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**Chapter 1**

**Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind**

*Sebastian Schmidt*

1. **The Problem of Mental Normativity**

Our attitudes – our beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions – are not actions. They are conceived of as mental *states* we are in, rather than as things we actively perform. Intuitively, we are not responsible merely for being in a state – at most, we are responsible for causing a state or for failing to avoid it. And yet we respond to and evaluate our attitudes in ways which are similar to the ways in which we respond to and evaluate our actions. We think that we *ought* to believe in human-induced climate change, and we even consider it to be appropriate to criticize others if they fail to believe in it. A malicious desire, like the desire for another’s suffering, can rightly provoke not only disapproval, but also resentment or indignation. An emotion like anger might turn out to be unjustified, and we might owe an apology to the person who was the target of our hostile emotion. And merely *intending* to become a better person is often already worthy of praise or credit.[[1]](#endnote-1)

Indeed, it is a widely shared assumption also in contemporary epistemology and metaethics that not only our actions, but also our attitudes are governed by norms, and that we are, in some sense, responsible for whether we comply with these norms. In epistemology, there is a long tradition that aims at providing a justification for our beliefs about an external world. Skeptical challenges – as posed by the thought experiments of the Cartesian Demon (Descartes 1641) or the Brain in a Vat (Putnam 1981) – call into doubt that we have *reasons* for our everyday beliefs (like your belief that you are reading this text right now). Replying to such skeptical challenges – *justifying* our everyday beliefs – is sometimes viewed as the central motivation for engaging in epistemology.[[2]](#endnote-2) It is thus not farfetched at all to conceive of epistemology as a normative discipline analogous, somehow, to ethics. How far we can take this analogy is, of course, a question open to reasonable dispute. Especially Clifford (1877) and James (1896) took the analogy so far as to speak of an *ethics of belief*: they discussed how moral and prudential considerations bear on the norms of belief, thereby motivating contemporary discussions about what kinds of reasons determine what we ought to believe.[[3]](#endnote-3)

In metaethics (broadly construed), an extensive and specialized discussion about the norms of rationality arose within the last decades. John Broome (2013) argued that being rational consists in having coherent attitudes, rather than in responding correctly to (apparent) reasons.[[4]](#endnote-4) According to Broome, we are, for example, rationally required to (roughly) intend those means that we believe are necessary to achieve our ends.[[5]](#endnote-5) This is a requirement to adjust our intentions and beliefs to each other. It is not presented as a requirement to perform certain *actions* in order to intentionally *ensure* by indirect means that we are coherent (for example, by meditation). Rather, rational requirements are meant to govern our attitudes *directly*. This also holds for accounts that conceive of rationality as the capacity to respond correctly to one’s reasons. For insofar as these accounts are concerned with responding to reasons for *attitudes*, they do not take themselves to be concerned with prudential or moral reasons for *managing* our attitudes.[[6]](#endnote-6)

It seems that we do not (or cannot) weigh rational requirements governing our attitudes against, say, prudential considerations that seem to favor an attitude. Take, for example, the consideration that an eccentric billionaire promises you a lot of money as a reward for causing yourself to believe something that is unsupported by your evidence. A common view holds that in such cases, there are two normative requirements in place: a rational requirement not to have the unsupported belief; and a practical requirement to cause yourself to have it.[[7]](#endnote-7) Such cases are currently debated, and some of our contributions will question the picture according to which epistemic reasons, or other object-given reasons for attitudes, constitute their own normative domain that is independent from the practical realms of prudence and morality.[[8]](#endnote-8) Yet the general framework in which philosophers currently conceive of rational requirements is to treat them as separate from, and quite unrelated to, practical requirements: prudence and morality govern our voluntary conduct, rationality governs our attitudes. Morality and prudence concern action; rationality concerns the mind.[[9]](#endnote-9)

However, philosophers have also recently discussed a line of thought that calls into doubt that our attitudes are the proper object of any normative evaluation whatsoever.[[10]](#endnote-10) Roughly, the line of thought goes as follows. Our beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions are not subject to the will in the way our actions are. We cannot decide to believe in the way we can decide to act.[[11]](#endnote-11) When someone offers me a huge reward for believing, in the absence of adequate evidence, that there is an even number of stars in the universe, I will not be able to believe it. This is true even if I *want* to believe it because I want to have the reward. Similarly, it does not seem possible to desire, feel, or intend something merely because someone offers me a reward for doing so. It seems that we cannot believe that *p* for just any reason that shows it worth believing that *p*. It seems that we cannot adopt a mental state or an attitude for just any reason that shows it worth being adopted.[[12]](#endnote-12)

