

From we-mode to role-mode

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1. Introduction

Nobody has done more to develop a we-mode account of collective intentionality than Raimo Tuomela (e.g., Tuomela 1995; 2007; 2013). In this paper, I want to pay tribute to Raimo by extending the mode-account of collective intentionality from we-mode to role-mode – the mode in which individuals and groups function in roles in organizations and institutions and take positions as occupants of these roles, as when, for example, an official announces economic data, a committee advises a certain course of action, or a parliament passes a law. The account I will sketch is inspired by Tuomela's account of the we-mode, and as he noted (2017, p. 77), there are also similarities with what he says about "normatively structured groups with positions and a division of tasks and rights" and the "positional mode" in his 2013 book *Social ontology: Collective Intentionality and group agents*.

I prefer to use the term "role" though because I use "position" to refer to the kind of theoretical or practical position associated with mode/force in the sense of what distinguishes beliefs and intentions and assertions and directions. I call we-mode and role-mode "subject modes" to distinguish them from mode/force in the more established sense, which I call "attitude mode" or "position mode" (Schmitz 2017; 2018).

While my approach is inspired by Raimo and I have learned much from him, my outlook also differs from his in some important ways that I should mention here at the outset – to set the stage and to help avoid misunderstandings. The first of these consists in the fact that – as Raimo noted in what was sadly to remain our only exchange in print (2017, p. 74, 76) – I'm much more focused than he was on the phenomenology of the we-mode, on the we-mode as a mode of consciousness. I'm therefore also happy to embrace the terminological kinship to the use of "mode" in consciousness studies to refer to global states of consciousness such as depression or even wakefulness. Though we-mode and role-mode states are of course more specific states, they still pervade consciousness in a way that is comparable to these states. For example, the experience of acting in one's professional role is often described in terms

of being – and having to be – "on": a peculiar state of heightened alertness and attention.

A second respect in which my outlook differs from Tuomela's is that I attach more importance to more basic forms of intentionality and consciousness such as sensory-motor-emotional consciousness. For example, I believe that fellow feelings of affiliation, alignment, empathy and identification as well as experiences of joint attention and joint action are absolutely central for understanding collective intentionality.

A third and related respect is that I think we should think about intentionality in general and collective intentionality in particular in terms of a layered picture according to which higher-level forms of collective intentionality such as role intentionality in institutional and organizational contexts can only function against the lower-level collective intentionality of shared beliefs and intentions as well as that of joint attention and joint bodily action. An important part of this picture is also the idea that the intentionality on these different levels can be distinguished in terms of the kinds of representations and the kinds of content involved.

(I don't mean to suggest that Tuomela would have disagreed with all of this. He did, for example, accept a role for "bond-creating non-conceptual elements" in his response to me (2017, p. 76). But he neither centered non-conceptual content in his own work nor layers.)

Fourth, and finally, one of the reasons for embracing the notion of role-mode for me is that it can help us to leave behind the fictionalist elements Tuomela felt compelled to introduce into his account of the intentionality of group agents such as organizations and institutions. On Tuomela's picture, such a group agent is "*partly fictitious*" (2017, p. 71; his italics) because it has "no intrinsic, biologically based features", but only extrinsic intentionality, which, however, may be "internalized by the agents (in a sense resembling actors internalizing role attitudes in a play)" (all 2017, p. 71).

There are certainly important similarities and connections between the capacities to play a role in a fictional context and to fill an institutional role such as being a government official. However, there is also a difference which is as important as it is elementary. The official does not merely pretend to make determinations and decisions in his role, but actually makes them. It therefore seems to me that it is important to develop an account of group agents such as corporations or governments that does not just treat their intentionality as merely fictitious and extrinsic.

Identifying with our functions e.g., as government officials and as citizens and accepting the powers and obligations of officials in our role as citizens (to the extent that we do!) and seeing the world from the perspective of these roles in role-mode, we really become officials and citizens. Taking positions, perceiving, acting, believing, planning, asserting and directing in these roles, we display a role intentionality that is not merely extrinsic or derived.

Given these differences between Raimo's outlook and mine, I was very moved that one of the last times we met, he said to me after a talk of mine: "I think you are on the right track". I often think back to this kind comment, especially in difficult times, and feel encouraged by it to present this account in the context of this volume.

I will now first motivate the mode account by comparing it to its principal rivals. I will then sketch its subject mode version, introduce the notion of role-mode, and explore it further by discussing 10 theses about it and its relation to we-mode.

