on the roofs of king Ujāyin's houses (ch. XVIII, T. p. 84; Schl. p. 531). In the 32nd chapter (T. p. 140; Schl. p. 535) the "18 fruits of the Tathāgatas" are mentioned, and in the same chapter (T. p. 144) among the texts, taught by the preceptor of Gods and men, occur 11 hearings (*bcva brgyad gsan*); 18 divisions of the Avīci-hell are found in ch. 45 (Schl. p. 558); 18 kinds of treasures are enumerated in ch. LIII (T. p. 223ff.); in XCL (T. p. 369) 4 treasures are mentioned, each of which has 18 ones again; LXXXVIII (T. p. 358) mentions the Tantra of 18 spiritual bases (*sems smad bcva rgyad*), and XCII (T. p. 377) a rain of blood lasts for 18 moons (months).

P. 28, line 22: For the symbolical number 72, i.e. 4×18 , the latter being $8 + 6 + 4$, cf. Pr z y l u s k i, Journal of the Greater India Society II, 2 (1935), p. 166.

P. 30, line 4: v. G l a s e n a p p, Der Jainismus p. 336f. refers to the Ācāradinakara according to which with the Śvetāmbaras 18 kinds of men and two more among women are not allowed to enter the order.

P. 31, line 1: Prof. K. Ch a t t o p a d h y a y a kindly directs attention (by post-card, 3. XII. 1936) to the colophons in the Sāhityadarpaṇa the author of which, Viśvanātha Kavirāja, calls himself *aṣṭādaśabhāṣāvāravilāsinībhujāṅga*.

1. Quoted according to the French translation by G.-Ch. T o u s s a i n t (abbrev. here T.), Le Dict des Padma (Bibliothique de l' 'Institut des Hautes Études chinoises, vol. III), Paris 1933; for some passages cf. the parallel quotations in the survey of the contents by Schlagintweit, Abhandl. d. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss., Philos.-philol. Kl. XXII, 1905 (abbrev. here Schl.)

2. Schl. ch. XII, p. 528; according to the Lithang Ms., the base of T's translation, ch. XII, p. 67, instead of 18 big villages are mentioned 18 millions of big districts.

THE AŚVAMEDHA PERFORMED BY SEVAI
JAYASING OF AMBER (1699-1744 A-D.)

(P. K. Gode)

In my article published in the *Journal of Indian History*,¹ Madras, I produced contemporary evidence to contradict the suggestion of Dr. Dinesh Chandra Sarkar that "Sevai Jayasing most probably did not celebrate any Aśvamedha." Since the publication of my paper I have come across some more documentary evidence of an anthology called the *Padyatarāṅgiṇī*, 3 MSS² of which are available in the Govt. MSS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. This evidence corroborates the evidence already recorded by me proving beyond all doubt the performance of the Aśvamedha by Sevai Jayasing. I shall refer in this paper to the MS of the *Padyatarāṅgiṇī* viz. No. 725 of 1886-92 acquired by Peterson³ for the Govt. of Bombay. The work was composed by Vrajanātha⁴

1. Vol. XV, pp. 364-367.

2. There are in all three MSS of this anthology recorded by Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Catalogorum*. They are identical with the following MSS in the Government MSS Library :—

(i) No. 725 of 1886-92—Text with author's own commentary on the 102 *anyokti* verses of the text. The commentary is called "अन्योक्तिपद्यभाव-प्रकाश" in the colophon on folio 23 of the MS. The MS contains 37 verses styled as "नृपतिवंशवर्णन" plus an additional verse recording the date of composition viz. the year 1809 (Sainvat)—folios 28.

(ii) No. 724 of 1886-92—Same as above—folios 25.

(iii) No. 421 of 1887-91—Contains text and Commentary but does not contain the verse of the chronogram as also the 37 verses regarding "नृपतिवंशवर्णन." It ends as follows :—“मीतो मार्गसीरसु शुक्ल ॥ १३ ॥ संवत् ॥ १८५१ ॥ पुस्तक लालामथुराकिशोरजीने लिषी आत्मपठनार्थं जयनगरमध्ये श्रीविजेगोविंदसंदिरे”

I am thankful to Dr. Hara Datta Sharma, M.A., Ph.D., for drawing my attention to the references to ह्यमेध in the above anthology.

3. Vide *Fourth Report* (1894) pp. 26-32.

4. Vrajanātha edited a work called वैदिकवैष्णवसदाचार composed by हारिकृष्णामिश्र by order of Sevai Jaya Sing (See MS No. 443 of 1891-95-B. O. R. I. Govt. MSS Library, folio 22—“ग्रंथोयं वैष्णववैर्ग्राह्यो ब्रजनाथेन संस्कृतः । ब्रजनाथमयेनाहो कविना यज्ञकारिणा. ”

to please Mādhava or Madhosing, son of Sevai Jayasing,¹ on Sunday, *Ekādaśī*, month of *Pauṣa* of the year 1809 which corresponds to 14th January 1753.² Verses 1 to 37 at the end of the work are devoted to the praise of Jayasing and his son Madhosing =Mādhava. In particular verses 1 to 10 deal directly with Sevai Jayasing and the sacrifices performed by him. I shall, therefore, reproduce them here to acquaint the reader with their contents and their bearing on the question at issue viz. the Aśvamedha sacrifice commonly attributed to Sevai Jayasing. These verses read as under :—

“ यस्तीक्ष्णांशुकुले बभूव विमले श्रीमान्धराधीश्वरः
 पृथ्वीराज इति प्रभावमहितः प्रत्यर्थि जेता रणे ।
 श्री कूर्मान्वयभूषणं नरहरिप्रेमैकपात्रं श्रियो
 लीलासद्मगुणैकधाम सकलक्षोणीशचूडामणिः ॥ १ ॥
 तद्वंशे सततावदातचरितः प्रौढप्रतापानल—
 ज्वालाजालविदीपितारिनिवहः सच्छास्त्रनिष्णातधीः ।
 देवब्राह्मणपूजकोतियशसा कुर्वन्सितं भूतलं
 जातः श्रीजयसिंह इत्यभिधया ख्यातो धराधीश्वरः ॥ २ ॥
 केनाभवन्नृपतयो बत विक्रमाद्याः
 केनाथकारि न हि तेषु तुरंगमेधः ।

हरिकृष्णमिश्र mentions जयसिंहकल्पद्रुम (Composed A.D. 1713) on folio 21 of the MS of वैदिकवैष्णवसदाचार. He appears to be identical with हरिकृष्णशर्मा, a Karnāṭaka Brahmin who attended the Aśvamedha of Sevai Jayasing as stated by कृष्ण कवि in Chap. IV (वाजिमेधारंभ) verse 41 of ईश्वरविलासकाव्य (MS No. 273 of 1884-86). This verse reads as follows :—

“ कर्णाटदेश्यद्विजवंशदीपश्वराचरे यश्चयनीप्रसिद्धः ।
 सोत्रागतः श्रीहरिकृष्णशर्मा पुरस्कृतो गोकुलवासिवर्यैः ॥ ४१ ॥ ”

1. Ibid, p. 29, verse 11 and p. 32, verse 36 which reads :—

“ तत्तुष्ट्यै ब्रजनाथेन रम्या पद्यतरंगिणी ।
 निबद्धा शोधनीयेयं सद्भिः सारानुरागिभिः ॥ ३६ ॥ ”

2. Vide *Indian Ephemeris*, Vol. VI, p. 308—The chronogram is recorded by the author in the following verse at the end of the MS :—

“ नंदाभ्रवसुशीतांशु १८०९ मितेऽद्वे मासि पौषके ।
 एकादश्यां रविदिने ग्रंथः संपूर्णतामगात् ॥

अस्मिन्द्युगे निखिलभूपतिसार्वभौम-
 तद्यज्ञकृद्विजयते जयसिंह एकः ॥ ३ ॥
 पारीक्षितोपि विदधे ह्यमेधमुच्च-
 स्तत्रापक्षापमयमुत्तमपूरुषोपि ।
 राजाधिराज'जयसिंह नृपश्चकार
 निर्विघ्नेनमधुना भगवत्प्रसादात् ॥ ४ ॥
 योदाद्वनीपककुलेषु सुवर्णपूगा-
 नंभःकणानिव नभःस्थितचारिवाहः ।
 वेदोदितेन विधिना ह्यमेधमुच्चै-
 श्चक्रे तथा क्रतुशतानि महाधनानि ॥ ५ ॥
 भासन्पूर्वं मानसिंहादयोषे
 भास्वद्वंश्याः क्षोणिपाजाः केयतः ।
 चक्रुर्भूमिं भूमिपालान्वशेते
 श्रौते मार्गे नैव निष्ठामवापुः ॥ ६ ॥
 राजाधिराजो जयसिंह एक-
 स्तद्वंशजः प्राक्तनपुण्यपुंजात् ।
 संभावितो दक्षिणदिग्द्विजेन्द्रैः
 श्रद्धालुरासीच्छ्रुतिधर्म एव ॥ ७ ॥
 पपाठ वेदं विदधेग्निहोत्रं
 चकार यज्ञान्विविधान्सदैव ।
 धनं ददौ ब्राह्मणपुंगवेभ्यो
 ग्रामान् गजांश्चापि तुरंगमांश्च ॥ ८ ॥
 बभौ स तस्य क्रतुराट् तदानीं
 महेंद्रसंस्पदिं समृद्धिभाजः ।
 अत्रागतश्चेन्नकुलः सदैवा-
 त्स्वर्णाद्द्वैपाश्र्वोथ भविष्यदेव ॥ ९ ॥

1. Compare *Īśvaravilāsakāvya* of Kṛṣṇa Kavi, B. O. R. Insti. MS No. 273 of 1884-86 folio 8 :—

“ यस्यावलोक्य धरणीचलये समंतात्
 सर्वेषु राजसु विशिष्टतरानुभावं ।
 दिल्लीश्वरः सपदिजातमनःप्रसादो-
 राजाधिराजपदमर्पितवान्प्रकामं ॥ २२ ॥ ”

See also Irvin : *Later Moguls*, vol. II, pp. 124. The title राजाधिराज was conferred on Sevai Jayasing on 12th June 1723.

वेदव्यासतनुः पुराणमनने तर्कागमे गौतमो
 वेदांतार्थविवेचने विधिसुतः काव्येषु काव्योपरः ।
 शेषो व्याकरणे कलासु कुशलो गर्गस्तथा ज्यौतिषे
 नानाशास्त्रविचक्षणो जयहरिः क्षोणीशमुख्योभवत् ॥ १० ॥ ”

The mention of तुरंगमेध (v. 3) and of हयमेध (verses 4 and 5) by Vrajanātha in A. D. 1753 will settle once for all the doubts of historians regarding the performance of the Aśvamedha sacrifice by Sevai Jayasing. The explicit statement of Vrajanātha that Jayasimha performed the *hayamedha* according to Vedic injunctions (“ वेदोदितेन विधिना हयमेधम्...चक्रे ”) is another direct contemporary testimony of a writer connected with the Jaipur court in 1753 A.D. and it would be worthwhile recording in this paper some information about this writer furnished by contemporary records.

A poem in praise of King Mādhava Simha = Madhosing, son of Sevai Jayasing, was composed by one Śyāma Latṭū in Śaka 1677 (=A. D. 1755) i.e. two years after the composition of Vrajanātha's *Padyatarāṅgiṇī*. The title of this poem is *Mādhavasimhāryā-S'ataka*.¹ It mentions the names of several learned men who flourished at Jaipur during the reign of Madho Sing. They are:— *Gaṅgārāma* (v. 122), *Rāmeśvara* (v. 123), *Gopīnātha* (v. 124), *Viśvanātha* (v. 124), *Vrajanātha* (v. 125), *Sudhākara S'armā* (v. 126), *Yamunākara Śarmā* (v. 127), *Haridatta S'armā* (v. 128), *Kevalarāma* (v. 129), *Sadāśiva S'armā* (v. 130), *Ravidatta S'armā* (v. 131), and *S'aṅkaradatta* (v. 132), who was perhaps a Mahārāṣṭra Brahmin (महाराष्ट्री ज्ञातिर्यस्यैषासर्वाविख्याता—” v. 133). The verse which describes ब्रजनाथ reads as follows:—

“ जयति श्रीब्रजनाथः कविरिह सततं ब्रजाधीशे ।
 सुकलितददतरभक्तिर्जयपुरनगरे पुराधीशे ॥ १२५ ॥ ”

The statement made in the the above verse that Vrajanātha was strongly attached to Madhosing² is proved by the composition of the *Padyatarāṅgiṇī* by Vrajanātha with a view to please (तत्तुष्ट्यै) his patron.

1. Vide note on this poem by Mr. M. M. Patkar in the *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. I, No. 4, pp. 34-37.

2. Vide *Peshwa Daftar XXI*—Letter No. 38 dated 25th January, 1751—Govind Ballal reports to the Peshwa that Jayaji Scindia and Malharrao Holkar left Jaipur after seating Madhosing on the Jaipur throne. Vide also

More information about the family of Vrajanātha is supplied to us by Kṛṣṇakavi the author of the *Īśvaravilāsakāvya*, only one MS of which is available in the Govt. MSS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona viz. No. 273 of 1883-84. In chapter X of this historical kāvya we get the following verses regarding Vrajanātha S'armā and other members of his family :—

Folio 37—

“ धुरंधरे राज्यधुरं समस्तं पुत्रे निधायेश्वरसिंघनास्मि ।
 क्रमान्वित्ताखिलभोगतृष्णः कृष्णाद्वयप्रेमभरं बभार ॥ ५ ॥
 विधाय सम्यक् सुकृतात्मकानि कार्याणि विज्ञातपरास्मत्तवः ।
 गोविंददेवस्य पदारविदे प्रमाणमेकांतमनन्यमूहे ॥ ६ ॥
 तस्याखिले पंडितराजचक्रे मान्यो गुरुभ्रातृसुतोतिविद्वान् ।
 श्रीपौंडरीकाध्वरयाज'योभूजित्यं समीपे ब्रजनाथशर्मा ॥ ७ ॥
 ऋग्वेदिविप्रप्रवरावतंसो रत्नाकरो नाम गुरुर्नृपस्य ।
 प्रभाकरो नाम बभूव तस्य भ्राता सदा यो मथुरैकवासी ॥ ८ ॥
 तदात्मजः श्रीवज्रनाथमानामा तथापरो गोकुलनाथ उक्तः ।
 तौ भ्रातरौ संनिहितौ नृपस्य निरंतरं शास्त्रकथां दधाने ॥ ९ ॥
 प्राज्ञोत्तमश्रीव्रजनाथवक्त्रविनिर्गतां शास्त्रकथामजस्रं ।
 श्रुण्वन्सविद्वन्समुदायमध्ये धर्मेण कालं सकलं निनाय ॥ १० ॥ ”


The above verses explicitly tell us that Sevai Jayasing entrusted the administration of the state to his son Īśvarasingh (v. 5). He then spent his time in devotional duties towards God Govinda (v. 6). In the whole assembly of pandits at his Court there was always by his side one *Vrajanātha S'armā* who was the son of the brother of his *guru* and who was very much respected on account of his deep learning. *Vrajanātha* had performed a Paunḍarīka sacrifice. *Ratnākara* was the *guru* of the King (Jayasingh). He was an ornament to the line of *R̥gvedī brahmins*. He had a brother by name *Prabhākara*, who always resided at *Mathurā*

Peshwa Daftar II, Letter No. 31, dated 21st February, 1751, which mentions the “horrid murders perpetrated upon the Maratha forces by orders of Madhosing.” In an earlier letter (No. 29 dated 15th Feb. 1751) Madhosing is styled as “ दुर्बद्धि ” or wicked and “ विश्वासघातकी ” or treacherous.

1. In the colophons of the MSS of *Jayasinhakalpadruma* compiled by Ratnākara, the author is called “ देवभट्टात्मजपौंडरीकयाजिरत्नाकर ” (See MS No. 253 of 1887-91, folio 193).

(v. 8). One of his sons was *Vrajanātha* while the other was called *Gokulanātha*. These two brothers were always at the side of the King expounding to him the meaning of the *S'āstras*. (v. 9). *Vrajanātha*, who was the wisest among the brahmins personally expounded the *S'āstras* to the King almost without a break and in this manner the King passed his entire time in the company of the learned, listening to the *Śāstras* and acting according to *dharma* (v. 10).

After the tragic end of *Īśvarasingh*,¹ *Vrajanātha* appears to have transferred his loyalty and attachment from Sevai Jayasing to his other son Madhosingh as evidenced by the composition of the work *Padyatarangiṇī* referred to above which was definitely composed to please his new patron. From the verses quoted above from the *Īśvaravilāsakāvya* we get the following genealogy of *Vrajanātha*'s family :—



1. Vide *Peshwa Daftar* II, (p. 53) Letter No 31 dated 21st February, 1751. This is an important newsletter addressed to *Govindpant Bundele* by his accountant *Baburao Vishnu*, from the camp of *Malharrao Holkar* and *Jayapa Scinde* in the vicinity of Jaipur. This letter of five pages gives a detailed account of the circumstances which resulted in the suicide of *Īśvarasing* and the treacherous conduct of Madhosing against the Maratha forces led by *Subhedar Malharrao Holkar* and *Jayapa Scinde*.

The old administrators of the State viz. *Hargovind* and *Vidyādhara* reported to *Īśvarasing* that the troops of Holkar had arrived at the gate of Jaipur. *Īśvarasing* asked them to negotiate for peace but they refused to approach *Holkar* whereupon feeling helpless and desperate *Īśvarasing* ordered his page to get a live cobra as also some *somalkhār* (=arsenic). He then took some of this poison himself and got the cobra to bite him. He died early at dawn. His three wives and one mistress also poisoned themselves and fell dead in the palace rooms. *Har Govind* and *Vidyādhara* reported this tragic occurrence to Holkar, who kept a guard at the palace and later cremated the body of *Īśvarasing* with due honour along with the bodies of three wives and one mistress. After successful negotiations carried on by *Har Govind* and *Vidyādhara*, *Holkar* withdrew his forces from the town of Jaipur. One queen and twenty mistresses of *Īśvarasing* burnt themselves as *Sati*. Madhosing returned to Jaipur after a fortnight and rode into the town on elephant's back together with Holkar. Jayapa Scinde came to Jaipur eight days after Madhosing's arrival.

Ratnākara mentioned in the above genealogy given by Kṛṣṇakavi in his *Īśvaravilāsakāvya* is identical with Ratnākara, the author of the Dharmaśāstra compendium called the *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma* composed at the request of Sevai Jayasing. Ratnākara belonged to the Śāṅḍilya gotra and was the son of a Brahmin Devabhāṭṭa, a resident of Benares.¹ The *Īśvaravilāsa Kāvya* has given us the name only of one brother of Ratnākara viz. Prabhākara. It appears, however, from Ratnākara's reference to his brothers in the *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma* that he had two brothers.²

Ratnākara completed his *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma* in A.D. 1713 (Śamvat 1770, in the month of *nabhas* i.e. Bhādrapada) as stated in verse 5 of the colophon.³ Further information about the descendants of Ratnākara is luckily available and my attention was drawn to it by Dr. Hara Datta Sharma.⁴ His study of a work on Dharmaśāstra composed by the great grandson of Ratnākara gives us some more details not recorded in the *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma* or the *Īśvaravilāsakāvya*. This great-grandson is none other than Viśveśvara, who wrote a work called

1. Vide the following verses at the beginning of *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma* (MS No. 253 of 1887-91) fol. 4—

“ तेन श्रीजयसिंहेन सर्वशास्त्रार्थसंविदा ।
संप्रार्थितं तिथेः कृत्यं कुरुतेति सुसंग्रहम् ॥ २६ ॥
रामांग्रिप्रवणः सुकर्मनिरतः शांडिल्यगोत्रोद्भवः
काशिस्थद्विजदेवभट्टतनयः सम्राट् सुविद्यान्वितः ।
संलब्धैर्धनसंचयैर्बहुविधैः सर्वान् कतूलाचरन्
तस्मात्स्यै व्रतकल्पशास्त्रिनमसुं निर्माति रत्नाकरः ॥ २७ ॥ ”

2. Ibid, fol. 1, verse 2—

“ श्रीजानकीदां शरणागतैका । दुःखापहं श्रीगिरिजाधवं च ।
स्मृत्वाथ पूज्यौ पितरौ गुरुंश्च । श्रीभ्रातरौसूर्यसमौ नमामि ॥ ”

The two brothers to whom Ratnākara bows in the above verse may have been older than himself and it is possible to conclude that Prabhākara was one of them.

3. Ibid, p. 894. The exact Christian equivalent of these details is *Saturday, 25th of July, 1713*, which is the date of completion to their work.

4. Dr. Sharma has submitted to the Ninth Oriental Conference an article on “*Nirṇaya-Kaustubha* or *Laghunirṇaya-Kaustubha of Viśveśvarabhāṭṭa—Its date and Contents.*” I am thankful to Dr. Sharma for allowing me the use of this article to make my account of Ratnakara's family as complete as possible.

*Nirṇaya-Kaustubha*¹ between A.D. 1788 and 1803 according to Dr. Sharma. Viśveśvara's surname was, *mahāśabda*.² In another work composed by Viśveśvara and called *Pratāpārka*³ he states that his surname was *mahāśabda* (महाशब्दोपनामा) and that he was the great grandson of Ratnākaraḥṭṭa, the author of the *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma*⁴, grandson of Gaṅgārāma⁵ and son of Rāmeśvara.⁶ We have already seen that Ratnākara mentions his *gotra* viz. *S'āṅḍilya* in his *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma*. Viśveśvara also has mentioned this *S'āṅḍilya* gotra in his *Pratāpārka*.⁷ The genealogy of Ratnākara's family gathered from the work *Pratāpārka* may now be presented as follows:—

देवभट्ट (of Śāṅḍilya gotra) (resident of Kāśī or Benares)
 |
 रत्नाकर (author of Jaya-Simha Kalpadruma)
 |
 गंगाराम } These two persons were at the court of Mādhava-
 रामेश्वर } sing son of Sevai Jayasing.⁸
 |
 विश्वेश्वर

1. Only one MS of this work is available in the Govt. MSS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona viz. No. 350 of 1875-76 (45 folios) dated Sarnvat 1863 = A.D. 1807.

2. Ibid, verse 1 at the beginning:—

“प्रणम्य जानकीजानि महाशब्दोपनायकः ।

विश्वेश्वरः सुबालानामवबोधार्थमादरात् ॥ ” etc.

“महाशब्दे” is a surname correct among the Maharashtra Brahmanas. Is it not possible to conclude that Ratnākara's family came from the Deccan and resided at Benares ?

3. Vide pp. 129-30 of Peterson's Cata. of Ulwar MSS.

4. Ibid verse 9 of the Extract from *Pratāpārka* quoted by Peterson.

5. Ibid verse 10.

6. Ibid verse 11.

7. Ibid, verse 7.—“श्रीशांडिल्यमुनेः कुले किल महाशब्दोपनामाजनि ।”


8. Vide Mr. M. M. Patkar's article on *Mādhavasimhāryāśataka* of Śyāma Latṭu composed in A.D. 1755 published in the *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 35. Among the learned pandits at the court of Mādhava-sing two pandits viz. गंगाराम and रामेश्वर are mentioned in the following verses quoted by Mr. Patkar:—

“श्रिपौण्डरीक्याजी गंगारामाभिधः सुरिः ।

ऋषिरिव बभूव चास्यां पुर्यां भूदेववर्यायं ॥ १२२ ॥

If we now consolidate the above genealogy with that given by Kṛṣṇakavi's *Īśvaravilāsakāvya* we get the following result :—

देवभट्ट महाशब्द of *S'āṇḍilya gotra*



Besides the contemporary evidence of Vrajānātha's work composed in A.D. 1753 regarding the Aśvamedha sacrifice performed by Sevai Jayasing we have also the testimony of a pandit at the court of Mādhavasīng in A.D. 1755. He is described by Śyāma Laṭṭu, the author of *Mādhavasīmhāryā S'ataka* as follows :—

“ जयति सदाशिवशर्मा मुनिजनधर्मा सुधर्माग्रयः ।

माधवसिंहसुधर्मा सदसि सुधर्मः स्वधर्माग्रयः ॥ १३० ॥¹

The Sadāśivaśarma mentioned in the above verse in a work composed in A.D. 1755 is possibly identical with the author of a work on *dharmasāstra* called the *Ācārasmṛticandrikā*² by name Sadāśiva. This work begins as follows :—

तस्मूनुद्विजराजः श्रीरामेश्वराभिधः सूरिः ।

श्रीपौण्डरीकयाजी विराजते ब्रह्मपुर्या यः ॥ १२३ ॥”

In the colophons the of जयसिंहकल्पद्रुम its author is styled “पौण्डरीकयाजि-रत्नाकर.” In verse 3 at the end of the जयसिंहकल्पद्रुम the performance of पौण्डरीक sacrifice is attributed to रत्नाकर (श्रेष्ठं सर्वकृतुभ्यो विविधविधियुतं पौण्डरीकं च युतं etc.). I have no doubt that गङ्गाराम and his son रामेश्वर mentioned in 1755 A.D. are identical with their namesakes mentioned later in the प्रतापार्क of विश्वेश्वर.

1. Vide *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 36.

2. MS No. 236 of 1887-91 in the Govt. MSS Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. Vide P. V. Kane's *History of Dharmasāstra*, Vol. I, p. 754. where we have the following information about Sadāśiva and his works :—

“ सदाशिव, son of गदाधर of the दशपुत्र family. *First quarter of the 18th century*; author of *आचारस्मृतिचन्द्रिका* (composed for king जयसिंह of जयनगर), *लिङ्गार्चनचन्द्रिका*”.

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीमन्महागणाधिपतये नमः ॥
 उमाकटितटस्फुरत्करिवराननालोकन—
 प्रसन्नहृदयं धिया सदयमिन्दुचूडं मृडम् ।
 नमामि गिरिजाधवं भजनमात्रदत्तेप्सितं ॥
 स्मिताननमनामयं प्रियमुमासहायं मुदा ॥ १ ॥
 धामाशेषबुधाशिषां शुभगुणग्रामाभिरामाकृतिः
 कामावासिकृतिं सतामवतरन्भूमाविवस्वर्द्रुमः ।
 भूपायस्तनुमानशेषतपसां श्रीविष्णुसिंहप्रभोः
 सूनुः श्रीजयसिंहभूपति पतिर्वर्द्धिकीर्त्या भुवि ॥ २ ॥
 यश्चामीकरवृष्टिभिः सुमनसां दारिद्र्यदावानलो—
 द्भूतं तापमपाचकारकरणाकल्लोलिनीवल्लभः ।
 न्याये वर्त्मनि च प्रजामिव निजां शश्वत्प्रजाः पालयन्
 श्रीरामस्य यशो जगाम विपुलं भूपाल चूडामणिः ॥ ३ ॥
 काशीजनपदनिलयास्तुरगमेधं सर्वमेधं च निर्माय ।
 अंगदिनः कुण्डलिनः कंकणितो येन विरचितानु(वि)बुधाः ॥ ४ ॥
 वंशोऽस्मिन्दशपुत्रनामनि महान् विष्णुर्द्विजाग्रयस्वभूत्
 सूनुस्तस्य सुधीर्गदाधर इति ख्यातो जगत्याख्यया ।
 तत्पुत्रेण सदाशिवेन कृपया श्रीविश्वनाथप्रभो—
 राचारस्मृतिचंद्रिका विरचिता विद्वच्चकोरष्टदा ॥ ५ ॥

In the above extract verse 4 is very important as it mentions the performance of तुरगमेध or Āsvamedha by Sevai Jayasing and the attendance of Benares pandits on the occasion, not to say the numerous presents given by the king to these Brahmins.

The B. O. R. I. MS mentioned above is the only MS of *Ācārasmṛti-candrikā* recorded by Aufrecht (Vide Cata. Catalo. III, p. 9.)

Vide also *Peshwa Daftar* No. II—Letter No. 7 dated A.D. 1747—This is a newsletter addressed to the Peshwa from the Maratha camp near Jaipur. It describes the great terror and anxiety created by the presence of the Maratha forces in the mind of *Madhosing*. The letter contains a reference to “ भट राजे सदाशिवजी ” who is also called “ भटजी ” and whom *Madhosing* consulted in his embarrassing situation. Most probably, this सदाशिवभटजी is identical with सदाशिवशर्मा mentioned by *Syūma Latṭu* in 1755 as associated with the court of *Madhosing*. A person whom *Madhosing* consulted in his troubles in 1747 may have attained some influence at his court later after the enthronement of *Madhosing* on the *gādi* of Jaipur in A.D. 1751.

We shall now quote a few verses at the end of the work which contain a reference to Jayasing by our author. These verses read as follows:—

“ मीमांसानयमांसलातिविमला प्रज्ञा तथा भूयसी
 दृष्टिः श्रौतनिबंधचारचतुरा येषां सदाचारिणां ।
 तेषां दृष्टिपथं प्रयातु सुहृदां संदर्भं एषस्थितः
 किंचान्यैर्निजदोषदुष्टमतिभिः प्राज्ञैतरैः प्रार्थितैः ॥
 प्राज्ञश्रीजयासिंहनामनृपतेस्तोषाय या निर्मिता
 साचारस्मृतिचंद्रिकाऽतिविमला विद्वच्छकोरेष्टदा ।
 तां पश्यंतु परीक्षकाः सहृदयाः निःपक्षपातं बुधा-
 स्तेनेयं गुणवत्तराहि भविता गौरीपतेस्तुष्टये ॥
 इति श्रीमद्दशपुत्रकुलावतंसेन विरचिता सदाशिव-
 पंडितेन ऽपस्तंबाचारस्मृतिचंद्रिका समाप्ता । ”

In the foregoing extract the author Sadāśiva definitely states that the work was composed to please his patron Jayasing (जयसिंहनाम-नृपतेस्तोषाय या निर्मिता). We must, therefore, presume that this work on *dharmasāstra* was composed during the life-time of Jayasing i.e. before A.D. 1744; the date of Jayasing's death. As this work refers to *तुरगमेध* (or *अश्वमेध*) it must have been composed after the performance of the *Aśvamedha*. We must, therefore, attach the highest evidential value to Sadāśiva's reference to *तुरगमेध* as it is a piece of contemporary evidence coming from a person in direct contact with his patron Jayasing. We also find that Ratnākara the author of the *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma*, though he refers to the other kinds of sacrifice in which Jayasing was interested does not make any reference to *Aśvamedha*—an omission which may enable us to fix the probable limits for the date of the performance of the *Aśvamedha* viz. A.D. 1713, the date of completion of the *Jayasimha-Kalpadruma* and say about 1742 A.D. presuming that Sadāśiva must have taken at least two years for the composition of his work *Ācārasmṛticandrikā* and shown it to his patron some time before his death. In addition to the references about the *Aśvamedha* found in contemporary and subsequent works of the 18th century as pointed out by me above I have found a reference to it in a still later work called

the *Dharmasaṅgraha*¹ composed by *Hariścandra* by order of *Rāmasiṃha* of the Jaipur dynasty. *Hariścandra* records in the beginning of his work some genealogy² of his patron and in doing so he refers to *Sevai Jayasing* and his *Aśvamedha* in verse 6 (देवाः संतोषिता येन चाश्वमेधेना कर्मणा). The genealogy recorded by *Hariścandra* is of the princes from *Sevai Jayasing* onwards. It is as follows :—

(Sevai) *Jayasimha*—*Mādhavasimha*—*Pratāpasimha*—*Jagatsimha*
Jayasimha—*Rāmasimha*.

1. Only one MS. of this work is recorded by *Aufrecht* (C. C. II, 58) viz. "Peters 4.8". It is the same as No. 223 of 1886-92 in the Govt. MSS. Library at the B. O. R. Institute, Poona.

2. *Ibid*, folios. 1-3—verses 2 to 22 read as follows :—

प्रणम्य श्रीगुरुनादौ ज्ञानानंदसरस्वतीं ।
प्रकाशानंदनाथेन धर्माभृतमहं ब्रुवे ॥ २ ॥
राज्ञामाज्ञां समादाय धर्मकामार्थहेतवे ।
लोकानामुपकाराय धर्माभृतमहं ब्रुवे ॥ ३ ॥
कूर्मवंशेतिविख्यातो मानसिंहो महीधरः ।
धीरः सुधी सुविज्ञश्च दानी शूरो जितेंद्रियः ॥ ४ ॥
विजित्य सकलां भूमिं स्वकीयखड्गधारया ।
आसमुद्राक्षितीशानां शत्रूणां दमनं कृतम् ॥ ५ ॥
तस्य वंशे समुद्भूतो जयासिंहो प्रतापवान् ।
देवाः संतोषिता येन चाश्वमेधेन कर्मणा ॥ ६ ॥
पंचाश्वमेधी विख्यातो स्मार्तधर्मपरायणः ।
राजनीत्या धर्मनीत्या लोकाः सर्वे वशीकृताः ॥ ७ ॥
यादृशो नगरो येन स्वबुध्या परिकल्पित—
स्तादृशो नैव भूलोके विख्याताहि जनश्रुतिः ॥ ८ ॥
तस्य पुत्रो समुत्पन्नो माधवेशः प्रतापवान् ।
तपस्वी धर्मसंपन्नो दयावांश्च जितेंद्रियः ॥ ९ ॥
माननीयो नृपाणां च भाग्यवान् समुपस्थितः ।
अनायासेन लब्धौ वै रणस्तंभगिरिर्वरः ॥ १० ॥
यादृशो हि वरो दुर्गस्तादृशो नगरः कृतः ।
स्वसामंतबलेनैव ब्रजराजो रणे जितः ॥ ११ ॥
तस्य पुत्रः समुत्पन्नः प्रतापेशो विचक्षणः ।
दयावान्धर्मशीलश्च चातुर्ये चातिविश्रुतः ॥ १२ ॥

The above genealogy appears to be substantially correct,¹ with the exception of the omission of the names of Īśvarasimha and Pṛthvisimha, whose careers were not apparently very important or prosperous in the opinion of Hariścandra.

मालवाधिपतेर्युद्धे पराजययुपागतः ।
 पुत्रस्तस्य समुत्पन्नो जगत्ेशो भुविश्रुतः ॥ १३ ॥
 दयावान् श्रद्धया युक्तो भोगैश्वर्ये सदारत- ।
 स्तस्य पुत्रः समुत्पन्नो जयसिंहो महाभुजः ॥ १४ ॥
 तपस्वी सत्यसंपन्नो दयावांश्च जितेंद्रियः ।
 तस्य पुत्रः समुत्पन्नो रामसिंहो नृपोत्तमः ॥ १५ ॥
 दयावान्शीलसंपन्नो शिवभक्तो महामतिः ।
 धर्ममार्गेण दमनं कृतं कुपथगामिनां ॥ १६ ॥
 निगमागमसंप्रोक्तो ख्यातो धर्मः सनातनः ।
 तस्मिन्धर्मे सर्वलोकास्थापिताश्च महीभुजा ॥ १७ ॥
 अस्मिन्कलियुगे घोरे विवेकी समदर्शनः ।
 रामसिंहसमो राजा न भूतो न भविष्यति ॥ १८ ॥
 राजराज्येन्द्रवर्येण रामसिंहेन धीमता ।
 निर्णयार्थं कृताः प्रश्नाः धर्मरक्षणहेतवे ॥ १९ ॥
 वशिष्ठगोत्रोत्पन्नो यो ज्ञात्यादवरविश्रुतः ।
 उपाध्यायो हरिश्रद्धः प्रश्नानां उत्तरं ददौ ॥ २० ॥

1. Vide article on Jaipur State in the *Mahārāshṭrīya Jñānakōśa* by Dr. S. V. Ketkar, Vol. 13 (Poona, 1925), pp. 119-124. It is stated in this volume (p. 122) that *Sevai Jaising ruled for 40 years and died in A.D. 1734*. This statement is absolutely wrong as Sevai Jayasing died in A.D. 1744 and ruled from A.D. 1699 to 1744—a period of 45 years. The chronology of the Jaipur rulers as given in this volume of the *Jñānakōśa* may be briefly indicated here :—

1. Savai Jayasing (1699-1744).
2. Ishvarasing (poisoned himself).
3. Madhavasing (ruled for 17 years.)
4. Pṛthvising II and his mother.
5. Pratapsing (ruled for 15 years) (1788 to 1803.)
6. Jagatsing—(1803 to 1818.)
7. Jayasing III—(1819 to 1835.)
8. Ramasing (*Savai*) 1835-1883.

Savai Ramasing the patron of Hariścandra was a very learned ruler. He assisted the English with 7000 troops in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. He constructed roads and railway line and founded schools in his state. He was a member of Legislative Council of the Govt. of India (1869-1875).

I have recorded the testimony of Hariścandra regarding the Aśvamedha of Sevai Jayasing even though it belongs to the middle of the 19th century to make my list of references to Aśvamedha as comprehensive as possible.

I shall now sum up in brief the evidence about the Aśvamedha as recorded in this paper as also in my previous paper on the subject published in the *Journal of Indian History, Madras* (Vol. XV) :—

1. *Evidence of Sadāśiva Daśaputra* recorded in his work called the *Ācārasmṛticāndrikā* composed to please Sevai Jayasing. This evidence has the highest evidential value as it is recorded *during the life-time of his patron i. e. before A.D. 1744.*
2. *Evidence of Kṛṣṇakavi* recorded in his work called the *Īśvaravilāsakāvya* composed some time after the death of Sevai Jayasing *i. e. at the coronation of his son Īśvarasing say about 1744-5 A.D.*
3. *Evidence of Vrajanātha* recorded in his work called the *Padyatarāṅgiṇī* composed in A.D. 1753. The personal contact of this author with Sevai Jayasing has been amply proved in this paper.
4. *Evidence recorded by Viśveśvara* in his work called the *Pratāpārka* composed between 1788 and 1803.
5. *Evidence recorded by Hariścandra* about the middle of the 19th Century in his work called the *Dharmasaṅgraha.*

The foregoing references to the Aśvamedha performed by Sevai Jayasing made by pandits patronized by the Jaipur line of princes are conclusive so far as they go. The echo of this epoch-making religious event which then caught the imagination of the citizens of the Jaipur State must have reverberated throughout the length and breadth of the Hindu India and hence it is possible to collect more references to this Aśvamedha in Rajputana records which unfortunately are not at present accessible to me. Perhaps in the Peshwa Daftar recently published by the Govt. of Bombay a few contemporary references to this event are likely to be traced. I shall, however, conclude this paper by reproducing a reference to this Aśvamedha made by a Maharashtra Brahmin

in 1782 A.D. This reference as found in the *Sources of Maratha History*¹ published by the Maharashtra historian V. K. Rajwade is as follows :—

Letter No. 436—dated *S'aka 1704, Māgha vadya 5* (=Sunday 3rd February, 1782) Mādhavrao Anant Vedānti writes to the young Peshwa a long letter of advice in which he deplores the decay of Hinduism in general and notes the special efforts made by certain Hindu kings to revive it. One such effort was made by the king of Jaipur by the performance of *Aśvamedha*. In the opinion of the writer all these efforts were disconcerted and hence not quite effective. He then refers to the incarnation of God Śiva on this earth in the form of the Maratha king Shivaji the Great and his life-long efforts to preserve Hindu literature and culture.

1. *Khanda* VI. p. 514—“ हिंदु राजे कित्येक होते जाले. त्यासही हितोपदेश-कर्ते लोक निर्माण जाले. त्याणीं नानाप्रकारें सांगून धर्मवांछा धरविली. परंतु जनाची प्रवृत्ति लावणें जाहलें नाहीं. जैपुरवाले याणीं अश्वमेध केला. ”

THE YAŚASTILAKA AND THE PAÑCATANTRA

(A. Venkatasubbiah)

The *Yaśastilaka-campū* (published by the Nirṇayasāgara Press in the Kāvya-mālā ; No. 70) is the work of the Jaina author Somadeva, and, as stated in the colophon at the end, was written in the Śaka year 881 (=A.D. 958) under the patronage of Prince Vāgarāja, feudatory of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa emperor Kṛṣṇa III, at his capital Gaṅgadhārā. The quotations from Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra*, from the works of Manu, Bhāradvāja and Viśālākṣa,¹ from Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*, Prajāpati's *Citrakarma*, *Ādityamata*, Varāhamihira's *Pratiṣṭhākāṇḍa* and *Nimittādhyāya*, from Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*, *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, *Ratnaparikṣā* and Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* in *Āśvāsas* 4 and 5, (see pp. 54-56 ; 100-1 ; 112-3 and 254-6 in Part 2), as well as the numerous references throughout the work to Purāṇic stories, show how wide and varied Somadeva's learning was. That he was acquainted with the *Pañcatantra* is not therefore a matter that needs cause one any surprise.² But what is of interest in this connection is the fact that the *Pañcatantra* version

1. Bhāradvāja and Viśālākṣa are both writers of works on *Arthaśāstra*. The passage cited by Somadeva from the work of the latter reads as follows :

चातुर्मास्येष्वर्धमासिकं, दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्चातूरात्रिकं, राजनक्षत्रे गुरुपर्वणि च त्रैरात्रिकं, एवमन्यासु चोपहतासु तिथिषु द्विरात्रमेकरात्रं वा सर्वेषामघातं घोषये-
दायुर्बलवृद्धयर्थम् ।

Compare with this Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (Mysore edition of 1909), p. 407, line 8 ff : चातुर्मास्येष्वर्ध मासिकमघातं, पौर्णमासीषु च चातूरात्रिकं, राज-
देशनक्षत्रेष्वेकरात्रिकं योनिबालवधं पुंस्वोपघातं च प्रतिषेधयेत् and note how closely the two passages resemble each other, in form as well as in meaning.

2. As a matter of fact the name पञ्चतन्त्र is actually employed by Somadeva in the following passage printed on p. 360 in Part 2 : धर्षणो नाम नृपतिः । अस्यातिचारप्ररुद्धप्रणयसहकारमञ्जरी सुमञ्जरीनामाग्रमहादेवी । पञ्च-
तन्त्रादिशास्त्रविस्तृतवचन उग्रसेनो नाम सचिवः ।

To judge from the context, however, it is hardly likely that पञ्चतन्त्र here denotes the well-known story-book.

that he was acquainted with was that of Vasubhāga.¹ This comes out clearly from the following passage in *Āśvāsa* 4 (p. 99 in Part 2):

प्राणाघातान्निवृत्तिः परधनहरणे संयमः सत्यवाक्यं
काले शक्त्या प्रदेयं युवतिजनकथामूकभावः परेषाम् ।
तृष्णास्त्रोतोविबन्धो गुरुषु च विनतिः सर्वभूतानुकम्पा
सामान्यं सर्वशास्त्रेष्वनुपहतविधिः श्रेयसामेष मार्गः ॥

इति कथमेतत् सर्वपथीनमुवाच वररुचिः ॥

This stanza which Somadeva ascribes to Vararuci is put into the mouth of Vararuci in Durgasimha's Pañcatantra also (see regarding this Pañcatantra version the article in 6,255 ff. and 7,8 ff. of the *Zeitschrift fuer Indologie und Iranistik*). In story 1,6 of this version, it is said that the sage Vararuci, when passing through the Daṇḍaka forest, was met by an ogre (*brahma-rākṣasa*) who wanted to eat him and put to him four questions :

कः पन्थाः का वार्ता, को मोदते, कः सेव्यते ।

and that Vararuci's answers took the form of the following stanzas :²

प्राणाघातान्निवृत्तिः परधनहरणे संयमः सत्यवाक्यं
काले शक्त्या प्रदानं युवतिजनकथामूकभावः परेषाम् ।
तृष्णास्त्रोतोविबन्धो गुरुषु च विनयः सर्वभूतानुकम्पा
सामान्यं सर्वशास्त्रेष्वनुपहतविधिः श्रेयसा मेष पन्थाः ॥

अस्मिन्महत्यण्डकटाहमध्ये

सूर्याग्निना रात्रिदिवेन्धनेन ।

मासतुर्द्वीं परिघट्टनेन

भूतानि कालः पचतीति वार्ता ॥

पञ्चमेहनि षष्ठे वा शाकं पचति यो गृहे ।

अनृणोह्यपरप्रेष्यः स रात्रिचर मोदते ॥

एका भार्या त्रयः पुत्रा द्वौ हलौ दश धेनवः ।

मध्यराष्ट्रं तु सुक्षेत्रमस्ति वेदतिसेव्यते ॥

It can be seen that the first of these stanzas is, slight variations apart, identical with that ascribed to Vararuci in the *Yaśastilaka*.

1. Regarding the Pañcatantra version of Vasubhāga, see *Indian Historical Quarterly*, X. 104 ff. and *Zeitschrift we Indologie und Iranistik*, 7, 18 ff. and 8, 230 ff.

2. See 6, 271-72 and 6, 302 in the above-mentioned article in the ZII.

The story of *Vararuci and the Ogre* is found in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* (taraṅga 5, vv. 50–52) and the *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī* (p 22; vv. 186–188) also. In both these works however it is related that an ogre (*rākṣasa*), desirous of eating Vararuci, propounded to him the question, “ Who is the most beautiful woman in this town ? ”, and that Vararuci answered, “ To each man, that woman is most beautiful who is the object of his affection ”.

So far as we know, it is in Durgasiṃha’s Pañcatantra only that Vararuci appears as the speaker of the stanza *prāṇāghātan niṛttih* This Pañcatantra however was written in A. D. 1031 (see *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 10, 105, n. 1), seventy-three years later than the *Yaśastilaka* ; and it is obvious that the above cited statement of Somadeva cannot be based on Durgasiṃha’s work. This work, however, is but a Kannaḍa rendering of the original work (written in Sanskrit) by Vasubhāga, that is, of a recension of Vasubhāga’s Sanskrit Pañcatantra that was current in the Kannaḍa country in the time of Durgasiṃha (see ZII. 6, 260 and 7, 11 f.). This recension must have come into existence in A. D. 931 at the latest ; and it contained, in all probability, as I have already observed in ZII. 7, 12 (lines 14–17), the story of *Vararuci and the Ogre* and the other stories found in Durgasiṃha’s Pañcatantra. Since, then, among the works anterior to A. D. 958, it is only the above-mentioned Pañcatantra recension, the original of Durgasiṃha’s Kannaḍa rendering, or one collateral with it,¹ that could have made Vararuci the speaker of the stanza *prāṇāghātān niṛttih*....., we are justified in concluding that Somadeva was acquainted with such a recension, that is to say, with a recension of Vasubhāga’s version of the Pañcatantra, and that the above-

1. The above-cited stanza *ekā bhāryā trayah putrāḥ*.....which forms Vararuci’s answer to the fourth question of the ogre is found in the *Tantri* (*Tantri Kāmandaka*) or Javanese version of the Pañcatantra also (no. 25 ; see p. 46 of Dr. Hooykaas’ edition of that work) ; but the story itself does not occur in it.

Since the *Tantri* is the adaptation of a Pañcatantra version belonging to the recension of Vasubhāga (see ZII. 8, 229 ff.), there can be no doubt that this version too contained the story of *Vararuci and the Ogre*.

cited passage of the *Yaśastilaka* is based on the story of *Vararuci and the Ogre*¹ found in that recension.

Similarly the passage किमङ्ग महामुनिगौतमः प्राणत्राणार्थं मात्मोप-
कारिणमपि नाडीजङ्घं न जघान in *Āśvāsa* 4 (p. 124 in Part 2), too, refers
without doubt to the story of *Gautama and the ape Nālijāṅgha*
which forms story I, 19 in Durgasiṃha's Pañcatantra (see ZII.
6, 274), and which must, therefore, have been contained in the
Sanskrit original of that work. So far as we know, this story² too
is not found in any other work.

On pp. 99, 115 and 253 of Part 2 of the *Yaśastilaka* are found
the following stanzas which, Somadeva has himself said, are cita-
tions from other works :

यावन्ति पशुरोमाणि पशुगात्रेषु भारत ।
तावद्वर्षसहस्राणि पच्यन्ते पशुघातकाः ॥
सन्दिग्धेषु परे लोके त्याज्यमेवाशुभं बुधैः ।
यदि न स्यात्ततः किं स्याद्यदि स्यान्नास्तिको हतः ॥
यावज्जीवेत्सुखं जीवेन्नास्ति मृत्योरगोचरः ।
भस्मीभूतस्य शान्तस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः ॥

These stanzas are, disregarding slight variations, identical
with stanzas 31, 32, 33 cited in Durgasiṃha's Pañcatantra (see
ZII. 6, 301); and it is possible that these too have been cited by
Somadeva from the Sanskrit original of Durgasiṃha's work.

1. The story of *Vararuci and the Ogre* is not found in any of the
recensions (e.g. Tantrākhyāyika, Southern Pañcatantra, Buehler-Kielhorn's
edition of the Pañcatantra in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, Pūrṇabhadra's
Pañcatantra) of Viṣṇuśarma's version of the Pañcatantra.

2. Somadeva, it will be noticed, has not said that Nālijāṅgha was an
ape; but this fact is mentioned in the commentary of Śrutasāgara. The
details of the story given by Śrutasāgara however differ much from those
given by Durgasiṃha.

The story of a Gautama who killed his benefactor for the purpose of
eating his flesh is related in the Mahābhārata (Kumbakonam ed., XII,
ch. 167 ff.) also. This Gautama was not a *mahāmuni* but only an unlettered
Brāhmaṇa; and the benefactor whom he killed was not Nālijāṅgha, but a
crane (*baka*) named Rājadharmā. It is thus plain that it is not this Mahā-
bhārata story that is referred to by Somadeva in the above-cited passage.

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(M. S. Sapra)

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REVIEWS

The Types of Sanskrit Drama by D. R. Mankad with a Foreword by Dr. S. K. De, pp. XI + 212, price Rs. 5/- or Sh. 8/6, published by Urmi Prakashan Mandir, Karachi, 1936.

Thanks to the learned labours of Dr. De and Mr. Kane, Sanskrit Poetics has very much come out of the dark obscurity in which it has been lying enveloped. But unfortunately the Sister department of Sanskrit Poetics—dramaturgy—is still little known and less understood. It is indeed a matter of shame to the modern scholarship of Sanskrit that this should have been so. It is, therefore, a matter of congratulation that at long last a scholar hails from Sind and proposes to tell something about our drama and dramaturgy.

Mr. D. R. Mankad has already made himself known to us by his admired papers on subjects connected with Sanskrit drama and dramaturgy. His papers have made us to feel that he is a sincere, sober scholar and a patient worker. This impression has been reinforced by reading the present book. Here he tries to study and examine in a critical way, the Sanskrit dramatic theory which may be said to be responsible for the development of the various types of Sanskrit drama and for controlling its technique. It is an index of judiciousness on his part to begin in the way he has done, for ambitious beginnings often forebode an ill success. Whatever we may say with regard to the inferences he has drawn, there can be no two opinions as far as the great value of material he has collected is concerned. His intensive study and patient assimilation of the Sanskrit works on dramaturgy call forth genuine admiration. As regards the sifting of the material thus gathered together, we have little doubt as to his sincerity of purpose, even though we may not agree with the result of his judgment.

The book under review is divided into eight chapters followed by two appendices and indices. He begins his first introductory chapter with a totally uncalled-for remark that "our drama was still-born" for "there has been very little advance in its technique." It is not a very happy way to begin a book like this.

especially as it has nowhere been convincingly borne out in the body of the book. How can it be, when we know so little about the origin and beginnings of our drama? This is followed by discussion about the exact significance of the words नृत्त, नृत्य and नाट्य, which is quite stimulating and a valuable contribution. He is right in coming to the old conclusion that "नाट्य incorporated all the three features—dance, music and speech." But our author proceeds a little further when he holds that there were "three distinct forms of entertainment, based on नृत्त, नृत्य and नाट्य". That which was based upon नृत्त never reached the status of drama but those which were based upon नृत्य and नाट्य gave birth to the two forms उपरूपक and रूपक respectively.

With this idea of रूपक and उपरूपक, our author begins to study in detail the divisions of the two. The next four chapters are devoted to the study of रूपक and the other two to the study of उपरूपक. The last chapter discusses the oft-discussed question with regard to the origin of Sanskrit Drama. His study of Sanskrit dramaturgy has led him to believe "in the gradual development of our नाट्य types from the नृत्य types, which in their turn evolved from the primitive नृत्त types."

The first appendix gives us a list of plays quoted in dramaturgical texts and the second contains an alphabetical list of the technical terms, often met with in the texts of Sanskrit dramaturgy. Our author has rendered a very great service to the study of Sanskrit dramaturgy by giving an exhausting annotated list of these technical terms. The two indices give us alphabetical list of names and subjects in Sanskrit and in English.

Thus we see that the main thesis of our author is that the different types of Sanskrit drama have their own story to tell. The divisions into रूपक and उपरूपक have much more to suggest than we usually understand. They seem, according to him, to suggest that they are born of two different parents and thus have even now those important features which their parents possessed. In a word रूपक point to नाट्य and उपरूपक both for their origin. It is a very interesting idea and quite a plausible hypothesis. But to our mind, the accumulative evidence is still wanting something to drive away our scepticism. We have

every hope that Mr. Mankad will be able to convince all students of Sanskrit drama and dramaturgy in a very near future by means of his further researches.

This remark of ours made above does not in any way minimise the great value of his contribution especially for gathering together so much material from obscure nooks and corners and for giving a fresh orientation to the study of Sanskrit literature.

No notice need be taken in such a work of pin-pricking misprints and other minor defects which will be, we hope, nowhere in the second edition after being carefully revised.

B. N. Sharma.

R̥gvedasamhitā : With the commentary of Sāyaṇācārya. Vol. II. Maṇḍalas II-V. Published by the Tilak Mahārāshtra University-Vaidika Samshodhan Maṇḍala (Vedic Research Institute) of Poona. S. Royal size. Pp. 1-46, 1-998, 2. Cloth bound. Price Rs. 12.

We had the privilege of reviewing the first volume of the *R̥gvedasamhitā* in the October 1936 issue of this journal. The present volume is an improvement on the last one in many respects. It comprises of four Maṇḍalas, namely, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and three Aṣṭakas, namely, 2, 3 and 4. Of these the second Aṣṭaka is based on 15 Mss., the third Aṣṭaka on 13 Mss. and the fourth Aṣṭaka on 15 Mss. These Mss. are classified into three divisions according to their importance. The Mss. ऀ and ँ belong to first division and form the principal bases of the second and the third Aṣṭakas. The former belongs to the Sarasvatī Mahal Library of Tanjore and the latter is from the private library of Shrimant Sardar M. V. Kibe of Indore. Both these are complete Mss., but they are assigned to third division in the text of the fourth Aṣṭaka, as they "omit a number of words from the commentary." Although nobody can doubt the integrity and sincerity of the learned editors, yet it would have been better if they had taken the readers also in their confidence by giving a detailed description of the Mss.

The method adopted in choosing and fixing the Reading in this volume is almost the same as in the first volume. It is

indeed regrettable that palm-leaf Mss. were not available for this volume (except one covering only a portion of the second Aṣṭaka) as they were for the first one. We hope that when Editors secure them even for this volume they will give the reading public the benefit of these Mss. in some later volume.

We fully appreciate importance which the Editors have attached to "the traditional recitation of the Saṁhitā and the Pādapāṭha" and entirely agree with the following remark, "We do not attach any importance to manuscripts in such a matter." The complement to superiority of traditional recitation to all Ms. and printed material is well deserved. This volume devotes 36 pages to the discussion of various readings (as against 8 pages in the first volume). It is not possible to enter into details about the readings in this review. The notes are full of erudition and prove complete grasp of the Editors on the entire Vedic literature. For instance, while discussing जुहाम्यग्निं हविषा घृतेन (Introduction, p. 1³, 1.7) the Editors support their arguments with quotations from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa common to Kāṇva and Mādhyandina recensions both) and the Taittirīya Saṁhitā.

The errata is surprisingly short, although not exhaustive; for instance, p. 34 (II, 1, 10, 2) श्रुयाः should be श्रूयाः.

After congratulating Mr. Sontakke, the Managing Editor and Mr. S. R. Sardesai, the Printer, for their praiseworthy performance, we conclude with joining the learned Editors in thanking the various generous Ruling Princes and Her Highness Mahārāni Saubhāgyavati Indirābāi Mā Sāheba Holkar, Indore, who have been helping this noble cause.

The Editor.

The Naishadhacarita of Śriharsha (Cantos I-XXII) for the first time translated into English with critical Notes and Extracts from unpublished Commentaries, Appendices and a Vocabulary. By Krishna Kanta Handiqui, M.A. (Cal., Oxon.) Principal and Senior Professor of Sanskrit and History, Jorhat College, Jorhat. Published by Motilal Banarsi Dass in the Punjab Oriental Series, No. 23. Royal Size; Cloth bound; pp. 2, 43, 611. Lahore, 1934. Price not mentioned.

Amongst the five *Mahākāvya*s, Śrī:Harṣa's *Naiṣadhacarita* ranks foremost. It is one of the most difficult Sanskrit *Kāvya*s and an English translation of this work was a long-felt desideratum. Any translation would have been welcome, but the present one is doubly welcome as it is from the pen of so eminent a scholar as Professor Handiqui, who has spared no pains to make the difficult *Naiṣadha* understandable even by an ordinary University student. At the same time, critical Notes, etc. add to its value and distinguish it from a mere help-book for the University examinees.

In the Introduction, Prof. Handiqui has given a critical account of the Mss. as well as of the intrinsic merit of the commentaries of (1) Caṇḍūpaṇḍita, (2) Vidyādhara, (3) Iśānadeva, (4) Narahari, (5) Viśveśvara, (6) Jinarāja, (7) Mallinātha and (8) Nārāyaṇa. Out of these, the commentaries of Mallinātha and Nārāyaṇa are printed. Extracts from the Mss. of the remaining six commentaries, together with various readings in the Text are quoted and discussed in detail by Prof. Handiqui in his Notes. Of these six unpublished commentaries, the *Dīpikā* of Caṇḍūpaṇḍita is the most learned, and there are few *Kāvya* commentaries which can compare with it in the extent and variety of its reference." Unfortunately, the two Mss. of *Dīpikā* utilised by Prof. Handiqui are not complete. It would indeed be very useful if it is published. Although Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Catalogorum* (quoted also in the 2nd edn. of *Nirṇayasāgara* Press) mentions as many as 23 commentaries, yet they could not be utilised by the author, perhaps because he had no access to their Mss. Prof. Handiqui in his introduction has given us also the names of authors and works quoted in the various commentaries used by him.

The introduction is followed by a Synopsis of the story in the different cantos. After the Synopsis we have the translation. The language of the translation is very lucid and clears all the obscure idioms of *Naiṣadha*. Of course, there will always be room for difference of opinion, and improvement, but on the whole the translation and the explanatory footnotes are excellent. The Notes following the translation, as already mentioned above, give copious extracts from the various com-

mentaries and discuss the various readings adopted by different commentaries.

The most valuable portion of the work are the Appendices attached to it. In Appendix I, Prof. Handiqui discusses the philosophical allusions in the *Naiṣadha*. It was natural for Śrī Harṣa, the author of *Khaṛḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* to indulge in philosophical allusions and references even in his *Kāvya*. Prof. Handiqui has very ably and in a masterly fashion elucidated the various allusions to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, Buddhism and Jainism. Prof. Handiqui has gone to the original sources of these systems and has quoted the references in full. For instance, he has very ably differentiated between the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika conception of *mukti*, and has dilated upon Bhāsarvajña's position with regard to *mukti*. We have to resist the temptation of discussing the various theories alluded to in Appendix I, as the space at our command is limited. We, therefore, pass on to Appendix II explaining minor allusions. Here, the mythological allusions to Dattatraya, white Hair of Viṣṇu, etc. are traced to various Purāṇas and position of the Buddhist goddess Tārā in Hindu pantheon is fully discussed.

The last, but the most important portion of the work is the Vocabulary of difficult or unusual words used in the work. One of the interesting words discussed here is *ulūlu* (उलूलु). It is commonly believed that this peculiar and auspicious sound is made by women of Bengal at the time of marriage. The commentator Nārāyaṇa, while commenting upon XIV, 51, says—
 विवाहाद्युत्सवे स्त्रीणां धवलादिमङ्गलगीतिविशेषा गौडदेशे “उलूलुः” इत्युच्यते ।
 सोप्यव्यक्तवर्णं उच्चार्यते । स्वदेशरीतिः कविनोक्ता ।
 It is perhaps this remark which led the late Pandit Nilakamala Bhattacharya, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit, Benares Hindu University, to advance the proposition that Śrī Harṣa was a Bengali, (See *Naiṣadha* and *Śrī Harṣa—The Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III, pp. 159-194). But Prof. Handiqui is quite right in saying:
 “There is, however, nothing to warrant Nārāyaṇa's statement, as references to the Ulūlu sound are found in writers belonging to the various part of India.” We perfectly agree with Prof. Handiqui and the references to various writers given here are

very important. Prof. Handiqui has not discussed the problem of Śrī Harṣa's personal history, but has promised to give it in separate Volume.

We cannot but congratulate Mr. Handiqui upon his excellent performance. We only wish that the book had been printed in some better press.

The Editor

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CHAPTER II

24. VĀDIRĀJA TĪRTHA

(B. N. Krishnamurti Śarma)

Vādirāja Svāmin (c. 1510-1600)

When Vyāsarāya died in 1539, his place in the polemical arena was quickly filled up for the rest of the 16th century by two of his illustrious successors, Vādirāja and Vijayīndra Tīrtha. Both are traditionally believed to have been the disciples of Vyāsarāya and read under him. Unlike Vijayīndra, Vādirāja does not acknowledge Vyāsarāya as his teacher, anywhere in his works.¹ Tradition and certain extraneous evidences in the works of celebrated Dāsas like Purandara Dāsa, Vijaya Dāsa, Timmaṇṇa Dāsa and Śrīda Viṭṭhala, go to prove that Vādirāja was certainly a student of Vyāsarāja.²

Date.

This makes it clear that Vādirāja must have flourished in the 16th century. Prof. P. P. S. Sastri, following the late Dr. Bhandarkar, argued in his Introduction to the III Volume of his Southern Recension of the *Mahābhārata*, that Vādirāja died in 1339 A.D. This has been exploded by P. K. Gode and myself in the Annals of the B. O. R. I., Poona (Vol. xviii, pts. 1-2), on the basis of literary and epigraphic evidences. There are inscriptions relating to Vādirāja in the years 1571,³ 1582⁴ and 1593⁵ A.D. and seeing that he was also a disciple of Vyāsarāja

1. Except in the *Śrīpādarājāṣṭakam* attributed to him. See my paper on the Date of Vādirāja, Annals, B. O. R. I. xviii, 2, p. 194.

2. The relevant passages from these have been quoted by me in the above article, to which attention is invited. The *Śrīpādarājāṣṭaka* (iii, 6) S. M. p. 317, also supports the contemporaneity of Vijayīndra and Vādirāja.

3. Ep. Car. Vii, Sb. 55, p. 10 (P. K. Gode, Annals).

4. The year of the consecration of the temple of Trivikrama at Sode.

5. Year of grant by Ārasappa Nāyaka, chief of Sode, to Vādirāja.

who died in 1539, it seems proper to conclude that Vādirāja flourished entirely within the 16th century. This agrees with the "Caramaśloka", preserved in the Sode Mutt at Uḍipi :

Svasti śrī Jayaśālivāhanaśake sārthāt sahasrāt param

Dvāvimśe śaradām gate prabhavati śrī Śārvarī vatsare !

Māse phālgunake sitetaratṭīyāyām tithau viḍdine

Svātīharṣaṇasamyute Haripadam Śrī Vādirājo gataḥ ॥

which gives 1600 A. D. as the year of Vādirāja's demise.

Life.

Vādirāja was a native of the village of Hūvinakere¹, in the Kundāpūr taluq of the S. Kanara district. He is believed to have been a Tuḷu (Shivalli) Brahmin by birth², born of Devaṇṇa Bhaṭṭa and Sarasavva³. Of his early life we know nothing. He became the Pontiff of the "Sode"-Mutt of Uḍipi after the death of Vāgiśa Tīrtha who was the fourteenth in descent from Madhvācārya, thro' Viṣṇu Tīrtha. A life of 120 years is traditionally ascribed to him. There is no doubt, however, that he enjoyed a long life and was Pontiff of the Mutt founded by him at Sode (N. Kanara, near Sirsi), for a very long time.

Vādirāja was a many-sided personality. He was a sound scholar, a great controversialist and a successful organiser, and a gifted religious poet, both in Sanskrit and Kannaḍa. His favourite deity was Hayagrīva. He is invested by tradition with great spiritual powers and is believed to have held under his

1. Which was granted by Vira-Venkaṭapatirāya to Vādirāja's successor Vedavedya Tīrtha, in 1614 A.D. (Ins. Madras Pres. ii, pp. 870-71), as a benefice.

2. Others claim him to have been a Koṭeśvara Brahman and hence a "Smārta" by birth, (with sympathies towards Śamkara's system). In his *Yuktimalikā* (i, 20) Vādirāja says that he became profoundly dissatisfied with the Māyāvāda, renounced it and became a follower of Madhva. This is a strong indication that he was not originally a Mādharma, by birth. His Kannaḍa translation of the Mbh. T. N. and his songs (padas) would also tend to show that he was most probably a Kannaḍiga by birth (and therefore possibly a Koṭeśvara as claimed by some). It may be remarked that the Shivallis are speakers of Tuḷu, not Kannaḍa. There is difficulty in believing Vādirāja's proficiency in Kannaḍa to have been wholly an acquired one. It is also significant that the Koṭeśvaras are now Vaiṣṇavas owing allegiance to the Sode Mutt of Vādirāja.