By contrast, if someone offered me a reward for performing an *action* for which I have no reward-independent reason, like the action of raising my arm right now, I could just do it and collect the reward. We usually can perform an action for any reason that shows the action worth doing: our actions are, as I would like to put it, *exercises of voluntary control*. We exercise voluntary control when we act: being able to act for reasons is a fundamental kind of freedom. Arguably, the fact that actions are free in this way is what explains why it can be true that we sometimes *ought* to do one thing rather than another: if raising my arm was not an exercise of voluntary control, it would not make sense to say that I *ought* to raise it. The rising of my arm would be a mere natural event outside the space of reasons that could not be evaluated in normative terms. In the absence of voluntary control, there would be no *obligations* to act, and no *reasons* to act in a certain way rather than in another. Maybe there would not even be such a thing as an action.[[13]](#endnote-13) Furthermore, it seems that we could not appropriately be *blamed* and *praised* for what we do if what we do was not an exercise of voluntary control. At least in this sense, Ought implies Can.

This raises a philosophical puzzle. If being subject to norms and reasons requires voluntary control, then it becomes mysterious how anything can be subject to norms that is not under our voluntary control. How can epistemology then be concerned with the *justification* of our beliefs? And how can metaethics be concerned with *normative requirements* governing our beliefs and intentions? While contemporary philosophy assumes that there is mental normativity, we at the same time seem to lack an explanation of how there can be such a thing. So, how can it be that we *ought* to believe, desire, feel, or intend something, that we have *reasons* for mental states, and that we can be *praised* and *blamed* for them? Call this the *problem of mental normativity*.[[14]](#endnote-14), [[15]](#endnote-15)

1. **Locating Our Approach: How the Ethics of Belief Motivates an Ethics of Mind**

I take the following two questions as providing a helpful framework for joining the debates that I just sketched:

1. How can we be responsible for our attitudes?
2. What attitudes should we have?

These are the fundamental questions of an *ethics of mind*.[[16]](#endnote-16) The first question is concerned with explaining how there can be such a thing as an ethics of mind – how our practice of holding each other accountable for our beliefs, emotions, desires, and intentions can be justified given that these attitudes are not under our voluntary control. Proponents in this debate either argue that attitudes are, contrary to first impression, controlled in a similar way as actions are controlled (“voluntarily”);[[17]](#endnote-17) or they argue that we can exercise a form of direct, but non-voluntary control over our attitudes, i.e. a form of direct control that is different from the control that we exercise when we act;[[18]](#endnote-18) or they deny that they are directly controlled in any way, and thus either deny some sense of “Ought implies Can,”[[19]](#endnote-19) or say that we are *never* directly responsible for our attitudes, but only indirectly insofar as we control our attitudes through our actions.[[20]](#endnote-20) By providing an explanation of our mental responsibility in this way, such accounts aim at providing a *foundation* for understanding the norms that underly our practice of holding one another accountable for our attitudes.[[21]](#endnote-21)

The second question is central to the debates about reasons for belief and about attitudinal rationality. It is concerned with the precise nature of the norms that govern our attitudes. If we can make sense of mental normativity and responsibility, then what *are* the standards or requirements that govern our attitudes, and what *are* the kinds of reasons for which we can hold attitudes, and how do we distinguish them? Are all reasons for attitudes object-given (or “of the right kind”), or are there state-given reasons (that is, “of the wrong kind”) as well?[[22]](#endnote-22) How do these reasons determine what we ought to believe, desire, feel, intend, etc.?[[23]](#endnote-23) And what is the normative force of these “mental Oughts,” which include the standards of epistemic rationality?[[24]](#endnote-24)

This overall framework for discussing mental normativity, provided by our two main questions, is mainly inspired by contemporary debates in the ethics of belief. The philosophical debate about whether we can be responsible for what we believe and what we ought to believe is flourishing like never before. Questions which preoccupied Clifford and James are discussed by contemporary scholars under the headings “Ethics of Belief” (Feldman 2000; Matheson/Vitz 2014), “Reasons for Belief” (Reisner/Steglich-Petersen 2011), “The Aim of Belief” (Chan 2013), and “Epistemic Norms” (Littlejohn/Turri 2013). Central questions include:

* Is only evidence for or against *p* relevant for whether one ought to believe that *p*, or are there state-given reasons which favour having a belief, e.g., facts about how valuable it would be to believe that *p*?[[25]](#endnote-25)
* If only evidence is relevant to this question – can this fact be explained by conceptual features of belief, like belief’s “aim of truth”?[[26]](#endnote-26)
* Can we weigh epistemic and practical reasons against each other so as to determine what we ought to believe, all things considered?[[27]](#endnote-27)
* Is it even possible to believe for practical reasons?[[28]](#endnote-28)
* Do we have any meaningful control over what we believe? Given that we do not control our beliefs as we control our actions (“voluntarily”), how can we explain our responsibility for believing, especially given that we are often subject to the criticism of epistemic irrationality?[[29]](#endnote-29)
* How do we have to interpret epistemic norms, and especially their (apparent) normative force?[[30]](#endnote-30)

