

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE RELEVANCY OF ART AND TIME IN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY**

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This thesis aims at propounding possible relations between the concepts of time and art in Martin Heidegger's thinking. Time and art which hold a central place in different periods of Heidegger's thinking in line with his fundamental question of Being are considered together mainly through the analysis of artwork's temporal characteristics. The temporality of the artwork in question is investigated specifically in terms of its basic elements of earth and world and with its relation to authenticity. In this respect, this thesis argues that the work of art bears a temporality of its own and attempts to show how this is realized with the experience of art.

Keywords: Heidegger, Art, Time, Temporality, Authenticity

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The framework of this thesis develops around two concepts which seemingly do not have much to do with each other: Time and art. The most easily recognizable characteristic of both, it might be suggested though, is the difficulty of coming up with a definition for each. Time is an evident but extremely questionable concept for philosophy. The remark of Augustinus in his *Confessions* points to the evident yet almost indefinable nature of time: “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not.” The same difficulty holds for art too – once we wish to explain what it is, it seems like we ‘do not know’ what it is. We can talk of a very wide range of, sometimes antagonistic approaches concerning art. Many of us are convinced that a distinction as art and non-art is adequate due to the differences they connote in terms of expression, experience and existence, because the encounter with the artwork creates an extraordinary effect which one can not easily experience in everyday reckoning with things. Yet, the underlying bases of the realization of such effect and from where the distinction arises have no firsthand answer. Besides, if the primary point of criterion as for the philosophical appropriation of various approaches to art consists of its relation to truth, then the subject matter gets even more complicated. My assertion is that thinking art *vis-à-vis* time could have much to tell us as to natures of both, once they are questioned together.

Common sense tells us that anything and everything, with all human actions and existence in the first place, is with/in time. How it is perceived and delineated in life, on the other hand, is one of the main determinants of the understanding of life itself

and being therein, because time always recalls and rather necessitates a gathering – a gathering of things in a certain way, a gathering of people and events, a gathering of entities. Time, as regards to what we understand from and how we use the term in everyday life, consists of practices of ordering, measuring and thus making beings compatible with each other at least in terms of such assumed temporality. So time, in the first place, appears in human life as a means for simplifying the encounter with the constant flux of things and events. Yet when we assess time only as a condition of the possibility of our relation to the world, that is, our mode of existence, we could be leaving another façade of the relation untouched. Is not time (and what we understand from it) also an outcome of the way we relate to the world? Don't we leave some problematic aspects of the concept aside when we take for granted the way of thinking which sees time merely as the condition for the possibility of such gathering/relating? Time, in another respect, might turn out to be this gathering itself. However with the conventional understanding of time, we tend to think time as something under/around which everything is gathered. So once this never ending reciprocity between time and gathering is considered, it can barely remain an unproblematic concept. Due to the above mentioned characteristic of time, it can be proposed that it is not only an immanent determinant of our way of accessing, understanding and interpreting the world but also bears the mark of the way such understanding occurs. It is always shaped by some specific interpretation of beings. So, in what follows, an inquiry of time as both the outcome and the condition of the relation with/in world will be undertaken.

How can art get involved in and help developing a discussion about time? In what way can a parallelism be found? One of the possible answers is that art also hints at a complex set of relations which turn out to be problematic and worthwhile as they imply what art might mean. Considering the extraordinary effect the artwork can create unlike the ordinary things, it might be thought that art in general and the work of art specifically hints at a different perceptiveness of the world and our way of existence there. Consequently, one of the possible questions to be raised about the relation of art and time is whether such difference originating from the work of art may amount to a transformation. If we could find valid grounds for thinking such a dimension in the experience of art, then it might be worth considering whether it

goes as far as to provide a rethinking or reshaping of time. These points, I believe, suffice to lead us to a path of thinking where the attempt of questioning the basic traits of art and time together is worthwhile.

When one tries to think on art and time, one of the most commonplace ways of relating the two is the permanence of art unlike most other trivial things that does not belong to the domain of art. There is, without doubt, “a certain truth in the assertion that permanence is essential to every work of art,” and that “the successful work ‘stands’”<sup>1</sup> Against what does such a stance take place; is it against time? So can we say that the work of art is something supra-temporal? It is unlikely that one can achieve such clear-cut conclusions once the subject matter consists of terms like art and time which necessitate a detailed explication. Moreover, it would be of limited philosophical worth unless the questioning does not aim for an insight beyond the already given way of thinking. So it seems that the conviction about the permanence of the work of art is far from being sufficient for grasping what is at stake in the relation between time and art. Referring to a few salient remarks of Hans-Georg Gadamer at this point may lead us to figure out the problematic aspect of the relation in question. In his short article “Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” he raises interesting statements concerning art’s relation to time, which are not discussed by him at length in the mentioned piece of writing. He asserts that “the work of art always has its own present,”<sup>2</sup> and furthermore that “the work of art is the absolute present for each particular present”<sup>3</sup>. He also says that “an absolute contemporaneousness exists between the work [of art] and its present beholder,”<sup>4</sup> then in another text, in somewhat more explicit fashion, he talks of “the timelessness of the rainbow of art, which spans all historical distances.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics" in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, translated and edited by David E. Linge. New York: University of California Press, 1992, p.100.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 104.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>5</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Heidegger's Later Philosophy" in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Tr. & ed. David E. Linge. New York: University of California Press, 1992, p. 216.

These statements of Gadamer seem to imply a supra-temporal character of the work of art. However what is meant by time, let alone supra-temporality, is far from being clear yet. And although it seems to be more trivial, as shall be seen, the term ‘present’ also necessitates a reflection, especially in terms of its dual connotation – that is, ‘what is present’ and present as simply ‘now’. As it will be explained, this duality contained in the word ‘present’, in fact, is the basic interconnection that determines our ordinary approach to being and time. So the main question of this thesis will be investigating whether the work of art really bears a peculiar temporal effect, and if so, how and due to which aspects of the work such effecting takes place. In order to do this, we need a proper domain of thinking in which the investigation about the nature of art and time can be carried out concurrently. The philosophy of Martin Heidegger, owing to the basic reasons mentioned below, provides an adequate sphere of such questioning.

Time (and temporality) is one of the concepts around which the entire philosophy of Martin Heidegger lingers, in accord with the main concern of ‘fundamental ontology’ based on the question of Being. Recalling the emphasis made above concerning the inherent connection between time and the world of human being, it is evident that Gadamer’s assertion on the nature of the work of art, even though in a tacit manner, bears the mark of a specific understanding of being in general. And due to the fact that he follows a philosophical path opened by his teacher Martin Heidegger, the relevancy of being is no surprise.

Rejecting an apprehension of time bound with the commonplace understanding, Heidegger conducts a reevaluation of the concept which extends beyond its entitative and thing-like treatment. In several occasions, he takes it to the point of claiming that human-being (*Dasein*) is nothing but its own temporality. His approximation of the terms of *Dasein* and time in an extreme manner, without doubt, makes little sense when uttered and tried to be understood as a detached proposition, out of the context of his thinking. Yet, even within his overall work, his conception of time does not actually acquire an explicit meaning in its relation to being. One thing, however, is certain – ‘time’ indicates a constitutive domain for the relation between human being and its world. Therefore time (hand to hand with

being) holds a pivotal place for Heidegger's entire thinking. On the other hand, in discussions on Heidegger's philosophy it is frequent that the entire thinking of the philosopher is handled in two main periods, namely as early and later Heidegger. The point defining the transition, referred as the turn (*Kehre*) is linked with the change of tone in his view of *Dasein*. Accordingly it can be claimed that the shift of focus in his philosophy with respect to the nature of the relation between *Dasein* and world also has repercussions regarding his concept of time. Especially for the so-called final phase of his thinking a special attention is allocated to the essence of the work of art. Upon such background, then, his philosophy might prove to be an adequate site to question whether a particular connection can be detected between art and time.

There is, however, a primary difficulty with respect to any discussion concerning time. As one of the aims of the following discussion is to propound whether it is sufficient to define time as an entitative concept, the intrinsic problem due to verbalization of the issue should not be disregarded. Since we are bound with the hidden presumptions of the language and with its everyday use, we are also prone to apprehend the concept of time as mere entity. Nevertheless, a little contemplation on the concept suffices to discern how it resists the usual linguistic demarcations as such. Before anything else, it is clear that we can neither take 'time' just as a piece of expression within language nor language itself as one of those things in time. Heidegger also had emphasizes a similar difficulty even in a broader sense: "a philosophical study of time is systematically beset with the problem of taking into account the role time has already played in constituting the terms and standards within which the discussion is to take place."<sup>6</sup> Formulized this way, it can be seen that the challenge of thinking and verbalizing on time covers more than the domain of language and extends to all the conditions already there within which the thinking will develop. Even though most of us would answer the question 'what is time?' in various ways yet with some common traits of the term in general; it should not be ignored that what is understood from 'time' is bound with the historical or cultural determinants of a specific time. So in the very first place we must be beware that

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<sup>6</sup> Cited in David Wood. *The Deconstruction of Time*, New York: Northwestern University Press, 2001, p. 264.



every attempt of understanding time is already bound with the terms of linguistic and conceptual framework which also bears the marks of certain interpretations of world.

Thus, the questions mentioned up to this point constitute the background for this thesis which is composed of four chapters. While the second and the third chapters are devoted to the relevant points in Martin Heidegger's philosophy and on a general discussion on the relation between time and art, respectively; the thesis will end with drawing specific conclusions regarding the work of art and its temporality.

The second chapter aims at giving a brief account of Heidegger's thoughts relevant to discussions with the help of some of his writings. Thematically the chapter will consist of three main parts. In the first part a general scheme of Heidegger's course of thinking will be analyzed with a critical approach to the view which tends to describe his work in two distinct periods. Also the importance of thinking the two periods and of what can be deduced from such thinking will be emphasized. The second part of the chapter will focus on Heidegger's conception of time and the centrality of the concept in his philosophy. The lecture *The Concept of Time and Being and Time* will be of primary concern for this part. In the third and final part of the chapter, a brief explication of Heidegger's theory of art will be proposed. Based on texts such as *Introduction to Metaphysics* and *Poetry, Language and Thought*, as well as his prominent lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art," I will try to show in what ways the arguments on the nature of art can be seen as an extension of his previous thinking and are closely tied to his overall philosophical concerns.

In the third chapter, the peculiar temporal characteristic of the work of art will be sought with the help of some key concepts in Heidegger's thinking, such as authenticity/inauthenticity and earth/world. Thus, I will attempt to suggest some possible ways to think the proximity between the nature of time and artwork based on –but not limited with– the philosophy of Heidegger. In the first place, the work of art will be discussed in terms of its connection with a preeminent pair of concepts in Heidegger, namely, authenticity and inauthenticity. As Heidegger also speaks of inauthentic time and authentic temporality as specifications of (in)authenticity, the

emphasis will be on the question ‘how can the work of art be assessed in terms of inauthentic time and authentic temporality?’ Then, in the second section of the chapter, temporality of the artwork will be question now in another pair of terms Heidegger employs in his discussions on the nature of art. With the help of the concepts of earth and world which hold a crucial place especially in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” another interpretation regarding the temporal character of the artwork will be sought. In this part, the ‘world-forming’ character of the work of art and the connotations of the expression will be of special importance.

Having lay out Heidegger’s way of thinking and made use of the concepts he proposed concerning time and art, the discussion will end with a concluding chapter including some specific propositions about the temporal character of the work of art. In this chapter what makes an artwork temporally different from non-art will be questioned and reformulating the suggestion that “the work of art always has its own present,” it will be argued that artwork urges us to a reconsideration of the concept of time. Therefore it has the potential to indicate the problems and limits of our ordinary understanding of the concept and implies another time of its own, which, however, is not and can not be taken separately from the ordinary. In order to illustrate the special temporal character of art and how it shows itself in specific works, the issues discussed in the thesis will be exemplified by three generic forms of art, namely, poetry, painting, and music.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **THE CONTINUITY OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT AND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF ART AND TIME THEREIN**

This chapter aims at giving an outline of Heidegger's overall thinking and the place of time and art therein. Heidegger's philosophy is mostly interpreted in different periods which in some cases represent his course of thinking to be as if in distinct phases. Since the habit of thinking his philosophy in periods seems to me as one of the reasons for the seeming irreconcilability of time and art, a consideration of the common grounds and points of difference in his entire thinking is necessary. Besides, the fact that his special interest in art shows itself in the so-called later period requires a review of early and late Heidegger together in order to grasp the significance of art in relation to his fundamental philosophical concerns.

#### **2.1 Heidegger and His Two Periods**

This section of the chapter consists of a brief discussion on Heidegger's overall thinking and to what extent can his philosophy be construed in terms of different periods. Emphasizing the major elements of continuity and discontinuity among those periods of Heidegger's thought I will try to lay open the philosophical ground on which the main subjects of this thesis, namely, time and art will be addressed together.

### 2.1.1 Thinking Heidegger in Distinct Periods

It would not be surprising to claim that the entire thinking of Heidegger emanates from and develops around a unique question: the question of Being. The way the question is cultivated and the position it was given with respect to beings, especially the human-being, however, shows a great diversity in his course of thinking. Some of the major concepts through which Heidegger ponders the question, such as *Dasein*, time, language and art suffice to show the extent he elaborates his questioning.

The introduction of *Being and Time* (1927), “Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being,” as the title implies, is devoted to the explication of the question and the need for the reexamination of the issue. Asserting that the question of ‘Being’ in Western philosophy, from Aristotle and Plato on, has not been considered profoundly, Heidegger points out how the question and questioning of Being undergoes a forgetfulness. Thus, the aim to expose the question anew constitutes the point of departure for his major work and for his entire thinking as well.

Heidegger handles the fundamental question of Being in *Being and Time* primarily in terms of *Dasein* (which virtually means the being of human), its relation to beings, and temporality as the “horizon of *Dasein*.” Yet, throughout his path of thinking he refers to different concepts, which were either presented in *Being and Time* or introduced later, with varying degrees of emphasis. Such diversification gives occasion to various approaches among Heidegger scholars with regard to assessment of his overall thinking, giving way even to the impression that some of his works are unrelated to others.<sup>7</sup> As Vensus A. George delineates, there is a number of ways how Heidegger’s overall philosophy is analyzed. Apart from the singular views such as the claim that all his thinking is an extension and elaboration

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<sup>7</sup> “This impression is especially strong when we compare Heidegger’s seminal work *Being and Time* with his post-1930 writings” – Abraham Mansbach. “Overcoming Anthropocentrism: Heidegger on the Heroic Role of Works of Art,” *Ratio X* (1997), p. 157.

of the themes in *Being and Time* or that there are in fact three separate periods;<sup>8</sup> the majority of Heidegger commentators refer to the philosophical turn (*Kehre*) taken by Heidegger after *Being and Time*, in mid-1930s. The prevailing way of periodization, accordingly, explains Heidegger's philosophy in two main periods divided by the 'turn', namely, the early Heidegger and the later Heidegger. As for the contents and the nature of the two periods, while the early Heidegger is generally defined with the motive to explicate the question of Being in terms of *Dasein* and the privileged being of human as the centre of questioning, the later Heidegger is assumed to put such a privilege away as he pursues the exposition of the question of Being.

Besides its validity, the nature and the extent of the 'turn' and characteristics of the 'two' periods constitute the crucial point for our discussion. While some commentators hold the view that the 'turn' amounts to a break between the two periods, some others underline the common grounds and the continuity between.<sup>9</sup> For example, John Wild, who belongs to the former group, describes the early period as "subjectivistic extreme" and the later period as "objectivistic extreme."<sup>10</sup> As we shall see below with examples from the latter approach, depicting the picture

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<sup>8</sup> "One opinion says that the whole of Heidegger's thinking is contained in his major work, *Being and Time*, as it anticipates all the themes that occur in his later writings. [Cf. Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger* (New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981), p. x.] Yet there is another view, which recognizes three separate periods in Heidegger's path of thinking. [Cf. Vincent Vycinas, *Earths and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961)] Vincent Vycinas speaks of the phase of *Dasein*, the phase of Being and the phase of earth and gods, as three phases in Heidegger's way. [Cf. also James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 183-186. Damske speaks of the first, the middle and final stages of Heidegger's thinking.]" - Vensus A. George. *Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger*, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/IIIB-1/introduction.htm>, August 2008.

<sup>9</sup> "Thinkers, like John Wild, Alphonse de Waelhens, Lazalo Versenyi and some others, say that there is a break in Heidegger's thought, the nature of which is such that there is no bridge leading from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. In other words, they speak of a complete break between the two phases. There are others, such as Otto Poeggeler, William J. Richardson, Walter Schulz and Werner Marx, who, though they recognize the shift in Heidegger's thinking, hold for a coherence and unity of both the phases. In other words, they see the two phases, not as isolated from each other, but as a continuity, both in content and aim, though the perspective is different. Thus, for them, Heidegger II is an explication and an interpretation of Heidegger I, from the perspective of Being." – Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> John Wild. "The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 60 (Oct. 24, 1963), p. 677.

in this way –that is, in terms of “two extreme contrary views”<sup>11</sup>– risks misunderstanding Heidegger’s philosophy.

It is a truism that *Dasein* is a central and privileged entity for Heidegger’s exposition of the question of Being in *Being and Time*. He says that “*Dasein* itself has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities” since “in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it.”<sup>12</sup> That is to say, in the first place, any thinking on the meaning of Being refers inevitably to a being-there (*Da-sein*). *There* is the one who thinks and the way one thinks. Heidegger is quite explicit when he says “*Dasein* is not only close to us – even that which is closest: we *are* it, each of us, we ourselves,” yet what he marks just before the sentence should not to be ignored: “Ontically, of course.”<sup>13</sup> As he hints at what is meant by the term ‘ontical,’ we need to understand it as ‘primarily in terms of entities and the facts about them’. The primary concern for what is ontological, on the other hand, is Being rather than entities (beings).<sup>14</sup> What concerns us here is that, with the advent of the ‘later period’ the way the question of Being is handled takes a different path. The meaning of ‘Being,’ previously interpreted primarily with respect to individual *Dasein*, is now sought rather starting mainly with beings themselves. As the special emphasis on the “active and projective character of *Dasein*”<sup>15</sup> is given up by the later Heidegger, human-being loses its priority for thinking on Being. The focus of attention, instead, is oriented equally towards beings as such and the possibilities therein gain a similar significance.<sup>16</sup> If *Dasein* is the term through which the question of Being is dealt

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p.677.

<sup>12</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996, p.32, H11-12. The numbers given after the page number, followed by ‘H’ refer to the page numbers of the original edition. Hereafter cited as *Being and Time*, and unless otherwise stated, this edition of the book is referred

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p.36, H15.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.31, fn3.

<sup>15</sup> Frederick A. Olafson. "The Unity of Heidegger's Thought" in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*. Ed. Charles Guignon. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.106.

