Abstract. Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) are two representatives of German Idealism, both of whom developed impressing category systems. At the core of both systems is the question of the relation of the Absolute to its determinations and the determinations of finite beings. Both idealists try to deduce their respective category systems from the immediacy of the Absolute. Both use combinatorial methods to get from known to new categories or constellations in the system, which then unfold in the world (in creation, in world history etc.). Krause is thereby considered the eponym of so-called panentheism, the doctrine that “Everything is in God.” Hegel is also often referred to as a panentheist. Through a (necessarily superficial) comparison of the two systems of categories, in this essay the thesis will be advocated that Hegel was in no sense a panentheist. Krause is and remains the gold standard of panentheism.¹

I. KRAUSE’S PANENTHEISM: ‘THE WORLD IS PART OF THE CATEGORICAL DETERMINATIONS OF GOD’

I.1 The ‘Wesensschau’ and The Combinatorial Derivation of the Categories of Essence

In the analytic-ascending science Krause derives the conditions of the possibility of cognition and the material as well as formal categories in a transcendental phenomenology of the ‘I’ (or in the “Grundschatz: Ich” as immediate beginning of science). The transcendental categories of cognition are thereby
identical with the categories of being and given by an immanent knowledge “in and through God”, as Benedikt P. Göcke states in his very helpful introduction “The Panentheism of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause“ (2018):

Krause argues that the essentialities, those categories the ego finds in analytic self-observation, with which it already understands itself, in fact, apply to all finite essences, as well as to the scientific principle of fact and knowledge. [...] [T]he material, formal, and material-formal categories recognized in transcendental phenomenology as the essentialities of the ego necessarily refer to all finite things of which the ego can be aware: we cannot help construing external objects as essences that exemplify selfhood, wholeness, positivity, comprehension, directedness, and their syntheses. However, not only finite beings are necessarily grasped with help of these essentialities. The idea of the one infinite and unconditioned essence, that is, the thought of the scientific principle of fact and knowledge, is also understood by these categories [...].

In the following, Krause’s deduction of the categories will be outlined in the second, the synthetic-descending part of science. In this derivation, the system of science shows itself “as a system of material and formal categories,” which is at the same time the “system of the unity of divine properties”; the world thereby proves to be “part of God’s categorial determination,” since it is “as a synthesis of reason and nature part of God’s structure in itself”. Here it should be recalled for comparison that in Hegel’s system the categories unfolded in the Science of Logic (in this article: SL) are interpreted, among other things, as determinations of God ‘before the act of creation’, and the real system comprising nature then represents the historical-worldly unfolding of the divine Absolute, which returns to itself in the Absolute Spirit. In Krause, too, the unity of transcendental categories and determinations of being shows that the absolute substance is at the same time the absolute subject.

The cognition of the material and formal categories in the synthetic part of science takes place in an “organic inner formation of the cognition of essence or God”, which forms an “absolute organic, necessarily articulated sci-

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4 Cf. on this and the entire following: Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 105–135.
5 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 105 and 105, fn. 250.
6 Ibid., 106.
ence”. This view of essence contains, according to its principle, all categories and all cognitions (here, however, only the uppermost categories are presented). It is not possible to express this view in a finite proposition or judgment, because “even every proposition or judgment, as a certain relation, must first be recognized at and in the Wesensschauung”.

This WESENSCHAU (vision of essence) is not conceptual, in the sense that a concept denotes a general instantiated in the individual - for an individual, i.e. sensual, cognition of God is just as impossible as a reduction of this Wesensschau to a pure general cognition. Rather, the Wesensschau is “neither conceptual nor sensible”; it is “itself before and without these, as well as without any opposition, and [it] is both members of each, also of this, opposition only in and among themselves comprehending.” This is reminiscent of Hegel’s doctrine of the Speculative Sentence (Spekulativer Satz) and the copula of the Speculative Sentence unfolding (in the doctrine of judgment and syllogism of the SL) or the “fulfilled copula” as terminus medius of the syllogisms (cf. on this below).