3. H. G. Bengeri, *History of Dāsa-Kūṣa*, 1931. This writer is wrong in stating that Hūvinakere is in the Dharwar Dt.

control a mysterious goblin (bhūta-rāja), with whose aid he is said to have performed many miracles and overcome the many obstacles that were placed in his way by his religious persecutors. The system of "Paryāyas" now obtaining at Uḍipi, is generally believed to have been inaugurated by him. However that may be, there is no doubt that Vādirāja by dint of his great influence over neighbouring chieftains and by his outstanding attainments as a scholar, was able to further the interests of his co-religionists at Uḍipi, to a remarkable extent¹. He is believed to have made vast improvements to the Kṛṣṇa temple at Uḍipi, rebuilt it on an extended plan, erected the eight Maṭhas around it, secured endowments for them and brought the temples of Ananteśvara and Candramaulīśvara at Uḍipi also, under the control and management of his co-religionists after evicting the Smārtas in ascendancy there and made the Ascetics of the Kṛṣṇa temple a power to be felt in the country around².

Vādirāja seems to have encountered severe opposition to his religious propaganda from two powerful quarters in S. Kanara, the Jains and the Smārtas. The influence of the Jains was particularly strong in S. Kanara in the 15-16th centuries.³ And Vādirāja was evidently thrown into heated controversies, with the scholars of the famous Bastis of Kārkāl and Mūḍubidri, and had altogether a very nasty time of it. His furious criticisms of the Jains in his *Pāṣaṇḍa-khaṇḍana* and other works, clearly indicate this.

1. Tradition says that it was during the time of Vādirāja that Acyutarāya of Vijayanagar visited Uḍipi and rebuilt the tank (Madhva-sarovara) adjoining the Kṛṣṇa temple. Vādirāja was most probably the "Pracaṇḍa-Mādhva-muni" (famous Mādhva ascetic) spoken of in the *Grāma-paddhati*, to whom is ascribed the reclamation of the Koṭeśvara (Koṭīśvara) Brahmins (*Vide* Saletore, *History of Tuḷuva*, pp. 444-49). In fact, tradition attributes the reclamation of the Koṭeśvara and of the "Maṭṭu" Brahmins of S. Kanara to Vādirāja and they are disciples of his Mutt.

2. It was evidently in virtue of these services that Vādirāja came to be looked upon as a "re-incarnation" of Madhva himself which soon gave rise to the view that he was one of the Rju-gaṇas (a class of souls destined to hold the office of Brahmā), and identical with the god (deva) Lātavya who is to be the future Vāyu and Brahmā: Bhāvi-Samīraṇa. See Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya's *Nayacandrikā*, p. 58, line 5). This has led to a schism among the Mādhvas.

3. The famous statue of Gomaṭa at Kārkāl was set up in 1432 A.D. Another was set up at Veṇūr in 1603.

The encounters with the Advaitins and Śaivas were equally sharp and protracted. There are certain covert allusions in the *Yuktimalikā* of Vādirāja to the difficulty in obtaining recognition and patronage for his faith from neighbouring chiefs : (Vide also *Yuktimalikā*, i, 6) :—

Adhunā vidhunā ruddham madhunāsīn madhuvrata ।

Udite muditebje syāt aditer vidite sute (i, 26) ॥

‘Tārṇe vaukasi pārṇe vā tāpaso bhūpa sovasat

‘lithau te’tithiretadvad vidvān kvāgaṇyapūṇyadaḥ ॥ (i, 27).

And the commentator Surottama ‘Tīrtha (a brother of the author) remarks under the second verse :—Jainādyāgamadurāgraha-grhītarājapīḍāyām, tam prati vaktavyam padyamāha. Vādirāja was personally a contemporary of the Keḷadi kings Sadāśiva Nāyaka and Doḍḍa Sankarṇa Nāyaka. In later years the Keḷadi rulers were ardent upholders of Śaivism. Venkaṭappa Nāyaka (1606–29) was the author of a commentary on the *S’ivagītā* (Madras R. No. 1879), in whose colophon he is styled : Viśuddhādvaitasiddhāntapratīṣṭhāpanaikadurandhara”. And Basavappa, the last of the Keḷadi chiefs wrote a monumental work the *Sivatattvaratnākara*.¹ But the grant of Hūvinakere, by Keḷadi Venkaṭappa Nāyaka, to Vādirāja’s successor Vedavedya in 1614, is a clear indication that Vādirāja had already established his reputation as a Defender of the faith of Madhva and gained a footing at the court of Venkaṭappa’s father.

Tradition says also that Vādirāja encountered Appayya Dīkṣita, the great champion of Śivādvaita, in a debate. The *Vādirāja-vijaya* (*Vṛttaratnasamgraha*² of Raghunāthācārya, (i, 56 ab), S. M. Pp. 320–46, says that Vādirāja had many disciples and followers at Gujerat :—

Gurjarādiṣu deśeṣu śva- śiṣyān kṛpayā yutah ।

Tatratyān eva kṛtavān Viṣṇudīkṣappravartakān³ ॥

1. Vepery, Madras, 1927.

2. Evidently the same as the “*Ratna-samgraha*” noticed by Keith, in the India Office Library Cat. (No. 6051) which is rather loosely described as “an anthology of the views of Vādirāja, by Raghunātha”. The date of this Raghunātha is uncertain. It is interesting to note that he believes Vādirāja to have been a Tuḷuva (I, 11 ab), by birth.

3. The allusion (ādi) is perhaps intended to cover the Gauḍa-Sārasvat or Koṅkaṇi Brahmans of Goa and N. Kanara who are also to be found in large numbers in S. Kanara and Cochin and follow the system of Madhva.

Works of Vādirāja.

Vādirāja was a prolific writer and more than sixty works stand to his credit. Of these, however, nearly a half are in the nature of minor stotras of no great importance. His major works are about twenty in number, of which more than a dozen can be designated as "original works". The rest are commentaries on the earlier classics of the system, none of which has, however, been printed as yet. Of his original works, six are available in print, including his *magnum opus*, the *Yuktimalikā*. The "*Guru-rājīya*" attributed in some catalogues to Vādirāja, is in reality a commentary on the *Nyāyasudhā*, by Keśavācārya.

Commentaries on the Daśa-Prakaraṇas.

Commentaries on the *Khaṇḍana-traya*, known by the general title of *Upannyāsa-ratnamālā* have been attributed to him.¹ No Ms. of any of them has, however, been brought to light. (1) The *Upannyāsaratnamālā* (Mysore O. L. C. 1859) is a different work altogether, having nothing to do with the *Khaṇḍanatraya*. It is a short sermon on the threefold classification of souls and has for its text the verse "Karaṇapālanaśīla nate sthitim..." of the author's *Rukmiṇīśa-Vijaya* (xvii, 12).

(2-3) The Gurvartha-dīpikās.

"Gurvarthadīpikā" is the general title of two² of Vādirāja's comm. on the Sūtraprasthāna. In the Mys. O. L. we have Mss. of his Gurvarthadīpikās on (2) the *Tattvapraśāṅgikā* (C 1842) and (3) the *Nyāyasudhā* (A. 255). The first one is quoted and criticised on two occasions in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā*³ of Jagannātha Tīrtha. His running commentary on the *Sudhā*, in 4650 granthas is a crisp and brief one. The com. in the Mysore:O. L. Ms. begins with the third adhikaraṇa. of the I Adhyāya. There is a quotation from the *Nṛsimha-karāvalambana-stotra* attributed to Śamkara, which the author flings at the face of his Śaiva-Advaitin

1. M. M. Sangha List.

2. Mysore O. L. (C 1057) about a com. on the B. S. B. of Madhva, is incorrect for C. 1842.

3. One of these criticisms has reference to Vādirāja's interpretation of the Ṛgvedic term "Gharmā" in Gharmā samantā... " Vādirāja reads 'Samantāt' (vyāptau) which is rightly rejected by Jagannātha as tortuous. It may be pointed out that the pada-pātha here has just "samantā", which is the old Vedic dual for 'samantau'.

opponent. There are no references to earlier commentaries in the field, either on the *Tattvaprahāśikā* or on the *Sudhā*. There is no indication of Vādirāja's authorship save the alliterative verses at the end : Vysāsāyāpratimetihāsaracanā... | characteristic of him. The com. on the TP runs to 2750 granthas and throws welcome light on many passages.

Upaniṣad-Prasthāna.

(4) A gloss on the Īśa Up. ascribed to Vādirāja, is attested by a Ms. from the Mysore O. L. (C 2277). Nothing is however known about a gloss on (5) the GB. attributed to him by tradition.

Original Works.

Some ten to twelve original works are known to have been written by Vādirāja of which some two are yet to be attested by Mss.

(6) *Ekona-Pañcapādikā**

This was evidently meant to be a criticism of the *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapāda, on the B. S. B. of Śamkara. No Ms. has so far been discovered of this interesting work, which is, however, alluded to in one of the introductory verses in the *Vivarāṇa-Vraṇam* of the same author.¹

(7) *Vivarāṇa-Vraṇam(m)*.

This, as the name itself indicates, is an elaborate adverse criticism of the *Pañcapādikā-vivarāṇam* of Prakāśātman.² A Dev. Ms. of it is preserved in the Mysore O. L. (C 1845). The work itself is referred to by name in the *Yuktimalikā*. It runs to over 2500 granthas and is written in the forcible and somewhat

1. Verse 9:—Tattvadīpanam ekonapādikām Pañcapādikām. | This reference is not, however, very conclusive. The lines beginning with "Vyākurve Vivarāṇam" (see next page, f. n. 1,) may simply mean that the author's refutation of the *Vivarāṇa* effectively disposes of the *Pañcapādikā* (its original) and the *Tattvadīpana*, (its commentary) in the same breath. This seems to me to be the most plausible view. It is very unlikely that Vādirāja would have troubled to refute the *Pañcapādikā* afresh when he had dealt with the *Vivarāṇa* once.

2. Vādirājo yatīḥ soham Advaitāgama-kardame |
Gacchan pathi ksīptapadaḥ tatsuddhyai spṛhayan muhuḥ ||
Vyākurve Vivarāṇam tivravraṇam dustattvadīpanam |
Tattvadīpanam, Ekonapādikām Pañcapādikām || (verses 8-9)
Yaccoktam *Vivarāṇe* "Sādhanacatusṭayasampannasya.....(p. 5b) ;
Yaccoktam Pareṇa—"Vṛksasya svagato bheḍaḥ.....(74b)

epigrammatic style of Vādirāja. The author quotes passages from both the *Vivarāṇa* and its commentary the *Tattvadīpana*¹, and passes severe strictures upon them. He does not even spare the benedictory stanzas in the *Vivarāṇa*, which he scrutinizes one by one and pronounces to be defective in various ways. Anent "Pālanc vimalasattvavṛttaye..." (verse 1) of the *Vivarāṇa*, he opines that the author should have given precedence to "janma" over "Pālana", of the world.

(8) *Pāṣaṇḍa-Khaṇḍanam*²(m)

This is a short metrical tract in 127 verses, criticising the religious and metaphysical tenets of Buddhism and Jainism. The author ridicules the Jain doctrine of Ahimsā, asks how the Jains permit slow torture and suicide by degrees :

"Keśānām luṅṭhanam śokapradam kasmāt pravartitam" and why if putting down of one's enemies could be regarded as the proper duty for a king, the same thing should not be said of Vedic sacrifices :—

Rājñām śatruvadho dharmo yadi, tarhyāgataḥ pathi. |

Vaidhī himsā ca Viprāṇām dharmo ityeva gṛhyatām ||

He expatiates upon the somewhat uncanny doctrine that like the doctor whose methods are painful at the outset, but give complete relief from suffering at the end, the sacrificer also is in fact a benefactor of his victim !

Agre'hitakṛdante sukhado arcyo yathā bhiṣak |

Tathā paśoḥ svargadānāt katham pūjyo na yājñikaḥ ?

There is obviously not much force in the argument :

Prāṇinam ca vṛthā hantum kim mūḍhāḥ pūrvasūrayaḥ ? "

The work winds up with a criticism of the Jain doctrine that the soul is of the size of the body it tenants and of Apavarga as a never-ending movement upwards (sadordhva-gamanam).

(9) *Yukti-mallikā* (p)

Yukti-mallikā is the *magnum opus* of the author running to 5379 ślokas. It is a monumental work in defence of the Dvaita system divided into five chapters called Saurabhas: Guṇa,

1. Yā ca Tattvadīpane—“Śāstrārthaśca Tattvam-pada.....(p. 4).

2. Also designated "Pāṣaṇḍa-mata-khaṇḍanam", but not as Pāṣaṇḍa-mala-khaṇḍanam", as stated on p. 316, of the Vij. Sex. Com. Vol. The work has been printed and published from Belgaum.

Śuddhi, Bheda ; Viśva and Phala-Saurabhas. It was commented upon by the author's brother¹ Surottama Tīrtha, who sums up the scope of the work in these words:

Adhunā śiṣyamanassamādhānāya Paramatanirākaraṇātmake-
samayapādoktam api samayanirākaraṇam prakṛtastāvya, punaḥ
samanvayādhyāyapratipādyam sarvagūṇapūrṇatvam Guṇa-saura-
bhasarvasve manaḥpriyam kurvan, tadanantaram avirodhādhyāya-
pratipādyam nirdoṣatvam Śuddhisaurabhasarvasvena rañjayan,
punar etadadhyāyadvayepi sūtre sūtre pratipāditam Jīveśvara-
bhedam Bhedasaurabhasarvasvena pratipādayan, tadanu Janmā-
dyasya yata iti sūtreṇa pratipāditam jagajjanmādikāraṇatva-
lakṣanaparirakṣaṇāya Viśvasaurabhasarvasvena jagataḥ satyatām
sthāpayan, punaḥ sādhanaphalādhyāyapratipādyam sādhanam
phalam ca Phalosaurabhasarvasvena samgrṇhan, pramāṇādhiṇā
prameyasiddhiriti nyāyena, Pañcasaurabhoktaprameyānām ca
pramāṇasāpekṣatvāt, Pramāṇeṣu ca prabalapramāṇabhutasya
vedasya "Na vilakṣaṇatvādi" sūtre nityatayā pratipāditam svataḥ-
prāmāṇyam samarthayitum Vedāpauruṣeyatvam tāvad ādau
sādhayitum upakramate " || (i. p. 33 b.)

The work combines great erudition with an incredibly simple yet poetically the most charming style characteristic of Vādirāja :—

Savinodam sāṭṭahāsam sasmitam sundarānvitam |

Sa-rahasyam sapramāṇam Vādirājavacomṛtam |

Nirduṣṭam rasavat spaṣṭam nānandayati kam janam ? ||

(*Vṛtta-ratna-samgraha*, i. p. 48-52)

No wonder he obtained the title of "Prasangābharāṇa", for his surging eloquence.

The works of Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya were too learned and stiff to be of use to the average man. It was Vādirāja who first brought the wisdom of his predecessors within the reach of all and in this respect, his works mark a new and necessary phase of development in the history of Dvaita Literature and breathes the spirit of a new age which produced such great champions as Purandara Dāsa, Kanaka Dāsa etc., who in like manner, endeavoured to translate the wisdom of the great Ācāryas of the Dvaita system, into the language of their pro-

1. *Vṛtta-ratnasamgraha*, iii, 28.

vince, viz., Kannaḍa,—an endeavour in which Vādirāja too took a leading part by his translation into Kannaḍa of the Mbh. T. N. and by his songs.

Vādirāja professes the greatest respect for Madhva and pays his homage to him a number of times in the course of his *Yuktimallikā* (iv, 793 ; v, 653 ; iii, 210). The views expressed by Śamkara¹ in his bhāṣya on the B.S., and those of Ānanda-bodha,² Śrīharṣa,³ and the *Tattvadīpana* are quoted and refuted in the course of the work. The sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and passages from the bhāṣya of Madhva are quoted off and on to show how naturally these authorities tend to support the dualism of Madhva.⁴ The author's originality is clearly seen in the many new topics for discussion⁵, introduced by him, the original criticisms passed by him upon the views of the Monists,⁶ and his novel and refreshingly original interpretation of texts from Scripture⁷ and quotations from several fresh sources not utilised by his predecessors.⁸

The last chapter of the *Yuktimallikā*, is specially important for its fulness of theological information about the Dvaitins' view of Mokṣa, its treatment of the question of Madhva's Avatār and vindication of the Śāstraic character of branding the body (tapta-mudrādhāraṇam), with the special symbols sacred to Vaiṣṇavism. The author refers in this connection, to a separate work of his entitled *Sudarśana-Mīmāṃsā*, dealing with this question. The work is available in the Mysore O.L. (C 723) and has been published in the S. M. pp. 212-21, under the name of *Cakra-Stuti*.

In essence the *Yuktimallikā* is an elaboration of the teaching of the Brahmasūtras, as deduced by Madhva. The author has given a complete rationalistic bias to his treatment and deserves credit for many original arguments and interpretations not found elsewhere in other works of the system. Chapters I

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|---|-------------|--------------------|
| 1. iii, 121. | 2. ii, 126. | 3. iii, 1097-1100. |
| 4. iii, 121, 209 ; iii, 227-46. | | |
| 5. iii, 168-9 ; v, 1331-79 ; v, 1398-1401 ; 1555 and 380-94. | | |
| 6. iii, 130-131 ; ii, 218 ; iii, 107-8 ; iii, 138, 580 ; v, 1285-6 ; v, 771-77. | | |
| 7. i, 567 ; 794 ; 964 ; iii, 227 ; 925 ; 1040. | | |
| 8. i, 632 (Pādma) ; v, 451-2 ; 628 ; 638-9 ; 639-50. | | |

and II establish the twin-principles of Madhva's Theism that the Brahman is ever full of attributes and free from any kind of imperfection. The III chapter establishes that the Jīva and Brahman can never be identical. The IV, the reality of the cosmos, refuting incidentally, the doctrine of Māyā. The last is an epitome of the III and IV chapters of the B. S.

(10) *Nyāya-Ratnāvalī*¹ (p)

This is another metrical work of Vādirāja, criticising the doctrines of the Advaita Vedānta and driving home those of the Dvaita. It contains 901 anuṣṭubhs arranged into five saraś (chapters). The style is, as usual with the author, alliterative and epigrammatical. He tries to flabbergast his opponents by a clever and judicious mixture of theology and metaphysics. His homely analogies and persuasive rhetoric make an instantaneous appeal to the reader and therein lies his strength and popularity. At the very outset the author draws a lurid contrast between the limited self of man and the Infinite Lord of all creation and asks how the two can ever be identical. The doctrines of (1) phenomenal reality; (2) identity on the analogy of Bimbapratibimba; (3) Adhyāsa; (4) temporary validity of scripture etc., are overthrown in the I Sara. Vādirāja argues that simply because there happens to be a text like *Tattvam Asi* one cannot literally swallow its meaning, however absurd it might be, and has a fling at the Monist with the aid of texts like "*Tasmāt putro mātaram svasāram vā adhirohati*" (A. Brāh. vii, 13, 12). The Eka-jivā-jñāna and Bahu-jivā-jñāna-vādas come in for criticism in the II Sara. No identification is possible unless there are two things to be so identified and such duality is necessarily opposed to Monism. (Sara iii). The fourth chapter seeks to confound the monist with his own texts. As interpreted by the Advaitin the text "*Ekamevādviṭīyam*" does away with souls and there can be no further talk of this identity. The theory that by worshipping the Saḡuṇa one reaches the Nirḡuṇa, is ridiculed. Chapter V pursues the subject of identity still further and concludes with a plea for the supremacy of Dvaita.

1. Printed at the Prabhākara Press, Udipi, 1935, and published by the enthusiastic Svāmi of the Sode Mutt.

(11) *Mādhva-vāg-Vajrāvali***

The title means 'the thunderbolt of the words of Madhva' and the work itself is in all probability an attack on the framework of the Advaita. No. Ms. of it is, however, known.

(12) *Cakra-Mīmāmsā* (p)

This is a small tract in 72 Anuṣṭubhs published in the S. M. and a Ms. is preserved at Mysore (C 723). Vādirāja's authorship of this tract is confirmed both by the *Yuktimallikū* (V, 649) and by Nārāyaṇa's com. on the *Tīrthaprabandha* :—

Yaścakre Cakramīmāmsām yaścakre Yuktimallikām |
Mukundalīlām yaścakre tasmai kāvyakṛte namaḥ ||

It deals briefly with the question of "Tapta-mudrā-dhāraṇa" and cites passages from the *Pādma*, *Gāruḍa* and other Purāṇas¹. Vādirāja remarks also that the practice is current among the followers of Nimbārka, Viṣṇu-Svāmin and Rāmānuja as well as among a certain section of Śamkara-Advaitins :—

Nimbādityānugaiḥ prājñair Māyāvādyekadeśibhiḥ |
Viṣṇusvāmi-mataiscaiva Rāmānujamatāśrayaiḥ ||
Tattvavādi janācāraiḥ siṣṭhaśreṣṭhairanuṣṭhite || (ver. 5)

(13) *Bṛndāvanākhyāna* (p)²

This is an anonymous work of unknown date and traditionally believed to have been revealed to a disciple by Vādirāja himself in the course of a dream-seance. It deals with the question of Vādirāja's identity with one of the Ṛju-gaṇas and is looked upon as an authority by those who hold Vādirāja to be a Ṛju-deva.³ Its posthumous character detracts much from its probative value.

(14) *S'ruti-tattva⁴ prakāśika* (m)

This is preserved in the Mysore O. L. (C 724) and (C 1870). It is a tract in 502 Anuṣṭubhs, vigorously assailing the doctrines of the Advaitavedānta. The concept of "Ajñāna" is elaborately

1. Pādma-gāruḍa-mukhyesu santyasmākam sahaśraśaḥ (31).

2. Belgaum.

3. It is said to have been commented upon by Vyāsācārya, son of Lingeri Śrīnivāsa (Vij, Sex. Com. Vol., p. 318).

4. Not "Śruti-tāla-prakāśikā" as we have it named on p. 316, of the Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.

criticised. The author denies that the identity of Jīva and Brahman has anywhere been taught in Scripture and examines the favorite texts of the Monist: 'Tattvamasi' etc., in this connection. He says also that the denial of the world cannot be the intention of texts like "Neha nānāsti". He wields an effective and alliterative style, as usual.

(15) [Haribhakti]-*Kalpalatā* (m)

This is also preserved in the Mysore O. L. (C725). It is mentioned by Surottama Tīrtha, in his com. on the *Yuktimallikā* i, 46 under the name of "*Kalpalatā*." It is a prose work in four chapters (Prasūna-mālā), dealing with the question of the proofs (Pramāṇa) of knowledge and devoted in the main to the establishment of the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas. It lacks the general clarity of Vādirāja's exposition and is somewhat abstruse and meandering. A good deal of space is taken up with the refutation of the doctrines of the Jains, their objections to the validity of Śabda-pramāṇa. Their view of jīva-pariṇāma, is adversely criticised (p. 24).

Mahābhārata Prasthāna

The Epic *Mahābhārata* occupies, as we have seen, a position of great authority in matters of religion and philosophy and has consequently been placed at the forefront of Śabda-pramāṇas (next of course to the Vedas), by Madhva, who had shown the importance he attached to it by writing an epitome of it, bringing into relief its esoteric sense as he had conceived it. But no regular commentary on the Epic was written by Mādharma scholars till the days of Vādirāja. He was the first to attempt and execute the stupendous task of writing a regular com. on the entire Epic, from the point of view of Madhva. Apart from the inherent value of this admittedly learned commentary to the system of Madhva, it holds a special attraction for the historical student of the Epic. Those interested in the laborious task of reconstituting the *textus simplicior* of the Epic, or of sifting matter for a genuinely South Indian Recension of the Epic, would find the "pratīkas" culled by Vādirāja, of immense value¹. In addition to his commentary on the Epic,

1. Prof. P. P. S. Sastri, who recently brought out his Southern Recension of the Mbh., has justly appraised the historical value of Vādirāja's

he wrote another on Madhva's *Mbh. T. N.* His commentary on the Epic notices elaborately the *Sanatsujātīya*¹ and *Viṣṇu-sahasranāma*², which are sometimes treated as separate works. His com. on the former is being printed at Bangalore.

(16) *Lakṣālamkāra(m)*

Vādirāja's commentary on the *Mbh.* goes by the name of "*Lakṣālamkāra*" or "*Lakṣābharana*". Uptil now only fragments of it have been published.³ It is an erudite performance, full of references and quotations from old lexicons.

(17) The com. on the *Mbh. T. N.* known as *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, is available in Mss. both at Madras and Mysore (O. L. C 1867).

Works on Kāvya Literature.

Vādirāja was gifted with real poetic talents;⁴ but unfortunately, he had not given them free rein and tried his hand at poetry for its own sake. What talents he had in that direction, he had early dedicated to the service of his creed. The result is that he has been able to leave us just a couple of religious kāvyas, cast in the mould of strict orthodoxy, but containing nevertheless many passages of enduring beauty. His position is thus analogous to that of Vedānta Deśika (author of *Yādavā-bhyudaya-kāvya*) in Viśiṣṭādvaita.

(18) *Rukmiṇīśa-Vijaya. (p)*⁵

This is the most important religious kāvya of the author, in 19 cantos, clothed in the gorgeous apparel of the kāvya style and having for its subject-matter, the abduction of Rukmiṇī by Kṛṣṇa and his marriage with her. It is given the rank of a "Mahākāvya", in traditional circles. The descriptions are effective and natural. The style is deeply alliterative. Sense and sound match well and the imagery too is lofty. The author commentary, tho' in his zeal to claim the authority and support of Vādirāja's com. to his Southern Rec., he has over-reached himself by pushing the date of Vādirāja three centuries earlier than his actual date. (Vol. iii, p. xi). For a refutation of his date see *Annals B. O. R. I. XVIII*, pp. 2-3.

1. Mysore O. L. (C2248) is *not* by Vādirāja.

2. MS. preserved at the Mysore O. L.

3. The com. on the *Sabhā Parva* has been published by P. P. S. Sastri in his Southern Recension.

4. In the colophons to his kāvyas etc., he is called "Kavikulatilaka".

5. Printed at Belgaum with a com.

revels in *double entendre*, *Citrabandhas*, *ekāṣara* and *yamakas* both partial and complete.

(19) His *Sarasa-bhāratī-vilāsa* (p), is a metrical work in praise of Viṣṇu.

(20) *Tīrtha-Prabandha* (p)

This is another metrical work of Vādirāja in which he has given us an account of the various Hindu temples and centres of pilgrimage (including holy rivers and tīrthas) visited by him during his grand tour thro' India. Some historical importance thus attaches to this work,¹ which in a sense, resembles the *Devāram* and *Prabandha* songs in Tamil. The descriptions show a good deal of poetic charm and felicity.

It is divided into four sections: the Northern tour, the Eastern, the Southern and the Western. Vādirāja starts from Uḍipi on the west-coast, and his Western march includes visits to Madhyatāla, Cintāmaṇi-Narasimha, R. *Netrāvati* and *Kumāradhāra*, Subrahmaṇya, *Payasvini Svarṇā*, Kumbhāsi, the Sahyādri range, Harihar, the temples of Someśvara and Aśvattha-Nārāyaṇa at Bidrūr, Bankāpūr, R. *Varadā*, Banavāsi, and the temples of Madhulinga, Sode, Gokaṛṇa (Eṇabhairava), Kolhāpur, the rivers *Tapti* and *Narmada*: Prabhāsa-kṣetra, Dvāraka, *Gomatī* and Puṣkar (Ajmer).

The Northern tour embraces visits to *Kṛṣṇaveṇī*, Paṇḍarpur, (Viṭṭhala), *Godavari*, Jumna, Allahabad, Benares, the temples of Bindu-Mādhava and Viśvanātha there, Gayā (Gadādhara and Viṣṇupāda), Muttra, Bṛndāvan, Ayodhyā, Naimiśa forest, Delhi, Kurukṣetra, the six Prayāgas and Badarī.

The Eastern tour takes Vādirāja to Jagannāth (Pūri), Ahobala Narasimha, the Nivṛtti-sangama, *Tungabhadra*, Vijayanagar, (the temples of Viṭṭhala and Virūpākṣa there), Pampā. Ānegondi, Tirupati, Kāñcī, (Ekāmranātha, Kāmākṣī and Varadarāja temples there), Tiruvaṅṅāmalai, Tirukoilūr (Trivikrama temple), Vḍḍhācalam, Śrīmuṣṇam and Kumbakonam.

The Southern tour covers Srirangam, Darbhaśayanam, Rameśvaram, Dhanuṣkoṭi, R. *Tāmraparnī*, Cape Camorin, Sucīndram and Trivandrum, whence Vādirāja moves on to his native land.

1. See Mr. G. H. Khare's remarks on p. 194-5 of the *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.* It should, therefore, have found mention on p. 316 of the *Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.*

STOTRAS.

(21) *Daśāvatārastotra* (p)

This is the most popular of Vādirāja's stotras celebrating the ten Avatars of Viṣṇu, in 41 verses cast in the Āsvadhātī (horse-trot) metre. The alliteration reaches its climax in this piece.

Other minor stotras include (22) *Brahmasūtranibaddha-adhikaraṇa-nāmāvalī*¹; (23) *Stotramālā*; (24) *Naivedyasamarpaṇapra-kāra*; (25) *Mangalāṣṭaka* (8 verses, ascribed also to Rājarajeśvara),² (26) *Vāyustuti* (S. M. pp. 250-4), *Punaśaraṇavidhāna*; (27) *Hayagrīvapañcaka*; (28) *Keśavādi-caturvimśatimūrtilakṣaṇastuti*; (29) *Trivikramastotra* (S. M.); (30) *Āpāda-stotra*; (31) *Kṛṣṇastuti*; (32) *S'riśaṅṅadarpaṇa*; (33) *Rameśa-stuti*; (34) *Haryaṣṭaka*; (35) *Venkaṭeśamaṅgalāṣṭaka*; (36) *Prārthanā-daśaka* (37) *Raupyapīṭhapura-Kṛṣṇastuti*; (38) *S'lokatraya*; (39) *Abhaya-stotra*; (40) *Navagrahastotra*; (41) *S'ripādarājāṣṭakam*; (42) *Vaikunṭhavarṇanam*; (43) *Praśnāvalī*; (44) *Haribhaktisāra* etc. His works on Worship include (45) ac. on the *Tantrasārasamgraha* of which, however, no Ms. has been brought to light.³ and (46) a *Dinatrayanirṇaya* dealing with the fixing of the tithis daśamī, ekādaśī and dvādaśī, whose observance is an intimate feature in the religious life of the Mādhyas.

1. Ms. in the Library of the Bangalore Press, Bangalore.

2. A Pontiff of the Palimār Mutt, another of whose works is the *Rāmasandēśa*, a khaṇḍakāvya, printed at Udipi.

3. It is, however, mentioned as a work of Vādirāja on p. 316, of the Vij. Sex. Com. Vol.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO VERBAL TESTIMONY
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
DVAITA VEDĀNTA

SECTION I

(P. Nagarajarao)

Verbal testimony is the third and the last *pramāṇa* accepted by Madhva. Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy with the exception of the Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣikas, and Cārvākas accept śabda *pramāṇa*. The Vaiśeṣikas contend that verbal testimony gets included under inference. It cannot be done so, for verbal testimony depends on the meaning of words, and it cannot be said that words are 'characteristic marks' of meaning. If such an assertion be made, inference would be possible as to the meaning with the 'words' as the middle term. Further in our experience we have the cognition of the sentence sense without the recollection of the pervasion of the 'sentence' by its 'sense'

'Defectless words' constitute valid verbal testimony.¹ The defects of words are (1) non-intelligibility (*abodhakatvam*), arising out of the two causes, (a) by the use of non-sensical words (*nirabhidheyatvam*) and (b) by the use of words which have no syntactical relation (*anvayābhava*), (2) giving rise to erroneous cognition (*viparītabodakatvam*), (3) explaining the known (*Jñātajñāpakatvam*), (4) teaching the useless (*aprayojanatvam*), (5) having a non-intended use (*anabhimataprayojanatvam*), (6) stating that which is incapable of being accomplished (*aśakyasādhanapratipādanam*), (7) teaching a difficult method when an easy one is available (*laghūpāye sati gurupāyopadeśaḥ*). Words without such defects constitute verbal testimony. A group of letters with a case ending constitutes a word. A group of words, having expectancy, compatibility, and proximity constitutes a sentence. Expectancy is the desire to know. It is a quality of the self. 'Compatibility' in the case of that where syntactical relation is cognised, is the non-existence of the conflict with any *pramāṇa*. It is an attribute of the 'word sense'. Proximity is the continuous utterance of words. It is an attribute of the words.

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*: Chap. 3, Sec. 1, p. 374.

There are two kinds of sounds, (1) dhvanyātmaka śabda i.e. indefinite sounds e.g., the sound of a bell, and (2) varṇātmaka śabda i.e., articulate sounds. The letters (varṇas) are eternal and pervasive substances according to the siddhāntin. If the letters be eternal and all pervasive we must have their perpetual cognition, because the sense organ is always in contact with them. To this the siddhāntin's reply is the cognition of the word is (karaṇa), the instrument of verbal knowledge, and the 'vācyavācakabhāva' is the vyāpāra i.e., the activity, and the knowledge of the object through word is the result. The varṇas though eternal manifest themselves through sounds (dhvanis), which are non-eternal and have to proceed from an individual. Like the waves of an ocean these reach the sense of hearing, and then immediately remind the hearer of the corresponding varṇas. So the mere presence and eternality of varṇas do not give their perpetual cognition. Further there is no possibility for the simultaneous utterance of word.

The only type of order that the siddhāntin recognises in the varṇas is the order imposed and cognised by the individual (bauddhikakrama). No other order is possible among letters because they exist in all places and always.

In a word we have a number of syllables (dhvanis). When the second syllable is uttered the first passes out of existence and all the syllables are not present to our cognition simultaneously. In a single moment we do not sense all these syllables together. How then is it possible for us to perceive the word as a whole ?

The Nyāya school maintains that each syllable leaves its impression behind, and when we come to the last syllable the apprehension of it aided by the accumulated impressions of the past syllables presents the meaning of the word as a whole. This view the siddhāntin criticises as follows : Mere cognition of the 'word' does not in any way help us to cognise its denotation ; e.g., a pundit who does not know the English language would not be able to cognise the denotation of a 'word' in English though he knows the 'word'. So the Nyāya view is inadequate.

The difficulty of this problem led the Grammarians to formulate the well-known 'sphoṭa doctrine'. Jayatīrtha states the

sphoṭa doctrine and criticises it like other vedāntins. The grammarians' argument is, 'If we assert that there is no sentence apart from words and no words apart from letters then there would be no cognition at all; because each letter by itself cannot manifest the sense and a combination of the letters in cognition is impossible. For the cognition of each letter perishes momentarily, so it is impossible for their combination to exist simultaneously. Further, if a single letter gives rise to cognition of the word, other letters of the 'word' are of no use. If it be further contended that the co-existence of the impressions of the prior letters in memory gives rise to the word cognition, it cannot be so. In memory also they cannot co-exist because they are produced in the particular order of our experience. So there is no simultaneity of impressions and hence no cognition of word is possible. If it be still further contended that the strength of the last impression originated by the accumulated impressions of the prior letters gives rise to 'the single word cognition' which has for its object all the letters of the word, then there is no need for sphoṭa. If it be so, there is no particular order observed, and it is the particular order that determines the word. There can be no spatial and temporal order for letters, because they are eternal and pervasive. The only order they can have is the order imposed by the individual mind. In a single memory cognition all of them co-exist. If it be further contended that order is of no concern then Sanskrit words like sara, rasa, navam, vanam, raja, jara, turn out to be identical. The grammarians postulate the sphoṭa doctrine to explain the unitary nature of word: without it the 'meaning' cannot be intelligibly comprehended. They treat the word as an unit and not as a composite of letters, and meaning as *sui generis* and revealed in impartite eternal sphoṭa. The sphoṭa is an unit like the judgment of Western Logic. "The judgment is not compound of parts like the subject, predicate and copula." Such parts are present only in the verbal expression of the judgment, i.e., the proposition. The sphoṭa, like the judgment, is revealed in the elements. Sphoṭa i.e., meaning which is manifested is a unit revealed by the particular sounds uttered in certain sequence. "The succeeding sounds make more clear what was less clearly

expressed by the preceding sounds, the latter provides sub-structure, and the former the superstructure, while all of them together reveal the one design which "while prompting their utterance is certainly not produced by them."

The siddhāntin criticises the sphaṭavādin as follows: "Does a cognised sphaṭa give rise to the word cognition or does its mere existence give rise to the cognition of the word? If the cognised 'sphaṭa' is responsible for the word cognition, is the sphaṭa cognised by 'presumption' or by any other pramāṇa? If it is cognised by 'presumption', then there is the defect of 'reciprocal dependence'. The cognised sphaṭa gives rise to the word 'cognition', and we presume the sphaṭa from the 'word cognition'. There is no other pramāṇa for sphaṭa. If the sphaṭavādin contends that he perceives the sphaṭa because of the cognition of the 'word' unit, then the siddhāntin desires to know the objects of perception. Has perception for its object the mere sphaṭa, or the sphaṭa together with the distinction of letters? In our experience we do not perceive the sphaṭa. Are the perceived letters along with the sphaṭa manifestors of the sphaṭa or originators? If it be a case of manifestation, is it by a single letter or by the aggregate of letters? We have the same old difficulty of the non-intelligibility of the 'word cognition'. The letters cannot be the originators of sphaṭa, because it is considered to be eternal. If the grammarians somehow explain sphaṭa through some presumption, then let those functions be discharged by the word itself. If the grammarians further contend that sphaṭa reveals the cognition of word gradually and completes the revelation of the meaning with the last letter, such a function cannot be adequately attributed to the cluster of letters. To this the siddhāntin replies that in our experience we do not perceive the fact of partial revelation. If the grammarians contend that sphaṭa uncognised gives rise to the 'word cognition' it is a case of undue extension. Then we should all have the knowledge of all the words at all times. On these grounds Madhva rejects the sphaṭa doctrine as prolix.

The siddhāntin is of opinion that the last syllable in contact with the sense of hearing gives rise to the 'word cognition'. The sense of hearing is aided by two factors: (1) impressions

generated by the experiences of the prior letters and (2) apprehension of the prior letters and their denotation. In the absence of the apprehension of the meaningfulness of the word we cannot have the 'word cognition'. The siddhāntin as other Vedāntins has taken up the position that the sounds by some mysterious laws of association give rise to the 'word cognition.' Meaning is purposive, and it is a unit. The process of compounding the letters can at best give us only an aggregate and not a word. The word i.e., 'a unit' has a plan and form first. The sphoṭa is the meaning, i.e., unit of a word.

SECTION II

The Sentence and its Structure

According to Madhva there is no separate 'sentence sense', apart from the 'word senses' put together. The sentence sense is originated by the sense of hearing which has contact with the final word. The sense of hearing is further aided by the impressions generated by the experience of prior words. In a sentence we have not only words but also syntactical relation. We do not have the sentence cognition without the syntactical relation. Now what is it that signifies this syntactical relation? The siddhāntins say that the word itself presents the individual meaning and the individual syntactical relation. The argument is set forth thus: 'Words are uttered to communicate our ideas to others. And as soon as a word is uttered the hearer's expectancy is roused as to what he has to do with the object which the word denotes, e.g., when the word 'pot' is uttered the hearer has his expectancy unfulfilled.' On this ground we presume that the word conveys not only its own sense, but also the syntactical relation with a compatible object (yogyetarānvitārtha-bodhakatvam). Every word has a single potency which is in the form of a universal, and has the possibility of being determined in a number of ways. The determination is effected by the proximity of words. The proximate word is a sahakāri; i.e., auxiliary. Thus the single potency of a word denotes the syntactical relation with a number of objects. This doctrine is technically called 'anvitābhidhānavāda'. Prabhākara posits a number of potencies in a word, and each word denotes several syntactical relations. This doctrine is called 'viśeṣānvitābhidhānavāda'.

Madhva criticises the Prabhākara view as being prolix, and posits only a single potency which has the possibility of getting determined in a number of ways. It assumes a number of attributes in accordance with the law of parsimony.

As against this view the Bhaṭṭa school holds that words cannot discharge both the functions ascribed to them by Prabhākara. The words of a sentence present their isolated meanings primarily which afterwards combine to produce the particular syntactical relation. The constructed meaning is obtained not directly from words but indirectly. 'Words' according to Kumārila are the 'invariable but not immediate antecedent condition for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. Further the idea is explained by a comparison : 'Just as fuel is the indispensable condition of cooking, though cooking is done not directly by the fuel but through the flame generated by it ; so also words are indispensable to the understanding of the meaning of a sentence but this understanding is not immediately caused by the words, but by the meaning they present to the mind. In our experience we sometimes understand the meaning of component words, but not the meaning of a sentence. This fact points out that some other condition is necessary for us to understand the 'sentence sense'. A sentence is 'words in syntactical relation'.

The siddhāntin criticises the Bhaṭṭa position as follows : Bhaṭṭa's assumption of two potencies, that is, the word potency and the potency of the word sense is prolix. The word-sense gives us the sentence cognition according to Bhaṭṭa. Is that cognition derived by perception or inference or verbal testimony ? It cannot belong to any one of these because the necessary conditions are absent. Granting that there is some pramāṇa for the knowledge there is no propriety in bringing it under verbal testimony.

The grammarians explain the syntactical relation by the aid of the sentence sphoṭa (vākyasphoṭa). The vākyasphoṭa is itself the meaning of the sentence. It is revealed in the successive words of a sentence. 'Neither the words nor their sequence is futile, for the words are the tools of manifestation and the sequence provides the form.' The sphoṭa doctrine points out that meaning is a unit, and that the evolution of our knowledge is from the less clear to the more clear.

Madhva criticises the vākyasphoṭa as follows: He considers that there is no separate sentence-sense apart from word-sense. Further the words denote their own sense as well as their syntactical relation. Madhva does not accept the word as a unit as Bhaṭṭa does nor does he admit the sentence as a unit as the grammarians do. 'Word' according to Madhva is the insipient sentence. The grammarians' vākyasphoṭa is another name for Madhva's word. What he has thrashed out he has tricked into new words. Madhva's acceptance of 'word' as expressing a syntactical relation points to the fact that meaning is a unit.

What does a word denote? The Bhaṭṭa school is of opinion that words primarily denote the class, and secondarily particular. The Vaiśeṣikas say that words denote particulars qualified by the class (Jātivīśiṣṭā vyakti). The grammarians think that words denote sometimes class, and sometimes particulars. e.g., the word 'pot' denotes a particular object of clay. When the individual perceives similar object, subsequently he learns that such objects are called 'pots'.

Verbal testimony is of two kinds: (1) composition having no author; (apauruṣeya), (2) human composition (pauruṣeya). The Vedas are of superhuman or divine composition and the rest human. The difference between the two kinds is that the one has no author and the other has. The Śrutis are so called, because they are learnt by the ear. Even the mantradrāṣṭṛs i.e., seers of the hymns declare that they only saw their meaning. The argument is also expressed in the form of an inference. The Vedas are apauruṣeya because all have learnt them by ear (sarvaiṣrutatvāt) and orally repeated (sarvairuccāritatvāt).

So the Vedas are considered apauruṣeya. The authoritative works for Madhva are the four Vedas, Mūla Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, Pañcarātra Āgama and such parts of the Purāṇas that are in unison with these. Revelation is the ultimate authority in the matters of spirit. Reliance on scripture is unphilosophical on the face of it. Scripture has to be interpreted according to the six determinative marks of purport: (1) the initial and (2) the concluding passages, (3) repetition, (4) novelty, (5) glorification by eulogistic passages, and con-

demnation by deprecatory ones and (6) intelligibility in the light of reasoning. Though reasoning is only one among the determinative marks of purport, still it plays a very important role. It is reason that has to settle which is the real beginning and which is the secondary. It is reasoning again that has to point which repetition is purportful and which not. So the authoritarianism of Dvaita Vedānta is only on the face of it.

SECTION III

The Problem of Validity

After an analytic study of the three pramāṇas Jayatīrtha examines the problem of validity and invalidity which in general may be stated thus : (1) Whether the validity (prāmāṇya) of the knowledge attained by the pramāṇas is originated (utpatti) by the very conditions which make the knowledge itself possible, or by any external condition; (2) 'Whether the validity of the knowledge is also ascertained (jñapti) by the very conditions which help us to ascertain the knowledge or by any external condition.' Indian epistemology clearly recognised the two-fold problems relating to the validity of pramāṇas : (1) the origination of validity (prāmāṇyasya utpattiḥ), (2) the ascertainment of validity (prāmāṇyasya jñaptiḥ), such a recognition clearly points out that they did not confuse 'mere psychological belief with logical certainty.'¹

Validity and invalidity are attributes that are present in cognition and its instruments : That validity which is produced without the help of any external factor other than those that produced the cognition is said to be intrinsic with reference to origin (utpattau svatastvam). The validity which is cognised without the aid of any external factor other than those which helped us to cognise the cognition is said to be intrinsic with reference to ascertainment (jñaptau svatastvam). That validity which is produced by factors other than those that give rise to cognition is said to be extrinsic with reference to origin (jñāna-japakātiriktakaraṇajanyatvam utpattau paratastvam). For example our sense organ of sight gives rise to the cognition of a pot. The very sense organ does not give rise to the validity in it. The guṇa i.e., the special merit of sense organ gives rise to the validity in it. So validity is not caused by the sense organ

1. *The Six Ways of Knowing* :—By Prof. Datta, pp. 329-335.

which gives rise to the cognition. Hence it is extrinsic. The validity which we cognise through an instrument other than the one through which we cognise the cognition is said to be extrinsic with reference to ascertainment (jñānajñāpakātiriktapramāṇāpekṣatvam jñaptau paratastvam).¹

Jayatīrtha codifies the opinions of different schools on this problem. The Nyāya school is of opinion that validity and invalidity are originated as well as ascertained by conditions external to the instruments of knowledge. This doctrine is called prāmāṇyaparatastva-vāda. The position is defended as follows :

‘If the validity and invalidity of knowledge were intrinsic (svatastvam) then no knowledge could turn out to be false. As this is not the case we must assume that some external condition determines validity and invalidity. The validity and invalidity of knowledge are inferred and known through samvāda and visamvāda (agreement and disagreement with experience).

As against the prāmāṇyaparatastva-vādins the Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaitins hold that truth is organic to knowledge and that error creeps in as a result of some hindrance in the way of knowledge. They hold that invalidity is extrinsic and that validity is intrinsic. If we accept validity to be extrinsic it lands in infinite regress. It is as follows: the validity of perceptual knowledge is ascertained through inference, the validity of the inferential knowledge is ascertained by a third type of knowledge, its validity is ascertained by a fourth, and so on ad infinitum. In order to avoid all these difficulties validity is accepted as intrinsic.³

The Bhaṭṭa school interprets the term ‘Svatastvam’ as follows: ‘The cognition as qualified by validity is inferred through the qualification ‘cognisedness.’ This definition of the term ‘intrinsic’ is only in name intrinsic. The very fact that validity has to be inferred is tantamount to the acceptance of the doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇa because validity is cognised by factors other than cognition.³

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*:—Chap. III, sec. 12, p. 448.

2. *The Six Ways of Knowing*:—By Prof. Datta, pp. 332-35.

3. ‘Prāmāṇya-viśiṣṭam jñānam jñātā-viśeṣeṇa anumīyata iti jñaptuh Svatastvam’.

Prabhākara is of opinion that cognition qualified by validity results from its own light, and there is no invalidity at all. The position that there is no invalid cognition is refuted in the fourth chapter.¹

Śrī Madhva is of opinion that validity is intrinsic with reference to origin and ascertainment. The validity that is present in cognition is produced as well as ascertained by the very instrument which produces and ascertains the cognition (Svāśraya-janaka-jñeyatvam, svāśraya-grāhya-grāhyatvam). The instruments that originate the cognition also originate its validity. The cognition and its validity are cognised by the witness consciousness (sākṣin). As for invalidity it is originated by the defects associated with the instruments of knowledge. The sākṣin cognises the cognition aspect of invalid cognition, and invalidity in it is inferred.² The invalidity in the instruments of knowledge (karaṇas) is originated by the very potency that gives rise to the instrument. As for invalidity it is originated by external defects. Hence it is extrinsic. The cognition of the instruments of knowledge and the potency in it that is responsible for valid knowledge (karaṇa-gata-prāmāṇya) are ascertained by different factors. The instruments of cognition such as the outer sense organs are cognised through inference, with the help of the probans like colour, taste, sound, etc. The Manas is cognised by sākṣin (witness consciousness). The instruments like the probans, and words are cognised by the sense organs of sight and sound. The potency i.e., being responsible for valid knowledge is cognised by inference with tests like workability as the probans. Hence the potency in the karaṇa is said to be extrinsic with reference to ascertainment (jñaptau paratastvam).

Pramāṇapaddhati :—Chap. III, sec. 12, p. 448.

The criticism of Madhva does not hold water. The Bhaṭṭa school recognises that cognition as well as the validity are both inferred by the same probans, viz., 'cognisedness'. Hence it follows that one and the same pramāṇa cognises validity and the cognition. Validity and cognition are both in the same boat. The Bhaṭṭa interpretation of term svatastvam is different from Madhva's. This difference arises because of the distinct feature of the Mīmāṃsā school i.e., the acceptance of jñātātā (cognisedness).

1. Chap. IV, pp. 32-33.

2. *Pramāṇapaddhati* :—Chap. III, sec. 13, p. 461 and Commentary of Rāghavendra, p. 462.

SOME UNPUBLISHED INSCRIPTIONS OF THE CHAULUKYAS OF GUJARĀT

(D. B. Diskalkar)

(Continued from the third issue)

(11)

SOMANĀTHA PĀṬAṆA INSCRIPTION OF BHĪMA (II)

OF V. S. 125 +

This inscription is engraved on a yellow stone slab lying in the Fauzdāri-Utārā at Verāval, an important port in Kāthiāwār, at a distance of three miles from Somanātha Pāṭaṇa, where it was originally found. The left-hand portion of the inscribed slab is broken away so that a number of letters in each line are lost. It is also broken a little in the right-hand lower corner causing a loss of the unit figure in the date. The inscription is on the whole in a fairly good condition. In its present condition it measures 1·2½" in length. Its height is 1·5½". It contains 25 lines of writing. The letters are well engraved in perfect straight lines and the writing is practically free from grammatical mistakes. The *characters* are *Nāgarī*. The *language* is *Sanskrit* and the record is in poetry. As regards the orthography it is only to be noted that a consonant following *r* is doubled in a few cases.

Since a considerable portion of each line is lost it has become difficult to give the contents of the record though it is at once seen that it is one pertaining to Jain religion. Nothing definitely can be said of the deity which is praised in the first line. The second and the third line give a description of [Aṇahi]-lapāṭaka, the famous capital of Gujarāt. It had become very rich under its famous sovereigns. The fourth line mentions King Mūlarāja, and in the sixth line the name of Bhīma (II) is given to whose reign the record belongs, without the mention of the intervening rulers. From the seventh line to the ourteenth line an account is given of a Saṅgha or rather Gachha of Jain preceptors of whom Nundakunda was one. In that line there was Kīrttisūri, who with a view to making pilgrimage to the sacred place of Nēminātha (i.e. Gīrnār) started from Chitrukūṭa and went to Aṇahillapura. He was much honoured there

by the king. The Sūri caused to be made there a Jain temple called Mūlavasantikā. After him Ajitachandra, Chārukīrtti, Yaśahkīrtti, Kshemakīrti and Hēmasūri became successively the Sūris. From the 17th to the 24th line an account is given of a new Jain temple caused to be built by Hēmasūri in the place of the old and ruined one. It seems from the 22nd line that he had built also a tank, a bath in which was supposed to cure white leprosy (Kuṣṭha). As the inscription is found at Somanātha¹ Pāṭaṇa it can be said that the Sūri had built these things there, but nowhere the name of Sōmanātha Pāṭaṇa is found in the preserved portion of the inscription beyond the mention of the western sea in l. 23. The last line says that the *praśasti* was composed by Pravarakīrtti. At the end is given the date of the record, the unit figure in which is destroyed. It is 125. +

It will be seen from these contents that our inscription does not give us any important historical information. The account of the Jain Gachha is, however, rather interesting.

TEXT²

१.[च्छ]ञ्चिव स्नाति नित्यमद्यापि वारिधौ ॥ [^३श्रे]यादभीष्टसंसिद्धयै
सुखं चंद्रप्र[भं].....
२.^४लुपाटकार्थं पत्तनं तद्विराजते ॥ ३ मन्ये वेधा विधायैतद्वि-
धिसुः पुनरीदृशं । शि.....
३.^५रेंद्वैर्भयमंत्रज्ञैर्यत्र लक्ष्मीः स्थिरीकृता ॥ ५ तन्निःशेषमहीपालमौलि
वृष्टाञ्चि.....
४.सौ नृपः । तेनोखातासुहृन्मूलो मूलराजः स उच्यते ॥ ७ एकैका-
धिकभूपालाः सम.....

1. A place called तेजःपुर is mentioned in a Ms. of Kshiraswamin's commentary on Amarakosha (See Vol. I p. 26 of this Journal). Sir Jadunath Sarkar proposes to identify it with Tejapurā in Katosan subdivision of the Mahikantha District (ibid Vol, II, No. 2). But it is an insignificant place and has no gain antiquities. It is better to identify Tejapurā with its synonymous Prabhāsapāṭana, which is the same as Somanātha Pāṭaṇa and which as the present inscription shows was an important place of the Jainas also.

2. From an impression in the Bhavnagar Museum.

3. Read भूयाद्.

4. It may be seen that the town is called here as Aṇahillapāṭaka and in the 11th line as Aṇahillapura.

५.[स] ब्रजखुराहतं । अतुच्छमुच्छलत्पूर्यं पर्वधर्मसजीजनत् ॥ पौरुषेण
प्रतापेन पुण्येना.....
६.रन्यूनविक्रमः । श्रीभीमभूपतिस्तेषां राज्यं प्राज्यं करोत्ययं ॥ ११
भालाक्षराप्यनन्नाणि यो बभञ्ज म.....
७.[न्नं] दिसंघे गणेश्वराः।बभ्रुवुः कुंदकुंदाख्याः साक्षात्कृतजगत्त्रयाः ॥
१३ येषामाकाशगामित्वं त्या.....
८.शतपंचकमुज्वलं । रमयित्वाथ जन्मांते येऽन्यन्नियमपूर्वकं ॥ १४
कालेऽस्मिन् भारते क्षेत्रे जाता.....
९.रीणास्तत्ववर्त्मनि । तेषां चारित्रिणां वंशो भूरयः सूरयोऽभवत् ॥ १७
सद्वेषा अपि निर्देषाः सकला अक.....
१०.प्रभावस्यारुह तत् । श्रीकीर्त्तिः प्राप्य सत्कीर्त्तिं सूरि [: *] सूरि-
गणं ततः ॥ १९ यदीयं देशनावरि सम्यग्दि.....
११.चित्रकूटाञ्चचाल सः । श्रीमन्नेमिजिनाधीशतीर्थयात्रानिमित्ततः ॥
२५ अणहिल्लपुरं रम्यमाजगा.....
१२.नीद्राय ददौ नृपः । बिरुदं मंडलाचार्यः सच्छछत्रं ससुखासनं ॥ २३
श्रीमूलवसंतिकाख्यं जिनभवनं तत्र.....
१३. संज्ञयैव यतीश्वरः । उच्यतेऽजितचंद्रो यस्ततोभूत्स गणीश्वरः ॥ २४ चारु-
कीर्तियशःकीर्त्ति ध
१४.सुक्तो यो रत्नत्रयवानपि । यथावद्विदितात्माभूत्क्षे[म]कीर्त्तिस्ततो
गणी ॥ २७ उदेति स्म लसज्ज्योति.....
१५.लैपि वासिते हेमसूरिणा । वस्त्रप्रावरणं येन ॥ २९.....
१६.कीर्त्तिर्यत्कीर्त्तिर्नक्तकीव नरिनर्त्ति । त्रिभुवनरचिता मुक्तिनूपुरशशि-
तिलकनेपथ्या ॥ ३१ ते.....
१७.ति ॥ ३२ समुद्भूत [: *] समुच्छन्नश्रीर्णजीर्णजिनालयः [यः] कृता
रत्ननिर्वाहसमुत्साहशिरोम ।
१८.शयैरवगण्यते ॥ ३४ वादिनो यस्पदद्वंद्वनखचंद्रेषु विविताः । कुर्वते
विगतश्रीकाःकलंक.....
१९.दं तीर्थभूतमनादिकं ॥ ३६ सीतायाः स्थापना यत्र सोमेशः पक्ष-
पातकृत् । प्रभोऽलोक्य.....
२०.तदुदुधृतं तेन जातोद्धारमनेकशः ॥ ३८ चैत्यमिदं ध्वजमिषतो निज-
भुजमुदुधृत्य सक.....
२१.पतो मंडलगणिललितकीर्त्तिसत्कीर्त्तिः । चतुरधिकविंशति लसद्ध्वज-
पटपटुहस्तक ॥

२२.मेतदीयसद्गोष्ठिकानामपि गल्लकानां ॥ ४१ यस्य स्नानपयोजुल्लिप्त-
मखिलं कुष्टं दवी.....
२३.स चंद्रप्रभः सप्रभुस्तीरे पश्चिमसागरस्य जयताहिग्वाससां शासनं ॥
४२ जिनपतिगृह
२४.वर्णिवर्यो व्रतविनयसमेतैः शिष्यवर्गौश्च सार्द्धं ॥ ४३ श्रीमद्विक्रम-
भूपस्य वर्षाणां द्वाद
२५.ककीर्त्तिलघुबंधुः । चक्रे प्रशस्तिमनघा[मपि]...प्रथरकीर्त्तिरिमां ॥
४५ सं १२[५] +

(12)

PORBANDAR INSCRIPTION OF VĪSALADEVA OF V. S. 1315

This inscription is inscribed on a thin slab of stone at present lying near the shop of a confectioner in the Mīṭhī Māṇḍavi of the Porbandar city in Kāthiawār. It has been lying there for a number of years and nobody knows from where and when it was brought to its present place. The inscribed portion measuring 1·6'' by 1'·2½'' has pitiablely suffered so that with any amount of trouble it cannot be fully deciphered. The slab is all in good condition. Above the inscription which consists of 14 lines of writing there is engraved a fine figure of a cow suckling her calf.

The record opens with the date, the ninth day—its name cannot be made out—of the dark half of Bhādrapada of the (Vikrama) year 1315. It then refers itself to the reign of Māhārāja Śrī Vīsaladēva of Aṇahilapāṭaka, and mentions the name Nāgaḍa of his chief minister. Then the names of the members of the *Pañchakula* appointed to rule over Saurāshṭra are given but they cannot be clearly read. In the further portion of the inscription only a few letters here and there can be read so that no connected information can be obtained of them. The inscription seems to record a grant of a certain number of *drammas* for various purposes. Nothing is known of the grantor and the grantee. In the twelfth line and probably also in the 8th a place is mentioned named *Bhūmalikā* which no doubt stands for the modern Ghumli in the Barḍa hills. It is well known that it was once an important city, being formerly the capital of the Jēṭhavās. It is now quite in ruins. The grant of the

present inscription seems to have been issued by somebody staying in Bhūmalikā.

Only three more inscriptions of this king are known which give the dates V. S. 1308,¹ 1311² and 1317³. The prime minister Nāgaḍa, mentioned in the present inscription is also mentioned in the copper plate inscription of V. S. 1317 and in the Koḍinār praśasti of the poet Nānāka.⁴ That he was a Nāgara Brāhmaṇa is seen from Harshagaṇi's Vastupālacharita. Nāgaḍa must have been appointed in the post some time after V. S. 1303. For in that year Tejaḥpāla was the chief minister as is mentioned in a manuscript⁵ of Āchārāṅgasūtra. He seems to have continued in the post at least upto V. S. 1328, the date of the Kōḍinār praśasti where it is mentioned.

TEXT⁶

१. ओं संवत् [१३] १५ वर्षे भाद्र[पद श्रदि ५]...चेह श्रीमदणहिल[पाट]
२. काधि[ष्ठित]समस्तराजावली विराजित महारा[ज]श्री[वी]स.
३. [ल]दे[व*] कल्याणविजयराज्ये तत्पादपञ्चोपजीविनि महा[मा].
४. व्यश्रीनागडे समस्तमुद्राव्यापारान्परिपथयत[ति] एवं का
५. ले वर्त्तमाने श्रीसुराष्ट्रमंडले[म]हं० श्री [वि-रापारा],
६. श्री[सिंहप्रभृति] पंचकुलप्रतिपत्तौ [वामक ?...द पुत्र
७. [श्री] जयदेवस्य [स्थितकै...ति...] र्थमिह श्री
८. मलिकासक ? समस्तप्रति.....
९.धाम.....
१०. द्र ४ पत्र?...द्र ४.....राष्ट्रके द्र ४ पत्रे
११. ...हके द्र ४ क...पट्टके द्र ४ सकल?...स्थित
१२. ...रविकारं ? भूमलिकायां.....
१३. ...बहुभिर्वसुधा मुक्ता राजभिःसगरादिभिःयस्य
१४. यस्य यदा भूमिस्तस्य तस्य तदा फलं । मंगलं महाश्री :

1. Above Vol. V, p. 102.

2. Ibid Vol. I, p. 25.

3. Ind. Ant. Vol. VI, p. 210.

4. Ibid Vol. XI, p. 100.

5. Peterson's Report of Search for Sanskrit MSS. 1882-83, p. 40.

6. From rubbings in the Rajkot and Bhavnagar Museums.

7. Expressed by a symbol.

8. Read भाद्र.

9. This stands evidently for भूमलिका.

(13)

KĀNṬELĀ INSCRIPTION OF ARJUNADEVA OF V. S. 1320

This interesting inscription is engraved on a black granite stone fixed below an image of Gaṇapati in the southern wall of a Śiva (Mahākālēśvara) temple on the bank of the Rēvatī Kuṇḍa in the village Kānṭelā under the Porbandar State in Kāthiāwār. The village is at a distance of 7 miles to the north-west of Porbandar and a mile from the sea-shore.

The inscription was published in Gujarāti by the late Mr. Tansukhram Mansukhram Tripathi in the *Buddhi Prakāśa* of 1915.

It measures 1', 9" in length and 11½" in breadth and is in a fairly good condition. The language of the inscription is Sanskrit and the whole of it is in verse except the last line which contains the date. The characters are *Nāgarī* and are well engraved. As regards *orthography* it is to be noted that a number of archaic forms are used throughout the inscription; e. g. in *th* (ll. 3, 4, 7 and 8), in *y* at the end of a conjunct consonant (ll. 1 and 5). - *Jy* in two cases where it is used (ll. 4 and 5) looks quite like *dy*. *B* is expressed by putting a very small point in the centre of the hollow part of *v*; as a result of this many times when the point is not clear we cannot distinguish between the two letters. The vowel *u* of *ju* (l. 4) is added to the left-hand portion of *j* and not to its perpendicular line as is usually done. The *Ṙshṭhamātrās* are used throughout.

In the first verse the poet expresses a desire that the tree of religion, protected by the God Viṣṇu, the enemy of the Daityas, be flourishing. He then tells us that there was in the Śrīmāla family one Udaya who was a minister. His son was Chāhaḍa. His son was Padmasimha, whose wife was called Prathimadevī. Three sons were born to them named Mahāsimha, Salaksha and Sāmantasimha. Salaksha was first appointed a viceroy over Saurāshṭra by the sovereign Viśaladeva but was afterwards transferred to the Lāṭa province, where he died on the bank of the Narmadā (Revā). Sāmantasimha for the merit of his brother caused to be made an image of Viṣṇu named Salaksha Nārāyaṇa. He also built a temple of Pāśyanātha in front of the temple of Neminātha on the Raivata (Girnar)

mountain.¹ Arjunadeva confirmed him in the post of the Viceory to which he was appointed by Vīsaladeva. The inscription further states that Sāmantsimha heard that the Revatī Kuṇḍa, situated on the sea-shore on the way to Dwāarakā was long out of repairs. In the forest where it was situated Revatī used to sport with her husband in ancient times. Considering it, therefore, to be a holy place he caused a new flight of steps to be built to the Revatīkuṇḍa. He also caused to be made images of Śiva and Viṣṇu (as Jalaśāyin) together with those of Gaṇeśa, Kshetranāla Sūrya and Chaṇḍikā, and also an image of Rēvatī and Balarāma. He moreover caused to be dug a well with a water trough attached to it. A bath with that water was supposed to protect children from the evil influence of the Rēvatī planet.

This *praśasti* was composed by the poet Harihara, son of Paṇḍita Mōkshārka. He is said to have been honoured by the family of Sāmantasimha. The last line contains the date of the record, Wednesday, the 4th of the bright half of Jyēṣṭha in the (Vikrama) year 1320.

I am first inclined to identify this Harihara with the one referred to by Sōmeśvaradeva, the Rājapurōhita of the Chaukyas, in his poems Kirttikaumudī. (canto I, v. 25) and Surathōtsava (canto XV, v. 44). But the poetry in the inscription is of a low order and does not seem to be the work of a good poet praised by Sōmeśvaradeva. One Mōkshāditya (which name is synonymous with Mōkshārka) is said to have composed the Bhīmavikramayāyōga in V. S. 1329. Our Harihara who was the son of Mōkshārka, as the record tells us may be his son if the date allows that.