<sup>16</sup> As de Beistegui puts it, considered in terms of the use of *Da-sein* the shift of emphasis can be summed as a transition from the adverbial rendering of the term from a rather verbal one. While the first interpretation emphasizes ‘*Da*,’ that is, the thereness of being; for the latter interpretation ‘*sein*’ is at the center of attention. Accordingly ‘being of there’ is central to the use of *Dasein* in later

with in the early Heidegger, *Ereignis*, “event of appropriation,” seems to be of similar significance for the later Heidegger.<sup>17</sup> In *Letter on Humanism* (1947) he indicates the importance of the term for his later thinking in an explicit fashion where he defines *Ereignis* as “the guiding word” of his thinking since 1936.<sup>18</sup>

*Ereignis*, which is often translated as ‘event,’ ‘occurrence’ or ‘(event of appropriation’ as the literal meanings of the word in German connote<sup>19</sup> and finally as ‘enownment’; remains one of the most difficult terms in Heidegger’s lexicon to comprehend. Coming from *Auge*, ‘eye’ and literally meaning ‘placing before the eye / becoming visible’ in Old German,<sup>20</sup> *Ereignis* implies an event of making (becoming) visible, that is, emergence of an entity (entities) through others. In the context of the question of Being, the later Heidegger speaks of “Being as *Ereignis*.” In *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enownment)* Heidegger explains the reason why the proper title contains ‘enownment’ (*Ereignis*) as follows: “It is no longer a case of talking “about” something and representing something objective, but rather of being owned over into enowning. This amounts to an essential transformation of the human from “rational animal” (*animal rationale*) to Da-sein.”<sup>21</sup>

Even though *Dasein*, especially with the emphasis on its individual rendition, ceases to hold the centre of Heidegger’s thinking, it remains to be an important concept. Its

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Heidegger and truth as it is preserved with the event of being in the openness is underlined, rather than what (or who) is there in the occurrence there. For a detailed analysis of the slight yet crucial difference between two usages of the term, see. Miguel De Beistegui, “The Transformation of the Sense of *Dasein* in Heidegger’s *Beitrage zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*” *Research in Phenomenology* 33 (2003).

<sup>17</sup> S.L.Bartky. "Heidegger and the Modes of World Disclosure." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 40, p.212.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Heidegger. "Letter on ‘Humanism’" in *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeil. Trans. William McNeil. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 241.

<sup>19</sup> For an overview of English translations of *Ereignis* and a discussion on their cogency see Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning*. Trans. Parvis Emad. New York: Indiana University Press, 2000, preface, pp. xix-xxii. (Hereafter this book is cited as *Contributions to Philosophy*.)

<sup>20</sup> Michael J. Inwood. *A Heidegger Dictionary*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 1999, p.54.

<sup>21</sup> *Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 3.

meaning and the position it holds within the questioning of Being –with that of man– on the other hand, are reconsidered and reformulated with regard to how “Be-ing holds sway as enowning.”<sup>22</sup> “Be-ing needs man in order to hold sway; and man belongs to be-ing so that he can accomplish his utmost destiny as Da-sein. (...) This *counter-resonance of needing and belonging* makes up be-ing as enowning.”<sup>23</sup>

As Da-sein turns out to be the entity which is grounded in itself by enowning and which grounds enowning<sup>24</sup> at the same time, *Dasein* in the later Heidegger is relocated between Being and man. Thus, somewhat one-way establishment of the meaning of Being in the early Heidegger departing from *Dasein* as individual human-being unfolds into a reciprocal state of relations.<sup>25</sup> Consequently *Dasein* becomes “the ‘between’ [Zwischen] which has the character of a mid-point”<sup>26</sup> rather than the one singular end to initiate the questioning. In the later Heidegger, therefore, “*Dasein* is no longer the locus of truth. Unconcealment is now taken to be a clearing in the midst of beings, a clearing to which humans belong and are exposed, instead of instituting it.”<sup>27</sup>

### 2.1.2 Two Periods *vis-à-vis* Each Other: The Turn, Time, and Art

When we consider what Heidegger himself writes on the ‘turn’ his thinking goes through, it becomes clear that it would be misleading to render the two periods as detached from each other.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p.22.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p.177.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p.184.

<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, Thomas Sheehan interprets *Ereignis* as “the opening up of the open space required for meaning” See. Thomas Sheehan. "Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind." *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey*, IV (1984), p.288.

<sup>26</sup> *Contributions to Philosophy*, p.23.

<sup>27</sup> Jacques Taminiaux. "The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’" in *Reading Heidegger : Commemorations*. Ed. John Sallis. New York: Indiana University, Folklore Institute, 1992, p.404.



If we understand what *Being and Time* calls “projection” as a representational positing, we take it to be an achievement of subjectivity and do not think it... as the ecstatic relation to the clearing of being. The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time* the third division of the first part, “Time and Being,” was held back (cf. *Being and Time*, p.39). Here everything is reversed. The division in question was held because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [*Kehre*] and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics.<sup>28</sup>

There are two outstanding points in the passage quoted above: First, Heidegger warns the reader against the risk of miscomprehending *Being and Time* in case it is read as a ‘subjectivistic’ text. Nevertheless he accepts that the unpublished third division in the book may lead to such reading and implies that the division in question would have envisaged the features of his later thinking. The second thing worth mentioning, which is rather important for our discussion, is the reason he gives for holding the division in question – that he could not find the “adequate saying” and “the language of metaphysics” was insufficient to do that. One of the motives of the later Heidegger, accordingly, is to find the adequate language for taking the way of thinking commenced with *Being and Time* further. Once we see the two periods in terms of such continuation and interdependence, besides the persistence of the question of Being, what Heidegger himself says for Heidegger I and Heidegger II can easily be grasped: “Only by way of what (Heidegger) I has thought does one gain access to what is to be thought by (Heidegger) II. But the thoughts of (Heidegger) I becomes possible only if it is contained in (Heidegger) II.”<sup>29</sup>

Having outlined the characteristics of the turn Heidegger’s philosophy has taken and the two periods supposed to emerge with reference to the turn, it can be noted that the periods of his thinking present a certain continuity and gain their true significance insofar as they are considered in the context of his overall thinking.

Let us now consider the turn and its implications regarding the notions of time and art. It can be said that ‘time’ holds a critical place in both the early and later

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<sup>28</sup> “Letter on Humanism,” pp. 249-250

<sup>29</sup> Cited in George.

Heidegger. Yet the status of 'time' in Heidegger's thinking, in accord with the question of Being, undergoes a transformation with the turn. The special interest in language and art, however, comes to the scene of thought as an attribute of the turn in the later period.

“The shift from existence as the ground of presence to presence as the ground of existence”<sup>30</sup> affects the status of time and temporality in a similar direction. That is to say, the emphasis on the temporality of *Dasein* (as human existence), and even thinking *Dasein* itself as time and as its own temporality diminishes as the status of *Dasein* is redefined in the later Heidegger. Starting with his Marburg and Freiburg lectures of 1927-30, as William McNeill notes, “Heidegger's thinking of the Being of *Dasein* as temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) shifted increasingly toward understanding that temporality, not in terms of the historicity of *Dasein* (as though *Dasein* were the “subject” of its own historicity), but in terms of the Temporality of Being itself (*Temporalität des Seins*)”<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, his approach towards time as an originary concept for understanding Being is maintained. Among the basic traits of this approach we can mention the priority of future (not-yet) over the present and past (already-been) and the non-objectifiable character of time.

Once the increasing emphasis on the term *Ereignis* in Heidegger's thinking is considered, it can be asserted that the way he elaborates the question of Being in his later period also serves a better articulation of his concept of time. What he says later on for *Ereignis* –“Enownment enowns” (*Das Ereignis ereignet*)– is strikingly similar to what he has been saying for temporality since 1920's: “Temporality temporalizes” (*Zeitlichkeit zeitigt*). Such seemingly tautological expressions in Heidegger, I think, give evidence to his intention to overcome metaphysics, by means of the language of metaphysics which he says he can not succeed. Such a motive, without doubt, coincides with Heidegger's special interest in art in his later period.

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<sup>30</sup> Olafson, p.114.

<sup>31</sup> William McNeill. *The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos*. New York: State University of New York Press, 2006, p.115.

Throughout Heidegger's comprehensive discussions on art, starting with the series of lectures "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1935-36), the question of Being is the leitmotif. His reflection on art, therefore, is an extension and elaboration of his main concern of conceiving Being "as an event of truth."<sup>32</sup> What is of fundamental importance as regards the 'turn' is the concurrence of his increasing interest in art with the process of the turn as such. This intertwining, both temporal and philosophical, is worth mentioning since 'philosophy of art' is associated usually with the later Heidegger alone. Not only can his reflection on the work of art be confined within the later period but also his meditation on the work of art, as he also says, plays a decisive role in the turn itself.<sup>33</sup> Hence thinking on art Heidegger comes up with a possible domain for unfolding the question of Being further, for which the philosophical range provided by the "fundamental ontology" (i.e., the early period) had been insufficient.

With the fulfillment of the turn, the work of art gains its originary status in Heidegger's philosophy as the mode of unconcealment. Rendered as the open region where the truth of Being finds the chance of disclosure, the work of art assumes a privileged status similar to *Dasein* held in the early period.<sup>34</sup> In order to highlight the truth of Being which is beyond the anthropocentric accounts of traditional philosophy (and partly of his own philosophy of fundamental ontology) Heidegger focuses on the self-sufficiency of the artwork and how it provides the possibility of disclosure of truth, as we shall see in detail in the last section of this chapter.

If "every thinker thinks one only thought,"<sup>35</sup> as Heidegger says, the one he thinks, as we have already noted, is the question of Being. The endeavor of thinking and verbalizing Being in the most appropriate way and in proper terms is the

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<sup>32</sup> "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p.224.

<sup>33</sup> Taminiaux, p.392. See Taminiaux's essay also for a detailed examination of the lectures on the origin of the work of art with respect to the 'turn.'

<sup>34</sup> Mansbach, pp.162-3.

<sup>35</sup> Martin Heidegger. *What Is Called Thinking?* Trans. J. G. Gray and Fred D. Wieck. New York: HarperCollins, 1976, p.50.

fundamental purpose of Heidegger's entire philosophy. The thinking itself, on the other hand, evolves with the means and terms discovered as it is carried out. Thus, in what follows, the question "how and on which grounds can we try to understand 'time' and 'art'?" will be pursued, based on Heidegger's manner of engagement with these two terms. Considering contributions from different phases of Heidegger's philosophy, such an attempt will hopefully help illustrating Heidegger's main concerns in an elaborate way, as well as providing a different understanding of art and time in terms of each other.

## **2.2 Heidegger's Conception of Time**

Trying to give an account of Heidegger's conception of time, this section discusses the centrality of the concept in Heidegger's philosophy with the help of his various texts in which the issue is addressed. The discussion aims at demonstrating the main points of Heidegger's criticism for the traditional interpretation of the concept, the commonplace relationship one tends to have with it, and what authentic apprehension of time denotes.

### **2.2.1 Introductory Remarks**

Once we consider what we think and verbalize concerning time in our daily lives, it is not difficult to convince ourselves that time is an almost all-encompassing and similarly enigmatic concept for us: *everything is in time, we have time for this and do not have time for that, time flows so quickly, time cures all the wounds, time is money*, etc. But what is time, what do we mean when we pronounce it? Evidently it is something to do with the way we organize our lives and the way things and events are given an order. Then it would not be wrong to take it as a mode and interpretation of the world 'outside,' that is, of the things, of entities; and finally of Being itself. Even though such assumptions are questionable, they might serve as the point to begin. Time, in order to assign a preliminary meaning, therefore, indicates a certain set of relations between man and the world. It is a 'certain' set of relations because the term 'time' makes sense only with the presence of some presumptions concerning those entities assumed to be in time. The preeminent presumption, one

may assert, is the principle of identity. After a little contemplation anyone can easily recognize the fact that it is virtually impossible to have two identical things. Yet, as Georg Kubler points out,

the entire organization of thought and language denies this simple affirmation of non-identity. We can grasp the universe only by simplifying it with ideas of identity by classes, types and categories and by rearranging the infinite continuation of non-identical events into a finite system of similitudes.<sup>36</sup>

Accordingly, time, which is a socially and historically constructed entity, is something we need to assume in order to ‘simplify’ our lives. Thus ‘time’ is a symbol of a socially learned synthesis<sup>37</sup> and not a ‘thing’ as we might tend to think due to having the word ‘time’ as a piece of language.<sup>38</sup> Indicating a mode of being in the world, it is both the outcome and bearer of certain set of relations between the man and the world. Thinking ‘time’ in these terms and recalling the overall approach Heidegger holds, one can anticipate its relevance for his thinking. As the presumptive elements within the concept starts dominating the way it is grasped and accepted, ‘time’ becomes, so to speak, one of the obstacles for thinking and confronting Being properly. More specifically, ‘time’ taken for granted, introduces the possibility of serving as a means for “forgetfulness of being.” It is not surprising; therefore, that ‘time’ is a problematic concept for a thinker whose fundamental question is that of re-exposing the question of Being and disclosure of its truth. While ‘time’ eases the human existence ontically, it turns out to be a challenging concept at the ontological level, and in this context are we to think the place the concept holds in Heidegger’s thinking.

It is hardly possible to give a due summary of Heidegger’s account of time in a few pages.<sup>39</sup> Still, a gist of his overall thought or at least of his attitude can be proposed.

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<sup>36</sup> George A. Kubler. *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*. New York: Yale University Press, 1965, p.67.

<sup>37</sup> Norbert Elias. *Zaman Üzerine*. Ayrıntı, 2000, p.46.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p.16

<sup>39</sup> There are several reasons for the impossibility of such a task. To enumerate some of them: first of all, Heidegger inescapably starts from and speaks within ‘language,’ conventions and hidden presuppositions of which he tries to defy. In accordance with this main concern, he chooses some distinguished terms and elaborates their meaning and sometimes introduces new ones. So while most

As one of the characteristics of his thinking, on the concept of time too, Heidegger initiates a kind of reinterpretation in order to reveal what is covered by the unthoughtful rendition rather than mere analysis or critique. So he not only questions time but also –foremost and more importantly indeed – questions the way and the terms through which the question is raised. He emphasizes the need for reflection upon how “the question about time” can and may be asked<sup>40</sup> and is rather considerate about asking ‘what’ it is: “Whether the question “What is time?” is appropriate must remain open... For the question concerning “what something is” implies that we always want to determine what is interrogated [*befragt*] as *something*, that is, as something other than itself.”<sup>41</sup>

### 2.2.2 Centrality of Time in Heidegger’s Philosophy

We have already noted the centrality of the question of Being in Heidegger’s philosophy. Time and temporality, likewise, hold a crucial place for Heidegger since it is hard to give a proper thinking on Being without considering time, and *vice versa*. On several occasions he underlines the fundamental relevance of the question of time to that of Being as follows: “[T]he question concerning the essence of time is *the origin of all the questions of metaphysics* and of their potential unfolding.”<sup>42</sup> The “essence of time” Heidegger refers to, evidently, indicates his own reinterpretation of the concept in line with his treatment of the question of Being. So it might seem that the conceptual convergence between Being and time is merely an outcome of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavor peculiar to his thinking. What he observes regarding the Western philosophy, through the metaphysics of which he claims that Being has undergone a forgetfulness, proves the contrary. That is, the close relation between the conceptualization of time and of Being, according to

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of the numerous concepts of the Heideggerian lexicon are closely interrelated, some of them are not ‘concepts’ as such. And finally, his usage of those concepts and their connotations are subject to change within his course of thought, that is, his philosophy itself bears a temporal character.

<sup>40</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols-Conversations-Letters*. Ed. Medard Boss. Trans. Franz K. Mayr. New York: Northwestern University Press, 2001, p.36.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p.45.

<sup>42</sup> Martin Heidegger. *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Trans. Nicholas Walker and William McNeill. New York: Indiana University Press, 2001, p.171. (Emphasis added). Hereafter cited as *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*.

Heidegger, is there with its full weight concealed in Western metaphysics. In the passage below Heidegger gives a subtle explanation of the issue:

But why time? Because in the beginning of Western philosophy the *perspective governing* the disclosure of being was time, though this perspective *as such* remained hidden—and inevitably so. When ultimately *ousia*, meaning permanent presence, became the basic concept of time, what was the unconcealed foundation of permanence and presence if not time? But *this* “time” remained essentially undeveloped and (on the basis and in the perspective of “physics”) could not be developed. For as soon as reflection on the essence of time began, at the *end* of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself had to be taken as something already present, *ousia tis*. Consequently time was considered from the standpoint of the “now,” the actual moment. The past is the “no-longer-now,” the future is the “not-yet-now.” Being in the sense of already-thereness (presence) became the perspective for the determination of time. But time was not the perspective specially chosen for the interpretation of being.<sup>43</sup>

Heidegger’s inclusive discussions on time, therefore, aim at reiterating its relation to Being. In *Being and Time*, he declares the specific path of his thinking which differs from the history of philosophy: “In contrast to all this [the history of philosophy], our treatment of the question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that *the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time*, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show *how* this is the case.”<sup>44</sup>

In the beginning of the second division entitled “*Dasein* and Temporality,” Heidegger hints at how he sets the relation anew. He says that the projection of the meaning of Being can be accomplished within the horizon of time,<sup>45</sup> for the characteristics of Being-towards-death and potentiality-for-Being are necessary for a complete understanding of *Dasein*. Thus the future and the not-yet, as ‘there’s of Being outside itself, are essential for thinking *Dasein* (Being-there). Similarly, temporality, three *ecstases* of which (past, present and future) with their respective characteristics of being “towards,” “to,” and “alongside” other entities, is the

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<sup>43</sup> Martin Heidegger. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Yale University Press, 1959, pp.205-206.

<sup>44</sup> *Being and Time*, p.40, H18. (emphasis added)

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p.278, H235.

*ekstatikon* pure and simple.<sup>46</sup> It is in terms of this common ecstatic (standing-outside-itself) mode that in Heidegger's thinking Being and time converge.<sup>47</sup>

Now let us articulate Heidegger's approach to time with the help of some primary texts of him. An address he gave in 1924, *The Concept of Time* is especially pertinent for it focuses on the concept and gives a rough yet pithy outline of the way he dealt with time. Another relevancy of the text is that it is regarded as the "earliest form"<sup>48</sup> of *Being and Time*. As his other works, *The Concept of Time* too refrains from suggesting an explicit definition of the concept. Yet, that he does not come up with a clear-cut definition, as we shall see, is an indication of his peculiar approach to the question as such.

At the beginning of his analysis, he mentions Aristotle and his discussion of time with the tacit conclusion that one can find there the roots of the commonsensical understanding of time. Aristotle's remarks on the relation between 'time and movement' and on 'to be in time' are particularly relevant.

Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time by the movement, because they define each other. The time marks the movement, since it is its number, and the movement the time.

(...)

Clearly then 'to be in time' has the same meaning for other things also, namely, that their being should be measured by time.<sup>49</sup>

In a similar manner Heidegger puts it as; "Time is that within which events take place," and adds, "Time is initially encountered in those entities which are changeable; change is in time."<sup>50</sup> The twofold expression that not only 'time is in entities which are changeable' but also 'change is in time' hints at how Heidegger

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p.377, H328-329.

<sup>47</sup> Sets of concepts such as authenticity/inauthenticity and presence-at-hand/readiness-to-hand which predominate Heidegger's early thinking can be seen as a means to emphasize the discontent with the hidden premises of traditional interpretations of Being and time.

<sup>48</sup> "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p.199.

<sup>49</sup> Cited in Charles M. Sherover. (ed.) *The Human Experience of Time : The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning*. New York: Northwestern University Press, 2001, pp.55-56.

