IN DEFENSE OF THE KANTIAN ACCOUNT
OF KNOWLEDGE: REPLY TO WHITING

Mark SCHROEDER

ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting's conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent with the account of knowledge and successfully deals with fake barns.

KEYWORDS: Knowledge, fake barns, Daniel Whiting, Gettier problem, perceptual reasons, seeing that

In earlier article,¹ I defended the view that knowledge can be successfully analyzed as belief for reasons that are both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Since this is Kant's characterization of knowledge in the first Critique, let us call this the Kantian Account.² My aim in that paper was to argue that the Kantian Account provides a simple and attractive way of making good on the idea that knowledge involves a kind of match between subjective and objective factors – the right sort of match to explain why knowledge is prime, why it has a distinctive kind of explanatory power, along the lines defended by Timothy Williamson,³ and why it exhibits the phenomenon that I call defeater pairing, on which, very roughly, objective conditions that defeat knowledge come paired with subjective counterparts.⁴ The Kantian Account, I argued, provides a way of making sense of these things without getting into either of the two major sources of trouble that

have traditionally plagued similarly motivated analyses of knowledge: the conditional fallacy and the defeater dialectic.\(^5\)

Daniel Whiting argues, in this journal, that I have overstated my case.\(^6\) More specifically, he argues that the Kantian Account founders on one of the most classic cases in the Gettierological literature, fake barns.\(^7\) In this paper I’ll rehearse the problem of fake barns as faced by the Kantian Account. We’ll see that this problem requires a certain view about the nature of basic perceptual reasons. Hence, I’ll argue that by adopting an alternative account of basic perceptual reasons, the Kantian Account can evade Whiting’s objection, and I’ll argue that this alternative account is independently better motivated. The moral will be that though Whiting is right to press his objection to the treatment of fake barns in my earlier paper, the Kantian Account itself can escape unscathed.

1. Fake Barns

The problem with fake barn cases is supposed to be simple. In a classic fake barn case, the subject (call her Fran) is driving through an area full of barn façades, cleverly painted to be visually indistinguishable from real barns to drivers from the road. Mostly ignoring the scenery, and oblivious to the fact that she is in fake barn country, Fran looks up at the only real barn for miles around, visually identifies it as a barn, and forms the belief that it is a barn. The intuitive judgment about the case is supposed to be that though it may be rational for Fran to believe that it is a barn, she does not know this. The Kantian Account claims that she knows just in case the reasons for which she believes are both objectively and subjectively sufficient. And according to my take on the Kantian account, her

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\(^7\) See Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976): 771-791. Stew Cohen, Shyam Nair, and Errol Lord have also pressed versions of objection to my version of the Kantian Account in conversation, but I find Whiting’s presentation particularly enlightening.
belief is doxastically rational just in case her reasons are subjectively sufficient. So
given that the agent in the fake barn case believes rationally, the Kantian Account
can deny that she knows only if it turns out that her reasons are not objectively
sufficient. This is what Whiting denies. He argues that Fran’s reasons for belief are
objectively sufficient in the fake barn case.

What does it mean for reasons for belief to be objectively sufficient? It
means, I claimed, that among the reasons for which you believe are some objective
reasons, and that those objective reasons beat all comers: they are at least as
weighty as any objective reasons for you not to believe. Having sufficient
objective reasons for your belief entails that it is correct, but not conversely –
there may be objective reasons that make your belief correct, but the reasons that
you have do not suffice, by themselves. Sufficiency of objective reasons is
paralleled by sufficiency of subjective reasons. A belief is rational just in case it is
supported by sufficient subjective reasons – i.e., just in case the agent’s subjective
reasons for that belief beat all comers: they are at least as weighty as any of the
agent’s subjective reasons not to believe.

Suppose, in a subjective variant of the original fake barn case, that Stan,
otherwise like Fran, believes that he is driving through fake barn country. Now he
looks up, visually identifies the structure before him as a barn, and forms the
belief, on that basis, that he is looking at a barn. The intuitive judgment about this
case, I submit, is that his belief is not rational, and indeed that it is not a rational
belief for him to form, in the absence of some further evidence that is independent
of his visual identification. Since his belief is not rational, we may infer that the
reasons for which he believes are not sufficient. Since in the absence of his belief
that he is in fake barn country, they would be sufficient, we may infer that it is
this belief that defeats his reasons. It is the contention of the Kantian account that
in the same way as this belief defeats Stan’s justification and hence his knowledge
in the revised fake barn case by rendering his reasons subjectively insufficient, the
fact that Fran really is in fake barn country defeats her knowledge in the original
fake barn case, by rendering her reasons objectively insufficient. This is just the
phenomenon of defeater pairing, which is one of the primary motivations for the
Kantian Account, to begin with.