Discussions surrounding the *ethics* of belief are partly an upshot of what is often mentioned as the *practical turn* in contemporary epistemology. Early indicators for this movement were virtue epistemology and debates about pragmatic encroachment with respect to the analysis of knowledge.[[31]](#endnote-31) Currently, the practical turn is shaped not only by the ethics of belief, but also, for example, by discussions about the value of knowledge and true belief,[[32]](#endnote-32) as well as by debates in social epistemology,[[33]](#endnote-33) including feminist epistemology.[[34]](#endnote-34)

The present volume is in line with this practical turn in that its first part addresses the ethics of belief. There we discuss topics that currently shape and even broaden the scope of the practical turn, like control over belief and its implication for the ethics of belief (Lindner), the role of the epistemic community for the possibility of epistemic normativity (Chrisman), responsibility for believing and doxastic strength (Gaultier), the doxastic norms within relationships, and whether they require us to be doxastically partial towards, say, our friends (Crawford), the structure, content, and force of epistemic norms (Skipper/Steglich-Petersen), as well as practical reasons for suspending judgment (Lord).

We summarize the contributions of Lindner, Chrisman, and Gaultier under the title “Doxastic Responsibility and Agency,” and the contributions of Crawford, Steglich-Petersen/Skipper, and Lord under “Reasons for Belief.” While the first debate is more concerned with the *possibility* of an ethics of belief (compare question 1 of the ethics of mind), the latter debate is concerned with the *nature and structure* of an ethics of belief (compare question 2). The aim of this first part is to bring both debates closer to each other, especially because the two broad topics they discuss are connected in important ways: how we explain the possibility of epistemic normativity will shape our understanding of epistemic norms. For example, if we argue that belief is subject to a robust form of direct control, then a pragmatist account about what we ought to believe might seem more plausible.[[35]](#endnote-35) By contrast, if we are doxastic involuntarists, i.e., if we think that belief is not directly controlled at all, but nevertheless subject to a robust form of normativity, then an evidentialist picture might seem more attractive.[[36]](#endnote-36)

Our volume, however, also reaches beyond epistemology, and even beyond the ethics of belief. Our second part is introduced by two contributions that frame the ethics of mind more generally. The first subpart discusses the first main question of an ethics of mind: how can we be responsible for our attitudes? (Schmidt) The second one is concerned with an aspect of the second main question: how should we understand theoretical and practical rationality? (Ernst) We summarize these two contributions under the label “Responsibility, Reasons, and Rationality.” Especially in the second subpart, our focus will shift from the practical dimensions of belief to issues revolving around reasons, responsibility, and agency with respect to other mental states or attitudes – especially the ethics of blame (Coates), the ethics of fear in public contexts (Döring), the agency we exercise in deciding (Soteriou), our responsibility for our passing thoughts (Tognazzini), and the limits our mental responsibility when it comes to our phantasies and mind-wanderings (McCormick). We summarize these contributions under the title “The Ethics of Blame, Fear, Decision, Passing Thought, and Phantasy.” Both our subparts illustrate how we might approach an ethics of mind in contemporary philosophy: either “top-down” by deriving insights relevant for mental normativity from already existing debates (first subpart), or “bottom-up” by considering the normative dimensions of specific mental phenomena, and thus providing the building blocks for an ethics of mind (second subpart).

In this second main part, some of our contributions are not (or not primarily) contributions to epistemology, even if epistemology is understood broadly as the study of the normativity of belief. Rather, they are more generally contributions to an *ethics of mind*, or to the discussion about the rationality of attitudes, or about what mental states or attitude we ought to have. Here our outlook is motivated both by general debates about the nature and normativity of rationality, where the focus is commonly not only on belief, but also on intention,[[37]](#endnote-37) by debates about the rationality of emotion,[[38]](#endnote-38) as well as by recent research on, more generally, responsibility for attitudes.[[39]](#endnote-39) Epistemologists can profit from research in these areas because there are parallels between the normativity of belief and the normativity of other attitudes –most strikingly the distinction between two kinds of (purported) reasons for attitudes: object-given and state-given, or “right kind” and “wrong kind” of reasons (on references, see note 22). Turning their attention beyond belief and towards attitudes in general will provide epistemologists with fresh arguments and ideas they would otherwise remain oblivious to.

We discuss the most current ideas revolving around the normativity of mental states, and especially the normativity of belief in the first part. By focusing primarily on belief normativity, we hope to draw some insightful lessons from a flourishing debate which can then be used for working on the normativity of mental states more generally. Going beyond the practical turn in epistemology, our volume reaches towards an ethics of mind.