<sup>50</sup> Martin Heidegger. *The Concept of Time*. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1992, pp.3-4.



will relate and interpret time, Being, and *Dasein* together. This is where a certain rationale of his idiosyncratic use of language in some cases, which sometimes seem as mere tautology, lies. What he utters in the address just after beginning with the question “What is time?” is typical in this sense: “If the philosopher asks about time, then he has resolved *to understand time in terms of time...*”<sup>51</sup>, otherwise we are left within the view which sees time merely as some ‘thing’ in which events take place. So we are in a realm where we need to understand the concept in question in terms of itself. Therefore what matters for Heidegger “in the question concerning time” is “allowing a possible connection between that which is in time [i.e. the inauthentic interpretation of the concept] and authentic temporality [which amounts to the proper understanding of the concept].”<sup>52</sup>

What he asserts up to this point – which apparently indicates a position against an understanding of time in itself as a closed entity with regard to “that which is in time” – are taken one step further with the following claim: “*Dasein*, conceived in its most extreme possibility of Being<sup>53</sup>, *is time itself*, not *in* time.”<sup>54</sup> Any view which sees *Dasein* as some entity *in* time, accordingly, bears a misinterpretation. Such enclosure of *Dasein* within ‘time’ is unjust because it ignores the open, the unknown and the not-yet, all of which are fundamentals of *Dasein* per se. This point is also uttered clearly in the lecture with the expressions that “*Dasein* as human life *is primarily being possible*”<sup>55</sup> and, in view of the foregoing, that “the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future.”<sup>56</sup> The fundamental category of *Dasein* is its ‘how,’<sup>57</sup> rather than ‘what.’ In other words, *Dasein* transcends what is present-at-

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid, pp.1-2.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p.7. That in this early appearance of the term “authenticity,” which will hold a significant place in *Being and Time*, takes place in direct relation to ‘temporality’ deserves attention.

<sup>53</sup> Here Heidegger refers to the proper appropriation of finitude of *Dasein*, i.e. its being-towards-death. Thus what ‘*Dasein*’ connotes is somewhat limited with ‘human existence,’ as we have seen above as one of the characteristics of Heidegger’s early period. The continuity between the two terms, however, persists even as the status of *Dasein* changes in the following years.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, pp.3-14.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p.12.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p.14.

hand and should be grasped in terms of its futural disposition. Hence Heidegger focuses on this point and distinguishes between *Dasein*'s authentic and inauthentic temporal existence.

As for the inauthentic temporal existence, details of which we will outline in the context of Heidegger's criticism of the vulgar notion of time, the following passages in *The Concept of Time* hint at the focal point of the discussion:

Yet we became acquainted with *Dasein*... as reckoning with time, indeed even measuring it with the clock. *Dasein*...reckon[ing] with and ask[ing] after 'how much' of time, is never alongside time in its authenticity. Asking in this way... *Dasein* loses its time.<sup>58</sup>

To ask after the 'how much' of time means to be absorbed in concern with some 'what' that is present. *Dasein* flees in the face of 'how' and clings to the specific 'what' that is present [and] grows weary in the 'what.'<sup>59</sup>

In the light of what has been said up to this point, Heidegger concludes with a rather strong claim of tripartite 'equivalence' between time, temporality, and *Dasein*. "[T]ime is *Dasein*... *Dasein* is time, time is temporal." He further claims that "The fundamental assertion that time is temporal is therefore the most authentic determination – and it is not a tautology, because the Being of temporality signifies non-identical actuality."<sup>60</sup> It can be said that, putting the issue in this way, he reformulates his criticism of Western metaphysics in terms of the concept of time. While the approach of metaphysics sees things, in the first place, in their identical beings and accordingly takes them to be objects in time; Heidegger highlights the original status of *Dasein* as openness by characterizing it as temporality itself, rather than as an entity in time. So at the end of the address he suggests that, investigated in this way the initial question "What is time?" has transformed itself and gains the form of "Who is time?"<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p.13.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p.15.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p.16.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, pp.20-21.

<sup>61</sup> Yet recalling the way Heidegger pursues for overcoming the anthropocentric approach to Being in his later period, it is evident that the latter form the question takes is not the ultimate one. In line with the transformation of the concept of *Dasein* in the following decades of his philosophy, it can be

### 2.2.3 Heidegger's Criticism: Time in Terms of Authenticity and Inauthenticity

The approach presented in *The Concept of Time*, as we can expect with regard to the aforementioned consistency of Heidegger's overall philosophy, persists in his later works too with slight differences of emphasis. It may be suggested that there are two main points concerning Heidegger's reexamination of the concept: (a) 'Time' should not be interpreted merely within a perspective of everyday relations which amounts to taking it as if an object in which other entities (including *Dasein*) are; (b) whereas traditional conception of time is confined primarily with a singular ecstasy of time, namely present; the futural aspect of time is its fundamental phenomenon. Both of these imports point to the dominance of presence-at-hand in everyday life and of forgetfulness of Being; and delineate Heidegger's basic attempt of overcoming them.

In *Zollikon Seminars* (1964-66) Heidegger speaks of three basic traits about the tradition of the concept of time which demonstrates the persistence of his early approach to the concept: "First, time is the succession of sequences of now-points. Second, time is not without psyche, *animus*, consciousness, mind, and subject. Third, time in its being is defined by the understanding of being in the sense of presence."<sup>62</sup>

We have already seen what Heidegger meant by time as the succession of now-points – future and past are leveled down to 'now-points' and the 'present' gains a privileged status. The third point emphasized above is like an extension of the first in that the privileged status of the 'present' leads to a certain mode of understanding Being.<sup>63</sup> The second instance of traditional conception of time corresponds to what has been formulized before as "Time is *Dasein*" and "*Dasein* is time." In this series

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proposed that the question 'who' is no longer the most proper way of asking about 'time'. Instead, it can be claimed that 'how' turns out to be a rather more appropriate way of asking the question.

<sup>62</sup> *Zollikon Seminars*, p.59.

<sup>63</sup> "Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence': this means they are understood with regard to definite mode of time – the 'Present.'" - *Being and Time*, p.47, H25.

of seminars belonging to his 'later period' he refines the previous interpretation of the belonging together of time and *Dasein* ("human-being's unfolding essence"). He says that the belonging-together of time and human being (soul or mind) is already mentioned in all discourse on time. Referring to thinkers such as Bergson and Husserl, Heidegger asserts that the way this relation is rendered in modern thought is still problematic.

This matter of the belonging together of time and the human being's unfolding essence is expressed in modern thought in the way and the manner in which the problem of time is approached, that is, with the expressions: *sense of time, experience of time, and consciousness of time.*

(...)

With this theoretical attribution of time to a *sense of time*, to a *consciousness of time*, and to an *experience of time*, a great deal has already been uncritically prejudged, regarding how time and the human being's unfolding essence belong together. ...In terms of priority, this belonging together is the first and not, as it might appear, the third element which results from putting the human being and time together.<sup>64</sup>

The set of concepts regarding Heidegger's discussion of time, as we have seen from the beginning, are integral to the general lexicon he uses. This is not surprising once the relevance of the concept of time for the fundamental question of Heidegger's thinking is considered. In the final part of this section it may be useful to give a brief account of some of the terms employed by Heidegger for the discussion on time, so that the matter can be thought in more palpable grounds.

In order to go beyond "the acceptance of the givenness of time, which underlies all our indications of time" and develop a new way of thinking, Heidegger, in the first place, tries to elucidate our everyday relationship to time.<sup>65</sup> While 'everyday time' and 'clock-time' (a specific realization of the former) are examples of the inauthentic temporality, authentic temporality is mostly discussed around the term 'moment of vision (*Augenblick*).'

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<sup>64</sup> *Zollikon Seminars*, pp.37-38.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*, p.42. At this point one thing is to be noted on 'everydayness': the term and its status which is almost the equivalent to inauthenticity in the context of early Heidegger and which is posited as if a counterpart of the 'authentic' is also subject to change later on. As Taminiaux says in later Heidegger, especially from *The Origin of the Work of Art* on, "everydayness is no longer the 'familiar, all too familiar' that resoluteness has to avoid and overcome. It is now strange despite being familiar." - Taminiaux, p.404.

As Heidegger demonstrates frequently, *Dasein*'s everyday relation to time is in the form of reckoning and such belonging together of *Dasein* and time has already been observed by Aristotle and Augustinus.<sup>66</sup> Clock-time as the model of reckoning with time is far from giving us time itself since the main interest therein is the "how much" of time. Due to essential requirements of calculation and measuring, clock-time in a sense is an extension of the view which sees time as successive now-points. What underlies clock-time therefore is a leveling down of moments and periods to set the measure in question. Based on this premise of equivalence, entities are grasped in their being-within-time which brings the interpretation of the world in terms of presence-at-hand.

The modern understanding of time and the way temporality is construed in our everyday lives are under the dominance of clock-time and practices derived upon there. Such 'inauthentic' construal of time is in well accord with (and in a certain sense based on) the scientific-time for which the entities in question are objects to be determined by way of measurement and calculation, that is, of quantitative representation. "The man on the street," Heidegger writes, "sees the truth of physics only in its effect, namely, in the form of the car he is driving."<sup>67</sup> Thus in the domain of the everyday, "the possible authenticity" is doubly covered. One is in the network of given relationships, concerned with the things to be done and lives within pre-allocated structures of time. Thus the inauthentic temporality "works to reactivate and reiterate the relations of functional interaction."<sup>68</sup>

After the elucidation of the inauthentic temporality through which we assume time in everydayness, the significant question is under which conditions and how can we go out of this circle. In what manner can we have the chance of overcoming inauthenticity and what does such overcoming amount to? Speaking of one of the possible ways to understand original temporality, Heidegger declares one of the

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p.37.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p.51.

<sup>68</sup> M. Haar. "The Enigma of Everydayness." In *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*. Ed. John Sallis. New York: Indiana University, Folklore Institute, 1992, p.25.

essential traits of such a path as “not regard[ing] time as something we find within our consciousness or as a subjective form,” since the contrary is “the chief obstacle preventing our access to original time.”<sup>69</sup> Only when this obstacle is removed can we have the chance to transcend the misinterpretation of time which confines us to presence-at-hand. Such transcendence, as it lets the not-yet and the possible be seen, leads to an authentic attunement with the world and a disclosure of *Dasein* in the proper sense. Right at this point the ‘moment of vision’ takes its turn: “This resolute self-disclosure of *Dasein* itself, however, namely in each case to be in the midst of beings what it is given to be in its determinateness – this resolute self-disclosure is the *moment of vision* [Augenblick].”<sup>70</sup>

As the literal meaning of the word *Augenblick*, ‘blink of an eye’ connotes, the term implies an occurrence which is momentous and significant but hardly recognizable ‘within-time.’ Such decisive moment, therefore, is capable of letting “existence gain mastery over the ‘everyday’; but it can never extinguish it.”<sup>71</sup> Since it would not be feasible to live in the midst of mere openness and possibilities, that is, according to what the fundamental characteristic of authentic temporality yields; a total renouncement of the ‘everyday’ is neither sensible nor possible. On the other hand the transformative power of the moment of vision should not be ignored. Because such ‘moment’ is by no means a ‘moment’ among others in that it can not be characterized as being-within-time. This point is crucial for understanding what does the term mean for Heidegger’s thinking and is made clear also by him.

This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which *Dasein* is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture that is *held* in resoluteness. The moment of vision is a phenomenon which *in principle* can *not* be clarified in terms of the “now.” [dem *Jetzt*]. The “now” is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-timeness: the “now” ‘in which’ something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. ‘In the moment of vision’ nothing can occur; but... the moment of vision permits us *to encounter for the first time* what can be ‘in a time’ as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, pp.133-134.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, p.149.

<sup>71</sup> *Being and Time*, p.422, H371.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, pp.387-8, H338.

Thus, the moment of vision bears the occasion for an original encounter with *Dasein* by shedding light on the latent possibilities either in *Dasein* itself or in the situation and opens a path to go beyond the state of being absorbed inauthentically in everydayness.

As a conclusion, Heidegger's criticism of traditional conception of time starts from the basic moments of its being structured upon the understanding for which 'presence' and the 'present' are given a privileged status. Since the ontological and temporal domains are in a relationship of mutual determination, these grounds lead us to confinement with what is already given. The insufficiency and inadequacy of the way of apprehension in question for an attempt to grasp Being is the main reason for Heidegger's discontent. So what is suggested as an authentic construal and practice concerning time is characterized with the avoidance from means and ends, calculation and representation.<sup>73</sup> "That which is *ontically* so familiar in the way *Dasein* has been factually interpreted that we never pay any heed to it, hides enigma after enigma existential-ontologically."<sup>74</sup>

In the case of our relationship with time, 'clock-time' or more specifically 'techno-scientific time' constitutes the ontically familiar façade of the problem. The predominating terms of techno-scientific worldview, most of which we can hardly recognize in the everyday, according to Heidegger is a severe threat for man.

What threatens man in his very nature is the view that technological production puts the world in order; while in fact this ordering is precisely what levels every *ordo*, every rank, down to the uniformity of production, and thus from the outset destroys the realm from which any rank and recognition could possibly arise.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Wood, p.xx.

<sup>74</sup> *Being and Time*, p.423, H371.

<sup>75</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Collins, 1971, p.117.

When we have nothing but technological relationships left, this is no longer the earth on which man lives.<sup>76</sup> As he discusses in an elaborate way in his 1955 essay “The Question Concerning Technology,” ‘enframing’ and consequently destining (pre-determination) is the underlying essence of technology. “When destining reigns in the mode of enframing,” man is faced with the greatest danger for himself.<sup>77</sup> The danger as such is the oblivion of ‘the possible’ and ‘the open’ in Being and in the nature of man, and falling prey to the dominance of ‘the measurable’ and ‘the calculable.’

What he adumbrates in the same essay regarding art seems to be of fundamental importance for the subject of this thesis since art is mentioned in this essay together with the hope of yielding a saving power. After citing Hölderlin with the lines “But where danger is, grows there the saving power also,” and “poetically man dwells on this earth,” Heidegger asks, “Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primarily, so that they for their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power, may awaken and found anew our vision of, and trust in, that which grants?”<sup>78</sup>

In order to see what the possible answers of the question can be, in the following section Heidegger’s discussions on the art and the work of art will be put into discussion.

### **2.3 Heidegger’s Approach to Art**

In the third and final part of the chapter, a brief explication of Heidegger’s approach to art will be proposed. With particular reference to his renowned lecture “The Origin of the Work of Art” I will try to elucidate some outstanding arguments in the text. In this regard, what distinguishes Heidegger’s understanding of art from that of

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<sup>76</sup> Cited in Michael E. Zimmerman. "How Modern Technology Transforms the Everyday World - and Points to a New One." In *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity : Technology, Politics, and Art*. By Michael E. Zimmerman. New York: Indiana University, Folklore Institute, 1990, p.210.

<sup>77</sup> Martin Heidegger. "The Question Concerning Technology." In *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays*. By Martin Heidegger. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: HarperCollins, 1982, p.26.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p.35.



traditional aesthetics and what kind of possibilities he sees in the works of art regarding his overall concerns will be two main questions whose answers will be sought.

### 2.3.1 Overcoming Aesthetics

‘Aesthetics,’ in the ordinary sense of ‘philosophy of art,’ is concerned with the nature of beauty, art and taste. Circumscribed in this manner, for any aesthetic endeavor the beautiful and the artwork are presupposed as entities to be thought and analyzed in terms of their perceptive affects. While in most cases the beautiful is seen as equivalent to what pleases and what stimulates imagination, what is at stake in the artwork in terms of its being is hardly a matter for the ‘discipline’ of aesthetics. Emergence of the discipline and such rendition of art, without doubt, take place within the specific conditions of the modernity in the broad sense of the term.

In the essay “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), where Heidegger refers to the essential phenomena of modernity as a techno-scientific age, he mentions “art’s moving into the purview of aesthetics” as one of those phenomena. What is implied by such moving, in the first place, is that “the artwork becomes an object of [subjective] experience [*Erlebens*]”<sup>79</sup> That he mentions the change the artwork undergoes is remarkable since the essay deals mainly with explicating the rationale of modern science and technology, which seemingly have little to do with art. Yet, as he puts forward what he means with world’s becoming picture, the relevance between the two domains becomes apparent:

What belongs properly to the essence of the picture is standing-together, system. By this is not meant the artificial and external simplifying and putting together of what is given, but the unity of structure in that which is represented [*im Vorgestellten*] as such, a unity that develops out of the projection of the objectivity of whatever is. [...]

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<sup>79</sup> Martin Heidegger. "The Age of the World Picture." In *Heidegger: Off the Beaten Track*. By Martin Heidegger. Trans. Kenneth Haynes and Julian Young. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.57.

In the other edition of the essay Lovitt translates *Erlebens* as “subjective experience.” "The Age of the World Picture." In *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. and ed. By William Lovitt. Harper Torchbooks, 1977, 115-154.

Where the world becomes picture, the system, and not only in thinking, comes to dominance.<sup>80</sup>

Thus the “world picture” which consists of “objects of representation” amounts to “a loss of being.”<sup>81</sup> As a consequence of the arguments cited above, Heidegger’s approach to art, before anything, bears the mark of an attempt to overcome ‘aesthetics.’ Therefore, his thinking is not concerned with the work of art as the object of *aisthesis* – the sensuous apprehension.<sup>82</sup> Instead of the aesthetic view for which “art is representation of the beautiful in the sense of the pleasing, the pleasant,” Heidegger aims at providing “art” with a new content in order to acquire a “recaptured, pristine relation to being.”<sup>83</sup> Thus, especially with the advent of the ‘later period,’ he deals with art in terms of its originary nature.

### 2.3.2 The Origin of the Work of Art

As it was mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the days when Heidegger’s interest in art and the work of art truly raises correspond to the ‘turn’ his thinking takes. One of the most preeminent and earliest studies –and probably the most comprehensive one– he makes on art, entitled “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-36), comes out in these very years.<sup>84</sup>

As the aforementioned arguments about the representational manner, which turns the world into picture suggest, Heidegger avoids interpreting artwork as a

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<sup>80</sup> “The Age of the World Picture” (1977), p.140.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p.141.

<sup>82</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.ix.

<sup>83</sup> *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p.132.

<sup>84</sup> “...we have three texts about the origin of the work of art...

1. The first elaboration of the lecture given by Heidegger on November 13, 1935...
2. The second elaboration of the same lecture... repeated without change in January 1936... under the title *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*.
3. ...a third elaboration...the text of the three lectures offered in November and December of 1936... published in the Fall of 1945 in the *Holzwege* under the title *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*.” - Taminiaux, p.392.

representation put forth by its maker, that is, the artist. Accordingly, the essay opens with demonstrating how one finds him/herself in a hermeneutical circle when the ‘origin’ of the work of art is considered: The artist and the work turn out to be origins of each other and this reciprocal relation can be understood only with reference to the nature of art. Understanding the nature of art, on the other hand, necessitates turning back to the work itself.<sup>85</sup> So taking it from the very basics, Heidegger tries to determine the status of the work of art with regard to ‘mere thing’ and ‘equipment.’ If ‘thing’ means “what is lifeless in nature and human usage,”<sup>86</sup> work of art is apparently more than mere thing. Yet the work of art is not exempt from the ‘thingly character’ every work has. However, one should be aware of the insufficient pretensions of the traditional renditions of ‘thing.’ In this respect, Heidegger expounds three predominant interpretations of the thing in the history of Western thought: (a) Thing as the bearer of characteristics; (b) thing as the unity of sensory manifold; and (c) thing as the formed matter. While the first one is too extensive to distinguish between what is thing and not; the second, unlike the first, brings the thing too close to the body. Finally, the last interpretation is not adequate for ‘thing’ because matter and form are determinations of equipmentality rather than thing. Therefore, the necessary condition “when we venture the attempt [for] the thingness of the thing” according to him, is “keeping at a distance the preconceptions and assaults of the above modes of thinking.”<sup>87</sup> As for the work of art, such deliberate assessment amounts to thinking beyond the purview of ‘aesthetics.’