So how does the belief that he is in fake barn country defeat Stan’s
subjective reasons to believe that there is a barn in front of him? Because the
Kantian account identifies sufficiency with the balance of reasons, it predicts that
if the reason for which you believe is an objective reason at all, then its defeat
must come in one of two varieties. When we change a situation in a way that
makes a reason that would otherwise be sufficient into one that is insufficient,
either we must have added to the competing reasons, or we must have reduced the force of the reason itself. Similarly, if Jill ceases to be the loudest person in the room, it must either be because someone else has gotten louder or a new, louder person has entered the room, or because Jill herself has gotten quieter. If the defeat comes from a contrary reason, we call it *countervailing* defeat, and if it comes from a reduction in the weight of our original reason, we call it *undercutting* defeat. Sometimes a defeater can both undercut and countervail. If something looks blue to you but you are wearing color-inverting glasses, you both lose the reason that you would otherwise have to believe that you are looking at something blue, and gain a reason for the contrary conclusion, that you are looking at something orange.

So we know that the Kantian account must hold that the reasons for which Fran believes fail to be objectively sufficient. And we know that for that to be the case, it must be that they are not objective reasons at all (as happens with false lemmas), or they are undercut, or they are countervailed. In my earlier paper, I assumed without argument that fake barn cases were straightforward cases of undercutting defeat. But what, exactly, we say about them will depend a great deal on how we think about the nature of basic perceptual reasons.

2. Two False Starts

How we think about the defeat in the fake barn case is very sensitive, I believe, to a variety of issues about how we think about the nature of visual evidence. In this section I’ll consider two views that are arguably inadequate to the case, and then in section 3 I’ll spell out a new view, which I now prefer.

One of the striking features of the fake barn case is that barns are not among the elements that our visual systems are evolutionarily hard-wired to represent. The features that *are* so hard-wired, including edge detection, motion, color, and face and emotion recognition, are commonly referred to as *low-level* features of visual perception. In the philosophy of perception, it is contested whether perception is also properly understood as representing what are known, in contrast, as *high-level* properties, including things like categories like (perhaps) *barn*. But even those – so-called *high-levelists* – who maintain that we can have

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genuinely visual experiences as of something’s being a barn – typically allow that these states epistemically depend on a learned background experience of what barns (for example) look like.9

So one natural idea about the classic fake barn case is simply to hold that in the fake barn case, when Fran bases her belief that there is a barn in front of her on her visual discrimination, she is also basing it, perhaps derivatively, on a background belief that turns out to be false when one is in fake barn country. On this treatment, Fran’s reasons turn out to be objectively insufficient because of a fault in the background beliefs which facilitate her visual identification of the barn.

Unfortunately, though many of the most natural versions of fake barn cases may involve high-level properties, it is possible with some art to construct cases that are relevantly like fake barn cases but involve low level properties. For example, distance perception is heavily affected by cues that are altered in the thinner atmosphere at high elevations. This is what is responsible for the fact that distant peaks can appear very close when high in the mountains. If Ann, who normally lives in the city, is visiting the mountains, her visual discrimination of distances is unreliable in the same way as Fran’s visual discrimination of barns, but the peak that she is now looking at may actually be as close as she judges it to be. This, I take it, is a low-level analogue of a fake barn case. So in what follows I will assume that there must be some more general solution, and will set aside issues about high-level contents.

According to a simple view of basic perceptual reasons – call it the phenomenal view – when you get visual evidence that there is a barn in front of you, your basic evidence is an appearance proposition – that it looks like a barn. I am not personally a fan of the phenomenal view,10 but in my earlier paper, I assumed it for the sake of simplifying discussion, and I used it to spell out my treatment of fake barn cases. I assumed that when Stan sees the barn, his visual evidence is that it looks like there is a barn in front of him, and that this is undercut by his belief that he is in fake barn country. Actually, I should also have said that it is also countervailed – together with the fact that it looks like there is a barn in front of him, the fact that most nearby things that look like barns are

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1-12 is doubtful about whether the issue can be resolved, at least for the case of perception of natural kind properties.
really barn façades is evidence that there is not a barn in front of him. Whiting, I believe, does not mean to contest any of this in his paper. He simply holds that the analogy does not straightforwardly transfer over to the objective case, as I supposed.