2. Content vs. mode vs. subject approaches to collective intentionality

The philosophy of collective intentionality in the 20th century has been haunted by the specter of the group mind. It has seemed to many that to take groups seriously ontologically and particularly to take them seriously as agents and as subjects of mental states would be to commit to that "abominable" and "perfectly dreadful metaphysical excrescence" (Searle 1998, p. 150). To avoid this has been a motivation not only for the most strongly reductionist view of collective intentionality, the content view most closely associated with Michael Bratman (2014) and Kirk Ludwig (2016; 2017), which assumes that at least small-scale collective intentionality can be entirely understood in terms of the content of individual mental states and speech acts – where content is understood in the traditional sense as propositional and as *what* is intended or believed, in contradistinction to the subject and the mode. It has also been a motivation for the mode account as defended by Tuomela¹ and also by John Searle – though Searle never uses the term "mode" in this connection, but only speaks of we-intentionality. The attraction of the mode account is precisely that it seems to allow us

¹ However, in his response to me he writes: "In my view, the subject of an attitude or action to which the mode is attributed accordingly may be either an individual or a collective (or a collection of people). Thus my we-mode notion can be regarded as primarily a subject account." (2017, p. 74). I may thus have misrepresented what Tuomela wrote earlier, but I am not entirely convinced for the reasons that I stated in my original piece and don't want to repeat here, as I focus on developing the positive picture. And though we should not give too much importance to such labels, others (e.g. Schmid and Schweikard (2013)) have also taken Tuomela to be the paradigmatic representative of a mode account taken to be distinct from a subject account.

to adopt a more liberal stance regarding the kind of mind involved in collective intentionality than the content account, while still avoiding the notion of a group subject which is taken to be "abominable" because, given certain plausible-seeming assumptions, it is tied to that of a group mind.

This, I believe, is at least part of what compelled Tuomela to think of the intentionality of a group agent only as a fiction entertained by the members of the group. But, as noted already, the determinations and decisions of a university, a corporation, or an association like ISOS, the International Social Ontology Society, are not merely fictitious. Nor is the intentionality of the people making these determinations and decisions merely extrinsic. The thoughts they have in their roles are just as intrinsically intentional (and as biological) as the thoughts they have as private persons.

A fortiori, corporations, associations and organizations are certainly not fictitious either. It is true, the law has often used the legal fiction that corporations are persons to make it possible to hold them legally responsible. But this does not mean that the corporation is a fiction. The fiction here is that the corporation *is a person*. I think it is quite revealing that the law would choose this conceptualization: the individual person is so much our paradigm of a locus of agency and responsibility that lawyers find the fiction that the corporation is a person the most expedient way of integrating it into the law.

Now a philosopher pondering this idea of a corporation conceived of as a person is very likely to be puzzled, even perturbed, by this somewhat in the way that Wittgenstein imagines philosophers to be puzzled by his fictitious example of a language where instead of "Nobody came into the room" one says something like "Mr. Nobody came into the room" (1958, p. 69).

(As Wittgenstein showed so convincingly, when we philosophize, we tend to operate with a much cruder and more primitive picture of what it would mean for expressions of our language – and nouns in particular – to succeed in referring to or representing something in the world than the one that is inherent in our actual linguistic practice.)

Two characteristic reactions of philosophers in such a situation would be to either try to make sense of the existence of such a person because they feel – correctly – that this expression serves an essential function in our fictitious language, or conversely, to explain away the apparent existence of such a person by giving a fictionalist interpretation of this kind of locution.

I think that a similar set of responses can be found in debates about groups and collective intentionality. Philosophers may be tempted to make sense of the notion of a group mind, or they may try to do such things as eliminating all references to "we" – at least when it occurs as the subject of attitudes like intention – or to give a fictionalist interpretation of the notion of a group agent because they are captivated by a mistaken idea of what it would mean for such a subject to really exist.

What is that idea? It's hard to even express it except by saying something like that the group would have to be just like another person or that its mind would have to be like the mind of another person, something over and above the individual minds of the group members. Such an idea is indeed an abomination, but does anybody really believe it?

This philosopher wants to suggest that we should not leave the idea of a group subject to mysticians trying to make sense of this idea – assuming they even exist – and should instead rather take seriously the notion of a plural subject. A group no more has a single mind than it has a single body. It rather has minds – and bodies.² What we have to understand is what it is about these minds – and bodies – and the persons or animals whose minds and bodies they are that ties them together as group members.