One of the conditions for maintaining such a distance is stepping out of our habitual language. The way Heidegger employs some specific terms in his discussion give evidence to this need. The Greek words *tekhne*, *physis*, and *aletheia*, along with *poiesis*, hold a crucial position in order to understand the essence of the arguments in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” *Tekhne*, as Heidegger puts, refers to both

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<sup>85</sup> Martin Heidegger. "The Origin of the Work of Art." In *Heidegger : Off the Beaten Track*. By Martin Heidegger. Trans. Kenneth Haynes and Julian Young. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.1-2. Hereafter cited as OWA.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p.5.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p.12.

handicraft and art. But what is more important is that “*tekhne* means neither... It never means any kind of practical accomplishment.” It designates rather “a way of knowing.”<sup>88</sup> The word *Tekhne*, therefore can not be assigned a clear-cut definition as such and is to be understood within the context of the entire discussion. This is also the case for *physis* and *aletheia*. While Heidegger defines the former as a process of “coming forth and rising up in itself and in all things,”<sup>89</sup> there are other distinguishing connotations of its meaning, such as “creative occurrence,” “originating,” and “appearing.” Hence the word *physis*, rather than being a concept in the ordinary sense, points to “a productive flux, governed by no restitutive necessities or teleological principles.”<sup>90</sup> The last of the three terms, *aletheia*, is at the heart of the discussion, especially on the relation between art and truth, as will be seen below. The word, which literally means ‘unconcealment,’ denotes the Greek understanding of truth. The adequacy of the word for Heidegger’s approach lies in the idea that the work of art is not a transposition of the real into an artistic production but “there is a happening of truth at work” as unconcealment. Thus, “the unconcealment of being” is designated as a happening in the work of art.

Another pair of notions Heidegger introduces as he contemplates on truth and the work is ‘earth’ and ‘world.’ The terms are brought forth with the well-known example of Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes. The way the shoes exist in the picture gives notice to how the “equipment belongs to the earth and yet finds protection in the world of the peasant woman.”<sup>91</sup> As we bring ourselves before the Van Gogh painting depicting a pair of worn-out shoes, Heidegger argues, the “equipmental being” of the simple equipment is discovered. The discovery in question, according to Heidegger, is “the disclosure of what the equipment in truth is” and through this disclosure “being steps forward into the unconcealment of its being.”<sup>92</sup> Leading a path beyond being as presence-at-hand, the work points to truth

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p.35.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p.21.

<sup>90</sup> Wood, p.256.

<sup>91</sup> OWA, p.15.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p.16.

as *aletheia* as it uncovers the oblivion of being. “The essential nature of art,” then, is “the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of its being.”<sup>93</sup>

Accordingly, a considerable part of the essay is devoted to the attempt to expose the relationship between truth and the work, in the terms of earth-world and concealment-unconcealment. Two essential features of the work are given as (i) to set up a world, and (ii) setting forth of earth.<sup>94</sup> World is that which is characterized with being “always-nonobjectual” and that transcends “mere collection of things.” Hence, while the stone is world-less, the peasant woman has a world since her existence has the trait of staying “in the openness of beings.”<sup>95</sup> As for earth, the work is well distinguished from equipment. Whereas the manufacturing of the latter uses up the earth – the always self-secluding, and lets it disappear into usefulness; in the former, the earth is allowed to come forth as it is brought “into open as self-secluding.”<sup>96</sup> *Aletheia*, the unconcealment as truth, is achieved along with the counterplay between earth and world as each “carries the other beyond itself” in their struggle. The work thus, lets us confront with the essentially self-secluding element therein as it lays clear the openness of a world. Because truth, according to Heidegger, essentially possesses the opposition between clearing and concealment and the process of such concealing denial “is the continuing origin of all clearing.”<sup>97</sup>

In the final section entitled ‘Truth and Art,’ where Heidegger deals specifically with art and the work of art and their relation to truth, what he says hardly differs from those he proposes concerning the work in general. The emergence of truth through the work of art is construed with respect to the struggle between earth and world, in terms of clearing and concealment, with an emphasis on its non-equipmental character. He adds the feature of “createdness” as a distinguishing trait of art form

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, pp.22-23.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, p.23.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, pp.24-25.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p.31.

the “readiness of the equipment.” Thanks to createdness of the work of art, what is announced is that “the work *is* rather than is not.”<sup>98</sup> At this point one can ask ‘to whom such announcement is directed’ and furthermore, ‘whether the happening of truth through the work of art is independent from the one who is appealed to’. Heidegger suggests that just like the creators, “preservers” are also essential for what is created to come into being. Thus, even if the work of art falls into oblivion, unlike the case for the equipment, there is still a preserving.<sup>99</sup> Preservation of the work, Heidegger asserts, is the very means by which human-beings’ being-with-one-another is founded and that what art lets originate is “the essential belonging together at work of creator and preserver.”<sup>100</sup> Thus, Heidegger defines art as “the creative preservation of the truth in the work,” and “*a becoming and happening of truth.*” The way truth happens as clearing and concealing, on the other hand, is through being poeticized. Based on this supposition Heidegger makes the remarkable claim that “*All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of beings, is, in essence, poetry.*”

Although the explication of the grounds and connotations of the claim which attributes poetry as the essence of all art requires a comprehensive discussion, what Heidegger says on the matter in the following pages are quite clear in that they give a pithy understanding of his thinking on art’s relation to the ordinary. He emphasizes that language itself is also poetry in the essential sense “[not] because it is ur-poesy; rather, poesy happens in language because the latter preserves the primordial essence of poetry.”<sup>101</sup>

If language is considered to be the domain of our dwelling on earth within and through which the world is founded, the significance of interpreting art and language as poetry in their essence becomes fairly manifest. Art in this sense is the “*unique poeticizing within the clearing of beings which has already happened, unnoticed, in*

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, pp.39-40.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p.41.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p.44.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p.46.

the language.”<sup>102</sup> Therefore, art acquires its ‘originariness’ not from being or pointing to something completely different from what already is, but due to its capability of allowing “truth to arise” which, Heidegger says, is meant to be the “origin.”<sup>103</sup>

### 2.3.3 The Place of Art in Heidegger’s Thinking

Heidegger’s thinking on art, which has been summarized within the context of “The Origin of the Work of Art” above, is crucial for a thorough understanding of his philosophy for several reasons. Some of those reasons regarding the ‘turn’ that occurs in his thinking has already been mentioned. In this final part of the section, I will note still other yet more general points of relevance for grasping the crucial place art holds in Heidegger’s thinking. There are two things which should be underscored in order to see more lucently how Heidegger basically deals with ‘the enigma of art’. First, art is questioned as an originary (*ursprünglich*) entity among others; and second, the nature of the questioning is intertwined with that of the essence of beings, that is, of Being.

Art, taken as what lets truth of beings arise, is one of the entities through which a springing forth and clearing among beings take place. Thus, what ‘origin’ denotes in this sense requires an interpretation which goes beyond the commonsensical understanding of the definition “from where and through which a thing is what it is and how it is.”<sup>104</sup>

The primordially of a state of Being does not coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate structural element. The ontological source [*Ursprung*] of *Dasein*’s Being is not ‘inferior’ to what springs [*entspringt*] from it, [...] in the field of ontology, any ‘springing-from’ is degeneration. If we penetrate to the “source” ontologically, we don’t come to things which are originally obvious for the common understanding; but the questionable character of everything obvious opens up.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p.47. (emphasis added)

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p.1.

<sup>105</sup> *Being and Time*, p.383, H334.

The passage quoted above from *Being and Time*, as it hints at the proper understanding of the relation between the source and what springs from it, coincides with the way the term origin (*Ursprung*) is rendered in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In another occasion, where the proper meaning of origin is given more explicitly, Heidegger speaks of the difference between ‘beginning’ (*Anfang*) (as ‘origin’) and ‘start’ (*Beginn*).

The start is immediately left behind, it vanishes as an event proceeds. The beginning, the origin, by contrast, first appears and comes to the fore in the course of an event and is fully there only at its end. Whoever starts many things often never reaches a beginning. Of course, we human beings can never begin with the beginning – only a god can do that. Rather we must start with, that is, set out from, something that will first lead into or point to the origin.<sup>106</sup>

Once this nuance regarding what is meant by ‘origin’ is considered, it is not difficult to discern the following: what is at stake throughout the discussion on the origin of art is not finding the ultimate origin upon which the work of art is founded as a final product but exposing the nature of art that is originary as such. Art, unlike science which is characterized as the cultivation of a domain of truth that has already been opened,<sup>107</sup> constantly indicates and calls for an original openness. Accordingly, what is founded in and through artwork, in Heidegger’s words, is an “overflowing.”<sup>108</sup> That is, what is at issue in the originary occurrence of truth in the experience of art is amounts to an excess when compared to what we are acquainted with in everyday life.

The second specific point regarding the distinctive status of art in Heidegger’s thinking is that art is seen as the manifestation of the essence of beings. So the attempt to lay open the originary essence of art, in fact, is hardly discernible from the fundamental question of Being. Gadamer mentions the proximity between Heidegger’s approach to art and Being, noting that the former supports the latter since both are conceived as an “event of truth.”<sup>109</sup> The essential affinity is uttered

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<sup>106</sup> Cited in McNeill, p.118

<sup>107</sup> OWA, p.37.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p.47.

<sup>109</sup> “Heidegger’s Later Philosophy,” p.224.



lucidly in the appendix Heidegger writes to “The Origin of the Work of Art” in 1956:

The entire essay moves knowingly yet implicitly, along the path of the question of the essence of being. Reflection on what *art* may be is completely and decisively directed solely toward the question of *being*. Art is accorded neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it belongs, rather, to the event out of which the “meaning of being” is first determined.<sup>110</sup>

In his *Nietzsche* lectures of late 1930’s, well before the addition of the appendix to “The Origin of the Work of Art,” he speaks of the act of bringing-forth in art in which the essence of beings is seen clearly.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, in the same lecture he says that

Great art and its works are great in their historical emergence and Being because in man’s historical existence they accomplish a decisive task: they make manifest, in the way appropriate to works, what beings as a whole are... [In art and its works] the truth of beings as a whole, i.e., the unconditioned, the absolute, opens itself to him.<sup>112</sup>

As a consequence, Heidegger’s approach to art is in complete accord with his concern for understanding and exposing the meaning of the essence of beings. That such an attempt is carried out in the domain of art and the work of art is, on the other hand, by no means arbitrary. On these grounds, it can be asserted that the relevance he sees in the nature of art and the adequacy of the ‘language’ of art for handling the question of Being are among the main reasons of his developing interest in art. In this respect, for Heidegger, meditation on the work of art turns out to be one of the basic ways of reopening the question of Being.<sup>113</sup> Art as a “becoming and happening of truth” and “the creative preservation of the truth in the work,” thus, has a privileged relation to Being, comparable to that of *Dasein* in Heidegger’s philosophy.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> OWA, p.55.

<sup>111</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Nietzsche*. Ed. David F. Krell. Vol. I-II. New York: Harper San Francisco, 1991, p.69.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid*, pp.83-84.

<sup>113</sup> Wood, pp.143-144.

<sup>114</sup> Mansbach, pp.162-163

Finally, it should be born in mind that Heidegger, at least in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” provides no answers for the question what art is. What he says regarding the nature of the work and art are, as he puts it, not answers to the question but “directions for the questioning.”<sup>115</sup> Indeed, he defines the task he pursues in the essay as seeing the enigma (riddle) that art itself is rather than solving it.<sup>116</sup> As Hölderlin says, “An enigma is pure springing forth” (*Ein Rätsel ist reinentsprungenes*)<sup>117</sup>. In this sense “the enigma art is” is nothing but the origin art is. What is concealed in the source can be interpreted only through what springs forth from it.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, art is something that we can come close to through interpretation and questioning of what springs forth therein, rather than being an entity of itself. That is why it seems that we know what art is when no one asks. What if it is asked properly? The inadequacy of an answer limited to the ‘aesthetic purview’ unveils.

In this chapter, we have tried to present the grounds on which an articulated discussion of time and art would be raised. With this purpose, in the first section the basic philosophical concern for Heidegger’s thinking, that is the question of Being and the different forms it takes throughout his thinking has been delineated briefly. Then, in the second and third sections, we have attempted to sketch Heidegger’s understanding of time and his approach to art, respectively. Furthermore, the

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<sup>115</sup> OWA, p.55.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p.50.

<sup>117</sup> Cited in Marc Froment-Meurice. *That Is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics*. Trans. Jan Plug. New York: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.164.

<sup>118</sup> In this respect, the etymology of the word is remarkable:

- “RIDDLE – Middle English redels, ridel, from Old English rdelse opinion, conjecture, riddle; akin to Old English ridan to **interpret**” - Merriam-Webster’s 11<sup>th</sup> Collegiate Dictionary.
- “RIDDLE – O.E. rædels "opinion, riddle, counsel, conjecture," from P.Gmc. \*rædislijan (cf. O.S. radisli, M.Du. raetsel, Du. raadsel, O.H.G. radisle, Ger. Rätsel "riddle"). Related to O.E. rædan "to advise, counsel, **read, guess**”” – Online Etymology Dictionary, <http://www.etymonline.com>, Aug. 2008.

particular statuses of these two terms and their significance for his overall thinking is set forth. Upon this thematic background, a specified discussion on art and time will be held in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3

### ART AND TIME IN TERMS OF TWO MOMENTS IN HEIDEGGER

In this chapter the temporal character of the work of art will be sought with reference to two main moments in Heidegger's philosophy; namely, the conceptual pairs of authenticity-inauthenticity and earth-world. These concepts, which have already been delineated in the previous chapter, will be reconsidered here with regard to their specific connection to temporality. Thus the attempt of ascertaining the position of the work of art with respect to two conceptual domains in question will constitute the basic thread of discussion. In the end, two arguments about the specific relation of art and time following from the discussions on two moments of thought shall be proposed. With this purpose, the guiding questions of what follows will be: (i) "what is the status of the artwork in terms of authentic and inauthentic time?" (ii) "How can earth and world in the work of art be interpreted in terms of the concept of time?" Starting with these questions, in order to outline the specific relations between art and time, work of art will be first interpreted in terms of its proximity to authenticity and authentic time, that is, to the moment of vision. Then, for the discussion concerning the second main moment of interpretation, the "world-forming character" of the artwork will be examined in terms of its temporal character.

As we have already seen, Heidegger's idiosyncratic approach to the work of art consists of his investigation of "the special way in which it is a thing."<sup>119</sup> Artwork, whose thingly character cannot be disregarded, connotes a special way of being a

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<sup>119</sup> Leon Rosenstein. "The Ontological Integrity of the Art Object from the Ludic Viewpoint." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 34 (1976), p.323.

thing in that a rightful understanding concerning art necessitates a consideration of how it is more than a mere object of experience. Such consideration, as already been demonstrated, amounts to overcoming of aesthetics in dealing with the artwork.

Once we give an adequate hearing to what is expressed through the work of art, we let it for the first time be what it is. In other words, the power of art as an indicator of what has been covered within our commonsensical engagement with things is revealed. Such revelation is the underlying element for the context within which one can claim that art has to do with the meaning of being and that art provides us with a domain for truth. Such power of art, as it is freed from an aesthetic purview, in fact, is the fundamental reason for Heidegger's interest in art. In his *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (1936-1938), a few years after the lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art," he clearly states the issue in the section entitled "Metaphysics and the Origin of the Work of Art" as follows:

The question of the origin of the work of art does not aim at a timelessly valid determination of what is ownmost to the work of art, which could simultaneously serve as the guiding-thread for a historically retrospective explanation of history of art. This question is most intimately connected with the task of overcoming aesthetics and that means simultaneously with overcoming a certain conception of beings as what is objectively representable. Overcoming of aesthetics again results necessarily from the historical encounter with metaphysics as such. This metaphysics comprises the basic Western position toward beings and thus also the ground for what is heretofore the ownmost of Western art and its works. Overcoming of metaphysics means freeing the priority of the question of the truth of being in the face of any "ideal," "causal," and "transcendental" and "dialectical" explanation of beings.<sup>120</sup>

In the light of the passage quoted above, two things deserve special attention for the discussion on the work of art where it is grasped with its truth-bearing nature. First, Heidegger's attempt in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and consideration of the work of art on other occasions are not directed toward the artwork characterized with a disinterestedness, which is regarded solely in terms of its internal formal aspects. Rather the motive for raising the question consists of the claim that overcoming the aesthetical approach towards art goes together with an encounter with the presupposed metaphysics and its connotations. It is by means of such an encounter that the significance of artwork emerges. The second important point, which follows from the first, is that an adequate confrontation with metaphysics in

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<sup>120</sup> *Contributions to Philosophy*, p.354.

question should refrain from a reformulation of the artwork in “ideal,” “causal,” “transcendental” or “dialectical” terms. Otherwise, the act of handling with the question of art ends up with a mere re-positing of the artwork within the same metaphysical grounds. The real power of the work of art, however, lies in its capacity to let break from being confined within aesthetics as an extension of the given metaphysical understanding of beings. Therefore, in this context the work of art implies a reconsideration of our approach to beings.

Recalling the aforementioned implications of ‘time’ and the meaning it has in our daily lives, it can be asserted that the modern concept of time stems primarily from the same understanding of beings, that is the representative approach of Western metaphysics. The vulgar conception of time, based on what is already present and takes for granted the presence of things, holds sway as long as the meaning of being is not subjected to questioning. Beings are interpreted in terms of their being within-time and time merely *is* with beings already there. No matter whether the ideal, causal, transcendental or dialectical explanation of beings is preferred, the concept and significance of time justifies and is justified by the approval of metaphysical approach to beings. Beings are there as the objects of any act to be carried out with them, as cognitive representations for the man, with their *within-timeness*. Events or experiences are determined temporally as measurements of durations and with the order in which they take place, for which beings serve as mere objects.

The work of art, on the other hand, unlike things ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, “expresses something in such a way that what is said is like a discovery, a disclosure of something previously concealed.”<sup>121</sup> The work of art not confined into the domain of aesthetics, accordingly, promises more than a thing within-time with its originary character. The originary way of its being expresses something which does not belong to beings as they are interpreted in terms of metaphysics mentioned above and the conception of time therein. Thus one might expect that the artwork resists being posited as a mere thing within-time and should have a peculiar relation to time

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<sup>121</sup> “Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” p.101.

as we know. In what follows, the validity of this argument will be asserted with an attempt to demonstrate how and in what terms such relation can be expounded.