The trouble, Whiting claims, is that as I agree, some defeaters can be defeated. If Stan were to believe not only that he is in fake barn country, but that he is in real barn state – a location within fake barn country where there are no façades – then he would be rational to believe that there really is a barn after all, and could know it. So Stan only lacks knowledge because he does not also believe this further defeater-defeater. In contrast, Whiting claims, in the objective case there is always a defeater-defeater for every defeater. So long as Fran is actually looking at a real barn, there will be some region including that barn but no façades, over which it is true that the only things that look like barns are actually barns. Were Stan to know that, his reasons would be subjectively sufficient, and hence since it is actually true, Fran’s reasons must be objectively sufficient.

For some time I believed that there must be a flaw with Whiting’s argument. I reasoned as follows: there must be some fact about the objective weight of Fran’s reason, and it is clearly less weighty in the fake barn case than it would be if Fran were driving through a normal countryside free of barn façades. So, I reasoned, an adequate account of the weight of reasons should yield this result, and that is all that the Kantian Account needs. Whiting actually argues that my own earlier account of the weight of reasons fails to predict this result, but so much the worse, I thought, for my earlier account of weight.

But this reasoning (mine, that is) trades on a mistake. There need not be any fact about the objective weight of Fran’s reason, if it is not an objective reason at all. And recall that one of the ways in which it can turn out that the reason for which Fran believes is not objectively sufficient, is that it is not an objective reason at all. It turns out that precisely this treatment of fake barn cases is yielded by an alternative view about basic perceptual reasons that I have come to prefer for independent reasons.

3. The Apparent Factive Relation Account

The view about basic perceptual reasons that I now prefer says that when you have visual evidence as of there being a barn in front of you, your evidence is that you see that there is a barn. I call this the apparent factive relation account. Since this reason entails that there is a barn in front of her, the apparent factive relation

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11 My account of weight can be found in chapter seven of Mark Schroeder, *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
account explains why Fran’s visual evidence rationalizes believing that there is a barn in front of her. But on all accounts, since Fran is in fake barn country, she does not actually count as seeing that there is a barn in front of her. So her subjective reason is not true, and hence is not an objective reason at all. Basing her belief on her perceptual evidence, in this case, according to this view, is exactly like basing a belief on a false lemma. On this view, since the problem with Fran’s subjective reasons is that they fail to be objective reasons altogether, rather than that they are defeated, there is no possibility that they can be reinstated by defeater-defeaters. So the apparent factive relation account gets the Kantian Account out of trouble with fake barn cases.

You might worry that this account offloads some of the features that we want from an analysis of knowledge onto closely related facts about factive perceptual verbs like ‘sees that.’ The worry is that fake barn cases have always been assumed to be a problem for the analysis of knowledge, but my solution requires assuming that we have a separate account of seeing that which deals with fake barn cases, so it only puts off the problem, rather than solving it. Worse, according to Williamson, knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude, and hence seeing that something is the case is just a species of knowing that it is the case. On Williamson’s account the reason why Fran does not count as seeing that there is a barn in front of her is that seeing that entails knowing it, and knowledge requires safety. So if we accept Williamson’s thesis that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude, then we will think that the Kantian Account can use this strategy in order to accommodate fake barn cases only by offloading the analysis of one of the special cases of knowledge.

I think, however, that we should reject Williamson’s idea that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude, at least on the assumption (which was required for this objection and Williamson himself accepts) that seeing that is a factive stative attitude. Together, these ideas causes a problem for the solution that I am suggesting here only because they entail that seeing that P entails knowing that P. But this entailment is highly doubtful. Since knowing that P entails believing that P (as Williamson himself allows to be true), it follows that seeing that P entails believing that P. But it seems perfectly coherent to me to imagine someone who sees that P without believing that P. The proverb, “seeing is believing,” after all, means not that seeing is sufficient for belief, but rather that seeing for yourself is sometimes required for belief. It is easy for seeing to come apart from believing, in fact, because in general, visual experience represents far more things than are ever taken up as beliefs. You might, for example, pass a

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classroom on your way to the restroom while thinking about a puzzle of Kant interpretation. You see that the lights are on in the classroom, but you don’t form a belief that they are.