The Wesenschau is “the One Activity of Reason” (i.e. a single, holistic basic act of reason), and “Wesen ist Eine Kategorie” as “the one, infinite object of science”. In this One Category, all other categories are “immediately certainly recognized,” which thus “do not stand unmediated next to each other, but are understood from their origin, God,” which Krause calls “Teilwensenschauungen” (ibid.). The starting point of this derivation of the categories is the question “what is essence in itself [an sich]”, as distinct from the question what is essence within itself [in sich]: “That which is an essence in itself is determined on the one hand by what it is within itself, but is independent of it on the other hand. That which constitutes an essence within itself can have other properties than the essence in itself, whereby the inner constituents in themselves are in turn determined by their essences in themselves and also determine these. A self-identical und whole essence as self-identical and whole is thus at the same time independent of its inner constitution, since its

9 K.C.F. Krause, Anfangsgründe der Erkenntnislehre, (1892), 42.
10 Krause, System, 362.
12 Krause, System, 365.
properties belong to itself and not to its parts, and determined by its inner constitution in its essence as such an essence that it is”\(^{13}\).

The starting point, then, is the answer to the question of what essence in itself is: “Wesen weset Wesen” ['Essence essences Essence'].\(^{14}\) However, the derivation of the categories from this judgment of essence is not a formal derivation in the sense of a semantic-logical implication, where a statement A is logically-semantically contained in a statement B precisely when it can be deduced according to the rules of inference of the presupposed calculus of sequences: "Krause’s understanding of implication is rather that of an ontological implication”\(^{15}\):

> Essence to Essence, or God to God. Therein and thereto is every relation. Now, since every conceivable member is at, or in, and under Essence, and every conceivable essence is at, or in, and under the Essencehood of Essence [Wesenheit Wesens], every binary relation stands in the form: Essence-as-A according to the Essencehood Essence-as-B relates to Essence-as-C; whereby A and B and C can also be the same.\(^{16}\)

\textbf{I.2 The material categories of WESENHEIT (essencehood),\ newline SELBHEIT (selfhood) and GANZHEIT (wholeness):}

In the Wesensschau in the first part of the synthetic-descending science it is shown that the judgment “Wesen weset Wesen [Essence essences Essence]” contains all other judgments in itself, with which all material and formal categories can be derived. In the judgment of essence “Wesen weset Wesen,”

\(^{13}\) Göcke, 	extit{Alles in Gott?}, 110: „Dasjenige, was ein Wesen an sich ist, wird auf der einen Seite von dem, was es in sich ist, bestimmt, ist aber auf der anderen Seite davon unabhängig. Dasjenige, was ein Wesen in sich konstituiert, kann andere Eigenschaften haben als das Wesen an sich, wobei die inneren Konstituenten an sich wiederum von ihren Wesenheiten in sich bestimmt werden und auch diese bestimmen. Ein selbst und ganes Wesen als selbst und ganzes ist somit von seiner inneren Konstitution zugleich unabhängig, da seine Eigenschaften ihm selbst und nicht seinen Teilen zukommen, und durch seine innere Konstitution in seinem Wesen bestimmt als ein solches Wesen, das es ist."

\(^{14}\) K.C.F. Krause, 	extit{Abriss des Systems der Philosophie} (1886), 101; Göcke, 	extit{Alles in Gott?}, 111.

\(^{15}\) Göcke, 	extit{Alles in Gott?}, ibid.

however, nothing about essence is distinguished, since “both parts [denote] the same: Essence”. God, as Essence, is one in whom nothing can be distinguished, yet at the same time “an essence that is identical with its essence”: $E = E$. The identity of Essence constitutes a self-mediation; it involves a supreme distinction in Essence: that “Essence is Essence”. This distinction is conceived as that between essence and its essencehood, with essence and essencehood being “equally encompassing” and being “thought of wholly in terms of one another”.