Udaya mentioned in our inscription was the famous Udayana who was intimately connected with Kumārpāla and his Jain preceptor Hemachandra as related in Jain chronicles. He had come from Srīmala for business purposes in Gujarāt during the time of Karṇa and was made one of the ministers. He was made governor of Stambha-tīrtha (Cambay) by Siddharāja Jayasimha. Kumārpāla, when he was in distress and had fled to

1. It was built in V. S. 1305 as an inscription of that date on Girnar shows (Cousin's List of Ant. Ren., p. 358). Salaksha must have, therefore, died some time before this date.

Cambay for fear of Siddharāja,¹ was very much helped by this Udayana, whom out of gratitude Kumārapāla made his prime minister when he got the throne. Udayana was sent against Sausara, king of Saurāṣṭra, but in the fight Kumārapāla's army was defeated and Udayana was mortally wounded.² We have found no inscription where Udayana is mentioned as Kumārapāla's prime minister. His earliest minister we know of from inscriptions was Mahādēva.³ Besides the present one there are some more inscriptions⁴ found on the Girnar hill which give an account of Udayan's family. He had four sons, Vāhaḍa, Āmbaḍa, Chāhaḍa and Salaksha. In Jain chronicles various confusing accounts are given of the first three brothers and it is difficult to elicit trustworthy account of them. It is sufficient to note that Vāhaḍadēva, Kumārapāla's prime minister mentioned in the Nāḍol plate⁵ of V. S. 1213, is most probably the eldest son of Udayana.⁶ Chāhaḍa's son Padmasimha had three sons, according to the present inscription, but one more according to another inscription.⁷ His wife's name is generally given as Prathimaḍēvi.⁸ But it is given as Bimbiḍēvi in the above mentioned inscription. If Pṛithima is a corruption of Sanskrit Pratimā which is very likely the case then Pratimā and Bimba

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1. History of Gujarat p. 182 ff.
 2. Ibid p. 186.
 3. Nos. II and IV above.
 4. Cousen's List of Antiquarian Remains in Bom. Pres. pp. 351 and 358.
 5. Ind. Ant. Vol.
 6. But I take this opportunity of correcting three mistakes occurring in the History of Gujarat p. 186 ff. in their account. The building of steps on the holy Girnar hill is attributed by Prabhāvakacharita and Prabandhachintāmaṇi to Vāgaḍa or Vāgbhaḍa. But we know from two inscriptions on Girnar of V. S. 1222 and 1223 (Cousen's list of Antiquarian remains in Bom. Pres. p. 359) that the builder of steps was Ambāka who was the son of Rāṇiga. That Ambāka is also not to be confounded with Ambaḍa, son of Udayana. A third mistake is that Udaya's son Chāhaḍa is supposed to have gone over to the side of Arnorāja and fought against Kumārapāla. But the rebel was a different man named Chāhaḍakumār who was, as the Prabandha Chaturviṃśati says, a Mālava prince.
 7. Cousen's List of Antiquarian Remains in Bombay Presidency, p. 351.
 8. As in this Kantela inscription and in the Girnar inscription of V. S. 1305. See ibid p. 358.

are synonymous. One of her four sons named Sāmantasimha is the cause of our inscription.

Our inscription helps us to know of the religious history of the time. The fact that the images of both the Brahmanical faith and the Jain faith were established by the same individual who was a Jain, speaks of the very friendly relations between the followers of the two faiths. The two other inscriptions on Girnar above referred to mention that Sāmantasimha had established Jain images also. It is well known that the famous minister Vastupāla, who lived only a few years before the time of this inscription had built both Jain and Brahmanical temples.¹

As regards the calculation of the date given in the record it is to be noted that the week-day does not correspond with that given in the record. The day given is Wednesday while on Jyēshtha Śudi 4 of V. S. 1320 the day is seen to be Thursday and the corresponding Christian date was 1st May 1264 A.D. It is possible to explain this discrepancy by supposing that the *tithi* given in the record is the true astronomical *tithi*, which is employed for certain ceremonies. The astronomical *tithi* generally begins on the day preceding the civil *tithi*, and in fact gives its number to the latter being that counted at sunrise on the civil *tithi*. Thus in the present record the ceremony may have actually taken place on Wednesday, 30th April 1264 after the astronomical *tithi* Śud 4 commenced, which it did about 10 minutes after sunrise on Wednesday.

TEXT²

१. ओं^३ ॥ स्वस्तिमानस्तु दैत्यारिगुप्तो धर्ममहीरुहः । महेन्द्रादिपदं यस्य परिपाको-
ज्वलं फलं ॥ १ श्रीश्रीमालकुले मंत्री प
२. विघ्नीकृतभूतलः । उद्यो नाम शीतांशुसितकीर्तिरजायत ॥ २ अंगभूरब्धि-
गंभीरस्ततः श्रीचाहडोऽभवत् । प ॥^४
३. प्रसिंहं कुलयोतिसुतरस्नमसूत यः ॥ ३ बभूव पञ्चसिंहस्य गुरुभक्तस्य गेहिनी ।
प्रिया पृथिमदेवीति मैथिली ॥

1. See Ind. Ant. Vol. XXXI, p. 494.

2. From an impression in the Watson Museum, Rajkot.

3. Expressed by a symbol.

4. These strokes in this line as in some of the following lines are engraved by the engraver simply to fill up the space.

४. व रघुप्रभोः ॥ ४ तयोऽस्योऽभवन्पुत्राः सुत्रामगुरुवाग्मिनः । मिथः प्रीतिजुषां
येषां न त्रिवर्गोपमेयतां ॥ ५ ज्या
५. यान्महणसिंहोभूत्सलक्षस्तेषु चानुजः । लेभे सामंतसिंहस्तु कनिष्ठज्येष्ठतां^१
तयोः ॥ ६ श्रोवीसलमहीपालः श्री ॥
६. सलक्षकरांबुजम् । चक्रे सौराष्ट्रकरणस्वर्णासुद्रांशुभासुरं ॥ ७ स लाटवेशाधिकृतः
प्रभोस्तस्यैव शासनात् । दधौ दिव्यां
७. तनुं रेवास्यक्तभूतमयाकृतिः ॥ ८ श्रेयसे प्रेयसस्तस्य भ्रातुः सामंतमंत्रिणा ।
सलक्ष[ना]रायण^२ इत्यस्थापि प्रतिमा हरेः
८. ॥ ९ रैवताचलचूले च श्रीनेमिनिलयाग्रतः । प्रांशुप्रासादमस्थापि विंबं पार्श्व-
जिनेशितुः ॥ १० यथा वीसलभूपा
९. लः सुराष्ट्राधिकृतं व्यधात् । सामंतसिंहं सचिवं तथैवार्जुनभूपतिः ॥ ११ स
जातु जलधेस्तीरे पथि द्वास्वतीपतेः । श्रु ॥
१०. श्राव रेवतीकुंडमिदं कालेन जर्जरं ॥ १२ निजप्रभावबीजेस्मिन् पूर्वं हि किल
रेवती[।*] चिक्रीड सह कान्तेन वेलावनवि
११. [हा]रिणी ॥ १३ अत एतन्महातीर्थं जननीश्रेयसेमुना । नवैरुपलसोपानैः सुर-
वापीसमं कृतं ॥ १४ गणेशक्षेत्रपाला ॥
१२. कैंचंडिकामातृभिः समं । कारितौ कृतिना चेह महेशजलशायिनौ ॥ १५ किं
चात्र सच्चरित्रेण रेवतीबलदेवयोः [।*]
१३. अस्थापि मूर्तियुगलं नवायतनपेशलं ॥ १६ अकारि कूपकोप्याःस्मिन्नरघट्टमनोहरः ।
धयन्ति धेनवो यस्य निपाने ।
१४. डु सुधासखं ॥ १७ रेवतीग्रहमुज्झन्ति शिशवो यत्र मज्जनात् । तदेतदस्तु
कल्पांतसाक्षि सामंतकीर्त्तनं ॥ १८ ख
१५. नेत्रानलशीतांशुमिते विक्रमवत्सरे । ज्येष्ठे सितचतुर्थ्यां ज्ञे मूर्त्तमेतत्प्रातिष्ठितं ॥ १९
प्रशस्तिमेतां सा
१६. मंतमंत्रिगोत्रस्य पूजितः । मोक्षार्कधीमतः सूनुश्चक्रे हरिहरः कविः ॥ २० ॥
मंगलं महा श्रीः ॥
१७. संवत् १३२० वर्षे ज्येष्ठ शुदि ४ बुधे । प्रतिष्ठा

1. Read कनिष्ठज्येष्ठतां.

2. The metre is incorrect here.

(14)

BHARĀṆĀ INSCRIPTION OF ARJUNADEVA OF V. S. 132(7)

This inscription is engraved on the pedestal of an image of Gaṇapati at the village called Bharāṇā in the Khambhāḷia Mahāl of the Navānagar State in Kāthiāwār. It was once published in the Pkt. and Skt. Inscriptions of Kāthiāwār p. 204, but its date and the name of the Chaulukya sovereign to whose reign it belonged, were wrongly read. It was supposed to be dated in 1275 and hence to refer to the reign of Bhīma (II). But I find that it is a clear mistake. The name of the sovereign is Arjunadeva and the date is 132 [7]. The unit figure in the date is doubtful but there is no doubt about the other figures. The last three lines in the record are very indistinct.

The language of the inscription is *Sanskrit*, and the characters *Nāgarī*. Nothing requires to be noted of the orthography. The word *Sīha* is used throughout for *Simha*.

The record opens with the date, the year 132[7] of the [Vikrama] era. The *tithi* and the month cannot well be deciphered but it looks to be the third day of the bright half of Bhādrapada. It then refers itself, as said above, to the reign of Mahārājādhirāja Arjunadeva, the sovereign ruler of Aṇahilapāṭaka. Then are mentioned the names of two officers, (Pālha) and Sāmantasimha, who were appointed to rule jointly over Saurāshṭra.

Two officers under these named Arisimha and [Jaya]simha, who were appointed to govern Bhadrāṇaka, which must be modern Bharāṇā, where the inscription was found, made a gift by a charter of a well of Mātarādēvi (?) for the provision of water to the cattle and of some *drammas* every year for the purpose which is not clear.

From the Kāṇṭhēlā inscription of V. S. 1320, of the same king, published above, (No. XIII) we know that Sāmantsimha was appointed viceroy over Saurāshṭra. By the time of this inscription, it seems that a senior joint officer was appointed to rule over Saurāshṭra along with him. His name cannot be clearly read but if it is Pālha, he must be the same viceroy mentioned in the following inscriptions.

It may be noted that four other inscriptions of the king have been discovered, two of V. S. 1320,¹ one of 1328² and one of 1330,³ which last from Girnar is published below. One more inscription of the king of V. S. 1320 is found in the Sirohi State but it is not certain whether it belongs to this Arjunadēva.⁴

TEXT⁵

१. अं^६ [संवत्] १३२ [७] वर्षे [भाद्रपद ? शुदि ३] ... येह श्रीमदणहि
२. लपाटकार्धष्टितसमस्तराजावलीसमलंकृतमहारा
३. जाधिराजश्रीमदर्जु [जुन] देवकल्याणविजयराज्ये श्रीसौ
४. राष्ट्रदेशे नियुक्त म [हं०] श्री [ठ०पालह ?] ठ० श्री साम्ब^७ [त] सीह
५. यो [: *] आदेशेन भ [द्रा] णके महं० श्री अरिसीह ठ० श्री [ज]
६. [य] सीहाभ्यां श्रीमातरादेवीवापिकायाः पत्रशासनं का
७. रितं । [गवां पानी ?] य पि—नार्थं भद्राणकमंडपिका [यां]—
८. —के द्र० ८ ! श्री वर्ष प्रति
९.

1. Ind. Ant. Vol. XVI, p. 147; ibid Vol. XI, p. 242.
 2. Antiquity of Kaccha by Khakhar p. 89.
 3. No. XVII, below.
 4. Gaurishankar Ojha's History of Sirohi State, p. 141.
 5. From two impressions in the Bhavnagar Museum.
 6. Expressed by a symbol.
 7. Read सामंत.

THE EXEGESIS OF THE VEDAS
WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 33rd CHAPTER
OF THE
AITAREYA BRĀHMAṆAM
(R. N. Sūryanārāyaṇa)

The ever increasing passion for learning has prompted scholars to dive deep into the unparalleled sacred books of the Brāhmaṇa land. The modern scientific principles and inventions can also assist us to interpret properly the vedic texts and expound the hidden meaning conveyed by them and understood by the ancient sages.

As science and religion appear, prima facie, to be contradictory to each other to those who are not well versed in both, much care has to be taken in making attempts to understand the truth of the Brāhmaṇadharmā. As science is a phase of Religion, those modern scientists who fail to realise the ultimate truth revealed in the Vedas should be cautious in giving out to the public the results of their finite attempts made to perceive the infinite. Of all the sciences psychology pretends to be closely related to Religion; therefore Psychologists form the first set among scientists whose proud and successful experiments conducted in the laboratory make them obstinate about the revealed truth. Even the psychological subtleties can never be demonstrated in the laboratory and the questions like ' how ' and ' why ' remain, even to-day, unanswered.

Though Brāhmaṇadharmā is beyond the reach of psychology and allied sciences, they are not antagonistic to each other. Science can be compared to the children's play which goes on changing in its limited province but which is delightful and interesting to those who take part in it.

Many branches of modern sciences have not yet come to a definite common understanding, regarding the truth of the natural phenomena and therefore of the Brāhmaṇadharmā; and the so-called modern Sanskrit scholars have not, unfortunately, been endowed with modern scientific out-look. Such of the scholars who are familiar with certain branches of sciences as well as Sanskrit language have been pouring out their energy not

to grasp the reality of the situation but to interpret it in their own way which may not be true in its entirety. Mr. V. G. Rele has taken much pains and trouble—for which we should thank him—to view the Vedic Gods from the biological point. No doubt, Mr. Rele has correctly interpreted things as they are, but his speculations are entirely blocked by the material out-look, and therefore, they do not reflect the universality and divinity of the things in question. Most of the learned translators like Dr. A. B. Keith etc., have taken the superficial meanings of the Vedic Texts in the same manner as they would do in the case of ordinary classical Sanskrit literary pieces. The Vedic Texts are abstruse and never yield, under ordinary circumstances, their intended right meaning, to the prejudicial alien minds, whether oriental or occidental.

I would suggest, therefore, that some scholars, learned in several branches of modern sciences, arts, Sanskrit, Philology etc., that are the several phases of the rational aspect of the Brāhmaṇadharma and of Acāras that are the practical aspect of the same, should gather together to interpret the Vedas and enlighten the world with their many-sided and infallible explanations and interpretations. Mr. H. A. Shah's astronomical interpretation of Vedic Gods too has been a guide to us¹.

Here I wish to offer my humble quota before this august assembly of erudite and recondite scholars of Oriental learning.

The question of the date of the Vedas has been purposely omitted here as it is premature to take it up now when the great majority of scholars appear to have presupposed certain things for practical purposes or otherwise irrespective of the truth of things.

Similarly the authorship of the Vedas has been disputable. The great Sāyaṇācārya and his predecessors have tried their utmost to explain away the complications in a manner known and suited to them. Many of the present-day modern scholars appear to have disagreed totally with them without entering into their depths.

The incomprehensive problems may be comprehended and solved in this age of modern science by modern scholars aided

1. Vide Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, Vol. XVII, pt. 11.

by the principles of the material radio and other inventions and discoveries, which enable us to apply the same to know the mystery of the Apauruṣeyatva and Śrutitva of the beginningless, endless, all-pervading and omnipresent eternal Vedas.

It is cited and admitted by ancient commentators that several sages realised certain portions of the Vedas on the ground that those portions contain a reference to the (seeming) names of the seers—or composers according to some scholars of to-day—of Hymns. The Pūrvamīmāṃsakas never admit that the Vedas were originated even from the Almighty as opposed to the view of the Uttaramīmāṃsakas. The Modern radio and other inventions of the past, present and future may lead us in the right path to prove, to a considerable extent, the doctrines of both the Mīmāṃsakas.

Mr. V. G. Rele has already paved the way of interpreting the Vedas from the biological standpoint. Though his exposition is dreadfully silent about the divinity and the universe (Brahmāṇḍa) as a whole, its method of interpretation serves as a model to us.¹ Similar attempts can be made to understand the mystery of the Vedas from several scientific points of view backed up by the religious wisdom. Even a deep study of æsthetics, fine arts, psychology, philosophy, physics, chemistry, biology etc., may fail to let us imbibe anything about the divinity of Brāhmaṇadharmā that is beyond their capacity to understand. However, an ardent student of Brāhmaṇadharmā with a knowledge of philology may conveniently be assisted by those branches of sciences to understand and explain the nature and mysterious ways of Brāhmaṇadharmā as revealed in the Vedas.

The episode that goes by the title of Sunaḥśepa Upākhyāna narrated in the 33rd chapter of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇam portion of the Vedas may enlighten us on the genuineness of the sacred texts, provided it is commented upon with deep insight. A superficial survey over the texts does not only suggest nothing peculiar to the most ancient books of the world, but does certainly mar the dignity and merits of the same. The object of this paper is to place before the public the exegesis of the Vedas with

1. Mr. H. A. Shah, B.A., of Bombay has ventured to give astronomical interpretation of Vedic Gods. (Vide B. O. R. Institute, Poona, Vol. XVII, pt. II.)

a special reference to a single episode mentioned in the 33rd chapter of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇam. The story runs as follows when viewed as an ordinary piece of literature.

THE STORY

There lived a king by name Hariścandra Vaidhasa, the Aikṣwāka. Though he had one hundred wives he was issueless. In his house, there lived two sages known as Nārada and Parvata. Being requested by the king, Nārada disclosed in a discourse the advantages of begetting children and advised him to pray to Varuṇa for a son whom he would offer, in return, to the deity. Accordingly the king offered his prayers to Varuṇa and was blessed with a son Rohitāśwa by name. The king did not like to part with his son soon after his birth and put off sacrificing him under reasonable and convincing excuses each time when Varuṇa demanded a sacrifice, until the boy was allowed to pass his 16th year. Whereupon the secret was disclosed to him. He ran away from the palace and migrated into the forest. While he was roaming in the jungle, he came to know that his father was suffering from dropsy, consequent upon his failure to keep his promise. Whenever Rohitāśwa made up his mind to return to his father's abode, Indra, the lord of Heaven, disguised himself as a Śrotriya and advised him to keep on wandering, eulogising at the same time the great benefit that one may derive from travel. Thus the prince attempted five times to return but each time he was prevented from doing so. While he found himself as a traveller for the sixth time, he saw accidentally a hermitage where he interviewed a sage called Ajigartha, son of Suyavas, who had three sons known as Śunaḥpucchaḥ, Śunaḥśepaḥ and Śunolāngūlaḥ. The prince proposed to pay one hundred and get rid of his distress through one of the sons of the sage. Ajigartha conceded to the proposal and gave away the middle son after deliberate consideration of Dharma and the instinct of his wife regarding the choice of the son. Rohitāśwa accompanied by Śunaḥśepa approached his father who made preparations to perform a Soma sacrifice with the Brāhmaṇa boy as the victim. The priests were invited and the sacrifice began. When the victim was about to be tied and dissected, neither the authorised priest nor any man in the

assembly stood up to bind the human being and draw out his life. Ajigartha himself rose, and demanding one hundred for each service he bound him to the sacrificial post and was ready with sword in hand to dissect his body. Then Śunaḥśepa observed the crisis and began to offer his final prayers to Prajāpati and several deities at the instruction of each deity in turn. When he was reciting concluding prayers to Uṣas his ties were loosened and he as well as the sacrificer were released from the bondages. Then the sacrifice had to be abruptly closed at this miracle, violating the formal injunctions of the Veda. At the request of the priests Śunaḥśepa conducted the rest of the ceremony and brought it to a close in the method thought out by him in conformity with the rational perspective of sacrifices.

Śunaḥśepa then, considering what family he should join, approached Viśvāmitra who honoured him. Ajigartha desirous of getting his son back appealed to the higher sense of Śunaḥśepa who in his turn being backed up by Viśvāmitra rejected the request of Ajigartha and made his seeming criminal offence clear to him and snubbed him. Next, Śunaḥśepa asked Viśvāmitra to expound the process of changing from one family to another which he had himself undergone. Viśvāmitra offered both his spiritual and material wealth to him besides giving him the station of the eldest son. In order to have his proposals confirmed by his own sons he asked, at the request of Śunaḥśepa, his one hundred sons to endorse his opinion. Fifty elder sons disagreed with their father and were consequently cursed to enter into births in the last Niśad class, which comprised the Pundras, the Pulindas, the Śabarās, the Mutibas, etc., and grew issueless. The fifty younger sons submissively agreed and were blessed by Viśvāmitra and lived happily with Śunaḥśepa at their head who inherited the characteristics of both his old and new families.

The merits and uses of the episode form the concluding portion of this section. According to which this episode is to be recited by the Hotṛ, approbated by the Adhvaryu before the sacrificer, invariably in all the sacrifices performed by kings. The honorarium is to be paid by the sacrificer befitting his capacity and wealth. The listener of this episode will surely be blessed with issues and success.

Such is the simple story related in the 33rd chapter of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. Though it is in the form of a story, it cannot be admitted that it is a narration of the past events. The verbs used in the past tenses should not be commented upon literally in accordance with the rules of classical grammar. In the Vedas past tenses are used in the place of present tenses, Pāṇini, the great grammarian and philologist has not forgotten to make mention the peculiar usages of the past tenses in the Vedas. Bearing this in mind, one may presume that this narration of events that generally occur in life, guides and sets an example to the adherers to the Brāhmaṇadharma so that one may commit this to memory, know such psychological and instinctive tendencies of human life,⁸ draw lessons on methods of adjustments, and amendments and cultivate tolerance and the spirit of self-sacrifice.

In this small section there are a great many problems relating to sacrifices solved by wisdom of the quintessence of the Upaniṣads that have been appended to-day as the third or fourth division of the Veda. It is a fact that all the four divisions of the Veda and all the four Vedas are inter-related and inter-dependent. There is nothing like Saṃhita, Brāhmaṇa, Aranyaka and Upaniṣads being different from one another. The chronological classification of the Vedas into Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Atharvaveda is not a genuine one. These divisions and classifications of the Vedas were first attempted by Vedavyāsa for practical purposes of learning and reciting them easily by several individuals who were unable to commit to memory the whole of the Veda. Since then it has been conventionally followed by later generations. Yet, from the point of view of Yajña and the practical aspects of Brāhmaṇadharma, no Śrotriya could dispense with any particular branch of the Veda. The Purvakāṇḍa and the Uttarakāṇḍa are interdependent so as to present a rational interpretation of the Brāhmaṇadharma.

Though this episode is included in the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Vedas it is not free from references to Saṃhita or Upaniṣads. It is quite obvious that Jñāna and Karma go hand in hand. Both are intertwined. It is explicitly stated in the Gitā that Jñāna is also a kind of Yajña. The very word Karma Yoga reveals that

Karma and Jñāna are the two terminals of the same Dharma united by devotion 'Bhakti' or love. The great sage Apastamba who advocates the cause of Śrotriyakarma does not forget to dilate upon Atmalābha which is indispensable to the Brāhmaṇas (i.e. people) in general. It is his impartial treatment of both Karmakāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa which are, in his view, interdependent, that has conferred on him the highest distinction on earth.

Most of the Vedic texts are in the form of Aphorisms (Sūtras). The exposition of the meaning of a single condensed form of composition runs into several volumes. The rules of interpretations and explanations are also framed by certain sages who were conscious of the intentions of Sacred injunctions and sayings.

The names referred to in the Vedas are not at all really the names of persons that were once in the mortal world. They possess both denotation and connotation. They are the species of a genus, the supreme Universal soul, and chosen here to represent certain characteristic features of the Self in different conditions. They may serve as algebraical symbols for purposes of illustrating by means of Arthavāda such of the principles of the Brāhmaṇadharmā and of the way of life as are difficult to understand directly from the general injunctions of the Vedas. If psychology coupled with philology could enable us to interpret them as representing the activities of the individual soul and mind, it will be a glorious achievement. The knowledge of physics, chemistry, biology, economics, law, politics etc., is quite essential to understand the spirit of the sayings of the sacred works on Brāhmaṇadharmā.

The word Hariścandra is like an algebraical symbol. It may represent any man or king possessing a clear common sense and religiously bent of mind. His being the son of Vedhaṣ and born in the race of Ikṣvāku indicates that generally kings are understood to have directly sprung from the Creator, Kriṣṇa Ikṣvāku etc., (cf. Nāviṣṇu Prithivīpatiḥ). In later ages too we find kings styling themselves as belonging to the races of the Sun and the Moon. The Sun and the Moon represent also the characteristic features of those kings. They are the primojeni-tory emblems as it were.

It is said that Nārada and Parvata resided in his house (Gṛhē ūṣatuḥ). Nārada and Parvata mean simply the nature and activities of the mind of the person. In other words it may be said that the mind of a hariṣcandra man is endowed with steadiness or firmness of mind (Parvataḥ, Sthitaprajñatā) and imagination, flashing intellect or intuition (Nārada). If he devotedly and seriously considers an intricate problem he will be able to find out correct solutions for himself as though they are intuitively perceived by him (cf. Yam Rakṣitumicchanti Buddhyā saṃyojayanti tam). This may be both subjective or internal and objective or external. Wherever Nārada is introduced in Sanskrit literature we can positively take it in the sense of activity of the mind within or without. Rohitāśwa too is symbolical and general. Etymologically it means a person having or representing red rays. This may correspond with the term Bālasūrya that can be applied to any baby resembling the glory of the Sun.

Ajigartha may point out a sage who sleeps over the material comforts (cf. Yasyām jāgrati bhūtāni tasyām nidrāti Saṃyamī). He may look distressed with poverty as depicted here. Suppose he is a household man possessing three sons who are equally glorious, learned, noble and self-sacrificing. In consistency with their blissful nature and character they may be named Śunaḥ-pucchaḥ, Śunaḥśepaḥ, Śunolāngūlaḥ. The terms are significant and clear in their meanings. The word śunaḥ denotes bliss and 'Puchcha' etc., mean piece or little. The Vedas describe here a family of learned men of divinity to be found in all ages and places, capable of dealing with extraneous problems of life and sacrifices, that could spare even their lives for the sake of humanity and divinity. There may be even to-day many living beings imbued with the spirit of self-sacrifice.

The so called names of priests too are to be taken as signifying terms. The words like Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, Ayasya and Vasiṣṭha clearly point out the distinguishing features of persons who could be entrusted with several posts in a sacrifice at all times and in all places. The etymological explanations too are very clear to us. A Viśvāmitra is one who pleases the world as well as the divine beings with proper prayers or Hymns.

A Jamadagni is one through whom the fire god has to consume the offerings. One who does not labour hard and who does sing happily and with ease the Hymns of the Veda is called an Ayasya. That sage who commands control over all branches of knowledge or several subordinate learned men with his mastery over all theoretical as well as practical portions of learning is called a Vasiṣṭha.

The term Devarāta is like Devadatta standing for any man in similar circumstances. The hotṛtva of Viśvāmitra may enable us to explain the idea connoted by the word Madhuchchanda, used in a sense of being his son. A Madhuchchanda man is one who has a sweet voice or one who possesses a special aptitude for metres, or who recites sweetly the metrical stanzas. Madhuchchanda is invariably connected with Viśvāmitra; many Hymns in the Vedas cite a reference to this word as well as many other words taken to mean the names of seers. In reality they do not denote any seer or composer but connote peculiar qualities of the Absolute Self manifesting Himself in various conditions reflected in several Vedic Hymns. These terms may throw light upon certain minute psychological biological factors etc., well founded on divinity.

To say that Viśvāmitra was once a king who changed his royalty to divinity in course of one and the same life is to impress us with the idea that a rajas soul may strive hard to exercise its pauruṣa (power) to attain the next higher, sātwwika stage, by means of reciting the hymns or mantras just as a sātwwika soul rises to the highest stage of divinity by means of devoted prayers. Viśvāmitra's possession of hundred sons is also problematical. The fifty-first son is called Madhuchchandasa. The rest are unknown. Who they are and what they are, are not mentioned. This may also suggest that all of them may be interpreted as qualities. As soon as a divine man (Devarāta) joins him he casts aside all his auxilliary qualities and transposes them considering that they are befitting the Niṣāda characteristics, comprising the Pundras, the Pulindas, the Śabarasa, the Andhrasa, the Mutibasa etc., varieties that are by nature, the proper substratum of such qualities as greediness, disobedience, worldly attachment etc. But this is very hard

to be realised. Even if we take it for granted that a man may actually have one hundred sons, it will be clear to us that he will be ready to dissociate with unworthy sons, and the sons who care more for worldly possessions notwithstanding their learning and dignity will fall down degraded and degenerated and change to a life of lowest class in this very life or in a life to come.

The relative merits of things, a man may possess in this world are expounded in this section. The possessions like Annam, Vāsaḥ, Hiraṇyam, paśavaḥ, Jāyā, duhitā, and putraḥ are spoken of as prāṇaḥ, śaraṇam, rūpaḥ, vivāhaḥ, sakhā, kṛpanam and jyotiḥ respectively. All these are in ascending or descending order in accordance with points of view of their intrinsic or extrinsic values. Duhitā is said to be kṛpanam which many commentators and translators take to mean misery or sorrow. Our limited experiences may prove what we mean. But in reality our experience may be disproved. A woman is described in the following gathas as 'ēṣā ābhūtiḥ ēṣā vō janani punaḥ' which show her high position. The Vedas look very highly upon ladies. A duhitā is as essential a factor as a putraḥ for the existence and continuance of life and the world. Therefore the Vedas can never be partial to putraḥ alone and ridicule the duhitṛ saying that she is misery incarnate. The parents without courage, endurance and wisdom may attach themselves closely to their daughters and be disappointed of their ambitions, and consequently they may inflict misery on themselves. In the eye of the Veda or the Almighty both the son and the daughter are equal. Of course there may be some difference between them. But the disparity should not be too extensive. When the wife is taken as friend by the husband, what should the position of his issue through her be? A female child is Kṛpanam and a male child is jyotiḥ. In the group of things characterised here the latter ones are associated always with all the previous ones together with their merits. For example vāsaḥ indicates not only itself but annam too. Jāyā may be considered independently and also being associated with annam, prāṇaḥ; vāsaḥ, śaraṇam; hiraṇyam, rūpaḥ; and paśavaḥ, vivāhaḥ. While all possessions are extolled, there

can be no reason why a duhitᅇ who is enumerated as the sixth of the possessions, should be devoid of her merits. So it is clear that the word should not be interpreted in a sense common to imperfect human beings and scholars. I cannot say that the great Sāyaᅇāchārya too was not in favour of duhitᅇ and looked down upon her. As the term duhitᅇ precedes Jyotiᅇ it must be associated with jyotiᅇ which includes also kᅇpaᅇa. Etymologically speaking 'kᅇpaᅇa' is derived from the root kᅇp Kᅇpāyām. The root may take kᅇt affix to form kᅇpaᅇa or it may be explained as kᅇpām anithī meaning a thing which draws out mercy or any similar feeling or emotion. According to Bhavabhūti 'ēko rasaᅇ karuᅇa ēva' manifests different sentiments like śᅇᅇgāra, vīra etc. Kᅇpā may be taken here, to represent some of the rasas, and kᅇpaᅇa as rasavat. Consequently kᅇpaᅇa may without any complication mean rasavat or rasapᅇa, pleasurable or delightful, an adjective appropriate with 'duhitᅇ = (rasam) dogdhi iti.'

The comprehensive meaning of the word Brāhmaᅇa may also be attempted likewise. Many are under the impression that the Vedas do make mention of the people of the four classes, in a sense in which the people at present are led to believe. It must be admitted that the universal sacred text books such as the Vedas never intend saying that x, y or z belong to particular classes. In the Vedas, all the people of several classes and communities are impartially treated. It is clearly pointed out how the diversified universal soul could choose a particular variety in consistency with its desire and enjoy learning, physical power, trade, servitude and animal passion either severally or jointly. So the five words like Brāhmaᅇa, Kᅇatriya etc. may primarily denote the chief characteristics of all the beings both animate and inanimate (for we find them in trees, plants, planets, deities etc.) and secondarily the ways and functions of all mortals.

Creatures are wont to embrace all the five characteristics in the main, and specialise any one of them in the variegated process of involution. Therefore, for the practical purpose of civilisation (vyavahāranīti) the specialised characteristics are considered to be determinating factors. Notwithstanding this classification it should be remembered that each in its turn is not wholly free from other characteristics. The mouth, the

arms, the thighs, the feet and outskirts represent the five-fold functions of souls. All are indispensable to the conditioned souls. That the divine service of making the victim lifeless has been undertaken by a great sage and it is spoken by another as a function befitting a person of the characteristics of servitude is clearly expressed in this episode. The refutation of the young sage does not attempt to accuse the great sage, but it suggests that such functions are considered as divine, and from that divine service no one should retire or violate. (Shaudrāt nyāyāt nāpāgāḥ.) This clearly supports that the five-fold characteristics stated above are common to all five-fold specialised classes. The story of the religious hunter narrated in the Bhārata evidently endorses this view-point.

In the episode it is mentioned that Rohita is instructed by Indra in the guise of a Brāhmaṇa. The word Brāhmaṇa means a Śrotriya according to the statement made by R. who has been prompted by the Almighty as it were. (R=Rohita)

In the statement 'putram brāhmaṇa icchadhvam,' brāhmaṇa has been rightly interpreted as vipra kṣatriyādayāḥ so much so the word brahma applies to all persons on earth.

In regard to the fifth class of people, Aitareya Brāhmaṇa enumerates certain tribes possessing such characteristics as pun-draḥ, Pulindaḥ, Andhraḥ, Mūtibāḥ etc. that may form the species of the whole niṣāda characteristics a section of those pancajanāḥ mentioned in the Veda. The formation of these tribes has been due to certain vices on the part of the individuals. The high-souled man may fall down at any moment, in this very life or in a life to come, and be born as any low-souled man in proportion to his commissions and in consistency with his choice, conscious or unconscious, active or passive and ignorant or illusory.

The present births of people in any class are liable to change. People of high births in the scale may not be proud of their superiority. A lawful inferior is thousand times better than a lawless superior. If both the superior and the inferior act lawlessly they go down deeper and deeper into darker infernal regions. A niṣāda is as good as a śrotriya and the like. We may conclude that the word Brāhmaṇa is a common word comprising all human creatures on earth, especially all those that follow the Vedas or the Brāhmaṇācāra.

The Vedas are not partial to any one of the Aśramas. The apparent superiority of other Aśramas to Gārhastya has been questioned in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇam, which reflects on the glory of Gārhastya. (Kinnu malam, kimajinam, kimu smaśruṇi, kim tapaḥ, putram brāhmaṇa icchadhvam sa vai loko'vadāvaḥ).

In conformity with this observation Āpastamba too concludes judiciously saying 'natajjyaiṣṭhyamāśramāṇām', meaning that the last āśrama can never claim superiority over the āśrama of a gṛhastha.

Thus we see how we can attempt to elicit beautiful and clear meaning from the texts and be enlightened. It is quite easy to say that such an interpretation is rather spasmodical. But a deep insight can never fail to grasp the beauty and precision of such interpretation of the universal texts that hold good for all times and places. The authors of rules of interpretation (paribhāṣā) do admit certain peculiarities of interpretation. With the help of their works and methods we will not go wrong in our endeavour to take things from the point of view of the modern revealed scientific methods and principles. This present episode is a treasure of gems of both spiritual and material lessons.

ITS TEACHINGS

(i) *The Glory of Begetting Issues*

The first and the foremost thing that rises before our minds is the glory of begetting issues. The Creator Himself wants to become many and He has so arranged that He could accomplish His desire by constructing a most wonderful and miraculous mechanism introduced in the body of all living beings.

A perusal of the text brings before us three sets of different families in different circumstances:—(a) A parent is without issues and anxiously awaiting the birth of a son though it be for sacrificing him. (b) Another in the forest has been bestowed upon with three blissful sons of whom preferably the middle one—in harmony with the precepts of the Veda and the natural instinctive laws—is liable to be given up by the parent voluntarily for the sake of divinity and royalty. The son comes forward without any complaint on his part. (c) The third man possesses one hundred sons but in addition to these he is

inclined to take dispassionately one more as his own son giving him the status of the eldest son and disinheriting his one hundred sons. A close and keen observation of the circumstances of these three sets of families may drive home to the mind of men that the invaluable treasure that one can have in this life is an issue, a son, a glorious son of outstanding attainments. The first man aspires to procure a son even though he is to perish soon after his birth. The second family is proud of three blissful sons and at the same time is ready to part, without any hesitation, with one of them. The third man welcomes heartily a god-given man of supernatural power, neglecting the prosperity of his numerous sons.

(ii) *The Spirit of Self-sacrifice*

Viewing the same from different angles of vision, we see how the first man grows passionate about his son and cherishes side by side the thought of sacrificing him to the deity through the blessings of whom he begets him. His failure to keep up his promise results in his illness as a punishment for not having kept his word. The second man disposes of his son first and next he tries to fulfil the cause of sacrifice by offering his services to see that his son is finally given away to the deities in a sacrifice. His readiness of purpose and his deep insight together with the blissful character of his son elevate the son to the highest stage of divinity itself. The third man exchanges as it were a more glorious man with his fifty disobedient sons whom he sacrifices (ñecks out from his family) and who are terribly punished for having not realised the value of self-sacrifice. All these events are commendable and nothing is to be contemptuously looked down upon. The proper ways of gaining and losing sons are painted very well to teach the people the glory of self-sacrifice.

(iii) *The Object of Self-sacrifice*

Another lesson we imbibe from this is that a sacrifice can be performed with some definite object in view. The injunction 'jyotistomena svargakāmo yajeta' may mean that jyotistoma should be performed by an authorised person desirous of svarga i. e., happiness, bliss or any desired object. It also suggests

that it can be performed, without any desire, for the good and prosperity of the public at large or for pleasing the self itself. The institution of sacrifice reveals the truth that the Vedas are impregnated with optimism.

It has been inculcated that self-sacrifice is the underlying principle of all sacrifices. It is well founded on the theory of causation. Unless a person sacrifices himself in advance as a sort of investment or determines to do he cannot attain the object here and hereafter. It is the surest of remedies for one's misery or suffering which is due to his own action and which disappears the moment one undertakes to perform "sacrifices through which the presiding deities of all kinds of activities of man are pleased and set the conditions of the sacrificer at right. It is the same as saying that the sacrificer becomes pure and free from calamities or misery or obstructions. If we do any harm to an individual intentionally or unintentionally our duty shall be to entreat him if we wish to be unstained from sin or impurity. Suppose the same crime was committed in our previous life and we passed away without remedying it. Now in this present life we are going to appease the injured souls with our offerings to the deities through whom the inflicted souls are pleased and get redressed our grievances which proceeded from our ignominious action of previous life.

A hariścandra man who is destined to be issueless or whose procreative faculty has been hindered by some cause could procure a son on condition that he should, according to this episode, offer him to the deity in a sacrifice. That is, he should sacrifice himself; Ātmayajña or Ātmārpaṇa is the highest thing that a man could undertake to attain either spiritual perfection or material objects or both. To get life, life is to be given. But it is not that the deities are fond of human flesh and blood. What all the deities demand from a mortal life is purity or sincerity of thought, speech and deed. Had the hariścandra man *stuck* to his promise, surely the divinity would have been pleased to restore his son back to life. As he failed to do so he not only suffered from serious illness which can also be proved by religion of psychology and of physiology, but he suffered separation from his son which in essence

amounts to the loss of his son. It is the law of nature, of cause and effect. Whether he be a student, merchant or any other man he has to forego his comforts (living) in order that he should earn his livelihood. In other words it means labour. It is a kind of sacrificing one's self. The spirit of self-sacrifice evinced forth by an ajigartha sage as well as a śunashēpa young soul is exemplary. An account of dadhici sage is also as good as this. Men of self-sacrificing nature are ready to help others as well as themselves. It is with mutual concord or concomittance between persons of various dispositions, the world can roll on smoothly for ever. If a man is wanting in something, there are others to comply with his desire. In fact the Bountiful Nature Herself may provide him with the necessaries.

(iv) *Substitution*

There are certain subtle problems of life when a person cannot sacrifice himself. Under such circumstances what one should do has been clearly set forth in this episode. The filial love towards his father on one side and love of his own life on the other, trouble Rohitaśwa very much. He is not wrong in cherishing simultaneously such opposite propositions, in his mind. Being pleased with sincerity of this individual soul, the great Almighty characterised as Indra, as it is in this instance, so arranges that the despondent man could solve the problem with the help of a sage and get over the conflict. The keynote of this is that a sacrifice may be performed by substituting another for one thing. This shall be disclosed to any man at any time under similar circumstances. The question of substitution is of paramount importance. Upon this fundamental principle the whole of economics, politics, sciences and arts are founded. Employing representatives, agents and the like is revealed first in the Vedas.

(*To be continued*)

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 REVIEW

(1) *Mṛcchakaṭika* of Śūdraka. Edited with a complete Translation into English, Introduction, Notes and Appendices. By R. D. Karmarkar, Principal and Professor of Sanskrit, Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona. First Ed. Poona, 1937, Pp. I-XXXIII, 1-518. Demy price, 3/8/-.

(2) *Mālatīmādhava* of Bhavabhūti. Edited with a complete Translation into English, Notes and Appendices. By D. R. Karmarkar, Principal and Professor, Sir Parashurambhau College, Poona. 1935. Demy. price Rs. 3/-.

Principal Karmarkar's name is a house-hold word in the Student Community. His editions of various *Nāṭakas*, *Mahākāvya*s, philosophical texts, Vedic Selections, *Kāvya*prakāśa, etc. have immensely benefitted the student and teacher alike. His edition of *Mṛcchakaṭika*, therefore, is most welcome, for there was no other good edition printed before it and the Students found it very difficult to understand this drama which has

problems of its own. It is a drama of the people and not of royalty as other Sanskrit dramas are. Hence, many strange idioms and words describing the ordinary life of a gambler, a courtesan, etc., are a peculiarity of this drama. Again, the different kinds of *prākṛta* enhance the difficulty of a commentator. But Principal Karmarkar has tackled his task most successfully. In his learned introduction he deals with the authorship, date, etc., of the *Mṛcchakaṭika* briefly. He has promised to give us the detailed arguments in favour of his thesis that *Mṛcchakaṭika* is a work of Daṇḍin. This theory was started by the late Prof. Pischel and upheld by the late Prof. Macdonell. But it found very strong opposition, as it was mainly based on two points that (a) the verse *स्मिन्तीव तमोऽगानि*, etc. is found in *Mṛcchakaṭika* (I. 34) and *Kāvyaḍarśa* (II. 226) both. Starting with the assumption that Daṇḍin has given only his own verses as illustrations in his *Kāvyaḍarśa*, *Mṛcchakaṭika* was assigned to him; and (b) the State of society depicted in *Mṛcchakaṭika* is similar to that depicted in *Kāvyaḍarśa*. Prof. Karmarkar advances 7 points in favour of his contention. But, unless we have an opportunity of examining the detailed exposition we cannot correctly judge the position. The late MM. Haraprasād Śāstri, Jibanand Vidyasāgara, Prof. Konow, Keith, etc. have entered the arena of date, etc. and we are waiting for Prof. Karmarkar's paper in the Trivandrum Oriental Conference with great eagerness. The introduction further discusses the merits of the play and gives its critical appreciation and time-analysis, describes the state of society and examines the principal characters.

The Sanskrit text is accompanied by English translation on each page and critical notes are given after the text. The notes are thorough, elucidating all difficult points, giving parallel expressions and verses from classical Sanskrit works, allusions, etc. And they do not make a dry reading. For instance, the personal experience given by Prof. Karmarkar (p. 385) very well illustrates the irresistible craving of *Samvāhaka* for gambling. The five appendices at the end give definitions of dramatic terms, a collection of sayings in *Mṛcchakaṭika*, a note on metre, a *pratika* index of verses and a list of difficult words.

The edition of *Mālatimādhava* follows the same lines as adopted in the *Mṛcchakaṭika*. It shows the same amount of scholarship, care and solicitude for students' good as other works of Prof. Karmarkar.

The printing and get-up of both the works leave nothing to be desired and we heartily welcome these excellent editions by Principal Karmarkar.

The Editor.

प्रागुद्धं च व्यक्तेरवस्थितं रूपं प्रदीपघटसंयोगेन व्यज्यते । तथा च शब्दोऽप्य-
वस्थितो भेरीदण्डसंयोगेन व्यज्यते, दारुपरशुसंयोगेन वा । तस्मात्संयोग-
व्यङ्ग्यत्वाश्रित्यः शब्द इति । अयमहेतुः कालात्ययापदेशात् । व्यञ्जकस्य संयोगस्य
कालं न व्यङ्ग्यस्य रूपस्य व्यक्तिरत्येति । सति प्रदीपघटसंयोगे रूपस्य ग्रहणं
भवति, न निवृत्ते संयोगे रूपं गृह्यते । निवृत्ते दारुपरशुसंयोगे दूरस्थेन शब्दः
श्रूयते विभागकाले । सेयं शब्दस्य व्यक्तिः संयोगकालमत्येतीति न संयोग-

काले संयोगो नास्तीति भवत्ययं कालात्ययापदिष्ट इति भाष्यवार्तिकयोः स्पष्टम् ।
नवीनमतेन तु—यत्र प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमविरोधः ‘ अनुणोऽद्भिर्द्रव्यत्वादिति ’ ‘ अश्रा-
वणः शब्दो गुणत्वादिति ’ ‘ शुचि नरशिरःकपालं प्राण्यत्वादिति ’ च सर्वः प्रमा-
णतो विपरोतनिर्णयेन सन्देहविशिष्टं कालमतिपततीति सोऽयं कालात्ययेनापदिश्य-
मानः कालातीत इति—तात्पर्यं स्पष्टम् ।

अनयोमतयोरसामञ्जस्यं विभाव्य तात्पर्यकारो हठादिव भाष्यपङ्क्तिमन्यथा
व्याख्यातवान् । तद्यथा-भाष्यकारः सूत्रं स्वपरमतसंश्लिष्टं व्याचष्टे । (१) काला-
त्ययेन संशयकालात्ययेन युक्तो यस्यार्थैकदेशः । धर्मविशिष्टो हि धर्मो हेतोरपदिश्य-
मानस्यार्थः । स ह्यर्थ्यते हेतुना । तस्यैकदेशः साध्यधर्मः । स हि धर्मिणि बलवता
प्रमाणेन तद्विपरीतधमनिर्णयं कुर्वतः संशयकालमतिपातितः । स तादृशो हेतुः
कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीत इति स्वमतेनार्थः । अत्र च पूर्वमेवोदाहृतमिति
पौनस्वस्याश्लोदाहृतम् । (२) परमते तु कालात्ययेन युक्तो यस्य हेतोरनुरूप एक-
देशो हेतुविशेषणं स कालात्ययापदिष्ट इति योजना । परमतेनैव निदर्शनमाह
निदर्शनमिति ।

अत्रास्य स्वपरमतविभागस्य मूलं सृज्यम् । उक्तयोश्च मतयोः कतरद् भाष्य-
पङ्क्त्या स्पष्टं सूचितं कतरच्च हठादिव तन्नारोपितम्—स्वमतेनोदाहरणमनुपन्यस्य
परमतेनैवोदाहरणमुपन्यस्तवान् भाष्यकार इति भाष्यकाररीत्यनुकूलं न वेत्यत्र च-
सुधिय एव प्रमाणम् । तात्पर्यमतेनार्थशब्दः पक्षपरः भाष्यमतेन तु हेतुपर इति
द्विवेकः । हेतुवद् यद् आभासते तदेव हेत्वाभासनामार्हति । नवीनाभिमते विरुद्धे
हेतौ हेतोरभासोऽपि नास्ति । भाष्याभिमते त्वांशिव्येवानुपपत्तिरिति भवत्येवाभासो
हेतोः ।

; भाष्योक्तलक्षणे कैश्चिदाक्षिसम्—असिद्धविशेषणतयाऽयं हेत्वाभासोऽसिद्ध एव
स्यान्न हेत्वाभासान्तरमिति । परमेतैराक्षेप्तुभिरिदं विस्मृतं यद् भाष्यकारादिभिः
प्राचीनैर्भागासिद्धो हेत्वाभासत्वेन नोज्ञावितः । अथ च भागासिद्धस्यैव भाष्योक्त-
कालातीतेऽन्तर्भावसम्भवः ।

निर्मिता भवति । कस्मात्? कारणाभावाद्धि कार्याभाव इति । एवमुदाहरण-
साधर्म्यस्याभावादसाधनमयं हेतुर्हेत्वाभास इति ।

अवयवविपर्यासवचनं न सूत्रार्थः । कस्मान्? यस्य येनार्थसम्बन्धो दूरस्थ-
स्यापि तस्य सः । अर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानामानन्तर्यमकारणम् ॥ इत्येतद्वचनाद्विपर्या-
सेनोक्तो हेतुरुदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्तथा वैधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं हेतुलक्षणं न
जहाति । अजहद्वेतुलक्षणं न हेत्वाभासो भवतीति । ' अवयवविपर्यासवचनं-
प्राप्तकालम् ' (५, २, ११) इति निग्रहस्थानमुक्तं तदेवेदं पुनरुच्यते इति ।
अतस्तत् न सूत्रार्थः ॥ ९ ॥

(३) छललक्षणप्रकरणम् ॥

(भा०) अथ छलम् ।

वचनविधातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् ॥ १० ॥

१ अत्र बौद्धनैयायिकेन सूत्रमन्यथा व्याख्याय दूषितम् । तद्यथा-प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं
हि हेतोः ' कालः ' । तमतीत्य हेतुः पश्चादपदिश्यमानः कालातीतो भवति । यथा
अनित्यः शब्दो घटादिवदित्युक्ते— ' कस्मात् ' इत्युक्तो ब्रूते—' कृतकत्वात् ' इति ।
अयमेव हेतुः ' कालातीत ' इति ।

एवं सूत्रार्थमुपवर्ण्य तत्राक्षेपः कृतः । कस्मादिति यः प्रश्नः स किं निरा-
काङ्क्षे वादिन्युद्धवत्युत साकङ्क्षे यदि निराकाङ्क्षे—'न्यूनम् ' एवास्य निग्रहस्थानम्
न हेत्वाभासः, हेतोः सर्वथाऽप्रयोगात् । प्रयुक्तो हि हेतुर्हेत्वाभासः स्यान्ना-
प्रयुक्तः । अथ साकाङ्क्षे वादिनि प्रतिवादिनः प्रश्नः, तदा पश्चादपि प्रयुक्तोऽसौ
हेतुरेव । न ह्यसौ तदा न साध्याविनाभूतोऽपक्षधर्मो वा । तत्रात्र कालातीतो नाम
हेत्वाभासोऽस्ति ।

तदेतद् दूषणमेतद्व्याख्यानानभ्युपगमेन परिहरति—अवचवेति ।

२ तदेवेदमिति । यद्युक्तार्थमेव सूत्रं स्यात्तदा यदेवाप्राप्तकालनिग्रहस्थानतयो-
क्तं तदेव कालातीताभिधहेत्वाभासत्वेनोक्तं स्यात्तत्र पुनरुक्तिरेव स्यादित्यर्थः ।

३ अथ छलमिति । साधनवादी प्रमादी प्रतिवादी वा सदुत्तरसमाधानयोरस्फूर्ती
जिगीषुस्तदाभासमपि ब्रूयादिति तदाभासव्युत्पादनावसरः । तत्रापि जातेः स्वपक्ष-
व्याघातापादकत्वेन जघन्यत्वात्, छलस्य च तास्पर्यतो दृष्टत्वेऽपि वचनतोऽदुष्टत्वात्,
अस्फूर्तिदशायामपि तदेव प्रथमं प्रयोक्तव्यम् । तस्याप्यस्फूर्ती जातिरिति जातेः
पूर्वं छलोद्देशः ।

४ अर्थविकल्पेति । यथा वक्तुरभिमतस्ततो विरुद्धः 'अर्थः'—तस्य 'विकल्पः'
कल्पना—सैव ' उपपत्तिः ' तयैत्यर्थः ।

न सामान्यलक्षणे छलं शक्यमुदाहर्तुम् । विभागे तूदाहरणानि ॥ १० ॥
विभागश्च—

तत्रिविधम्—वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं चेति ॥११॥

तेषाम्—

अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् ॥१२॥

नवकम्बलोऽयं माणवक इति प्रयोगः । अत्र नवः कम्बलोऽस्येति वक्तु-
रभिप्रायः । विग्रहे तु विशेषो, न समासे । तत्रायं छलवादी वक्तुरभिप्राया-
विवक्षितमन्यमर्थं नव कम्बला अस्येति तावदभिहितं भवतेति कल्पयति,
कल्पयित्वा चासम्भवेन प्रतिषेधति—एकोऽस्य कम्बलः कुतो नव कम्बला इति ।
तदिदं सामान्यशब्दे वाचि छलं वाक्छलमिति ।

अस्य प्रत्यवस्थानम्—सामान्यशब्दस्थानेकार्थत्वेऽन्यतराभिधानकल्प-
नायां विशेषवचनम् । नवकम्बल इत्यनेकार्थाभिधानम्—नवः कम्बलोऽस्येति
नव कम्बला अस्येति । एतस्मिन्प्रयुक्ते येयं कल्पना नव कम्बला अस्येत्येतद्भव-
ताऽभिहितं तच्च न सम्भवतीति । एतस्यामन्यतराभिधानकल्पनायां विशेषो
वक्तव्यः—यस्माद्विशेषो विज्ञायतेऽयमर्थोऽनेनाभिहित इति । स च विशेषो
नास्ति । तस्मान्मिथ्याभियोगमात्रमेतदिति ।

प्रसिद्धश्च लोके शब्दार्थसम्बन्धोऽभिधानाभिधेयनियमनियोगः । अस्या-
भिधानस्यायमर्थोऽभिधेय इति समानः सामान्यशब्दस्य, विशेषो विशिष्ट-
शब्दस्य । प्रयुक्तपूर्वाश्रमे शब्दा अर्थे प्रयुज्यन्ते नाप्रयुक्तपूर्वाः । प्रयोगश्चार्थ-
संप्रत्ययार्थः । अर्थप्रत्ययाश्च व्यवहार इति । तत्रैवमर्थगत्यर्थे शब्दप्रयोगे सामर्थ्या-
त्सामान्यशब्दस्य प्रयोगनियमः । अजां ग्रामं नय सर्पिणाहर ब्राह्मणं भोजयेति

१ यस्मादिति—वचनादिति शेषः ।

२ अभिधानेति । अभिधानाभिधेययोर् 'नियमः'—अयमवार्थोऽस्य शब्दस्य,
अयं शब्दो वाचकोऽस्यैवार्थस्येति—तत्र यः पुरुषस्य 'नियोगः' अस्मादयमेव बोद्धव्य
इत्याकारः ।

३ समान इति । सामान्यशब्दस्य समानः विशेषशब्दस्य च विशेषो नियोग
इति योजना ।

४ अर्थगत्यर्थ इति । अर्थावगमार्थे—इति यावत् ।

सामान्यशब्दाः सन्तोऽर्थावयवेषु प्रयुज्यन्ते । सामर्थ्याद्यत्रार्थक्रियादेशना सम्भवति तत्र प्रवर्तन्ते । नार्थसामान्ये क्रियादेशना सम्भवेत् । एवमयं सामान्यशब्दो नवकम्बल इति योऽर्थः सम्भवति नवः कम्बलोऽस्येति तत्र प्रवर्तते । यस्तु न सम्भवति नव कम्बला अस्येति तत्र न प्रवर्तते । सोऽयमनुपपद्यमानार्थकल्पनया परवाक्योपालम्भस्ते नै कल्पत इति ॥ १२ ॥

सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना

सामान्यच्छलम् ॥ १३ ॥

अहो खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणो विद्याचरणसम्पन्न इत्युक्ते कश्चिदाह सम्भवति ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसम्पदिति । अस्य वचनस्य विघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्याऽसम्भूतार्थकल्पनया क्रियते—यदि ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसम्पत्सम्भवति त्रात्येऽपि सम्भवेत्, त्रात्योऽपि ब्राह्मणः, सोऽप्यस्तु विद्याचरणसम्पन्न इति ।

यद्विवाक्षितमर्थमाप्नोति चात्येति च तदतिसामान्यम् । यथा ब्राह्मणत्वं विद्याचरणसम्पदं क्वचिदाप्नोति क्वचिदत्येति । सामान्यनिमित्तं छलं सामान्यच्छलमिति ।

अस्य च प्रत्यवस्थानम्—अविवाक्षितहेतुकस्य विषयानुवादः, प्रशंसार्थत्वाद् वाक्यस्य । तदत्रासम्भूतार्थकल्पनानुपपत्तिः । यथा सम्भवन्त्यस्मिन्क्षेत्रे शालय इति—अनिराकृतमविवक्षितं च बीजजन्म—प्रवृत्तिविषयस्तु क्षेत्रं प्रशस्यते । सोऽर्थं क्षेत्रानुवादो—नास्मिन् शालयो विधीयन्त इति । बीजात्तु शालिनिर्वृत्तिः सती न विवाक्षिता । एवं सम्भवति ब्राह्मणे विद्याचरणसम्पदिति सम्पद्विषयो ब्राह्मणत्वम्, न सम्पद्धेतुः । न चात्र हेतुर्विवाक्षितः ।

१ अर्थावयवेष्विति—अर्थविशेषेष्वित्यर्थः । विशेषो हि सामान्यस्यावयवो भवति ।

२ न कल्पत इति । न सङ्केतकरणावस्थायां वृद्धव्यवहारे वा कश्चिच्छब्दः कञ्चिदर्थं शृङ्गग्राहितकतया बोधयति । अपि तु सामान्यद्वारेणार्थप्रकरणादिसहकारी विशेषे वर्तते । तस्मात्त्रैष प्रतिपादयितुरपराधो यदविशेषशब्दैर्विशेषान्तरं प्रतिपादयति । किन्तु सङ्केतस्यैवायमपराधो यो विशेषमपहाय सामान्ये वर्तते । तस्माद्यथासङ्केतं बोधयन्नापराध्यः प्रयोक्तेति ।

३ विषयानुवाद इति । सम्पद्विषयस्य ब्राह्मणत्वस्यानुवाद इत्यर्थः ।

४ नास्मिन्निति । एतादृशं प्रशस्तं क्षेत्रं यदत्र बीजवपनमपि विना शालयो रोहन्त्येवेत्यर्थः ।

विषयानुवादस्त्वयं प्रशंसार्थत्वाद् वाक्यस्थः—सति ब्राह्मणत्वे सम्पद्धेतुः समर्थ इति । विषयं च प्रशंसता वाक्येन यथा हेतुतः फलनिर्वृत्तिर्न प्रत्याख्यायते । तदेवं सति वचनविघातोऽसम्भूतार्थकल्पनया नोपपद्यत इति ॥१३॥

‘ धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशेऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् ॥ १४ ॥ ’

‘ अभिधानस्य धर्मो यथार्थप्रयोगः । धर्मविकल्पोऽन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगः । तस्य निर्देशे धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे । यथा मञ्ज्राः क्रोशन्तीति—अर्थसद्भावेन प्रतिषेधः मञ्ज्रस्थाः पुरुषाः क्रोशन्ति न तु मञ्ज्राः क्रोशन्ति ।

“ का पुनरत्रार्थविकल्पोपपत्तिः ? ”

अन्यथा प्रयुक्तस्यान्यथाऽर्थकल्पनम् । भक्त्या प्रयोगे प्राधान्येन कल्पनमुपचारविषयं छलमुपचारच्छलम् । उपचारो नीतार्थः सहचरणादिनिमित्तेन, अतद्भावे तद्वदभिधानमुपचार इति ।

१ धर्मेत्यादि सूत्रम् । वादी स्वोक्ता लक्ष्येऽर्थे पदं प्रयुक्ते प्रतिवादी तत्पदस्य वाच्यार्थतात्पर्येण लक्ष्यं प्रतिषेधति । तदेतदुपचारच्छलमिति भाष्यानुसारी सूत्रार्थः । ‘ न तदर्थान्तरभावादिति ’ षोडशसूत्रवार्तिके वाक्छलोपचारच्छलयोर्भेदवर्णने—एकत्र (वाक्छले) धर्मः प्रतिषिध्यते, एकत्र (उपचारच्छले) धर्मी ’ इत्युक्तम् । तदनेनास्य सूत्रस्याक्षरानुसार्यन्य एवार्थः प्रतिभाति । ‘ धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे ’ यदा वादी धर्मपरं वचनं प्रयुङ्क्ते—‘ अर्थसद्भावनिषेधः ’ प्रतिवादी तु अर्थस्यैव धर्मिणः, न धर्मस्य, सद्भावं निषेधति—तदा ‘ उपचारच्छलम् ’ इति ।

२ अभिधानस्येति । ‘ अभिधानस्य ’ शब्दस्य ‘ धर्मः ’ प्रयोगः । तस्य ‘ विकल्पः ’ द्वैविध्यम् । तस्य द्विविधः प्रयोगः, प्रधानो भाक्तश्च । तत्रापि प्रधानं एव ‘ यथार्थ ’ औत्सर्गिक इति भावः । तस्य तु क्वचिदपवादाद् भाक्तप्रयोगोऽप्याश्रियते ।

३ तस्येति । ‘ तस्य ’ धर्मविकल्पस्य ‘ निर्देशे ’ धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे इति सूत्रसमामविग्रहः । किन्तु वाक्ये यतोऽर्थस्य निर्देशो न भवत्यतोऽत्रारुचिस्तात्पर्यकारस्य यस्य मतेन—‘ धर्मविकल्पेन निर्देशो ’ इत्येव विग्रहः । तत्र च ‘ निर्देशे ’ इत्यस्य ‘ वाक्ये ’ इत्यर्थः । निर्दिश्यतेऽनेनेति व्युत्पत्त्या ।

४ का पुनरिति । अर्थविकल्पोपपत्तेः सर्वत्र छलेऽपवावश्यकत्वम् । यथोक्तं छलसामान्यलक्षणे दशमे सूत्रे ।

५ ननु यद्यन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगो हेतुः सर्वं सर्वत्र प्रयुज्येतेत्यत आह नीतार्थः इति प्रापितार्थः इति यावत् । अन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र प्रयोगः सम्बन्धादेव भवतीति नातिप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः ।

अत्र समाधिः—प्रसिद्धे प्रयोगे वक्तुर्यथाभिप्रायं शब्दार्थयोरभ्यनुज्ञा प्रतिषेधो वा, न छन्दतः । प्रधानभूतस्य शब्दस्य भाक्तस्य च गुणभूतस्य प्रयोग उभयोर्लोकसिद्धः । सिद्धे प्रयोगे यथा वक्तुरभिप्रायस्तथा शब्दार्थावनुज्ञेयौ प्रतिषेधौ वा, न छन्दतः । यदि वक्ता प्रधानशब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते यथाभूतस्याभ्यनुज्ञा प्रतिषेधो वा, न छन्दतः । अथ गुणभूतं तदा गुणभूतस्य । यत्र तु वक्ता गुणभूतं शब्दं प्रयुङ्क्ते प्रधानभूतमभिप्रेत्य परः प्रतिषेधति, स्वमर्नाषया प्रतिषेधोऽसौ भवति न परोपालम्भ इति ॥ १४ ॥

वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात्” ॥ १५ ॥

“न वाक्छलादुपचारच्छलं भिद्यते, तस्याप्यर्थान्तरकल्पनाया अविशेषात् । इहापि स्थान्यर्थो गुणशब्दः, प्रधानशब्दः स्थानार्थ इति, कल्पयित्वा प्रतिषिध्यत इति ” ॥ १५ ॥

न, तदर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ १६ ॥

न वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तस्यार्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधस्यार्थान्तरभावात् । कुतः ? अर्थान्तरकल्पनातः । अन्या ह्यर्थान्तरकल्पना अन्योऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधः इति ॥ १६ ॥

१ अत्र समाधिरिति—प्रतिविधानमुपचारच्छलस्येति शेषः ।

२ छन्दतः इत्यस्य स्थाने ‘ छलतः ’ पाठः इति केचित् । ‘ छन्दतः ’ स्वेच्छयेत्यर्थः । छन्दनेति तात्पर्यकृतः ।

३ वाक्छलमिति सूत्रम् । परीक्षापर्वणः सन्निधानात् तदर्थं लक्षणपर्वण्यपि सूत्रकारश्छललक्षणं परीक्षितुमुपक्रमते ।

४ इहापीति । यथा वाक्छले नवीनार्थो नवशब्दः सङ्ख्याभेदे विकल्पितस्तथोपचारच्छलेऽपि मञ्जस्थपुरुषार्थो मञ्जशब्दो मञ्जार्थ एव कल्पित इति साम्यम् ।

५ अन्येति । एकत्र—उपचारच्छले—वस्तुसद्भावः प्रतिषिध्यते, अन्यत्र—वाक्छले—वस्त्वभ्यनुज्ञाय कम्बलयोगमप्यभ्युपगम्य कम्बलस्थानेकतारूपो धर्मः प्रतिषिध्यते । एकत्र धर्मः प्रतिषिध्यतेऽन्यत्र धर्मो । सोऽयमतिमहान् विशेष इति वार्तिकमतेन । भाष्यमतेन तु—उपचारच्छले भाक्तमर्थं विहाय प्रधानस्यार्थस्य कल्पना, वाक्छले तु नवसंख्यास्वरूपस्यार्थस्य सर्वथा प्रतिषेध एवेति विशेषः ।

अत्र तात्पर्यम्—मञ्जाः क्रोशन्तीत्यत्र क्रोशनं विधीयते, मञ्जा इति त्वनूद्यते । अत एव गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पनेति मञ्जा इत्येतदप्रधानमनूद्यतया भाक्तम्, न तु

अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः ॥ १७ ॥

छलस्य द्वित्वमभ्यनुज्ञाय त्रित्वं प्रतिषिध्यते, किञ्चित्साधर्म्यात् । यथा चायं हेतुश्चित्त्वं प्रतिषेधति तथा द्वित्वमप्यभ्यनुज्ञातं प्रतिषेधति । विद्यते हि किञ्चित्साधर्म्यं द्वयोरपीति । अथ द्वित्वं किञ्चित्साधर्म्यान्न निवर्तते त्रित्वमपि न निवर्त्यति ॥ १७ ॥

(४) पुरुषाशक्तिलिङ्गदोषसामान्यलक्षणप्रकरणम् ।

अत ऊर्ध्वम्—

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः ॥ १८ ॥

प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसङ्गो जायते स जातिः । स च प्रसङ्गः साधर्म्य-
वैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानमुपालम्भः प्रतिषेध इति । ' उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्साध्य-
साधनं हेतु'रित्यस्योदाहरणसाधर्म्येण प्रत्यवस्थानम् । प्रत्यनीकभावाज्जायमानोऽर्थो जातिरिति ॥ १८ ॥

क्रोधानमेव वस्तु प्रतिषिध्यते ' नैव मञ्जाः क्रोशन्तीति ' छलवाक्येन । ' नवकम्बलो देवदत्त ' इति वाक्ये तु देवदत्तमनूद्य नवत्वविशिष्टः कम्बलो विधीयते । तत्र न विधेयस्य वस्तुतः कम्बलस्य मञ्जावः प्रतिषिध्यते, किन्तु तदेकदेशस्यानेकतायाः इति महान् भेद इति ।

१ प्रतिषिध्यत इति—पञ्चदशसूत्रे शङ्केनेत्यर्थः ।

२ साधर्म्येत्यादि सूत्रम् । व्याप्तिनिरपेक्षयत्किञ्चित्पदार्थसाधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां ' प्रत्यवस्थानम् ' अनिष्टप्रदर्शनेन दूषणाभिधानं जातिः । यद्यपि साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं सर्वत्र जातौ नास्ति तथाऽपि व्याप्तिनिरपेक्षतया दूषणाभिधाने तात्पर्यमिति विवरणकाराः । अत एव—' असदुत्तरं जाति ' रित्येतावन्मात्रमेव जातिलक्षणं नव्यानामिति ।

३ न छले साधर्म्यवैधर्म्ये स्तः, न च सम्यग् दूषणं साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यमात्रात् , अपि तु प्रयोगादिति प्रयुक्ते हेतौ तदाभासे वा, यः प्रसङ्गो ' जायते स जातिरिति ' ।

जात्योत्तरणं न सर्वत्रानुचितमेव । जल्पे हि वेदप्रामाण्यविद्वांसं प्रति कुहेतुना यदा नास्तिकैरधिक्षिप्यते, सदुत्तरं चास्य सहसा न स्फुरति, तदेष्वराणां माभूद्देदा-
प्रामाण्यशङ्केति जात्याऽपि प्रत्यवस्थेयम् । क्वचित्पुनर्बुद्धिपूर्वमेव हेतौ हेत्वाभासे वा जातिप्रयोगः सम्भवति ।

४ उदाहरणेति । अत्रोदाहरणग्रहणमुपलक्षणार्थम् । अनुदाहरणसाधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामपि प्रत्यवस्थानं भवत्येव जातिरिति वार्तिकम् ।

५ जायमान इति । जायत इति जातिरिति पदव्युत्पत्तिं दर्शयति ॥

विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ १९ ॥

विपरीता वा कुत्सिता वा प्रतिपत्तिर्विप्रतिपत्तिः । विप्रतिपद्यमानः पराजयं प्राप्नोति । निग्रहस्थानं खलु पराजयप्राप्तिः । अप्रतिपत्तिस्त्वारम्भ-विषयेऽप्यप्रारम्भः । परेण स्थापितं वा न प्रतिषेधति प्रतिषेधं वा नोद्धरति ।

असमासाच्च नैते एव निग्रहस्थाने इति ॥ १९ ॥

“किं पुनर्दृष्टान्तवज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानयोरभेदोऽथ सिद्धान्तवद्भेद” इत्यत

आह—

तद्विकल्पाज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम् ॥ २० ॥

तस्य साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानस्य विकल्पाज्जातिबहुत्वम् । तयोश्च विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्त्योर्विकल्पान्निग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम् । नानाकल्पो विकल्पः । विविधो वा कल्पो विकल्पः । तत्राननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विश्लेषो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयो-ज्योपेक्षणमित्यप्रतिपत्तिर्निग्रहस्थानम् । शेषस्तु विप्रतिपत्तिरिति ।

इमे प्रमाणादयः पदार्था उद्दिष्टा लक्षिताः यथालक्षणं परीक्षिष्यन्त इति त्रिविधा चाऽस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिर्वेदितव्येति ॥ २० ॥

इति वात्स्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये प्रथमाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ।

समाप्तश्चाऽयं प्रथमोऽध्यायः ।

१ विप्रतिपत्तिरिति सूत्रम् । निग्रहस्थानेनैव समस्तकथामुद्गणमित्यस्य पश्चादभिधानम् । कथायां प्रवृत्तायां वादिप्रतिवादिनोरतत्त्वज्ञानज्ञापिका क्रिया निग्रहस्थानमिति सूत्रार्थः ।

२ विपरीतेति । सूक्ष्मविषया प्रतिपत्तिः ‘विपरीता’, स्थूलविषया च ‘कुत्सिता’ इति भेदेन निर्देशः ।

३ लाघवाय ‘विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्ती’ इत्येव वक्तव्ये कस्मादसमासकरणमित्यत आह असमासादिति । विप्रतिपत्त्यप्रतिपत्तिभ्यामन्यदपि हेतूदाहरणाधिकं ‘नाम जल्पे निग्रहस्थानमस्ति, तदपि ग्रन्थाधिक्येनावरुध्यत इति भावः ।

४ किं पुनरिति । जातिनिग्रहस्थानं च प्रत्येकमेकविधमेवोक्तं नानाविधमिति प्रश्नार्थः ॥

५ दृष्टान्तवदिति । यद्यपि साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां दृष्टान्तस्यापि भेदस्तथाऽपि लक्षणाभेदाभिप्रायेणाभेद उक्तः ।

६ तद्विकल्पादिति सूत्रम् । एतेन तयोर्विभागकथनं कालविलम्बः सूचितः । ‘नानाकल्प’ इति स्वरूपतः, ‘विविध’ इति प्रकारतः ।

७ परीक्षिष्यन्त इति द्वितीयादिष्वध्यायेष्विति यावत् ।

अथ द्वितीयाध्यायस्याद्यमाह्निकम् ।

(१) संशयपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

अत उर्ध्वं प्रमाणादिपरीक्षा । सा च ' विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामथा-
वधारणं निर्णय (१, १, ४१) इत्यग्रे विमर्श एव परीक्ष्यते—

“समानानेकधर्माध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न संशयः” ॥१॥

“समानस्य धर्मस्याध्यवसायात्संशयो न धर्ममात्रात् । “अथ वा
समानमनयोर्धर्ममुपलभ इति धर्मधर्मिग्रहणे संशयाभाव इति । अथ वा
समानधर्माध्यवसायादर्थान्तरभूते धर्मिणि संशयोऽनुपपन्नः । न ज्ञातु

१ समानेत्यादि संशयलक्षणोक्तकारणमात्रोपलक्षणम् । अत्र पञ्चसूत्रात्मकः
पूर्वपक्षः ।

२ समानस्येत्यादिभाष्यमसमञ्जसमिवाभाति । ' समानधर्माध्यवसायात्, न
संशय ' इति सूत्राक्षराणां स्पष्टोऽर्थः । अतः ' समानस्य धर्मस्याध्यवसायात् संशय'
इति भाष्योक्तिः सूत्रविरुद्धेवाभाति । केचिदिदमसामञ्जस्यमेवं परिहरन्ति—
' अज्ञायमानस्य धर्ममात्रस्य संशयं प्रत्यहेतुत्वान्तदवधारणे निश्चयस्य संशयविरोधित्व-
स्वाभाध्येन संशयहेतुत्वानुपपत्तिरिति भावः '—इति । किन्त्वयमेव भावो भाष्योक्त-
चतुर्थविकल्पस्य स्पष्टः । अतःस एव भावः प्रथमकल्पस्य न भवितुमर्हति ।

इदमसामञ्जस्यं वार्तिककारेण तथा च तात्पर्यकारेणापि लक्षितम् । अत एवे-
मां पूर्वपक्षोक्तिं वार्तिककारो यथाश्रुत्युत्थानत्वेन निर्दिष्टवान् । तात्पर्यकारश्च—'समान-
धर्मोपपत्त्यादेर्विशेषणमपश्यतः पूर्वपक्ष ' इत्युक्तवान् ।

अत्र सूत्रे त्रीणि वाक्यानि । (१) प्रथमं तावत्—' समानधर्माध्यव-
सायात् न संशय ' इति संशयलक्षणसूत्रस्थस्य (१।१।२३) ' समानधर्मोपपत्तेः
संशय ' इत्यस्य वाक्यस्य प्रतिषेधरूपम् । एतस्यैव वाक्यस्य तात्पर्यभाष्यकार
उक्तिचतुष्टयेनाह । संशयलक्षणसूत्रस्थमुपपत्तिपदमस्तिस्वपरं मन्वानस्यैवाद्योक्तिः—
धर्ममात्रस्य सत्त्वान्न संशयः किन्तु तस्याध्यवसायादिति । अथवेत्यादिद्वितीयोक्ति-
रूपपत्तिपदं ज्ञानसामान्यपरं मन्वानस्य । पुनरथवेत्यादितृतीयोक्तिरूपपत्तिपदं निश्चया-
त्मकज्ञानपरं मन्वानस्य । पुनरथवेत्यादिचतुर्थ्युक्तिस्तृतीयाया एव प्रकारान्तरेणोप-
वर्णनम् । (२) द्वितीयं सूत्रवाक्यम्—' अनेकधर्माध्यवसायात् संशय ' इति संशय-
लक्षणसूत्रस्थोपपत्तिपदप्रयोगमूलकम् । अत्रापि पूर्ववत्पूर्वपक्षोक्तिचतुष्टयस्य सम्भवः ।
(३) तृतीयं सूत्रवाक्यम्—' अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायात् संशय ' इति ।

३ अथ वा समानधर्माध्यवसायादिति । धर्मिणोरर्थान्तरभावाद्वा न संशयः ।
न ह्यन्यस्मिन्नुपलब्धेऽन्यत्र संशयः ।

रूपस्यार्थान्तरभूतस्याध्यवसायादर्थान्तरभूते स्पर्शे संशय इति । अथवा नाध्यवसायादर्थावधारणादनवधारणज्ञानं संशय उपपद्यते कार्यकारणयोः सारूप्याभावादिति ।

“एतेनानेकधर्माध्यवसायादिति व्याख्यातम् । अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाच्च संशयो न भवति । ततो ह्यन्यतरावधारणमेवेति” ॥ १ ॥

“ विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायाच्च” ॥ २ ॥

“ न विप्रतिपत्तिमात्रादव्यवस्थामात्राद्वा संशयः । किं तर्हि विप्रतिपत्तिमुपलभमानस्य संशयः । एवमव्यवस्थायामपीति । अथवास्त्यात्मेत्येके नास्त्यात्मेत्यपरे मन्यन्त इत्युपलब्धेः कथं संशयः स्यादिति । तथोपलब्धिरव्यवस्थिता अनुपलब्धिश्चाव्यवस्थितेति विभागेनाध्यवसिते संशयो नोपपद्यत इति” ॥ २ ॥

“ विप्रतिपत्तौ च सम्प्रतिपत्तेः” ॥ ३ ॥

“यां च विप्रतिपत्तिं भवान् संशयहेतुं मन्यते सा सम्प्रतिपत्तिः । सा हि द्वयोः प्रत्यनीकधर्मविषया । तत्र यदि विप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः सम्प्रतिपत्तेरेव संशय इति” ॥ ३ ॥

“ अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः” ॥ ४ ॥

१ नाध्यवसायादिति । कार्यस्यानवधारणरूपत्वात् कारणस्यावधारणात्मकत्वञ्च सम्भवति । न निश्चयोऽनिश्चयस्य जनको भवितुमर्हति ।

२ तत इति—अवधारणात्मकादध्यवसायादित्यर्थः ।

३ विप्रतिपत्तीति पूर्वपक्षोऽनुवर्तते । अत्रापि संशयसूत्रस्थोपपत्तिपदाश्रित एव पूर्वपक्षः । तत्र प्रथमवाक्यं तत्पदमस्तित्वमात्रपरं मन्वानस्य । अथवेत्यादि द्वितीयं तु तत्पदं ज्ञानपरं मन्वानस्येत्यवधेयम् ।

४ तथोपलब्धिरिति । उपलब्धिरनिश्चितानुपलब्धिश्चानिश्चितेत्येताभ्यां जानतः पुरुषस्य संशयो न सम्भवति । प्रत्युतास्यामवस्थायान्तस्य तद्विषयविशेषस्य किमपि ज्ञानं न सम्भवति ।

५ यां चेति । अस्त्यात्मेत्येकस्य निश्चयात्मकं ज्ञानम् , नास्त्यात्मेति चापरस्य । एवञ्चात्र निश्चयात्मकमेव ज्ञानद्वयम् । तथा सति यदि संशयस्तदा निश्चयादेव संशय इत्यापत्तीति पूर्वपक्षिणो हृदयम् ।

“न संशयः । यदि तावदियमव्यवस्थाऽऽत्मन्येव व्यवस्थिता व्यवस्थानादव्यवस्था न भवतीत्यनुपपन्नः संशयः । अथाव्यवस्थाऽऽत्मनि न व्यवस्थिता एवमतादात्म्यादव्यवस्था न भवतीति संशयाभाव इति” ॥ ४ ॥

“तथाऽत्यन्तसंशयस्तद्धर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः” ॥ ५ ॥

“येन कल्पेन भवान् समानधर्मोपपत्तेः संशय इति मन्यते, तेन खल्वत्यन्तसंशयः प्रसज्यते । समानधर्मोपपत्तेरनुच्छेदात् संशयानुच्छेदः । न ह्ययम-तद्धर्मा धर्मा विमृश्यमाणो गृह्यते, सततं तु तद्धर्मा भवतीति” ॥ ५ ॥

अस्य प्रतिषेधप्रपञ्चस्य सङ्क्षेपेणोद्धारः—

यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात् संशये नासंशयो नात्यन्त-संशयो वा ॥ ६ ॥

न संशयानुपपत्तिः, संशयानुच्छेदश्च न प्रसज्यते । कथं ? यत्तावत् समानधर्माध्यवसायः संशयहेतुः न समानधर्ममात्रमिति । एवमेतत् । “कस्मादेवं नोच्यते इति ?” विशेषापेक्ष इति वचनात् तत्सिद्धेः । विशेषस्यापेक्षाऽऽकाङ्क्षा । सा चानुपलभ्यमाने विशेषे समर्था । न चोक्तं समानधर्मापेक्ष

१ न संशय इति भाष्यस्य सूत्रपदैरेवान्वयः । यदि तावदिति । अध्यवस्थायाम् अन्यवस्थात्वं यदि निश्चितन्तदा निश्चितरूपत्वात्तस्या अध्यवस्थात्मनैव निरस्ता । अथ च तथात्वन्तस्या यद्यनिश्चितं तर्हि तस्याः स्वरूपहानादेवाध्यवस्थात्मता सुवृ-पराहतेति भावः ।

२ तथेत्यादिदूर्वैरक्षोऽनुवर्तते । समानधर्मादीनां संशयकारणानां सातत्यान्नित्य-संशयप्रसङ्गः ।

३ नह्ययमिति । स्थाणुरयं पुरुषो वेति संशयानन्तरं स्थाणुरेवायमिति निश्च-यात्मके ज्ञाने जातेऽपि समानधर्मादीनां ज्ञानं वर्तते एव । निश्चयज्ञानेन ते धर्मास्त-द्धर्मज्ञानं वा नापनोद्यते । ततो यदि समानधर्मज्ञानमेव संशयकारणं तर्हि निश्चय-ज्ञानानन्तरमपि संशयप्रसङ्ग इति भावः ।

४ यथोक्तेत्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । यदि निर्विशेषणं समानधर्मोपपत्त्यादि संशय-कारणमुच्येत तदा तदुपपत्तेः पश्चादकरणात् पूर्वमपि न कुर्यादित्यसंशयः स्यात् । अथवा पूर्वं करणात् पश्चादपि कुर्यादित्यत्यन्तसंशयः स्यात् । दूरत्वादिदोषविशेषा-दर्शनादिविशेषणविशिष्टमेव तु समानधर्मोपपत्त्यादि संशयकारणत्वेनेष्टमतो नोक्तप्रसङ्ग-प्रसङ्गः ।

५ न चोक्तमिति । संशयलक्षणसूत्रे विशेषापेक्षः संशय इत्युक्तम्, न समान-धर्मापेक्ष इति । समानधर्मापेक्षाभावश्च समानधर्माध्यवसाये सत्येव भवितुमर्हति ।

इति । समाने च धर्मे कथमाकाङ्क्षा न भवेद् यद्ययं प्रत्यक्षः स्यात् । एतेन सामर्थ्येन विज्ञायते समानधर्माध्यवसायादिति । ॥

उपपत्तिवचनाद्वा । समानधर्मोपपत्तेरित्युच्यते । न चान्या सद्भावसंवेदनाहते समानधर्मोपपत्तिरस्ति । अनुपलभ्यमानसद्भावो हि समानो धर्मोऽविद्यमानवद्भवतीति ।

विषयशब्देन वा विषयिणः प्रत्ययस्याभिधानम् । यथा लोके धूमेत्ताग्निरनुमीयते इत्युक्ते धूमदर्शनेनाग्निरनुमीयत इति ज्ञायते । कथम् ? दृष्ट्वा हि धूममथाग्निमनुमिनोति नादृष्टे । न च वाक्ये दर्शनशब्दः श्रूयते, अनुजानाति च वाक्यस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वम् । तेन मन्यामहे विषयशब्देन विषयिणः प्रत्ययस्याभिधानं बोद्धानुजानाति । एवमिहापि समानधर्मशब्देन समानधर्माध्यवसायमाहेति ।

यथोहित्वा-“समानमनयोर्धर्ममुपलभ इति धर्मधर्मिग्रहणे संशयाभावः” इति-पूर्वदृष्टविषयमेतत् । यावहमर्थो पूर्वमद्राक्षं तयोः समानं धर्ममुपलभे विशेषं नोपलभ इति, कथं नु विशेषं पश्येयं येनान्यतरमवधारयेयमिति । न चैतत् समानधर्मोपलब्धौ धर्मधर्मिग्रहणमात्रेण निवर्तत इति ।

यच्चोक्तं-“नार्थान्तराध्यवसायादन्यत्र संशयः” इति, यो ह्यर्थान्तराध्यवसायमात्रं संशयहेतुमुपाददीत स एवं वाच्य इति ।

यत्पुनरेतत्-“कार्यकारणयोः सारूप्याभावादिति”, कारणस्य भावाभावयोः कार्यस्य भावाभावौ कार्यकारणयोः सारूप्यम् । यस्योत्पादाद्यदुत्पद्यते

एवञ्च समानधर्मापेक्षाया अनुपन्यासेनैव समानधर्माध्यवसाय उपलक्षितः । उपपत्तिपदं सत्तापरमभ्युपगम्यैवेदमुत्तरं पूर्वपक्षस्य । ॥

१ विषयशब्देनेति । समानधर्मो ‘विषयः’ तेन विषयिणस्तज्ज्ञानस्याप्यभिधानमित्यर्थः ।

२ यथोहित्वेति । यदप्युक्तमित्यर्थ इति तात्पर्यकृतः ।

३ यच्चोक्तमिति । प्रथमसूत्रभाष्यगतपूर्वपक्षतृतीयहेतोरनुवादः ।

४ सारूप्याभावादित्यनन्तरमध्यवसायादनवधारणात्मकः संशयो नोपपद्यत इति पक्षचतुर्थहेतोरनुवादः ।

यस्य चानुत्पादाद् यज्ञोत्पद्यते तत्कारणं कार्यमितरदित्येतत्सारूप्यम् । अस्ति च संशयकारणे संशये चैतदिति ।

एतेनानेकधर्माध्यवसायादिति प्रतिषेधः परिहृत इति ।

यत्पुनरेतदुक्तं “ विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायाच्च न संशय ” इति, प्रथमप्रवादयोर्व्याहृतमर्थमुपलभे विशेषं च न जानामि नोपलभे येनान्यतर-मवधारयेयम्, तत्कोऽत्र विशेषः स्याद्येनैकतरमवधारयेयमिति संशयो विप्रति-पत्तिजनितोऽर्थः न शक्यो विप्रतिपत्तिसम्प्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण निवर्त्तयितुमिति ।

एवमुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थाकृते संशये वेदितव्यमिति ।

यत्पुनरेतत्—“ प्रतिपत्तौ च सम्प्रतिपत्तेरिति ” विप्रतिपत्तिशब्दस्य-योऽर्थः तदध्यवसायो विशेषापेक्षः संशयहेतुः । तस्य च समाख्यान्तरेण न निवृत्तिः । समानेऽधिकरणे व्याहृतार्थो प्रवादौ विप्रतिपत्तिशब्दस्यार्थः । तद-ध्यवसायश्च विशेषापेक्षः संशयहेतुः । न चास्य सम्प्रतिपत्तिशब्दे समाख्यान्तरे योज्यमाने संशयहेतुत्वं निवर्तते । तदिदमकृतबुद्धिसम्मोहनमिति ।

१ अस्ति चेति । अत्र केषाञ्चिन्मतेन द्विविधं सारूप्यं भाष्यकारेणोक्तम्—कारणस्य भावाभावयोः कार्यस्य भावाभाववित्येकं सारूप्यम्, कारणस्योत्पादात्कारणमुत्पद्यते तदनुत्पादाच्च नोत्पद्यत इत्यपरम् । किन्तु द्वितीयस्य पूर्वानुवादकत्वमेव स्पष्टं प्रतिभाति ।

वार्तिकमतेन तु विशेषानवधारणमात्रमेव संशयतत्कारणयोः सारूप्यम् । यद्यु-त्पत्तिः सारूप्यं कार्यकारणयोस्तदा नित्यद्रव्याणां तादृशसारूप्याभावादकारणतैव स्यादित्येव भाष्यमतेऽरुचिबीजम् ।

२ विप्रतिपत्तिसम्प्रतिपत्तीति । विप्रतिपत्तयोर्द्वयोः पुरुषयोर्यां विप्रतिपत्तिस्तस्याः सम्प्रतिपत्तिज्ञानं पार्श्वस्थस्य तृतीयस्य, तन्मात्रेणेत्यर्थः । यत्पुनरिति तृतीयसूत्र-गताक्षेपस्य परामर्शः ।

३ समाख्यान्तरेणेति—विप्रतिपत्तिपदस्य प्रसिद्धोऽर्थो मतभेदस्तस्याध्यवसाया-ज्ज्ञानाद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशय उत्पद्यत इति निर्विवादं स्थिते विप्रतिपत्तेः ‘ सम्प्रतिपत्ति ’ रिति नामान्तरमुज्जाह्वय तस्याः संशयकारणत्वं निषेधयितुं न शक्यते । विप्रतिपत्त-योरेकैकस्य स्वमतस्य सम्प्रतिपत्तिरूपत्वेऽपि पार्श्वस्थं तृतीयस्युभयोर्विप्रतिपत्ति-रूपतैवेति हृदयम् ।

यत्पुनः—“अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थाया” इति संशय-
हेतोरर्थस्याप्रतिषेधादव्यवस्थाभ्यनुज्ञानाच्च निमित्तान्तरेण शब्दान्तरकल्पना-
व्यर्था शब्दान्तरकल्पना । अव्यवस्था खलु व्यवस्था न भवत्यव्यवस्थात्मनि
व्यवस्थितत्वात् । नानयोरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धयोः सदसद्विषयत्वं विशेषापेक्षं
संशयहेतुर्न भवतीति प्रतिषिध्यते, यावता चाव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थिता न
तावतात्मानं जहाति, तावता ह्यनुज्ञाताऽव्यवस्था । एवमियं क्रियमाणापि
शब्दान्तरकल्पना नार्थान्तरं साधयतीति ।

यत्पुनरेतन्—“तथात्यन्तसंशयः तद्धर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः” इति, नार्यं समान-
धर्मादिभ्य एव संशयः । किं तर्हि ? तद्विषयाध्यवसायाद् विशेषस्मृतिसहिता-
दित्यतो नात्यन्तसंशय इति ।

“अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न संशय” इति । तन्न युक्तम् । विशेषापेक्षो
विमर्शः संशय इति वचनान् । विशेषाश्चान्यतरधर्मः । न तस्मिन्नध्यवसीयमाने
विशेषापेक्षा सम्भवतीति ॥ ६ ॥

यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः ॥ ७ ॥

यत्र यत्र संशयपूर्विका परीक्षा शास्त्रे कथायां वा, तत्र तत्रैवं संशये परेण
प्रातिषिद्धे समाधिर्वाच्य इति । अतः सर्वपरीक्षाद्यापित्वान् प्रथमं संशयः
परीक्षित इति ॥ ७ ॥

इति संशयपरीक्षा प्रकरणम् ॥

१ यत्पुनरिति चतुर्थसूत्रगतपूर्वपक्षपरामर्शः ।

२ अव्यवस्था खल्विति । या किल ‘अव्यवस्था’ इति नाम्ना प्रसिद्धा तस्याः
‘अव्यवस्थात्मनि’ अव्यवस्थास्वे ‘व्यवस्थितत्वात्’ निश्चितत्वात् सा ‘व्यवस्था’
न भवितुमर्हति । अतस्तस्या व्यवस्थेति यत्नान्तरकल्पनं तत्सर्वथा व्यर्थमेवेत्यर्थः ।

३ अनुज्ञातेति—पूर्वपक्षिणेत्यर्थः ।

४ यत्र संशय इत्यादि सूत्रम् । अस्य यथाश्रुत्यर्थो भाष्यकारेणैव स्पष्टीकृतः ।
परिशुद्धिकारस्तस्य तात्पर्यान्तरमपि वर्णयाञ्चकार । तद्यथा । यस्य (पदार्थस्य)
विषये संशयस्तस्यैव परीक्षोपयुक्ता । प्रयोजनादीनां तु परीक्षा नास्ति । यतोऽस्मिन्
विषये संशयो नास्ति । आगोपाङ्गनमा च पण्डितरूपेभ्योऽविवादसिद्धे संदेहाभावात् ।
अथवा प्रयोजनादयोऽप्यतिदेशेन परीक्षिताः । यत्र क्वचित् संशयः स्यात् तत्रैवमुत्तरो-
त्तरप्रसङ्गः कर्तव्यः । उत्तरोत्तरेषु प्रयोजनादिषु परीक्षाप्रसङ्गः कर्तव्य इति भावः ॥

(२) प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षा प्रकरणम् ।

अथ प्रमाणपरीक्षा—

“प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः” ॥ ८ ॥

“प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणत्वं नास्ति त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः । पूर्वापरसहभावानुप-
पत्तेरित्यर्थः” ॥ ८ ॥

अस्य सामान्यवचनस्यार्थविभागः—

“पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात्प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः” ॥ ९ ॥

“गन्धादिविषयं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्यदि पूर्वं, पश्चाद्गन्धादीनां सिद्धिः,
नेदं गन्धादिसन्निकर्षादुत्पद्यत इति” ॥ ९ ॥

“पश्चात्सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः” ॥ १० ॥

“असति प्रमाणे केन प्रमीयमाणोऽर्थः प्रमेयः स्यात् । प्रमाणेन खलु
प्रमीयमाणोऽर्थः प्रमेयमित्येतत्सिध्यति” ॥ १० ॥

१ अथ प्रमाणेति । आर्येण हि क्रमेण संशयपरीक्षायामुद्देशक्रमो बाधितः ।
प्रमाणादिषु तु तद्बाधकारणाभावाद्बुद्देशक्रमानुरोधेन प्रमेयादिभ्यः प्राक् प्रमाणान्येव
परीक्षितानि । तत्रापि प्रथमं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणपरीक्षा, तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणा-
नाम् । तत्र सामान्यलक्षणम्—‘ उपलब्धिसाधनं प्रमाणमिति ’ । तच्चोपलब्धिसाधन-
त्वं प्रत्यक्षादीनामेव ।

२ प्रत्यक्षादीनामिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । अयमत्र पूर्वपक्षिणो माध्यमिकस्याभि-
सन्धिः । यद्यपि मम विश्वविचारासहत्ववादिनः प्रमाणं नाम न किञ्चिदस्ति विचार-
सहम्, तथाऽपि लोकसिद्धान्येव प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रमाणैः पर्यालोच्यमानानि विचारं न
सहन्ते । सोऽयं प्रमाणानामपराधो यानि स्वविरोधेन विलीयन्ते, न ममापराध इति ।
प्रयोगस्तु—प्रत्यक्षादयो न प्रमाणत्वेन व्यवहर्तव्याः, कालखयेऽप्यथाप्रतिपादकत्वात्-
यदेवञ्च तत् प्रमाणत्वेन व्यवहियते—यथा ज्ञानविषयम्—तथा चैतत्—तस्मात्तथेति ।

३ पूर्वं हीत्यादि पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । ज्ञानं हि ‘ प्रमाणम् ’ । तद्योगात् ‘ प्रमेयम् ’
इति च ‘ अर्थ ’ इति च भवति । तद्यदि प्रमाणं प्रमेयादथात् पूर्वमुत्पद्यते ततः
प्रमाणात्पूर्वज्ञासावर्थे इतीन्द्रियार्थेत्यादिसूत्रव्याघात इत्यर्थः ।

४ पश्चादित्यादि द्वितीयं पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । अथ पूर्वं प्रमेयं पश्चात् प्रमाणं तत्राह
पश्चादिति । यद्यप्यर्थस्य स्वरूपं न प्रमाणाधीनं तथापि तस्य प्रमेयत्वं तदधीनम् ।
तदपि चेत् प्रमाणात् पूर्वं न प्रमाणयोगनिबन्धनं स्यादित्यर्थः ।

“ युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धी-
नाम् ” ॥ ११ ॥

“ यदि प्रमाणं प्रमेयं च युगपद्भवतः एवमपि गन्धादिविन्द्रियार्थेषु
ज्ञानानि प्रत्यर्थनियतानि युगपत्सम्भवन्तीति ज्ञानानां प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात्
क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावः । या इमा बुद्ध्यः क्रमेणार्थेषु वर्तन्ते तासां क्रमवृत्तित्वं न
सम्भवतीति ।

“ व्याघातश्च ‘ युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ’ (१, १, १६) इति ।

“ एतावांश्च प्रमाणप्रमेययोः सद्भावविषयः । स चानुपपन्न इति ।
तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणत्वं न सम्भवतीति ” ।

अस्य समाधिः—उपलब्धिहेतोरुपलब्धिविषयस्य चार्थस्य पूर्वापरसह-
भावानियमाद्यथादर्शनं विभागवचनम् । क्वचिदुपलब्धिहेतुः पूर्वं, पश्चादुपलब्धि-
विषयः—यथादित्यस्य प्रकाश उत्पद्यमानानाम् । क्वचित्पूर्वमुपलब्धिविषयः
पश्चादुपलब्धिहेतुः—यथावस्थितानां प्रदीपः । क्वचिदुपलब्धिहेतुरुपलब्धिविषयश्च
सह भवतः—यथा धूमेनाग्नेर्ग्रहणमिति । उपलब्धिहेतुश्च प्रमाणं, प्रमेयं तूप-
लब्धिविषयः । एवं प्रमाणप्रमेययोः पूर्वापरसहभावेऽनियते यथाऽर्थो दृश्यते
तथा विभज्य वचनीय इति । तत्रैकान्तेन प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । सामान्येन
खल्वविभज्य प्रतिषेध उक्त इति ।

१ युगपदित्यादि द्वितीयपूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । यौगपद्ये दृष्टव्याघातः सूत्रव्या-
घातश्चेत्यर्थः ।

२ एतावानिति । पूर्ववृत्तित्वम्—पश्चान्नावित्वं—यौगपद्यं वा इत्येत एव त्रयः
पक्षैः सम्भवन्ति प्रमाणप्रमेययोर्विषये ।

३ अस्य समाधिरिति गतसूत्रत्रयोद्भावितपूर्वपक्षस्य समाधानमाह ।

४ उपलब्धिहेतोरित्यादिवाक्यस्य क्वचित्सूत्रावेनोल्लेखः प्रामादिकः ।

५ ‘ उपलब्धिहेतुः ’ प्रमाकरणम् । ‘ उपलब्धिविषयः ’ प्रमेयः । यथादर्शनमिति
यथाप्रमाणमित्यर्थः ।

६ आदित्यस्येति । आदित्यप्रकाशश्चिरन्तनस्थायि, तदुद्भासिताः पदार्थास्तु
क्रमवा उत्पद्यन्ते ।

७ खल्वविभज्येति पाठः सम्यक् । यतः पूर्वपक्षिणा ‘ सामान्येन ’ प्रमाणसा-
मान्यप्रमेयसामान्यपरतया—‘ अविभज्य ’ पदार्थविशेषावस्थाविशेषादिवैशिष्ट्यम-
विचार्यैव सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेध उक्तः । खलु विभज्येत्येव पाठः स्वीकृत्य भाष्यचन्द्रेण
व्याख्यातः ।

समाख्याहेतोस्त्रैकाल्ययोगात्तथाभूता समाख्या । यत्पुनरिदम्—“पश्चात्सिद्धावसति प्रमाणे प्रमेयं न सिध्यति । प्रमाणेन प्रमीयमाणोऽर्थः प्रमेयमिति विज्ञायत ” इति—प्रमाणमित्येतस्याः समाख्याया उपलब्धिहेतुत्वं निमित्तम् । तस्य त्रैकाल्ययोगः । उपलब्धिमकार्षीदुपलब्धिं करोति उपलब्धिं करिष्यतीति समाख्याहेतोस्त्रैकाल्ययोगात् समाख्या तथाभूता । प्रमितोऽनेनार्थः प्रमीयते प्रमास्यत इति प्रमाणम् । प्रमितं प्रमीयते प्रमास्यते इति च प्रमेयम् । एवं सति भविष्यत्यस्मिन् हेतुत उपलब्धिः, प्रमास्यतेऽयमर्थः प्रमेयमिदमित्येतत्सर्वं भवतीति ।

त्रैकाल्यानभ्यनुज्ञाने च व्यवहारानुपपत्तिः । यश्चैवं नाभ्यनुजानीयात्तस्य पाचकमानय पक्षयति लावकमानय लविष्यतांति व्यवहारो नोपपद्यत इति ।

“प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धे ” रित्येवमादिवाक्यं प्रमाणप्रतिषेधः । तत्रायं प्रष्टव्यः—अथानेन प्रतिषेधेन भवता किं क्रियत इति । किं सम्भवो निवर्त्यते अथासम्भवो ज्ञाप्यत इति ? तद्यदि सम्भवो निवर्त्यते, सति सम्भवे प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । अथासम्भवो ज्ञाप्यते, प्रमाणलक्षणं प्राप्तस्तर्हि प्रतिषेधः प्रमाणासम्भवस्योपलब्धिहेतुत्वादिति ॥ ११ ॥

“किं चातः”—

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ १२ ॥

अस्य तु त्रिभागः । पूर्वं हि प्रतिषेधसिद्धावसति प्रतिषेधे किं प्रतिषिध्यते । पश्चात्सिद्धौ प्रतिषेध्यासिद्धिः प्रतिषेधाभावादिति । युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रतिषेधसिद्धयभ्यनुज्ञानादनर्थकः प्रतिषेध इति । प्रतिषेधलक्षणे च वाक्येऽनुपपन्नमाने सिद्धं प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणत्वमिति ॥ १२ ॥

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

१ प्रमाणप्रतिषेधः—आस्यन्तिक इति भावः ।

२ सम्भवः—प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणानामिति शेषः ।

३ सति सम्भव इति । यस्य सम्भवः—यन्नात्यन्तमसत्—तस्यात्यन्तिकः प्रतिषेधो नोद्भावयितुं शक्य इति हृदयम् ।

४ अथासम्भव इति । यदि पूर्वपक्षिणः प्रतिषेधवाक्यमसम्भवस्य ज्ञापकं तदा ज्ञापकत्वसाम्यात् प्रमाणस्वभावमेव भवति । ततश्च प्रमाणप्रतिषेधे ये हेतवः पूर्वपक्षिणोद्भावितस्तैरेव तदीयप्रतिषेधवाक्यमपि प्रतिषिद्धं भवतीति भावः ।

न्या. सू. ६

कथम् ? त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेरित्यस्य हेतोर्यत्पुदाहरणमुपादीयते हेत्वर्थस्य साधकत्वं दृष्टान्ते दर्शयितव्यमिति । न च तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यम् । अथ प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यम्, उपादीयमानमप्युदाहरणं नार्थं साधयिष्यतीति । सोऽयं सर्वप्रमाणैर्व्याहृतो हेतुरहेतुः । 'सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्ध' (१, २, ६) इति । वाक्यार्थो ह्यस्य सिद्धान्तः । स च वाक्यार्थः—प्रत्यक्षादीनि नार्थं साधयन्तीति । इदं चावयवानामुपादानमर्थस्य साधनायेति । अथ नोपादीयते, अप्रदर्शितहेत्वर्थस्य दृष्टान्ते न साधकत्वमिति । निषेधो नोपपद्यते हेतुत्वासिद्धेरिति ॥ १३ ॥

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा न सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेधः ॥ १४ ॥

प्रतिषेधलक्षणे स्ववाक्ये तेषामवयवाश्रितानां प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रामाण्येऽभ्यनुज्ञायमाने परवाक्येऽप्यवयवाश्रितानां प्रामाण्यं प्रसज्यते—अविशेषादिति । एवं च न सर्वाणि प्रमाणानि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते इति । विप्रतिषेध इति वीत्ययमुपसर्गः मन्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थे, न व्याघातेऽर्थाभावादिति ॥ १४ ॥

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १५ ॥

“किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते ?”

१ वाक्यार्थ इति । 'प्रमाणानि नार्थं साधयन्ति—' इति वाक्यं पूर्वपक्षिणः सिद्धान्तप्रतिपादकम् । तत्साधनाय पञ्चावयवोपपन्नानुमानवाक्यान्पुञ्जावितानि । प्रत्येकं चैतेऽवयवाः स्वार्थप्रतिपादकाः, तत्प्रतिपादकत्वाच्चैते प्रमाणानि । एवमव्यवयववाक्यानां स्वसिद्धान्तसाधनायोज्ञावने विरुद्धो नाम हेत्वाभासः ।

२ अप्रदर्शितेति । 'दृष्टान्ते अप्रदर्शितहेत्वर्थस्य साधकत्वमेव न' इत्यन्वयः । यस्य हेतोः हेतुभावो न प्रदर्शितस्तादृशो हेतुः किमपि साधयितुं शक्येति । अथ वा यावद्भवतां स्वोद्भावितहेतोर्दृष्टान्ते हेतुत्वञ्च प्रदर्शितत्वावत् तस्य साधकत्वञ्च सम्भवति । अस्मिन् पक्षे अप्रदर्शितहेत्वर्थस्य तत्रेति सम्बन्धः ।

३ वीत्ययमुपसर्ग इति । यावदुक्तं विशेषेण सर्वेषु प्रमाणेषु प्रतिषेध इति तावदुक्तं भवति विप्रतिषेध इति । कानिचित्प्रमाणानि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते कानिचिदभ्यनुज्ञायन्ते—स्ववाक्याश्रितान्यभ्यनुज्ञायन्ते परवाक्याश्रितानि प्रतिषिध्यन्ते । तच्च नातीवोचितं प्रमाणप्रतिषेधकस्य माध्यमिकस्येत्यर्थः ।

४ किमर्थमिति । एकादशसूत्रभाष्ये अस्य समाधिरित्यस्यानन्तरमुक्तम्—'उपलब्धिहेतोरित्यादि' समुद्दिश्य प्रश्नः । यत्तत्रोक्तं तदेवात्र पुनः किमर्थमुच्यते इति भावः ।

एतत्प्रश्नबलेनैव पूर्वोक्तं वाक्यमुलब्धिहेतोरित्यादिविभागवचनमित्यन्तं सूत्रत्वेनाभिप्रयन्ति केचित् । एवं सत्येवात्रत्यं त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्चेति वाक्यं प्रति पौनर-

पूर्वोक्तनिबन्धनार्थम् । यत्तावत्पूर्वोक्तम्—“ उपलब्धिहेतोरुपलब्धि-
विषयस्य चार्थस्य पूर्वापरसहभावानियमाद् यथादर्शनं विभागवचनमिति ”—
तद्विदितःसमुत्थानं यथा विज्ञायेत । अनियमदर्शी स्वल्पयमृषिर्नियमेन प्रतिषेधं
प्रत्याचष्टे । त्रैकाल्ये चायुक्तः प्रतिषेध इति ।

तत्रैकां विधामुदाहरति शब्दादातोद्यसिद्धिवदिति । यथा पश्चात्सिद्धेन
शब्देन पूर्वसिद्धमातोद्यमनुमीयते । साध्यं चातोद्यं साधनं च शब्दः । अन्त-
र्हिते ह्यातोद्ये स्वगतोऽनुमानं भवतीति । वीणा वाद्यते वेणुः पूर्यते इति
स्वनविशेषेण आतोद्यविशेषं प्रतिपद्यते । तथा पूर्वसिद्धमुपलब्धिविषयं पश्चा-
त्सिद्धेनोपलब्धिहेतुना प्रतिपद्यत इति ।

निदर्शनार्थत्वाच्चास्य शेषयोर्विधयोर्यथोक्तमुदाहरणं वेदितव्यमिति ।

“ कस्मात्पुनरिह तन्नोच्यते ? ”

पूर्वोक्तमुपपाद्यत इति । सर्वथा तावदयमर्थः प्रकाशयितव्यः । स इह वा
प्रकाशयेत तत्र वा—न कश्चिद्विशेष इति ॥ १५ ॥

प्रमाणं प्रमेयमिति च समाख्या समावेशेन वर्तते समाख्यानिमित्त-
वशात् । समाख्यानिमित्तं तूपलब्धिसाधनं प्रमाणम् उपलब्धिविषयश्च प्रमेय-
मिति । यदा च उपलब्धिविषयः क्वचिदुपलब्धिसाधनं भवति तदा प्रमाणं
प्रमेयमिति चैकोऽर्थोऽभिधीयते ॥

अस्यार्थस्यावद्योतनार्थमिदमुच्यते—

प्रमेया च तुला प्रामाण्यवत् ॥ १६ ॥

कत्याक्षेपः स्यादिति तेषामाशयः । किन्त्वेतन्मतं भाष्यस्थयैवाग्रिमपंक्त्या पूर्वोक्त-
निबन्धनार्थमित्यादिरूपया पराहतम् । एकादशसूत्रभाष्ये यदुक्तं तस्य बीजमन्त्रस्य-
मूत्रमेवेति ब्रुवता भाष्यकारेण पूर्वस्य वाक्यस्यासूत्रत्वमन्त्रस्य च सूत्रत्वं स्पष्टीकृतम् ।

१ पूर्वोक्तेति । एकादशसूत्रे यदस्माभिरुक्तं न तदुत्सूत्रमपि तु सूत्रोक्तार्थं पुवेति
भावः ।

२ इतस्समुत्थानमिति । इतः अत्रैव त्रैकाल्येत्यादिसूत्रे समुत्थानम् बीजं यस्य
तत् ।

३ समावेशेनेति । समावेशो नियम इति वार्तिकम् ।

४ प्रमेया चेति सूत्रपाठो वाचस्पतिमिश्रसम्मतः । तदन्वयश्च—‘ तुला प्रामाण्यवत्
प्रमेया च ’ इति । तुला यथा प्रमाणं भवति तथा प्रमेया चेत्यर्थः । तुला सुवर्णा-
दिगुरुत्वे ‘ प्रमाणम् ’ भवति । किन्तु यदाऽस्याः प्रामाण्यं प्रति सन्देहो भवति तदा

गुरुत्वपरिमाणज्ञानसाधनं तुला प्रमाणं, ज्ञानविषयो गुरुद्रव्यं सुवर्णादि प्रमेयम् । यदा सुवर्णादिना तुलान्तरं व्यवस्थाप्यते तदा तुलान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ सुवर्णादि प्रमाणं तुलान्तरं प्रमेयमिति ।

एवमनवयवेन तन्त्रार्थ उद्दिष्टो वेदितव्यः । आत्मा तावदुपलब्धिविषयत्वात् प्रमेये परिपठितः । उपलब्धौ स्वातन्त्र्यात् प्रमाता । बुद्धिरुपलब्धिसाधनत्वात् प्रमाणम् । उपलब्धिविषयत्वात् प्रमेयम् । उभयाभावात् तु प्रमितिः । एव-
मर्थविशेषे समाख्यासमावेशो योज्यः । तथा च कारकशब्दा निमित्तवशात् समावेशेन वर्तन्ते इति । वृक्षस्तिष्ठतीति स्वस्थितौ स्वातन्त्र्यात्कर्ता । वृक्षं पश्य-
तीति दर्शनेनाप्तुमिष्यमाणतमत्वात् कर्म । वृक्षेण चन्द्रमसं ज्ञापयतीति ज्ञापकस्य साधकतमत्वात् करणम् । वृक्षायोदकमासिञ्चतीति आसिञ्चमानोदकेन वृक्षमभि-
प्रेतीति सम्प्रदानम् । वृक्षात्पर्णं पततीति ध्रुवमपायेऽपादानमित्यपादानम् । वृक्षे
वयांसि सन्तीत्याधारोऽधिकरणमित्यधिकरणम् ।

एवं च सति न द्रव्यमात्रं कारकं, न क्रियामात्रम् । किं तर्हि ?
क्रियासाधनं क्रियाविशेषयुक्तं कारकम् । यत्क्रियासाधनं स्वतन्त्रः स कर्ता, न
सिद्धप्रमाणभावेन तुलान्तरेण यत् परीक्षितं सुवर्णादि तेन तुलायाः प्रामाण्यं निर्धार्यते-
तत्र चेयं ' प्रमेया ' भवति । एवमेव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्यपि स्वगोचरविषयं प्रति
प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाणि स्वस्वज्ञानम्प्रतीति हृदयम् ॥

प्रमेयता चेति पाठः क्वचिद्भार्तिकपुस्तकेषु नवीनसूत्रध्याकर्तृभिश्च धृतः । तत्र-
प्रमाणानामप्रमेयता च भवति, तुलाप्रामाण्यवत्-यथा तुलायाः प्रामाण्यमप्रमेयता चैवमेव
प्रमाणानामपीति भावः ।

१ व्यवस्थाप्यते इति । शुद्धत्वेन परीक्ष्यते इत्यर्थः ।

२ अनवयवेनेति । कारस्त्वेनेत्यर्थः । उक्तः प्रमेयप्रमाणसमारख्यासमावेशः
सकलशास्त्रविषयं व्याप्नोतीति भावः ।

३ एवं च सतीत्यारभ्य हातुमर्हतीत्यन्तं ग्रन्थं केचित्पूर्वपक्षत्वेनाभिप्रयन्ति ।
तन्मतेन च ' अस्ति भोः ' इत्यादि ग्रन्थस्तरपूर्वपक्षस्य समाधानम् ' इत्येवमादिने '-
त्येतत्पर्यन्तम् । पुनः सेयमुपलब्धिरित्यपरः पूर्वपक्षः ।

वार्तिकतात्पर्यादिरुतेन तु ' एवं चेत्यादि ' हातुमर्हतीत्यन्तं सिद्धान्तिन एव
वचनम् । तदनन्तरम् अस्ति भोरित्याद्यष्टादशसूत्रपर्यन्तं पूर्वपक्षवचनम् ।

४ द्रव्यमात्रं कारकमिति माध्यमिकराद्धान्तः ।

५ क्रियामात्रमिति । अवान्तरक्रियामात्रमित्यर्थः ।

६ क्रियासाधनमिति । यत् प्रधानक्रियासाधकमवान्तरक्रियायुक्तं तत्कारक-
मित्यर्थः ।

द्रव्यमात्रं न क्रियामात्रम् । क्रियया व्याप्तुमिष्यमाणतमं कर्म, न द्रव्यमात्रं न क्रियामात्रम् । एवं साधकतमादिष्वपि । एवं च कारकान्वाख्यानं यथैव उपपत्तिः, एवं लक्षणतः कारकान्वाख्यानमपि, न द्रव्यमात्रेण न क्रियया वा । किं तर्हि ? क्रियासाधने क्रियाविशेषयुक्त इति । कारकशब्दश्चायं प्रमाणं प्रमेयमिति । स च कारकधर्मं न हातुमर्हति ॥ १६ ॥

“ अस्ति भोः कारकशब्दानां निमित्तवशात् समावेशः । प्रत्यक्षादीनि च प्रमाणानि उपलब्धिहेतुत्वात्, प्रमेयं चोपलब्धिविषयत्वात् । संवेद्यानि च प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि, प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभे अनुमानेनोपलभे उपमानेनोपलभे आगमेनोपलभे प्रत्यक्षं मे ज्ञानमानुमानिकं मे ज्ञानमौपमानिकं मे ज्ञानमागमिकं मे ज्ञानमिति विशेषा गृह्यन्ते । लक्षणतश्च ज्ञाप्यमानानि ज्ञायन्ते विशेषेणोन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमित्येवमादिना । सेयमुपलब्धिः प्रत्यक्षादिविषया किं प्रमाणान्तरतोऽथान्तरेण प्रमाणान्तरमसाधनेति ” ॥

कश्चात्र विशेषः ?—

१ पूर्वपक्षमुत्थापयति अस्ति भोरिति ।

२ उपलब्धिविषयत्वं कुत इत्यत आह प्रत्यक्षमिति ।

अयमत्र पूर्वपक्षसङ्क्षेपस्तात्पर्यकारोक्तः । अत्रैते कल्पा उपप्लवन्ते । किं प्रत्यक्षादीनामुपलब्धिः ससाधना निस्साधना वा । यदाऽपि ससाधना तदाऽपि किमेभिरेव प्रत्यक्षादिभिराहो प्रमाणान्तरेण । यदाऽप्येभिस्तदाऽपि किं तथैव प्रत्यक्षव्यवस्थाऽथैका व्यक्तिर्व्यवस्थान्तरेणेति । तत्र प्रमाणान्तराभ्युपगमे विभागसूत्रव्याघातोऽनवस्थापातश्च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षादिभिः प्रत्यक्षाद्यन्तराणां ग्रहणेऽनवस्थापातः । तथैव व्यवस्था तु ग्रहणे आत्मनि वृत्तिविरोधः । नहि तथैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा छिद्यते । तस्मादसाधना प्रमाणोपलब्धिः । एवं चेत् कृतं प्रमेयसाधनैः प्रमाणैः प्रमाणवदसाधनैवास्तु प्रमेयोपलब्धिरिति ।

३ सिद्धान्ती पृच्छति कश्चेति ।

अयमत्र सिद्धान्तः—नासाधना प्रमाणसिद्धिर्नापि प्रत्यक्षादिव्यतिरिक्तप्रमाणाभ्युपगमो येन विभागसूत्रव्याघातः स्यात् । नापि च तथैव व्यवस्था तस्या एव ग्रहणमुपेयते येनात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधो भवेत् । अपि तु प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयेन प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयस्य ग्रहणमातिष्ठामहे । न चानवस्थाऽस्ति । किञ्चित्प्रमाणं स्वज्ञानेनान्यधीहेतुर्यथा धूमादिः, किञ्चित्पुनरज्ञातमेव बुद्धिसाधनम्, यथा चक्षुरादि । तत्र पूर्वं स्वज्ञानं चक्षुराद्यपेक्षम् । चक्षुरादि तु ज्ञानानपेक्षमेव ज्ञानसाधनमिति काऽनवस्था । बुभुत्सया

“ प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः ” ॥ १७ ॥

“ यदि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यन्ते, येन प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यन्ते तत्-
प्रमाणान्तरमस्तीति प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावः प्रसज्यत इति । अनवस्थामाह तस्याप्य-
न्येन तस्याप्यन्येनेति । न चानवस्था शक्याऽनुज्ञातुमनुपपत्तेरिति ” ॥ १७ ॥

अस्तु तर्हि प्रमाणान्तरमन्तरेण निःसाधनेति ?-

“ तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः ” ॥ १८ ॥

“ यदि प्रत्यक्षाद्युपलब्धौ प्रमाणान्तरं निवर्तते, आत्माद्युपलब्धावपि
प्रमाणान्तरं निवर्त्यत्यविशेषात् ” ॥ १८ ॥

एवं च सर्वप्रमाणविलोप इत्यत आह--

न । प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ १९ ॥

यथा प्रदीपप्रकाशः प्रत्यक्षाङ्गत्वात् दृश्यदर्शने प्रमाणम्, स च प्रत्यक्षान्तरेण
चक्षुषः सन्निकर्षेण गृह्यते । प्रदीपभावाभावयोर्दर्शनस्य तथाभावादर्शनहेतुरनु-
मीयते । तमसि प्रदीपमुपाददीथा इत्याप्तोपदेशेनापि प्रतिपद्यते । एवं प्रत्य-
क्षादीनां यथादर्शनं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेवोपलब्धिः । इन्द्रियाणि तावत् स्वविषय-
ग्रहणेनैवानुमीयन्ते । अर्थाः प्रत्यक्षतो गृह्यन्ते । इन्द्रियार्थेसन्निकर्षास्त्वावरणेन
लिङ्गेनानुमीयन्ते । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमात्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादा-
त्मसमवायाच्च सुखादिवद्गृह्यते । एवं प्रमाणविशेषो विभज्य वचनीयः । यथा

चतदपि शक्यज्ञानम् । सा च कदाचिदेव क्वचिदिति नानवस्था । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षादिभिः
प्रत्यक्षादीनामुपलब्धिरिति ।

१ सिद्धान्तमवतारयति एवमिति । न प्रदीपेत्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ।

२ गृह्यत इति । ततश्च प्रत्यक्षगम्य इत्यर्थः ।

३ तथाभावादिति । भावाभावादन्वयव्यतिरेकादिति यावत् ।

४ अनुमीयत इति । ततश्च शब्दोऽनुमानगम्य इति भावः ।

५ प्रतिपद्यत इति । ततश्चायं शब्दप्रमाणगम्य इति भावः ।

६ इन्द्रियेति । सन्निकर्षप्रतिरोधकावरणाभावे प्रत्यक्षं जायते, तद्भावे च न
जायते । एवं चावरणाभावेन सन्निकर्षानुमानम् । ततश्चावरणमेव स्वाभावद्वारा तत्र
लिङ्गमिति भावः । अनुमानस्वरूपं च प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं तादृशसन्निकर्षप्रति-
रोधकावरणे सति तदभावादिति ।

च दृश्यः सन् प्रदीपप्रकाशो दृश्यान्तराणां दर्शनहेतुरिति दृश्यदर्शनव्यवस्थां लभते, एवं प्रमेयं सत्किञ्चिदर्थजातमुपलब्धिहेतुत्वात् प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवस्थां लभते । सेयं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शनमुपलब्धिर्न प्रमाणान्तरतो, न च प्रमाणमन्तरेण निःसाधनेति ।

“ तेनैव तस्याग्रहणमिति ” चेद्,—न अर्थभेदस्य लक्षणसामान्यात् । “ प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव ग्रहणमित्युक्तम् । अन्येन ह्यन्यस्य ग्रहणं दृष्टमिति ” । न, अर्थभेदस्य लक्षणसामान्यात् । प्रत्यक्षलक्षणेनानेकोऽर्थः सङ्गृहीतः । तत्र केनचित्कस्यचिद् ग्रहणमित्यदोषः । एवमनुमानादिष्वपीति । यथोद्धृतेनोदकेनाशयस्थस्य ग्रहणमिति ।

ज्ञातृमनसोश्च दर्शनात् । अहं सुखी अहं दुःखी चेति तेनैव ज्ञात्रा तस्यैव ग्रहणं दृश्यते । ‘ युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ’ (१, १, १६) इति च तेनैव मनसा तस्यैवानुमानं दृश्यते । ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयस्य चाभेदो ग्रहणस्य ग्राह्यस्य चाभेद इति ।

१ दृश्यदर्शनेति । ‘ दृश्यं ’—दर्शनविषयं—‘ दर्शनं ’—दर्शनकरणम्—इति वा व्यपदेशं लभत इत्यर्थः ।

२ एवं प्रमेयमिति । किञ्चिद्ग्रस्तु यदा ज्ञानस्य विषयस्तदा ‘ प्रमेयमिति ’, यदा ज्ञानस्य हेतुः करणन्तदा ‘ प्रमाणमिति ’ व्यपदेशं लभते ।

३ अर्थभेदस्येति । तत्त्वतः प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तयो भिन्ना एव—केवलमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजत्वादिसादृश्येन प्रत्यक्षमित्यनेन नाम्ना सङ्गृहीता व्यपदिष्टा भवन्ति । एवं च एकस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रत्यक्षान्तरेण ग्रहणे न तस्यैव तेन ग्रहणम्भवति ।

४ उद्धृतेनेति । जलाशयादुद्धृतेन जलेन जलाशयस्थस्य जलस्यानुमानम् । तत्र यद्यपि जलेनैव जलस्यानुमानं तथाऽपि न तत्त्वतस्तेनैव तद्ग्रहणम् ।

५ ज्ञातृमनसोरिति । ज्ञाता ज्ञेय इति सकर्माभिप्रायम् । नह्यन्यस्य समवेता ज्ञानक्रिया, येनात्मनः कर्मता स्यात्, अपि तु ज्ञातृस्यैव । परसमवेतफलशालि हि कर्मस्थुक्तम् । तस्मात्सुखादीनामात्मधर्माणामत्र कर्मता आत्मनस्तु प्रकाशमानता । तत्र विवक्षया ज्ञेयत्वाभिधानम् । मनस्तु यद्यपि करणं कर्म स्वज्ञानं प्रति करणं च तथापि न स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधः । यदि हि ज्ञानं करणं भवेत्तदाऽऽत्माश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गः । स्वसत्तया च ज्ञानं प्रति करणम् । अन्यच्च,स्य ज्ञानमन्या च सत्ता । न च तत्समवेता ज्ञानक्रिया, किन्वात्मसमवेता । तस्माज्ज्ञेयत्वं ज्ञानसाधनत्वं च मनसो न दोषमर्हतीति हृदयम् ।

६ ग्राह्यस्येत्यस्य स्थाने ग्राहकस्येति काचित्कः पाठो न सम्यक् । अहं सुखीत्यादौ ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयस्य चाभेदः । मनसोऽनुमाने च मन एव ग्रहणकरणम् ग्रहणविषयश्च । नचात्र ग्राहकस्य ज्ञातृसमावेशः ।

“ निमित्तभेदोऽत्रेति ” चेत्,—समानम् । “ न निमित्तान्तरेण विना ज्ञाताऽऽत्मानं जानीते । न च निमित्तान्तरेण विना मनसा मनो गृह्यत इति । ” समानमेतत् प्रत्यक्षादिभिः । प्रत्यक्षादीनां ग्रहणमित्यत्राप्यर्थभेदो गृह्यत इति ।

प्रत्यक्षादीनां चाविषयस्यानुपपत्तेः । यदि स्यात् किञ्चिदर्थजातं प्रत्यक्षादीनामविषयः—यत्प्रत्यक्षादिभिर्न शक्यं ग्रहीतुम्—तस्य ग्रहणाय प्रमाणान्तरमुपादीयेत । तत्तु न शक्यं केनचिदुपपादयितुमिति । प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शनमेवेदं सञ्जासञ्च सर्वं विषय इति ॥ १९ ॥

कोचित्तु दृष्टान्तमपरिगृहीतं हेतुना विशेषहेतुमन्तरेण साध्यसाधनायोपाददते—“यथा प्रदीपप्रकाशः प्रदीपान्तरप्रकाशमन्तरेण गृह्यते तथा प्रमाणानि प्रमाणान्तरमन्तरेण गृह्यन्त इति ” । स चायम्—

क्वचिन्निवृत्तिदर्शनादनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च क्वचिदनैकान्तः ॥ २० ॥

यथा चायं प्रसङ्गो निवृत्तिदर्शनात् प्रमाणसाधनायोपादीयते

१ असञ्चेति । असतः प्रमाणविषयत्वप्रदर्शितमुपोद्धातभाष्ये प्रथमसूत्रे-असञ्चादिति गृह्यमाणं यथाभूतमविपरीतं तत्त्वं भवतीति ॥ १९ ॥

२ केचित्त्वित्यादि आचार्यदेशायानां मतम् । तद्यथा—प्रदीपप्रकाशो यथा न प्रकाशान्तरमपेक्षते एवमप्रमाणान्यपि प्रमाणान्तरमनपेक्षमाणान्यपि सन्ति भविष्यन्तीति । ‘ विशेषहेतुमन्तरेण हेतुनाऽपरिगृहीतमेव दृष्टान्तं साध्यसाधनायोपाददते ’ इति सम्यग्बन्धः ।

३ न्यायसूचीनिबन्धे क्वचिदित्यादि सूत्रत्वेनोपन्यस्तम् । उक्ताचार्यदेशायान् प्रच्छेददिति चोक्तं वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण तास्पर्यं । अपरे तु हेतुविशेषपरिग्रहमन्तरेण दृष्टान्तमात्रं प्रदीपप्रकाशसूत्रेणोपाददते तान् प्रतीदमुच्यत इति वार्तिकम् ।

सूत्राथस्तु—‘ क्वचित् ’ प्रदीपादौ प्रमाणान्तरस्य ‘ निवृत्तिदर्शनात् ’ ‘ क्वचित् ’ रूपादिप्रकाशकघटादौ प्रमाणान्तरस्य ‘ अनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ”—प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षादर्शनादिति यावत्—त्वदीयः प्रकाशकत्वरूपो हेतुः (प्रत्यक्षादयः प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षाः प्रकाशकत्वादित्यत्रानुमाने) ‘ अनैकान्तः ’ सव्यभिचार इत्यर्थः । तथा च प्रदीपदृष्टान्तेन यथा प्रमाणान्तरनिवृत्तिः साध्यते, तथैव घटदृष्टान्तेन प्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षैव किञ्च साध्यत इति ।

४ अयं प्रसङ्ग इति । प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षत्वप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः । निवृत्तिदर्शनादिति-प्रमाणान्तरस्येति शेषः । प्रदीपे प्रदीपान्तरानपेक्षया प्रकाशकत्वदर्शनात् प्रमाणान्तरानपेक्षाण्येवा लोकवत् प्रमाणानि सेत्स्यन्तीत्येवमर्थमुपादीयते प्रसङ्गः ।

एवं प्रमेयसाधनायाप्युपादेयोऽविशेषहेतुत्वात् । यथा च स्थाल्यादिरूपग्रहणे प्रदीपप्रकाशः प्रमेयसाधनायोपादीयते, एवं प्रमाणसाधनायाप्युपादेयो विशेषहेत्वभावात् । सोऽयं विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहमन्तरेण दृष्टान्त एकस्मिन्पक्षे उपादेयो न प्रतिपक्षे इत्यनेकान्तः । एकस्मिन्श्च पक्षे दृष्टान्त उपादेयो न प्रतिपक्षे दृष्टान्त इत्यनेकान्तो विशेषहेत्वभावादिति । विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहे सति उपसंहाराभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः । विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहीतस्तु दृष्टान्त एकस्मिन्पक्षे उपसंहियमाणो न शक्योऽननुज्ञातुम् । एवं च सत्यनेकान्त इत्ययं प्रतिषेधो न भवति ।

‘प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रत्यक्षादिभिरुपलब्धावनवस्थेति’ चेत्, न । संविद्धिपय-निमित्तानामुपलब्ध्या व्यवहारोपपत्तेः । प्रत्यक्षेणार्थमुपलभं अनुमानेनार्थमुपलभे उपमानेनार्थमुपलभे आगमेनार्थमुपलभे इति, प्रत्यक्षं मे ज्ञानमानुमानिकं मे ज्ञानमौपमानिकं मे ज्ञानमागमिकं मे ज्ञानमिति-संवित्तिविषयं संवित्तिनिमित्तं चोपलभमानस्य धर्मार्थसुखापवर्गप्रयोजनस्तत्प्रत्यनीकपरिवर्जनप्रयोजनश्च व्यवहार उपपद्यते । सोऽयं तावत्येव निर्वर्तते । न चास्ति व्यवहारान्तरमनवस्थासाधनीयं येन प्रयुक्तोऽनवस्थामुपाददीतेति ॥ २० ॥

इति प्रमाणसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ॥

(३) प्रत्यक्षपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

सामान्येन प्रमाणानि परीक्ष्य विशेषेण परीक्ष्यन्ते । तत्र—

“ प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात् ” ॥ २१ ॥

१ एवं प्रमेयेति । प्रमेयाण्यप्यनपेक्षाण्येव सेस्यन्तीत्येवमर्थमुपादेयः । तथा च प्रमाणाभाव इत्यर्थः ।

२ स्थालीति । प्रदीपदृष्टान्ताश्रयणेन प्रमाणाभावप्रसङ्गः स्थाल्यादिदृष्टान्तोपादाने च प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षेति प्रदर्शितम् ।

३ विशेषहेत्विति । विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहमन्तरेण केवलदृष्टान्तोपादानेऽनिष्टं प्रदर्शयन् जनविंशसूत्रभाष्यप्रदर्शितरीत्या विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहेऽनिष्टाभावं दर्शयति भाष्यकारः ।

४ विशेषहेतुपरिग्रह इत्यादि वाक्यं भाष्यचन्द्रे सूत्रत्वेन स्वीकृतम् ।

५ प्रत्यक्षेति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । एतत्सूत्रस्थं लक्षणपदं केचिद् व्यवच्छेदकपरं वर्णयन्ति । तत्र सम्यक् । लक्षणं हि ‘ असमग्रं ’ सकलप्रत्यक्षाख्याप्त्या वा स्यात्, अतिव्यापकत्वेऽपेक्षितविशेषणान्तरानभिधानाद्वा स्यात् । न च प्रकृते तदेकमपि सम्भवति । यथाश्रुते सूत्रे लक्षणपदेन कारणाभिधानमेव प्रतिभासते । अतो यथाप्रतिभासमेव पूर्वपक्षोत्थानम् ।

“ आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षो हि कारणान्तरं नोक्तमिति ” ॥ २१ ॥

“ न चासंयुक्ते द्रव्ये संयोगजन्यस्य गुणस्योत्पत्तिरिति, ज्ञानोत्पत्तिदर्शना-
दात्ममनःसन्निकर्षः कारणम् । मनः-सन्निकर्षानपेक्षस्य चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य
ज्ञानकारणत्वे युगपदुत्पद्येन् बुद्ध्य इति मनःसन्निकर्षोऽपि कारणम् । तदिदं
सूत्रं पुरस्तात्कृतभाष्यम्—

“ नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ” ॥ २२ ॥

“ आत्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे नोत्पद्यते प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षा-
भाववदिति ॥ २२ ॥

सैति चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे ज्ञानोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् कारणभावं ब्रुवतो—

दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ २३ ॥

दिगादिषु सत्सु ज्ञानभावान्तान्यपि कारणानीति ।

१ न चासंयुक्तेत्यादिभाष्यं नात्ममनसोरिति द्वाविंशं सूत्रमपटित्वैव व्याचष्ट
इति तात्पर्यकाराः ।

२ तदिदमिति । ‘ इदम् ’ अग्रिमं द्वाविंशं सूत्रं ‘ पुरस्तात् ’ सूत्रपाठात् प्रागेव
‘ कृतम् ’ उपन्यस्तं भाष्यं ‘ नचासंयुक्त’-इत्यादिरूपं यस्य तदेवंरूपमित्यन्वयः ।
द्वाविंशस्य सूत्रस्य भाष्यं सूत्रपाठात् प्रागेवोपन्यस्तमिति भावः ।

३ नात्ममनसोरिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रं, तदुपपादकतया भाष्यकारेण व्याख्यासत्त्वात् ।
अस्य सिद्धान्तसूत्रत्वे ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादिति त्रयोविंशं सूत्रं तद्वयौगपद्येति चतुर्विंशं
चानर्थकमापद्येत, पूर्वैणैव गतार्थत्वादिति परिशुद्धौ स्पष्टम् ।

४ आत्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे यतः प्रत्यक्षं नोत्पद्यते तत एतत्सन्निकर्षस्य
सन्निकर्षेशः प्रत्यक्षलक्षणसूत्रं आवश्यक इति सूत्रार्थः ।

५ तदेवं सूत्राभ्यां पूर्वपक्षिते सति-भावमात्रेणेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादीनामेतैः कारणत्व-
मुक्तमिति मन्वानः पार्श्वस्थः प्रत्यक्षतिष्ठते सिद्धान्तितं पूर्वपक्षिणं च प्रति-सति-
चेत्यादि कारणानीत्यन्तेन । पार्श्वस्थस्यैवेयमुक्तिर्न पूर्वपक्षिणो नापि सिद्धान्तितः । यदि
पूर्वपक्षिण उक्तिस्तदाऽऽत्ममनस्सन्निकर्षादिकारणत्वव्युत्पादनेनासमग्रतापूर्वपक्षस्य
विरोधः । यदि सिद्धान्तित उक्तिस्तर्ह्यपिसिद्धान्तः ।

६ ब्रुवतः—सिद्धान्तितः पूर्वपक्षिणश्च—दिगादिष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्ग इति सूत्रेणान्वयः ।

७ दिगादिष्विति । न सति भावमात्रेण कारणत्वम् । तथा सत्याकाशादीनामपि
कारणत्वप्रसङ्गः । पूर्वपक्ष्युपन्यस्तात्ममनस्संयोगे सिद्धान्त्युपन्यस्तेन्द्रियादिसंयोगे च
कारणत्वं सति भावमात्रेणोपन्यस्तम् । अतो नैतयोरपि कारणत्वं युक्तमिति पार्श्वस्थस्य
हृदयम् ।

अकारणभावेऽपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्दिगादिसन्निधेरवर्जनीयत्वात् । यदाप्यकारणं दिगादीनि ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ, तदापि सत्सु दिगादिषु ज्ञानेन भवितव्यम् । न हि दिगादीनां सन्निधिः शक्यः परिवर्जयितुमिति । तत्र कारणभावे हेतुवचनम् । एतस्माद्धेतोर्दिगादीनि ज्ञानकारणानीति ॥ २३ ॥

“आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षस्तद्व्युपसङ्ख्येय ” इति ?