In this case, though you don’t believe that the lights are on in the classroom and hence don’t know that they are on, you are still in a *position* to know that they are, and so if these were the only counterexamples to *sees* entails *knows*, then it might still be true of a kind of hyper-idealized version of ourselves. But other counterexamples show, I believe, that you can see that something is the case without even being in a position to know that it is the case. All that we need to construct such cases is that it is rational for you to doubt the deliverances of your visual experiences. And we’ve already been considering such a case, that of Stan, who is driving through a perfectly ordinary, barn-studded, countryside, but *believes* that he is in fake barn country. Stan sees that there is barn in front of him, but because he believes that he is in fake barn country, he doubts the deliverances of his senses, and suspects that it is probably just a façade. So seeing does not even entail the possibility of rationally believing, and hence seeing does not entail even being in a position to know.

I conclude from this reasoning that the problem of explaining why the kinds of failures of safety that are manifested by fake barn cases result in failures of seeing that is independent of the analysis of knowledge. So it is no mistake to delegate those problems to where they belong – in the proper treatment of what it is to see that something is the case.

But why think that visual perceptual evidence is always of the form, “I see that P”? It’s my view that the reasons to prefer the factive relation account of basic perceptual reasons are strong, but complex, and in my earlier paper defending the Kantian Account, I had hoped to avoid them. Some of the chief advantages of this account over the phenomenal account are familiar from treatments by John McDowell and Timothy Williamson. The phenomenal account, as Williamson observes, is what is responsible for raising the specter of skeptical hypotheses, by creating a great distance between perceptual evidence and the perceptual beliefs that that evidence is supposed to justify. And any attempt to close that gap, as McDowell argues, leads us into ungrounded circles. In contrast, the view that basic visual evidence takes the form, “I see that P,” has the virtue of being *world-implicating*. You see that P only if P, and hence there are no skeptical scenarios for P that are consistent with all of your evidence.

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Of course, this view of evidence is not the only one on which it is world-implicating. I used to think, for example, that when you have a visual experience \textit{as of} $P$ (which could be either veridical or otherwise), you come to have the proposition that $P$ as among your reasons to believe that $P$.\textsuperscript{14} This view shares the world-implicating features of the factive-attitude view, and so it offers the same response to skepticism. But it runs into trouble with defeaters. If your visual evidence that there is something red in front of you is just \textit{that there is something red in front of you}, this is \textit{such} good evidence that there is something red in front of you that it is hard to see how it could be defeated by learning that you are wearing rose-colored glasses.\textsuperscript{15} Worse, you could have both tactile and visual evidence that there is something square in front of you, but only one of these should be defeated if you learn that your right arm has been amputated and you are experiencing phantom limb sensations. But if both sources gave you the same reason – \textit{that there is something square in front of you} – then it is hard to see how one could be defeated but not the other.\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast, the apparent factive relation account yields just the right treatment of these cases. Learning that you are wearing rose-colored glasses is evidence that despite appearances, you are not really seeing that there is something red in front of you, after all. And learning that your arm has been amputated is evidence that you are not feeling something square in front of you, without being evidence that you are not seeing that there is something red in front of you. So of the world-implicating accounts of perceptual evidence, the apparent factive relation account is preferable.

I once worried about the apparent factive relation account as follows.\textsuperscript{17} In general, nothing is your subjective reason unless you bear the right cognitive possession relation to that proposition. Since being true is not a cognitive possession relation, I worried that in order for the proposition that you see that $P$ to be your reason, you would first have to believe, or bear some other positive psychological relation, to the content that you see that $P$. In contrast, in order for the proposition that $P$ to be your reason, you would only need to have a visual experience as of $P$, which is less demanding.


\textsuperscript{15} For appreciating the force of this problem, I am indebted to Scott Sturgeon. Ryan Walsh also made this point, in the form in which it is presented here, independently in my graduate seminar in spring 2012.

\textsuperscript{16} Thanks to Shyam Nair for pressing this worry forcefully.

\textsuperscript{17} Schroeder, “Having Reasons.”
In contrast, however, I now think that the extra demandingness of the apparent factive relation account is plausibly just right. There are multiple layers of perceptual representation in the visual, auditory, and sensorimotor cortex. On a plausible view, some of those layers of representation are not consciously available at all, but only play a role in processing of visual information in order to feed forward to successive layers that are consciously available. Some striking evidence for this comes from a wide variety of experiments that show how senses are affected by information available from other sensory modalities. In one of the most striking such experiments, experimental subjects are outfitted with a device known as a pseudophone that routes sound from the left side of their body to their right ear, and from the right side of their body to their left ear. When seated blindfolded with a woman to their left and a man to their right, subjects hear the woman as on their right and the man as on their left. But when the blindfold is removed, subjects promptly hear the woman as on their left and the man as on their right, exhibiting a powerful switch in how things sound to the subject on the basis of a change in visual information alone.