### 3.1 Artwork and Authenticity

Authenticity and inauthenticity, as already been demonstrated in the previous chapter, hold a significant place in Heidegger's thinking. The pair of concepts serves, in the first place, as a means of the explication of *Dasein*'s mode of being. Even though one can find a number of subjects discussed in terms of their authenticity and/or inauthenticity, everything that is (in)authentic is in relation to (in)authenticity of *Dasein*.<sup>122</sup> Thus, the concepts are discussed in detail in *Being and Time*, in terms of *Dasein*'s (in)authentic existence which appears either as existing in the mode of "them" or as one's being-one's-self. While inauthentic existence of *Dasein* is explained as that in which *Dasein*'s possibilities are confined with those already determined by "them" as *Dasein* flees in the face of Being, authentic existence can be understood as the mode of existence that lets *Dasein* be aware of its real possibilities and potentials. In fact, in the latter, *Dasein* sees itself as the domain of undiscovered possibilities since the mode of being in the world as such is put into question. That is to say, unlike in inauthentic mode of being, in authentic being one faces up to and acknowledges the meaning of one's existence.<sup>123</sup> The interpretation of the authentic and the inauthentic with specific emphasis on the manner of one's (*Dasein*'s) mode of existence, however, belong mainly to Heidegger's 'early period.' Accordingly, Heidegger does not refer to these two terms later on as much he does as in his early period. Yet, in order to carry out a discussion encompassing also the later connotations of *Dasein* – as the region of openness between the man and the world – one can rightfully refer not only to (in)authentic modalities of man but also to (in)authentic natures of beings.

Before going through authentic temporality and artwork's relation to it, the question how authenticity and inauthenticity are posited with respect to each other is worth

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<sup>122</sup> Inwood, p.23.

<sup>123</sup> Roderick Munday. "Glossary of Terms in Being and Time." Sept. 2006. <[http://www.visual-memory.co.uk/b\\_resources/b\\_and\\_t\\_glossary.html](http://www.visual-memory.co.uk/b_resources/b_and_t_glossary.html)>.

rearticulating in order to recall the nature of conceptualization. The most important point in the interpretation of the mode of being as authentic or inauthentic is taking those modes not as opposite states of being. One can evidently speak of a choice between the authentic and the inauthentic, yet, thinking them as exclusive modes may lead to an understanding of terms as if they are grounded on a causal or dialectical basis. Authentic mode of being, as Heidegger underlines in several occasions, emerges upon the inauthentic way of being as a modification of the latter: “Authentic *Being-one’s-self* does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the ‘they’; *it is rather an existentiell modification of the “they” – of the “they” as an essential existentielle.*”<sup>124</sup> It would not be proper to think authenticity apart from inauthenticity because “no one is himself in everydayness”<sup>125</sup> and the mode of living in everydayness is mainly determined by the preoccupation with things as the *others (they)* do. Therefore the average way of one’s being in the world for the most part is as “them.” The mode of being as “they” dominates over the authentic being, that is, the mode of being-one’s-self. The instance when authentic being comes to the scene as the modification of the inauthenticity indicates a discovery of the dormant possibilities of *Dasein*. These possibilities are unrecognized in inauthentic being of *Dasein* since in the mode of inauthenticity *Dasein* is preoccupied with its ontical concerns. Therefore the modification which leads to the authentic being denotes a “moment of vision” that rearranges *Dasein*’s engagement with beings in another level – that is, a transition from ontic to the ontological consideration of itself.<sup>126</sup> So (in)authenticity, in the first place, is to be understood as *Dasein*’s mode of being in the world and how it is interpreted with other beings.

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<sup>124</sup> *Being and Time*, p.168, H130.

Only the particular *Dasein* decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. the understanding of oneself which leads *along this way* we call “*existentiell*.” The question of existence is one of *Dasein*’s ontical ‘affairs’. This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. (Ibid., 33, H12)

<sup>125</sup> *The Concept of Time*, p.8.

<sup>126</sup> Occurrence of such a modification means, in other words, relinquishing the understanding which takes entities in their factuality. Thus, in the authentic mode of being *Dasein* goes beyond seeing entities with their presence-at-hand or readiness-to-hand, which implies that the quantitative representation of beings (as measurable and calculable things) are put aside.



Referring to the significance Heidegger attributes to poetry might help at this point for the explication of at least two things regarding (in)authenticity. First, the relation proposed between poetic discourse and language suggests a vivid understanding of the relation between the modes of authentic and inauthentic. And secondly, by means of the case of poetry, we can foresee how we can think of the connection between authenticity and the authentic ‘experience’ of art.

Just as the inauthentic mode which prevails in everydayness, the way we use language on average is far from demonstrating a creative discourse. As we treat language as a reserve of words and phrases to be used up in order to maintain our basic communicative needs, language turns out to be something ready-to-hand. The most typical instance of such ‘usage’ of language is idle talk. If language is “the house of being,” then the way language partakes our lives is indicative of our mode of dwelling in that house and therefore of our relation to being. Poetry, on the other hand, unlike the everyday usage of language, embodies a kind of creative occurrence of language in which the latent possibilities of the same language originates. Yet, poetry – the essence of all art according to Heidegger – “is never merely a higher mode (*melos*) of everyday language.”<sup>127</sup> Similarly, it is improper to think language as a kind of “ur-poesy” from the elements of which poetry is made. In Heidegger’s words, “it is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten and used-up poem.”<sup>128</sup> Therefore the proper ground for the explanation of how poetry happens in language is that language “preserves the primordial essence of poetry” and that “language itself is poetry in the essential sense.”<sup>129</sup> So if poetry is “authentic language,”<sup>130</sup> that is because it has the power of letting language realize its creative potential which remains covered and forgotten in the context of inauthentic everydayness.

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<sup>127</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.208.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, p.208.

<sup>129</sup> OWA, p.46.

<sup>130</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.xiii.

What is described as authentic, accordingly, is characterized with its potency of letting the originary essence of beings be uncovered. Thus, authenticity is related to the process of opening a domain of productive flux through entities which were previously used up without being recognized and whose essence were covered in inauthenticity. In this sense, “the great work of art, especially poetry,” as “the *techne* which enables people to be at home with things, to understand in advance what things are,” lets people “pro-duce things, bring them forth, let them be.”<sup>131</sup> What is at stake in such effect of the work of art is the disclosure of the essence of being which falls into oblivion under the conditions of our inauthentic mode of being in the world.

Since the ordinary conception of time is one of the most dominant categories of inauthenticity as a means of preventing our confrontation with the essence of beings, the disclosure experienced with the artwork can also be thought in terms of its temporal effect. In this regard, in what follows, authentic time as the moment of vision and the proximity between the originary nature of artwork and the moment of vision will be discussed.

### **3.1.1 Authentic Time: The Moment of Vision**

When we focus our attention on the subject of temporality and its discussion in terms of authenticity, the key concept we need to confront in Heideggerian lexicon is ‘the moment of vision’ (*Augenblick*). However it should be once again emphasized that consideration of different entities in terms of their (in)authentic nature is not to be thought as an independent assessment of those entities with respect to the criterion of authenticity as one aspect among others. Because (in)authenticity as a mode of existence is best understood as an intertwining of how particular entities in question take place in and contribute to (in)authenticity as such.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Zimmerman, p.230.

<sup>132</sup> The present discussion regarding authentic temporality and the work of art, thus, requires keeping in mind that what is aimed here is an interpretation of these two threads in their possible connections – the question of being is still at the heart of the discussion.

If the crucial feature of authenticity mentioned above (that it is a certain modification of inauthenticity) is also valid for authentic time, then it would be appropriate to attempt grasping it in relation to the characteristics of inauthentic temporality. In this way we can see the fundamentals of inauthentic time by which our mode of existence in everydayness is mostly shaped. More importantly, recalling the characteristics of inauthentic time, we can clearly see the features of ‘time’ that undergoes a modification in order to constitute authentic time. Based typically on the clock-time and the homogenized now-points therein, inauthentic time is primarily characterized with the motive of determining things and events in advance. Such determination *in advance* does not necessarily mean that it takes place beforehand. Things and events, with the reserved temporal categories of past and future, are molded into pre-determined temporal structures. In the practice of such temporal pre-determination of beings, it is possible to speak of some patterns for the rendition of beings. One of the most fundamental patterns is the urge to measure time. Measurement brings the ‘universal applicability’ of clock-time as it sets a temporal frame ‘valid’ for all people and creates the illusion that we all have a common time as if an object to be used. Also due to the nature of the act of measuring, once the units in terms of which the other things will be determined are decided; the nature of what is measured – in this case, time and temporality of beings – gets out of sight. The presence of that which is measured is taken for granted and the entire practice of dealing with them develops upon this forgetfulness of the question concerning the nature of being. Here lies the gist of Heidegger’s criticism of the privileged status of presence (and present) in vulgar notion of time. According to his criticism, bringing temporality of beings to present in each case amounts to forcing them into the category of ‘what’ (some thing that is already present and grasped in its givenness) and thus covers the essence of being as the originary possibilities is left unnoticed. Under such circumstances, beings consequently turn into mere objects of representation. Another pattern of seeing things, in accordance with that of measuring, is functionality. It is expected that every single thing should have a function to serve and according to this interpretation of beings, the function of a thing constitutes its *raison d’etre*. In short, the notion of inauthentic temporality embodies the interpretation of time characterized in that it is concerned primarily with *what* is present, *what* is

measurable, and *what* can be explained in terms of functionality and causality. It is on these grounds that the inauthentic temporality works to reiterate the relations of representational and functional interaction. Apparently, ‘interpretation of time’ here is equivalent to ‘interpretation of beings.’ Because in line with the conceptualization of time in the inauthentic mode of being, ‘time’ is presumed as an omnipresent entity and things bear the feature of within-timeness.<sup>133</sup>

As for the instant for modification of the inauthentic temporality which is both an outcome and reiterating source of inauthentic mode of existence, Heidegger introduces the concept of *Augenblick*. The term literally meaning ‘the glance of the eye,’ however, indicates the origin of time itself rather than being a moment *in* time. Evidently here there are two ‘time’s in question; namely the authentic time for which *Augenblick* is the origin and inauthentic time in which *Augenblick* is not to be taken to be a moment *in*. Just like in the case of poetry and everyday language, *Augenblick* is characterized as the origin of time since inauthentic time implies a fallenness of *Dasein* into inauthentic existence as the concealment and forgetfulness of the former. *Augenblick*, in this sense, can be defined as “the abruptness of the sudden descent of all that can be grounded yet has never yet been grounded into the clearing of *Being*,” and as “the abruptness of the human being’s uprising into an inherent stance within the midst of this clearing.”<sup>134</sup> The passage below elucidates the way ‘moment of vision’ makes a situation authentically present, that is, how the modification of the inauthentic temporality takes place through ‘moment of vision’:

...the irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalizes itself in the mode of making-present which does not await but forgets. He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and be-fallings which he encounters in such a making-present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways. Busily losing *himself* in the object of his concern, he *loses his time* in it too. Hence his characteristic way of talking – ‘I have no time’. But just as he who exists inauthentically is constantly losing time and never ‘has’ any, the temporality of authentic existence remains distinctive in that such existence, in its resoluteness, never loses time and ‘always has time’. For the temporality of resoluteness has, with relation to its present, the character of a *moment of vision*. When such a moment makes the Situation authentically present, this making-present does not itself take the lead, but is *held* in that future which is in

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<sup>133</sup> Such account of inauthenticity also hints at the relevance of the literal meaning of the word authenticity (*eigentlichkeit* ~ “selfness”): under authenticity, things are not allowed to be themselves as the essence of being is covered and falls into oblivion.

<sup>134</sup> McNeill, p.128.

the process of having-been. One's existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical *constancy* of the Self.<sup>135</sup>

So, while the way inauthentic existence temporalizes itself is characterized with a mode of forgetting; the authentic mode of making-present is "held in that future which is in the process of having-been." Forgetting here is to be understood as the unnoticed habit of making being fall into hiddenness. The emphasis on the futural aspect of authentic temporality, on the other hand, points to the undisclosed possibilities of the situation and therefore to those of *Dasein*. Inauthentic mode of existence, therefore, corresponds to *Dasein* losing time and getting lost *in* time. Yet with the resoluteness of authentic existence one 'always has time' in the original sense of time. That is why seeing the moment of vision (*Augenblick*) just as a moment in time indicates a tacit acceptance of the habit of forgetting and therefore loss of time. Because in this kind of interpretation such 'moment' is taken merely as an exceptional instant without the power of affecting the entire structure of the mode of existence as it can not bear an original temporality.

Ordinary understanding certainly sees the moment within time as well, but it only sees the moment of vision as an ordinary moment, and only sees the ordinary moment in its evanescent character as something which is present at hand only for a short time. It is incapable of seeing the essence of the moment of vision, which rests in its seldomness when seen in relation to the time of any *Dasein* as a whole. The ordinary understanding is unable to grasp the seldomness of such moments and the ecstatic expanse of this seldomness, because it lacks the power of recollection [*Erinnerung*].<sup>136</sup>

An overall consideration of the modes of (in)authentic existence and the corresponding temporal characters therein leads to an interesting conclusion regarding the status of forgetfulness in these modes. There are, in fact, two dimensions of oblivion in issue: first, the oblivion of being as such; and second, the oblivion of the fact that there is such oblivion. So 'the power of recollection' attributed to the moment of vision should embrace an overcoming of both levels of oblivion.

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<sup>135</sup> *Being and Time*, p.463, H410.

<sup>136</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p.295.

In what follows, it will be suggested that the work of art with its originating power is capable of fulfilling such an overcoming. According to this argument whose account will be given below, artwork hints at a similar temporality in line with the originary character attributed to *Augenblick*. Regarding the double overcoming through *Augenblick*, two initial questions may rise: (i) Is ‘moment of vision’ out of time? (ii) Does it imply another time? Apparently, with the claim that the originary work of art serves an adequate sphere as the manifestation of a similar effect, these questions also hold for the work of art. These are, indeed, the guiding questions the affirmative answers of which will constitute the leitmotiv of the discussion on the artwork as moment of vision. Now let us look at in what manner the *originary* artwork works as “the resolute rapture with which *Dasein* is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation as possible objects of concern,”<sup>137</sup> that is, as *Augenblick*.

### 3.1.2 Art as the Moment of Vision

It can be asserted that philosophies of art, regardless of the varied interpretations and understandings of the term, linger around a few basic questions: What is the nature of art? What is it that distinguishes art from non-art? What an artwork is for? What kind of an effect does it have on us, and how does that affecting work? Although the answers provided for each of these questions may differ greatly, it is possible to conclude some initial characteristics of art from these common questions.<sup>138</sup>

Whatever approach one takes, a great work of art<sup>139</sup> is always distinguished for its uniqueness and consequently for the unordinary effect it creates. Therefore

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<sup>137</sup> *Being and Time*, p.387, H338.

<sup>138</sup> For the time being, the predispositions some of those questions imply and their adequacy for the interpretation of the work of art in the context of the current discussion are left aside.

<sup>139</sup> For the sake of clarity, we need to specify at this point that the artwork in issue here for the most part is the one which is ‘originary,’ whose meaning is discussed in detail in the previous chapter. This should be thought in line with Heidegger’s emphasis in the OWA that what his discussions are about great art. Otherwise, the work of art which partakes little or none from such originariness, taken as an object of aesthetical apprehension could easily become an ‘object’ among others. In this respect, it is the great work of art that can possibly succeed leaping out of inauthentic mode of existence while others are more prone to falling into aesthetic purview.

*extraordinariness*, if we assume that what is ordinary is ordinary in the real sense, is one of the fundamental traits of the artwork. But what are we to do with such *extraordinariness* and the ‘sense of beauty’ it produces; what does it serve for? Once the effect of surprise in art is seen merely in terms of relief and joy it creates, there does not seem to be much to discuss further. However, taking the issue further and asking what good art has for us indeed, in most cases it is hard to find specific answers. The difficulty of suggesting a definite justification for the existence of the artwork points to another fundamental feature of art. It is different from other human products whose functions or reasons of presence are explicitly known. Therefore the work of art implies a *non-causal* and *non-functional* being. One can multiply the questions endlessly; besides, new ones are raised through a confrontation with the artwork. Yet it is not easy to come up with ultimate answers for those questions. Thus, as a final aspect of art, we can speak of its *undeterminable* nature, which shows itself with the sphere of *questioning* it opens.

Then, the originary work of art which indicates a “creative preservation of the truth”<sup>140</sup> as it is “concerned to reproduce the general essence of things”<sup>141</sup> can for the most part be understood in terms of the basic issues mentioned above. First, the essential resistance against being construed in a set of functional relations distinguishes the work of art from the equipmental mode of being and thus carries it beyond a presence- or readiness-to-hand. Second, in connection with the first, the originary artwork yields a kind of surprise – serving as a means to recognize how extraordinary the ordinary is indeed.<sup>142</sup> And finally, with its almost inexhaustible power of responding to and bearing questions – starting with those concerning its own nature – it embodies openness; a ‘still-to-come’ and a ‘not-yet,’ pointing beyond an ‘already’ implying a futural identity rather than taking presence as its

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<sup>140</sup> OWA, p.44.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, p.16.

<sup>142</sup> ‘Surprise,’ as the etymology of the word clearly indicates, reifies an unexpected overtaking - a taking-beyond: “Surprise: “unexpected attack or capture,” from M.Fr. surprise “a taking unawares,” from noun use of pp. of O.Fr. *surprendre* “to overtake,” from *sur-* “over” + *prendre* “to take,” from L. *prendere*, contracted from *prehendere* “to grasp, seize”” – Online Etymology Dictionary, Aug. 2008.

focus of attention. Once we consider the work and ‘experience’ of art in these terms, its proximity with the moment of vision begins making itself apparent.

In his lectures on aesthetics delivered in 1932, John Dewey employs the metaphor of “a flash of lightning illumin[ating] a dark landscape” which yields “a momentary recognition of objects” with the emphasis that “the recognition itself is not a mere point in time.”<sup>143</sup> This short description used by Dewey in his discussion on the structure of time in the artwork is applicable for the authentic experience of temporality stimulated by the work of art. Because the work of art, due to its extraordinariness with regard to our inauthentic occupation with beings, gives occasion for giving a hearing (and seeing) to what we neglect in everydayness. Such an experience is indeed similar to the flash of lightning for at least two reasons. First, what it illuminates is something already there which is otherwise hidden in the dark. That is to say, the real source of its effect is its power to remind us that *there is* that something. On the other hand, the occurrence of such an effect is characterized in that it lasts in the after dark. For the recognition it provides involves such an aftereffect, it outreaches the moment of its occurrence.<sup>144</sup> Therefore it is not a mere point *in* time. So the work of art and the unique experience it yields, just as the moment of vision, helps an overcoming of forgetfulness and suggests a modification of inauthentic temporality consisting of discrete now-points. Now, in order to clarify what is meant by artwork’s concern for ‘reproducing the general essence of things’ we need to bear in mind that the experience of art as moment of vision has a special relation with the whole and in this sense differs from the inauthentic experience.

[A]s the encounter with the authentic (...) the experience of art is *experience* in a real sense and must master ever anew the task that experience involves: the task of integrating it into whole of one’s orientation to a world and one’s own self-understanding. The language of art is constituted precisely by the fact that it speaks to the self-understanding of every person, and it does this as ever present and by means of its own contemporaneousness.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Cited in Eugene Francis Kaelin. *Art and Existence*. Bucknell University Press, 1971, p.118.

<sup>144</sup> Recalling Heidegger’s emphasis that *Dasein*, for the most part, *is* in inauthenticity and that inauthentic mode of existence dominates authentic mode may help seeing the adequacy of the metaphor of “lightning.”

<sup>145</sup> “Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” pp.101-102.