तत्रेदमुच्यते—

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः ॥ २४ ॥

ज्ञानंमात्मलिङ्गं तद्गुणत्वात् । न चासंयुक्ते द्रव्ये संयोगजस्य गुण-
स्योत्पत्तिरस्तीति ॥ २४ ॥

१ अकारणभाव इति पार्श्वस्थोक्तेः परिहारः । नान्वयमात्राकारणत्वनिश्चयोऽपि त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् । दिगादिषु नित्यविभुषु व्यतिरेकासम्भवाच्चेत्तेषां कारणत्वम् । सेन्द्रियशरीरवर्त्यात्ममनस्संयोगस्त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारितसामर्थ्यः, सुतस्य प्रत्यक्षा-
चनुत्पादादिति परिहारार्थः ।

२ हेतुवचनमिति आवश्यकमिति शेषः । दिगादीनां कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे हेतुर्भवता पार्श्वस्थेन वक्तव्य इत्यर्थः ।

३ पार्श्वस्थे निरस्ते पूर्वपक्ष्याह आत्मेति । यदि भावमात्रेण न कारणत्वम्, यदि चात्ममनःसन्निकर्षस्य कारणत्वं दिगाद्यपेक्षया स्पष्टतरं, तदाऽऽत्ममनःसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षलक्षणे उपसङ्ख्येयः निवेदयितव्य इत्यर्थः । विवरणकारमतेन तु—‘यदि भाव-
मात्रेण न कारणत्वं तर्ह्यात्ममनःसन्निकर्षोऽपि ‘उपसङ्ख्येयः’ त्याज्य इत्यर्थः ।

‘आत्ममनःसन्निकर्ष’ इत्यादिभाष्यग्रन्थमारभ्य प्रत्यक्षेत्यादिषड्विंशसूत्रपर्यन्त-
ग्रन्थस्य व्याख्यानं मतभेद उपलभ्यते । विवरणकारमतेन आत्मेत्यादिवाक्यस्य तात्पर्यं
‘आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षोऽपि त्याज्य’ इति । अस्योत्तरं चतुर्विंशपञ्चविंशसूत्रयोः प्रदत्तम् ।
तत्र पुनः पूर्वपक्षिणः प्रश्नः—एवं तर्हि आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षस्यापि सन्निवेश
आवश्यकोऽपि प्रत्यक्षलक्षणसूत्रे कथं नोक्त इति । अस्योत्तरे पञ्चविंशं सूत्रम् ।

४ तत्रेति । आत्मेत्यादिपूर्वपक्षोक्तेः समाधाने इदं ज्ञानेत्यादि सूत्रमुच्यते इति
सम्बन्धः ।

५ नानवरोध इति न्यायसूचीनिबन्धधृतः पाठः । नानवरोध इति बहुषु पुस्तकेषु
धृतः । उभयथाऽपि ‘नासंग्रह’ इत्येवार्थः पर्यवस्यति । नानवरोध इति विवरण-
समतः पाठः, ‘नान्यथासिद्धत्वमिति’ च तस्यार्थः ।

६ तद्गुणत्वादिति । यस्मादात्माश्रितमेव ज्ञानं सिध्यति तस्मादात्मनि ज्ञानं
लिङ्गमिति भाष्यार्थः ।

तदयौगपद्यलिङ्गत्वाच्च न मनसः ॥ २५ ॥

अनवरोध इति वर्तते । युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमित्युच्यमाने सिद्धयत्येव मनस्सन्निकर्षापेक्ष इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो ज्ञानकारणमिति ॥ २५ ॥

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य स्वशब्देन वचनम् ॥ २६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दानां निमित्तमात्ममनःसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षस्यैवेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष इत्यसमानः । असमानत्वात्तस्य ग्रहणम् ॥ २६ ॥

मुमुक्षुयासक्तमनसां चेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ॥ २७ ॥

वार्तिकाद्यभिमतमात्मैत्यादिवाक्यस्य तात्पर्य प्रागेव प्रदर्शितम्—आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षः सन्निवेशयितव्य इति । तस्योत्तरे चतुर्विंशं सूत्रम् । आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षस्थान्यथा सूचितत्वाच्च तस्य साक्षाद्ग्रहणमावश्यकमिति तस्यार्थः । कथञ्च स सूचित इत्यस्य प्रदर्शनाय पञ्चविंशं सूत्रम् ।

तत्र पुनराक्षेपः—यद्यात्मनःसन्निकर्षस्थान्यथा सूचितत्वादेव प्रत्यक्षलक्षणेऽसन्निवेशस्तर्हि तस्मादेव कारणादिन्द्रियार्थसंयोगस्यापि सन्निवेशो नातीवावश्यक इति । एतन्ममाधाने षड्विंशं सूत्रम् ।

१ आत्ममनःसंयोगस्यासमावेशे व्याख्याते इन्द्रियमनःसंयोगः कस्मान्नोक्त इति प्रश्ने सूत्रं तदयौगपद्येति ।

अत्र सूत्रद्वयोक्त समाधान प्रौढिवादमात्रम् । सवर्षां प्रत्यक्षकारणानां वचन-तल्लक्षणे नातीवावश्यकमित्येव पूर्वपक्षिणं प्रति समीचीनमुत्तरमिति वार्तिकतापर्ययोः स्पष्टम् ।

२ आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षवदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोऽप्यर्थतः प्राप्त एव । तथा सति कर्षमस्य समावेशः प्रत्यक्षलक्षणसूत्रे कृत इति प्रश्ने उत्तरम्—प्रत्यक्षेत्यादिसूत्रम् ।

आत्मादीनां सर्वेषामनभिधाने प्रत्यक्षं न लक्षितं स्यात् । तल्लक्षणाय च किञ्चिद्वक्तव्यम् । तत्रेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष एव वक्तव्यः, समस्तप्रत्यक्षव्यापकत्वात्, नेतरावात्ममनःसन्निकर्ष इन्द्रियमनःसन्निकर्षश्च, अव्यापकत्वाद्दित्यव्यापकत्वाच्चेति परमः सौत्रः समाधिः ।

उक्तमव्यापकत्वमतिव्यापकत्वं च प्रदर्शयतिऽग्रिमग्रन्थे ।

३ सुप्तेत्यादि सूत्रम् । ' सुप्तं ' ' व्यासक्तं ' चेत्येतदुभयमपि मनोविशेषणम् । इन्द्रियाथयोरिति । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वादित्येवंसमासकरणमेव सामान्यतः समुचितम् । ' इन्द्रियार्थयो'रित्येतस्य पृथक्करणेन च समासस्यासमर्थता स्पष्टा । किन्त्वेतदसमर्थसमासाकरणे सूत्रकारस्य तात्पर्यविशेषः—इन्द्रियार्थयोरेव पाठवलक्षणं प्राधान्यं यथा विशायेतेति । सन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वादिति—ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरिति शेषः ।

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य ग्रहणं, नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षस्येति । एकदा खल्वयं प्रबोधकालं प्रणिधाय सुप्तः प्रणिधानवशात् प्रबुध्यते । यदा तु तात्रौ ध्वनिस्पर्शौ प्रबोधकारणं भवतः तदा प्रसुप्तस्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षनिमित्तं प्रबोधज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । तत्र न ज्ञातुर्मनसश्च सन्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यं भवति, किं तर्हि, इन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य । न ह्यात्मा जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनस्तदा प्रेरयतीति ।

एकदा खल्वयं विषयान्तरासक्तमनाः सङ्कल्पवशाद्विषयान्तरं जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नप्रेरितेन मनसा इन्द्रियं संयोज्य तद्विषयान्तरं जानीते । यदा तु खल्वस्य निःसङ्कल्पस्य निर्जिज्ञासस्य च व्यासक्तमनसो बाह्यविषयोपनिपातनात् । ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यम् । न ह्यत्रासौ जिज्ञासमानः प्रयत्नेन मनः प्रेरयतीति ।

प्राधान्याच्चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य ग्रहणं कार्यं, गुणत्वात्, नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षस्येति ॥ २७ ॥

प्राधान्ये च हेत्वन्तरम्—

तैश्चापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम् ॥ २८ ॥

तैरिन्द्रियैरर्थैश्च व्यपदिश्यन्ते ज्ञानविशेषाः । “ कथम् ” ?

ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः सन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात् ‘ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य ग्रहणं ’ (प्रत्यक्षलक्षणसूत्रे) इति भाष्यग्रन्थेन सम्बन्धः ।

१ सुप्तमनसामिति सौत्रं विशेषणं व्याचष्टे एकदेति । एतत् साधारणानुभवं परामृशति—यदास्वित्यादि स्वनुभवविशेषं सूत्रकाराभिप्रेतमिति बोध्यम् ।

२ प्रणिधायेति । सङ्कल्प्येत्यर्थः । प्रदोषे सुप्तोऽर्धरात्रे मयोत्थातव्यमिति मनसि निधाय यद्यर्धरात्र एवावबुध्यते तदाऽस्त्येव मनस्सन्निकर्षोऽवबोधज्ञानकारणम् । यदा तु तीव्रध्वनिस्पर्शाभ्यामकस्मादेवावबुध्यते तत्रावबोधज्ञाने नास्ति कोऽपि मनस्सन्निकर्षस्य व्यापार इति विवेकः ।

३ प्रबोधज्ञानमिति । ‘ प्रबोधे ’ निद्राविच्छेदे ‘ ज्ञानं ’ द्रव्यादिस्पर्शस्येत्यर्थः ।

४ सुप्तमनसामिति व्याख्याय व्यासक्तमनसामिति व्याचष्टे एकदेति । एतदपि साधारणानुभवं परामृशति ।

५ जानीत इति । अत्र च स्पष्टो मनस्सन्निकर्षस्य व्यापारः ।

६ मनो न प्रेरयतीति—ततश्च नात्र मनस्सन्निकर्षस्य कोऽपि व्यापार इत्यर्थः ।

७ गुणत्वादिति । अप्राधान्यादित्यर्थः ।

८ प्राधान्य इति । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्येत्यर्थः ।

घ्राणेन जिघ्रति, चक्षुषा पश्यति, रसनया रसयतीति, घ्राणविज्ञानं चक्षुर्विज्ञानं रसनविज्ञानं गन्धविज्ञानं रूपाविज्ञानं रसविज्ञानमिति च—इन्द्रियविषयविशेषाच्च पञ्चधा बुद्धिर्भवति । अतः प्राधान्यमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्येति ॥ २८ ॥

“यदुक्तमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षग्रहणं कार्यम्, नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षस्येति, कस्मात् ? सुप्रव्यासक्तमनसामिन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षस्य ज्ञाननिमित्तत्वादिति । सोयम्—

“व्याहृतत्वादहेतुः ॥ २९ ॥

“यदि तावन् क्वचिदात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वं नेष्यते, तदा ‘युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति’ व्याहन्येत । नेदांर्नी मनसः सन्निकर्षमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोऽपेक्षते । मनःसंयोगानपेक्षायां च युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः । अथ मा भूद् व्याघात इति सर्वविज्ञानानामात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षः कारणमिष्यते, तदवस्थमेवेदं भवति—ज्ञानकारणत्वादात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षस्य ग्रहणं कार्यमिति” ॥ २९ ॥

न—अर्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् ॥ ३० ॥

नास्ति व्याघातः । न ह्यात्ममनः सन्निकर्षस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वं व्यभिचरति । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यमुपादीयते । अर्थविशेषप्राबल्याद्धि सुप्रव्यासक्तमनसां ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरेकदा भवति । अर्थविशेषः कश्चिदेवेन्द्रियार्थः । तस्य प्राबल्यं तीव्रतापदुते । तच्चार्यविशेषप्राबल्यमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षविषयं नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षविषयम् । तस्मादिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः प्रधानमिति ।

१ इन्द्रियविषयेति । इन्द्रियसङ्ख्यालुरोधादेव ज्ञानस्य पञ्चविधत्वमित्यर्थः ।

२ पूर्वेण सूत्रत्रयेणेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष एव कारणं ज्ञानस्य, न त्वात्ममनससन्निकर्ष इन्द्रियमनससन्निकर्षो वेत्युक्तं सिद्धातिनेति मन्वानःपूर्वपक्षी न्याहृतत्वादित्याक्षेपसूत्रमवतारयन्नाह यदुक्तमिति ।

३ ग्रहणमिति । प्रत्यक्षलक्षणसूत्रे सन्निवेश इत्यर्थः ।

४ नार्थेत्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ।

५ न ह्यात्मेति । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यमात्रमुच्यते नचात्ममनससंयोगस्येन्द्रियमनससंयोगस्य वा कारणत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते । अतो न व्याघात इत्यर्थः ।

“असति प्रणिधाने सङ्कल्पे चासति सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां यदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादुत्पद्यते ज्ञानं तत्र मनःसंयोगोऽपि कारणमिति मनसि क्रियाकारणं वाच्यमिति ” ।

यथैव ज्ञातुः स्वल्पमिच्छाजनितः प्रयत्नो मनसः प्रेरक आत्मगुण एवमात्मानि गुणान्तरं सर्वस्य साधकं प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितमस्ति, येन प्रेरितं मन इन्द्रियेण सम्ब्रध्यते । तेन ह्यप्रेर्यमाणे मनसि संयोगाभावाद् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तौ सर्वार्थताऽस्य निवर्तते । एषितव्यं चास्य गुणान्तरस्य द्रव्यगुणकर्मकारणत्वम् । अन्यथा हि चतुर्विधानामणूनां भूतसूक्ष्माणां मनसां च ततोऽन्यस्य क्रियाहेतोरसम्भवाच्छरीरेन्द्रियविषयाणामनुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः ॥ ३० ॥

इति प्रत्यक्षलक्षणपरीक्षा

(४) प्रत्यक्षानुमानत्वपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

“ प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेः ” ॥ ३१ ॥

१ पूर्वपक्षी पृच्छति असतीति । यत्र प्रयत्नादि मनःप्रेरकं वर्तते तत्र मनोव्यापारः सुवचः । यत्र तु सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां ज्ञानेषु प्रयत्नादिकं मनःप्रेरकं नास्ति तत्र मनोव्यापारस्य किं कारणमिति प्रश्नार्थः ।

२ गुणान्तरमिति । अदृष्टमिति यावत् ।

३ संयोगाभावादिति । अन्यस्य क्रियाहेतोरभावादित्यर्थः ।

भांगोऽदृष्टस्य प्रधानं प्रयोजनं तन्नान्तरीयकतया जन्मायुषी आक्षिपति । स्वसम्बन्धिसुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारश्च भोगः । तदायतनं च शरीरम् । अप्राप्तं च मनो न शरीरे भोगं वा भोगविषयां सुखदुःखे वा तयोः कारणं ज्ञानं वा जनयितुमर्हति । अतो नूनं तत्प्राप्तिहेतोर्मनःकर्मणः कारणमदृष्टमेव वक्तव्यम् । अन्यथाऽस्य सर्वद्रव्यगुणकर्मकारणता न स्यात् ।

४ सर्वार्थतेति । सर्वद्रव्यगुणकर्मकारणतेत्यर्थः ।

५ ननु माभूत्सर्वार्थतेत्यत आह एषितव्यमिति ।

६ भूतसूक्ष्माणामित्यणूनां विशेषणम् ।

७ तत इति । अदृष्टादित्यर्थः ।

८ स्वरूपतः प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं परीक्षितम् । अथेदानीं प्रसङ्गेन विषयतः परीक्ष्यते । अयमेव च प्रकरणार्थः । तत्र तत्प्रसङ्गपादनं प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानेऽन्तर्भावं कुर्वत् पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम्-प्रत्यक्षमित्यादि । ‘ एकदेशस्य ’ पुरोवर्त्यवयवभागस्य ‘ ग्रहणात् ’ इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादुपलब्धेः अवयविनो वृक्षस्य उपलब्धिरिति भावः ।

अयमत्र पूर्वपक्षसङ्गपः । न ह्यवयवी नाम कश्चिदर्थान्तरभूतोऽवयवभ्योऽस्ति, अपि त्ववयवा एव परमार्थसन्तः । तेषु च कतिपयानवयवान् गृहीत्वा तत्सहचरि-

“ यदिदमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादुत्पद्यते ज्ञानं वृक्ष इति, एतत् किल प्रत्यक्षं, तत् खल्वनुमानमेव । कस्मात् ? एकदेशग्रहणात् वृक्षस्योपलब्धेः । अर्वाग्भा-
गमयं गृहीत्वा वृक्षमुपलभते । न चैकदेशो वृक्षः । तत्र यथा धूमं गृहीत्वा
वह्निमनुमिनोति तादृगेव तद्भवति” ॥

१ किं पुनर्गृह्यमाणादेकदेशादर्थान्तरमनुमेयं मन्यसे ?

“ अवयवसमूहपक्षे अवयवान्तराणि, द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिपक्षे तानि
चावयवी चेति ” ।

अवयवसमूहपक्षे तावदेकदेशग्रहणाद् वृक्षबुद्धेरभावः । नागृह्यमाणमेक-
देशान्तरं वृक्षो गृह्यमाणैकदेशवदिति । अथ “ एकदेशग्रहणादेकदेशान्तरानुमाने
समुदायप्रतिसन्धानात् तत्र वृक्षबुद्धिः—” न तर्हि वृक्षबुद्धिरनुमानमेवं सति भवि-
तुमर्हतीति । द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिपक्षे नावयव्यनुमेयोऽभ्यैकदेशसम्बद्धस्याग्रहणात्

तानवयवाननुमाय प्रतिसन्धानजेयं वृक्षबुद्धिः । तानेवावयवानालम्बमानाननुमाया-
नुमानमिति प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानेऽन्तर्भावात् विभागसूत्रेण न्यूनाधिकसङ्ख्याव्यवच्छेदो
नोपपद्यत इति ।

१ प्रत्यक्षमिति । सिद्धान्त्यभिमतमिति यावत् ।

२ सिद्धान्ती पृच्छति किं पुनरिति ।

३ पूर्वपक्षी प्रत्युत्तरयति अवयवेति । द्विधा चात्र प्रतिपत्तिः । अवयवसमूह
एवावयवी नावयवेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति पक्षे दृष्टेभ्योऽवयवेभ्योऽन्येऽवयवा अनुमीयन्ते ।
अवयवेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमेवोत्पद्यते कश्चिदवयवी नामेति पक्षे दृष्टेभ्योऽवयवेभ्योऽन्येऽवयवा
अवयवी चानुमीयन्ते इति ।

४ प्रथमं पक्षं दूषयन्नाह सिद्धान्ती अवयवेति । यथैव प्रत्यक्षदृष्टोऽर्वाग्भागो न
‘ वृक्षः ’ एवमनुमितौ परमध्यभागावपि न ‘ वृक्षः ’ । ततश्च ‘ वृक्षो’ऽयमिति बुद्धेर-
पलाप एवेति भावः ।

५ पूर्वपक्षिणोऽभिप्रायान्तरं प्रकटयति । अथेति । कतिपयानवयवान् गृहीत्वा
तत्सहचरितानवयवाननुमाय प्रतिसन्धानजा बुद्धिरियं ‘ वृक्ष’ इति—इति पूर्वपक्षिणोऽ-
भिप्रायः ।

६ उक्तमभिप्रायं दूषयति न तर्हीति । त्वदुक्तानुसारेणावयवान्तराण्येवानु-
मितानि न वृक्ष इति । तथा च प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति भावः ।

७ द्वितीयं पक्षं दूषयति द्रव्यान्तरेति । अवयवी यद्यनुमेयस्तर्हि तेन सहावयवानां
व्याप्तिसम्बन्धग्रहणमवश्यं स्वीकणीयम् । न च सम्बद्धयोर्ग्रहणमन्तरेण सम्बन्धग्रहणं
सम्भवति । तथा चोक्तव्याप्तिसम्बन्धग्रहणकालेऽवयवव्यपि गृहीतः स्यात्—इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।
तादृशे चाभ्युपगमेऽवयवविनः प्रत्यक्षग्रहणमभ्युपेतमेव स्यात् । ततश्च तस्य नानुमेयत्व-
मिति हृदयम् ।

ग्रहणे चाविशेषादनुमेयत्वाभावः । तस्माद् वृक्षबुद्धिरनुमानं न भवति ॥३१॥

एकदेशग्रहणमाश्रित्य प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानत्वमुपपाद्यते । तच्च—

नै, प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदप्युपलम्भात् ॥ ३२ ॥

न प्रत्यक्षमनुमानम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपलम्भात् । यत् तदेकदेश-
ग्रहणमाश्रीयते प्रत्यक्षेणासावुपलम्भः । न चोपलम्भो निर्विषयोऽस्ति । याव-
च्चार्थजातं तस्य विषयस्तावदभ्यनुज्ञायमानं प्रत्यक्षव्यवस्थापकं भवति ।

“ किं पुनस्ततोऽन्यदर्थजातम् ” ।

अवयवी समुदायो वा । नै चैकदेशग्रहणमनुमानं भावयितुं शक्यं
हेत्वभावादिति ।

अन्यथापि च प्रत्यक्षस्य नानुमानत्वप्रसङ्गः । तत्पूर्वकत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षपूर्-
वकमनुमानम् । सम्बद्धावग्निधूमौ प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्टवतो धूमप्रत्यक्षदर्शनादभावनु-
मानं भवति । तत्र यच्च सम्बद्धयोर्लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः प्रत्यक्षं, यच्च लिङ्गमात्रप्रत्य-
क्षग्रहणं, नैतदन्तरेणानुमानस्य प्रवृत्तिरस्ति । न त्वेतदनुमानम्, इन्द्रियार्थसन्नि-
कर्षजत्वात् । न चानुमेयस्येन्द्रियेण सन्निकर्षादनुमानं भवति । सोऽयं प्रत्यक्षा-
नुमानयोर्लक्षणभेदो महानाश्रयितव्य इति ॥ ३२ ॥

नै चैकदेशोपलब्धिरवयविसद्भावात् ॥ ३३ ॥

न चैकदेशोपलब्धिमात्रम् । किं तर्हि, एकदेशोपलब्धिः तत्सहचरितावय-
व्युपलब्धिश्च । कस्मात् ? अवयविसद्भावात् । अस्ति ह्ययमेकदेशव्यतिरिक्तोऽव-

१ उत्तरसूत्रमवतारयति एकदेशेति ।

२ तच्चेति सूत्रगतेन 'न' इत्यनेन सम्बध्यते ।

३ नैत्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । तत्—प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानत्वं—'न' सम्भवति, 'यावत्'
—एकदेशभूतस्यार्थजातस्य ग्रहणम् एकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेरिति पूर्वसूत्रोक्ते हेतौ इष्यते
—'तावत्' अपि प्रत्यक्षेणैव । अतस्तावतोऽर्थजातस्य प्रत्यक्षेणोपलम्भात्—'प्रत्यक्षम-
नुमानम्' इति प्रतिज्ञा एकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेरितिहेतुना विरुद्धेति विरुद्धो हेतुः ।
अथ चैकदेशग्रहणस्य प्रत्यक्षेणानभ्युपगमे प्रमाणान्तरस्य तत्रानुपपत्तेरसिद्धो हेतुः ।
सेयमुभयतः पाशारज्जुरित्यर्थः ।

४ नन्वनुमानेनैकदेशग्रहणात्तसिद्धो हेतुरित्यत आह नचेति । एवं सत्यनवस्था-
प्रसङ्गात् तादृशहेतोरभावात् एकदेशग्रहणमप्यनुमानमेवेति पक्षो न युज्यत इत्यर्थः ।

५ नचैकेत्यादि सूत्रम् । तात्पर्यकारास्वेतत्सूत्रत्वेन न परिगृह्णन्ति । न्यायसूची-
निबन्धेऽस्यानुपलम्भः । तदेतद्भाष्यमनुभाष्य वार्तिककारो व्याचष्ट इति च व्याख्यानम् ।

यवी । तस्यावयवस्थानस्योपलब्धिकारणप्राप्तस्यैकदेशोपलब्धावनुपलब्धिरेनुपपन्ने-
ति ।

“ अकृत्स्नग्रहणादिति चेत् ” न, कारणतोऽन्यस्यैकदेशस्याभावात् । “ नै-
चावयवाः कृत्स्ना गृह्यन्ते अवयवैरेवावयवान्तरव्यवधानाद्, नावयवी कृत्स्नो
गृह्यत इति । नायं गृह्यमाणेष्ववयवेषु परिसमाप्त इति । सेयमेकदेशोपलब्धि-
निवृत्तैवेति ” ।

कृत्स्नमिति वै खल्वशेषतायां सत्यां भवति, अकृत्स्नमिति शेषे सति ।
तच्चैतदवयवेषु बहुष्वस्ति, अव्यवधाने ग्रहणाद् व्यवधाने चाग्रहणादिति ।

अङ्गं तु भवान् पृष्ठो व्याचष्टाम्—गृह्यमाणस्यावयविनः किमगृहीतं मन्यसे,
‘येनैकदेशोपलब्धिः स्यादिति । न ह्यस्य कारणेभ्योऽन्ये एकदेशा भवन्तीति
तत्रावयववृत्तं नोपपद्यत इति । इदं तस्य वृत्तम्—येषामिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्ग्रहणमव-

अवयविनोऽसत्त्वं मन्यमानेन पूर्वपक्षिणा एकदेशोपलब्ध्या वृक्षबुद्धेरनुमानत्व-
मुक्तम् । नत्विमेकदेशमात्रोपलब्धिरपि तु तस्य तत्सहचरितस्य चावयविनः,
उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य तस्य सिद्धेरिति सूत्रार्थः ।

१ अवयवस्थानस्येति—अवयवसमानदेशस्येति यावत् ।

२ अनुपपन्नेति । महदनेकद्रव्यरूपाण्युपलब्धिकारणानि । तान्येकदेशवदेकदेशि-
न्यवयविन्यपि विद्यन्ते । तस्मादेकदेश उपलभ्यते नैकदेशीत्युक्तमिति हृदयम् ।

३ आक्षेपभाष्यम्—अकृत्स्नेति ।

४ उत्तरभाष्यम्—न कारणत इति । ‘कारणतः’ समवायिकारणत इत्यर्थः ।

५ आक्षेपभाष्यविवरणम्—नचावयवा इति । एकदेशग्रहणनिवृत्त्यर्थं हि त्वयाऽ-
न्यविग्रहणमास्थीयते । न चैतावता कृत्स्नग्रहणसम्भवो यत एकदेशनिवृत्तिः स्यात् । न
ह्यवयविग्रहणे कृत्स्ना अवयवा गृहीता भवन्ति । नाप्यवयवी गृहीतो भवति,
तस्यार्वाग्भागस्थस्य ग्रहणेऽपि मध्यमपरभागस्थस्याग्रहणादित्याक्षेपभाष्यार्थः ।

६ उत्तरभाष्यविवरणम्—कृत्स्नमिति । कृत्स्नमित्यनेकस्याशेषस्याभिधानमेकदेश
इति चानेकत्वे सति कस्यचिदभिधानमिति वार्तिकम् ।

७ तच्चैतदित्यवयविनं परामृशति ।

८ येनेति । येनाग्रहणेन प्रत्यक्षमेवैकदेशस्यैवाभ्युपगतं स्यान्नावयविन इत्यर्थः ।
अस्येति । अवयविन इत्यर्थः ।

९ कारणेभ्य इति । समवायिकारणभूतेभ्योऽवयवेषुऽन्यत् किमप्येकदेशपद-
वा ह्यं नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

१० तत्रेति । अवयविन्यवयवस्वभाव आरोपयितुं न युक्त इत्यर्थः ।

यवानां तैः सह गृह्यते, येषामवयवानां व्यवधानाद्ग्रहणं तैः सह न गृह्यते । न चैतत्कृतोऽस्ति भेद इति ।

समुदायशेषता वा । समुदायो वृक्षः स्यात् तत्प्राप्तिर्वा, उभयथा ग्रहणाभावः । मूलस्कन्धशाखापलाशादीनामशेषता वा समुदायो वृक्ष इति स्यात् प्राप्तिर्वा समुदायिनामिति । उभयथा समुदायभूतस्य वृक्षस्य ग्रहणं नोपपद्यते इति । अवयवैस्तावदवयवान्तरस्य व्यवधानाद्ग्रहणं नोपपद्यते । प्राप्ति-ग्रहणमपि नोपपद्यते प्राप्तिमतामग्रहणात् ।

“सेयमेकदेशग्रहणसहचरिता वृक्षबुद्धिर्द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तौ कल्पते न समुदायमात्रे इति ॥ ३३ ॥

(४) अवयविपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् प्रासङ्गिकम् ॥

“साध्यत्वादवयविनि सन्देहः” ॥ ३४ ॥

“यदुक्तमवयविसद्भावात् इति, अयमहेतुः—साध्यत्वात् । साध्यं तावदेतत्कारणेभ्यो द्रव्यान्तरमुत्पद्यत इति ।

अनुपपादितमेतत् । एवं च सति विप्रतिपत्तिमात्रं भवति । विप्रतिपत्ते-श्चावयविनि संशय इति ” ॥ ३४ ॥

१ नचेति । अर्वागभागस्थस्यावयविनि उपलब्धावपि परमध्यभागस्थस्य नोपलब्धिरिति पूर्वपक्षोद्भावितं निराकरोति । एकभागस्थैरवयवैस्सहावयवी गृह्यतेऽपरभागस्थैश्च सह न गृह्यत इत्येतावन्मात्रेण न नानावयविसिद्धिः ।

२ यः पुनर्मन्यतेऽवयवसमुदाय एवावयवीति तं प्रत्याह समुदायीति ।

३ ग्रहणाभाव इति—यद्यवयवी नाम न कश्चित्स्यादिति शेषः ।

४ सेयमिति । अवयवीनाम द्रव्यान्तरं नावयवसमुदायमात्रमित्येतत्पक्ष एवोक्ता बुद्धिः सम्भवति नान्यथेत्यर्थः ।

५ साध्यत्वादिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । परं प्रत्यसिद्धत्वमेवावयविनः ‘साध्यत्वम्’ । स खल्वेवं मेने—“संविद्धिष्ठा हि विषयव्यवस्थितिः । स एव संविद्धा व्यवस्थाप्यते यस्तस्या विषयः । स एव तस्या विषयो यस्तस्यामाकारमर्पयति । न च निरन्तरोत्पन्न-रूपादिपरमाण्वतिरिक्तमवयवाकारं विभ्रतीं संविदमीक्षामहे, किन्तु निरन्तरोत्पन्न-रूपादिपरमाण्वाकाराम् । स्थौल्यं च यद्यपि न परमाणूनां प्रत्येकमस्ति, तथाऽपि प्रति-भासधर्मः बहुत्वादिवत् न पुनरवयविनमेकमवस्थापयितुमर्हति” इति । तमेवंमा-निनं प्रत्यवयविनोऽसिद्धेर्विप्रतिपत्तिः । ततः साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे सति संशय इति सूत्रार्थः ।

६ अनुपपादितमिति—असिद्धमित्यर्थः ।

सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेः ॥ ३५ ॥

यद्यवयवी नास्ति सर्वस्य ग्रहणं नोपपद्यते । “ किं तत्सर्वम् ? ”

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः ।

“ कथं कृत्वा ? ”

परमाणुसमवस्थानं तावद् दर्शनविषयो न भवत्यतीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम् ।
द्रव्यान्तरञ्चावयविभूतं दर्शनविषयो नास्ति । दर्शनविषयस्थाश्रमे द्रव्यादयो
गृह्यन्ते । ते निरधिष्ठाना न गृह्येरन् । गृह्यन्ते तु कुम्भोऽयं श्याम एको महान्
संयुक्तः स्पन्दते अस्ति मृन्मयश्चेति । सन्ति चेमे गुणादयो धर्मा इति । तेन
सर्वस्य ग्रहणात्पश्यामोऽस्ति द्रव्यान्तरभूतोऽवयवीति ॥ ३५ ॥

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३६ ॥

अवयव्यर्थान्तरभूत इति ।

१ सर्वाग्रहणमिति सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । ‘ सर्वस्य ’ द्रव्यगुणादेः ‘ अग्रहणं ’ स्यात्,
यद्यवयवी न सिध्येत्, परमाणूनां तद्वत्गुणादीनां चाग्राह्यत्वात् ।

सर्वाग्रहणमित्यस्यार्थान्तरमपि वर्णितं वार्तिककारेण । तद्यथा । सर्वैः प्रमाणैरग्रह-
णम् । कथम् ? प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमहद्विषयत्वात् । अवयविप्रत्याख्याने च न बाह्यकरण-
प्रत्यक्षविषयोऽस्ति । प्रत्यक्षस्य चाभावादनुमानादेरप्यभावः । सेयं सर्वप्रमाणनिवृत्तिः ।
उपलभ्यन्ते चार्थाः प्रत्यक्षादिभिः प्रमाणैः । तैः सर्वैरग्रहणात् पश्यामोऽस्यवयवीति ।
तदिदं सूत्रमवयव्यनभ्युपगमे विरोधप्रदर्शनपरम् ।

२ नास्तीति—पूर्वपक्षमतेनेति शेषः ।

३ निरधिष्ठाना इति । अवयव्यसत्त्वे तेषामधिष्ठानासम्भवादित्यर्थः ।

४ धारणेत्यादिसिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेश्च अवयवी अर्थान्तरभूत इति
सूत्रभाष्ययोरन्वयः । भाष्यस्थवाक्यपूर्तिः सूत्रस्थेन चकारेण सूचितेति वार्तिक-
काराः ।

५ ‘ अवयवी अर्थान्तरभूतः—धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेः ’—इत्येवं चेदमनुमानवाक्ये
व्यधिकरणो हेतुः । धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेर्हि नावयव्यधिकरणं भवितुमर्हति । अतः तत्रो-
क्तमनुमानं तात्पर्यकारो व्यतिरेकिरूपमेव व्याख्यातवान् । तद्यथा—योऽयं दृश्यमानो
गोघटादिरवयवी (परमाणुसमूहभावेन विवादाध्यासितः) नासावनवयवी—धारणा-
कर्षणानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात्—यो योऽनवयवी तत्र तत्र धारणाकर्षणे न भवतः यथा
विज्ञानादौ—न चायं गोघटादिस्तथा—तस्मान्ज्ञानवयवीति ॥ धारणाकर्षणानुपपत्ति-
प्रसङ्गादिति व्यतिरेकिस्वभाविष्कर्तुमेव तात्पर्यकृतमयमायासः । परमार्थतरतु धारणा-
कर्षणवत्त्वादित्येव सूत्रोक्तहेत्वर्थ इति परिशुद्धिः ।

“सङ्ग्रहकारिते वै धारणाकर्षणे । सङ्ग्रहो नाम संयोगसहचरितं गुणान्तरं स्नेहद्रवत्वकारितमपां संयोगादामे कुम्भे, अभिसंयोगात्पके । यदि त्ववयविकारिते अभविष्यतां पांशुराशिप्रभृतिष्वप्यज्ञास्येताम् । द्रव्यान्तरानुत्पत्तौ च तृणोपलकाष्ठादिषु जतुसङ्गृहीतेष्वपि नाभविष्यतामिति ।”

“अथावयविनं प्रत्याचक्षाणको मा भूत् प्रत्यक्षलोप इत्यणुसञ्चयं दर्शनविषयं प्रतिजानानः किमनुयोक्तव्य इति ?”

एकमिदं द्रव्यमित्येकबुद्धेर्विषयं पर्यनुयोज्यः । किमेकबुद्धिरभिन्नार्थविषयेति आहो स्वित् भिन्नार्थविषयेति ? अभिन्नार्थविषयेति चेद्, — अर्थान्तरानुज्ञानादवयविसिद्धिः । नानार्थविषयेति चेद्, — भिन्नेष्वेकदर्शनानुपपत्तिः । अनेकस्मिन्नेक इति व्याहृता बुद्धिर्न दृश्यत इति ॥ ३६ ॥

सेनावनवद् ग्रहणमिति चेन्नातीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम् ॥ ३७ ॥

“यथा सेनाङ्गेषु वनाङ्गेषु च दूराद्गृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वेष्वेकमिदमित्युपपद्यते बुद्धिः, एवमणुषु सञ्चितेष्वगृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वेष्वेकमिदमित्युपपद्यते बुद्धिरिति” ।

१ पूर्वपक्षी सूत्रोक्तं हेतुं दूषयति सङ्ग्रहकारित इत्यादि नाभविष्यतामित्यन्तम् । पांशुराशावपि सिद्धान्तानुसारेणावयविनः सङ्गावात् तत्रापि धारणाकर्षणे स्याताम् । जतुसङ्गृहीतेषु च तृणोपलकाष्ठादिषूपलभ्येते धारणाकर्षणे, नच तत्रावयवी द्रव्यान्तरभूत उत्पद्यते सिद्धान्तानुसारेणापि । एवं चोभयथापि धारणाकर्षणाभ्याञ्चावयविसिद्धिरिति पूर्वपक्षसङ्क्षेपः ।

२ सिद्धान्त्याचार्येणानुक्त एव परिहारे पूर्वपक्षयुक्तिभिर्विचलितहृदयः शिष्यः पृच्छति अथावयविनमिति । योऽयं पूर्वपक्ष्यवयविनं प्रतिषेधत्यणुसञ्चयमेव च प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वेन स्वीकरोति तमेवंभूतं प्रति को हेतुरूपन्यसितव्य इति प्रश्नार्थः ।

३ आचार्यः शिष्यप्रश्नोत्तरव्याजेन पूर्वपक्षं परिहरति एकमिति । एकमिदं द्रव्यमित्यस्या बुद्धेः को विषय इति स प्रष्टव्य इत्यर्थः ।

४ अभिन्नार्थेति—नानेकार्थविषयेति यावत् । अस्या एकबुद्धेः किमेक एव विषय उत नाना ? एकश्चेत् स एवावयवीति सिद्धं नः समीहितम् । नाना चेत् पूर्वपक्षिणो व्याघातः ।

५ अगृह्यमाणेति—सामान्यतो दृश्यानामपि दूरत्वाद्यनेककारणवशात् क्वचिद्दर्शनमिति भावः ।

यथा गृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वानां सेनावनाङ्गानामारात्कारणान्तरतः पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणं, यथा गृह्यमाणजातीनां पलाश इति वा खदिर इति वा नाराज्जातिग्रहणं भवति, यथा गृह्यमाणप्रस्पन्दानां नारात् स्पन्दग्रहणं, गृह्यमाणे चार्थजाते पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणादेकमिति भाक्तः प्रत्ययो भवति । न त्वणूनां गृह्यमाणपृथक्त्वानां कारणतः पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणाद्भाक्त एकप्रत्ययोऽतीन्द्रियत्वाद्गणूनामिति ।

इदमेव च परीक्ष्यते—किमेकप्रत्ययोऽणुसञ्चयविषय आहोस्विन्नेति । अणुसञ्चय एव सेनावनाङ्गानि । न च परीक्ष्यमाणमुदाहरणमिति युक्तं, साध्यत्वादिति ।

दृष्टिमिति चेन्न । तद्विषयस्य परीक्षोपपत्तेः । यदपि मन्यते—“ दृष्टमिदं सेनावनाङ्गानां पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणादभेदेनैकमिति ग्रहणं, न च दृष्टं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुमिति । ” तच्च नैवम्, तद्विषयस्य परीक्षोपपत्तेः । दर्शनविषय एवायं परीक्ष्यते । योऽयमेकमिति प्रत्ययो दृश्यते स परीक्ष्यते । किं द्रव्यान्तरविषयो वा अथाणुसञ्चयविषय इति । अत्र दर्शनमन्यतरस्य साधकं न भवति । नानाभावे चाणूनां पृथक्त्वस्याग्रहणादभेदेनैकमिति ग्रहणम् अतस्मिन्स्तदिति प्रत्ययः यथा स्थाणौ पुरुष इति । ततः किम् ? अतस्मिन्स्तदिति प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानापेक्षित्वात् प्रधानसिद्धिः ।

“ स्थाणौ पुरुष इति प्रत्ययस्य किं प्रधानम् ? ”

योऽसौ पुरुषे पुरुषप्रत्ययस्तस्मिन्सति पुरुषसामान्यग्रहणात् स्थाणौ पुरुषोऽयमिति । एवं नानाभूतेष्वेकमिति सामान्यग्रहणात् प्रधाने सति भवि-

१ गृह्यमाण इति । यत्र सामान्यतो दृश्यानामर्थानां पृथक्त्वञ्च दृश्यते तत्र पृथक्त्वादर्शनादेकबुद्धिर्या जायते सा भाक्तैवेत्यर्थः । अणूनां त्वदृश्यत्वान्न तत्र तादृशभाक्तप्रत्ययस्यावकाशः ।

२ इदमिति । सर्वत्रावयविनमपह्नुवानस्यातीन्द्रियं वाऽणुसञ्चयमात्रमिच्छतः सेनावनाङ्गानामपि करिकुञ्जरादीनामतीन्द्रियाणुसञ्चयमात्रत्वात् दृष्टान्ताभाव इति तात्पर्यार्थः ।

३ साध्यत्वादिति साध्यसमत्वादित्यर्थः ।

४ तद्विषयस्येति । प्रत्यक्षविषयस्यैव परीक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च प्रत्यक्षमेव साधनबाधनकोटौ प्रवेशमर्हति ।

५ प्रधानेति । यद्विषयं यथार्थज्ञानं तद्विषयमेव मिथ्याज्ञानमपि सम्भवति । यथार्थज्ञानमेव मिथ्याज्ञानस्य प्रधानमित्यत्रोच्यते । तथाच यथा पुरुषे पुरुषबुद्धिः सत्या असत्यायाः स्थाणौ पुरुषबुद्धेः प्रधानम् । एवं अनेकविषयेष्वेकमिति मिथ्याज्ञानस्य कुत्राप्येकविषये एकबुद्ध्या सत्यया भवितव्यम् ।

तुमर्हति । प्रधानं च सर्वस्याग्रहणादिति नोपपद्यते । तस्मादभिन्न एवायमभेद-
प्रत्यय एकमिति ।

“ इन्द्रियान्तरविषयेष्वभेदप्रत्ययः प्रधानमिति ” चेद्—न विशेषहेत्व-
भावाद् दृष्टान्ताव्यवस्था । श्रोत्रादिविषयेषु शब्दादिष्वभिन्नेष्वेकप्रत्ययः
प्रधानमनेकस्मिन्नेकप्रत्ययस्येति । एवं च सति दृष्टान्तोपादानं न व्यवतिष्ठते,
विशेषहेत्वभावात् । अणुषु सञ्चितेष्वेकप्रत्ययः किमतास्मिस्तदिति प्रत्ययः
स्थाणौ पुरुषप्रत्ययवत् ? अथार्थस्य तथाभावात्तास्मिस्तदिति प्रत्ययो यथा
शब्दस्यैकत्वादेकः शब्द इति ? । विशेषहेतुपरिग्रहमन्तरेण दृष्टान्तौ
संशयमापादयत इति । कुम्भवत्सञ्चयमात्रं गन्धादयोऽपीत्यनुदाहरणं गन्धादय
इति ।

एवं परिमाणसंयोगस्पन्दजातिविशेषप्रत्ययानयनुयोक्तव्यः । तेषु चैवं
प्रसङ्ग इति ।

एकत्वबुद्धिस्तास्मिस्तदिति प्रत्यय इति विशेषहेतुर्महदिति प्रत्ययेन
सामानाधिकरण्यात् । एकमिदं महत्चेति एकविषयौ प्रत्ययौ सामानाधिकरणौ
भवतः । तेन विज्ञायते यन्महत्तदेकमिति ।

“ अणुसमूहातिशयग्रहणे महत्प्रत्यय ” इति चेत्—सोऽयममहत्स्व-
णुषु महत्प्रत्ययोऽतास्मिस्तदिति प्रत्ययो भवतीति । “ किञ्चातः ? ”

अतास्मिस्तदिति प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानापेक्षित्वात् प्रधानसिद्धिरिति भवितव्यं
महत्येव महत्प्रत्ययेनेति ।

१ दृष्टान्तोपादानमिति । दृष्टान्तमात्रीपन्यासेन न किञ्चित्सिध्यतीत्यर्थः ।

२ कुम्भवदिति । यांश्च शब्दादीन् प्रधानप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वेन भवान् प्रतिपद्यते ते-
ऽपि सञ्चिता एव । वैभासिकाः खलु भूतभौतिकसमूहात् पटादपि उत्पन्नान् शब्दादीन्
हृच्छन्ति । अतस्तेषां मते शब्दादयोऽपि सञ्चिता एव । अपि चास्मन्मतेऽपि शब्दादीनां
न मुख्यमेकत्वम्, सङ्ख्याया गुणस्य गुणेषु शब्दादिष्वप्येकत्वप्रत्ययो भाक्त एवेति
हृद्यम् । भाक्तत्वेऽप्यस्यैकत्वप्रत्ययस्य क्वचित्सत्यत्वम्—यत्र न कोऽपि बाधकप्रत्यय
उदेति, क्वचिन्मिथ्यात्वं—यत्र बाधप्रत्ययस्योदय इति विवेकः ।

३ एवमिति । अवयविनं प्रत्याचक्षाणक एवं पर्यनुयोक्तव्य इत्यन्वयः । यद्यवय-
विनमर्थान्तरं न प्रतिपद्यसे ‘ महत् ’ इति ‘ संयुक्त ’ इति ‘ अभवो गच्छतीति ’
वा प्रत्यया न प्राप्नुवन्ति । नह्यतीन्द्रियेषु परमाणुषु ते प्रत्यया युज्यन्त इत्यर्थः ।

४, उक्तेषु परिमाणस्पन्दजातिविशेषेषु चतुर्षु परिमाणं परामृशति एकत्वेत्यादिना।

“अणुः शब्दो महानिति च व्यवसायात् प्रधानसिद्धिरिति ” चेद्-न, मन्दतीव्रताग्रहणमित्येत्तानवधारणाद् यथा द्रव्ये । अणुः शब्दोऽल्पो मन्द इत्येतस्य ग्रहणं महान् शब्दः पटुस्तीव्र इत्येतस्य ग्रहणं कस्मात् ? इयत्तानवधारणात् । न ह्ययं महान् शब्द इति व्यवस्यन्नियानयमित्यवधारयति । यथा बदरामलकवित्वादीनि ।

१ संयुक्ते इमे इति च द्वित्वसमानाश्रयप्राप्तिग्रहणम् ।

“द्वौ समुदायावाश्रयः संयोगस्येति ” चेत्—कोऽयं समुदायः ?

“प्राप्तिरनेकस्थानेका वा प्राप्तिरेकस्य समुदाय इति चेत् ” प्राप्तेरग्रहणं प्राप्त्याश्रितायाः । संयुक्ते इमे वस्तुनी इति नात्र द्वे प्राप्ती संयुक्ते गृह्येते ।

१ अणुः शब्द इति । अणुः शब्दो महानित्यत्राणुत्वमहस्त्वयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं लक्ष्यते । इदमेव च प्रधानं भविष्यति परमाणौ महत्प्रत्ययस्येत्यर्थः ।

२ इत्येति । प्रत्यक्षपरिमाणविषयमित्यन्तावधारणम् । नच तत्सम्भवति शब्देऽणौ वा ।

३ संयुक्ते इति—उक्तेषु चतुर्षु संयोगं परामृशति । ‘संयुक्ते इमे’ इति ज्ञानं द्वित्वसमानाश्रयं प्राप्तिग्रहणं सत् अवयविनः प्रतिपादकमित्यन्वयः ।

४ आक्षिपति द्वाविति । द्वाववयवसमुदायावेव न तु द्वाववयविनौ आश्रितः संयुक्तप्रत्यय इति हृदयम् ।

५ आक्षेपं परिहरिष्यन् पृच्छति कोऽयमिति । समुदायार्थं विकल्प्योत्तरयति पूर्वपक्षी प्राप्तिरनेकस्येति । अनेकस्य अवयवस्य प्राप्तिः संयोग एव समुदाय इति प्रथमविकल्पस्यार्थः । भिन्नाः समुदायिनः (अवयवाः) संयोगेन एकीकृताः समुदाय इत्यर्थः । एकस्यैवावयवस्य अनेका प्राप्तिरनेकैरवयवैः संयोगः समुदायार्थ इति द्वितीयविकल्पार्थः । अनेकेऽवयवसमूहा एव समुदाय इत्यर्थः । इमावेव विकल्पौ द्वात्रिंशत्सूत्रभाष्येऽप्युक्तौ—समुदाय्यशेषता वा समुदायो वृक्षः स्यात्त-प्राप्तिर्वेत्यादिना । तत्र यत्समुदाय्यशेषतापदेन विवक्षितं तदेवात्र द्वितीयविकल्प-रूपेणोपन्यस्तम् । समुदायिप्राप्तिस्त्वेन यत्तत्रोक्तं तदेवात्र प्राप्तिरनेकस्येत्यनेन विवक्षितम् ।

६ आद्यं विकल्पं दूषयति प्राप्तेरिति । प्राप्त्याश्रितायाः प्राप्तेरग्रहणमित्यन्वयः संयुक्ते इमे वस्तुनी इत्यत्र द्वयोः समुदाययोः संयोगो गृह्यते । तत्र यदि अनेकस्य प्राप्तिरेव समुदायो भवेत् तर्ह्यत्र द्वयोः समुदायभूतयोः प्राप्त्योरेव प्राप्तिर्गृहीता स्यात् । न च प्राप्तेः प्राप्तिर्गृह्यते । अतो नानेकप्राप्तिः समुदायो भवितुमर्हति ।

“अनेकसमूहः समुदाय ” इति चेद्—न, द्वित्वेन समानाधिकरणस्य ग्रहणात् । द्वाविमौ संयुक्तावर्थाविति ग्रहणे सति नानेकसमूहाश्रयः संयोगो गृह्यते । न च द्वयोरण्वोर्ग्रहणमस्ति । तस्मान्महती द्वित्वाश्रयभूते द्रव्ये संयोगस्य स्थानमिति ।

“प्रत्यासत्तिः प्रतीघातावसाना संयोगो नार्थान्तरमिति ”चेत्—न, अर्थान्तरहेतुत्वात्संयोगस्य । शब्दरूपादिस्पन्दानां हेतुः संयोगः । न च द्रव्य-योर्गुणान्तरोपजननमन्तरेण शब्दे रूपादिषु स्पन्दे च कारणत्वं गृह्यते । तस्माद् गुणान्तरं, प्रत्ययविषयश्चार्थान्तरं तत्प्रतिषेधो वा—कुण्डली गुरुरकुण्डलश्चात्र इति । संयोगबुद्धेश्च यद्यर्थान्तरं न विषयः, अर्थान्तरप्रतिषेधस्तर्हि विषयः । तत्र प्रतिषिध्यमानवचनम् । संयुक्ते द्रव्ये इति यद्यर्थान्तरमन्यत्र दृष्टमिह प्रति-षिध्यते तद्वक्तव्यमिति । द्वयोर्महतोराश्रितस्य ग्रहणान्नाण्वाश्रय इति ।

जातिविशेषस्य प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिलिङ्गस्याप्रत्याख्यानम् । प्रत्याख्याने वा प्रत्ययव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः ।

व्यधिकरणस्थानमिव्यक्तेरधिकरणवचनम् ।

“अणुसमवस्थानं विपय ” इति चेत्—प्राप्ताप्राप्तसामर्थ्यवचनम् । किमप्राप्ते अणुसमवस्थाने तदाश्रयो जातिविशेषो गृह्यते, अथ प्राप्ते इति ?

१ प्रथमं विकल्पं पराहतं कृत्वा द्वितीयमुत्थापयति अनेकसमूह इति । अनेका प्राप्तिरिति पक्षे द्वे वस्तुनी इति द्वित्वसामानाधिकरण्यमनेकत्वस्य न घटते ।

२ न चेति । परमाणोरतीन्द्रियत्वात्परमाणुद्वयस्याप्यतीन्द्रियत्वादित्यर्थः

३ पूर्वोक्तेषु चतुर्षु तृतीयं स्पन्दमुद्दिश्य व्याचष्टे प्रत्यासत्तिरिति ।

४ प्रतिषिध्यमानवचनमिति । किमत्र प्रतिषिध्यते तद् वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः ।

५ उक्तेषु चतुर्षु चतुर्थीं जातिमुद्दिश्य व्याचष्टे जातिविशेषस्येति । प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिलिङ्गस्येत्यत्र लिङ्गपदं निमित्तवाचकम् । लिङ्गमनुभापकमिति तु तात्पर्यकृतः । तथा चोक्तम्—प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिर्यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षा तथाऽपि विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति सैव लिङ्गमुच्यते ।

६ व्यधिकरणस्येति । न चायं जातिविशेषो व्यधिकरणो व्यज्यते—इत्यधिकरण-मवश्यं वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः ।

७ विषय इति । अधिकरणमित्यर्थः । परमाणव एव केनचित् समवस्थानेनाव-तिष्ठमानाः तां तां जातिं व्यञ्जयन्ति । अतो नावयवी सिध्यतीति पूर्वपक्षिणो हृदयम् ।

८ प्राप्ताप्राप्तेति पूर्वपक्षोक्तं दूषयति । यत्तत् परमाणूनां समवस्थानं जातिविशेषं व्यनक्ति—इति मन्यसे—किं तच्चक्षुषा प्राप्तं जातिविशेषं व्यनक्त्याहोस्विदप्राप्तमिति भावः ।

अप्राप्ते ग्रहणमिति चेत्,—व्यवहितस्याणुसमवस्थानस्याप्युपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः । व्यवहितेऽणुसमवस्थाने तदाश्रयो जातिविशेषो गृह्येत । प्राप्ते ग्रहणमिति चेत् ? मध्यपरभागयोरप्राप्तावनभिव्यक्तिः । यावत्प्राप्तं भवति तावत्यभिव्यक्तिरिति चेत्,—तावतोऽधिकरणत्वमणुसमवस्थानस्य । यावति प्राप्ते जातिविशेषो गृह्यते तावदस्याधिकरणमिति प्राप्तं भवति । तत्रैकसमुदाये प्रतीयमानेऽर्थभेदः । एवं च सति योऽयमणुसमुदायो वृक्ष इति प्रतीयते तत्र वृक्षबहुत्वं प्रतीयेत—यत्र यत्र ह्यणुसमुदायस्य भागे वृक्षत्वं गृह्यते स स वृक्ष इति । तस्मात्समुदिताणुसमवस्थानस्यार्थान्तरस्य जातिविशेषाभिव्यक्तिविषयत्वादवयव्यर्थान्तरभूत इति ॥ ३७ ॥

(५) अनुमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

परीक्षितं प्रत्यक्षम् । अनुमानमिदानीं परीक्ष्यते—

“ रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यो न्यभिचारादनुमानमप्रमाणम् ” ॥३८॥

“ अप्रमाणमिति—एकदाप्यर्थस्य न प्रतिपादकमिति । रोधादपि नदी पूर्णा गृह्यते । तदा चोपरिष्ठाद्बृष्टो देव इति मिथ्यानुमानम् । ” नीडोपघातादपि

१ तत्रैकेति । योऽयं वृक्ष इति समुदायः प्रतीयते तस्य वृक्षस्य भेदः प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः । यावति यावति जातिर्व्यञ्ज्यते स स वृक्ष इति प्राप्नोति । तत्रैको वृक्षोऽनेक इति प्रतीयेत—एकप्रत्ययश्च न स्यादित्याशयः ।

२ उपसंहरति तस्मादिति । समुदिता अणवः समवस्थानमधिकरणं यस्य तादृशस्यार्थान्तरस्य जातिविशेषाभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वं नाणूनामिति सिद्धोऽवयवीति भावः ।

३ प्रतिपादकमिति । निश्चायकमित्यर्थः । प्रतिपादनमात्रं त्वप्रमाणेनापि क्रियत एव । अतः प्रतिपादनमत्र निश्चायकमेव त्रिवक्षितम् ।

४ नदीपूरदर्शनादभूद्बृष्टिरिति शेषवदनुमानम्—कार्यात् कारणस्येति । तस्मात्शायिकत्वेन दूषयति रोधादिति । जलस्यावरोधादपि नद्याः पूरो भवति । अतो नास्ति नियतः सम्बन्धो नदीपूरस्य बृष्ट्येत्यर्थः ।

५ पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणान्द्रविष्यति वृष्टिरिति पूर्ववदनुमानम् कारणात्कार्यस्य । तद्दूषयति नीडोपघातादिति । स्ववासस्थानभ्रंशादपि पिपीलिका अण्डं गृहीत्वा निस्सरन्ति । अतो नास्ति नियतः सम्बन्धः पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणस्य भाविवृष्ट्येत्याशयः ।

अत्रेदमवधेयम् । न पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणं वर्षायाः कारणम् । अनुपलब्धसामर्थ्यात् । असत्यपि तस्मिन् वर्षोपपत्तेः । वर्षामूलकारणस्य तु महाभूतसङ्क्षोभस्य पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणं पूर्वकार्यम् । भौमेनोष्मणा कथ्यमानाः पिपीलिकाः स्वान्यण्डानि

पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारो भवति । तदा च भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति मिथ्यानुमान-
मिति । पुरुषोऽपि मयूरवाशितमनुकरोति । तदापि शब्दसादृश्यान्मिथ्यानु-
मानं भवति ” ॥ ३८ ॥

न, एकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्योऽर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ३९ ॥

नायमनुमानव्यभिचारः । अननुमाने तु खल्वयमनुमानाभिमानः ।
कथम् ? नाविशिष्टो लिङ्गं भवितुमर्हति । पूर्वोदकविशिष्टं खलु वर्षोदकं शीघ्र-
तरत्वं स्रोतसो बहुतरफेनफलपर्णकाष्ठादिवहनं चोपलभमानः पूर्णत्वेन नद्या
उपरि वृष्टो देव इत्यनुमिनोति, नोदकवृद्धिमात्रेण । पिपीलिकाप्रायस्याण्डसञ्चारे
भविष्यति वृष्टिरित्यनुमीयते, न कासाञ्चिदिति । नेदं मयूरवाशितं तत्स-
दृशोऽयं शब्द इति विशेषापरिज्ञानान्मिथ्यानुमानमिति । यस्तु विशिष्टाच्छ-

भूमिष्ठान्युपरिष्टान्नयन्ति । तस्मात्पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारेण वर्षकारणं महाभूतसङ्क्षोभम-
नुमाय यदि वर्षकारणात् वर्षकार्यमनुमीयते तदा पूर्ववदुदाहरणम् । अथ कार्यकारण-
भावमब्रुध्वैवानुमिमीते पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चारेण वर्षं तदा कार्यकारणभावाभावेन
सामान्यतोदृष्टस्योदाहरणमिदम् ।

१ मयूररुतं श्रुत्वा वर्तमानो मेघोऽनुमीयते—तदपि दृपयति पुरुष इति ।
यच्छ्रूयते मयूररुतत्वेन च ज्ञायते तत्पुरुषकृतं मयूररुतानुकरणमेव स्यात् । वार्तिक-
कारोक्त्या तु मयूररुतेन मयूरस्यैवास्तित्वमनुमीयत इत्येवात्र विवक्षितम् ।

२ अनुमानमिथ्यात्वं निराकरोति नेत्यादिना सूत्रेण ।

अनुमानाप्रामाण्यं न युक्तम्—एकदेशजनदीवृद्धि—त्रासजपिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चार-
मयूररुतसदृशरुतेभ्योऽर्थान्तरत्वात्—यथार्थानुमितिकरणत्वेनाभिमतानामिति शेषः । ये
नदीवृद्ध्यादयोऽनुमितिकरणत्वेनाभिमतास्ते एकदेशजादिभ्यो भिन्ना एवेत्याशयः ।

३ नाविशिष्ट इति । नदीवृद्ध्यादिमात्रं नानुमितिकरणत्वेनाभिमतमपि तु
विशिष्टमेवेत्यर्थः ।

४ नदीवृद्ध्यादीनां विशेषं दर्शयति पूर्वोदकेति ।

५ पिपीलिकेति । प्रायः प्रबन्धः पङ्क्तिरिति यावत् ।

६ विशेषापरिज्ञानादिति । यदा मयूररुतात् तत्सदृशशब्दस्य भेदं नावधारयति
तद्द्वारैव चानुमिमीते तदैवेदमनुमानं मिथ्या । एवं च यदा रोधादिकारणान्तरैरुप-
जनितो नदीपूर इति नावधारयति तद्द्वारेण च उपरि वृष्टो देव इत्यनुमिनोति
तदैवानुमानं मिथ्या । त्रासजोऽयं पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चार इति यदा नावधारयति—
अनुमिनोति च तद्द्वारैवागामिनीं वृष्टिं तदैवानुमानं मिथ्या नान्यथेत्याशयः ।

७ विशिष्टादिति । पङ्कजस्वरविशिष्टादित्यर्थः ।

ब्दाद्विशिष्टमयूरवाशितं गृह्णाति तस्य विशिष्टोऽर्थो गृह्यमाणो लिङ्गं, यथा सर्पादीनामिति । सोऽयमनुमातुरपराधो नानुमानस्य, योऽर्थविषेणानुमेयमर्थमविशिष्टार्थदर्शनेन बुभुत्सत इति ॥ ३९ ॥

(६) वर्तमानकालपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् औपोद्धातिकम् ॥

त्रिकालविषयमनुमानं त्रैकाल्यग्रहणादित्युक्तम्, अत्र च—

“ वर्तमानाभावः, पततः पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः ” ॥ ४० ॥

“ वृन्तात्प्रव्युत्स्य फलस्य भूमौ प्रत्यासीदतो यदूर्ध्वं स पतितोऽध्वा । तत्संयुक्तः कालः पतितकालः । योऽधस्तात् स पतितव्योऽध्वा । तत्संयुक्तः कालः पतितव्यकालः । नेदानीं तृतीयोऽध्वा विद्यते यत्र पततीति वर्तमानः कालो गृह्येत । तस्माद्वर्तमानः कालो न विद्यत इति ” ॥ ४० ॥

तयोरप्यभावो वर्तमानाभावे, तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ४१ ॥

नाध्वव्यङ्ग्यः कालः, किं तर्हि, क्रियाव्यङ्ग्यः—पततीति । यदा पतनक्रिया व्युपरता भवति स कालः पतितकालः । यदोत्पत्स्यते स पतितव्यकालः । यदा द्रव्ये वर्तमाना क्रिया गृह्यते स वर्तमानः कालः । यदि चार्थं द्रव्ये वर्तमानं पतनं न गृह्णाति कस्योपरममुत्पत्स्यमानतां वा प्रतिपद्यते । पतितः काल इति भूता क्रिया । पतितव्यः काल इति चोत्पत्स्यमाना क्रिया । उभयोः कालयोः क्रियाहीनं द्रव्यम् । अधः पततीति क्रियासम्बद्धम् । सोऽयं क्रिया-

१ सर्पादीनामिति । सर्पादयो मयूरस्यैव विशिष्टं शब्दं श्रुत्वा तस्यास्तित्वमनुमिन्वन्ति । न तेषां कदापि मयूरसदृशरुतमात्रात्तदस्तित्वभ्रान्तिः ।

२ तदेवमनुमानलक्षणपरीक्षाद्वारेणानुमानं परीक्ष्य सम्प्रत्यनुमानविषयपरीक्षयाऽनुमानपरीक्षामवतारयति त्रिकालेति ।

३ तयोरिति । अतीतानागतयोरिति यावत् । तदपेक्षत्वादिति वर्तमानापेक्षत्वादित्यर्थः ।

यदा खल्वयं पुरुषः फलं प्रवर्तमानपतनक्रियाविशिष्टं प्रतिपद्यते तदा व्यपदिशति 'पतति' फलमिति । तन्मूले चास्यातीतानागते—'अपतत्फलम्'—'पतिष्यतीति' । न च प्रवर्तमानं पतनमसिद्धम्—येन कालं न व्यञ्ज्यात् । प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं हि तत् पतनम् । प्रवर्तमानपतनक्रियाया अभावे कस्य कारणं गुरुत्वं, कस्य च फलं भूमिसंयोगः । एवं चातीतानागतयोर्वर्तमानापेक्षत्वात् वर्तमानस्य च तदपेक्षत्वादस्ति त्रैकाल्यमिति सिद्धान्तः ।

द्रव्ययोः सम्बन्धं गृह्णातीति वर्तमानः कालः । तदाश्रयौ चेतारौ कालौ तदभावे
न स्यातामिति ॥ ४१ ॥

अथापि—

नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेक्षा सिद्धिः ॥ ४२ ॥

यद्यतीतानागतावितरेतरापेक्षौ सिद्धेयतां प्रतिपद्येमहि वर्तमानविलोपम् ।
नातीतापेक्षाऽनागतसिद्धिः नाप्यनागतापेक्षाऽतीतसिद्धिः ।

कया युक्त्या ?