What appears to be happening in cases like this one is that information from vision is incorporated at higher levels of auditory processing. One thing experiments like this appear to show is that the representational information encoded in lower levels of auditory processing – which do represent the woman’s voice as coming from the subject’s right – are not directly available to consciousness.

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19 It is not strictly accurate to say that the subject has only visual information about location in this experiment, because some sound reaches the ears through the head rather than through the pinnae of the ears. But the change in perceived location is due only to the change in visual information.

20 For the point that I’m making here, nothing actually turns on the fact that this case involves inter-modal interactions. Similar points can be made, I believe, with a single perceptual modality, at least in some cases where cues from different sources work together to shape perception of some property or relation. For example, in the moon illusion, the visual angle subtended by the moon appears to be larger when appearing near the horizon than when appearing high overhead. The exact explanation of the moon illusion is a matter of great controversy, but most promising explanations appeal to the fact that visual angle is related to perceived size, and consciously perceived size is also related to perceived distance. For example, according to one simple explanation, the illusion arises because occlusion is one of the visual clues to distance. So when the moon appears closer to the horizon, it is more obviously behind distant objects like buildings and trees, which triggers a perception of it as larger. But given the general relationship between size and visual angle, this leads it to appear to subtend a larger...
representation are not, I believe, plausibly available as reasons. They only become reasons when the experience is conscious.

But in conscious experience, I believe, contents about the world are never presented unadorned. When you have a visual experience as of a barn in front of you, what is happening is that it seems to you that you are seeing a barn. That is just what it is for the experience to be a visual one – that it is an experience as of seeing. Similarly, auditory experiences are experiences as of hearing. That is why in the experiment that I’ve described, the subject counts as having an auditory experience as of the woman being on her left, even though the sole source of perceptual information that the woman is on the left actually comes from vision. Since perceptual experiences are all experiences as of seeing (or hearing, or feeling, or smelling), it turns out that there is no extra demandingness, after all, associated with the apparent factive relation view.

Visual angle. Because we know that visual angle needs to be represented at low levels of visual processing, accounts on which the moon illusion is at least in part due to clues about distance suggest that the low level at which representation of visual angle is represented is not directly consciously available, and our conscious perceptions of visual angle are actually shaped by our perceptions of objective size. For more on the moon illusion, see Helen Ross and Cornelius Plug, *The Mystery of the Moon Illusion: Exploring Size Perception* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Compare John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Searle argues that visual experiences represent themselves as being caused by their objects, on the grounds that this is the condition of their veridicality. But in some cases of veridical hallucination, an object can be what causes a hallucination of itself. In such cases, the contents that Searle assigns to visual experiences are true, but the experiences are not veridical. So an improved version of Searle’s view would hold that the visual experience as of P represents itself as being a seeing that P. Since this is false even in the case of veridical hallucinations that are caused by their objects, it better fits with Searle’s motivations. But this is just the sort of account that is required by the apparent factive relation view.

I also believe that it is possible to give a more ecumenical interpretation of the apparent factive relation account. Disjunctivism about perception is the view that the only thing that seeing that there is something red in front of you and having a perceptual illusion as of something red in front of you have in common, is that both are subjectively indistinguishable from seeing that there is something red in front of you. Non-disjunctivists agree that this is something that both states have in common, though they deny that this is the only thing. But then ‘appearing,’ in the apparent factive relation account, can be interpreted to mean ‘is in a state that is subjectively indiscriminable from,’ and anyone who accepts that veridical experiences and hallucinations have this in common accepts the psychological commitments that are required in order to make good on the apparent factive relation account, making this a highly ecumenical interpretation of the view.
4. Conclusion

A proponent of the Kantian Account who endorses the factive attitude view about the contents of basic perceptual reasons has no trouble, I believe, with fake barn cases. This treatment is better, I believe, than the one in terms of objective undercutting, for all of the reasons that Whiting articulates in his article. The commitments that it requires are two: the view that seeing that fails in fake barn cases, but not because it is a special case of knowledge, and the view about basic perceptual reasons that I’ve called the factive relations view. I’ve argued that each of these commitments is independently well-motivated. Though there is still much more to be said about each, I do think this shows that the Kantian Account is not dead in the water.23

23 Special thanks to Daniel Whiting, Shyam Nair, Ben Lennertz, Janet Levin, Ryan Walsh, Stew Cohen, and Juan Comesaña.