1. **The Contributions**

Our opening contribution in chapter 2 by Martina Lindner connects the *classicus locus* of the ethics of belief – W. K. Clifford’s paper – with the contemporary discussion about doxastic control. Clifford argues for the evidentialist principle that one should never believe upon insufficient evidence. His position differs from most contemporary evidentialist approaches in that he takes this principle to be a moral norm backed by a consequentialist justification. It is a widely held view that Clifford fails to establish his ethics of belief – not least because, as critics argue, a consequentialist moral framework commits one to an ethics of belief that is (more or less radically) different from Clifford’s position. Lindner shows that examining the question whether Clifford or these critics are right eventually amounts to an empirical investigation; however, she also argues that this philosophical dead end can be avoided by drawing on results from the philosophical debate on doxastic voluntarism. Even though the question can thus not ultimately be answered, Lindner claims that Clifford’s ethics of belief fares better than his critics’ positions with regard to the results from this debate. Furthermore, the widely accepted moderate critical position does not fare much better than the radical one.

Chapter 3 by Matthew Chrisman then proposes a specific account of how doxastic control can explain our responsibility for belief, and how this motivates a social approach toward epistemological issues. In the attempt to understand the norms governing believers, epistemologists have tended to focus on individual belief as the primary object of epistemic evaluation. However, norm governance is often assumed to concern, at base, things we can do as a free exercise or manifestation of our agency. Yet believing is not plausibly conceived as something we freely do but rather as a state we are in, usually as the mostly automatic or involuntary result of cognitively processes shaped by nature, bias, and ideology. In this chapter, Chrisman sketches a response to this tension. This response is based on rejecting the traditional theoretical focus on an individual’s particular beliefs as the primary object of normative epistemic evaluation. If we shift our focus from the particular beliefs of individuals to the community and its information managing practices, we may lessen the tension between norm governance and automaticity and involuntariness in a way that construes autonomous cognitive agency as a resultant of rather than a precondition for our norm-governed epistemic sociality.

In chapter 4, Benoit Gaultier then concludes our first subpart by approaching the issues of control and normativity. He is asking how it is possible for deontic evaluations of beliefs to be appropriate if we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs. Gaultier argues that we should reject the claim that we can have indirect control over beliefs in virtue of the basic voluntary control we have over our actions. We have another kind of indirect control over beliefs: we can demonstrate doxastic strength or, on the contrary, doxastic weakness when forming our beliefs. That is, we can resist or, on the contrary, fail to resist the influence of some of our conative attitudes. And in the same way that we take our actions to be open to blame when they result from having demonstrated weakness of will even though this does not consist in doing something *at will*, we take our beliefs to be open to blame, and hence subject to deontic evaluation, when they result from having demonstrated doxastic weakness even though this does not consist in doing something at will.

Chapter 5 by Lindsay Crawford opens our part on reasons for belief. The central dispute between evidentialists and pragmatists about reasons for belief concerns whether or not non-evidential considerations can be reasons for belief. In recent work, some pragmatists about reasons for belief have made their case for pragmatism by appealing, in part, to a broad range of cases in which facts about one’s relationships with significant others (friends, romantic partners, and the like) appear to give one non-evidential reasons to have beliefs skewed in their favor. Crawford explores whether and how such relationships might provide non-evidential reasons for belief. After first making the case against the evidentialist’s claim that there cannot be non-evidential reasons for belief, she turns to examine different accounts of how our personal relationships might ground reasons for doxastic partiality. These are accounts on which reasons for doxastic partiality are grounded in facts about what attitudes are partly constitutive of being a good significant other to someone, and accounts on which reasons for doxastic partiality are grounded in reasons, more broadly, to benefit one’s significant others. Crawford argues that our personal relationships do not provide non-evidential reasons for belief, even if the pragmatist is right that there can be non-evidential reasons for belief.

In the following chapter 6, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Mattias Skipper defend epistemic instrumentalism against a challenge from alleged asymmetries between epistemic and practical reasons. Epistemic instrumentalists think that *epistemic* normativity is just a special kind of *instrumental* normativity. According to them, you have epistemic reason to believe a proposition insofar as doing so is conducive to certain epistemic *goals* or *aims* – say, to believe what is true and avoid believing what is false. Perhaps the most prominent challenge for instrumentalists in recent years has been to explain, or explain away, why one’s epistemic reasons often do not seem to depend on one’s aims. This challenge can arguably be met. But a different challenge looms: instrumental reasons in the *practical* domain have various properties that *epistemic* reasons do not seem to share. In their contribution, Skipper and Steglich-Petersen offer a way for epistemic instrumentalists to overcome this challenge. Their main thesis takes the form of a conditional: if we accept an independently plausible *transmission principle* of instrumental normativity, we can maintain that epistemic reasons in fact *do* share the relevant properties of practical instrumental reasons. In addition, we can explain why epistemic reasons *seem* to lack these properties in the first place: some properties of epistemic reasons are *elusive*, or easy to overlook, because we tend to think and talk about epistemic reasons in an “elliptical” manner.

Our final contribution on doxastic normativity in chapter 7 explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. There Errol Lord argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.