केन कल्पेनातीतः कथमतीतापेक्षाऽनागतसिद्धिः, केन च कल्पेनानागत
इति नैतच्छक्यं निर्वक्तुम् । अव्यारकणीयमेतद्वर्तमानलोप इति ।

यच्च मन्येत—“ ह्रस्वदीर्घयोः स्थलनिम्नयोश्छायातपयोश्च यथेतरेतरापे-
क्षया सिद्धिरेवमतीतानागतयोरिति ” तन्नोपपद्यते, विशेषहेत्वभावात् । दृष्टान्त-
वत्प्रतिदृष्टान्तोऽपि प्रसज्यते । यथा रूपरूपशौ गन्धरसौ नेतरेतरापेक्षौ सिध्यतः,
एवमतीतानागताविति नेतरेतरापेक्षा कस्यचित्सिद्धिरिति । यस्मादेकाभावेऽ-
न्यतराभावादुभयाभावः । यद्येकस्यान्यतरापेक्षा सिद्धिरन्यतरस्येदानीं किम-
पेक्षा ? यद्यन्यतरस्यैकापेक्षा सिद्धिरेकस्येदानीं किमपेक्षा ? एवमेकस्याभावे
अन्यतरस्य सिध्यतीत्युभयाभावः प्रसज्यते ॥ ४२ ॥

अर्थसद्भावव्यङ्ग्यश्चायं वर्तमानः कालः, विद्यते द्रव्यं विद्यते गुणः
विद्यते कर्मेति । यस्य चायं नास्ति, तस्य—

वर्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४३ ॥

१ नातीतेत्यादिसूत्रम् । परस्परापेक्षसिद्धेर्हि वर्तमानाभावः । सैव तु नास्तीति
सूत्रार्थः ।

२ कया युक्त्येति ग्रन्थः । केन कल्पेनेति तस्योत्तरम् । कल्पेनेति प्रकारेणेत्यर्थः ।
अनेन वर्तमानाभावेऽतीतरूपाक्षेपः कृतः ।

३ ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादीनां परस्परापेक्षसिद्धस्वमङ्गीकृत्याऽऽह तन्नोपपद्यत इति ।
परमार्थतस्तु ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादीनामपि न परस्परापेक्षा सिद्धिरिति ।

४ वक्ष्यमाणसूत्रावतारपरं भाष्यम्—अर्थसद्भावेति । अयमस्यार्थः । न केवलं पत-
नादिक्रियाव्यङ्ग्यो वर्तमानः कालः । अपि तु ‘ अर्थसद्भावः ’—अर्थस्य सत्ता, अस्तित्-
क्रिया—तया व्यङ्ग्य इत्यवधेयम् ।

५ वर्तमानेत्यादिसूत्रम् । एतदुक्तं भवति—पतनादयः क्रियाः वर्तमानेषु अपयान्ति
उपयान्ति च । अस्तिक्रिया तु सर्ववर्तमानव्यापिनी । तदेवमस्तिक्रियाविशिष्टस्य
वर्तमानस्याभावे सर्वाग्रहणम्, प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेरिति ।

प्रत्यक्षमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजम् । न चाविद्यमानमसदिन्द्रियेण सन्निकृष्यते । न चायं विद्यमानं सात्किञ्चिदनुजानाति । प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तं प्रत्यक्षविषयः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं-सर्वं नोपपद्यते । प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तौ तत्पूर्वकत्वाद् अनुमानागमयोरनुपपत्तिः । सर्वप्रमाणविलोपे सर्वग्रहणं न भवतीति ॥ ४३ ॥

उभयथा च वर्तमानः कालो गृह्यते । क्वचिदर्थसद्भावव्यङ्ग्यः, यथा अस्ति द्रव्यमिति । क्वचित् क्रियासन्तानव्यङ्ग्यः, यथा पचति छिनत्तीति । नानाविधा चैकार्था क्रिया-क्रियासन्तानः, क्रियाभ्यासश्च । नानाविधा चैकार्था क्रिया-पचतीति-स्थात्यधिश्रयणमुदकासेचनं तण्डुलावपनमेधोऽपसर्पणमग्न्यभि-
व्वालनं दर्वीघट्टनं मण्डस्त्रावणमधोऽवतारणमिति । छिनत्तीति क्रियाभ्यासः-
उद्यम्योद्यम्य परशुं दारुणि निपातयन् छिनत्तीत्युच्यते ॥ ४३ ॥

यच्चेदं पच्यमानं छिद्यमानं च तत्क्रियमाणम् । तस्मिन् क्रियमाणे—

कृतताकर्तव्यतोपपत्तेस्तूभयथा ग्रहणम् ॥ ४४ ॥

१ अविद्यमानमित्यस्य विवरणम्—असदिति ।

२ अयमिति—पूर्वपक्षी

३ प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तमिति । ' प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तं ' सन्निकर्षः, अस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षविषयो विद्यमानो घटादिः, प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् अनाधारम्—एतत् सर्वं नोपपद्यत इत्याशयः ।

४ कथं पुनर्वर्तमानाभावे प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिः । यस्मादिदं प्रत्यक्षं वर्तमानाधारं कार्यत्वात्—यत् कार्यं तद्वर्तमानाधारं दृष्टम्—यथा क्षीरम्—कार्यं च प्रत्यक्षं तस्माद्वर्तमानाधारमिति । अत एव वर्तमानकालानभ्युपगमेऽनाधारं प्रत्यक्षं प्राप्नोति । अनाधारं च कार्यं नास्तीति प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिरिति ।

५ अर्थसद्भावेति—अस्तिक्रियामात्रगम्य इत्यर्थः ।

६ यथा पचतीत्यादि । पचतीत्यत्र नानाविधा एका क्रिया । अतोऽत्र नानाक्रियासन्तानगम्यो वर्तमानः कालः । एता नानाक्रिया उद्दिष्टा अधस्तात् स्थात्यधिश्रयणमित्यादि । छिनत्तीत्यत्र तु एकस्या एव छेदनक्रियाया अभ्यास एव क्रियासन्तानो येन गम्यः कालः । एवंरूपमेव भेदं समुद्दिश्य दृष्टान्तद्वयमुपन्यस्तम् ।

७ तदेवं वर्तमानक्रियासद्भावमुक्त्वा तत्सम्बन्धव्यङ्ग्यां कारणस्य वर्तमानतामाह यच्चेदमिति । ' तत् ' क्रियमाणं वर्तमानक्रियासम्बन्धेन ' वर्तमानं, ' नतु स्वरूपत इत्याशयः ।

८ तस्य च कारणस्य वर्तमानक्रियासम्बन्धमतीतानागतानपेक्षमपेक्ष्यातीतानागतत्वे क्रियायाः कारकस्यापि व्यक्तिः तन्नावव्यक्तिः । तद्धेतुकं च द्वैविध्यमिति प्रतिपादनपरं सूत्रमवतारयति तस्मिन् क्रियमाण इति ।

क्रियासन्तानोऽनारब्धश्चिकीर्षितोऽनागतः कालः—पश्यतीति । प्रयोजनावसानः क्रियासन्तानोपरमः अतीतः कालः—अपाक्षीदिति । आरब्धक्रियासन्तानो वर्तमानः कालः—पचतीति । तत्र या उपरता सा कृतता । या चिकीर्षिता सा कर्त्तव्यता । या विद्यमाना सा क्रियमाणता । तदेवं क्रियासन्तानस्थत्रैकाल्यसमाहारः । पचति पच्यत इति वर्तमानग्रहणेन गृह्यते । क्रियासन्तानस्य ह्यत्राविच्छेदो विधीयते, नारम्भो नोपरम इति । सोऽग्रमुभयथा वर्तमानो गृह्यते—अपवृक्तो व्यपवृक्तश्चातीतानागताभ्याम् । स्थितिव्यङ्ग्यः—विद्यते द्रव्यमिति । क्रियासन्तानाविच्छेदाभिधायी च त्रैकाल्यान्वितः—पचति छिनत्तीति । अन्यश्च प्रत्यासत्तिप्रभृतेरर्थस्य विवक्षायां तदभिधायी बहुप्रकारो लोकेषु उत्प्रेक्षितव्यः । तस्मादस्ति वर्तमानः काल इति ॥ ४४ ॥

(७) उपमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

“ अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः ” ॥ ४५ ॥

“ अत्यन्तसाधर्म्यादुपमानं न सिध्यति । न चैवं भवति यथा गौरैवं गौरिति । प्रायसाधर्म्यादुपमानं न सिध्यति । न हि भवति यथाऽनड्डानेवं महिष इति । एकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानं न सिध्यति । न हि सर्वेण सर्वमुपमीयत इति ” ॥ ४५ ॥

१ त्रैकाल्यान्वित इति । ‘पचति’ ‘छिनत्ति’ इत्यत्र सम्पृक्तः, काश्चिदत्र क्रियाः व्यतीताः काश्चिदनागताः, एका च वर्तमाना । एवमेव त्रैकाल्यान्वितत्वम् ।

२ अत्यन्तेत्यादिपूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । यथा गौरैवं गवय इत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मृतिसहकारि सारूप्यदर्शनं साध्यस्य—गवयोऽयमिति संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धस्य—साधनमुपमानम् । तच्चेदं नोपपद्यते विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । किं यथा गौरैवं गवय इत्यत्यन्तसाधर्म्यं विवक्षितम् प्रायिकं साधर्म्यं वा । उभयथाऽपि नोपपद्यत इति पूर्वपक्षाशयः ।

३ न चैवमिति । गोगवययोरत्यन्तसादृश्ये सति—यावदुक्तं भवति ‘ यथा गौस्तथा गवय ’ इति तावदुक्तं भवति ‘ यथा गौस्तथा गौरिति ’ । न चैतद्वाक्यमभीप्सितसंज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धं बोधयितुं शक्नोति ।

४ नहि भवतीति । प्रायिके सादृश्ये विवक्षिते सति अनड्डुन्महिषयोरपि तादृशे सादृश्ये वर्तमाने ‘ यथाऽनड्डुवांस्तथा महिष ’ इत्यपि स्यात् । महिषस्यापि च गवा प्रायिकसादृश्यदर्शनात् तस्यापि गवयाभिधानप्रसङ्गः स्यात् ।

५ नहि सर्वेणेति । सर्वेषामपि वस्तूनां यत्किञ्चित्साधर्म्यं भवत्येवेत्याशयः ।

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः ॥ ४६ ॥

न साधर्म्यस्य कृत्स्नप्रायाल्पभावमाश्रित्योपमानं प्रवर्तते, किं तर्हि प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनभावमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते । यत्र चैतदस्ति न तत्रोपमानं प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्यम् । तस्माद्यथोक्तदोषो नोपपद्यत इति ॥ ४६ ॥

“ अस्तु तर्ह्युपमानमनुमानम्—

“ प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः ” ॥ ४७ ॥

“ यथा धूमेन प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षस्य वह्नेर्ग्रहणमनुमानम्, एवं गवा प्रत्यक्षेणाऽप्रत्यक्षस्य गवयस्य ग्रहणमिति नेदमनुमानाद्विशिष्यते ” ॥ ४७ ॥

विशिष्यत इत्याह । कया युक्त्या ?—

नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस्य पश्याम इति ॥ ४८ ॥

१ प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादिति पूर्वपक्षपरिहारसूत्रम् । प्रकरणाद्यपेक्षं हि वाक्यं स्वार्थं प्रतिपादयति, न केवलम् । तद्वशाच्च क्वचिदस्यन्तसादृश्यं प्रतीयते, क्वचित्प्रायिकसाधर्म्यम्, क्वचिदेकदेशसाधर्म्यम् । तदिह प्रतीतमहिषादिकं पुरुषं प्रति यदा ‘ यथा गौरैवं गवयः ’ इति वाक्यमुच्चार्यते तदा महिषादिपरिहाराय भूयस्साधर्म्यं विवक्षितम्—इति तद्वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् महिषादिषु गोसादृश्यं पश्यन्नपि न गवयसंज्ञां निवेशयति अपि तु भूयस्सादृश्यवति गवय एव तां निवेशयतीत्याशयः ।

२ न साधर्म्यस्येति भाष्यं नियमं निषेधति । न साधर्म्यस्य कृत्स्नभावमेव वाऽल्पभावमेव वाऽऽश्रित्यातिदेशवाक्यं प्रवर्तत इत्याशयः ।

३ उपमानमिति । अतिदेशवाक्यमित्यर्थः ।

४ साध्यसाधनेति । ‘साध्यः’ संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धः । एतदुक्तं भवति । अतिदेशवाक्यप्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यं यतः संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धस्य साधनं भविष्यति—ततः न नियमः, किन्तु क्वचित् क्वचित् साधर्म्यमाश्रित्यातिदेशवाक्यं प्रवर्तते । तच्च प्रकरणादुन्नेयमिति ।

५ उपमानमनुमानेऽन्तर्भावयन्नाह पूर्वपक्षी—प्रत्यक्षेणेति सूत्रम् । यथा गौरैवं गवय इति वाक्यं ‘ प्रत्यक्षेण ’ गवा गवयमप्रत्यक्षं प्रतिपादयति । श्रुतवाक्योऽपि यदा प्रत्यक्षेण गवयं पश्यति तदा वाक्यार्थाधिगमादधिकं न किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यते । संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धोऽप्यस्माद्वाक्यदेवावगतः । तस्मात् ‘ प्रत्यक्षेण ’ गवा ‘ अप्रत्यक्षस्य ’ गवयस्य गवयसंज्ञाविशिष्टस्य प्रतीतेरुपमानस्यानुमानतेति पूर्वपक्षिणो हृदयम् ।

६ नाप्रत्यक्ष इत्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ।

यदा ह्ययमुपयुक्तोपमानो गोदर्शी गवा समानमर्थं पश्यति तदाऽयं गवय इत्यस्य संज्ञाशब्दस्य व्यवस्थां प्रतिपद्यते, न चेदमनुमानमिति ।

परार्थं चोपमानं यस्य ह्युपमेयमप्रसिद्धं तदर्थं प्रसिद्धोभयेन क्रियत इति ।

“परार्थमुपमानमिति” चेत्, न, स्वयमध्यवसायात् । “भवति च भोः स्वयमध्यवसायः—यथा गौरैवं गवय इति ” ।

नाध्यवसायः प्रतिषिध्यते । उपमानं तु तन्न भवति । प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् । न च यस्योभयं प्रसिद्धं तं प्रति साध्यसाधनभावो विद्यत इति ॥ ४८ ॥

अथापि—

तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः ॥ ४९ ॥

तथेति समानधर्मोपसंहारादुपमानं सिध्यति, नानुमानम् । अयं चानयोर्विशेष इति ॥ ४९ ॥

(८) शब्दसामान्यपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

“शब्दोऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलब्धेरनुमेयत्वात्” ॥ ५० ॥

१ नचेदमिति । गवयत्वं हि ‘संज्ञि’ । न च तत् ‘यथा गौस्तथा गवय’ इति वाक्यात्प्रतीयते, अपि तु कस्यचिज्जन्तोः गवा सादृश्यमेव तस्माद्वाक्यात्प्रतीयते । न च वाक्यगतो गवयशब्दस्तस्य सादृश्यस्य वाचकः, तथा तदानीमगृहीतसङ्गति-त्वात् । न च सादृश्यं ‘संज्ञि’ । तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षे एव गवये गवयत्वस्य जातेः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धपरिच्छेदः । स एव चोपमानस्य प्रमाणस्यार्थं इति परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते परार्थमुपमानमिति चेदिति । एवमत्र सम्बन्धः । परार्थमनुमानमिति चेन्मन्यसे सिद्धान्तवादिन्, तन्नास्ति,—कुतः स्वयमप्यध्यवसायात् । ‘यथा गौरैवं गवय’ इति वाक्यमेव परार्थं स्याद्यदि परस्यैवाध्यवसायं जनयेत् । तावतो-च्चारयितुरप्यध्यवसायं जनयति । तस्मात् स्वार्थमपीति नानुमानादतीव भेद इत्याक्षेपस्याशयः ।

२ आक्षेपं परिहरति नाध्यवसाय इति । उक्तोऽध्यवसायोऽतिदेशवाक्योच्चार-यित्त्वारं प्रति उपमानं न भवतीत्येतावन्मात्रं सिद्धान्तिन आशय इत्यर्थः ।

३ तथेत्यादि सूत्रम् । नानुमानमेवं भवति—‘यथा धूमस्तथाऽग्निरिति’ । अस्ति तूपमानं ‘यथा गौस्तथा गवय’ इति ।

४ शब्दोऽनुमानमिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । प्रत्यक्षेणानुपलभ्यमानार्थत्वादिति तदर्थः । यज्ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षेणानुपलभ्यमानविषयं प्रत्यक्षस्य पश्चादुपजायते तत् ‘अनुमानम्’ । यथाऽग्निमद्धूमज्ञानम् । तथा च शब्दज्ञानम्—तस्मादनुमानमित्याशयः ।

“ शब्दोऽनुमानं न प्रमाणान्तरम् । कस्मात् ? शब्दार्थस्यानुमेयत्वात् । कथमनुमेयत्वम् ? प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेः । यथाऽनुपलभ्यमानो लिङ्गी मितेन लिङ्गेन पश्चान्मीयत इति अनुमानम्, एवं मितेन शब्देन पश्चान्मीयतेऽर्थोऽनुपलभ्यमान इत्यनुमानं शब्दः ” ॥ ५० ॥

“ इतश्चानुमानं शब्दः—

“ उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् ” ॥ ५१ ॥

“ प्रमाणान्तरभावे द्विप्रवृत्तिरुपलब्धिः । अन्यथा ह्युपलब्धिरनुमाने अन्यथोपमाने—तद्व्याख्यातम् । शब्दानुमानयोस्तूपलब्धिरद्विप्रवृत्तिः । यथानुमाने प्रवर्तते तथा शब्देऽपि । विशेषाभावादानुमानं शब्द इति ” ॥ ५१ ॥

“ सम्बन्धाच्च ” ॥ ५२ ॥

“ शब्दोऽनुमानमिति वर्तते । सम्बद्धयोश्च शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धप्रसिद्धौ शब्दोपलब्धेरर्थग्रहणं, यथा सम्बद्धयोलिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः सम्बन्धप्रतीतौ लिङ्गोपलब्धौ लिङ्गिग्रहणमिति ” ॥ ५२ ॥

यत्तावदर्थस्यानुमेयत्वादिति, तत्र—

१ पूर्वपक्षे हेत्वन्तरम्—उपलब्धेरिति सूत्रम् ।

२ द्विप्रवृत्तिरिति—प्रवृत्तिप्रकारभेद इत्यर्थः ।

३ पूर्वपक्षे तृतीयो हेतुः सम्बन्धाच्चेति सूत्रम् ।

अत्रहि सूत्रकारेण प्रथमं शब्दस्यानुमानान्तर्गतिरेव परीक्षिता । न चापरीक्षितप्रमाणभावस्य सा युक्तेति वार्तिककारोऽस्यादौ प्रमाणभावमेव परीक्षाञ्चके । तत्रायं पूर्वपक्षसंक्षेपः—

यस्मिन् सति प्रमा भवत्येव, न च न भवति, तदेव प्रमाणम्—साधकतमस्य करणत्वात् । सत्यपि तु शब्दे प्रमा न भवति यावदसावश्रुतः । एतच्च तस्य साधकतमत्वं विघटयति । अन्यच्च । प्रामाण्यं हि विषयवत्तया व्याप्तम् । सा शब्दं निवर्तमाना प्रामाण्यमपि निवर्तयति । द्विविधश्च विषयः । प्रत्यक्षः परोक्षश्च । तत्र पूर्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणस्य विषयः, अप्रत्यक्षश्चाविनाभूतालिङ्गादवगन्तव्यः । तदनपेक्षेणासम्बन्धाविशेषात् सर्वं सर्वस्माद्गम्येत । तथा च सर्वः परोक्षार्थः प्रत्ययोऽनुमानव्याप्तः । न च प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षाभ्यामन्यो राशिरस्ति । तस्माद् विषयाभावादपि न शब्दप्रामाण्यमिति । एवं च प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां भिन्नप्रस्थानः शब्दो न प्रमाणम्, प्रमाणत्वे वा तदन्तर्भूत एव । तत्रापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः कतरस्मिन्नस्यान्तर्भाव—इति जिज्ञासायामनुमान एवान्तर्भाव इतिसूत्रत्रयार्थः ।

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययः ॥ ५३ ॥

स्वर्गः अप्सरसः उत्तराः कुरवः सप्तद्वीपसमुद्रो लोकसन्निवेश इत्येव-
मादेरप्रत्यक्षस्यार्थस्य न शब्दमात्रात्प्रत्ययः । किं तर्हि, आप्तैरयमुक्तः शब्द
इत्यतः सम्प्रत्ययः, विपर्ययेण सम्प्रत्ययाभावात् । न त्वेवमनुमानमिति ।

यत्पुनरुपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वादिति—अथमेव शब्दानुमानयोरुपलब्धेः
प्रवृत्तिभेदः,—तत्र विशेषे सत्यहेतुर्विशेषाभावादिति ।

यत्पुनरिदं सम्बन्धाच्चेति—अस्ति च शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धोऽनुज्ञातः,
अस्ति च प्रतिषिद्धः । अस्येदमिति षष्ठीविशिष्टस्य वाक्यस्यार्थविशेषोऽनुज्ञातः,
प्राप्तिलक्षणस्तु शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धः प्रतिषिद्धः । कस्मात्? प्रमाणतोऽनुप-
लब्धेः । प्रत्यक्षतस्तावच्छब्दार्थप्राप्तेर्नोपलब्धिरतीन्द्रियत्वात् । येनेन्द्रियेण गृह्यते
शब्दस्तस्य विषयभावमतिवृत्तोऽर्थो न गृह्यते । अस्ति चातीन्द्रियविषयभूतोऽ-
र्थः । समानेन चेन्द्रियेण गृह्यमाणयोः प्राप्तिर्गृह्यत इति ॥ ५३ ॥

१ आप्तोपदेशेत्यादि सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । अत्राभ्युच्चयमात्रतथा भाष्यवार्तिक-
काराभ्यामाप्तोक्तत्वाश्रयत्वानाश्रयत्वे शब्दानुमानभेदहेतुतयोपन्यस्ते । वस्तुतस्तु
यद्यन्तादृष्टपूर्वं स्वगापूर्वदेवतादि तद् वाक्यार्थरूपमेव, नास्मदादिप्रत्यक्षगोचरम् ।
न चागृहीतं लिङ्गमस्मिन् प्रवर्तितुमर्हति । नचागृहीते सम्बन्धिनि सम्बन्धः शक्यग्रहः ।
वाक्यार्थप्रमां च प्रति पदानामेव पदार्थस्मरणान्तरव्यापाराणां करणत्वम् । पदान्येव
हि पदार्थस्मरणद्वारेण तत्संसर्ग लक्षयन्ति वाक्यार्थं प्रमाणम् । तेषां चापक्षधर्मतया
न लिङ्गत्वम् । स्मृतिजनकत्वमपि पदानां वाक्यार्थप्रत्यायनाथ कल्पितं न सम्बन्धान्तरं
व्यनक्ति ॥

२ शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्ध इति । वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणः सम्बन्धोऽनुज्ञातः,
मीमांसकाभिमतः स्वाभाविकश्च सम्बन्धः प्रतिषिद्ध इत्याशयः ।

३ प्राप्तिलक्षण इति । स्वाभाविको हि शब्दार्थयोस्सम्बन्धस्तदा स्यात्—यदा
(१) तादात्म्यलक्षणो वा, (२) प्रत्याख्यप्रत्यायकस्वभावो वा, (३) प्राप्तिलक्षणो वा
स्यात् । तत्र प्रत्यक्षलक्षणस्थेन अव्यपदेश्यपदेन तादात्म्यमपाकृतम् । ततश्च नामेदः
शब्दस्य प्रत्यक्षात् । प्रत्याख्यप्रत्यायकभावश्चौत्पत्तिकः सम्बन्धो मीमांसकाभिमतो
निराकरिष्यतेऽधस्तात् । तेन प्राप्तिलक्षणमेव सम्बन्धं निराकरोति भाष्यकारः ।

४ अस्ति चेति । अतीन्द्रियश्चासौ विषयभूत इति समासः । अतीन्द्रियश्च
शब्दग्राहकेन्द्रियातिपतित इन्द्रियमात्रमतिपतितश्चेति ज्ञेयम् ।

५ गृह्यत इति । एकेन्द्रियग्राह्ययोः प्राप्तिः प्रत्यक्षा । यथाऽङ्गुल्योः । नतु
शब्दार्थयोरेकेन्द्रियग्राह्यता । येनेन्द्रियेण शब्दो गृह्यते न तेन तस्यार्थ इति भावः ।

प्राप्तिलक्षणे च गृह्यमाणे सम्बन्धे शब्दार्थयोः शब्दान्तिके वार्थः स्यात्, अर्थान्तिके वा शब्दः स्याद्, उभयं बोभयत्र ।

अथ स्वत्वयम्—

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः ॥ ५४ ॥

स्थानकरणाभावादिति चार्थः । न चायमनुमानतोऽप्युपलभ्यते—शब्दान्तिकेऽर्थ इति । एतस्मिन्पक्षेऽप्यास्यस्थानकरणोच्चारणीयः शब्दस्तदन्तिकेऽर्थ इति—अत्राग्न्यसिशब्दोच्चारणे पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानि गृह्येरन् । न च गृह्यन्ते । अप्रहणान्नानुमेयः प्राप्तिलक्षणः सम्बन्धः ।

अर्थान्तिके शब्द इति स्थानकरणासम्भवादानुच्चारणम् । स्थानं कण्ठादयः । करणं प्रयत्नविशेषः । तस्यार्थान्तिकेऽनुपपत्तिरिति । उभयप्रतिषेधाच्च नोभयम् । तस्मान्न शब्देनार्थः प्राप्त इति ॥ ५४ ॥

“ शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः ” ॥ ५५ ॥

“ शब्दार्थप्रत्ययस्य व्यवस्थादर्शनादनुमीयते अस्ति शब्दार्थसम्बन्धो व्यवस्थाकारणम् । असम्बन्धे हि शब्दमात्रादर्थमात्रे प्रत्ययप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादप्रतिषेधः सम्बन्धस्येति ” ॥ ५५ ॥

अत्र समाधिः—

नै, सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य ॥ ५६ ॥

न सम्बन्धकारितं शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानम्—किन्तर्हि—समयकारितम् । यन्तद्वोचाम—अस्येदमिति षष्ठीविशिष्टस्य वाक्यस्यार्थविशेषोऽनुज्ञातः

१ प्राप्तिलक्षण इत्याद्यागामिसूत्रमवतारयति ।

अतीन्द्रियत्वादप्रत्यक्षः शब्दार्थोऽनुमानेनोपलप्स्यत इति चेत् नानुमानेन, विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । शब्दो वाऽर्थदेशं गच्छति—अर्थो वा शब्ददेशम्—उभयं वा । मोदकशब्दे चोच्चार्यमाणे आगच्छन् मोदकादिरुपलभ्येत—नचोपलभ्यते—तस्मान्न गच्छति शब्ददेशमर्थः । शब्दस्य तु गतिरेव न सम्भवतीत्यादि स्पष्टमग्रिमभाष्ये ।

२ स्थानेति । ‘ स्थानं ’ कण्ठादयः । ‘ करणं ’ प्रयत्नविशेषः ।

३ चार्थ इति । सूत्रस्थचकारस्यार्थ इति भावः ।

४ पूर्वसूत्रोक्तदूषणपरिहारपरं पूर्वपक्षिसूत्रम्—शब्दार्थेति ।

५ न सामयिकत्वादित्यादि समाधानसूत्रम् ।

शब्दार्थयोर्नित्यमेव सम्बन्धं वयं निषेधामो न सम्बन्धमात्रम्—सम्बन्धस्तु अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इत्येवंरूपसमयकारितोऽस्त्येव शब्दार्थयोरिति भावः ।

शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्ध इति—समयं तमवोचाम इति । कः पुनरयं समयः ? अस्य शब्दस्येदमर्थजातमभिधेयमिति अभिधानाभिधेयनियमनियोगः । तस्मिन्नुपयुक्ते शब्दादर्थसम्प्रत्ययो भवति । विपर्यये हि शब्दश्रवणेऽपि प्रत्ययाभावः । सम्बन्धवादिनापि चायमवर्जनीय इति । प्रयुज्यमानग्रहणाच्च समयोपयोगो लौकिकानां समयपालनार्थं चेदं पदलक्षणाया वाचोऽन्वाख्यानं व्याकरणम् । वाक्यलक्षणाया वाचोऽर्थो लक्षणम् । पदसमूहो वाक्यमर्थपरिसमाप्ताविति । तदेवं प्राप्तिलक्षणस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्धस्यार्थजुषोऽर्थानुमानहेतुर्न भवतीति ॥ ५६ ॥

जातिविशेषे चानियमात् ॥ ५७ ॥

सामयिकः शब्दादर्थसम्प्रत्ययो न स्वाभाविकः । ऋष्यार्यम्लेच्छानां यथाकामं शब्दविनियोगोऽर्थप्रत्यायनाय प्रवर्तते । स्वाभाविके हि शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वे यथाकामं न स्याद् । यथा तैजसस्य प्रकाशस्य रूपप्रत्ययहेतुत्वं न जातिविशेषे व्यभिचरतीति ॥ ५७ ॥

(९) शब्दविशेषपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

“ पुत्रकामेष्टिहवनाभ्यासेषु ”—

१ नियमनियोग इति । सर्गादावीश्वरस्येति शेषः ।

२ सम्बन्धवादिनेति । शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनिश्चयतावादिना भीमांसकेनापि उक्तः समय एव परमोपायः शब्दार्थसम्बन्धनिर्णयस्येति ।

३ समयेति । पारमेश्वरसमयपरिपालनार्थमित्याशयः । तथा च येषां पदानां येनार्थेन परमेश्वरेण समयः कृतः तानि तस्मिन्नर्थे साधून्यसाधूनीतरन्नेति विभागाद्यैव व्याकरणमर्थवदिति सिद्धम् ।

४ अनुमानहेतुरिति । प्राप्तिलक्षणसम्बन्धानुमापको हेतुरित्यर्थः ।

तथा च शब्दस्य स्वाभाविकसम्बन्धाभावादानुमानाभेदायाविनाभावसिद्धयर्थं स्वाभाविकसम्बन्धाभिधानमयुक्तमिति सिद्धं भवति ।

५ सम्बन्धानित्यतायामपरो हेतुः—जातिविशेष इति सूत्रम् ।

६ ऋष्यार्येति । तथाहि यवशब्द आर्यैर्दीर्घशूके पदार्थे प्रयुज्यते । ते हि यवशब्दात् दीर्घशूकपदार्थं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । म्लेच्छास्तु तमेव प्रियङ्गौ प्रयुञ्जते । सोऽयमनियमः स्वाभाविके सम्बन्धे न स्यात् । नहि रूपेण स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध आलोकः शिल्पिसहस्रेणापि रसादिसम्बन्धः शक्यते कर्तुं यतस्ततो रसादयो गृह्येरन् । सोऽयमनियमः सामयिकत्वे उपपद्यते, पुरुषेच्छाधीनत्वात्समयस्य, इच्छायाश्चानियतत्वादिति भावः ।

“ तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ” ॥ ५८ ॥

“ तस्येति शब्दविशेषमेवाधिकुरुते भगवान् ऋषिः । शब्दस्य प्रमाणत्वं न सम्भवति । कस्मात् ? अनृतदोषात् । पुत्रकामेष्टौ—‘ पुत्रकामः पुत्रेष्टया यजेत ’ इति । नेष्टौ संस्थितायां पुत्रजन्म दृश्यते । दृष्टार्थस्य वाक्यस्यानृतत्वाद्-दृष्टार्थमपि वाक्यम् ‘ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकाम ’ इत्याद्यनृतमिति ज्ञायते ।

“ विहितव्याघातदोषाच्च । हवने—‘ उदिते होतव्यम् अनुदिते होतव्यम् समयाध्युषिते होतव्यम् ’ इति—विधाय, विहितं व्याहन्ति—‘ श्यावोऽस्याहुतिमभ्यवहरति य उदिते जुहोति, शबलोऽस्याहुतिमभ्यवहरति योऽनुदिते जुहोति, श्यावशबलौ वास्याहुतिमभ्यवहरतो यः समयाध्युषिते जुहोति ’ । व्याघाताच्चान्यतरन्मिथ्येति ।

“पुनरुक्तदोषाच्च । अभ्यासे देश्यमाने—‘ त्रिः प्रथमामन्वाह त्रिरुत्तमाम् ’ इति पुनरुक्तदोषो भवति । पुनरुक्तं च प्रमत्तवाक्यमिति ।

१ तदप्रामाण्यमित्यादिशब्दप्रामाण्यनिराकरणपरं पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ।

२ ‘ व्याघातः ’ पदयोर्वाक्ययोर्वा विरुद्धार्थोपस्थापकत्वेन महासम्भवः ।

पूर्वप्रकरणे समस्तलोक्यात्रानुबद्धस्य शब्दस्य झटित्यप्रामाण्याभिधानं लोकविरुद्धं स्वचरितविरुद्धं चेति मन्वानस्य पूर्वपक्षिणोऽनुमानानन्तर्भावमुखेन तद्वाह्यतयाऽप्रामाण्यमेवाभिमतम् । तदेवं बहिर्भावसिद्धाविदानीं विभाव्य प्रत्यवस्थानम् । न हि सर्वस्य शब्दस्याप्रामाण्यमस्य पूर्वपक्षिणो विवक्षितम्, स्ववचनव्याघातप्रसङ्गात्—इति परमैश्वर्यसाधनत्वेन नैयायिकाभिमतं शब्दविशेषस्य वेदस्यैव प्रामाण्यमाक्षिपति ।

वस्तुतस्त्वस्य हृदये शब्दमात्रस्यैवाप्रामाण्यं चेष्टते । कैश्चिद् हेतुभिः केषाञ्चिद्दे-दगतानामप्रामाण्यं प्रसाध्य तद्दृष्टान्तबलेनान्येषामपि वाक्यानामप्रामाण्यं साधयितुं सुकरम्—नित्यसन्देहादासानाप्तविभागस्य दुष्करत्वादित्याशयः ।

३ तस्येतीति । सूत्रे तच्छब्दप्रयोगोऽप्येतदेव सूचयति । यस्मात्प्रकरणेन प्राप्तमपि शब्दं तच्छब्देन पुनरभिधत्ते तेन ज्ञापयति शब्दविशेषं प्रतीयं चिन्ता न शब्दमात्रमिति । अन्यथैवं वक्तव्यम्—‘ अप्रमाणं शब्दोऽनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ’ इति ।

४ अनृतत्वादिति । अत्र फलादर्शनमेव ‘ अनृतत्वम् ’ ।

५ श्यावशबलाविति । ‘ श्वानौ द्वौ श्यावशबलौ वैवस्वतकुलोद्भवौ । ताभ्याम्पिण्डं प्रयच्छामि स्यातामेतावर्हिंसकाविति ’ बलिमन्त्रोऽत्रानुसन्धेयः ।

६ व्याघातादिति । उदितहोमादिविधिवाक्यानां निन्दावाक्यैर्व्याघातः ।

“ तस्मादप्रमाणं शब्दोऽनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्य इति ” ॥ ५८ ॥

नै कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् ॥ ५९ ॥

नानृतदोषः पुत्रकामेष्टौ । कस्मात् ? कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् । इष्टया पितरौ संयुज्यमानौ पुत्रं जनयत इति-इष्टिः करणं साधनम्, पितरौ कर्तारौ, संयोगः कर्म । त्रयाणां गुणयोगात् पुत्रजन्म । वैगुण्याद्विपर्ययः ।

इष्टयाश्रयं तावत्कर्मवैगुण्यं-समीहाश्लेषः । कर्तृवैगुण्यम्-अविद्वान्-प्रयोक्ता कर्तृवैगुण्यम् । साधनवैगुण्यं-हविरसंस्कृतमुपहतमिति, मन्त्रा न्यूनाधिकाः स्वरवर्णहीना इति, दक्षिणा दुरागता हीना निन्दिता चेति ।

अथोपजनाश्रयं कर्मवैगुण्यम्-मिथ्यासम्प्रयोगः । कर्तृवैगुण्यं-योनिव्यापादो बीजोपघातश्चेति । साधनवैगुण्यम्-इष्टावभिहितम् ।

लोके च “ अग्निकामो दारुणी मथनीयात् ” इति विधिवाक्यम् ।

१ तस्मादप्रमाणमिति । दृष्टान्तस्वेनैतानि वाक्यान्वुपन्यस्यैककर्तृकत्वेनाशेषवेदवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यमिति ।

२ न कर्मस्थादि पूर्वपक्षपरिहारसूत्रम् । तस्यार्थः-फलादर्शनमन्यथाप्युपपद्यमानं नानृतत्वं साधयति, ततश्चासिद्धमनृतत्वं हेतुरिति ।

३ समीहाश्लेष इति । ‘समीहा’ तदङ्गसमिदाद्यनुष्ठानम्-तस्या ‘श्लेषः’ अंशोऽननुष्ठानमिति यावत् ।

४ कर्तृवैगुण्यमिति । विदुषो ह्यधिकारः सामर्थ्यात् । अत एव स्त्रीशूद्रतिरश्चामसमर्थानामनधिकारः ।

५ विद्वानपि यदि द्विजातिकर्महानिहेतुं कर्म ब्रह्महत्यादि कृतवान् तत्कृतमपि कर्म फलाय न कल्पते-इति दर्शयति कपूयेति । ‘कपूयं’ निन्दितम् आचरतीति ‘आचरणः’ पुरुषः । अथवा कपूयमाचरणं यस्य स एवंभूतः पुरुषः ।

६ असंस्कृतमिति । अपूतमप्रोक्षितमित्यर्थः ।

७ उपहृतमिति-श्वमाजारादिभिरिति ।

८ स्वरवर्णेत्येति । “ मन्त्रो हीनः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा मिथ्याप्रयुक्तो न स तमर्थमाह । स वाग्वज्रो यजमानं हिनस्ति यथेन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधादिति ” ।

९ दुरागतैति । दौस्थ्यदूतोत्कोचादेः दुष्टादुपायादागतैत्यर्थः । हीनैति । ऋत्विजः परितोषं न करोतीति ।

१० निन्दतेति । रजतादिप्रतिषिद्धद्रव्यरूपा ।

११ कर्तृवैगुण्यं प्रदर्श्य कर्मवैगुण्यं प्रदर्शयति अथेति । ‘उपजनं’ पुत्रोत्पादनरूपं कर्म ।

तत्र कर्मवैगुण्यम्—मिथ्याभिमन्थनम् । कर्तृवैगुण्यं—प्रज्ञाप्रयत्नगतः प्रमादः । साधनवैगुण्यम्—आर्द्रं सुषिरं दार्विति । तत्र फलं न निष्पद्यत इति नानृत-
दोषः । गुणयोगेन फलनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् ।

न चेदं लौकिकाद्भिद्यते “ पुत्रकामः पुत्रेष्टया यजेत ” इति ॥ ५९ ॥

अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात् ॥ ६० ॥

न व्याघातो हवन इत्यनुवर्तते । योऽभ्युपगतं हवनकालं भिनत्ति
ततोऽन्यत्र जुहोति तत्रायमभ्युपगतकालभेदे दोष उच्यते—“ श्यावोऽस्याहुति-
मभ्यवहरति य उदिते जुहोति ” । तदिदं विधिभ्रेषे निन्दावचनमिति ॥ ६० ॥

अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ६१ ॥

पुनरुक्तदोषोऽभ्यासे नेति प्रकृतम् । अनर्थकोऽभ्यासः पुनरुक्तम् ।
अर्थवानभ्यासोऽनुवादः । योऽयमभ्यासः—“ त्रिः प्रथमामन्वाह त्रिरुत्तमाम् ”
इत्यनुवाद उपपद्यते, अर्थवत्त्वात् । त्रिर्वचनेन हि प्रथमोत्तमयोः पञ्चदशत्वं
सामिधेनीनां भवति । तथा च मन्त्राभिवादः—“ इदमहं भ्रातृव्यं पञ्चदशा-
वरेण वाग्वज्रेण बाधे योऽस्मान्द्वेष्टि यं च वयं द्विष्म ” इति—पञ्चदश-
सामिधेनीर्वज्रं मन्त्रोऽभिवदति । तदभ्यासमन्तरेण न स्यादिति ॥ ६१ ॥

वाक्यविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात् ॥ ६२ ॥

प्रमाणं शब्दो यथा लोके ॥ ६२ ॥

विभागश्च ब्राह्मणवाक्यानां त्रिविधः—

१ मिथ्येति । येषामभिमन्थनेनाग्निर्न जायते तदेव ‘ मिथ्या ’ ।

२ नचेदमिति । यथा लोकेऽपि कर्त्रादिवैगुण्यवशादसम्पन्नमग्निजननरूपं कर्म—
‘ अग्निकामो दाहणी मथनीयात् ’ इत्यस्य विधिवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं न व्याहन्ति—तथैव
कर्त्रादिवैगुण्येनासम्पद्यमानं पुत्रजननरूपं कर्म—‘ पुत्रकामः पुत्रेष्टया यजेत ’ इत्यस्य
विधिवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं न व्याहन्तीति लौकिकदृष्टान्तोद्भावनतास्पर्यम् ।

३ अभ्युपेत्येति सूत्रं पूर्वपक्षोक्तं व्याघातदोषं परिहरति ।

४ अनुवादेति सूत्रं पूर्वपक्षोक्तपुनरुक्तदोषं परिहरति ।

५ अर्थवानिति । पुनरुक्तं नाम तस्यैवार्थस्थानङ्गीकृतविशेषस्य पुनर्वचनम् ।
अनुवादस्तु पुनः श्रुतिसामान्यादङ्गीकृतविशेषस्यार्थस्य वादः । एवं च सति न
यथोक्तो दोषः ।

६ वाक्यविभागस्येति सूत्रं समस्तानि वेदवाक्यानि पक्षीकरोति । प्रमाणं वेद-
वाक्यानि, अर्थविभागवत्त्वात्, मन्वादिवाक्यवदित्यर्थः ।

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् ॥ ६३ ॥

त्रिधा खलु ब्राह्मणवाक्यानि विनियुक्तानि—विधिवचनान्यर्थवादवचना-
न्यनुवादवचनानीति ॥ ६३ ॥

तत्र—

विधिर्विधायकः ॥ ६४ ॥

यद्वाक्यं विधायकं चोदकं स विधिः । ^१विधिस्तु नियोगोऽनुज्ञा वा, यथा
“ अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः ” इत्यादि ॥ ६४ ॥

स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इत्यर्थवादः ॥ ६५ ॥

विधेः फलवादलक्षणा या प्रशंसा सा स्तुतिः सम्प्रत्ययार्था—स्तूयमानं
श्रद्धधीतेति—प्रवर्तिका च, फलश्रवणात् प्रवर्तते । “ सर्वजितो वै देवा सर्वम-
जयन् सर्वस्याप्त्यै सर्वस्य जित्यै सर्वमेवैतेनाप्नोति सर्वं जयति ” इत्येवमादि ।

अनिष्टफलवादो निन्दा वर्जनार्था,—निन्दितं न समाचरेदिति । “स एष
वाव प्रथमो यज्ञो यज्ञानां यज्योतिष्टोमो य एतेनानिष्ठाऽन्येन यजते गर्ते
पतत्ययमेवैतज्जीर्यते वा प्रमीयते वा ” इत्येवमादि ।

अन्यकर्तृकस्य व्याहृतस्य विधेर्वादः परकृतिः । “ हुत्वा वपामेवाग्नेऽभि-
धारयन्ति अथ पृषदाज्यम्, तदुह चरकाध्वर्यवः पृषदाज्यमेवाग्नेऽभिधारयन्ति,
अग्नेः प्राणाः पृषदाज्यमित्येवमभिद्धति ” इत्येवमादि ।

^१ विधिस्त्विति । ‘अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम’ इति वाक्यमप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तकलक्षणं
कर्त्रपेक्षितोपायतां ज्ञापयत् ‘विधिः’ इति । तदेव तत्साधनद्रव्याद्यवाप्तिप्रवृत्ति-
मनुजानातीति ‘अनुज्ञापि’ भवति । एतदुक्तं भवति । एकमेवाग्निहोत्रवाक्यमप्राप्ते-
ऽग्निहोत्रादौ ‘विधिः,’ अन्यतः प्राप्ते तत्साधने ‘अनुज्ञा’ चेति ।

पुनश्च ये द्रव्यार्जननियमविधयः—‘ब्राह्मणस्य प्रतिग्रहादिना’ इत्येवमादयः—
ते च रागतो धनार्जने प्रवृत्तानां ब्राह्मणानां लौकिकानेकोपायप्रयुक्तौ सत्यां नियमपराः
पुरुषार्थाः, न ऋत्वर्थाः । ऋतुविधयस्तु धनसाधनाः । तेऽनूदिताः पर्यवस्यन्तोऽपि
न धनार्जनं वा तन्नियमं वा प्रयुज्यते—तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वेनैव प्रयुक्तत्वात् । केवल-
मनुजानन्ति तु तदिति ।

२ परकृतिरिति । चरकाध्वर्युपुरुषसम्बन्धात् वपाहोमपृषदाज्याभिधारणयोः
क्रमभेदस्याप्राप्तस्य पुरुषविशेषधर्मतया विधायकं परकृतिवाक्यम् । तथा वहिष्पव-
मानसामस्तोममन्त्रसम्बन्धस्य पूर्वकालपुरुषसम्बन्धितया श्रवणादिदानान्तनपुरुषधर्म-
तया विधायकं पुराकल्पवाक्यमिति विवेकः । स्फुटतरस्तुतिनिन्दाप्रतीत्यभावाच्च
परकृतिपुराकल्पयोः स्तुतिनिन्दाभ्यां भेदेनोपन्यासः ।

ऐतिह्यसमाचरितो विधिः पुराकल्प इति । “ तस्माद्वा एतेन ब्राह्मणा वहिष्पवमानं सामस्तोमस्तौषन् योने यज्ञं प्रतनवामहे ” इत्येवमादि ।

“ कथं परकृतिपुराकल्पावर्थवादाविति ? ”

स्तुतिनिन्दावाक्येनाभिसम्बन्धाद्विध्याश्रयस्य कस्यचिदर्थस्य द्योतनादर्थ-
वाद इति ॥ ६५ ॥

^३ विधिविहितस्यानुवचनमनुवादः ॥ ६६ ॥

विध्यनुवचनं चानुवादो विहितानुवचनं च । पूर्वः शब्दानुवादोऽपरोऽ-
र्थानुवादः । यथा पुनरुक्तं द्विविधमेवमनुवादोऽपि ।

“ किमर्थं पुनर्विहितमनुवचते ? ”

अधिकारार्थम् । विहितमधिकृत्य स्तुतिर्बोध्यते निन्दा वा-विधिशेषो
वाऽभिधीयते । विहितानन्तरार्थोऽपि चानुवादो भवति । एवमन्यदप्युत्प्रेक्ष-
णीयम् ।

लोकेऽपि च विधिरर्थवादोऽनुवाद इति च त्रिविधं वाक्यम् । ओदनं
पचेदिति विधिवाक्यम् । अर्थवादवाक्यमायुर्वर्चो बलं सुखं प्रतिभानं चान्ने
प्रतिष्ठितम् । अनुवादः-पचतु पचतु भवानित्यभ्यासः-क्षिप्रं पच्यतामिति वा,
अङ्ग पच्यतामित्यभ्येषणार्थम्, पच्यतामेवेति वावधारणार्थम् ।

यथा लौकिकवाक्ये विभागेनार्थग्रहणात्प्रमाणत्वम् एवं वेदवाक्यानामपि
विभागेनार्थग्रहणात्प्रमाणत्वं भवितुमर्हतीति ॥ ६६ ॥

१ कथमित्यादिप्रश्नस्योत्तरम्-स्तुतिनिन्देति । स्तुतिनिन्दावाक्येन कस्य-
चिद्विधेः शेषभूतेन सम्बन्धादिति भावः ।

२ अर्थवाद इति । न तावदेतेषु वाक्येषु सिद्धाभिधायिषु विधिश्चुतिरस्ति । तत्र
किमश्रूयमाणो विधिः कल्प्यताम्-आहोस्वित् प्रतीतेनैव केनचिदन्येन विधिनैक-
वाक्यता कल्प्यतामिति संशये-कल्पनालाघवात् प्रतीतेनैव विधिनैकवाक्यता ज्यायसी ।
पूर्वपक्षे विधिकल्पना तदेकवाक्यताकल्पना वेति द्वयं कल्पनीयम्, उत्तरस्मिन्स्त्वेक-
वाक्यतामात्रमित्याशयः ।

३ विधिविहितस्येत्यादि सूत्रम् (१) अश्वमेधेन यजेतेति विधेरनुवादो ‘योऽश्व-
मेधेन यजते तरति मृत्युं तरति पाप्मानमित्यादि’ विहितं स्तोतुम् । (२) उदिते
होतव्यमिति विधेरनुवादः ‘यदुदिते जुहोति यदनुदिते जुहोति श्यावो वास्याहुतिम-
भ्यवहरतीत्यादि’ विहितातिक्रमं निन्दितुम् । (३) सोमयागो विहितो दर्शपूर्णमासौ
च, तयोरनुवादो ‘दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिष्ट्वा सोमेन यजेतेत्यादि’ अनुष्ठानक्रमं बोधयितुम्।
सूत्रपञ्चकोक्तमुपसंहरति यथा लौकिक इति ।

“ नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः ” ॥ ६७ ॥

“ पुनरुक्तमसाधु साधुरनुवाद इत्ययं विशेषो नोपपद्यते । कस्मात् ? उभयत्र हि प्रतीतार्थः शब्दोऽभ्यस्यते । चरितार्थस्य शब्दस्याभ्यासादुभयमसाध्विति ” ॥ ६७ ॥

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदभ्यासान्नाविशेषः ॥ ६८ ॥

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोरविशेषः । कस्मात् ? अर्थवतोऽभ्यासस्यानुवादभावात् । समानेऽभ्यासे पुनरुक्तमनर्थकम् , अर्थवानभ्यासोऽनुवादः, शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवत् । शीघ्रं शीघ्रं गम्यतां शीघ्रतरं गम्यतामिति क्रियातिशयोऽभ्यासेनैवोच्यते । उदाहरणार्थं चेदम् । एवमन्योऽप्यभ्यासः । पचति पचतीति क्रियानुपरमः । ग्रामो ग्रामो रमणीय इति व्याप्तिः । परि परि त्रिगर्तेभ्यो वृष्टो देव इति परिवर्जनम् । अध्यधिकुड्यं निपण्णमिति सामीप्यम् । तिक्तं तिक्तम् इति प्रकारः ।

एवमनुवादस्य स्तुतिनिन्दाशेषविधिष्वधिकारार्थता विहितानन्तरार्थता चेति ॥ ६८ ॥

“ किं पुनः प्रतिषेधहेतूद्वारादेव शब्दस्य प्रमाणत्वं सिध्यति ? ”

अतश्च—

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ६९ ॥

“ किं पुनरायुर्वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम् ? ”

यत्तदायुर्वेदेनोपदिश्यते—इदं कृत्वेष्टमधिगच्छतीदं वर्जयित्वाऽनिष्टं जहाति, तस्यानुष्ठीयमानस्य तथाभावः सत्यार्थताऽविपर्ययः । मन्त्रपदानां च विषभूताशनिप्रतिषेधार्थानां प्रयोगेऽर्थस्य तथाभाव एतत्प्रामाण्यम् ।

१ भाष्योक्तमनुवादप्रयोजनमविद्वानाक्षिपति—नानुवादेति सूत्रम् ।

२ शीघ्रतरत्यादि समाधानसूत्रम् ।

३ अर्थवानिति । अनुवादलक्षणोऽभ्यासः सप्रयोजनः प्रत्ययविशेषहेतुत्वात् शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदिति ।

४ अतश्चेति । यतः प्रतिषेधहेतूद्वारादेव शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यं न सिध्यति—अतः सूत्रकारो हेत्वन्तरैस्तत् साक्षात् साधयति ।

५ मन्त्रेत्यादिसूत्रम् । तत्र चकारः पूर्वहेत्वनुकर्षणार्थः । अत्र प्रयोगः—प्रमाणं वेदवाक्यानि वक्तृविशेषाभिहितत्वात् मन्त्रायुर्वेदवाक्यवदिति । अथवा—एककर्तृकत्वेन मन्त्रायुर्वेदवाक्यानि पक्षीकृत्यार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन वैधर्म्यहेतुर्वक्तव्यः ।

किं कृतमेतत् ? आप्तप्रामाण्यकृतम् ?

किं पुनराप्तानां प्रामाण्यम् ? साक्षात्कृतधर्मता भूतदया यथाभूतार्थचिख्यापयिषेति । आप्ताः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्माणः—इदं हातव्यमिदमस्य हानिहेतुरिदमस्याधिगन्तव्यमिदमस्याधिगमहेतुरिति—भूतान्यनुकम्पन्ते—तेषां खलु वै प्राणभृतां स्वयमनवबुद्धयमानानां नान्यदुपदेशादवबोधकारणमस्ति, न चानवबोधे समीहा वर्जनं वा, न वाऽकृत्वा स्वस्तिभावः, नाप्यस्यान्य उपकारकोऽप्यस्ति, हेन्त वयमेभ्यो यथादर्शनं यथाभूतमुपदिशामस्त इमे श्रुत्वा प्रतिपद्यमाना हेयं हास्यन्त्याधिगन्तव्यमेवाधिगमिष्यन्ति इति एवमाप्तोपदेशः । एतेन त्रिविधेनाप्तप्रामाण्येन परिगृहीतोऽनुष्ठीयमानोऽर्थस्य साधको भवति । एवमाप्तोपदेशः प्रमाणम् । एवमाप्ताः प्रमाणम् ।

दृष्टार्थेनाप्तोपदेशेनायुर्वेदेनादृष्टार्थो वेदभागोऽनुमातव्यः प्रमाणमिति । आप्तप्रामाण्यस्य हेतोः समानत्वादिति । अस्यापि चैकदेशो “ प्रामकामो यजेत ” इत्येवमादिदृष्टार्थः । तेनानुमातव्यमिति ।

लोके च भूयानुपदेशाश्रयो व्यवहारः । लौकिकस्याप्युपदेष्टुरुपदेष्टव्यार्थज्ञानेन परानुजिघृक्षया यथाभूतार्थचिख्यापयिषया च प्रामाण्यम् । तत्परिग्रहादाप्तोपदेशः प्रमाणमिति ।

द्रष्टृप्रवक्तृसामान्याच्चानुमानम् । य एवाप्ता वेदार्थानां द्रष्टारः प्रवक्तारश्च त एवायुर्वेदप्रभृतीनाम्—इत्यायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवद्वेदप्रामाण्यमनुमातव्यमिति ।

“ नित्यत्वाद् वेदवाक्यानां प्रमाणत्वे तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यादित्ययुक्तम् ” ।

शब्दस्य वाचकत्वादर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रमाणत्वम्, न नित्यत्वात्, नित्यत्वे हि सर्वस्य सर्वेण वचनाच्छब्दार्थव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः । “ नानित्यत्वे वाचकत्वमिति ” चेद्, न, लौकिकेवर्थदर्शनात् । “ तेऽपि नित्या इति ” चेद्, न, अनाप्तोपदेशादर्थविसंवादोऽनुपपन्नः । नित्यत्वाद्धि शब्दः प्रमाणमिति । “ अनित्यः

१ इदं हातव्यमित्यादि साक्षात्कृतधर्मतां प्रदर्शयति ।

२ हन्तेत्यादि यथाभूतार्थचिख्यापयिषां सूचयति ।

३ समानत्वादिति । यथाऽऽयुर्वेद आप्तप्रणीतस्तथा वेदोऽपीत्यर्थः ।

४ अनाप्तेति । यदि लौकिका अपि शब्दा नित्यास्तर्ह्यनाप्तवचने योऽर्थविसंवादः सकलानुभवगम्यः स न स्यादित्यर्थः ।

स इति ” चेत्, आविशेषवचनम् । अनाप्तोपदेशो लौकिको न नित्य इति कारणं वाच्यमिति । यथानियोगं चार्थस्य प्रत्यायनान्नामधेयशब्दानां लोके प्रामाण्यम् । नित्यत्वात्प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः । यत्रार्थे नामधेयशब्दो नियुज्यते लोके तस्य नियोगसामर्थ्यात्प्रत्यायको भवति, न नित्यत्वात् । मन्वन्तरयुगान्तरेषु चातीतानागतेषु सम्प्रदायाभ्यासप्रयोगाविच्छेदो वेदानां नित्यत्वम् । आप्तप्रामाण्याच्च प्रामाण्यम् । लौकिकेषु शब्देषु चैतत्समानमिति ॥ ६९ ॥

इति वास्यायनीये न्यायभाष्ये द्वितीया-
ध्यायस्याद्यमाह्निकम् ।

अथ द्वितीयाध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम्^१

(१) प्रमाणचतुष्टयपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् ।

अयथार्थः प्रमाणोद्देश इति मत्वाऽऽह—

“ न चतुष्टयमैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् ” ॥ १ ॥

“ न चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि । किं तर्हि ? ऐतिह्यमर्थापत्तिः सम्भवोऽभाव इत्येतान्यपि प्रमाणानि । तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानि ।

“ इति ह्येचुरित्यनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यमैतिह्यम् ।

“ अर्थादापत्तिरर्थापत्तिः । आपत्तिः—प्राप्तिः—प्रसङ्गः । यत्राभिधीयमानेऽर्थे योऽन्योऽर्थः प्रसज्यते सोऽर्थापत्तिः । यथा मेघेष्वसत्सु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति । किमत्र प्रसज्यते ? सत्सु भवति ।

“ सम्भवो नामाविनाभाविनोऽर्थस्य सत्ताग्रहणादन्यस्य सत्ताग्रहणम् । यथा द्रोणस्य सत्ताग्रहणादाढकस्य सत्ताग्रहणम् आढकस्य ग्रहणात्प्रस्थस्येति ।

“ अभावो विरोधी—अभूतं भूतस्य, अविद्यमानं वर्षकर्म विद्यमानस्य वाय्वभ्रसंयोगस्य प्रतिपादकम् । विधारके हि वाय्वभ्रसंयोगे गुरुत्वादपां पतनकर्म न भवतीति ” ॥ १ ॥

सैत्यमेतानि प्रमाणानि, न तु प्रमाणान्तराणि । प्रमाणान्तरं च मन्यमानेन प्रतिषेध उच्यते । सोऽयम्—

१ एवं प्रथमाह्निके धर्मिणः प्रत्यक्षादीन् शब्दान्तान्निरूप्येदानीं द्वितीयाह्निके चतुष्टयादयस्तेषां धर्मां निरूपणीयाः । तत्र प्रमाणधर्मपरीक्षा द्वितीयाह्निकार्थः ।

२ अयथार्थ इति । प्रमाणानां विभागोद्देशो यः सोऽयथार्थ इत्यर्थः ।

३ न चतुष्टयमित्यादि पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । अभ्युपगतोक्तप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणभावोऽनभ्युपगतचतुष्टयमात्रोऽत्र पूर्वपक्षी । अथ वा तन्त्रान्तरोक्तप्रमाणान्तरसत्त्वासत्त्वनिश्चयरहितः सतीर्थ एवात्र प्रष्टा ।

४ वाय्वभ्रेति । अपां पातप्रत्यनीकस्य पातविरोधिनः वाय्वभ्रसंयोगस्य ग्रहणम् । तदिदं किलाभावाख्यं प्रमाणम् । प्रमीयतेऽनेन (मेघोदयेऽपि तोयपाताभावेन) वाय्वभ्रसंयोग इत्याशयः ।

५ सत्यमिति । सत्यमेतान्यैतिह्यादीनि प्रमाणानि—न तु प्रत्यक्षादिभ्योऽन्यानि । प्रत्यक्षादिभ्योऽन्यत् प्रमाणं नस्तीत्येतावन्मात्रेऽस्माकमाग्रहः । न चैतिह्यादीनां प्रमाणत्वमेव न सृष्यामह इति हृदयम् ।

६ सोयमिति—अनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेध इत्यग्रिमेण भाष्यग्रन्थेनान्वयः ।

शब्द ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावाद्नुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्था-
न्तरभावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ ॥

अनुपपन्नः प्रतिषेधः । कथम् ? आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः इति । न च शब्द-
लक्षणमैतिह्याद्व्यावर्तते । सोऽयं भेदः सामान्यात्सङ्गृह्यत इति ।

प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षस्य सम्बद्धस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनुमानम् । तथा चार्थापत्तिसम्भ-
वाभावाः । वाक्यार्थसम्प्रत्ययेनानभिहितस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यनीकभावाद्ग्रहणमर्था-
पत्तिरनुमानमेव । अविनाभाववृत्त्या च सम्बद्धयोः समुदायसमुदायिनोः
समुदायेनेतरस्य ग्रहणं सम्भवः, तदप्यनुमानमेव । अस्मिन्सतीदं नोपपद्यत
इति विरोधित्वे प्रसिद्धे कार्यानुत्पत्त्या कारणस्य प्रतिबन्धकमनुमीयते । सोऽयं
यथार्थ एव प्रमाणोद्देश इति ॥ २ ॥

“ सत्यमेतानि प्रमाणानि न तु प्रमाणान्तराणीत्युक्तम् । अत्रार्थापत्तेः
प्रमाणभावाभ्यनुज्ञा नोपपद्यते । तथा हीयम्—

“ अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात् ” ॥३॥

“ असत्सु मेघेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति सत्सु भवतीत्येतदार्थादापद्यते सत्स्वपि
चैकदा न भवति । सेयमर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमिति ” ॥ ३ ॥

नानैकान्तिकत्वमर्थापत्तेः—

अनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् ॥ ४ ॥

असति कारणे कार्यं नोत्पद्यत इति वाक्यात्प्रत्यनीकभूतोऽर्थः सति
कारणे कार्यमुत्पद्यते इत्यर्थादापद्यते,—अभावस्य हि भावः प्रत्यनीक इति ।
सोऽयं कार्योत्पादः सति कारणेऽर्थादापद्यमानो न कारणस्य सत्तां व्यभि-
चरति । न खल्वसति कारणे कार्यमुत्पद्यते । तस्मान्नानैकान्तिकी ।

१ शब्द इत्यादिसिद्धान्तसूत्रमुक्तानां प्रागुक्तेष्वेवान्तर्भावप्रदर्शनार्थम् ।

२ शब्दलक्षणमिति । यत् खल्वनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकप्रवादपारम्पर्यमैतिह्यं तस्य चेदाप्तः
कर्ता नावधारितः, ततस्तत् प्रमाणमेव न भवति । अथाक्षरपरम्परेत्यवगतं तत्राप्युपदेश
इति शब्दलक्षणं नातिवर्तत इत्यर्थः ।

३ वाक्यार्थेति । असत्सु मेघेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीत्येतद्वाक्यमवगत्य तेनानभिहितं
' सत्सु मेघेषु भविष्यतीति ' अवगच्छत्यर्थापत्त्येति पूर्वपक्षिणोऽभिमतम् । एतच्चानु-
मानमेव—यतोऽस्त्येवोक्तयोर्वाक्ययोर्विरोधरूपः सम्बन्धोऽनुमानबीजम् ।

४ अर्थापत्तिरिति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् ।

५ अनर्थेति सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् ।

यत्तु “ सति कारणे निमित्तप्रतिबन्धात्कार्यं नोत्पद्यते ” इति, कारण-धर्मोऽसौ न त्वर्थापत्तेः प्रमेयम् । किं तर्ह्यस्याः प्रमेयम् ? सति कारणे कार्य-मुत्पद्यते इति योऽसौ कार्योत्पादः कारणस्य सत्तां न व्यभिचरति तदस्याः प्रमेयम् । एवं तु सत्यनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्यभिमानं कृत्वा प्रतिषेध उच्यते इति । दृष्टश्च कारणधर्मो न शक्यः प्रत्याख्यातुमिति ॥ ४ ॥

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यं चानैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

अर्थापत्तिर्न प्रमाणम् अनैकान्तिकत्वादिति वाक्यं प्रतिषेधः । तेनाने-नार्थापत्तेः प्रमाणत्वं प्रतिषिध्यते न सद्भावः । एवमनैकान्तिको भवति । अनैकान्तिकत्वादप्रमाणेनानेन न कश्चिदर्थः प्रतिषिध्यते इति ॥ ५ ॥

अथ मन्यसे— “ नियतविषयेष्वर्थेषु स्वविषये व्यभिचारो भवति; न च प्रतिषेधस्य सद्भावो विषयः ” ! एवं तर्हि

तैप्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

अर्थापत्तेरपि कार्योत्पादेन कारणसत्ताया अव्यभिचारो विषयः न च कारणधर्मो निमित्तप्रतिबन्धात् कार्यानुत्पादकत्वमिति ॥ ६ ॥

“ अभावस्य तर्हि प्रमाणभावाभ्यनुज्ञा नोपपद्यते । ” कथमिति ?—

“ नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः ” ॥ ७ ॥

अभावस्य भूयसि प्रमेये लोकसिद्धे वैर्यात्यादुच्यते नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेरिति ॥ ७ ॥

१ न व्यभिचरतीति । ततश्च नानैकान्तिकतेति भावः ।

२ उच्यते इति । पूर्वपक्षिणा तृतीयसूत्र इति शेषः ।

३ प्रतिषेधेति सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रम् ।

४ एवमिति । एवं द्वैकान्तिकः स्याद्यद्यर्थापत्तेः प्रामाण्यं सत्तां च प्रतिषेधेत् । नत्वनकान्तिकत्वात्सर्वं प्रतिषेद्धुमर्हति । न भवति ‘ यदनैकान्तिकं तत् सर्वं नास्तीति ’ । प्रमेयत्वादीनां नित्यत्वसाधनेऽनैकान्तिकत्वेऽपि सत्त्वादिति हृदयम् ।

५ तदिति सिद्धान्तिनः सूत्रम् । तदिति प्रतिषेधं परामृशति ।

६ नाभावेति पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् । नाभावज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । कस्मात् ? प्रमेयस्याभा-वस्यासिद्धेः । यत् किल सर्वोपाख्यारहितं तन्न प्रमाणज्ञानविषयभावमनुभवति । केवलं काल्पनिको ह्यभावव्यवहारो लौकिकानामिति पूर्वपक्षिणो हृदयम् ।

७ अभावस्येति । पूर्वपक्षपरिहारोऽयम् । सर्वजनीनाभावप्रत्ययव्यवहारौ न काल्पनिकौ भवितुमर्हतः । न च कल्पनाऽपि सर्वोपाख्यारहितं गोचरयितुमर्हति ।

८ वैर्यात्यादिति । साहसमात्रादित्यर्थः ।

which has *not* the character of being produced is always eternal, e. g., such substances as the Soul and the like.*

Sūtra 36

That Familiar instance,—which, through similarity to what is to be proved (*i. e.* the Subject), is possessed of a property of that (Subject)—constitutes the 'Statement of the Corroborative Instance.'