We should think of a group as a higher-level unity, a unity of people (or animals), of minds and bodies. We are always tempted to think of a group in such a way that the difference between individuals is dissolved, that they disappear into the group as it were. (Strikingly, evocations of this fantasy are also a hallmark of totalitarian collectivist ideologies.) But if this were to happen, the group would cease to exist. The group is essentially a higher-level unity of individuals. To put this into a slogan: no we without Is. So what we have to understand are the *modes* of mind, or, more broadly, the forms of *group mindedness*, that tie individuals together so that they form higher-level plural subjects.

This is not meant to suggest though that the connections between group members are only mental or spiritual. A group is not a communion of disembodied spirits, but of flesh-and-blood individuals. At its most basic, it is typically held together through physical interaction, through touch, joint attention, joint bodily actions, joint skills, feelings of affiliation and identification, and so on. The emphasis on mind is only meant to indicate that all these interactions and relations have an

² Tuomela wrote: "a group agent necessarily lacks an intrinsic mind qua group." (2017, p. 72). Certainly, but my question is: why should we even expect it to have one intrinsic mind?

essential mental component, not that they are purely mental.

The mind-body dualism that we are accustomed to does us a disservice here and makes it hard to understand how we relate to others at the most basic, sensory-motor-emotional level, because it is inadequate either to say that we relate to others merely as bodies, nor only as minds. It seems to me that there is a way of understanding others that is prior to the mind-body differentiation as when e.g., we perceive somebody as doing something. We perceive the movement as purposive, as the kind of action that it is, but this does not mean that we separately perceive bodily movement and purposes or intentions. Such a differentiation or analysis of the action into physical and mental components is only made at a higher, reflective and conceptual layer of intentionality. Still, the focus of this paper will be on the mental component of collective intentionality. But it is important to keep in mind that, like other forms of intentionality, collective intentionality is essentially embodied and enacted.

I propose to think of modes like we-mode and role-mode as explaining collective subjects rather than as explaining them away. This is one reason I call the account that I will present in the next section the "subject mode" account of collective intentionality: it indicates that I attempt to marry a mode account in the tradition of Tuomela and John Searle with a subject account as it has been defended by Margaret Gilbert (2013) and Bernhard Schmid (2014) among others.

One important difference between the subject mode account and Gilbert's and Schmid's subject accounts is that I acknowledge a greater variety of collective subject-constituting entities. For Gilbert, it is joint commitment alone that constitutes collective subjects, while for Schmid it is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. I believe that the basic sort of collectivity constituting intentionality is pre-reflective and pre-conceptual – the sensory-motor-emotional intentionality of joint attention, action and affiliation – but that against the background of this lower-level intentionality, the higher-level intentionality of joint commitments, of shared beliefs, intentions and values, as well as that of contracts, laws and other forms of institutional intentionality, creates corresponding higher-level unities from plural subjects of a commitment to take a walk together to corporations and countries.

Now why can't we account for all this collectivity-constituting intentionality in terms of propositional content as traditionally conceived, as proposed by the content account? I can't argue this point at length here, but I believe that there are two related reasons for this. The first is that "we" and its cognates, at least in their basic uses, on

which others depend, directly latch onto pre-conceptual, sensory-motor-emotional forms of collective intentionality. In the central cases, I use "we" to refer to us *as related in one or several such pre-conceptual ways* – e.g. as standing or walking together and/or attending to something jointly – not by first forming a conception of these relations (in terms of which it could then be analyzed), but directly, similarly to how it has been argued that uses of "I" are also based on pre-conceptual forms of self-consciousness (Bermúdez 1998, p. 2011). The second reason is that using "we" also centrally involves the capacity to see the world from our shared perspective and therefore us as a subject with a (partially) shared point of view. That is the reason we-intentionality cannot be reduced to *what* I-subjects intend, believe, or otherwise represent as an *object* of their intentionality.

This brings me to the second reason why the "subject mode" account is so-called and a crucial respect in which it differs from the standard versions of the subject-, mode- and content-accounts (see (Schweikard and Schmid 2013)). These all accept the received understanding of intentional states and speech acts – postures – as propositional attitudes, which I believe makes it hard to understand how subjects can experience and represent themselves as subjects of attitudes towards facts and goals in the world, including as collective subjects who share goals or are jointly aware of facts. The basic idea of the subject mode account is that such awareness of collective subjects as subjects can be understood in terms of representing others as co-subjects of postures towards the world, ranging from joint attention and action over shared beliefs and intentions to the positions we take as occupants of roles in institutional contexts. If subjects mutually represent each other as subjects of such postures, various kinds of groups ranging from joint attention dyads over subjects of shared beliefs, plans and values, to corporations and other institutional, legal units, come into existence.

