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**Disagreement and Progress in Philosophy and in Empirical Sciences**

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**Abstract:** The fact that philosophy has not made much progress in finding answers to its big questions is often demonstrated with a comparison to natural sciences. Some have recently argued that the state of progress in philosophy is not so different than the sciences: there are many unresolved big questions in the sciences too, and philosophy has made progress on its smaller questions just like the sciences. I argue that this comparison is misleading: the situation in the two fields look similar only if we focus on unresolved scientific questions that have philosophical import. The sciences have made progress on many questions that are significant but that are not “big” in a philosophical sense, while philosophy has made less progress on its own significant questions. Moreover, “smaller” questions in the sciences are significant in themselves, while smaller questions in philosophy do not have much significance beyond their contribution to the bigger debates. I conclude with brief remarks about what underlies the disparity between the two fields: to understand the slow pace of progress in philosophy we should pay attention to factors that are at the intersection of the nature of philosophical questions, current philosophical methodology, and the sociology of academic philosophy.

**Keywords:** Metaphilosophy, Disagreement, Philosophical Progress, Scientific Progress, Philosophical Method, Social Epistemology

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