BHĀṢYA

† 'Similarity to what is proved' consists in the presence of the same property in both; when by reason of this similarity, the

* The reading of the Vizia. Edition is defective; the proper reading is 'anītyaḥ śabdāḥ, utpatti-dharmakatvāt anutpattidharmakaṃ nītyaṃ, yathā ātmādidraavyam,' as found in the Puri MSS.

† The wording of this Sūtra is not clear. The meaning is clear enough:—that is the right example which possesses two properties in common with the Subject,—one property whose presence in the Subject is to be proved, and the other that which is already known to subsist in it. But the difficulty arises from the presence of the word 'sādhyā' in the Sūtra. Ordinarily this word stands for the Probandum, that whose presence in the Subject is to be proved; that the word cannot mean this in the present Sūtra is made clear in the Vārtika. The translation has adopted the explanation provided by the Tūtparyā, as follows:—'Sādhyasādharma' must mean the similarity of the Instance to the Subject,—this similarity, in the case of the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal because it is a product,' consisting in the presence of the property of *being produced*, which is the Probans; this is equally present in the Subject, Sound, *which is to be proved* as 'non-eternal,' and in the Instance, dish, &c.; and on the basis of this similarity, the Instance is found to possess another property meant to belong to that same Subject (Sound),—that is, *that* the connection of Sound with which is to be proved, e. g. the property of non-eternality; and the dish, &c., are actually found to be possessed of this last property.

There is yet another difficulty;—*udāharāṇa*, as a factor of reasoning, is a *verbal statement*; how can a familiar instance, which is an object possessing certain properties, be called a 'statement'? This difficulty has been sought to be cleared by the Vārtika.

The translation has adopted the interpretation of the Vārtika and the Bhāṣya. But the Sūtra is capable of a much simpler interpretation—*Sādhyena (dharmeṇa anītyatvena) sādharāṇyāt (sāmānādhikarāṇyāt, sādhyasāmānādhikarāṇam dharmāntaramutpattidharmakatvamavalambya) tad dharmabhāvī (sādhyadharmavāṇ)*;—translated thus—'That familiar instance which possessing a property that is known to be co-existent or concomitant with

familiar instance is found to be *possessed of a character of that same,—i. e., the character of what is to be proved.* ‘*What is to be proved*’ is of two kinds—(a) in some cases it is the property as qualified by (belonging to) the object;—as when we assert the ‘*non-eternality of Sound*’; and (2) in others it is the object as qualified by the property, as when we assert that ‘*sound is non-eternal*’; and it is this latter that is referred to by the pronoun ‘*tat*’ [in the compound *taddharmabhāvī*] (in the *Sūtra*) [and not the *probandum*, which is what is usually spoken of as ‘*sādhya*’]. “How do you know that it is this latter that is meant by the word ‘*sādhya*’ here?” For the simple reason that we find the ‘*property*’, ‘*dharmā*’, mentioned separately from ‘*that*’, ‘*tat*’ [so that ‘*tat*’ and ‘*dharmā*’ could not be the same]; the word ‘*taddharmabhāvī*’ means ‘*that which has the bhāva or presence of the dharmā or property of ‘tat’ or ‘that’; that is to say, that familiar instance which is possessed of a property that belongs also to the Subject; and it is such an instance which can be spoken of as ‘possessed of a property of the Subject’, in virtue of its similarity to that Subject. For instance, in the reasoning ‘sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced’, what the probans, ‘being produced’, means is that being produced, it ceases to be,—i. e. loses itself,—i. e. is destroyed; here we find that being produced, is meant to be the means of proving (i. e. the Probans) and being non-eternal is what is proved (the Probandum); and the notion that there is the relation of means and object between the two properties can arise only when the two are found to co-exist in any one thing; and it arises only by reason of the ‘similarity’ (of a number of things, in every one of which the two properties are found to co-exist); so that when one has per-*

the probandum, possesses also the probandum’. The *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparyā* appear to have been led away by the impossibility of there being any ‘*Sādharmya*’ (similarity) between the Instance (which is an object, a *dharmīn*) and the Probandum (which is a property, a *dharmā*). But the *Bhāṣya* itself affords an explanation (below) which shows that ‘*Sādharmya*’ means ‘*concomitance in a single substratum*’, and not *similarity*; and that this concomitance is between the two properties—*e. g.* non-eternality’ (probandum) and ‘*being produced*’, both of which, known to be concomitant, should subsist in the Instance.

ceived the said relation in the familiar instance, he naturally infers the same in Sound also;—the form of the inference being ‘Sound also is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced, just like such things as the dish, the cup and like’. And this is called ‘Statement of the Corroborative Instance’, ‘*udāharaṇa*’ because it is what is the means of establishing, between the two properties, of the relation of means and object.

Sūtra 37

And the other kind of ‘statement of Corroborative Instance’ is that which is contrary to what has been described in the foregoing Sūtra.

BHĀṢYA

What is meant to be described is that ‘familiar’ instance which constitutes the ‘Statement of Corroborative Instance’; so that what the Sūtra means is that the other kind of Statement of the (heterogeneous) Instance consists in *that familiar instance which, through dissimilarity to what is to be proved, is not possessed of a property of that Subject*. E. g. ‘Sound is non-eternal’, because it has the character of being produced,—*everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, for instance, the ‘Soul and the rest’*;—here ‘Soul and the rest’ constitute the required ‘familiar instance,’ which, through their ‘dissimilarity to what is to be proved’—*i. e.* on account of their not having the *character of being produced*,—are not ‘possessed of the property of the Subject,’—*i. e.* the property of *non-eternality*. When we find that in the case of the Soul, the character of *being produced* being absent,* it does not possess non-eternality, we infer the contrary in the case of Sound,—‘because Sound is possessed of the character of *being produced*, Sound is non-eternal’.†

* The reading ‘*sya—bhāvāt*’ is wrong ; the correct reading given in the Puri Ms. is ‘*syābhāvāt* ;’.

† The *Tātparya* takes exception to the example cited in the *Bhāṣya* :—“ Both the examples cited in the *Bhāṣya*—that of the Homogeneous Instance as well as that of the Heterogeneous Instance—are those of the ‘affirmative-negative’ kind ; and in the latter case it has declared that the absence of the property to be proved is due to the absence of the character which proves it ; and this is not right, as in the case of the ‘affirmative-negative’ reasoning, even though a heterogeneous Instance be available, the right course is always to cite the homogeneous Instance ; as the *dissimilarity* of a

When the Probans is stated with a view to similarity—*i. e.* in the affirmative form,—what constitutes the *Statement of the Instance* is that familiar instance which, through its similarity to what is to be proved, is possessed of a property of the Subject; and when the Probans is stated with a view to dissimilarity,—*i. e.* in the negative form—the *Statement of the Instance* consists of that familiar instance which, through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved, does not possess the property of the Subject. In the former case, the observer perceives, in the Instance, that it possesses two properties so related that the presence of the one proves the presence of the other, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the Subject also the presence of the one should prove the presence of the other;—and in the latter case he observes in regard to the Instance that there are two properties so related that the absence of one proves the absence of another, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the Subject also the said properties are similarly related, the absence of one proving the absence of the other.

The process (of corroboration by means of familiar instances) is not possible in the case of fallacious Probans; and it is for this reason that they are regarded as 'fallacious', as not true probans.

The subject of this related capacity of the Probans and the Instance is very subtle and difficult to grasp; it can be rightly understood only by exceptionally wise and learned men.

thing is recognised always after its *similarity*; so that it is not right to have recourse to the roundabout way when a straight road is available for the same purpose." This contention appears to be favoured by the *Vārtika* also, which says that an instance of the heterogeneous Instance is to be found cited in connection with the 'Negative' reasoning. The instance that the *Tātparyā* would have is found in the following reasoning—'The living body is with Soul because otherwise it would be without the life-breath,—like the *jar*', where the 'property' of the Subject—the living body—*having the life-breath*—is not present in the jar. What the *Bhāṣya* itself proceeds to explain in the next sentence shows that the instance cited cannot be the right one; if it is true that 'when the Probans is stated affirmatively, the Instance cited should be homogeneous', then in the case of the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it has the character of being produced*'—where the probans is stated affirmatively—the right example could not be the *heterogeneous* one; while if the reasoning is put forward in the form 'the living body is with Soul, as *otherwise it would be without the life-breath*'—where the probans is stated *negatively*—we would have the heterogeneous Instance of the *jar* as cited by the *Tātparyā*.

Sūtra 38

The 'Re-affirmation' is that which, on the strength of the Instance, re-asserts the Subject as being 'so' [*i.e.*, as possessing the character which has been found, in the Instance, to be concomitant with the Probandum]—or as being 'not so' [*i.e.*, as not possessing the character which has been found in the Instance to be concomitant with the negation of the Probandum.]

BHĀṢYA

The term 'udāharṇaasāpēkṣaḥ' means 'depending on the Instance'—*i.e.* on the strength of the Instance.

(a) When the Instance cited is the homogeneous one, which is similar to the Subject,—*e. g.* when the Dish is cited as the example to show, that it is a *product* and is *non-eternal*—we have the 'Re-affirmation' stated in the form, 'Sound is so'—*i. e.* 'Sound is a product'; where the character of *being a product* is affirmed of the Subject *Sound*. (b) When the Instance cited is the heterogeneous one, which is dissimilar to the Subject,—*e. g.* when the Soul is cited as an example of the substance which, *not being a product*, is eternal,—the 'Re-affirmation' is stated in the form 'Sound is not so'; where the character of *being a product* is reasserted of the Subject, *Sound*, through the denial of the affirmation of the character of *not being produced*. Thus there are two kinds of *Reaffirmation*, based upon the two kinds of *Instance*.

The term 'upasamhāra' (in order to be made applicable to the *Verbal* re-affirmation) should be explained as *that by means of which there is reassertion (upasamhriyate anena)*. *

* On this Sūtra, the *Parīśuddhi* remarks as follows:—When the Sūtra speaks of the two kinds of Re-affirmation, it refers to the definitions that it has given of the two kinds of Instance in the two preceding Sūtras. The two kinds of Instance have been defined separately; but the corresponding two kinds of *Re-affirmation* are defined in one Sūtra. The *Tātparyā* observes that the definition common to both kinds of Re-affirmations would be in the form—उदाहरणापेक्षः उपसंहारः (साध्यस्य) उपनयः—*i. e.*, Re-affirmation consists in the re-assertion of the Subject (as possessing the Probans), on the strength of the Instance.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Even though the Statement of the Probans and Re-affirmation are both of two kinds, yet of one uniform character is—

Sūtra 39

the Final Conclusion, which is the re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probans.*

The Probans having been stated either *per* similarity or *per* dissimilarity, we have a recapitulation (of the entire reasoning) in accordance with the Instance ; and this recapitulation constitutes the Final Conclusion ; which is in the form—‘Therefore, having the character of product, Sound is non-eternal.’ This has been called ‘*Nigamana*’ (Final Conclusion), because it serves to connect or string together (*nigamyante*’ *anena*) the Proposition, the Statement of the Probans, the Statement of the Example and the Re-affirmation ; the word ‘*nigamyante*’ being synonymous with the ‘*samarthyante*’, (are ‘supported’) and ‘*sambadhyante*’ (‘are connected’).

When the Probans has been stated *per* similarity, the *Proposition* is in the form of the Statement ‘Sound is non-eternal’;—the *Probans* is stated in the form ‘because it has the character of being a product’;—the *Instance* is in the form ‘things like the dish, which have the character of being a product, are all non-eternal’ ; the *Re-affirmation* is in the form ‘Sound also has the same character of being a product’ ;— and the Final Conclusion is in the form ‘therefore, having the character of being a product Sound is non-eternal.’ Similarly, when the Probans is stated *per* dissimilarity, the *Proposition* is in the form ‘Sound is non-eternal’ ;—‘because it has the character of being a product, (*Probans*)’;—‘such things as the Soul which are not products are eternal’ (*Instance*);—‘Sound is not a thing that is not a product (*Re-affirmation*)’ ;—‘therefore not being a non-product, Sound is non-eternal’ (*Final Conclusion*).

* As a matter of fact, the Final Conclusion is what is established or proved, while the Proposition asserts what is yet to be proved ; but the two refer to the same thing ; that which appears in the conclusion as *proved* is precisely what has appeared before in the Proposition as *to be proved*. So that there is no incongruity in speaking of the Conclusion as being the Proposition.

In every inferential statement, which consists of the (five 'Factors,') several distinct *pramāṇas* commingle and co-operate towards the accomplishment of the end (in the shape of inferential cognition). There is 'commingling' in the following cases—(a) In the inference bearing on Sound, the *Proposition* ('Sound is non-eternal') comes under verbal cognition, and verbal assertion, unless it is heard directly from a Ṛṣi,—cannot by itself be accepted as 'trustworthy'; and it stands in need of corroboration by Perception and Inference; (b) in the *Statement of the Probans* we have an 'Inference', being deduced, as it is, from the cognition of similarity by the Statement of the Instance;* this has been explained clearly in the *Bhāṣya* dealing with the *Statement of the Instance*;—(c) the *Statement of the Instance* represents 'Perception'; the deduction of the unseen (unknown or uncertain conclusion) from the seen (what is perceived in the Instance) being only natural;—(d) the *Re-affirmation* is in the form of 'Analogy', as it is expressed in the form 'as that so this', or 'this is not as that is', when there is denial of the analogous character; in which case the *Re-affirmation* is in the form of the denial of the contrary character;—(e) the *Final Conclusion* serves to show how all the Factors combined are capable of bringing about the cognition of a single object (in the shape of the *Probandum* through that of the *Probans*).

There is mutual co-operation also among the five 'Factors'; e.g. (a) If there were no *Proposition*, there would be no basis on which the *Statement of the Probans* and the other Factors could proceed; (b) if there were no *Statement of the Probans*, the instrumental efficiency of what (towards the bringing about of the cognition) could be shown (by the Inference) ?—what again would that be whose connection with the Instance and the Probandum could be shown ?—on the basis of what again could there be the *Final Conclusion* consisting in the re-statement of the Proposition ?—(c) If there were no *Statement of the Instance*, what would that be to which there would be similarity, or dissimilarity, of what is put forward as the means (Probans) of proving the Pro-

* The Probans is recognised as such only when the reasoner has become cognisant of the invariable concomitance between the Probandum and the Probans as perceived in the thing that is cited as the Instance.

bandum?—on the strength of similarity to what too would the final recapitulation proceed?—(d) If there were no *Reaffirmation*, the character put forward as proving the Probandum, not having its presence in the Probandum reasserted, could not accomplish its purpose;—(e) lastly, in the absence of the *Final Conclusion*, there would be nothing to indicate the mutual relationship among the Proposition and the other Factors, or the fact of their combining to accomplish a common purpose; and what too would it be that would be declared as proved by means of such expressions as 'so is this'?

We now proceed to show the purpose served by each of the five 'Factors of Reasoning.'* (a) The *Proposition* serves the purpose of mentioning the relation between the character to be proved and the *Subject*; (b) the *Statement of the Probans* serves the purpose of stating the fact of a certain character, which is either similar or dissimilar to what is stated in the *Instance*, proving what is to be proved; (c) the *Statement of the Instance* serves the purpose of indicating the presence, between the two characters, of the relation of 'proof and proved' (Probans and Probandum), as manifested in a single substratum; (d) the purpose served by the *Reaffirmation* is to indicate the co-existence (in the Subject) of the character put forward as Probans with that put forward as the Probandum;—(e) and the *Final Conclusion* serves the purpose of showing that it is not possible to deny, in regard to the particular Probandum (and Subject), the relation of 'proof and proved' which has been found, in the Instance, to subsist between the two characters. †

* Though the purpose of each Factor has already been shown under the *sūtra* defining each of them, yet the Author proceeds to explain it again, for the good of his disciples.—*Tātparyā*.

† The *Final Conclusion* thus is not the same as the *Proposition*; the latter puts forward the fact only tentatively, as requiring confirmation by the reasoning with the aid of the Probans and the Instance, while the former puts it forward as one fully established, and thus precluding the possibility of the truth being contrary to it. This cannot be done by the *Proposition*; as, if it did, then the rest of the Factors would be entirely futile.—*Tātparyā*.

The above remarks of the *Tātparyā* show that the writer was conscious of the objection that every syllogism involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*; and has supplied a reasonable answer.

When the Probans and the Instance have been duly put forward in the correct form, in the manner described above, there is no opportunity for the Opponent to urge (against the reasoning) any 'Futile Rejoinder,'- in the shape of urging contrary arguments vitiating either the similarity or the dissimilarity of the Probans—or any one of the many 'Clinchers.' The Opponent who has recourse to 'Futile Rejoinder' does so (with effect) only after he has shown the doubtful character of the relation of 'proof and proved' between the two characters as found in the Instance; and as a matter of fact a Probans is put forward as such only when its relation of 'proof and proved' to the Probandum has been duly grasped in the Instance,—and not when its mere 'similarity' or 'dissimilarity' to the character in the Instance has been recognised. [So that when the Probans is duly stated, there can be no room for Futile Rejoinder or Clinchers being urged against it.]

SECTION (7)

*Factors Supplementary to Reasoning
Cogitation (Tarka)*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After the Factors of Reasoning, it is necessary to define *Tarka*, Cogitation.* This is what is declared in the next *Sūtra*.

Sūtra 40

When the real character of a thing is not well known, there is put forward, for the purpose of ascertaining that real character, a reasoning (in support of a certain conclusion) which indicates the presence of proof (showing the undesirability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion);—and this is called 'Cogitation.'

BHĀṢYA

As a matter of fact, when the real character of a thing is not well known, there is a desire to know it;—this desire appearing in

* Because this is mentioned in the opening *Sūtra*, next to '*Avayava*', and also because it serves the purpose of strengthening the inferential conclusion by setting aside its contrary.

The Viz. Series edition has a superfluous '*tarkaḥ*' here; it is absent in the Puri MSS.

the form 'may I know it.' After this comes the doubt as to the thing possessing this or that particular character— one of two contradictory characters;* this doubt appearing in the form—'is this thing so and so, or is it not so and so?'; and when one comes to ponder over these two contradictory characters, if he finds proofs in support of one of them, he accepts (or assents to) it,—this assent being in the form 'there are proofs supporting this fact; and as there are proofs, the thing must have this character, and not the other one'.†

As an example of this Cogitation, we have the following (in regard to the cognitive Soul being a product and having a beginning, or being beginningless):—First of all there arises a *desire to know* the real character of the *cogniser*, the agent who cognises what is to be cognised,—this desire being in the form 'may I know the real character of the cogniser.'—Then comes the *doubt* in the form—'has this cogniser a beginning or is it beginningless?'—thus the real character of the thing being in doubt, and not well known, the enquirer accepts and assents to that particular character in support of which he finds proofs and grounds for acceptance. For instance (in the particular case cited) the proof would be in the following form,—'If the cogniser were beginningless, then alone would *Birth & Rebirth* and *Release* be possible for him;—*Birth & Rebirth* consisting in the functioning, one after the other, of pain, birth, activity, defect and ignorance, among whom that which follows is the cause of that which precedes it; and *Release* consisting in the disappearance, one after the other, of these same (as declared in Sū. 1.1.2); and both of these would be impossible for him, if the cogniser had a beginning; for in that case the cogniser would be connected with a particular set of body, sense-organs, intellection and sensations, only when he would come into existence for the first time; so that these, body and the rest, could not be the products of his

* Doubt is a necessary element in *Tarka*; as it is only when there is doubt as to the presence of this or that particular character that we can have a reasoning which shows the impossibility of the presence of one, and hence the certainty of the presence of the other character; and it is this reasoning that constitutes *Tarka*.

† The proof in support being in the form of the absurdity or impossibility of the other alternative.

own past actions; and further, anything that is born also ceases to be (very soon after); so that, becoming non-existent or destroyed, he would not be these to undergo the experiences resulting from his actions;—thus then for any one cogniser, it would be absolutely impossible to have either connection with more than one body, or disconnection (separation) from any body at all.' If (in another instance) the reasoner finds no such proof forthcoming, he does not accept or assent to the conclusion.* It is reasoning of this kind that is called '*Tarka*', 'Cogitation.'

[The *Sūtra* says that *Tarka* is 'for the purpose of knowing the real character of the thing'; against this an objection is raised:]—"Why should this reasoning be said to be for the purpose of bringing about the true knowledge of the real character', and not to be that *knowledge* itself [appearing as it has been represented to do, in the form 'the thing must be so and so, and of no other kind', which is the form in which the knowledge of the real character of the things appears.]"

Our answer to this is that it would not be right for us to speak of the reasoning as embodying the *knowledge* itself, because, as a matter of fact, it is indecisive, being purely permissive in its character,—the reasoner simply assenting to the assertion of one of the two suspected characters, on the strength of the proof adduced; and he does not (by this reasoning alone) accurately determine or decide, or ascertain† that the thing must be so and so.

"How then does the reasoning serve the purpose of bringing about the knowledge of the real character of things?"

The true knowledge arises from the force of the Instrument of Cognition (which becomes fully operative and effective) when following after the reasoning, which has been duly considered and found to be free from all defects, and which appears in the form of assent to the conclusion indicated by the said Instrument

* The Viz. S. edition reads *taccānujānāti*, which is clearly wrong ; the correct reading is *tannānujānāti*, as the Puri MS. and the *Tātparya* read.

† The author puts forth several synonyms with a view to show that the form in which the reasoning appears is totally different from that of a definite, fully ascertained cognition,—says the *Tātparya*.

of Cognition;* and it is in this manner that the reasoning serves the purpose of bringing about the true knowledge of the real character of things. †

Thus then, we find that Cogitation serves the purpose of restoring or resuscitating the *Pramāṇas* or Instruments of Cognition (which have become shaken by doubts in regard to the truth of the conclusions arising from them), and (thereby) assents to and confirms those conclusions; it is for this reason that it is mentioned along with '*Pramāṇa*' in the Sūtra (I.2.1) which defines *Discussion*.

This Cogitation assents to or confirms the notion as to the real character of a thing whose real character is not known; *i.e.* the idea of the thing *as it really exists*, which is what is meant by its 'real character'; *i.e.* the character that is free from all misconceptions with regard to the thing. ‡

Nirṇaya-Demonstrated Truth
INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

In regard to the subject-matter of the above-described Cogitation—

Sūtra 41

“when there is an ascertainment of the real character of the thing after duly deliberating over the two sides of the question—an argument in favour of a certain conclusion and also that in its confutation§—we have what is called '*Demonstrated Truth*', '*Nirṇaya*'”.

* The reading of the Viz. S. edition is again defective : in L. 4, for *lakṣaṇāmigraho* we should read '*lakṣaṇādūhā*' as read by the Puri MS., by the *Tātparya* and also by three other MSS. as mentioned in the footnote in the Viz S. edition.

† By declaring that the true knowledge arises from the force of the Instrument of Cognition, the author means to lay stress upon the fact that *Tarka* can never, *by itself*, be the independent means of any knowledge—*Tātparya*.

‡ For '*yathābhāva*,' read '*tathābhāva*' which gives better sense and is supported by the *Vārtika*.

§ By '*pakṣa*' and '*pratipakṣa*' here are meant respectively—(1) the argument in favour of a certain conclusion, and (2) the argument against that conclusion. Such is the interpretation by the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. But the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* of Rādhāmohana takes '*pratipakṣa*' as the argument against the view opposed to the said conclusion.

In regard to every matter of dispute we have two opposite views—one seeks to establish the truth of a certain conclusion with regard to the thing under investigation, and the other denies that conclusion, and seeks to confute the former view; and, these two,—the arguments favouring and the arguments demolishing—are based upon—*i. e.* put forward with a view to—the ‘conclusion’ (*pakṣa*) and its ‘confutation’ (*pratipakṣa*); and the two sets of arguments themselves, when appearing together,—*i. e.* when put forward side by side,—come to be spoken of respectively as the ‘*pakṣa*’ (a certain view) and ‘*pratipakṣa*’ (the contrary view). And of these two views, it is necessary that one should be rejected and the other confirmed; and when one is confirmed, the ‘ascertainment’ with regard to that is called ‘*Demonstrated Truth*’, ‘*Nirṇaya*’.

An opponent [being misled by the terms ‘*pakṣa*’, ‘one view’, and ‘*pratipakṣa*’, ‘contrary view’, to think that the whole definition refers to *Discussion*, and it implies the presence of an element of *Doubt*] urges the following objection:—“It is not possible to have the said *ascertainment* by means of the ‘*pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*’. In every *Discussion* what happens is as follows:—(A) At first, one disputant states one view and supports it* with arguments, and rejects all the objections that the other party could bring against that view;—(B) the second disputant thereupon refutes the arguments put forward by the former in support of his view, and also answers the arguments urged against the objections put forward by himself—(C) so it goes on, until one (set of arguments) stops; and when one has stopped, the other becomes established; and it is by means of this latter set of arguments *alone* (and not by both, as said in the *Sūtra*) that we have that ‘ascertainment of the real character of the thing’ which is called ‘*Demonstrated Truth*’. [So that it is not right to speak of the ‘ascertainment’ as obtained through both ‘*pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*’]; specially as in a *bona-fide* discussion, both parties are equally *certain* as to the truth of their allegations, and there is no element of *Doubt* in their minds; or else, they would not engage in the *Discussion*.”

* The *Viz. S. Edition* reads a superfluous ‘*tam*’ here, which is not found either in the *Puri MS.* or in the reading adopted by the *Tātṭparyā*.

The answer to the above is that, as a matter of fact 'ascertainment' is got at through both. "How is this proved?" In the following manner, we reply. Every Discussion ends in showing the possibility or reasonableness of one view and the impossibility or unreasonableness of the 'confutation' of (the arguments against) that view, [or *vice versa*, the reasonableness of the confutation and the unreasonableness of the original view]; and it is only when we have *both* of these—the *reasonableness* and *unreasonableness*—that they *conjointly* set aside the doubt or uncertainty attaching to the real character of the thing; while if we do not have them both, the uncertainty continues to remain.

'*After deliberating*'—*i.e.*, after having carried on due deliberation. This 'deliberation' consists in the bringing to light—*i.e.*, formulating—the two sides of the question; whereby it provides the occasion for reasonings to operate,—*i.e.*, to be put forward (with a view to ascertain the truth).

What is declared here in this *Sūtra* must be taken as referring to mutually contradictory views pertaining to one and the same thing. When it is found that the two contradictory characters subsist in *similar* things (and not in the *same* thing), then both being possible, both are accepted; for the simple reason that due investigation has shown such to be the real state of the things; for example, when the definition of *Substance* is stated in the form 'Substance is that which has Motion,' it is found that a Substance, for which Motion is possible or certain, 'has motion,' while at the same time, there are substances for which no activity is possible, and these certainly 'have no motion' [so that in regard to this case both views 'Substance has motion' and 'Substance has no motion,' are admissible, and as such cannot be called 'contradictory views']. Even with regard to the same thing, if the two contradictory characters are predicated in reference to different points of time, then there is an option with regard to time [both being accepted as true, in reference to different points of time]; *e.g.*, the same substance which, at one time being moving, is said to 'have motion,' may be admitted to 'have no motion' at another time, when either the motion may not have yet appeared, or it may have ceased.

When the *Sūtra* declares, that '*Demonstrated Truth is that ascertainment which is got at after duly deliberating the two sides of a question,*' it is not meant to apply to *all kinds of Demonstrated Truth*; for in the case of Perception, which is born of the contact of the sense-organ with the object, the *Demonstrated Truth* consists simply in the 'ascertainment of the object';—it is only in regard to a thing in doubt, which is under investigation [and with regard to which a Cogitation has been put forward], that *Demonstrated Truth* consists in *the ascertainment got at by duly deliberating the two sides of the question*; while lastly, in regard to the subject-matter of Discussion and the Scriptures there is no 'deliberation' (or doubt).*

Thus ends the First *Daily Lesson* in the First *Discourse* of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*.

DISCOURSE I

Second Daily Lesson

LECTURE (1)

Controversy

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

† There are three kinds of Controversy—(1) Discussion, (2) Disputation and (3) Wrangling. Of these—

* In the case of Perception we have neither 'deliberation' nor the 'two sides of the question';—in the case of things under investigation we have both; while in the case of Discussion, we have the 'two sides of the question,' but no 'deliberation,'—as each party is equally certain of his view; and in the case of Scriptures, there may be 'two sides'; but there is no 'deliberation' or 'doubt.'

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* remarks that in the case of 'Inference for one's own benefit, also, there is neither 'doubt' nor 'two sides.'

† The connection of the two Daily Lessons is thus explained in the *Parishuddhi*—The entire method of reasoning with all its accessories has been explained in the First Daily Lesson. All this reasoning helps the reasoner to arrive at a definite conclusion either by himself alone, or by holding a consultation with others. In the latter case there arise occasions for discussion and mutual criticism; and it is this latter method of arriving at a conclusion that constitutes the subject-matter of the Second Daily Lesson. Controversy, according to a certain writer, whom the *Parishuddhi* calls the प्रौढगौडनैयायिक, is of four kinds—जल्पः,—प्रतिपक्षस्थापनहीनो जल्पः;—वादः— and प्रतिपक्षस्थापनहीनो वादः; while according to the "Bāhyas" (outsiders, i. e. Bauddhas) there is only one kind of Controversy.

Sūtra 1

Discussion consists in the putting forward (by two persons) of a conception and a counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings,—neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine (or thesis), and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors.

When two contrary particular characters are alleged to subsist in the same substratum, they are called 'pakṣa and pratipakṣa', 'conception and counter-conception', being, as they are, like opponents to each other; e. g. when we have two such allegations as—'soul is' and 'soul is not'; when, however, the contrary characters are conceived to subsist in different substrata, they are not called 'conception and counter-conception'; e. g. such conceptions as 'Soul is eternal' and 'Buddhi is non-eternal.' *Parigraha*, 'putting forward,' means asserting, or laying stress upon, the thing being of a particular character. And it is this asserting of two contrary characters that constitutes Discussion.

The distinctive features of this Discussion are next put forward:—*In which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings*—i. e. in which a conception is supported by means of proofs and reasonings, and also condemned by means of proofs and reasonings; so that what is meant is that both the *supporting* and the *condemning* are done by means of proofs and reasonings.* 'Supporting' here stands for establishing,

* The footnote in the Vizianagram Sans. Series says that the 'supporting' is done by means of proofs only and the 'condemning' is done by means of reasoning only. But this is contrary to what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. The last says—Though in Wrangling also there is putting forward of conception and counter-conception, yet herein we have no 'supporting' of the counter-allegation; as in Wrangling there is only demolishing of each other's positions, and no supporting at all;—though in Disputation there is supporting of the counter-conception, yet the supporting and condemning are not always by means of such reasonings as have all their factors entirely valid. So that from both Wrangling and Disputation Discussion becomes distinguished by reason of its having both the supporting and condemning done in accordance with reasonings and proofs. The *Vārtika* explains the compound '*pramānatarkasādhanoṣālambhah*' somewhat differently: It takes it as a *madhyamaṣālopi* compound, expounding it as '*pramānatarkasādhanaḥ pramānatarkasādhanoṣālambhauśca*'—i. e. the supporting is done by means of proofs and reasonings, and the condemnation of that supporting is also done by means of proofs and reasonings.

and 'condemning' for denying or rejecting. These two, 'supporting' and 'condemning' of the two conceptions, proceed hand in hand, in a connected manner,—until one of the two conceptions becomes rejected and another established; so that there is ultimately 'condemnation' of that which has been rejected and 'supporting' of that which remains unshaken.

As a rule *Clinchers* are employed in Disputation; so that their use is precluded from Discussion. But even though *Clinchers* are, as a body, precluded from Discussion, yet the use of some of them is permitted;—that is what is meant by the qualification 'not opposed to the main doctrine'; *—for instance, it is permitted to employ, in Discussion, the Clincher, in the shape of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction,' which has been defined (in Sū. 1-2-6) as 'that which contradicts the accepted thesis.' Similarly the qualification 'carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the Five Factors' has been added with a view to indicate that it is permitted to employ, in Discus-

* The *Vārtika* does not accept this interpretation; according to it, this qualification is meant to exclude the *Apasiddhānta*.

The *Parisuddhi* thus explains the difference in the two interpretations:—We have a general rule that 'no animals should be killed,' then we have the exception 'the *Agnisomiya* animal should be killed'; so here we have the general rule that in वाद् no clinchers are to be put forward, and then there is the exception, that the *Apasiddhānta* clincher should be urged. Thus according to the *Bhāṣya*. According to the *Vārtika* the sense is that there is a natural tendency to urge *all* clinchers in वाद्; and hence there is the exclusive selection of the *Apasiddhānta* as the only one of the clinchers to be urged.

The *Parisuddhi* goes on—'From among the 22 clinchers, there are *six* that cannot by their very nature, be urged in वाद्—(1) प्रतिज्ञाहानि, (2) प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास, (3) निरर्थक, (4) अर्थान्तर, (5) अविज्ञातार्थ and (6) अपार्थक;—there are *seven* which, even though possible, should not be urged—(1) प्रतिज्ञान्तर, (2) हेत्वन्तर, (3) अज्ञान, (4) अप्रतिभा, (5) विक्षेप, (6) मतानुज्ञा, (7) पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण;—there are *seven* again which *may* be urged—(1) विरोध, (2) अप्राप्तकाल, (3) न्यून, (4) अधिक, (5) पुनरुक्त, (6) अननुभाषण, (7) अपसिद्धान्त;—there are *two* which, when urged, put an end to the controversy—(1) हेत्वाभास, (2) निरनुयोज्यानुयोग.

sion, the two Clinchers of 'Deficiency,'—which is defined as 'that which is wanting in any one of the factors of reasoning' (Sū. 5-2-12)—and 'Redundance'—defined as 'that which puts forward superfluous Proband and Example.' (Sū. 5-2-13).

[One purpose of the term 'in which the supporting and condemning are by means of proofs and reasonings' having been already explained, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to point out other purposes served by the same term.]—(1) Even though 'proofs and reasonings' are included among the 'Factors' [so that the presence of 'proofs and reasonings' is already implied in the qualification 'in accordance with reasoning through the Five Factors'], yet 'proofs and reasonings' have been added separately, with a view to indicate that the proofs and reasonings urged by the two parties should be inter-related (and not independent of one another); otherwise it would have to be regarded as 'Discussion' when both parties go on urging arguments, each in support of his own view (without any regard to arguments propounded by the other).*—(2) In some cases, it is found that even without the use of the 'Factors of Reasoning', several Proofs accomplish their purpose (of determining the real nature of things); so that it would be real Discussion also when the 'supporting' and 'condemning' are carried on by means of such proofs (as are independent of the Factors);—and it is this fact that is indicated by the adding of the term 'by means of proofs and reasonings' [while, in the absence of this term, the said form of Discussion would not be included in the definition, which, in that case, would make the presence of the 'five factors' essential].—(3) Lastly, the term 'in accordance with proofs and reasonings' has been added for the purpose of precluding the notion that Disputation does not admit of those Clinchers that are employed in Discussion,—Disputation being defined (in the next Sūtra) as 'that in which the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers'; that is to say, this definition of Disputation might

* For instance, when one party goes on propounding, from his own standpoint, arguments in support of the eternity of Sound, and the other person putting forward from his point of view alone, arguments in support of its non-eternity; and neither takes any account of the arguments urged by the other.

give rise to the notion that Disputation is that wherein the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of Casuistry &c. only (and never by means of proofs and reasonings); while wherever the supporting and condemning are carried on by means of proofs and reasonings, it is *Discussion* always (and never *Disputation*);—and with a view to preclude this notion, the Sūtra has added the term ‘by means of proofs and reasonings’. [The sense being that, as a matter of fact, some of the Clinchers employed in Discussion may be employed in Disputation and *vice-versa*, and yet there is this distinction that, in Discussion the supporting and condemning are done strictly in accordance with proofs and reasonings, while in Disputation, they are done by means of Casuistry, etc., *also*.]

Sūtra 2

Jalpa-Disputation

Disputation is that which is endowed with the said characteristics and in which there is supporting and condemning by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers (also).

BHĀṢYA

‘*Endowed with the said characteristics*’,—*i.e.* (a) it puts forward a conception and counter-conception,—(b) consists in supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings,—(c) is not opposed to the main doctrine,—and (d) is carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through Five Factors.

‘*In which there is supporting and condemning by means of Casuistry &c.*’—*i.e.* the peculiarity of Disputation (as distinguished from Discussion) lies in this that here the supporting as well as the condemning are done also by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers.

An objection is raised—“As a matter of fact, no *supporting* of anything is ever done by means of Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers; all these serve the purpose only of condemning (or opposing) things; as is distinctly expressed in their general definitions as well as detailed classifications: For instance, the general definitions of these (as provided in the *Nyāya Sūtra*) are—

(d) 'Casuistry consists in opposing an assertion through the assumption of an alternative meaning' (1. 2. 18),—(b) 'Futile Rejoinder consists in opposing an assertion through similarity and dissimilarity', (1. 2. 10),—and (c) 'Clincher consists in the indicating of the disputant's misunderstanding and failing to understand the point at issue'. (1. 2. 19); and in the detailed classification of each of these also it is clear that every one of them serves the purpose of only opposing assertions. There is nothing in the Sūtra as we have it from which one could understand that Casuistry &c., serve to *support* conceptions through opposing (their contraries); this sense could be got at only if we had the Sūtra in the form that 'in Disputation, *opposing* is by means of Casuistry, &c.' (dropping the term '*supporting*' altogether)."

[The answer to the above objection is as follows]—As a matter of fact, both *supporting* and *condemning* are done by means of *proofs*; and Casuistry, &c., come in only as auxiliaries, serving the purpose of guarding one's own view; and they never, by themselves, serve as the means of supporting. That is to say, when a person *supports* by means of proofs, Casuistry, Futile Rejoinder and Clinchers are employed as auxiliaries,† serving, as they do, the purpose of guarding one's own view;—as a matter of fact, whenever these are employed they guard one's own view by attacking or opposing the other view. This is exactly what is declared later on in the Sūtra—'Disputation and Wrangling serve the purpose of safeguarding the conception of truth—just as the fencing of thorny boughs serves the purpose of safeguarding the sprouting of seeds.' (4-2-50). Similarly when a person condemns a counter-conception by means of proofs, if he employs Casuistry &c., they become helpful in setting aside or warding off the attacks that might be made against that condemnation. So that Casuistry, &c., are employed only as subsidiary auxiliaries; [there is this difference, however, that] as regards *supporting*, they never by themselves serve as the direct means (always serv-

† The words न स्वतन्त्राणां साधनभावः यत् तत् प्रमाणैरर्थस्य साधनं तत्र छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानामज्ञाभावः 'स्वपक्षरक्षणार्थत्वात्' are wanting in the Pūri manuscript; but this must be due to लेखकप्रमाद, caused by the same word रक्षणार्थत्वात् occurring twice.

ing as subsidiary auxiliaries),—but as regards *condemning*, they do by themselves, serve as the direct means also.*

Vitaṇḍā-Wrangling

Sūtra 3

That same Disputation is Wrangling when there is no establishing of the counter-conception. †

BHĀṢYA

The aforesaid Disputation becomes 'Wrangling';—with this further qualification that it is without any establishing of the counter-conception. That is to say, out of the above described two allegations in regard to two contrary characters as subsisting in the same substratum,—which have been called above, 'conception and counter-conception'—the Wrangler does not establish one (that which he himself holds), but only goes on to criticise the (proofs adduced for establishing the) conception of the other person.

"In that case the definition of Wrangling had better be stated in the form that it is that Disputation *which is without a counter-conception.*"§

But as a matter of fact, the statement that the Wrangler makes in attacking his opponent's view could constitute his own 'view'; and what is meant (by there being no establishing of the counter-conception) is that he does not proceed to establish the proposition which he lays down as to be proved by himself. And

* The *Vārtika* has taken exception to the whole of this question and answer in the *Bhāṣya*. It is interesting to note that the न्यायसूत्रविवरण takes साधनोपालम्भ as साधनाय उपालम्भ: *attacking for the purpose of supporting*.

† The 'Sacred Books of the Hindus' edition reads the *Sūtra* as 'स्वप्रतिपक्ष'. This is not supported by any of the available commentaries, nor by the Puri manuscripts, nor by the explanations given by the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*. The last says—"The *conception* of the critic himself is what is called *counter-conception* here,—as opposed to the view that he is criticising."

§ When there is no *establishing* of the critic's own view, it follows that he has no *view* of his own to establish; for unless an attempt is made by a person to establish a certain idea, the idea cannot be called a 'pakṣa', a *view*.

(for this reason) it is better to have the definition as it stands in the Sūtra. *

SECTION (2)

Of the Fallacious Probans.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The 'Hetvābhāsas,, 'Fallacious Probans', are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true Probans, and yet they are sufficiently similar to the Probans to appear as such. And these—

Sūtra 4

(1) The Savyabhicāra (Inconclusive), (2) The Viruddha (Contradictory), (3) The Prakaraṇasama (Neutralised), (4) The Sādhyasama (unknown), and the Kālātīta (Mistimed)—are the Fallacious Probans.

The Inconclusive Probans (1).

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

From among the aforesaid five Fallacious Probans—

Sūtra 5

† The Inconclusive is that which is tainted by indecision.

* When the wrangler confines himself to merely criticising the opponent's view, he does so with the idea that when the opponent's view has been rejected as wrong, it would follow as a necessary consequence that his own view is right ; so that he does have a *view* of his own ; but it is stated in wrangling, only in the form of the attack on the other view ; this 'criticism, being figuratively spoken of as his 'view'.—So that the meaning is that though the wrangler has a view of his own, yet he does not make any attempt at *establishing* it, apart from the attack that he directs against the other view. Hence it is only right to speak of there being no *establishing* of his own view ; but it would be wrong to say that *there* is no other view.—*Tātparya*.

† The term, अनैकान्तिक is explained by the न्यायसूत्रविवरण as follows— 'एकस्य,' साध्यस्य साध्याभावस्य वा 'अन्ते' अधिकरणमात्रे यस्तिष्ठति स 'एकान्तः'। तदन्यः 'अनैकान्तः'. एकस्मिन् अन्ते यो नियतः स एकान्तः—says the *Bhāṣya* below. On this Sū. the *Tātparya* remarks that the terms 'inconclusive' and 'indecisive' being synonymous—which is the term defined and which is the defining term should vary with the student. If he knows the meaning of 'inconclusive' and not that of 'indecisive' then the latter shall be for him the defined term, and the former the defining term, and so *vice versa*.

The term 'vyabhicāra', 'indecision', means *non-fixity on any one point* * ; and that which is accompanied by this 'indecision' is the 'indecisive'. As for example, in the reasoning 'Sound is eternal because it is intangible—the jar which is tangible has been found to be non-eternal,—and Sound is not tangible,—therefore, being intangible, Sound must be eternal',—we find that the character of *intangibility* has been put forward as proving the character of *eternality*; while as a matter of fact the two characters do not bear to each other the relation of *proof and proved* (Probans and Probandum); [as all *non-eternal* things are not *tangible*, e.g. *Buddhi* is non-eternal and yet it is intangible]; for we find that the *Atom* is tangible and yet eternal. If the *Soul* and such other things (which combine *eternality* with *intangibility*) be cited as the instance (supporting the reasoning), then—inasmuch as the Probans has been defined (above, in Sū. 1-1-34) as 'that which establishes the Probandum through similarity to the instance',—'intangibility' will have to be regarded as the Probans; and this would be found to be not necessarily concomitant with *eternality*,—e.g. in the case of *Buddhi*, which is *intangible* and yet *non-eternal*. So that in both kinds of instance [in that of *dissimilarity*, in the case of *jar* cited before, which is tangible and non-eternal,—and in that of *similarity*, as in the case of *Soul*, which is intangible and eternal], there is 'indecision', non-concomitance, between *intangibility* and *eternality*; and thus they cannot be accepted to be related as *probans* and *probandum*; and thus, not fulfilling the conditions of the Probans, what is cited in the above reasoning cannot be a true Probans.

[If the term 'अनेकान्तिकः' be taken as embodying the definition and 'सव्यभिचारः' as the term defined, in that case the word अनेकान्तिकः should be explained as follows:]—In the reasoning cited, 'eternality' is one 'anta', *point*, and 'non-eternality' is another one 'anta', *point*; that which subsists in—is concomitant with—one *point* would be 'ekānta', *one-pointed*: and the contrary (that is not concomitant, with *one*) would be 'anaikānta', *not one-pointed*; as this would be concomitant with both (the Probandum, *eternality*, and its contrary, *non-eternality*).

* I. E. When a probans is found to be concomitant with neither the *probandum only*, nor the *negation of the probandum only*,—but with *both*—then it is said to be 'tainted by *vyabhicāra* or *indecision*'.

Sūtra 6

The Contradictory Probans (2)

A certain doctrine (or view) having been accepted, the probans that is contradictory to it is called the 'Contradictory'.

BHĀṢYA

The term '*tadvirodhi*', 'contradictory to it', means *that which contradicts it, i.e. that which contradicts (sets aside, renders impossible*) the doctrine that has been accepted. E. g. [When the author of the Yogabhāṣya on Yogasūtra III-13† makes the two statements]—'This world, being a modification, ceases from manifestation, because its eternality is denied'—and—'Even when thus ceasing, it continues to exist, because its utter destruction is denied.'* Here we find that what the Probans in the former reasoning—'because its eternality is denied'—means is that 'no modification can be eternal'; and this is certainly contradictory to the doctrine enunciated in the second statement, that 'even when ceasing, the modification continues to exist.' "How?" Well, the 'manifestation' of a thing is only the *attaining of existence*, and 'ceasing' is *falling off*; so that if the modification when *fallen off (apeta, ceasing) from its existence (vyakteh, from manifestation)*, does 'continue to exist', then it is not possible to deny its eternality; because the very fact that the modification continues to exist even after manifestation should constitute its *eternality*; and 'denial of its eternality' should necessarily imply the possibility of the modification falling off from its existence; as it is only what actually falls off from existence that has been found to be non-eternal; while that which *still exists* does not fall off from existence;—so that 'continuing to exist' and 'falling off from existence' are two mutually contradictory concepts; and as such can never co-exist. Thus it is found that the Probans put forward ('denial of eternality') actually sets aside the

* In *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 5-2-4, "is contradicted" has been explained as "is rendered impossible".

† The real words of the योगभाष्य are तदेतत् त्रैलोक्यं विकारो etc. as quoted in the *Vārtika*.

very doctrine (of continuity of existence) on whose basis it is put forward.*

Sūtra 7

(3) The Neutralised Probans—the Third Fallacious Probans

The Neutralised Probans is that which is put forward to establish a definite conclusion, while it is one that only gives rise to suspense (and vascillation) in regard to the point at issue.

BHĀṢYA

The term 'prakaraṇa', 'point at issue', stands for the two opposite views on a doubtful question, neither of which is definitely ascertained ;—the 'cintā', 'suspense', in regard to such point at issue, consists in that desire to ascertain the truth, that whole process of investigation, which, starting with the doubt, ends with the definitive cognition ;—now that Probans which really only gives rise to the said suspense, if put forward as leading to

* There is a marked difference between the Bhāṣya's account of the Contradictory Probans and that given by the later Logicians. It is clear from the Bhāṣya that what is meant is that the Probans is contradictory to some doctrine that its propounder has already accepted. The later Logicians define it as *that which proves the contradictory of the proposition which it is put forward to prove*. The earliest mention of this later view is found in the *Vārtika*, which puts it forward as an alternative explanation of the definition given in the Sūtra. The words of the Sūtra afford directly the meaning assigned to them in the Bhāṣya ; but how the words may be made to yield the later view is thus explained in the न्यायसूत्रविवरण—वादिना न्यायादिबोधित-सिद्धान्तं तत्प्रतिज्ञातसाध्यरूपमभ्युपेत्य—अनूद्य—तद्रक्षणाय प्रयुक्तः तद्विरोधी साध्याभावव्याप्यप्रकृतहेतुः विरुद्धः । [When the opponent repeats the view he is going to refute and then propounds the refuting reason, this reason is contradictory.] अथवा साध्यमभ्युपेत्य उद्दिश्य तत्साधनाय प्रयुक्तो यो वस्तुगत्या साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुः । [That which really happens to prove a conclusion contrary to what it is meant to prove.] The former of these two explanations is not right ; the latter represents the generally accepted view.

The *Parīśuddhi* thus distinguishes '*Virodha*' from '*Apasiddhānta*'—'We have *Apasiddhānta* when the assertion made goes against what the speaker himself has declared previously on the basis of a more authoritative *pramāṇa* ; while there is *Virodha* when the assertion itself contains within itself the elements of contradiction, when one part of it asserts one thing and another part a totally contradictory thing.'

definitive cognition, does not differ (in point of being doubtful) from the point at issue; as both sides would be equal (equally doubtful); and thus being *similar (sama)* to the point at issue (*prakaraṇa*), it does not lead to any definite conclusion. *

Example—‘Sound is non-eternal, because we do not find in it the properties of the eternal thing; and we have found, in the case of such things as the Dish and the like, that what is not found to possess the properties of an eternal thing is non-eternal.’

That reasoning, in which what is put forward as the Probans is the character that is admitted (by both parties) to be common (to the Probandum and its Reverse), is ‘equal to doubt’ (in not leading to a certain conclusion); and such a Probans, therefore, has been called ‘Indecisive’;—[in the case of the *Prakarāṇasama*], on the other hand, what gives rise to the ‘*prakaraṇa*’, the point at issue, is (not *Doubt*, but) only that factor of Doubt which consists in the fact of there being found nothing which could favour either of the two opposite views; e.g. in regard to the reasoning cited, we find that in *Sound*, properties of an *eternal* thing are not found, just as properties of a *non-eternal* thing are not found; and this not finding of peculiarities favouring either of the two views

* The two opposite views, which constitute the ‘point at issue’, have been here called ‘*prakaraṇa*’ in the sense that these views are what are *made the probandum (sādhyatvena prakriyate)* by the two parties..... The ‘suspense’ in regard to these views, is due to the real truth on the point being not known; e.g. when a man puts forward the fallacious reasoning—‘Sound is non-eternal because the properties of an eternal thing are not found in it’—the person to whom this is addressed falls into a suspense, as he does not find, in *Sound*, either such properties as are invariably concomitant with *eternality*, or such as are inseparable from *non-eternality*; having therefore his doubts thus aroused, he proceeds to enquire and investigate. So that the urging of the *non-finding of the properties of an eternal thing*, as brought forward to prove *eternality*,—while it leads only to a doubt as to *eternality* and *non-eternality*,—constitutes the Fallacious Probans called ‘*Prakarāṇasama*’... ‘Both sides would be equal’—i.e. just as the *not finding of the properties of the eternal thing* would indicate *non-eternality*, exactly in the same manner would the *not finding of the properties of a non-eternal thing* indicate *eternality*..... The explanation of the term as ‘*similar to the point at issue*’ (*prakaraṇasya samah*) is only by way of indicating what the etymology of the word signifies; it is not meant that *similarity to the point at issue* constitutes the denotation of the term; in fact what the term really denotes is only *being neutralised* (having an opponent equally strong)—*Tātparya*.

gives rise to 'suspense in regard to the point at issue.' "How?" Because in the contrary case (i.e. in the case of our finding peculiarities favouring either of the two views), there would be an end to the 'point at issue' (one of the views being definitely ascertained); for example, if we actually found, in Sound, properties of the *eternal* thing, it would no longer be a 'point at issue'; or if we found in it properties of the *non-eternal* thing, then also it would cease to be a 'point at issue'. Thus then we find that, inasmuch as such a Probans gives rise to (lends support to) both the opposite views, it cannot lead to a definitive cognition in regard to either one of them. *

Sūtra 8

(4) The Unknown Probans

The Unknown Probans is that which, being still to be proved, is not different from the Probandum.†

* The difference between the Inconclusive and the Neutralised probans, as brought out in the Bhāṣya, is thus explained in the *Tātparyā*—The Probans in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because properties of an eternal thing are not found in it' would be called 'Inconclusive', only if the *not-finding of the properties of an eternal thing* were known to subsist in a thing which is admitted by both parties to be *eternal*; or the *not-finding of the properties of the non-eternal thing* were known to subsist in a thing admitted by both parties to be *non-eternal*. As it is, however, neither of these two conditions is fulfilled by the case cited, in which all that we have is that in Sound, there is *not-finding of the properties of the eternal thing*, and also the *not-finding of the properties of the non-eternal thing*; that is all; and these two circumstances neutralising one another, we call the Probans 'neutralised.'

† 'That whose subsistence in the Subject is as unsettled as that of the Probandum'—says the न्यायसूत्रविवरण. The *Tātparyā* has the following notes on the text of the Sūtra :—The definition here provided is meant to include all the four kinds of असिद्ध—स्वरूपासिद्ध, एकदेशासिद्ध, आश्रयासिद्ध, अन्यथासिद्ध; as every one of them is *still to be proved* and as such similar to the Probandum. If the definition had been stated simply as—'the *sādhyasama* Probans is that which is unknown', then, we could not include in this that Probans which is unknown to only one of the parties (and *known* to the other); while this becomes included when we add साध्याविशिष्ट, as the Probandum also is unknown to only one of the two parties. And if we had only the term साध्याविशिष्ट then this would apply to the अन्यतरासिद्ध only; as it is only this that is exactly similar to the Probandum,—in that both are unknown

BHĀṢYA

[As an example of this Fallacious Probans, we have the reasoning]—‘Shadow is a substance’,—the Probandum; to prove which is put forward the Probans ‘because it has motion’; and this Probans does not differ from the Probandum, inasmuch as it is still to be proved; and hence it is an ‘Unknown’ Probans. Because that Shadow ‘has motion’ is not known, and it has got to be made known, just as much as the Probandum (that Shadow is a substance). What has got to be ‘known’ or ascertained is the following—‘Does the shadow move, like the man? or is it that, as the object obstructing the light moves along, there is a continuity of the obstruction, which leads to the continuity of the *absence of the light*, and it is this *absence of light* which is perceived (as the shadow)?’ What actually happens is that as the object moves along, it obstructs certain portions of light, and what is perceived as ‘shadow’ is only the continued absence of those portions of light that are obstructed (by the moving object); as ‘obstruction is only *negation of approach*.’*

Sūtra 9

(5) *The Belated or Mistimed Probans.*

The Belated or Mistimed Probans is that which, as adduced, is behind time.

before proof (by one party only) and both become known after proof; and all the other kinds of ‘unknown’ would become excluded. Hence the Sūtra has added the term ‘*sādhyaṭvāt*’, *being still to be proved*; the Probandum also is *still to be proved*; or else it would not be a ‘*probandum*’ at all; hence the Probans is called ‘unknown’ because it is *still to be proved*; and some of the ‘unknown’ are such as are wanting in proof only temporarily (such a सन्न्यतरासिद्ध) while others have this want permanently, not being capable of being proved at all; and to this latter class belong the स्वरूपासिद्ध and the आश्रयासिद्ध. It might seem that the definition applies to all *that is to be proved*, and hence it applies to the Probandum also. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the definition has to be taken as subject to the general definition of ‘Fallacious Probans’; so what the definition means is that the ‘Unknown’ is that *probans* which etc. etc.; and this cannot apply to the Probandum.

* In the last sentence, the readings adopted in the body of the *vis.* text are defective; the correct readings are supplied in the footnotes; and these are supported by the two Puri Mss. also.

BHĀṢYA

When one factor of the thing adduced as Probans is found to be affected by lapse of time, it is said to be adduced 'behind time;' and it is then called 'Belated.' Example—'Sound is eternal, because it is manifested by conjunction, like Colour; the Colour that is manifested by the conjunction of light with the jar is one that was in existence before, as well as after, its manifestation; similarly the Sound also that is manifested by the conjunction of the drum and the stick, or by the conjunction of the wood and the axe, is one that is in existence before and after its manifestation; so that, being manifested by conjunction, Sound must be regarded as eternal.'—This is not a valid Probans; because when adduced, it is behind time.* In the case of Colour, the time at which the

* It is clear from this passage and from the explanation of the कालातीत हेत्वाभास as given here and in the *Vārtika*, that the conception of this fallacy has undergone a complete change at the hands of the later logicians. The latter regard that Probans as कालात्ययापदिष्ट which is found to be opposed to a well-ascertained fact; when, for instance, the coolness of fire is adduced as Probans; in accordance with this view they have given to their fallacy the name of बाधित, 'annulled'; while what the *Bhāṣya* means is that we have the कालातीत fallacy when one part of the Probans is found to be such as is not true at the time in connection with which it is put forward; e. g. 'manifested by conjunction,' as adduced to prove the eternity of sound, is found to be a Probans of which one part, conjunction, is not present at the time that Sound appears, though it was there before that appearance; so that it is behind time, 'belated.' The name कालातीत—Belated—can rightly be applied to only this; the बाधित of the moderns was never true; so that the name 'belated' cannot apply to it. With a view to meet this discrepancy between the two views, the *Tātparyā* has adopted the method of a very forced interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. It says that the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* states both views—the 'svamata,' his own view, as also the 'paramata,' the view of others; the *Tātparyā* taking care to brand what clearly is the *Bhāṣya* view as 'paramata,' and the modern view as 'svamata'; and it gets the two views out of the two meanings of the word *artha*, 'thing,' in the *Bhāṣya*. According to the view of the *Tātparyā*, 'thing' stands for the Subject of the Proposition, in which the Probans should subsist; and the Subject—like every other thing—has two factors, the thing itself and its qualities: and when one of these factors—the quality—is found to be affected by lapse of time, we call it 'belated'; e. g. when coolness of fire is urged as proving its eternity, we find that the coolness, which is adduced

manifesting *conjunction* appears does not go beyond (*i. e.* does not differ from) that at which the manifested *colour* exists; as it is only during the time at which the conjunction of the light and jar is present that colour is perceived; while Colour is not perceived when the conjunction has ceased to exist. The case of Sound, however, is entirely different; for instance, it is only after the conjunction of the drum and stick has ceased that Sound is heard by the man at a distance; in fact it is heard at the time of the Disjunction (*i. e.* at the time that the stick has ceased to touch the drum); so that the manifestation of Sound is *beyond the time*

as a quality of the subject, *Fire*, is 'belated,' because its contrary has been already definitely ascertained. By the view of the *Bhāṣya* itself the 'thing' is the *Probans* itself; and it is called 'belated,' when not the whole of it, but only a part of it is found to be *behind time*; as in the case of the *Probans* 'manifested by conjunction', where it is found that though the *manifestation* is true, the *conjunction* has passed off when the Sound appears. And when the *Tātparyya* finds the example given in the *Bhāṣya* not fitting in with its own view, it seeks to meet this difficulty by saying that the example according to the true view has not been given in the *Bhāṣya*, because several examples of it have already been given; when for instance it has been said that no conclusion can be deduced from what is contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception or to scripture; so that the *Bhāṣya* cites an example only according to the *paramata*. This method, however, is not quite in keeping with the practice of *Bhāṣyas*. All *Bhāṣyas*—that of *Vātsyāyana* among them—err more on the side of diffuseness than of conciseness.