3. The subject mode account

To pave the way for the subject mode account, I need to at least briefly address the received understanding of propositions and propositional attitudes, which stands in its way and, in spite of some recent criticisms, still has a dominant role in contemporary thinking about mind and language.

It embodies three biases in the philosophy of mind and language:

1. For propositional and conceptual forms of representation over

nonpropositional and nonconceptual ones

2. For theoretical, mind-to-world direction of fit representation of the world over practical, world-to-mind direction of fit representation
3. For individual over collective intentionality

First, on the received understanding of intentional states as propositional attitudes, all content is propositional and conceptual. But the content of basic individual and collective intentionality – the sensory-motor-emotional intentionality of joint attention, action and affiliation – is non-propositional and non-conceptual. Second, the content of a posture is taken to be identical to its propositional content. That is, neither subject nor mode/force make a contribution to content on this model. For example, when we believe that it rains, neither we nor our believing as such makes a contribution to content – though of course they would be represented in the content of a report of this attitude. And the state of affairs that the individual or collective subject is directed at is always implicitly taken as represented from a theoretical position towards the world – as truth is representational success from a theoretical position towards the world – regardless of whether the attitude is theoretical like belief or practical like intention. That is, even a practical attitude like intention is taken to have a proposition as its content, in spite of the fact that ordinarily we only ascribe truth values to theoretical attitudes like belief. Third, as we have discussed already, collective subjects are often seen as an abomination, and the default assumption is always that the subject is an individual.

The alternative picture I want to present is inspired by recent criticisms of the notion of a proposition and the force-content dichotomy to which this notion is closely linked (Hanks 2015; 2019; Recanati 2019; 2022), as well as by a tradition of thinkers ranging from Immanuel Kant, over Jean Piaget, Peter Strawson and Gareth Evans to contemporary thinkers like José Luis Bermúdez that treat self- and object-consciousness as inextricably linked, as two sides of the same coin. On this kind of view, we are always aware of objects and states of affairs (SOAs) in the world in relation to ourselves. This is true for a multitude of such relations, e.g., spatial or temporal ones, as well as the theoretical, epistemic ones and practical ones that are manifest in belief and intention as well as in theoretical and practical knowledge. And, again, it is true on various layers or levels of intentionality which are characterized through the different modes and formats of representation that are involved. These layers can be distinguished in a fine-grained way through various criteria (Schmitz

2020), but for purposes of rough orientation it is sufficient to distinguish three broad layers:

1. The preconceptual and non-propositional layer of perceptual, actional and emotional experience. This layer corresponds to sensory-motor-emotional experience.
2. The conceptual and propositional layer of belief, intention, theoretical and practical knowledge. This layer corresponds to spoken language.
3. The documental level of shared contracts, constitutions, legal frameworks, cultural heritage etc. This layer corresponds to written language.

On all these levels subjects experience and represent their position towards the world. In perception they experience the world as acting on them, in action they experience themselves as acting on the world. In asserting something like that the door is closed the subject presents itself as knowing this. In directing somebody to close it, a subject presents itself as knowing this as the thing to do, as possessing knowledge of what to do. Basic force indicators such as intonation, word order and grammatical mood nonconceptually indicate this theoretical or practical position towards the world and express a sense of this position (Schmitz 2022). This also illustrates how the different levels of intentionality work together: when a subject asserts that the door is closed by means of uttering a sentence like "The door is closed", it indicates its position nonconceptually, while the SOA it presents itself as knowing is represented conceptually.

The subject of the posture does not only have a sense of its position and presents itself as occupying this position, but also experiences and presents itself *as the subject* of this position. In our example, this also happens nonconceptually. The subject has a nonconceptual actional experience of performing a speech act and also typically nonconceptually experiences itself bodily and in yet other ways as well. Contrast this with a case where a subject performs an assertion through a performative use of a speech act verb as in "I assert that the door is closed". In this case, the subject conceptually represents itself and the position it takes.

The content representing the relevant SOA can be called "SOA-content", that representing the subject's position "position-content" and that representing the subject "subject-content".

Now the basic idea of the subject mode account is that there is a difference

between representing others as mere objects of one's attitudes and as co-subjects of such attitudes. In representing others as co-subjects of positions towards the world, we share a perspective on the world and see it from the perspective of the group. Seeing the world from a we-perspective expands the subject slot of individual intentionality, as it were. The subject now takes a position in a mode of identification with others.