Our second main part on the ethics of mind more broadly opens with my own proposal for explaining responsibility for attitudes in chapter 8. There I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. We are left with three options: denying that there are any reasons for attitudes, opting for pragmatism about reasons for attitudes, or arguing that the challenge rests on a misunderstanding of the normative force of reasons for attitudes. I finally suggest a version of the last strategy. We can understand the normative force of reasons for attitudes, and thereby solve the problem of mental responsibility, by acknowledging that the way we blame each other for irrationality is different from the way we blame each other when we failed to respond correctly to reasons for action.

Gerhard Ernst’s chapter 9 then tries to clarify the nature of rationality. He does this by distinguishing two fundamentally different kinds of rationality: rationality in the “adjustment-sense” and rationality in the “evaluation-sense.” A person is rational in the adjustment-sense if her mental states are well adjusted to each other, i.e. if her beliefs, emotions and intentions fit together (in a sense Ernst explains); a person is rational in the evaluation-sense if she has evaluative beliefs which are adequate on the basis of her non-evaluative beliefs. Our “rational response system,” as Ernst calls it, is concerned with keeping our mind unified by adjusting our mental states to each other and with evaluating what we believe. On the basis of the distinction between rationality in the adjustment-sense and rationality in the evaluation-sense one can understand what is right about the view that rationality consists in responding adequately to reasons and what is right about the view that rationality consists in being consistent (broadly understood).

Our final subpart on the normativity of specific attitudes is opened by Justin Coates’ contribution on the ethics of blame in chapter 10. It is widely held that if an agent is not morally responsible for her action – i.e., if she is not deserving of blame – then we have a (decisive) reason to refrain from blaming her. But though this is true, the fact that someone *is* deserving of blame isn’t clearly sufficient for there to be most all-things-considered reason for blaming that person. Other considerations bear on this question as well. Coates offers an account of some of these considerations – particularly those that can serve as deontic constraints on blame. He also offers a reply to those skeptical of the “ethics of blame” on the grounds that such theorizing invariably appeals to the “wrong kind of reasons.”

We then turn to the ethics of emotions in chapter 11 – more specifically, to Sabine Döring’s account of the ethics of fear in public contexts. The question is why it is that objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. Answering this question requires an analysis of the nature of fear in the public sphere since feeling safe means to feel that one avoids the frightening, i.e. the threats or dangers that one perceives in the world. Döring argues that the fact resistance fear might display in the public sphere is due to the characteristic function that fear fulfills in this sphere. In the public sphere, fear is typically embodied by “fear narratives,” i.e. by real life structuring stories of local groups which thereby respond to feelings of powerless fear and insecurity. By specifying what the threat is and how to deal with it in the right way, fear narratives reduce felt insecurity. Because of this and by thus enabling a feeling of superiority which may even turn the fear narrative into a narrative of enthusiastic heroism, fear in the public sphere does itself satisfy subjective preferences. This is why objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. The question is how we could and should handle this.

In chapter 12, Matthew Soteriou considers the kind of agency, and thus responsibility, that is involved in deciding to act, rather than in acting itself. One of his aims is to trace out connections between the notion that we occupy a tensed temporal perspective from which we regard the future as open, and the notion that we occupy a deliberative standpoint from which we act under the idea of freedom. A further aim is to suggest that identifying connections between the psychology of self-determination and our temporal psychology should be central to an account of the sort of mental agency we exercise in deciding to act, and hence central to an account of what makes us responsible for our decisions. After having considered ways in which aspects of the psychology of our temporal perspective may contribute to explaining our capacity to exercise agency in deciding to act, Soteriou considers how our capacity to make decisions can contribute to explaining some of the distinctive features of the temporal perspective on the future that we occupy. In particular, he considers and responds to the suggestion that when it comes to our perspective on our future, there is a potential tension between the standpoint of theoretical reason and the standpoint of practical reason.

Neal Tognazzini then turns to how we evaluate and judge one another for our passing thoughts in chapter 13. He explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, Tognazzini argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented toward them, or to see them through a particular mental lens, in a way that produces a particular pattern of salience and silence. That is: caring about someone (at least ideally) has the effect of making some features of that person particularly salient, and silencing or screening off other features from one’s consciousness. One is aptly described as judgmental when one’s thoughts do not display this sort of pattern, indicating a failure to fully adopt the orientation that constitutes properly caring about the person.