Unless the way experience of art speaks to the self-understanding of the preserver is recognized, the power of the authentic experience can hardly arise. The occurrence of such recognition, which is a rare situation due to the dominance of the inauthentic mode of existence, depends on the greatness of the artwork and the preserver's capability of giving a hearing to the language of art he encounters. These constituents, on the other hand, may help or hinder the emergence of each other. The self-understanding in question is in accord with the meaning of the word Heidegger employs for authenticity, namely *eigentlichkeit*. The word derives from the root own (*eigen*) and literally means 'ownedness' or 'ownmostness.' In other words, 'authenticity' in the sense of a self-understanding, refers to *Dasein*'s understanding of its true nature rather than an individual subject getting to know himself/herself. Other than a situation in which the moment of vision takes place, *Dasein* can not let itself face the extraordinary through what seems to be ordinary in inauthentic existence. Consequently it keeps lingering within what is already familiar and under such circumstances the artwork is also forced into inauthentic relations and becomes a part of what is already familiar. In this case, neither the artwork nor *Dasein* in relation with it can find the occasion to be what it authentically is. Because for the work of art confined to the terms of an inauthentic interpretation of time, it is unlikely that a temporal unfolding and the experience of moment of vision will emerge. Gadamer elaborates the difference between the genuine experience of art and that which remains in the domain of familiarity as follows:

[V]isitors in a museum congratulate themselves on recognizing a master or a familiar motif as coming from a given period. But this recognition does not at all represent the real immediacy of a genuine experience of art. For experience in its deeper sense as experience is never merely a confirmation of expectations but a surprise.<sup>146</sup>

Then the authentic experience of art commences once the unexpectedness in the work is let manifest as a moment of sur-prise, that is, a taking over. The process of temporal unfolding in the experience of art, due to which the artwork is claimed to constitute a moment of vision, is initiated by the element of surprise the work of art creates. The authenticity of such experience arises when the artwork presents "the

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<sup>146</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer. "Artworks in Word and Image." *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23 (2006), p.61.

same kind of tension produced in the organism's phenomenal field when it first becomes aware that an object exists."<sup>147</sup> What follows the moment of surprise in the encounter with the artwork is thus the experience of apprehending things – even those which were previously assumed to be ordinary – anew in their essential yet formerly hidden extra-ordinariness. Such experience offered by the artwork is another way of manifesting its originary character.

The 'vision' envisaged through the encounter with the artwork is the way the work gains its distinctive essential features. The experience in question leads to a withdrawal from the sphere of inauthentic relations and therefore from the inauthentic appropriation of time. This effect of rupture born by the artwork sets the basis for the aforementioned initial characteristics of art: (i) since the chain of causal and functional relationships is exposed to an interruption, artwork can not be easily situated in such meshes; (ii) once it produces a stepping out of the presumed ordinariness of life, the underlying extraordinariness therein is revealed; and finally (iii) for the experience of art implies a privileged status for the artwork which resists being grasped and construed in terms of the inauthentic mode of being, the work gains an indeterminate position among beings present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. Yet, as long as the happening of the *modification* of the inauthentic mode is made *noticed*, such indeterminateness does not denote arbitrariness but a productive openness.

The whole connection between authentic and inauthentic existence, between the moment of vision and the absence of such a moment, is not something present at hand which transpires within man, but one which belongs to *Dasein*. We can only understand the *concepts* that open up this connection as long as they are not taken to signify characteristic features or properties of something present at hand, but are taken rather as *indications* that show how our understanding must first twist free from our ordinary conceptions of beings and properly transform itself into the Da-sein in us.<sup>148</sup>

So what the work of art does with the authentic experience it yields, in the broadest sense, can be summed up as opening up the connection between authentic and inauthentic existence in the way cited above. Concerning the temporal dimension of

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<sup>147</sup> Kaelin, p.165.

<sup>148</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p.296.

the issue, the artwork that withstands being enframed in 'presence' taken for granted, suggests an existence beyond representation.<sup>149</sup> Since the inauthentic construal of time and the accompanying inauthentic mode of existence are based on a representative stance toward beings, what happens with the work of art is a transformation of inauthentic time. The originary work of art, therefore, is capable of opening a path for uncovering what is covered in our being engaged in 'what.' The inauthentic approach to beings is chiefly concerned with asking 'when' and 'how much.' This shows that is "absorbed in concern with some 'what' that is present" and unknowingly steals away from "authentic futurity."<sup>150</sup> It is such 'authentic futurity' that the creative openness of the artwork bears and by means of which the work serves a moment of vision. Therefore the inauthentic time is exposed to a deconstruction with the experience of art. The work of art, in this way, opens a path "toward understanding original temporality" as the proper encounter with it "does not regard time as something we find within our consciousness or as a subjective form."<sup>151</sup> If the latter interpretation of time implies oblivion of being, then the power of stimulating the original temporality within the work of art is a means for the happening of clearing among beings. Hence, the truth-bearing nature of art as the occurrence of unconcealment of being considered in terms of the original temporality gives evidence to how the essence of the work of art serves a moment of vision.

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<sup>149</sup> Here 'representation' is employed in the several ways it may emerge and should be thought also as specifications of the mode of existence which is based on taking things to be mental or sensuous projections. In this respect, the interpretation of beings for which they are taken with their *within-timeness* and the unquestioned habits of measuring, calculating, ordering, etc therein can be given as instantiations of representation.

<sup>150</sup> *The Concept of Time*, pp.15-16.

<sup>151</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, pp.133-134. In this text, in which Heidegger does not discuss the work of art, what Heidegger speaks of here as a means to original temporality is interestingly boredom. Yet, what he argues for the connection between boredom and essence of time can be rendered as a model of a possible connection between the work of art and authentic time. Considering the fact that he suggests boredom as one way among others capable of hinting at such an understanding of original time, it can be asserted that art may be one of those other spheres with such a power. Although the subject of boredom or its possible connections with the experience of art is far beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that it might be interesting to read Heidegger's discussion on boredom in terms of its relevancy with art. (For the discussion on the nature of boredom and time in the book, see *ibid*, pp. 78-164.

In the first part of the discussion on the temporal character of the artwork, an explication of the proximity between the experience of art and the moment of vision is suggested heretofore. In the second section, we will be dealing with the same question regarding the nature of the work of art, now in terms of the conceptual pair of earth-world which is taken as the second specific moment in Heidegger's approach to art.

### **3.2 Temporality of the Work of Art in Terms of Earth and World**

In this section, the current discussion on the temporal character of the work of art will be approached with help of a different yet a more specific conceptual pair, namely, 'earth' and 'world.' The term which was central to the discussion in previous section, moment of vision, was one which had not been employed by Heidegger in the specific consideration of the nature of artwork. 'Earth' and 'world,' on the other hand, make an explicit appearance in his discussion on art. Especially in "The Origin of the Work of Art" the pair of notions holds a crucial place in understanding the working of the artwork which Heidegger defines in terms of an endless strife between the two. Nevertheless what is connoted by earth and world in this lecture is not as clear and explicit as it could be. Regarding the significance of the conceptual pair in Heidegger's approach to the work of art, it is worth attempting a further explication. Thus, in this section what 'earth' and 'world' may suggest for a further understanding of the work and experience of art will be sought. Specifically, the points of correspondence with the already discussed relation of art and time and new connections regarding the issue will be considered.

#### **3.2.1 Earth and World**

Earth and world are two outstanding concepts around which Heidegger discusses the nature of the work of art. The earth in the artwork is most basically what constitutes "the existing reality of the work". The words of a poem, the colors of a painting, the stone of a sculpture, or the tones of the music can be thought as the elements of earth in the work. Following from this, world can be sketched as the overall meaning

rising upon the conglomeration of earthly elements and hence corresponds to “the being of existing reality in the work of art.”<sup>152</sup>

As it was outlined in the previous chapter, in “The Origin of the Work of Art” there are two basic assertions regarding the explanation of the work of art in terms of earth and world. The work (i) sets up a world, and (ii) sets forth the earth. The clearing brought about by the work of art as unconcealment is based on the strife between earth and world. Accordingly, setting up a world and setting forth the earth are two essential features of the work which emerge interdependently. In Heidegger’s words, “the relation between world and earth never atrophies into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one another.”<sup>153</sup>

The earth is set forth as a world is opened up, and similarly, “in setting up a world, the work sets forth the earth.”<sup>154</sup> While earth implies the self-secluding element in the work as an indicator of the there-ness of things, world denotes the openness the work provides. The happening of truth, in this context emerges as a never-ending strife between self-concealment of the earth and unconcealment as the revelation of the essentially self-concealing earth; where the latter amounts to the setting up a world as openness. Even though this might be a valid summary of Heidegger’s consideration of the artwork in terms of earth and world; such a brief explanation apparently can not give away the meaning and the status of the two terms. So in what follows, the meaning of these concepts will be delineated with their essential features. However, it should be kept in mind that a proper understanding of each term requires considering it in relation to the other.

The concept of the world, as Gadamer notes, had been one of Heidegger’s main concepts since his early writings “as the referential totality of *Dasein*’s projection, “world” constituted the horizon that was preliminary to all projections of *Dasein*’s

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<sup>152</sup> Robert B. Stulberg. "Heidegger and the Origin of the Work of Art: An Explication." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32 (Winter, 1973), p.261.

<sup>153</sup> OWA, p.26..

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, p.24.

concern.”<sup>155</sup> The concept of earth, however, is introduced later on within the context of his discussions on the essence of art. It might be claimed that the appearance of earth in Heidegger’s lexicon corresponds to the turn taken by his thought with the advent of his interest in the artwork and its nature. Thus, this “mythical and gnostic”<sup>156</sup> concept has a fundamental role in explication of Heidegger’s approach to the work of art and deserves special consideration.

Earth, before anything, is characterized with its “self-secluding” aspect. Setting forth the earth, the artwork “brings it into open as the self-secluding”<sup>157</sup> It is the basic impenetrable element we are confronted in the experience of art. In order to understand this mythical term on more palpable grounds, it might be helpful to think of the specific elements in the works of art cited above. Assuming that earth implies the “sensuous surface” and world to the “imaginative depth”<sup>158</sup> in the artwork, one can envision a painting, a sculpture or a piece of music in these terms. The effect produced by a painting raises over certain tones of color or strokes of brush which is of no meaning alone. Similarly what is manifested with a sculpture, including any kind of form or expression, is built upon nothing but the brute physicality of the stone. The structures of harmony, rhythm and melody in a musical composition, all emerge from single tunes which would hardly be distinguished from noise in themselves. The following sentences Heidegger writes for the earth gives notice to the incomprehensibility of the concept as such: “It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth shatters every attempt to explain it. *It turns every merely calculational intrusion into an act of destruction.*”<sup>159</sup> Recalling that the inauthentic mode of existence is primarily based on an orientation towards things as representations, it can be asserted that the unrepresentable character of the earth in the work emerges as the basis of artwork’s transformative power mentioned before.

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<sup>155</sup> “Heidegger’s Later Philosophy,” p.217.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> OWA, p.25.

<sup>158</sup> Kaelin, p.268.

<sup>159</sup> OWA, p.25. (Emphasis added)

So the first important aspect of the concept of earth is its self-secluding, impenetrable, unfathomable and unrepresentable character.

The second aspect of earth which is crucial for a proper understanding of the concept is that it differs from 'matter,' although it seems to mean it. The essential difference lies in the way earth is used and the employment of matter in making equipment. The equipment is marked with its readiness for use which "means that it [matter] is released beyond itself to disappear into usefulness."<sup>160</sup> "In the manufacture of equipment," Heidegger explains, "the stone is used and used up. It disappears into usefulness... On the other hand, the temple work, in setting up a world, does not let the material disappear; rather, it allows it to come forth the very first time."<sup>161</sup> In the same manner, "the sculptor (or the poet) does not use up the stone (or words) like the mason (or the ordinary speaker) does." They are used in the work of art "in such a way that only now does the word become and remain truly a word."<sup>162</sup> Therefore earth is distinguished from 'matter' (or material) in that it is not used up and exhausted in equipmentality. On the contrary, due to one of the essential features of the artwork the earth is brought forth in its concealedness. So the concept of earth indicates rather "the more profound origin of what 'metaphysics knows as the sensible.'"<sup>163</sup> The profoundness comes from its impenetrable, unfathomable and unexplainable nature by means of which it constitutes the inexhaustible element in the artwork. Accordingly the earthiness in the work of art is one of the underlying characteristics that carry it beyond a readiness-to-use and has a decisive role in yielding its extraordinariness.

The second fundamental concept in the consideration of the essence of the artwork is world. Like the earth, what world denotes also diverges from what we ordinary mean with the term. The ordinary use of the world suggests the totality of things one encounters as they are. The concept somehow retains its primary use in early

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p.39.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, p.24.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid, p.25.

<sup>163</sup> Cited in Mark sinclair. *Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art: Poiesis in Being*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.142.

Heidegger as it indicates what is available within the horizon of *Dasein*'s concern. Yet, in accordance with the shift of focus in the meaning of *Dasein* which is rendered in the later period rather as the open domain of possibilities, the concept of world also gains a specific meaning in "The Origin of the Work of Art." In this context, the concept denotes "not a mere collection of things that are present at hand"<sup>164</sup> and "not a totality of given entities but an openness."<sup>165</sup> In "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger defines world in more general terms:

For us "world" does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of being. (...)  
"World" is the clearing of being into which the human being stands out on the basis of his thrown essence. "Being-in-the-world" designates the essence of ek-sistence with regard to the clear dimension out of which the "ek-" of ek-sistence essentially unfolds.<sup>166</sup>

The openness provided with the setting up of a world in the artwork, however, is possible only when the concealing element of earth is set forth with the same work. Even though earth and world seem respectively as the concealment and unconcealment of the essence of being, this is, in fact, a misinterpretation of what Heidegger says. The endless struggle between earth and world is to be grasped on the assertion that the true nature of each is disclosed only via presence of the other. What is disclosed in the openness of the world is the concealing aspect of the earth. What takes place as unconcealment is the appearance and disappearance of the self-secluding essence in the course of this struggle. If they still look like opposite poles in the process of working of the artwork, another aspect of the world might prove the contrary. If world were indeed the counter-part of earth, one could properly expect it to have something to do with what is already familiar. However world, just like the earth, does not bear the feature of familiarity one might have expected. Interestingly, world is also characterized in terms of unfamiliarity. "World is the ever unfamiliar [*Unheimliche*]"<sup>167</sup> as man "does not live immediately in the drift

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<sup>164</sup> OWA, p.23.

<sup>165</sup> R. Raj singh. "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 48 (Summer, 1990), p.217. For a detailed discussion on the various uses of the 'world' in Heidegger see. Bartky, pp.213-218.

<sup>166</sup> "Letter on Humanism," p.266.

<sup>167</sup> Cited in Taminioux, p.401.



and wind of the whole draft.”<sup>168</sup> The reason behind this unfamiliarity can be seen when the dominance of the inauthentic mode of existence is considered – within the inauthentic everydayness, living in the openness of the world is at least as unlikely as living in the face of the impenetrable earth. The continuous strife between such extreme manifestations of entities as the bearer of unconcealment, then, serves as the grounds for an understanding of the unfamiliarity (or extra-ordinariness) of the work of art.

### 3.2.2 World-Formation through Artwork

Now for a consideration of the main concern of the present discussion on the concepts of earth and world in the artwork, that is the temporal character of the work in these terms, the happening of world-formation comes up as the specific domain of interrogation. In order to elucidate the significance of world-formation in this context (and since setting up a world necessitates the setting forth of the earth) it would be proper to start with what these terms indicate on a broader level. What is in question in earthiness and world-formation of the work of art brings about, in fact, an impact on our modes of existence similar to the moment of vision. To be more explicit, the experience of art defined in terms of the encounter with the earth and the world rising above it emerges as another formulation of the way the connection between authentic and inauthentic is indicated. Earth as the impenetrable and unexplainable, helps the worlding of the world as openness come forth and is elucidated within such openness as the concealedness. The openness of the world, as it opens the path for seeing the hidden possibilities and potentialities of Da-sein, gives occasion for going beyond the inauthentic mode of existence within which entities are confined to their presence-at-hand. Thus, the artwork reveals “not only [the] peasant’s world and earth” as in the case of Van Gogh painting, but “it also reveals the human being’s world and the human being’s earth, i.e., the world in general (*überhaupt*) and the earth in general.”<sup>169</sup> Or as Heidegger puts it, “the *question concerning world-formation* is (...) the *question concerning ourselves*,

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<sup>168</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.108.

<sup>169</sup> Singh, p.216.

indeed the question concerning how things stand with us. But this is what we have already asked and properly asked in our earlier attempt to *awaken a fundamental attunement to our Dasein*.<sup>170</sup>

‘Awakening a fundamental attunement;’ this is precisely where the relevance of world-formation for the temporality of artwork makes its appearance. The creative openness of world emanating from the experience of art indicates an instance through which the usual manner things stand with us is transcended. Such an act of transcending can hardly be thought apart from a transformation of ‘time,’ since time – in the ordinary use of the term – denotes before anything an impalpable structure that concurrently shows and determines the way things stand with us. The world that is “neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, (...) temporalizes itself in temporality.”<sup>171</sup> That such temporalization is not *in time* but in temporality means, it does not come up merely as an occurrence in time as we know, but somehow grants ‘a time of its own’. It is on these grounds that we can credit the openness of world with foundation of a new truth of Being.<sup>172</sup> The meaning of openness that comes forth with the formation of the world and what such openness hints at are explained quite clearly in the passage below:

When we say that the world is amongst other things the *accessibility* of beings, then we already thereby contradict the so-called *natural concept of world*. By ‘world’ we usually mean the *entirety of beings*, everything that there is, taken together. (...) Yet clearly the concept of world which we have indicated does not mean this, but means the accessibility of beings as such rather than beings in themselves. According to this, beings do indeed belong to world, but only insofar as they are *accessible*, (...) This is true only if beings as such can *become manifest*. This implies that beings are not manifest beforehand, are *closed off* and *concealed*.<sup>173</sup>

We have already mentioned how the inauthentic construal of time serves as one of the most comprehensive grounds for the oblivion of being. Determining both the limits of our *Dasein* and the way things stand with us, time as such blocks our way

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<sup>170</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, pp.281-282.

<sup>171</sup> *Being and Time*, pp.416-417, H365.

<sup>172</sup> McNeill, p.122.

<sup>173</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, pp.279-280.

to beings as it bears and re-iterates their concealedness. So in disclosing the essential accessibility of beings, world-formation induces a transcendence of the vulgar notion of time and comes forth as original temporality rather than as an event in time. This kind of an effect stems from “something that lies beyond our grasp” in the artwork “and precisely its ungraspability is what [makes] an overwhelming impression on us.”<sup>174</sup> Accordingly “in encountering a work of art we have the experience of something emerging – and this one can call truth!” The ungraspability upon which truth as emergence in the artwork is experienced consists of the ungraspable essence of both earth and world. While the ungraspability of the earth is caused by its self-secluding nature; the so-called ungraspability of world refers to a forgotten accessibility of things. “The higher its consciousness,” as Heidegger says, “the more the conscious being is excluded from the world. This is why man (...) is ‘before the world.’ He is not admitted into the Open.”<sup>175</sup> As self-assertive man objectifies the world, he “completely blocks his path, already obstructed, into the Open.”<sup>176</sup> Considering the fact that the commonsensical concept of time essentially coexists with the process of such objectification of the world, ‘time’ comes forth as a significant constituent of the blocking in question. That the ‘weight’ of time is felt more intensely for man throughout the process of its historical ‘development’ gives notice to the correspondence between the objectification of the world and the increasing dominance of concept of time.<sup>177</sup> Ungraspability of the world and man’s exclusion from openness in the inauthentic mode of existence is challenged by the world-forming character of the experience of art. Correspondingly, the accompanying inauthentic apprehension of time is transformed as the artwork sets up a world upon the exposition of the earth.