Again, this happens on different levels of collective intentionality, as when one attends and acts with others and jointly commits to plans and beliefs with them. And again, the different levels function together. For example, think about congregants in a church saying a prayer or singing a song together. They nonconceptually experience themselves as singing or praying together and thus as jointly affirming what they express even if conceptually it is an SOA I-content like e.g., "I am a sinner". This content is still nonconceptually experienced and presented as something that is known and known jointly.

On the traditional view of propositions and propositional attitudes there is a strong tendency to interpret sentences like the following so that subject and speech act verb are part of propositional content (as traditionally conceived):

- (1) We assert that no nation can long endure half republic and half empire.
- (2) We order you to learn Dutch.

Now, it is true that such interpretations are possible if we think of them as answers to the question of what we would or should do under certain circumstances. For example, (1) – part of the of 1900 platform of the US Democratic Party – might be uttered in a group or individual deliberation on how to respond to any foreign policy initiatives that smack of imperialism (for a similar example, see Green (2022, p. 211 fn 5)). Under such an interpretation, that we assert or order may indeed be the SOA-content of something that a subject asserts or advises. (Whether it is an assertion or a piece of advice, and who the subject of that advice is may again be determined nonconceptually and/or through the broader context.)

However, this is certainly not the most common or even a mandatory interpretation. The most common and most natural uses of sentences like (1) and (2) are the 'performative' ones, where the speech act verbs are actually used to indicate the speech act being performed and the first-person pronoun indicates the subject of the speech act. Attempts to in turn derive this performative interpretation from a

truth-conditional reading of sentences of this kind have to my mind not been successful, nor are they well-motivated (compare (Schmitz 2019, p. 119-120) for more discussion). I think we should just accept that such sentences are ambiguous and that the most natural reading is the one where the speech act verbs function as force indicators.

On the subject mode account, groups are constituted through the intentionality of the group members, through their group mindedness. And this mindedness is (at least also) representational, it consists in experiencing and representing others as co-subjects of positions towards the world. Though this has often been denied by philosophers of collective intentionality, including by Tuomela, I think this also means that misrepresentation is possible. I might be in a we-mode state of jointly intending with others, who have, unbeknownst to me, already abandoned what had been our shared plan. In this case, I misrepresent a subject of joint intention that does not really exist. My state is in one sense still an instance of collective intentionality because it is an instance of the kind of group mindedness through which collectives are constituted. In another sense it isn't, because it is not the intentionality of a group. I believe both senses have to be recognized because the group mindedness of individuals constitutes the intentionality of groups.

But it is tempting to ask at this point: who is really the subject of collective intentionality, the individuals or the groups of which they are members? It seems to me the only possible answer is that the individuals are jointly the subject. They jointly constitute it by mutually representing themselves as co-subjects of the positions the group takes. So, fittingly, the task of representing the group's position is also a shared one.

4. Introducing role-mode

We are now in a position to begin addressing how the notion of we-mode can and should be extended to include role-mode as another subject mode. Let me begin by discussing the relation between roles and identities.

Identities may seem to be more pervasive and more deeply anchored than roles. For example, being a man or a woman is a deeper and more pervasive aspect of one's being than one's professional role. One is always, or almost always, perceived as belonging to a gender, but not nearly so often as having a professional role. At the same time, gender is both conceived of as an identity and as a role. But when we think

of it as an identity, we think of it more as coming from an internal sense of what a person is, while if we think of it as a role, we think of it more as something that comes from the social environment of the person.

Many definitions of roles highlight their social character. For example, Merriam-Webster's online dictionary defines one meaning of "role" as "a socially expected behavior pattern usually determined by an individual's status in a particular society". Similarly, philosophers have often emphasized an understanding of role as a social status assigned and imposed from outside. But it seems we also need to take into account subjects' identification with them. Individuals do not just passively accept the roles others assign to them. They also strive for roles and even create them for themselves. And they develop their own interpretations of roles assigned to them and adapt them to their own preferences and purposes. I think we therefore cannot understand roles just as conferred from the outside. We also have to understand the subject that identifies with them and that takes position towards the world as a role bearer.