Our final chapter 14 by Miriam Schleifer McCormick delineates the limits, or at least one limit, of the ethics of mind. Many theorists, including McCormick herself, have argued that some states of mind are appropriate targets of certain reactive attitudes even if they cannot be directly controlled. McCormick now worries that the scope of agency can be widened too far so that no area of mind is beyond the reach of appropriate assessment and judgement. She begins with the intuition that there is, or ought to be, a domain of the mind that is completely free of normative assessment, where you are safe to let your thoughts and images go wherever they take you without concern that you are doing anything wrong, where praise and shame do not apply. McCormick begins by offering an example of the kind of state she thinks should be beyond normative judgment; she argues that certain kinds of wakeful fantasies are on par with sleeping dreams. If one shares McCormick’s view that there is a “free” domain of the wakeful mind, then what she is doing can be seen as clarifying why such states exempt them from judgment. If one does not share this intuition, then what McCormick is doing can be seen as specifying what criteria *would* be needed for a kind of state (or domain) to be free in this sense. And then some may argue that no wakeful fantasies satisfy these criteria. McCormick addresses those arguments and argues that *if* the fantasies as characterized are appropriate targets of normative assessment, then it will be very difficult to exempt dreams of sleep, as well as other exercises of imagination. Of course, some people (like Augustine and surprisingly many others) will not mind this result. McCormick doesn’t think then that is the end of the discussion, stalemate and parting of intuitions. For she argues that a case can be made for the *value* of having a realm of imagination that is beyond the reach of any kind of judgment.

1. **Outlook**

These last papers which were concerned with the normativity of specific attitudes (chapters 10–14) can be read as exploring various *facets* of an ethics of mind. They might thus provide building blocks for a more encompassing theory of mental normativity that has yet to be spelled out. Our contributions on the possibility of an ethics of mind (chapters 3, 4, and 8) as well as our chapters on what attitudes we ought to have, that is, on issues surrounding reasons and rationality (chapters 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), are meant to inspire such an ethics of mind on a more abstract level – i.e., without focusing on any *specific* attitude. We hope that our volume motivates such approaches and brings epistemologists, (meta)ethicists, and philosophers of mind to a fruitful exchange.[[40]](#endnote-40)