The *Bhāṣya* view really does not lend support to the modern view of the fallacy of Annulment; if only a *part* of the *Probans* is 'behind time,' it cannot be said to be contrary to, and hence *annulled* by, well-ascertained facts of perception etc.; so in order to remove this difficulty, the *Tātparyya* has taken the term 'one part' of the *Bhāṣya* to refer to the *Subject*, and not to the *Probans*. As regards the objection that might be urged against the *Bhāṣya* that it does not—if its own explanation of the *Sūtra* is accepted—mention the 'annulled' at all among the Fallacious *probans*,—it has to be borne in mind that a true *Fallacious Probans* is that which has some semblance of being a valid *Probans*, and as a matter of fact, anything so absurd as the *coolness of fire* cannot be said to have any 'semblance' to a valid *Probans*. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that we can apply the term 'behind time' or 'belated' to only what was true before, but is not true at the time in connection with that with which it is adduced; and this also can never apply to anything so absurd as *coolness of fire*. So that the modern view would appear to be unsupported, not only by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika*, but also by the *Sūtra*.

of the conjunction ; and as such it cannot be *caused* by that conjunction ; because as a rule when the *cause* has ceased to exist, the *effect* does not appear [so that if conjunction were the cause of the manifestation of Sound, the latter should cease after the former has ceased]. Thus then, it is found that what is adduced as the Probans is not 'similar to the example'; and as such it cannot prove the Proposition ; hence it is a Fallacious Probans.*

[The Bauddha logician has defined the 'Belated Probans' as that which is adduced at a time other than that at which it should be adduced ; e. g. when one party has urged the reasoning simply as 'Sound is eternal, like the jar', and he adduces the Probans, 'because it is a product', only *after* he has been asked 'Why?' Having thus explained and exemplified the *Sūtra*, the Bauddha has found fault with it as follows :—The question—'Why?'—that the Opponent puts—is it put *after* the first party has completed his say, or *before* that ? If the former, then the first party is open to the clincher of 'Deficiency', his reasoning being *deficient* in that it does not state the *Probans* at all, and hence it cannot be a case of Fallacious Probans being urged. If on the other hand the question is put *before* the first party has completed his say, then the *Probans* does not cease to be a truly valid Probans, simply because it is urged after some time ; if it fulfils all the conditions of the valid Probans, it does not lose its validity simply because of the interruption by the over-zealous Opponent. This is met by the *Bhāṣya* by rejecting the suggested interpretation of the *Sūtra*]—The *Sūtra* does not mean that 'belatedness' consists in the

* The *Tātparya* remarks that the Fallacious Probans as here explained would only be a form of the *Unknown* Probans, and as such the 'Belated' should be the same as the 'Unknown' ; and the fact that even though this objection should have been brought forward by the *Bhāṣya* if the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* was really *paramata*, yet it has not been urged—has been met by the specious reasoning that the defect was so apparent that the *Bhāṣya*, did not think it worth while to urge it. But we have to remember that the 'Belated' as explained by the *Bhāṣya*, is not included in any of the three kinds of 'Unknown' accepted by the older logicians स्वरूपासिद्ध, आश्रयासिद्ध and अन्यथासिद्ध (see above) ; it falls under what the later logicians have called the भागासिद्ध the *partly* 'unknown', of which however no mention is found either in the *Bhāṣya* or in the *Vārtika*,

reversing of the order of the Factors of Reasoning. Why? Because we have the general law that—‘when one thing is by its inherent capability connected with another thing, the connection subsists also when they are remote from one another, and on the contrary, when the two things are not connected at all, mere proximity is ineffective’;—and according to this law even when the Probans is stated in an order other than the usual one, it does not lose its character of the ‘Probans’—which consists in its *similarity* or *dissimilarity* to the Example (Sū. 4-1-34 and 35); and so long as it does not lose the character of the ‘Probans’, it cannot be called a ‘Fallacious’ Probans. And further, the ‘reversing of the order of the Factors’ is what has been stated (in Sū. 5-2-11) as constituting the *Clincher* of ‘Inopportune’; so that if the same were mentioned here (as a ‘Fallacious Probans’), that would be a needless repetition. Thus we conclude that such is not the meaning of the Sūtra.*

SECTION 3

CASUISTRY

Sūtras 10—17

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Next we proceed to describe *Casuistry*. †

* The examples of ‘annulment’ by the more authoritative contrary cognition of the Subject are thus supplied by the *Parisuddhi*—(1) ‘The jar is all-prevading, because it is an entity, like Ākāśa’—when the all-prevadingness of the jar is opposed to what we know of the jar by preception;—(2) ‘the atom is made of component parts, because it is corporeal, like the jar’—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the atom by Inference;—(3) ‘the Meru consists of stone, because it is a mountain, like the Vindhya’—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the Meru from the scriptures. The following is an example of the annulment of the conception of the Probans as adduced—(1) ‘Water and Air are hot, because their touch is different from that of Earth, like Fire’—where the fact of the touch of Air being different from that of Earth is opposed to our perception; and so on.

† The sequence is thus explained by the *Parisuddhi*—When the disputant finds that his reasoning is vitiated by a fallacy, and he finds himself unable to remove the fallaciousness, he, still desperately trying to snatch victory to himself, puts forward improper answers—of which there are two kinds—*Casuistry* and *Futile Rejoinder*. The former comes first, as though wrong in sense, it is verbally and apparently right, while *Yāti* is more absurd, as it involves the contradiction of one’s own assertions.

Sūtra 10

Casuistry consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the one intended.

It is not possible to cite specific examples in connection with the general definition; they will be cited along with the definition of the several kinds of Casuistry.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The division of Casuistry is as follows—

Sūtra 11

It is of three kinds—(A) Vākchala, Verbal Casuistry, (B) Sāmānyacchala, Generalising Casuistry, and (C) Upacāra-cchala, Figurative Casuistry.—

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

From among these—

Sūtra 12

(A) Verbal Casuistry consists in assuming a meaning other than that intended to be conveyed by a word,—when the meaning (intended) is not definitely specified.

For instance, when the proposition is put forward in the form—‘*Navakambalo yam māṇavakaḥ*,’ where what the speaker means is that ‘the young boy is one whose blanket is new,’ the compound word ‘*navakambalaḥ*’ being equivalent to the expression ‘*navāḥ kambalo yasya*,’—though this latter uncompounded expression sufficiently clearly defines the particular idea desired to be conveyed, the same is not done by the *compounded* word ‘*navakambalaḥ*’ (which is ambiguous, being capable of affording more than one meaning);—and what the Casuist does is to assign to the compounded word a meaning other than the one intended by the speaker, and expounding the compound as ‘*navakambalāḥ yasya*,’ takes it to mean that the young boy is one who *has nine blankets*, and says—‘you say that the young boy has nine blankets’;—having thus imposed upon the man an idea that he never intended to convey, he proceeds to oppose the assertion by showing its absurdity—‘this boy has only *one* blanket, where are the *nine* blankets?’ Thus this is a case of Casuistry which is urged on the occasion of an ambiguous word being used; and being based upon a *word*, it is called ‘*Verbal*’ Casuistry.

This Casuistry is to be met by urging the necessity of the Casuist himself pointing out the peculiar circumstances favouring his own interpretation of the ambiguous word; for instance, the word '*Navakambalaḥ*' is ambiguous,—signifying, 'one who has a *new* blanket' and also 'one who has *nine* blankets'; under the circumstances, when you take it to mean 'one who has nine blankets' (and then turn to me and say that the man has only *one* blanket, and not *nine*), this is hardly fair; as it is necessary to point out the peculiar circumstances that favour either of the two possible significations,—from the statement of which peculiar circumstances it would be known that the word (in the context in question) expressed that particular meaning;—as a matter of fact you have no such peculiar circumstances that you could urge (in favour of your own interpretation); so that what you have brought against us is a false and futile attack. *

Further, the connection of a word with its denotation is well known in the world to consist in the conventional restriction of a certain word having a certain denotation—in the form that 'of such and such a verbal expression such and such is the denotation'; and this conventional restriction is found to be general (wide) in the case of general terms, and particular (specialised) in the case of particular terms; and whenever these words are used, they are used according to previous usage, and never in a way in which they have never been used before; the use of a word again is only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of its meaning, and it is only when the meaning has been comprehended that there follows any activity (as resulting from the hearing of that word). Thus the use of words being for the sake of bringing about the comprehension of its meaning, the exact usage of the general term is determined by the force (of circumstances); *i.e.* when such expressions are used as—'take the *goat* to the village,' 'bring *butter*', 'feed the *Brāhmaṇa*'—every one of these words ('goat', 'butter' and 'brāhmaṇa') is a general or common term, and yet it is applied, in actual usage, to particular individuals composing what is denoted by that term; and to what particular individuals it is applied is determined by the force of circumstances; the term is applied to that particular

* The Puri MS. reads '*abhiyoga*' for *niyoga*.

individual (goat, for instance) with which it is found possible to connect the direction of the particular activity (of *taking to village*, for instance); it being absolutely impossible for the entire community (of *all goats* f. i.) to be connected with the direction expressed by the words ['take to the village'] [no one man at any one time could take to a village all the goats that there are in the world, all of which are denoted by the general term 'goat']. Similarly the term under discussion,—'*navakambalah*' is a general term [as it has two significations]; and as such, when it is used it has to be taken as applied to that to which it has the capability to apply, under the circumstances;—so that when it is addressed in regard to a person having only one *new* blanket, it has to be taken as signifying 'one who has a new blanket'; and under the circumstances, the *possessing of nine blankets* being found impossible, the word cannot signify 'one who has *nine* blankets'. Thus when you assign to your opponent's word a meaning that it cannot possibly convey, your attack must be regarded as entirely futile. *

Sūtra 13

(B) **Generalising Casuistry** consists in the urging of an absurd signification, which is rendered possible by the use of a too generic term.

BHĀṢYA

When one man says—'Oh, this Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character', and another replies—'learning and character are quite natural to a Brāhmaṇa',—the latter assertion is met by opposition, by assigning to the word ('*Brāhmaṇa*') a

* At the time that the exact denotation is fixed by convention for the first time, it is not said to pertain to any particular individual; the denotation fixed is entirely generic in its character; and it comes to be applied to particular individuals only through the force of such circumstances as the particular context in which the term is used, the particular person using it, the particular person to whom it is addressed, the particular time and place at which it is used, and so on. So that when the speaker has used a general term on a particular occasion and under particular circumstances, his exact meaning can be easily determined; and the fact that the word has a vague generic denotation is not his fault; the fault lies with the original convention that fixed that denotation; and as this convention is fixed by persons other than the particular speaker who uses the word, he cannot be blamed for making use of such a word; blaming him for it is altogether unfair.—*Tātparya*.

meaning other than the one intended,—that is by assigning to it an entirely absurd meaning ;—this opposition being in the following form—‘ If learning and character are natural to the Brāhmaṇa, then they should be found in the delinquent * Brāhmaṇa also ; as he also is a *Brahmaṇa* ’.

That word is called ‘ too generic ’ which, while applying to the thing desired to be spoken of, also over-reaches it ; e. g. the *Brahmaṇahood*—which is denoted by the term ‘ *Brāhmaṇa* ’—is, sometimes found to be concomitant with ‘ learning and character ’ and sometimes it is found to over-reach it, *i. e.* not concomitant with it. And as the opposition offered is based upon this ‘ too generic ’ character of the term used, it has been called the ‘ *Generalising Casuistry*. ’

This Casuistry is to be met by pointing out that what the speaker (of the second sentence) means is not to propound a reason (for what the previous speaker has said with regard to a particular Brāhmaṇa being endowed with learning and character), but only to make a *reference* (*i. e.* a *representation* of what has been asserted in the previous sentence); as the second assertion is meant to be mere praise (of the *particular* Brāhmaṇa mentioned in the preceding sentence); so that there is no room for the assigning of the absurd signification. For instance, when one says ‘ corns grow in this field ’, another man may say ‘ in this field even seeds do not have to be sown, ’—it is certainly not meant that seeds are not to be sown in the field ; and yet what is said clearly is that they are not necessary ; and by this the field, which is the receptacle of the growing corn, is praised ; so that the assertion ‘ seeds do not have to be sown in this field ’ is meant to be a *reference* to the particular field with a view to praise it ; and though the growing of the corn depends upon the seeds, this is not what is meant to be expressed by the sentence. Similarly in the case in question, by the assertion ‘ learning and character are only natural to the Brāhmaṇa ’, what is meant is that the particular Brāhmaṇa possesses learning and character, and not that he possesses them *because he is a Brāhmaṇa* ; what is meant to be expressed is not the *cause* (of the man’s possessing learning

* The Brāhmaṇa who has not gone through the rites and ceremonies essential for all Brāhmaṇas is called a ‘ *vrātya* ’ ‘ delinquent. ’

and character); the assertion is a reference to a particular object which it is meant to eulogise; the meaning being that 'it is because the man is a Brāhmaṇa that the causes bringing about learning and character have become effective'; so that when the man praises the particular object, he does not deny the operation of causes leading up to the result (that makes the object worthy of that praise). Thus it is not right to offer opposition to the assertion by assigning to it an absurd signification.

Sūtra 14

(C) A Statement being made on the basis of the secondary (figurative) denotation of words, if it is opposed by a denial of the existence of what is asserted (on the basis of their primary denotation),—this constitutes Figurative (or shifting) Casuistry. *

BHĀṢYA

By the term 'dharma' in the Sūtra is meant that property of the word which consists in its use in accordance with its primary denotation; but sometimes [when the primary denotation is

* The meaning of the Sūtra is not quite clear; the translation is in accordance with the explanation given by the *Bhāṣya*; according to the *Vārtika* (on Sū. 16), the term अर्थसदुभावप्रतिबंध here means 'the denial of the presence of the thing'; and this suggests to the mind a very much simpler interpretation of the Sūtra itself: 'when the statement is made in regard to the 'धर्म' property, of a thing, if this is opposed by the denial of the thing itself, we have the Shifting Casuistry'. This appears to be more in keeping with what follows in the next two Sūtras; and it is also supported by the *Vārtika* where it says that in the Shifting Casuistry what is denied is the object 'the thing,' *dharmīn*. Though this statement, not being found to be in keeping with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, has been twisted by the *Tātparya* and the *Parīśuddhi* to mean something totally different.

The explanation of the Sūtra provided by the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* is as follows: 'Dharma' stands for one of the two denotations of a word—primary or secondary;—*tasya*, 'of that'—*vividhaḥ kalpāḥ*, 'more than one alternative meaning'—*yatra*, 'in which'; *nirdeśe*, *vādyuktaśabde-sati i. e.*, 'the words used by the first party being such as admit of more than one meaning';—*arthasadbhāvena, tādrśaikataravṛttyā sadarthatātparyaprayuktavākya, aparavṛttyā arthāntaratātparyakalpanayā pratiśedhaḥ*,—the statement declaring the existence of a thing by one denotation, if the existence of that is denied in accordance with the other denotation,—it constitutes figurative casuistry.

found inapplicable] this property (usage) becomes subject to option (in the shape of a second denotation); and this secondary usage consists in using a word, which has been found to have one primary denotation, in a sense different from that denotation;—and when a statement is made in accordance with this secondary denotation, we have what has been called in the *Sūtra* ‘*dharmavikalpanirdeśa*’ * e. g. When the statement is made ‘the platforms are shouting’, (which is made on the basis of the secondary meaning of the term ‘platforms’, which here stands for the *men* on the platforms);—and it is opposed by a denial on the basis of the primary meaning [*i.e.* taking the word as if it had been used in its primary denotation, this denial being in the form ‘Certainly it is the men seated on the platforms that are shouting, and *not the platforms themselves.*’

“But in this case, where is ‘the assumption of a contrary meaning’ [which, according to *Sūtra* 1 2-10, is a necessary condition in all Casuistry]?”

It consists in assigning to the word a meaning different from that with reference to which it has been used; *i.e.* the word having been used in reference to its secondary meaning, the Opponent assigns to it the primary meaning;—and as this Casuistry pertains to the figurative or secondary signification of words, it is called ‘Figurative Casuistry.’ What is meant by ‘*upacāra*’, ‘secondary or figurative denotation’ is that meaning which is indicated by such causes as *association* and the like; and we have the *figurative use* of a word only when there is such a meaning indicated by *association* &c. [so that figurative significations cannot be had recourse to at random].

This third kind of Casuistry is met in the following manner :—Whenever a statement is made, a concurrence with, or denial of; the words used, and their significations, should be in accordance

* The words of the *Bhāṣya* are ‘*tasya nirdeśe*’ ‘when there is a statement of that’—*i. e.* of the secondary meaning; but as the statement is not of the meaning, the *Tātparyā* has taken the words to mean ‘*tena*’—‘*dharmavikalpanena*’—‘*nirdeśe*’—‘*vākye*’; so that the meaning is ‘when there is statement in accordance with the secondary meaning.’ The *Parisuddhi* remarks that all this twisting of the words of the *Bhāṣya* has been done with a view to reconcile the *Bhāṣya* to the *Vārtika*. But we fail to see much difference between the two.

with the intention of the person making that statement,—and not at random, according to one's own wish. * It is well known in common parlance that a word may be used either in its primary direct sense or in its secondary figurative sense; and when such usage is generally accepted, if a certain word is used, the concurrence with it, or the denial of it, should be in keeping with the speaker's intention, and not at random; so that when the speaker uses a term in its primary sense, the concurrence with, or denial of, his statement should be in reference to that sense of his words, and not in reference to any sense that the Opponent may choose to impose upon it; similarly if he uses the term in its secondary sense, it is this sense that should be concurred with or denied. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a term in its secondary sense, and his Opponent denies it in reference to its primary sense,—then this denial becomes a mere arbitrary denial, and it cannot be regarded as an opposition to the first party.

Sūtra 15

[An objection is raised]—

“Figurative Casuistry is only verbal Casuistry; as it does not differ from it.”

BHĀṢYA

[An objection is raised]—“Figurative Casuistry does not differ from Verbal Casuistry; as the assigning of a different meaning (from the one intended by the speaker) is common to both. For instance, in the example cited,—in the statement ‘the platforms are shouting,’ the word (‘platform’) intended to be taken in the secondary sense of *the persons* occupying the place (on the platform) is assumed to have the primary sense of the *place* itself; and the opposition offered is based upon this assumption.”

* The *Tātparya* takes छन्दतः to mean छद्मना, *by trick*. But the ordinary meaning of छन्द appears to be more suitable. The sense is that you should concur with, or deny, the statement in the form and in the sense in which it is made by the speaker, and you are not to impose your own reading or your own interpretation on it

Sūtra 16

[Answer]—

It is not so ; as there is a difference in it.

BHĀṢYA

[The answer to the objection urged in the preceding *Sūtra* is that] Figurative Casuistry is not the same as Verbal Casuistry ; as in the former, *the denial of the presence of the thing* constitutes a difference. “Difference from what ? ” From the mere assumption of a different meaning (which is found in Verbal Casuistry) ; as a matter of fact the ‘assumption of a different meaning’ is one thing, and the ‘total denial of the presence of the thing denoted’ is something entirely different.

Sūtra 17

If the two were to be regarded as non-different on the ground of some kind of similarity,—there would be only one kind of Casuistry.

BHĀṢYA

What the Opponent in *Sūtra* 15 has done is to accept the twofold division of Casuistry and to deny the third kind ; this denial being on the ground of some sort of a similarity (between the third and the first kinds). But just as this reason (the presence of some sort of similarity) serves to set aside threefoldness, so ought it to set aside twofoldness also ; as there is some sort of similarity between these two (first and second kinds) also. If the mere presence of some similarity cannot do away with the twofold division, then it should not do away with the threefold division either. ’

SECTION 4

[*Sūtras* 18–20]*Defects of Reasoning due to the Incapacity of the Reasoner.*

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Next to Casuistry—

Sūtra 18

Futile rejoinder is that objection which is taken on the basis of mere * similarity and dissimilarity.

* The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains that Futile Rejoinder is that which is urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity only,—i.e. ‘irrespectively

When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that *follows, takes birth* (jāyate)—is called 'Jāti', 'Futile Rejoinder.' This objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a denial—on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. That is to say, when the Probans put forward by the first party is one that is intended to prove the conclusion through its *similarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *dissimilarity* (to that Example);—or when the Probans put forward is intended to prove the conclusion through its *dissimilarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *similarity* to it;—we have what is called 'Jāti' (Futile Rejoinder), because it comes up—*is born*—as an opponent (to the original reasoning).*

Sūtra 19

It is a case of Clincher when there is misapprehension, as also when there is incomprehension. †

of any idea of invariable concomitance; in fact, it continues, 'similarity and dissimilarity' do not enter into all cases of Futile Rejoinder; as is clear from the definitions and examples provided under Adh. 5; it makes a Futile Rejoinder when no notice is taken of invariable concomitance. This is what has led the modern Logicians to define *Jāti*, Futile Rejoinder, simply as 'āsāt uttaram' 'wrong answer', *i. e.* an answer which is either incapable of shaking the opposite view, or which is vitiated by self-contradictions.

The *Tātparyā* has an interesting note. It is not always reprehensible to put forward a Futile Rejoinder; for instance, when a man, upholding the authority of the Veda, is met by a series of arguments against its authority, and at the spur of the moment he does not find proper answers to these arguments, he is fully justified in urging what is really a Futile Rejoinder, if he feels that by so doing he will stave off the atheistic tendency of the audience produced by his opponent's arguments. But in other cases a Futile Rejoinder is urged only unknowingly.

* In view of the real nature of several Futile Rejoinders—which are not urged on the basis of a similarity or dissimilarity to any *Example* at all,—the *Vārtika* says that when the *Bhāṣya* talks of similarity or dissimilarity to the Example, it is only by way of illustration. As there are several Futile Rejoinders that are urged on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity to other things also.

† The *Parisuddhi*, not satisfied with the *Sūtra* as it stands, takes it as implying the following generalised definition:—'When a controversy has been started, any action that is indicative of either party's ignorance constitutes a *Clincher*.' It further says that Clincher is treated of last, as it puts an end to all controversy; no further discussion can proceed when once one of the parties falls into a Clincher.

BHĀṢYA

'Misapprehension' is that comprehension which is either wrong or reprehensible. * The man who misapprehends things becomes defeated ; and 'Clincher' consists in this defeat. It is a case of 'incomprehension' when, the subject being one on which something has to be said, if the person does not say anything ; that is, for instance, if he either does not oppose what has been sought to be proved by the other party, or does not meet the objections that have been urged against himself.

The non-compounding (of the words '*vipratipattiḥ*' and '*apratipattiḥ*', whose compounding would have made the Sūtra terser) is meant to indicate that these two are not the only Clinchers [there being several others, as described in detail in Adh. V, all which become implied by the use of the particle 'ca'].

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

A question arises—"Example" has been described as of one kind only ; are Futile Rejoinder and Clincher also each of one kind only ? Or are these of diverse kinds, like *Doctrine* ? "

The answer to this is provided in the following Sūtra.—

Sūtra 20

There is a Multiplicity of Futile Rejoinders and Clinchers, owing to there being several and diverse varieties of both.

As 'Objection taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity' can be of several diverse kinds—there must be several varieties of Futile Rejoinder. Similarly as 'misapprehension and incomprehension' are of several diverse kinds,—there must be several varieties of Clincher also. The term '*vikalpa*' stands for *several varieties* or *diverse varieties*. As examples of the diversity of Clinchers (defined in Sū. 5, 2 1—24)—the Clinchers of *Ananubhāṣana*, *Ajñāna*, *Apratibhā*, *Vikṣepa*, *Matānujñā* and *Paryanuyo-
jyopēksana*, are indicative of *incomprehension* ; while the rest are indicative of *misapprehension*.

Thus have *Pramāṇa* and other categories been (a) 'mentioned' (in Sū. 1. 1. 1) and (b) 'defined' in the order of their mention ; and they will (in the next four Adhyāyas) be (c) 'examined' in accordance with their definitions. Thus is the threefold function of the Scientific Treatise to be regarded as duly fulfilled.

Thus ends the first Adhyāya of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūtra*.

* A misapprehension is called simply 'wrong', when the subject-matter is something too subtle to be grasped by an ordinary intellect ; it is called 'reprehensible' when it pertains to something gross, an ordinary thing quite within the range of ordinary minds.—*Tātparyā*.

ADHYĀYA II
Daily Lesson I
SECTION 1
Detailed Examination of Doubt
[Sūtras 1—7]

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

After this proceeds the *detailed examination* of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories. And, inasmuch as every definitive cognition has been declared (in Sūtra 1-1-41) to consist in the 'ascertainment of the real character of a thing after duly *deliberating* over the two sides of the question,' (whereby *deliberation* or *Doubt*, is made the precursor of all Definite Cognition)—it is Doubt that is examined first of all. *

Sūtra 1

“ No Doubt can arise either from the certain cognition of properties common to several objects, or from the certain cognition of characters belonging to only one of the objects.”†

(a) “ As a matter of fact, Doubt arises from the cognition of common properties, and not from the *properties* only‡ ;—(b) or

* The *Vārtika* gives further reasons for beginning the *detailed examination* with Doubt, even though the *enunciation* has begun with *Pramāṇa*.

† Sūtras 1 to 5 embody the *Pūrvapakṣa* view—which traverses the explanation of Doubt provided in Sū. 1-1-23.

‡ This opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is a little obscure. The words of the *Sūtra* apparently mean that ‘Doubt *does not arise* from the *cognition* of common properties’; while the *Bhāṣya* represents the sense to be that ‘Doubt *arises* from the cognition of common properties’. The explanation given in the Footnote (in the *Vizianagram Series* Edition) is in itself a forced one! but it would be acceptable if it did not make this opening sentence identical in sense with what follows as the fourth alternative explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* below. Both the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparyā* have felt this difficulty. The former characterises this first statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* as ‘*Yathāśruti utthānam*,’ and the latter remarks that the statement is made regardless of the explanations that have been provided under Sū. 1-1-23. The real explanation is as follows, as is made clear in the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

The present Sū. 1 contains three statements—I समानधर्मोपपत्तेः न संशयः (this denies the first statement in Sū. 1-1-23, *viz.* समानधर्मोपपत्तेः

again, as a matter of fact, we do not find any Doubt arising from the mere cognition of the property and the things possessing that property ;—*i. e.* no Doubt is found to arise at the time that the observer has the idea ' I perceive a property common to these two things' * ;—(*c*) or it is not possible for any Doubt to arise from the cognition of common properties, when the thing (in regard to which the common properties are perceived) is different; *e. g.* when the cognition of common properties appears in regard to one thing for instance *Colour*, the Doubt cannot arise in regard to another thing, for instance *Touch* ;—(*d*) or lastly, from *Adhyavsāya*,—which stands for *conviction, certain cognition*,—there cannot arise *Doubt*, which stands for *uncertain cognition* ; as in this case there would be no affinity between Cause and Effect (which is essential).

“ These same objections apply also to the view that Doubt arises *anekadharmādhyavsāyāt*, *i. e.*, from the conviction of the properties of several things.

“ Nor does Doubt ever arise from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things; on the contrary, from such cognition there arises the *certain cognition* of that one thing.”†

संशयः) this is interpreted by the Bhā. as representing the four *pūrvapakṣas*:—
 (a) taking उपपत्ति of Sū. 1-1-23 to mean mere *presence or connection*, and denying that mere presence of common properties gives rise to Doubt, which only arises when these properties are duly recognised ; (b) taking उपपत्ति to mean *cognition*, and denying that any doubt can arise even from the recognition of common properties in only one of the two things that enter into the doubt ; (c) taking उपपत्ति = *definite ascertainment* ; and (d) stating the objection in a different manner from (c). II. अनेकधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः (this denies the अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति of Sū. 1-1-23), which containing the same term उपपत्ति is open to all the four *pūrvapakṣas* that have been urged above. III. अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः

* This thing (which is seen) and that thing (which is remembered) ; इमं विशेषेण पश्यन् इमं च विशेषेण स्मरन् कथं संशयीत—says *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† This alternative takes '*aneka*' as equivalent to '*anyatara*,' one of the two similar things.

Sūtra 2

(f) “Nor from the cognition of diversity of opinions, or from that of uncertainty.”

(1) “Doubt does not arise either from ‘diversity of opinions’ only, or from ‘uncertainty’ only; in fact Doubt appears in a man who knows of the ‘diversity of opinions’;—similarly it appears in one who is cognisant of the uncertainty.” * (2) Or, how could any Doubt arise from the certain cognition of the fact that ‘some people think that the Soul exists, while others think that it does not exist’? Similarly, † in regard to the ‘uncertainty of perception’ (which has been held in Sū. 1-1-23, to be a cause of Doubt). What happens in the case of *uncertainty* is that the observer duly recognises that there can be no certainty as to the thing being *perceived* (actually cognised as possessed of a certain character) and also that there is no certainty as to its being *not perceived* (actually cognised as *not* possessing a certain character); and when each of these facts is duly cognised, there can be no Doubt.‡”

Sūtra 3

(g) “Also because in a case of Diversity of opinions there is certainty of conviction.”

“That which you regard to be a case of ‘diversity of opinions’ is a case of *certain conviction*; it represents the certain conviction of two persons in regard to two opposite ideas [one man being *certain of the existence* of the Soul while the other is *certain of its*

* The *Bhāṣyacandra* says that this Pūrvapakṣa emanates from one who does not rightly comprehend the meanings of the two terms ‘*vipratipatti*’ and ‘*avyavasthā*’ as contained in Sū. 1-1-23, and hence denies the fact of Doubt proceeding from these.

And here also in the *Bhāṣya*, the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* (1) proceeds on the basis of the term ‘*upapatti*’ being taken to signify mere *presence*, while that in (2) is based upon ‘*upapatti*’ signifying *cognition*.

† तथा gives better sense—and is found in the Puri Mss. as also in three other Mss.

‡ The *Bhāṣyacandra* interprets ‘*upalabdhi*’ as the means of cognising a thing as possessing a character, and ‘*anupalabdhi*’ as a means of cognising it as not possessing it. So that in cases of uncertainty all that the observer feels is that there is neither any proof nor disproof of a certain fact; and what this means is that the man will have no idea at all, and not that he will have a *doubt*.

non-existence, each man having a firm conviction in regard to his own opinion, which is contrary to the opinion of another person.] So that if Doubt arose from 'diversity' of opinions, it would arise also from 'certain conviction' (which is absurd.)"

Sūtra 4

(h) " Further, because uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character [no Doubt can arise from it]."

"*No Doubt can arise*—this has to be added to the Sūtra. The meaning is this :—If the *Uncertainty* (that has been held to be the cause of Doubt) is, in itself, quite *certain*, then, inasmuch as there is *certainly*—it would not be a case of *Uncertainty* at all; so that there should be no Doubt possible. If, on the other hand, the *Uncertainty* is not quite certain in its own character, this would mean that it is not a real *Uncertainty* at all, being not certain in its uncertain character; and in this case also no Doubt should arise."

Sūtra 5

(f) " Lastly, Doubt would never cease ; inasmuch as the property (whose cognition gives rise to the Doubt) continues to exist. "

BHĀṢYA

" You hold that Doubt arises from the cognition of a common property ; now on this theory Doubt should be absolutely persistent ; * for inasmuch as the cognition of the common property (which is the cause) does not cease to exist, there should be no cessation of the Doubt (which is the effect). As a matter of fact, even while one is pondering over a certain thing (the Post, for instance), this thing does not cease to be known as possessing the (common) property (*Tallness* for instance, whose perception may have given rise to Doubt) ; in fact it always retains that property [so that when the cause is there, the effect, in the shape of the Doubt, must be there also]. "

* *I. E.* It should continue even when the distinguishing feature of any one thing would be clearly perceived.

“ To the above detailed Objection (embodied in Sūtras 1-5), the following is the reply briefly stated (in one Sūtra)—

Sūtra 6

When Doubt is held to arise only from such cognition as has been described (in Sū. 1-1-23) as not apprehending the specific character of any one object, *—there is no possibility of either there being no Doubt at all, or of there arising a Doubt that would be unceasingly persistent. †

There arises no such contingency as that no Doubt should arise, or that (when arisen) the Doubt should never cease.

“ How so ? ”

(a) Well, it has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that ‘what is the cause of Doubt is the *cognition* of the common property, and not the common property itself’;—and this is quite true. “ Why then is not this fact clearly mentioned (in the Sūtra) ? ” For the simple reason that this is already implied in the term ‘*viśeṣāpekṣaḥ*’; ‘in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting’ (Sū. 1-1-23). By the ‘*apekṣā*’ of the ‘specific character’ is meant the *wanting to know it*; and this is real and effective (and possible only while the specific character is *not perceived*;) and when the *Sūtra* does not use the term ‘*samānadharmāpekṣaḥ*’, ‘wanting the cognition of the common property’; this omission means that there is *no wanting* of the cognition of the common property; and this *no wanting* would be possible only when there is direct cognition of the common property; so that by the force of this (omission of the *wanting of the cognition of the common pro-*

* Though this is a qualification of *Doubt*, it may be regarded as qualifying the *Source of Doubt* also—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† *The Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains the term ‘*viśeṣāpekṣaḥ*’ of this Sūtra to mean ‘depending upon such peculiar circumstances as the non-realisation of the difficulties caused by the remoteness of the object (and such other conditions which obstruct the correct perception of it)’.

party) it is implied that there is *cognition of the common property*, from which cognition the Doubt arises. *

As a matter of fact however, the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is set aside by the presence of the term '*upapatti*' itself in the Sū. (1-1-23). What the Sūtra says is that Doubt arises from the '*upapatti*' of the common property; and there can be no *upapatti* of a thing apart from the *cognition of its existence*; for a common property whose existence is not cognised would be as good as *non-existent*.

Then again [even granting that the term '*upapatti*' denotes mere presence, and not *cognition of existence*], a term that expresses an object also generally denotes the *cognition* of that object; e. g. when in ordinary parlance people say, 'fire is inferred from smoke' what this assertion is understood to mean is that 'Fire is inferred from the *perception of smoke*'; and why is it so? Simply because the man makes the inference when he perceives the smoke, and not while he does not perceive it; and yet in the said assertion, we do not find the term '*perception*' though everyone admits that that is what the assertion means; from which it is clear that the person who hears and understands the said assertion admits that a term expressingⁿ the *object* also denotes the *cognition of that object*. Similarly in the case in question, the term '*common property*' may be taken to denote the *cognition* of the common property.

(b) It has been urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa Bhāṣya*, that—"No doubt is found to arise at the time that the observer has the idea 'I perceive a property common to these two things', wherein there is an apprehension of the property and the things possessing it."—But what is here asserted refers to what is perceived before (the appearance of Doubt),—the idea present in the observer's mind (at the time that Doubt appears) being in the following form—"I am perceiving now a property that is common to two things known to me (perceived by me before),—and I am not perceiving any property that belongs to any one of them specifically,—how may I find some such specific property

* This answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* proceeds on the admission that the word '*upapatti*' in Sū. 1-1-23 means *presence*—the meaning assigned to the term by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. The real answer, however, is that the term '*upapatti*' itself means *cognition*; and this answer follows in the next sentence.

whereby I may be certain as to one or the other?' And certainly a Doubt in this form does not cease merely on the perception of a common property bringing to the mind that property and the thing possessing that property.

(c) Thirdly, it has been urged that—"Doubt with regard to one thing cannot arise from the certain conviction with regard to another."—This could be rightly urged only against one who holds the view that mere certain conviction with regard to one thing is the cause of Doubt [and we do not hold any such view].*

(d) Fourthly, it has been urged that—"From the certain cognition of common property Doubt cannot arise), as in this case there would not be that affinity between cause and effect (which is essential).†"—But what constitutes the 'affinity' between cause and effect is only the fact that the presence and absence of the effect are in accordance with the presence and absence of the cause; and further, when between two things it is found that if one comes into existence the other also comes into existence, and if the former does not come to existence, the latter also does not come into existence,—then the former is called the 'cause' and the latter the 'effect'; this is what constitutes another 'affinity' or 'homogeneity' (between cause and effect);‡ and certainly there is this 'affinity' between Doubt and its cause (the Perception of Common Property).‡

* Our view being that Doubt arises regarding a thing with specific properties, when what is perceived is only a thing as possessing properties common to more than one thing.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The certain cognition of common property apprehends the *presence* of such property; while Doubt apprehends the *absence* of such property; and no affinity is possible between two such heterogeneous cognitions;—this is the meaning of the *Pūrvapakṣa-Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ According to the *Bhāṣyacandra*, there are two *affinities* pointed out here as expressed in the translation. It may however be simpler to take the *second* as only explanatory of the *first*; the only *affinity* consisting in the fact that the presence and absence of the one are in accordance (simultaneous) with the presence and absence of the other; that is to say, the affinity consists in the fact that when one comes into existence, the other also does the same &c., &c.

‡ The *Vārtika* does not accept this view of 'affinity'; according to it the homogeneity between *Doubt* and its cause in the shape of the Cognition of common property consists in the fact that in both the Cognition of specific properties is wanting. The *Tātparyā* adds that according to the view expressed in the *Bhāṣya*, the case of all *eternal* causes would be excluded; as they never *come into existence and cease to exist*.

(e) The above reasoning also serves to answer the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument that no Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of several things.

(f) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (under Sū. 2) that—“No Doubt can arise from the Cognition of either diverse opinions or uncertainty.”—Our answer to this is that, (as regards the case of *Diverse opinions*) when the Doubt appears, the idea present in the observer’s mind is as follows—‘From two contradictory statements I find the thing to be possessed of contradictory properties,—and I do not know of any specific circumstance attending it,—nor do I perceive any such property whereby I could be certain with regard to one or the other of the two properties,—what specific circumstance could there be, whereby I could become certain with regard to one or the other?’—And such being the well-known form of the Doubt brought about by the *Diversity of Opinions* (as helped by the non-cognition of special conditions), it cannot be rejected simply by reason of the comprehension (by the third party) of the diversity of opinions.*

The same holds good also with regard to what has been urged against Doubt arising from the ‘uncertainty in regard to Perception and Non-perception’. † [In this case also the particular form in which the Doubt appears makes it clear that it arises from the *cognition of uncertainty* as helped by the non-cognition of special circumstances. And this Doubt also cannot be rejected merely by reason of the cognition of uncertainty].

(g) It has been urged (in Sū. 3) that—“Because there is certainty of conviction in the case of Diversity of opinions (no Doubt can arise from this latter).”—Now what is held to be the

* विप्रतिपत्तिसंशय of the *Viz.* Edn. gives no sense. The Puri MSS. read विप्रतिपत्तिसम्प्रतिपत्ति. The meaning is that the presence of Doubt in the mind of the observer, the third party, is not incompatible with his comprehension of the fact that these two persons hold two different opinions on this point.

† ‘Perception’ here stands for ‘proof in support’ and ‘non-perception’ for ‘proof against’; there is ‘uncertainty’ in regarding these when the observer does not find either; and this certainly gives rise to Doubt.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

cause of Doubt is the Cognition of that which is denoted by the term 'Diversity of opinions;' this Cognition being wanting in the conception of any specific character (favouring any one of the opinions); and certainly it is not fair to discard the view merely by thrusting a different name (to what is meant by 'diverse opinions'); that is to say, the term 'diverse opinions' stands for *contradictory assertions with regard to one and the same thing*; what gives rise to Doubt is the Cognition (by the third party, the enquirer) of such assertions, as helped by the non-cognition of any special circumstances (in favour of one or the other); and it cannot cease to give rise to doubt merely by your giving to it a different name; so that this argument of the Pūrvapakṣin can only delude the ignorant.*

(h) It has been urged (under Sū. 4) that—"Because uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character (it cannot give rise to Doubt)."—Well, in arguing thus it is admitted that there is such a thing as the 'Cause of Doubt,' and also that it is of the nature of 'uncertainty' essentially; all that is done is to give it a different name 'certainty', ('without denying the thing itself')—and this name can apply to the said thing only in a sense different from its natural signification [*i.e. Uncertainty can be called 'certainty' only in the sense of fixity, definiteness, and not in the sense of freedom from doubt*]; and this assumption of a different name also is absolutely futile; for a *certainty* can never be 'uncertainty', being as it is, *fixed* in its own (certain) character. So that the assertion made by the Opponent does not deny the fact that Doubt is produced by the fact of perception and non-perception pertaining to both existence and non-existence (of the thing with regard to which the Doubt arises), as accompanied by the fact of a specific circumstance in favour of either not being available;—and in so far as the said *uncertainty* is fixed in its *uncertain* character, it does not lose its own character; hence the 'uncertainty' is admitted by (the Opponent's own assertion).—Thus it is found that even though a different name is assumed, it

* It is true that the individual upholder of each of the diverse opinions has a certain conviction on the point; there is however no such conviction in the mind of the third party, who only hears these opinions expressed, and cannot find any special circumstances in favour of either.

does not prove anything different (from the conclusion to which exception is meant to be taken).

(i) It has also been urged (in Sū. 5) that—"Doubt would never cease, as the property continues to persist".—But as a matter of fact, Doubt is produced, *not* merely by the *common property*, etc. (whose persistence would make the Doubt persistent), but by the *cognition of the common property*, as accompanied by a *remembrance of the specific characters*, (as shown under Sū. 1-1-23); so that there is no possibility of the Doubt being unceasingly persistent.

(j) Lastly, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"Doubt never arises from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things".—This objection is not well taken; for it has been distinctly stated (in Sū. 1-1-23) that Doubt is that wavering judgment which is *wanting in the cognition of the specific character of a thing*; and as the 'specific character' can only consist in the 'property of one out of two things', when there is a cognition of such property, there can be no 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character' [and as such it would not be a Doubt at all].

Sūtra 7

Wherever there is Doubt, there is possibility of the aforesaid questions and answers.

BHĀṢYA

Wherever the Investigation carried on is preceded by Doubt, —either in a scientific Treatise or in a Controversy—the Opponent will try to deny the very existence of the Doubt (in the manner of the above *Pūrvapakṣa*); and in that case he should be met with the answer (detailed above). * It is for this reason that as pertaining to all Investigations, *Doubt* has been examined first of all. †

* The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* remarks that this advice applies to the case of the examination of every one of the sixteen categories;—the examination of *Pramāṇa* also is preceded by the doubt as to whether there are 2 or 3 or 4 *Pramāṇas* and so forth; in regard to every one of such Doubts, the *Pūrvapakṣin* may try to deny the very existence of Doubt; and then he is to be met in the manner explained here.

† The *Parisuddhi* offers another interesting explanation of this *Sūtra* (7) It takes it to be a sort of an explanation provided for the *Sūtra* undertaking

SECTION (2)

Detailed Examination of Pramāṇas in General.

Sūtras 8-20

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

Next follows the detailed *Examination of Pramāṇa*.*—

to enter into a thorough *examination* of *Pramāṇas* and a few other categories only, and omitting such others as *Prayojana* and the like. The Sū. is taken to mean that a thorough *examination* is called for only in regard to matters in regard whereto there are doubts. As a matter of fact, the nature of *Prayojana* and the other categories, whose *examination* has been omitted, is fully known to all—from the learned philosopher down to the mere cowherdess; so that no thorough examination is necessary in their case. Then again, the method of examination employed in regard to *Pramāṇa*, &c. may be applied to these other categories also; this is what the *seventh* Sūtra means—“Whenever there is any doubt in regard to any category we should employ the method of examination which consists of questions and answers.”

The *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks as follows—“The Sūtra is meant to be an advice to the Pupil to the effect that it is not right to deny the existence of Doubt as a preliminary accessory of all Discussion; the sense being that, inasmuch as Doubt is such an accessory whenever any Discussion is started, one should not meet it with the preliminary objection that the very Doubt, on which the Discussion proceeds, is not possible; the right course is to supply answers to the questions raised. This advice being summed up in three verses :—‘The dull ignoramus and the man who has reached the highest pinnacle of wisdom, these two persons are happy; persons falling between these two extremes always suffer (1).—The man whose mind is in doubt is beset with difficulties at each step; freedom from Doubt represents highest bliss; this being the form of the Supreme Self (2).—For these reasons, you should listen to all theories, and then having raised questions in regard to these, you should enter into the discussion with qualified persons and thereby ascertain the truth (3).’”

* In the case of Doubt, it was necessary to alter the order in which the categories had been mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1; because Doubt forms the starting-point of all investigations. Among the rest of the categories, there is no reason for dealing with any of them out of its proper place; so the Author now takes up the examination of *Pramāṇa*. There again, he begins with the examination of the character of *Pramāṇa* in general, before proceeding with the particular *Pramāṇas*. The *Pramāṇa*, in general, may be defined as the Instrument of Cognition; and these instruments are Perception and the rest.—*Tātparya*.

Sūtra 8

“ Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of Cognition, on account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time.”—*

“ The character of Instrument of Cognition cannot belong to Perception, &c., as it is impossible to connect them with any of the three points of time ; that is to say, it is not possible for them either to precede or to synchronise with or to follow (the objects cognised).”†

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

What has been stated above in a general way is next explained in detail (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—

Sūtra 9

“ If the *Pramāṇa* exists already before (the Object), then perception cannot be produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.”—

“ Perception is the Cognition of such objects as Odour and the rest ; if this Perception (*Pramāṇa*) exists already, and Odour,

* The Sūtra denies the very existence of *Pramāṇas*, on the ground that they do not prove the existence of these objects at any point of time.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The *Tātparyā* thus sums up the *Pūrvapakṣa* embodied in Sūtras 8-11 :—This *Pūrvapakṣa* emanates from the *Mādhyamika* Buddha, and may be explained as follows :—“ Though our firm conviction is that nothing in the world can bear any investigation,—so that so far as we ourselves are concerned, *Pramāṇa* also is a subject that cannot bear any examination,—yet we proceed to show that *Pramāṇas*, as accepted by other people, are untenable ; and this we shall show on the basis of those same *Pramāṇas* that are held by those same people ; and thus it is a fault of the *Pramāṇas* themselves that they melt away by their own inner contradictions. The argument against *Pramāṇa* may be thus formally stated—Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as *Pramāṇa*, because they cannot prove or indicate the presence of their objects at any point of time,—anything that does not prove its object at any time is not regarded as *Pramāṇa*, for instance, the conception of Hare’s Horns ;—Perception, &c., are such—therefore they cannot be regarded as *Pramāṇa*. ”

It is interesting to compare this statement of the *Mādhyamika* view with the Vedānta view expressed in *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*, Trans. Vol. I, Para 79.

&c., come into existence *after* it, then the Perception cannot be said to be produced by the contact (with the sense-organ) of those things, Odour, &c.”*

Sūtra 10

“ If the Pramāṇa comes into existence after (the Object), then the existence of the Object of Cognition cannot be dependent upon Pramāṇas.†—

“ While the Pramāṇa does not exist, by whose instrumentality would the thing be *cognised*, and thereby become the *object of cognition* ? It is only when a thing is cognised by the instrumentality of Pramāṇas, that it comes to be known as ‘*prameya*’, *object of cognition*.”

Sūtra 11

“ If the two come into existence simultaneously, then, inasmuch as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions.”§

BHĀṢYA

“ If it be held that the *Pramāṇa* and its *Object* both come into existence at the same time,—then, inasmuch as all cognitions pertain to their own particular object, it would be possible for them to come into existence at the same time ; and therefore, *inasmuch as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no necessity of sequence among cognitions*. As a matter of fact, all these cognitions are found to appear with regard to their objects, one after the other ; but this sequence would not be necessary (if the cognition and its object were to appear at the same time). And further, [even if such sequence be not considered essential] this simultaneity of cognitions would contradict

* I. E. The Substance can have no connection with the operation (which is absurd)—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† The meaning of the Sūtra is as follows—As a matter of fact, Pramāṇa is an Instrument, and the Instrument is a particular kind of substance accompanied by a certain action or operation ; neither the *operation* alone nor the substance alone can be called ‘Instrument’ ; if then, this substance, along with the operation of bringing about the cognition, is already there, before the Object has come into existence,—then the said cognition cannot be regarded as brought about by contact with that object.—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ ‘Cognition’ in this Sūtra stands for ‘*Pramāṇa*’, which, as explained before, stands for the *means of cognition*, and also the *cognition itself*.

what has been declared (under Sū. 1-1-16) to the effect that 'the presence of the Mind is indicated by the non-simultaneity of cognitions.' "

"The aforesaid are the only three possible alternatives in regard to the existence (or relation) of *Pramāṇa* and its *Object*; and every one of them has been found to be untenable; so the conclusion is that Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as '*Pramāṇa*.' "

The answer to the above is as follows :—

* *As a matter of fact between what is called the 'cause or instrument of apprehension' and what the 'object of apprehension',—there being no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before, or after, or simultaneously with the latter, we take each case on its own merits, just as we find it, and assert accordingly (either precedence or sequence or simultaneity of the one or the other). That is to say, in some cases the Cause of Apprehension appears first, and then its object; e.g. in the case of the apprehension of things coming into existence while the Sun is shining [in which case the sunlight, which is the cause of the perception, is already there, when the things are coming into existence];—in other cases the Object appears before and the Cause of its apprehension afterwards; e.g. when the lamp (just lighted) illumines, and makes perceptible things already in existence;—in other cases again the Cause of apprehension and its Object come into existence together; e.g. when the apprehension of fire is brought about by means of smoke.† Now '*Pramāṇa*' is the name of the *cause of apprehension*, and '*Prameya*' that of the *Object of apprehension*; so that (as shown above), there being no restriction as to exact precedence or sequence or simultaneity between the two, we have to take each case just as we find it.‡ So that there*

* The Viz. Edition prints this and some other passages in thicker type;—see in this connection our note on Sū. 15, below. The whole of the italicised portion occurs as a *Sūtra* in the सूत्रपाठ attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyacandra* also appears to regard this first passage as a *Sūtra*.

† The apprehension of fire synchronises with the apprehension of smoke.

‡ 'Such is the sense of the *Sūtra*'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*; and from this it appears that the passage containing the term *vibhāgavacanam* constitutes a *Sūtra*.

is no ground for the entire denial (of Pramāṇas) (which you have put forward); specially in view of the fact that you yourself admit the (efficiency of) *Pramāṇas* in general (in the shape e. g. of your own words) and then go on to deny the efficiency of all *Pramāṇas* without exception.*

† Secondly, as the grounds on which the names ('*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*') are based pertain to all three points of time, the name also should be accepted as such. That is to say, it has been urged (in Sū. 10) that—"if the *Pramāṇa* be held to come into existence after the *Prameya*, then, at the time that the *Pramāṇa* is non-existent, (i.e. not actually bringing about the apprehension at that time) the object could not be called '*Prameya*'; as it is only when an object is actually apprehended at the time by means of

* The reading खलु विभज्य is difficult to construe. What the Pūrvapakṣin has done is to take no account of the particular facts of each case and has roundly denied the efficiency of all *Pramāṇas* promiscuously; so that the correct word would appear to be अविभज्य. The mistake may be due to the mis-reading of खलु for खत्व; लु and त्व being very nearly alike in Matihili and Bengali scripts. But the *Bhāṣyacandra* accepts the reading खलु विभज्य and supplies a reasonable explanation. It remarks that the passage points out an inconsistency (*vyāghāta*) on the part of the Pūrvapakṣin. He denies all *Pramāṇas*, but certainly accepts his own word embodying this denial as a very valid *Pramāṇa*.

† The italicised portion occurs, as Sūtra in the सूत्रपाठ attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyacandra* remarks—This refers to the following argument of the opponent—"There are four kinds of basis for the application of verbal names; these being—(1) the presence of *Genus* i.e. this is a '*Cow*', '*this is a Brāhmaṇa*' &c.; (2) Presence of *Quality*; '*the cow is white*', '*the Brāhmaṇa is patient*'; (3) Presence of certain things; '*the Brahman has a stick*'; and (4) Presence of action; '*this is a doer*', '*this a cogniser*' and so forth. So that the name '*Pramāṇa*' also must have for its basis the actual *presence* of the *action of apprehension* at the same time; and it is therefore not right to say '*the Prameya is apprehended by the Cogniser, by means of the Prāmaṇa*'.—The answer to this, given in the *Bhāṣya*, is that the application of the name is not based upon the actual *presence of the action at the time*; it is based upon the *potentiality* of the thing to bring about the action; e.g. we speak of the '*cook*' though he is only *going to do the cooking*; or we say '*the cook is bathing*', where even though the *action* present is that of *bathing*, yet the name applied to the man is '*Cook*'. This '*potentiality*' consists in the mere form of the thing concerned, as aided by the necessary accessories.

Pramāṇa that it is known as '*Prameya*' '* ;—but as a matter of fact, the application of the name '*Pramāṇa*' is due to the fact of what is so named being the *cause of apprehension* (*i. e.* being endowed with the potentiality of bringing about the cognition), and this fact pertains to all three points of time; for instance, [when we give the name '*Pramāṇa*' to the cause of apprehension] we make use of either of the three expressions '*this has brought about the apprehension* (therefore it is *Pramāṇa*)', or '*this brings about the apprehension* (hence it is *Pramāṇa*)'; or '*this will bring about the apprehension* (hence it is *Pramāṇa*)'; so that the grounds of the naming pertaining to all three points of time—past, present and future—; the name also should be taken as pertaining to all points of time. † So that when we apply the name '*Pramāṇa*', what is meant is that the object *has been apprehended* (in the past) by its means, or that the object *is apprehended* by its means (in the present), or that the object *will be apprehended* by its means (in the future). Similarly when we apply the name '*Prameya*', what is meant is that it *has been apprehended*, or that it *is apprehended*, or that it *will be apprehended* by the *Prameya*. Such being the case, an object can very well be known as '*prameya*' when we have such ideas as 'the apprehension of this thing *will* be brought about by the *right cause* [*Pramāṇa*, when it comes into existence]', '*this will be apprehended*', and so forth.

If this applicability of a name on the basis of the possibility of the requisite operation at all three points of time is not admitted, then much of ordinary usage would be impossible. That is to say, if one were not to admit the application of names as described above, for him no such expressions would be possible as—'bring a *cook*, he *will do* the cooking', 'bring in a *wood-cutter*, he *will do* the cutting.'

Further, the assertion (made in Sū. 8) that—'Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of Cognition, on

* सिद्धावसति प्रमाणे is the reading of all manuscripts but one, as also of the two Puri MSS. ; we have adopted this ; specially as सति प्रमाणे of the Viz. text does not give good sense.

† And when in defining '*Pramāṇa*' we have said that it is *what actually brings about the cognition*—it is only by way of an illustration ; and we do not mean to restrict the name *pramāṇa* only to what actually at the time brings about Cognition—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time'—apparently denies all 'Pramāṇa' entirely;—the person making such an assertion should be asked—what do you mean to accomplish by this denial? Do you mean to set aside the possibility or very form (of the Pramāṇas, Perception, &c.)? Or to make known their impossibility or absence of any form? If the former, then the possibility or form of the Pramāṇas is admitted [as it is only what exists that can be *set aside*],—and the possibility or form being there, Perception and the other Pramāṇas cannot be denied entirely. If, on the other hand, the denial is meant to make known their impossibility, then the denial itself becomes endowed with the character of 'Pramāṇa' (Instrument of Cognition, being that which *makes known* things): * as the denial becomes the cause or instrument of the Cognition of the 'impossibility of Pramāṇas.'

[Even knowing this inconsistency, the Opponent asks]—“What then?”.—[The answer comes in the next Sūtra].

Sūtra 12

There can be no Denial, as it is impossible to connect it with any of the three points of time.

BHĀṢYA

[The Opponent having asked—“What is the harm if the Denial becomes endowed with the character of Pramāṇa?”—the answer is given by the Sūtra]—The detailed explanation here is the same (as in the Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtra 8) [*i.e.*, inasmuch as the Denial has become a Pramāṇa it becomes open to the arguments that the Pūrvapakṣin has urged against the possibility of Pramāṇas so that] if the *Denial* [which *ex hypothesi* is only an instrument of right negative cognition] exists before the thing *Denied*, then, what would be there that would be denied, while the thing denied [*i.e.*, the object of the negative cognition] is not in existence? On the other hand, if the Denial came after the thing *Denied*, then while the Denial is not in existence, the thing could not be 'denied'. Lastly, if both the *Denial* and the *Denied* came into

* लक्षणं प्राप्तः, the reading of all Mss. save one, gives better sense than लक्षणप्राप्तः.

existence simultancously, then as the thing will have been already recognised as 'denied', the Denial would be absolutely futile.

Thus then, the assertion (of the Pūrvapakṣin) embodying, as it does, a *Denial*, being (as just shown) found to be impossible,—it becomes established that Perception and the rest are genuine *Pramāṇas*.

Sūtra 13

Because all *Pramāṇas* have been denied, the Denial itself cannot be established.*

BHĀṢYA

"Why (can the Denial not be established)?"†—asks the *Pūrvapakṣin*. [For the following reason, we reply]—You have put forward (in Sū. 8) as your reason, 'because it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time'; now if in support of this reason you can cite an Instance, then it behoves you to show (on the strength of perceptual or other valid cognition) that what you have put forward as your Reason (i.e. your Minor Premiss) does hold true in the case that you cite as the corroborative Instance; and if you do this, you cannot deny the character of *Pramāṇa* (Proof) in regard to all Perception and the rest [as at last one such Perception you will have employed to prove the truth of your Reason]. And if Perception and the rest were absolutely no proof, then what you would cite as an Instance would also not *prove* anything [as that also would only be a perceptual or other valid cognition]; so that your reason, in that case, would be nullified by all *Pramāṇas*, and, as such, cease to be a proper Reason; in fact, such a Reason would be a "contradictory Reason";—that has been defined as the 'contradictory Reason or Probans' which contradicts a certain doctrine that has been previously admitted' (Sū. 1. 2. 6); and what is put forward by the opponent in the assertion made by him constitutes his 'doctrine';

* Later Commentator:—for instance the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha and the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa*—do not have this as a *Sūtra*. The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* however cites it as a *Sūtra* and so also the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which remarks that this *Sūtra* puts forward another 'self-contradiction' involved in the *Pūrvapakṣa* stand-point.

† According to the *Bhāṣyacandra* this '*Katham*' is an attack on the opponent:—'How can you reasonably deny all *Pramāṇas*?'

and this assertion is that ' Perception and the rest do not prove the existence of anything ' ; and yet the several reasoning factors [the Premisses etc., which represent Pramāṇas] have been put forward (in the reasoning urged in Sū. 8) with a view to prove (i.e. *make known* to others) your own conclusions.*

If, on the other hand, the Instance (corroborative of the Reason put forward in support of the Denial of Pramāṇas) is not cited (as representing a *valid cognition, pramāṇa*) then you are faced by the difficulty that until you have shown the truth of your Reason, or Minor Premiss, in a certain well-known Instance, your assertion cannot prove your conclusion for you ; so that the Denial of the Pramāṇas cannot be established, for the simple reason that the reason or premiss put forward does not possess the character of a really valid ' Reason ' .

Sūtra 14

If the character of Pramāṇa in the case of the reasoning-factors is admitted,—then your Denial becomes restricted to only a few from among all Pramāṇas, [which would not be right].†

BHĀṢYA

If you admit that the ' character of Pramāṇa ' really belongs§ to these *Perception and the rest* that are embodied in the reason-

* The statement of the Probans, which is the principal reasoning-factor, embodies facts ordinarily perceived—*e. g.* ' because Perception, &c., cannot be connected with any point of time ' represents a number of facts perceived in ordinary experience. Now the Proposition is that ' Perception, &c., do not prove anything ; ' and yet the said Perception—that the Perception, &c., cannot be connected with any point of time—has been urged with a view to prove the conclusion. Thus the Reason, as put forward, is entirely a contravention of the Proposition.

The *Vārtika* in quoting this passage reads प्रमाणानाम् for अवयवानाम् and the *Tātparya* explains प्रमाणानाम् as referring to the *Avayavas*. The *Bhāṣyacandra* reads अवयवानाम्. The sense remains the same.

† It appears simpler to interpret the Sūtra as—' the Denial does not apply to all Pramāṇas ' . But the *Bhāṣya* has made capital out of the prefix वि in विप्रतिषेध; in view of which the translation has had to be put in a roundabout fashion ; though the sense remains the same.

§ The reading of the Viz. edition नामप्रामाण्ये is wrong. Both Puri Mss. read नां प्रामाण्ये, which is the right reading.

ing-factors or premises involved in your negative argument (against Pramāṇas, in Sū. 8),—then you will have to accept the 'character of Pramāṇa' also in those *Perception and the rest* that would be embodied in the reasoning-factors that might be urged (against you) by your Opponent ; as there would be no difference between the two sets of 'premises'. And this would mean that you do not deny all Pramāṇas (but only some of them ; for which restricted denial there can be no justification). In the term '*vipratishedhaḥ*' (in the Sūtra) the prefix '*vi*' signifies *affirmation* ('*vipratishedha*' meaning *viśeṣeṇa pratishedha*, denial by selection) and not *negation* (*vipratishedha* in that case being construed as *vigataḥ pratishedhaḥ*—*negatived denial*); * as there can be no sense in such an expression. †

Sūtra 15

There should be no denial (of Pramāṇas and Prameyas) in regard to all three points of time ; § as their existence (as cause and effect) is proved in the same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound.

BHĀṢYA

[An objection is raised at the very outset]—“Why should this be repeated (in the Sūtra,) when it has already been stated before, in the *Bhāṣya* ? ”. †

* If वि signified denial, then विप्रतिषेधः would mean 'denial of the denial', Denial being the object of Denial ; and this would be absurd as coming from the Pūrvapakṣin. For purposes of *denial*, one always uses the term 'na'—says the *Bhāṣyacandra*.

† For in that case the expression in the Sūtra—'*na vipratishedhaḥ*' would mean that 'the denial is *not negatived*,' which would be the reverse of what is intended by the Siddhāntin—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

§ That is, it is quite possible for Pramāṇa and Pramēya to be related to each other as 'cause and effect' and also as 'means of Cognition' and 'object of cognition'—*Bhāṣyacandra*.

‡ From what we read here, there appears to be a confusion in regard to the exact position of the Sūtra and portions of the *Bhāṣya*. It has been remarked by several writers that the *Bhāṣya* contains certain passages, which form part of an older *Vṛtti* on the Sūtras. The editor of the Vizianagram series has made an attempt to indicate some of these passages by printing them in thicker type. The wider aspect of this question shall be dealt with in a suitable place. But in connection with the present

The answer is that this serves to confirm what has been said before. That is to say, we have stated above (Bhā. 2. 1. 11) that—'*between the cause of apprehension and the object of apprehension there is no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before or after or simultaneously with the latter, and we take each case on its own merits just as we find it, and assert accordingly*'—and the present Sūtra serves to show that this assertion of ours had its source in this Sūtra. [By the presence of this Sūtra] it is made clear that the Sage (Gautama) himself does not admit of any restriction (as to priority &c. between the *Pramāṇa* and its *Prameya*), and hence firmly rejects the opponent's denial—by asserting that 'the denial in regard to all three points of time is not right.'

Out of the three possibilities (of priority, posteriority and simultaneity), the *S'ūtra* cites the example of one—'*In the same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound*. In the case cited we find that *by means of* the Sound, which comes into existence after the musical instrument, we infer the existence of the musical instrument, which has been in existence prior to the Sound; and here the musical instrument is what is *to be made known*, and the Sound is the *means* by which it is made known [and here the *Pramāṇa* is posterior to the *Prameya*];—this refers to a case where the musical instrument being hidden from view, its presence is inferred, and the inference is that 'the lute is being played,' or 'the flute is being blown',—the particular instrument being inferred by the peculiarity of the Sound. Thus

passage, the following appears to be noteworthy.—The objector asks why this Sūtra should be here, when what is herein said has already been said before. This question would imply that the two assertions—Sū. 15, and the Bhāṣya-passage on Sū. 2, 1, 11—stood on the same level, being the work of the same writer; this also would appear to be the implication of what follows in the *Bhāṣya* on the present Sūtra. But the answer that the *Bhāṣya* gives to the objector's question is that the former statement, has its source or authority in the present Sūtra—that is why the fact previously asserted is asserted again. Now what does this mean? It apparently means that the present declaration is a 'Sūtra', and the former declaration was 'Bhāṣya' which derived its authority from this Sūtra. This is clearly stated in the *Bhāṣyacandra*, which says—'The Bhāṣya has already shown that there is no restriction as to precedence, sequence or simultaneity among Pramāṇas; and the *Sūtra* now proceeds to show one of these three methods'.

then, here we have a case where we apprehend the 'object of cognition' (the musical instrument) which has a prior existence, by means of the 'means of cognition' (Sound) which comes into existence after the former.

The Sūtra has cited this one instance (of the posteriority of Pramāṇa) by way of illustration; as examples of the other two ways (priority and simultaneity of Pramāṇa and Prameya), we may take those that have already been cited above.

"Why are not those examples cited here (rather than there)?"

We are only explaining here what has already been stated before. All that we have got to do is to state the facts; it does not make any difference whether it is stated here or on the previous occasion.

INTRODUCTORY BHĀṢYA

The names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Prameya*' are applied according to circumstances; such application depending upon certain causes that go to determine the name; such cause or circumstance, in the case in question, consists in the fact that (a) that which is the *means* of bringing about an apprehension is called '*Pramāṇa*', (b) that which is the object apprehended is called '*Prameya*', and (c) when that which, though itself an *apprehended object*, happens to be the *means* of the apprehension of something else, then that same thing may be called '*Pramāṇa*' as well as '*Prameya*.' This is the fact brought out in the following Sūtra.

Sūtra 16

The weighing balance, which is a Pramāṇa, [the means of ascertaining the weight of things], is Prameya also, [as regards its own accuracy]. *

* All the Mss. of the *Bhāṣya*, except one read प्रमेया; so do also the *Tātparyā*, the *Nyāyasūcīnībandha* and the *Bhāṣyacandra*. But some Mss. of the *Vārtika* and all the later commentators read प्रमेयता. The sense is that प्रमेयता also belongs to Pramāṇas, as we find in the case of a particular Pramāṇa, the Balance. प्रमेयता च भवति, यथा तुलाख्ये प्रमाणे दृश्यते; in this case तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् is a compound word. With the reading प्रमेया the construction is तुला प्रामाण्यवत् प्रमेया च भवति, यथा इयं प्रमाणम्भवति तथा प्रमेयाऽपि; in this case तुला and प्रामाण्यवत् are not taken as a compound. The purport of the Sūtra is the same in both cases.