Roles therefore cannot be distinguished from identities purely on the basis of an internal/external opposition and the distinction in terms of pervasiveness, while suggestive, is certainly not sharp either. And, as noted, gender is conceptualized as a role as well as an identity, and this is also true of other relevant concepts. Luckily, for present purposes it is not really important to sharpen the distinction between identities and roles. In what follows I will focus on professional and other institutional roles though, since I am primarily interested in the role subjects have in fairly tightly organized and quite strongly cooperative contexts, the kind of contexts Tuomela also had in mind when thinking about group agents.

While we-mode is more egalitarian – without claiming that completely egalitarian relations ever exist in human groups – roles have to do with power and competence differentiation within groups and therefore also with specialization. A role is defined in relation to other group members, but also in relation to the world. A role bearer has a sphere of power, of influence, responsibility and – at least hopefully – of competence. That is, role has not only to do with what I am proposing to understand in terms of subject mode, but also in terms of position mode. The role bearer will have particular actional and perceptual skills and particular theoretical and practical knowledge regarding the role domain.

Role-mode is a mode of identification with the role, with the group in the context of which a role is defined, with its powers and obligations, and with the practical and

theoretical skills and the domains of knowledge it requires. Of central importance for role-mode are the theoretical and practical positions subjects take in their roles and the powers and obligations they have as role bearers. Canonical linguistic expressions of role intentionality are therefore "As [role] ..." and "In my role as [role]..." as in examples like the following:

- (1) As chancellor, I believe...
- (2) As your supervisor, I order you...
- (3) As certified yoga instructors, we know...
- (4) As members of the committee, we have decided...
- (5) In my role as your student, I have the right...

Of particular significance is the fact, which we will return to, that people sometimes take different positions as role bearers than they would privately or in different roles.

Before I begin characterizing role-mode through a series of theses, I want to consider a question which has been raised by Bernhard Schmid (2017) primarily with regard to the we-mode, but which a fortiori can also be raised regarding role-mode: why should we think of these as species of mode at all? What is the justification for calling both subject-modes and position-modes "modes"?

It seems to me it is natural to extend the concept of mode in this way. It is natural to distinguish position-mode from SOA-content because the same SOA can be represented from different positions. For example, I may direct somebody to close the door and then go on to assert that this somebody has closed it. Analogously, I may take up the same position in different modes. For example, I may intend to support the election of a candidate both as a private person and as a member of the same party as the candidate. But, as just noted, one can also take different positions in different roles, as when one supports a candidate as a party official, but not as a private person, or conversely.

The deeper motivation for Schmid's question is of course the traditional understanding of speech acts and propositional attitudes, where subject, mode/force and propositional content are taken to be three fundamentally different constituents or aspects of these postures. The present approach does try to give a more unified account. Force/position-mode and content as reconceptualized as SOA-content are still different, but not as different as in their earlier conceptualization, as now content is also ascribed to force/position-mode. Both individual and collective subjects also

remain distinct from subject mode, but they are still importantly connected, as a subject can be transformed into a group member by experiencing and understanding itself in relation to co-subjects and by being in turn experienced and understood by these co-subjects.

From this perspective, position-mode and subject-mode naturally belong together because they are both forms of self-consciousness. Subjects take positions in self-aware ways and in modes of identification with others and/or with their roles, experiencing and representing themselves as co-subjects of such positions.

5. 10 these about role-mode and we-mode

I will now explore role-mode further by discussing 10 theses about role-mode and its relation to we-mode.

1. We-mode and role-mode are further modifications of self- or I-consciousness

Just like there is no we without Is, there cannot be a we-consciousness that is not a modification (or a mode-ification if you will) of an I-consciousness. It must always be possible to expand the "we" as e.g., "Maria and Tony and I" or "the other Germans and I". (Note that who we refer to by "I" when expanding is also what marks my and your we-mode or role-mode state as different even when we mutually include ourselves in the same "we" and represent the same position.) Likewise, there cannot be a role consciousness that is not a modification of a we- or I-consciousness. It must be possible for "As committee members" to be followed by "we", which in turn it again must be possible to expand in the way just described. And it must be possible for e.g. "As CEO" to be followed by "I" in corresponding fashion.

2. We-mode and role-mode consciousness are both bigger and smaller than I-consciousness

A graphic way to state an important relation between role-, we- and I-consciousness is to say that we- and role-consciousness are both smaller and bigger than I-consciousness. They are smaller because any particular form of we- or role-consciousness is just one of the we- or role-modes a given individual participates in. And they are bigger in so far as we- and role-mode are modes of identification with something larger.