To sum up what has been said regarding the status of earth and world in the experience of art and the temporal repercussions thereof, we can say that the

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<sup>174</sup> “Artworks in Word and Image,” p.67.

<sup>175</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.108.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid*, p.116.

<sup>177</sup> For the developing sense of time in history see Elias, especially “Introduction.”

exposition of the earth and the formation of the world evoke an impulse for transforming man's attunement to things and to his own existence. As Jaeger puts it,

To understand Heidegger's conception of the world one must keep in mind the difference between existing reality, *das Seiende*, and the being of existing reality, *das Sein des Seienden*. Man exists in such a way that he not only transcends himself toward the realization of his possibilities, but he also transcends things that exist around him toward their being so that they reveal to him what they are. Both forms of transcendence are interdependent, one is not without the other, they are the same.<sup>178</sup>

As for the distinguished roles of the earth and the world in the experience of art, one can properly relate them with the following basic features of the artwork in order to explicate the issue. Artwork's setting forth the earth as the impenetrable element of beings points to the *thereness* of things which we, the preservers of art, hardly recognize in our everyday concerns. Such setting forth of earth constitutes the initial instance of the element of surprise in the work. On the same grounds, the disclosure of earth as concealedness also amounts to a suspension of inauthentic time. Because inauthentic time is based on man's reliance on the givenness of entities and the presupposition that he holds sway over beings as far as they are objects for the self-assertive man. Yet the encounter with the earth modifies this common structure of understanding. Setting up the world, on the other hand, constitutes the indeterminable nature of the experience of art since it provides us with a creative openness hinting at the possibilities of our *Dasein*. The outstanding quality of world-formation regarding the temporality is, therefore, the indication of futurity rather than the presence. Due to the original unfolding taking place in the openness of the world, we are introduced the temporality of the artwork as an original unfolding.

In short, the original temporality of the artwork can be formulated regarding at least two moments as explicated in this section, namely, in terms of its authenticity and openness. According to these two moments, artwork (i) transforms-deconstructs the vulgar notion of time as it lays open the grounds on which the understanding of such a time is constructed; and (ii) revealing the earth and proposing a world as openness, it comes up with a time of its own. The productive flux the artwork bears, thus, creates a time as unfolding which corresponds to authentic rendition of vulgar

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<sup>178</sup> Hans Jaeger. "Heidegger and the Work of Art." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* sep. 17 (1958), pp.62-63.

time.<sup>179</sup> Yet the two characteristics are not processes which follow each other or appear interdependently in the temporality of the work of art but two chief variants of the specific temporal character of the work of art.

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<sup>179</sup> It should be noted that the two main points suggested as the basic tenets of Heidegger's criticism of the vulgar notion of time in the previous chapter and the original temporal effect of the artwork coincide to a great extent. The temporality suggested by the work of art, in this respect, provides an overcoming of what Heidegger criticizes in inauthentic temporality. (cf. 2.2.3)

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION: TEMPORALITY OF THE ARTWORK

In the previous chapters what Heidegger's thinking tells us regarding art and the concept of time and the possible connections between the two have been investigated respectively. The previous chapter, where the work of art and its special relation with time has been discussed in terms of two specific conceptual moments Heidegger employed, has hopefully laid open the overall concern of this discussion and the proposed points of relevance therein. In the light of what has been considered so far, this chapter aims at setting forth some specific conclusions on the issue and how these consequences are manifested in different forms of art.

Heidegger's thinking on the work of art and its peculiar nature, as it has been emphasized on several occasions throughout this thesis, is integral to his fundamental question of Being. That the working of art shows itself as an event as such, besides serving the manifestation of truth, "offers us an opportunity to pursue one step further Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics and its culmination in the subjectivism of the modern age."<sup>180</sup> The central motive of the current discussion, accordingly, can also be regarded as an attempt to take this step in the direction of another central concept in Heidegger's philosophy, that is, the concept of time. As we gave heed to the nature of the artwork, we have seen how it could lead to a transcendence of our ordinary concept of time. Specifically, upon our questioning of the work of art in terms of its originary and world-forming essence, we have had chance to assert two chief points concerning its special relation with 'time.' The

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<sup>180</sup> "Heidegger's Later Philosophy," p.224.

‘great’ work of art, as a consequence of its overall effect, transforms/deconstructs the inauthentic time and besides, comes up with a time of its own which can properly be understood in terms of the concept of authentic temporality.

If “the question concerning the essence of time is the origin of all the questions of metaphysics and of their potential unfolding,”<sup>181</sup> then a proper understanding of the relation of artwork to time can not be thought apart from its ontological repercussions. Such relevance, indeed, is the leitmotiv of Heidegger’s interest in the nature of the artwork. It is the same relevance which makes thinking on art together with time significant. “[T]he thrownness of Da-sein,” as Heidegger notes, is the *raison d’etre* of our commonsensical construal of time; and what is more important, “what is existentially and ontologically decisive about reckoning with time must not be seen in the quantification of time, but must be more primordially conceived in terms of the temporality of Da-sein reckoning with time.”<sup>182</sup> In other words, that *Dasein* reckons with time *in this specific way* is the first thing to be noted in order to catch the sight of any potential unfolding in what is questioned. Since “concealment,” the oblivion of Being, “reigns in the midst of beings in a twofold manner” as “refusal” and “obstructing,”<sup>183</sup> the happening of truth with the work of art as unconcealment needs to both reveal and overcome the concealment. The concealment in issue is twofold today since “not only do we not have an answer to the question of the meaning of Being, [but also] we do not even find it perplexing. We have to learn to ask the question before we can begin to answer it.”<sup>184</sup> In this regard, when we come to artwork’s temporality and its temporal effect we can assert that transformation/deconstruction of ordinary time and the indication of authentic temporality therein amount to this double overcoming in terms of time.

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<sup>181</sup> *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p.171.

<sup>182</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, p.378.

<sup>183</sup> OWA, pp.30-31.

<sup>184</sup> Wood, p.151.

#### 4.1 An Overall Assessment

Throughout the current discussion, art has been considered mostly in terms of the potentialities it embodies against the inauthentic mode of existence and the concept of time belonging to *Dasein*'s inauthentic orientation towards world. Yet, it is worth mentioning that the significance of questioning the nature of art both in Heidegger and in this thesis lies in the historical context within which the questioning takes place. Because the concealment mentioned above, or at least the manner in which it is assumed to show itself, evidently bears the mark of the modern paradigm according to which 'object' and 'subject' are taken as the grounds for the explanation of beings. Such an understanding leads to the limited representational interpretation of them. The state of being forced into the well-defined borders of this understanding amounts to a concept that Heidegger refers in characterizing the essence of modern technology, namely, *Gestell* (Enframing). The term denotes the "posing-positing-establishing of the calculative thinking" which does not let things "appear or unfold in all disclosing possibilities."<sup>185</sup> The clock-time which is one of the most influential manifestations of *Dasein*'s reckoning with time and therefore with beings as "calculative thinking," in this regard, plays a crucial role in blocking the path for unfolding essence of beings. At this point the work of art comes to the scene of thinking with its originary character. Hence, not only is the questioning of the essence of art free from a historical time, on the contrary, it is the very timely preconditions of modern age that makes such questioning meaningful. What is said concerning the nature of the artwork and its temporal implications, therefore, find their true import within the world we live in today.

In this specific historical context, the artwork's existence is bound as well by the practice of enframing. So it would not be appropriate to think the work as an entity standing in itself free from the risk of falling into the oblivion that Being goes through. Once the work of art is confined in the scope of aesthetics, the realization of its originary nature is hindered and it becomes an object among others. Once

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<sup>185</sup> Cited in Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu. "Aesthetics and Ethics: A Tenuous Relation Revisited." In *Aesthetics and Art in the 20th Century*, June 2001, Ankara. Ed. İpek Türeli. Ankara: SANART, 2002, p.14.



construed within this limited scope, artworks are also ‘things’ *in* ‘time.’ Taken this way, what one may think of the relation between the artwork and time can hardly go beyond the *cliché* that *great art stands the test of time*. Yet speaking only of their immortality as an enigmatic trait of them leads to a mere romantic idealization of art and misses the significance of such permanence. This is the state in which “the thrust into the extra-ordinary [*Ur-geheure*] is captured by familiarity” and “the art business” takes over the works.<sup>186</sup> “[I]t is [to be] decided whether art can be an origin – and therefore must be a leap ahead – or whether it should remain a mere postscript, in which case it can be carried along as a cultural phenomenon that has become routine.”<sup>187</sup> As for artwork’s relation to time, such decision amounts to taking the issue further than the assertion of permanence and asking *what it is that makes the great work of art capable of traversing times*. This is one of the questions to be asked in order to let the work of out of enframing and let its essence unfold. Furthermore, asking the question leads us to the fundamental temporal assets of the artwork as it has been attempted here. The answer in this specific context of discussion shows itself as follows: It is the originary essence of the work that distinguishes it from other things of presence-at-hand that enables the artwork to transverse the span of time. Thus “the creative preservation of the truth in the work” is realized by its unique temporality which transcends the inauthentic construal of time. Consequently, even when it is forced to partake within the frame of the “world picture”<sup>188</sup> and falls into the oblivion, “it is still a preserving.”<sup>189</sup> It is a preserving because the great artwork, due to its characteristics explained in the previous chapter, in each case bears the possibility of yielding a moment of vision and opening up a world.

Accordingly the following summing assertions may be made from what has been explicated hitherto. The originary power of artwork as the happening of truth is best understood in its relation to the concept of authenticity (or *Ereignis*) and the creative

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<sup>186</sup> OWA, p.42.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, p.49.

<sup>188</sup> For the meaning and philosophical implications of the phrase, see “The Age of the World Picture.”

<sup>189</sup> OWA, p.41.

openness it suggests. Thanks to these characteristics of the work of art, it brings about a modification of the inauthentic time and in a manner gains a temporality of its own. Now let us briefly rephrase what ‘art as authenticity/*Ereignis*’ and ‘art as openness’ means.

#### 4.1.1 Art as *Ereignis* and Openness

As we have mentioned before, the concept of *Ereignis* holds a crucial place in Heidegger’s thinking, especially in the so-called ‘later period.’ As he drops the frequently employed term of ‘authenticity’ in “Being and Time”, he focuses on *Ereignis*<sup>190</sup> which is rendered in English as ‘event of appropriation’ or ‘enownment.’ Since art’s relation to authenticity and especially to authentic temporality has already been discussed in length in terms of moment of vision, in restating the issue we would better focus on the term *Ereignis*. The working of the artwork can rightly be considered as an instance of ‘event of appropriation’ due to its several aspects. In the work of art an *event* is at work since there we can find a happening of truth. It is on the other hand an event *of appropriation* because the happening of truth therein designates the truth of beings. Heidegger’s assertion that the artwork is a manifestation of ‘what beings as a whole are’ points also to this attribute of the work.<sup>191</sup> Another thing which gives notice to the proximity between the nature of the artwork and the ‘event of appropriation’ shows itself through the earth-world structure of the work. The word ‘event’ is derived from ‘to come out’ (*ex-venire*) and truth as event indicates “something that comes out, comes to the fore, rises from the Hidden into the Unhidden”<sup>192</sup> In other words, truth as unconcealment showing itself through the endless strife between the earth and world in the artwork denotes an e-vent as such. Furthermore, in *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enownment)* Heidegger characterizes *Ereignis* (enowning) specifically as “taking [time and

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<sup>190</sup> Wood, p.167.

<sup>191</sup> Nietzsche, pp.83-84.

<sup>192</sup> Jaeger, p.61.

event: 1573, from M.Fr. event, from Latin *eventus* "occurrence, issue," from *evenire* "to come out, happen, result," from *ex-* "out" + *venire* "to come". - Online Etymology Dictionary.

space] back into the *strife*” between earth and world.<sup>193</sup> The striving between the self-secluding earth and the openness of world, as have already been pointed out, constitute the source for artwork’s temporal uniqueness as it provides the basis for the moment of vision and openness created with the work. So thinking the nature of art in its *Ereignis*-like character provides us another way to formulate its temporal characteristics. It can also be offered that in seeing art as *Ereignis*, the two formerly discussed moments of artwork’s temporal characteristic merges into each other. As the artwork brings about an openness and comes forth itself as an event, it can withstand the process of enframing which tends to enclose it in the inauthentic network of relations of everyday and cover the preservation of truth with the work.

Regarding the openness the artwork provides, referring to the openness of *Dasein* as defined by Heidegger may help a succinct reconsideration of the issue. Let us recall that *Dasein*’s existence for Heidegger is authentic as long as it is not bound simply with the present but open to the possibilities and potentialities it holds. In this manner, he defines *Dasein*’s existence primarily in terms of a ‘being-possible (*Möglichsein*)’ and a ‘potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*).’<sup>194</sup> The work of art – similar to *Dasein* – *is* (or becomes) what it is in its becoming. Putting it more clearly, the essence of the artwork consists of the event of constant originating which leads to a creative unfolding. Thus, the artwork defers any attempt of conceiving it in predefined terms; that is why, like *Dasein*’s existence, it “does not allow itself to be grasped by process of measurement.”<sup>195</sup> A not-yet inheres in every point of its working. This openness which can not be utterly verbalized constitutes the “secret sameness in the creation and in the perception of an artwork.”<sup>196</sup> Lyotard puts the encounter with this ungraspability in the following way, where he defines it ironically as a ‘misery’:

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<sup>193</sup> *Contributions to Philosophy*, p.184.

<sup>194</sup> “...*Dasein* is always and already ahead of itself because its Existenz is what he terms a ‘being-possible (*Möglichsein*)’ or a ‘potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*).” Cited in Sinclair, p.78.

<sup>195</sup> “Artworks in Word and Image,” p.74.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid*, p.75.

This is the misery that the painter faces with a plastic surface, of the musician with the acoustic surface, the misery that the thinker faces with a desert of thought, and so on. Not only faces with the empty canvas or the empty page, at the ‘beginning’ of the work, but every time something has to be waited for, and thus forms a question at every point of questioning [*point d’integration*], at every ‘and what now?’<sup>197</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Resetting of Relations: The Untimeliness of Art

This ‘misery’ the artist and the preserver encounter in the experience of art is, in fact, one of the most explicit manifestations of artwork’s special relation to time. Once the overall originary character of the work is considered, it can be asserted that the true experience of art bears another modality of relation with beings than the usual, and henceforth is a modification/deconstruction of inauthentic time. Revealing to us “what things *already* are, but which we have been too blind to see,” the work of art, in this sense, “transforms our ontological perceptiveness.”<sup>198</sup> Heidegger refers directly to such transformation as that of “*all familiar relations* to world and to earth” which restrains “all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking.”<sup>199</sup> In order to justify the conclusion that the transformation in question is so encompassing that it amounts to a change in “*ontological* perceptiveness” and accordingly in temporality, in what we define as ‘usual’ there should be certain interpretations of being and time which can not be surpassed within that ordinariness. In the final section of *An Introduction to Metaphysics* entitled “The Limitation of Being” what Heidegger depicts as the distinctions that determine Being in Western philosophy sums these interpretations in a lucid manner.

Over against becoming being is permanence.  
Over against appearance being is the enduring prototype, the always identical.  
Over against thought it is the underlying, the already-there.  
Over against the ought it is the datum, the ought that is not yet realized or already realized.  
Permanent, always identical, already-there, given – all mean fundamentally the same: enduring presence, *on* as *ousia*.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Jean-Francois Lyotard. *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. New York: Stanford University Press, 1992, pp.91-92.

<sup>198</sup> Zimmerman, p.240.

<sup>199</sup> OWA, p.40. (Emphasis added)

<sup>200</sup> *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p.202.

Thus the artwork's transformation of usual relations can be grasped to a great extent by a reversal of these determinations. The *Ereignis*-like character of art indicates a 'becoming' and an event of 'appearance' as unconcealment over against permanence and endurance. The state of questioning the working of art leads to, that is, the openness produced by the artwork promotes 'thinking' and emphasized 'futurity' over against 'the already-there' and 'givenness.' The essence of Being, which is "limited *over against* becoming, appearance, thought, the ought,"<sup>201</sup> is therefore let unfold in the experience of art. Regarding the temporal repercussions of this ontological modification, which we have explicated so far in its several aspects, what Heidegger says in the following pages of the same text is worth citing in length since it sheds light on the essential connection between. Referring to why he has chosen 'time' along with 'Being' in his *magnum opus* as one of the central concepts for questioning, he says:

Because in the beginning of Western philosophy the *perspective governing* the disclosure of being was time, though this perspective as such remained hidden – and inevitably so. When ultimately *ousia*, meaning permanent presence, became the basic concept of time, what was the unconcealed foundation of permanence and presence if not time? But *this* "time" remained essentially undeveloped and (on the basis and in the perspective of "physics") could not be developed. For as soon as the reflection on the essence of time began, at the *end* of Greek philosophy with Aristotle, time itself had to be taken as something somehow present, *ousia tis*. Consequently time was considered from the standpoint of "now" [...] Being in the sense of already-thereness (presence) became the perspective for the determination of time. But time was not the perspective specially chosen for the interpretation of being.<sup>202</sup>

Bearing in mind the essential relation between the usual interpretation of being and that of time, both of which inhere in our relations with things, it is easier to demonstrate the temporal effect of the artwork in terms of the transformation it produces in one's "ontological perceptiveness."<sup>203</sup> Thus in the experience of art, even though it is hardly recognizable, temporality is one of the main moments that constitute a perspective for re-interpretation of being and this amounts necessarily to re-interpretation of the vulgar conception of time. In this respect, one of the central suggestions of our discussion can be summed up as follows: the artwork indicates a

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid, p.203.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid, pp.205-206.

<sup>203</sup> Zimmerman, p.240.

resetting of relations. It is a resetting both in the sense of a clearing among beings which brings one back to the 'original' essence of beings, and also a re-setting since with the openness formed with the work of art, it sets up a world and a time of its own. It is precisely in this way that it serves a 'moment of vision.'

The feature of setting the relations anew in this context may also help clarify what has been cited from Gadamer in the introduction of the thesis. As we might recall, Gadamer asserted that "the work of art always has its own present"<sup>204</sup> and that "the work of art is the absolute present for each particular present."<sup>205</sup> He also claims that artworks are "marked by an immediate presentness in time and at the same time by a rising above time."<sup>206</sup> The phrases "its own present," "the absolute present" and "immediate presentness" correspond to what has been designated here as the second temporal characteristic moment of the artwork, that is, artwork's having a time of its own. This second moment of the work of art has been considered mainly in terms of world-formation. In accordance with the creative openness proposed with the world-formation, the artwork can withstand being posited as a readiness- or presence-at-hand. Due to this refusal it secures a special temporal status out of the network of functional and teleological relations which carries it beyond inauthentic time. The second moment of artwork's temporal characteristics, which seems to be rather more abstract in comparison to the first, thus, arises from the realization of a constant origination in its working. The features of "immediate presentness" and having a time of its own can be understood in terms of this constant origination. What Heidegger attributes the act of "essential philosophical questioning" provides a proper pattern for grasping how the work of art attains a time of its own due to a similar creative openness.

All essential philosophical questioning is necessarily untimely because [among other things] it is one of those few things that *can never find an immediate echo in the present*. When such an echo seems to occur, when a philosophy becomes fashionable, either it is no real philosophy or it has been misinterpreted and misused for ephemeral and extraneous purposes.