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1. The reactions might come close to or might be sometimes identical with Strawson’s (1962) reactive attitudes (resentment, indignation, guilt, gratitude, …). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. See, for instance, Williams (1999: 35). For a good reader about contemporary classics on skepticism about the external world, see DeRose/Warfield (1999). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. While evidentialists deny that anything besides evidential considerations – i.e., facts indicating the truth of a proposition – can be reasons for belief, pragmatists argue that *also* practical considerations – i.e., prudential or moral considerations that count in favour of holding a specific belief – can count as reasons for belief and thus determine what we ought to believe. For some influential cases for evidentialism, see Adler (2002); Kelly (2003); Shah (2006); Velleman (2000a); Wedgwood (2002). Recent pragmatists include McCormick (2015), Reisner (2009), and Rinard (2015; 2017; 2019; forthcoming), as well as our contributors Crawford, Steglich-Petersen/Skipper, and Lord (see chs. 5–7 in this volume; esp. Lord makes an extensive case for a version of pragmatism when it comes to rationally suspending judgment). It is noteworthy that some epistemologists think that not only *reasons* are relevant for determining what we ought to believe: pragmatic encroachers (see note 31 below for references) argue that what counts as sufficient evidence is determined by the practical stakes at play in believing; not all of them would accept that the practical stakes can enter as reasons to believe (cf. the distinction in Crawford’s contribution, ch. 5 of this volume, sect. 2). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. The account of rationality as responding correctly to one’s apparent reasons – i.e., the reasons one would have if one’s beliefs were true – is associated with Parfit (2001; 2011), and was further spelled out by Schroeder (2009) (for instrumental rationality), and Way (2009; 2010). For a proposal of how to reconcile rationality as coherence and rationality as responding correctly to reasons, cf. the contribution by Ernst (ch. 9). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. “Rationality requires of us that, if we intend an end and believe some means is necessary to that end, then we intend the means. This has to be a requirement of rationality. A person is necessarily irrational if she does not intend whatever she believes is a necessary means to an end she intends” (Broome 2005: 2). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. See Kiesewetter (2017) and Lord (2018), who argue that no formulation of the coherentist requirements of rationality can make it intelligible why we ought to be rational or why we have reason to be rational; see also Kolodny (2005), who motivated their accounts. Kiesewetter and Lord instead propose that we should understand rationality as responding correctly to our (available) reasons, i.e., the reasons that are epistemically accessible or possessed by us. Note that these accounts are quite different from the accounts of rationality as responding correctly to *apparent* reasons mentioned in note 4 above. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Wedgwood (2017: 41–52) argues that in such cases, there are two independent requirements at play: although we ought to believe what is prudentially best according to the “wrong kind of reasons,” we ought to believe what is epistemically rational to believe according to the “right kind of reasons.” There is no question, according to Wedgwood, what to believe “all things considered.” See Meylan (ms), Rinard (2017; 2019) as well as Crawford (this volume, ch. 5, sect. 2) for some disagreement. I argue in Schmidt (2017) that there is *a sense* in which we “ought to believe” what is best to believe in the same way as we ought to do what is best to do. See also the contribution by Coates (ch. 10, sect. 3) for some arguments that the “all-things-considered” question is meaningful, especially when it comes to when we ought to blame. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Martina Lindner, Matthew Chrisman, as well as Benoit Gaultier all discuss the ethics of belief as being concerned with how we influence, manage, or control our beliefs through prior activity (see chapters 1–3), though Lindner ultimately views the control that we have over our beliefs as being very limited. I argue in my contribution (chapter 8) that we need to keep rational and moral criticism distinct in order to understand responsibility for attitudes. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. See McCormick (2015: 1–3) for how contemporary philosophers see a disparity between norms of belief and norms of action, so that belief requires its own kind of ethics (see esp. Adler 2002). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. In the doxastic realm, this line of thought is often traced back to Williams (1970) and Alston (1988). Adams (1985) is often cited as one of the first ones to defend our responsibility for attitudes more generally. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. For some arguments see Bennett (1990), Hieronymi (2006), Schmidt (2016), Scott-Kakures (1994) and Williams (1970). A famous defense of the possibility of deciding to believe is Ginet (2001). McCormick (2015, ch. 6) argues that our beliefs are sometimes subject to the same kind of control as our actions are (guidance control). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Cf. Hieronymi’s definition of voluntariness (2006: 45–49), which I adopt here. She is following Bennett’s (1990) definition. *Prima facie*, a lack of voluntary control might be controversial in the case of intentions. See Kavka (1983), however, for why intentions are as involuntary as any other mental state or attitude. See Soteriou (this volume, ch. 12) on how we can be said to control our decisions (which might be construed as formings of intentions). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. However, John Hyman (2015) argues that even inanimate things, like the sun, can act (it is *shining*). I reserve “action” or “to act” here for full-blooded agency that is intentional under a description. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. I use “mental normativity” here as referring to the phenomenon of normative standards governing our attitudes. One might also wish to point out that there are mental actions that are subject to normative standards. Mental actions, however, do not give rise to the problem of mental normativity because they are, per definition, under our voluntary control. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. On more detailed versions of this problem, see our contributions by Chrisman (ch. 3, sect. 2) and Schmidt (ch. 8, sect. 3). Most contemporary philosophers phrase the puzzle terms of *responsibility*: How can we be *responsible* for our mental states in the absence of voluntary control over them? McHugh (2014) points out that the puzzle arises for norms and reasons if we assume some kind of “Ought implies Can”-principle. See also Alston (1988) and Owens (2000) for the puzzle in terms of norms and reasons. Somewhat oversimplifying, I will here view evaluations expressed in blame, praise, or various forms of reactive and moral attitudes (resentment, indignation, gratitude, guilt) as one form of normative evaluation among others which *seem* to presuppose voluntary control. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Adams already spoke of an “ethics of motives, and more generally of states of mind” (1985: 12). [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. See esp. Ginet (2001), but also McCormick (2015), who refrains from calling the kind of control she has in mind for both action and belief “voluntary control.” She endorses an account for responsibility for hope that is along the lines of her account of doxastic control in McCormick (2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. See, among others, Boyle (2013); Hieronymi (2006; 2008; 2009; 2014; ms); Montmarquet (2013); Raz (2011, esp. his ch. 5 and part III); Smith (2005). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. See especially Adams (1985) and Owens (2000; 2017). Owens only denies “Ought implies Can” for beliefs and emotions, but not for intentions. According to Owens, we are responsible for our intentions in virtue of having *reflective control* over them – a control we also exercise over actions, but which is different from voluntary control nevertheless. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Direct responsibility for belief has most explicitly been denied by Meylan (2013; 2017) and Peels (2017). Also Chrisman’s account (2008; 2018; this volume) emphasizes forms of indirect control, but he distances himself from accounts that view doxastic agency as too external to belief. In this volume, Gaultier (ch. 4) argues that doxastic responsibility is to be explained in terms of indirect control. However, his position is original in that it denies that the relevant form of indirect control is voluntary control. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. This is the idea of Meylan (2013), titled *Foundations of an Ethics of Belief*. There are of course positions that do not neatly fit into one of the categories I present here. Next to Gaultier’s position in this volume (cf. last note), the position of Graham (2014) is to be mentioned, who thinks that we are never directly responsible for our actions, but only for our attitudes. He does not explicitly ground this direct responsibility in control, and thus most likely belongs to the same category as Adams and Owens (see note 19). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. For a discussion of the distinction between object-given and state-given (or right-kind and wrong-kind) reasons, see Gertken/Kiesewetter (2017). The labels “right kind” and “wrong kind” of reasons have their origin in a debate about fitting attitude accounts of value (see Rabinowicz/Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). For some doubts about whether this distinction is applicable to intentions, see Heuer (2018). See Schmidt (ch. 8 of this volume, sect. 2) for some initial characterization of the two kinds of reasons. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. For proposals of how to weigh practical reasons for belief against epistemic reasons, see Reisner (2008; ms) and Steglich-Petersen/Skipper (forthcoming). McCormick (2017) proposes how to weigh different kinds of reasons for *hope* with one another. For a critical voice on weighing both kinds of reasons, see, e.g., Papineau (2013: 70). There has been previous work on the kinds of norms that govern blaming-attitudes (see Coates/Tognazzini 2013; Coates 2016). In this volume, Coates pursues the ethics of blame further (ch. 10). [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Recently, there have been arguments against the “normativity” of epistemic reasons, see Papineau (2013), Rinard (2015), Glüer/Wikforss (2018), Maguire/Woods (forthcoming; ms), Mantel (2019); for a critical discussion, see Paakkunainen (2018). Such arguments can be understood as questioning the normative force of (what we deem to be) *reasons* for belief. Kiesewetter (ms) defends the normativity of epistemic reasons. The worry that epistemic reasons are not normative partly stems from a general worry with considering object-given reasons as normative reasons (see Maguire 2018 for some doubts about the existence of reasons for affective attitudes; see my contribution in ch. 8 of this volume for a discussion of an argument against the existence of object-given reasons more generally). For a recent positive proposal about the significance of evidence, and thus of epistemic normativity, see Mitova (2017, ch. 10), whose account is motivated by Velleman’s (2000b; 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. We might want to distinguish between two questions here (for this distinction, see also Crawford, ch. 5, sect. 2 in this volume): First, do pragmatic factors influence the threshold of when to count a belief as epistemically justified or rational? (See Fantl/McGrath 2002; Kim/McGrath 2019) Secondly, are practical considerations indicating a belief’s value *reasons* for belief? (See note 3 above). [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. See esp. Velleman (2000a), Owens (2003), Steglich-Petersen (2006; 2009; 2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. On weighing different kinds of reasons, see note 23 above. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ginet (2001), McCormick (2015, esp. chs. 3 and 6), Reisner (2008; 2009), and Rinard (2015; 2017; 2019; forthcoming) think that it is possible to believe for practical reasons; Bennett (1990), Hieronymi (2006), Schmidt (2016), Scott-Kakures (1994) and Williams (1970), among others, think that it is not. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. The fourth and fifth question are often seen as interrelated, for many authors argue that we are responsible for beliefs insofar as we are able to control them. See notes 17, 18, and 20 above. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. As pointed out by, for example, Raz (2011: 41-5), epistemic reasons are not related to value in the way practical reasons seem to be. If we do not necessarily realize any value by following our epistemic reasons, how can these reasons possess normative force? See note 24 on the present discussion about the normativity of epistemic reasons. Steglich-Petersen advances an understanding of epistemic reasons as instrumental reasons, which might safeguard their normativity and at the same time preserve their relation to value (see esp. Steglich-Petersen 2011; Skipper/Steglich-Petersen this volume). [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. On virtue epistemology, see esp. Zagzebski (1996), and Sosa (2007/2009). On pragmatic encroachment, see esp. Fantl/McGrath (2002), Hawthorne (2003), and Kim/McGrath (2019). [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. See, e.g., the volume of Pritchard et al. (2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. One topic currently under discussion in social epistemology is, next to discussions about power relations (see next note below), peer disagreement (see Frances 2014 for an introduction). On social epistemology more broadly, see, e.g., Craig (1990), Gilbert (1989), Goldman (1999), Haddock et al. (2010), Matheson/Vitz (2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. On feminist epistemology as a branch of social epistemology, see Anderson (1995). See also the work of Fricker (2007) on power relations in the epistemic realm. For a more recent collection, see Grasswick (2011). See also Grasswick (2014) for a recent discussion of epistemic norms in the context of feminist epistemology. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. For this sort of connection between the debates, see esp. how the two parts of McCormick (2015) are set up. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. See, e.g., the account of Adler (2002). [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. See notes 4–6 for references. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. See esp. de Sousa (1987). Issues under discussion include whether emotions can make it rational to act against one’s best judgment (Arpaly 2000), or whether recalcitrant emotions, i.e., emotions which persist in the face of one’s judging that they are not appropriate, can be rational (Roberts 2003, 91-3; Brady 2007; 2009; Tappolet 2012; 2016, 31-45), and, more generally, discussions about cases in which our emotions conflict with our judgment (Helm 2001, ch. 5; Döring 2009, 2010). On the evaluative dimensions of emotions, see also Price (2015, chs. 6 and 7). [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Here especially the works of Pamela Hieronymi (2006; 2008; 2014) and Angela Smith (2005; 2015a; 2015b) on responsibility for mental states are to be mentioned. Adams (1985) became a classical point of reference for this discussion. Furthermore, various authors argued that we can neither choose our emotions (Oakley 1993, 130-132), nor our intentions (Kavka 1983; Owens 2000, 81-2; Hieronymi 2006) at will. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. I am grateful to Gerhard Ernst and Marie van Loon for very helpful comments. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)