3. Role-mode and we-mode representation can both misrepresent

Just like we-mode representation, role-mode representation can misrepresent. I may represent myself as CEO and take some positions towards the world from the CEO vantage point, while still failing to be CEO because relevant others do not recognize and therefore do not represent me as such. So just like in the we-mode case successful role-mode representation is a shared labor of the subjects involved in the relevant institutional context.

4. Roles are not merely belief- or observer-dependent

Roles are essentially a matter of the intentionality of subjects. However, they cannot be simply reduced to being belief- or observer dependent, as it is attempted at least in John Searle's early work on institutional reality (Searle 1995). On Searle's view of institutional reality, a subject has certain powers and obligations because a collective jointly believes that it has these powers and obligations. But, for example, for somebody to be a CEO, it is not enough that a group of outside observers believes this person to be CEO. This is not sufficient for two reasons: first, because the attitudes of outsiders are not enough. It is the attitudes of the co-subjects, in this case, the co-workers and other members of the relevant corporation, that are crucial. They must accept that this person is CEO, and they must accept it from the vantage points of their respective positions, for example, as employees and as relevant government officials. Second, the relevant stances are not merely theoretical / observational, but they are essentially practical stances. They are practical stances of recognizing and accepting the powers and the authority of the role bearer. (To think that only beliefs and observation are relevant is an example of the bias for the theoretical discussed above.)

5. Roles are closely connected to theoretical and practical powers and procedures

In an institutional context, there are rules that determine which theoretical and practical powers a subject as acting in their role has and which procedures have to be followed in certain situations. There is again a familiar structure in that these powers and procedures connected to the role may both extend and restrict the theoretical and practical reach of the subject acting in the role – they make it bigger in some ways and

smaller in others. For example, as a judge or juror I may have access to knowledge I wouldn't have outside of my role; but I may also be unable to make use of knowledge I have, for example, evidence that is legally inadmissible. The same is true for practical powers: I have access to the power of the organization I am a part of, but its procedures may also bar me from using some of my personal powers.

6. We-mode and role-mode self-consciousness is the consciousness of taking a position, not of introspecting it

Both we-mode and role-mode consciousness are forms of self-consciousness. A subject is aware of itself as the member of a group, or as the occupant of a role in that group, and through such episodes of self-consciousness the group is also conscious of itself. But neither we-mode nor role-mode consciousness is introspective self-consciousness. That is, I do not look into myself to determine what my positions as a group member or as a role occupant are. Nor does the group as a whole take an introspective stance towards its attitudes. When we jointly take positions, our minds are directed towards the world. The relevant self-consciousness of the individuals and the groups they constitute is a backgrounded consciousness of taking positions in a self-aware way. Likewise, when making up my mind as a role occupant, I am not directed at my role as an object. I rather look at the world from the point of view of the role and take positions in light of the theoretical and practical knowledge, the values, tasks, obligations, powers and so on, that the role affords.

7. In both we-mode and role-mode one takes positions one would not take merely as an individual or as a private person

For example, in we-mode identification with Germany and / or in my role as a German citizen, I may accept responsibility for crimes committed by Germans acting in their roles in the German government, even if I don't accept any personal responsibility for these crimes. (I may still be personally affected by these crimes as being German is part of who I am.) Politicians in particular often take role-specific positions. For example, when Angela Merkel was both chancellor of Germany and leader of the CDU, she sometimes took a position as party leader that she did not take as chancellor, or at least not yet. Similarly, a member of the police may feel duty-bound to arrest somebody for the use of marijuana even if privately or as a citizen

they do not believe that marijuana use should be legally sanctioned.

8. We-mode and role-mode help to explain the structure of attitude conflicts

While taking different positions in a role than one takes in one's personal life may lead to a life that is inauthentic, we must also acknowledge that any life within a society or group is to some extent based on compromise and accepting certain rules and ways of acting one may not agree with, at least not initially and in some cases never. So conflicts between the requirements of different roles, or between one's personal values and attitudes and the values and attitudes required by certain roles or groups, are an essential part of life, in particular of modern life in a large and diverse society.

It may be tempting to think that the notion of role-mode is meant to sanitize this kind of conflict by compartmentalization, or at least could be used for this purpose: we would just say that the relevant attitudes are held in different modes and the conflict would be gone. But that is not intended at all: the role-mode account is meant to help explain the structure of the conflict rather than to explain it away. Role-modes do constitute a certain degree of compartmentalization, but the compartments are not completely sealed off from one another and so conflicts still arise. The point is just that a conflict within a role is different than one between different roles. If, for example, as a government official I have to do something with which I disagree as a private citizen as in our police example above, this is a different kind of conflict than is a clash of attitudes within a given role. To resolve the former kind of conflict, I may have to work to change the requirements of the role. Or I may just learn to live with the fact that I represent values and rules that are not always the ones I personally favor. I may even strongly identify with doing this because I believe it to be essential to the functioning of a diverse and liberal society. But I could also decide that this conflict is unbearable and that the only right thing for me to do is to resign my role, or to try to start a revolution.