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<sup>204</sup> „Aesthetics and Hermeneutics,” p.95.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid, p.104.

<sup>206</sup> “Artworks in Word and Image,” p.58.

Accordingly, philosophy cannot be directly learned like manual or technical skills; it *cannot be directly applied or judged by its usefulness* in the manner of economic or other professional knowledge.

But what is useless can still be a force, perhaps the only real force. (...) *What is untimely will have its own times.*<sup>207</sup>

It is a similar untimeliness that the great artwork has if time is thought in its vulgar conception and with its aforementioned delimiting connotations. Furthermore such untimeliness in the experience of art emerges as a force due to deconstruction of inauthentic time and suggestion of an original time therein.

## **4.2 The Work of Art in Three Generic Forms**

How, then, do these essential features of openness, resetting of relations and original temporality of the work of art show themselves in different forms of art? What do the setting forth of earth and setting up world as openness correspond to in singular artworks; and accordingly how would the peculiar temporal characteristics of the work emerge? In this section of the conclusion, considering some of these specific domains of artistic manifestations could be useful for the articulation of the working of art in terms of the current discussion. So what is proposed below is a brief review of how the underlying dynamics of artwork's peculiar temporality are manifest in different forms of art – especially in three generic forms of poetry, painting and music – which will hopefully help envisage what has been discussed hitherto.

### **4.2.1 Poetry**

Starting with poetry, which Heidegger defines as what all art in essence is, seems reasonable since it may also serve as a guide to think the other forms of art especially in analogy with its status *vis-à-vis* language. If “language is the house of being,” the way man is in relation with language is a matter of how he dwells in this house and therefore of which modes of existence he is in. In this respect, literature in the broader sense could also be taken as a point of departure for our review. However in the artwork in prose it is rather difficult to distinguish the way language

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<sup>207</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.8.

is at work as an originary whole due to its “closer correspondence to the patterns of everyday language.”<sup>208</sup> Of course the creative ‘use’ of language in prosaic works too provides a passageway beyond the everyday conception of time with the “organized and organizing medium of rhythmic ebb and flow of expectant impulse, forward and retracted movement”<sup>209</sup> it provides. Still, the effect of poetry or poetic discourse in a wider sense is more readily observable as it is “the elementary emergence into words (*Zum-Wort-Kommen*),” and “the becoming-uncovered of *Existenz* as being-in-the-world.”<sup>210</sup> In poetic discourse, man encounters with a specific way of language’s setting-into-work where the ordinary use of words and the dominance of their reliability in everyday language are transcended. That is why Heidegger starts also with the explication of the relation between poetry and language in his assertion that poetry is the essence of all art. The claim that such a relation is at work in all arts, however, necessitates a proper understanding of both poetry and language. With this purpose, he distinguishes between poetry (*Dichtung*) and poesy (*Poesie*).<sup>211</sup> While the former refers to “the revealing capacity of language, the primordial speech which discloses that something *is*,”<sup>212</sup> the latter is used for the specific non-prosaic works of art. Accordingly, ‘language’ is to be understood in the first place as what “brings beings to word and appearance”<sup>213</sup> rather than as a means for communication. Once grasped in their proper sense, it becomes evident that the relation between is not that poetry “takes language as a material at its disposal” but rather “*poetry itself makes language possible*.”<sup>214</sup> If language is taken in the wider sense as the beings’ coming to word/appearance, and poetry as setting words/appearances into work in such a way that their latent possibilities are awoken, the significance of ‘making possible’ becomes evident. Words/appearances which

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<sup>208</sup> Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary – “Prose”

<sup>209</sup> Cited in Kaelin, p.118.

<sup>210</sup> Cited in Sinclair, p.180.

<sup>211</sup> OWA, p.45.

<sup>212</sup> Bartky, p.221.

<sup>213</sup> OWA, p.46.

<sup>214</sup> Martin Heidegger. *Elucidations of Holderlin’s Poetry*. Trans. Keith Hoeller. New York: Humanity Books, 2000, p.60. (emphasis added)



are *used up* in the inauthentic use of language find the chance of emerging with their true potential in poetic discourse. In poetry, the words we ‘use’ unthinkingly in ordinary speech appear as if we see them for the first time. These ‘pieces of language’ whose meaning and function we supposedly know very well in ordinary speech now demand a resetting of their referential and associative relations. In this way, “in the familiar appearances, the poet calls the alien”<sup>215</sup> and “speaks as though the essent were being expressed and invoked for the first time.”<sup>216</sup> Thus, what seems familiar though alien is brought forth in the world set up by poetry. As another yet more important outcome of this bringing forth, in poetry the preserver of the work encounters what is ‘alien’ in his existence. That is, “in ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*) can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence.”<sup>217</sup> Rendering this event of disclosure in terms of its temporal effect, it could be viable to assert the following: the emergence of existential possibilities as an “aim in itself” constitutes the moment of vision in poetry. Because with the introduction of what is unfamiliar the earthy element of the work is brought forth and thus the encounter with the work is carried beyond inauthentic existence which works mainly with the already known and pre-determined. Upon the emergence of what is alien as the element of earth, beings are let unfold through the openness the words/appearance are granted. Hence, the disclosure of existential possibilities with/in the ‘house of being’ amounts to the world-formation in poetry which begets an original existential modality and temporality.

#### **4.2.2 Painting**

In the case of artworks in image, we can speak of a similar poetic manifestation now in terms of being’s coming to appearance rather than words. With the purpose of indicating how the dynamics of originating are at work in pictorial disclosing, we shall be focusing our attention on the art of painting that provides multifarious

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<sup>215</sup> *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.225.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid*, p.26.

<sup>217</sup> *Being and Time*, p.205, H162.

renditions of the basic elements of light and color in almost endless combinations. For the temporal aspect of the painting, one can advert to various dimensions between the painting and time which can be summed as

the time it takes the painter to paint the picture (time of 'production'), the time required to look at and understand the work (time of 'consumption'), the time to which the work refers (a moment, a scene, a situation, a sequence of events: the time of the diegetic referent, of the story told by the picture) and finally, perhaps, the time the painting is.<sup>218</sup>

In line with the main concern of this thesis, the last of these four possible dimensions of relation turn out to be the most significant one for our discussion. What is meant with "the time the painting is," on the other hand, can not be easily separated from the 'time's of production and consumption if we think 'time' in these phrases in terms of the effect of original unfolding the artist and the preserver encounter, rather than as time measured.<sup>219</sup> In this regard, we should first return to the transformative power of the work and how it is realized in the art of painting. For realization of the effect we can again quest for the occurrence of a bringing forth of the unfamiliar in the seemingly familiar. The bringing forth in painting is in the first place that of basic visual elements of light, color and texture and the way they are combined and composed. The successful painting, whether figurative or not, is thus based on creative setting-into-work of these elements and is characterized with "presenting on the sensuous surface of [the] work the same kind of tension produced in the organism's phenomenal field when it first becomes aware that an object exists."<sup>220</sup> The effect of first encounter, on the other hand, is to be thought not only on the level of 'objects' as such, but also for the elemental pictorial constituents of the work. That is to say, the disclosure of what is presented in the painting is built on the disclosure of the aforesaid basic elements that constitute the earthy aspect of the painting. The tension in question is, accordingly, between those very elements which

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<sup>218</sup> Lyotard, p.78.

<sup>219</sup> Interestingly, in his discussion of earth and world by the example the Van Gogh painting, Heidegger focuses solely on the earth and world the painting 'refers to,' that is, the earth on which the peasant woman is on and the world she is in. This limited approach accordingly implies a basis for only the third relation between the work and time. For this reason, I think, his way of putting earth and world in this specific discussion remains vague and incomplete for it does not mention what modern aesthetics calls the 'formal' aspects of the picture.

<sup>220</sup> Kaelin, p.165.

lack a meaning alone but built up the meaningful whole of pictorial composition through their interrelation as that of striving between earth and world.

Considered this way, whether the painting includes a ‘representation’ of something/someone or not loses its significance. Because what is of real import is *how* that thing is presented pictorially rather than *what* it is. In this respect, Paul Cézanne and the movement of impressionism, whose significance for Heidegger is also known, is worth mentioning since their basic artistic motive marks an exemplary reconsideration of pictorial representation. The way the impressionists searched for can be interpreted as an artistic path ‘back to things themselves.’ Renouncing the general attitude of realistic painting that relied on “representation of real objects in perspectival space,” the impressionists worked with “small dots or strokes of primary colors in close juxtaposition, in an attempt to capture the sparkle of the first visual impressions made by light reflected off real objects.”<sup>221</sup> The way the composition raises upon those senseless dots and strokes is notable since it provides a clear articulation of the strife between the elements of earth and world in the picture. In an attempt to explicate how the colors are linked in such a composition so that “they neither exclude each other as incompatible nor merge into a uniform gray,” Raphael suggests that Cézanne’s way of solution was

to intensify their contrasts to the point where they repel each other, and introduce between them such a wealth of mediating differentiations that, through the combination of discontinuity and continuity, a self-contained network is formed, a network in which each spot of color is both sharply distinguished from its neighbor and most closely related to it.<sup>222</sup>

In the passage above one can easily observe a depiction of the earthy elements in their impenetrability and on the other hand how openness is found upon these elements. Gauguin’s description of the process of never-ending interrelation between the pictorial elements in Cézanne’s work is even more explicit in putting the happening of truth as striving in the work.

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<sup>221</sup> Ibid, p.164.

<sup>222</sup> Max Raphael. *The Demands of Art: With an Appendix, Toward an Empirical Theory of Art*. New York: Princeton University Press, 1968, p.15.

The spots of color seem to be in a process of fermentation, each seeking its definitive place in a self-ordering chaos. One is struck above all by the large number of self-contained spots clearly distinguished from one another; for the most part they seem to lack firmly outlined limits, but their inner structure is extraordinarily clear. Other spots are defined less by their inner structure than by their surroundings; some, thick and opaque, have no structure at all and some are structured to a varying extent. Form thus derives *a certain contrast between openness and closeness, precision and vagueness, a play between created and creating*. Every detail is, but the whole surges with life in the manner of a richly orchestrated melody of many voices.<sup>223</sup>

The interrelation between openness and closeness within the painting which starts with groups of colors and strokes extends to what is presented as a whole. Thus, in the visual manifestation of beings too an occurrence of *Ereignis* is at work. In this way, great paintings are capable of disclosing “the sheer *isness* of things” and what is visually ‘familiar’ in inauthenticity is “transformed by a new mode of ontological perception.”<sup>224</sup> In a true encounter with the art of painting, accordingly, there occurs a suspension of everyday apprehension of things and the relational modes they are part of. Consequently the openness of the work shows itself and this amounts to what has been suggested as the originary temporal experience therein.

### 4.2.3 Music

As the third and final generic form of art, let us briefly consider music and its temporality. Music’s relation to time is more easily observable in comparison to poetry and painting since it inherently bears a temporal composition as such. By the same token it provides an adequate form for thinking artwork’s temporal characteristics we have discussed.

When we think on the general definition of music, the constituents which take part in the temporal working of a musical work as its originary aspects show themselves clearly. It is “ordering tones or sounds in succession, in combination, and in temporal relationships to produce a composition having unity and continuity”<sup>225</sup> which yields to at least one of the three basic elements of rhythm, melody, and

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<sup>223</sup> Cited in Raphael, p.18. (emphasis added)

<sup>224</sup> Zimmerman, p.238.

<sup>225</sup> Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary – “music”

harmony. In this ordering of tones and sounds, what is most relevant for the ongoing discussion is the way these basic elements gain their sentient status within the work. The sounds and tones which by no means carry a musicality of their own and which even can be taken as pure noise in themselves, make up ‘music’ with their internal relationships. A rest, for instance becomes significant in the musical context of sounds. Similarly the effect of a soft tone followed by a strong forte gives evidence to the essential relationality between the basic constituents of a piece of music. Thus, the musical significance created in this way makes the temporality of music different from the vulgar time since the musical elements are not things in themselves to be posited in the network of predetermined relations but become what they are only in the event of interrelating with each other. As Langer puts it,

Musical duration is an image of what might be termed “lived” or “experienced” time – the passage of life that we feel as expectations become “now,” and “now” turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions, and emotions; and it has not merely a different measure, but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time.<sup>226</sup>

Then, the experience of musical temporality is distinguished from the inauthentic construal of time primarily by the way it calls the listener for a transcendence of closed now points. What is heard as singular tones or measures in music *are* what they are in the piece only by way of being grasped in their interconnection with the already heard and not-yet heard notes. In this regard, “the musical composition possesses all its parts simultaneously in each moment of its structural process” and “only by refusing to hear the immediate present as present can we achieve the significance of the piece.”<sup>227</sup> By means of such giving a hearing to what we listen, musical experience amounts to not only a singular temporality of the piece but also a temporality of our own. In short, what Kaelin says for music, in fact, seems valid for other forms of art too: “The image provided by music is not *of time* at all; it *is* our own temporality directed outward toward, and controlled by, the moving forms of sound.”<sup>228</sup> Similarly other arts either by the moving forms of words, images or

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<sup>226</sup> Cited in Kaelin, p.109.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, p.214.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p.202.

sounds provide us our own (authentic) temporality with their power to transform and go beyond the inauthentic modes of existence.

### 4.3 Conclusion

In this thesis I have aimed at proposing a reciprocal understanding of the themes of art and time in Martin Heidegger's philosophy. 'Time' holds a central place throughout Heidegger's philosophy. It appears as a key concept in his preeminent works of *The Concept of Time* (1925) and *Being and Time* (1927) and his interest in the concept can be traced back to his earliest writings of 1910's. The contemplation on the nature of art, on the other hand, emerges as profound philosophical concern especially as from the so-called turn his thinking takes in mid-1930's. So much so that, due to his profound interest on the nature of art it became one of the characterizing themes of his later philosophy. These two themes which seemingly belong to quite disparate spheres of thinking indeed had a common point in the manner they have partaken Heidegger's thinking – both are approached in the context of the fundamental question of being. Still, despite their unique status in his course of thinking, in none of his published works Heidegger holds a detailed discussion that focuses on the common grounds of his reflection on time and art even though he refers to their relevance to the question of being in his specific discussion on each.

Thus, I have attempted to consider art and time *vis-à-vis* each other which I believed could yield an original understanding of both. Having these in mind, I have specifically tried to focus on what I have called the special temporal character of the artwork and the underlying essential dynamics therein, for the most part in accordance with the way the two terms take place in Heidegger's thinking.

With this purpose, I have started with giving an outline of Heidegger's overall philosophy and his interpretation of time and art. The second chapter aimed at delineating specific statuses of the two terms within Heidegger's general context of thinking. In the first section of the chapter I held a brief discussion on the so-called early and late periods of his philosophy. Because dividing his philosophy in periods

seemed to be one of the reasons for the seeming irreconcilability of the two terms. So I asserted that, even though the focus of emphasis changes along with his path of thinking, Heidegger's main concern of demonstrating the being of *Dasein* as a domain of potentialities and possibilities over against the 'enframing' attitude of Western metaphysics which he claims to dominate in everyday life in the guise of inauthentic mode of existence persists to a great extent. Then I have tried to recount his conception of time with regard to the ontological significance of the concept in his philosophy and the points of criticism he raises against the vulgar notion of time. In the last section of the chapter in which delineation of Heidegger's approach to art was aimed, how the work of art with its originary character comes to the scene of thinking in Heidegger's philosophy as a distinctive domain of discussion for the essence of beings is summed.

As for the discussion of main specifications of the correspondence between the originary nature of the work of art and temporality, in the third chapter I have concentrated on two moments in terms of two conceptual pairs, namely, authenticity-inauthenticity and earth-world. While the former is central to Heidegger's thinking of existential modes of *Dasein*, the latter pair constitutes the terms around which the essence of the work of art is explicated. In so far as these moments are considered, I claimed two chief temporal characteristics of the artwork in the third chapter as (i) the artwork provides a 'moment of vision' and bears the experience of authentic temporality; and (ii) considered in terms of the setting-forth of earth and formation of a world, the artwork has a peculiar temporality of its own.

When the different connotations and interpretations of the concept of time is considered, either in different philosophical discourses or in the way we use the term in everyday life, I think, all variants of 'time's can be roughly grouped under two main categories. In its first and prevailing construal, 'time' is based on the enfoldedness (or enframing) of beings. That is, time is something in which beings are present as objects of identical-entities. In this scheme, beings and the grounds for their presence have been determined in advance by certain cultural, social and philosophical paradigms. Accordingly they are easily posited in the already-existing sets of teleological or functional relations which amount to keeping them as what

they are already assumed to be and thus confining with these predetermined terms. Hence first 'time' which may rightly be thought to correspond to Heidegger's inauthentic time in the broadest sense, is for the most part the concept partakes our everyday lives. "Present as now" and therefore "presence" in this kind of 'time' gain a privileged status. Beings which are within-time, in this regard, are defined in terms of their presence rather than what they indeed are or could be. The second generic variant of 'time,' unlike the first, can be grasped in terms of a letting beings unfold and consequently indicates not a structural scheme but rather a happening as being's self-realization. So 'temporality' seems to be a more proper wording for this second 'time' since it connotes an occurrence rather than an entity. The second kind of time, therefore, lacks what we may call the universal-validity of the first and entails an original character. In so far as this second 'time' is thought as the counterpart of the first, it is similar to Heidegger's authentic temporality. It shows itself as an occurrence of beings' unfolding essence, that is, the originating of their latent possibilities in their full openness, with the weight of their there-ness.

It can be maintained, therefore, we have two 'time's with which the relation of the artwork could be sought; or at least two different levels of times. Yet, thinking the work of art solely in terms of the first construal of time, that is, inauthentic (measurable) time would amount to considering artworks as if they are not distinguished from things within-time. Such an approach towards art is indeed what Heidegger criticizes modern 'worldview' as enframing the artwork within the purview of aesthetics. In that case, the striking effect of great art would be left unexplained and speaking of the 'originary' nature of art would lose its grounds. That is why, in this thesis, in investigating the temporal peculiarities of the artwork and how they show themselves in the experience of art, primary emphasis is given to explanation of artwork's authentic temporality. What is more, the originary nature of the artwork verbalized in terms of earth and world – which correspond respectively to the impenetrable/unexplainable element and the openness raising upon the interrelation between the former – temporally stands close to the second 'time' described above. With what Heidegger calls the setting-forth of earth and formation of world out of the 'strife' between the two, the work of art bears an *Ereignis*-like nature and therefore calls for a further explication in terms of authentic temporality.



Yet, recalling Heidegger's assertion that authenticity is not the opposite but in the first place a certain modification of the inauthentic, an account of artwork's temporal character necessarily starts with an encounter with the inauthentic.

Accordingly, what is mainly argued in this thesis regarding the temporal character in question is that the experience of art bears suspension of inauthentic time and yields a deconstruction of it with the original temporality of its own. Such original temporality, as it has been discussed in length, stems from the artwork's power to transform our "ontological perceptiveness" against beings. The transformation in question happens, in the broadest sense, as a resetting of relations. In so far as the true encounter with the work amounts to a perceptiveness as if it is happening for the first time, the commonplace relations between the preserver and its world and those between beings as such undergo a re-setting. In this way, true experience of art goes beyond the aesthetical apprehension of the work, that is, of inauthentic mode of existence as it reveals the essence of beings as openness.

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