9. Switching from and to modes works similarly for we- and role-mode

How do we decide a conflict between the requirements of different roles, or between a role and my values and attitudes as a private person? Do we need a special mode here like an "overall mode" (see Laitinen (2017)), in which conflicts between different modes can be negotiated and resolved? It seems to me that we do not. As all we-modes

and role-modes are modifications of the individual consciousness or I-mode, it is simply in I-mode that the conflicts will be negotiated and resolved. The I-mode already is the "overall mode".

How then can we switch between different modes as between I-mode and we-mode, or between different role-modes? The switch between I-mode and we-mode is at least sometimes arational, like when we perform a switch based just on emotional identification, and we can certainly also switch into a role or between different roles in this way.

What kinds of switching are there? A temporal switch can just be triggered by being immersed in a group context – e.g., joining my friend group for a hiking excursion, or simply starting work in my professional role. When we talk about joining a group or starting a job, this will often and, in the latter case typically, be based on deliberation. Such deliberation occurs in I-mode – by which I essentially mean here: not in the mode of the group I am thinking about joining or that of the role I am about to adopt, as my reasoning may well be, partially or entirely, conducted from the point of view of modes of identification with one or several other groups or roles.

A crucial point is that this kind of deliberation of whether to join a group or to adopt a role is essentially different from reasoning and acting *from the point of view of a group or role*. When engaging in the former kind of deliberation, I may try on, as it were, the attitudes and responsibilities of the new role to see if they fit me; but when I really adopt them, when I really grow into this role and make it mine, which of course will typically take time – even after I have already legally adopted it – I see the world from the vantage point of the role. I think this means that there must be a presumption in favor of at least some of the positions, the attitudes, values and rules defining the role when reasoning from the point of view of the role. Otherwise I haven't really identified with the role and my reasoning collapses into I-mode reasoning. One could say that this is how the I-reductionist envisages things. Again, it seems to me that what reductionism misses is how we often reason, think, act and perceive from the point of view of the role or group, how our group memberships and the roles we occupy structure our intentionality.

10. Role-mode reaches all the way down

So far, we have focused on conceptual level positions and on reasoning. But in

accordance with the layered model I also want to emphasize that role-mode reaches all the way down, is embodied and enacted. For example, the role structure in a group of animals may be entirely realized in their sensory-motor-emotional interaction, in how they experience the other group members and the world at that level. But professional and other institutional roles also reach all the way down in that they are reflected in characteristic perceptual and actional experiences and skills and in the structure of attention. For example, members of the police on the beat perceive the world differently, attend to other things, and carry themselves differently than, say, construction workers in the same environment.

6. Conclusion

Is the subject mode account collectivist or individualist? Let me conclude this paper by reviewing its argument in the light of this fundamental question. In the spirit of Raimo Tuomela I have argued that collective intentionality is conceptually – or intentionally, as we might say more broadly – irreducible. That is, humans and some other animals display irreducible forms of group and role mindedness. I have gone beyond Tuomela in arguing that this intentionality is also constitutive of groups. When group members mutually experience and otherwise represent themselves as co-subjects of positions they jointly take up towards the world and perceive the world and act in it in modes of identification with the group, group subjects do come into being.

I have further begun to extend the concept of the we-mode made popular by Tuomela to role-mode in order to account for the intentionality of group agents such as institutions and organizations. It seems to me we can then be equally realist about such subjects. Again, there is no reason to leave the concept of a group subject to mysterians, or to turn fictionalist in any sense regarding group agents. This is because an antireductionist and fully realist view about collective intentionality which emphasizes that we take positions towards the world in irreducible modes of identification with groups and roles, in no way commits us to group subjects or group minds that float free of individual subjects and minds.

Our account can and should still be individualist in the sense that it holds that all we- and role-consciousness is a modification of I-consciousness and that a group can only take a position through at least one individual taking it as a group member and / or as the occupant of a role within the group. At the same time, that one

individual takes such a position is never sufficient for the group taking it because representing the group's positions is always essentially a task shared by all group members.

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