The substantive spelling out is given by the answer to the question “What is the essencehood of essence?”: “The essencehood of essence is the essencehood-unity [WESENHEITEINHEIT], i.e., ‘unity is That which is the essencehood of essence’” (ibid.) Thus, what is essence is the unity of that which is essence; the unity of the essencehood of essence is thereby the unity of essencehood itself, independent of the wholeness, partiality, and unity [Ganzheit, Teilheit, Vereinheit] of its parts (ibid.). This categorical unity thus gives rise to two further categories: selfhood (SELBHEIT) and wholeness (GANZHEIT), which are “at the essencehood of essence [Wesenheit Wesens] as the [essencehood]-unity are simultaneous but distinct”. The essencehood of essence is the unity of selfhood and wholeness (essence itself is thus selfhood and wholeness each as a whole — and this recalls the disjunctive judgment in Hegel’s Logic, which is already an adequate representation of the Notion [Begriff] in which the Notion is each of its disjunctive moments as a whole and complete). I.e., “Essence is thus essence, essencehood, essencehood-unity, selfness, and wholeness [= Wesenheit, Wesenheitseinheit, Selbheit, Ganzheit]”. Finally, selfness is to be interpreted with Krause as the property of self-sufficiency, and wholeness as the property that the whole is above its parts. In this sense, sameness [Selbheit] is the unconditionality of God and wholeness [Ganzheit] is his infinity. Entirely in the sense of the classical via eminentiae, these determinations of God are “positive descriptions of God’s essencehood-unity increased to infinity, since this is a description of essence

17 Krause, System, 364; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 113.
18 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, ibid.
19 Krause, System, 364; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, ibid.
20 Krause: ibid.; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 114.
21 Krause, System, 365; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, ibid.
22 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, ibid.
in contrast to the negating and therefore indirect linguistic circumscription of God." 

To fully clarify the idea of unity, “God as pure unity must be distinguished from that of which he is unity, for ‘we still further distinguish the unity of essencehood itself, from these two its partial essencehoods [Teilwesenheiten], from selfhood [Selbheit] and wholeness [Ganzheit]’. The unity of essencehoods [Wesenheiteneinheit] in the difference of selfhood and wholeness is the “primordial unity of essencehood [Ureinheit der Wesenheit],” the “WESENHEITUREINHEIT,” and thus that higher unity that encompasses selfhood and wholeness (ibid.). In this higher unity of selfhood and wholeness, “each is the other in itself,” which is precisely reminiscent of the total mediations in Hegel’s dialectical-speculative method. Krause also calls this higher unity or synthesis “Nebenwesenheitvereinheit,” “Selbvereinganzheit,” or “Selbganzvereinwesenheit” — in the terminology of unconditionality and infinity, it would thus be called “infinite unconditionality” and “unconditional infinity.”

Every differentiation therefore takes place against the background of a unity encompassing the differentiated. The selfhood as unconditionality of essence and the wholeness as infinity of essence must form a unity with this comprehensive primordial unity: The “primordial self-unificationessencehood” (URSELBVEREINWESENHEIT) is the comprehensive unity with regard to the unity with the selfhood, and the “primordial wholeness-unity” (URGANZEINHEIT) is the comprehensive unity with regard to the unity with the wholeness. Finally, the unity of the URWESENHEINHEIT with the unity of Selbheit and Ganzheit is called the VEREINWESENHEIT DER VEREINWESENHEIT (Unificationessencehood of Unificationessencehood) as “synthesis of unity with synthesis”.

This category relation already emerged in the phenomenological, analytic-ascending part of Krause’s Doctrine of Science, but there the material categories still stood unmediated next to each other. Here in the synthetic part, they are unfolded from their unitary ground and remain tied back to

23 Ibid., 115.
24 Krause, System, 368; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 116.
25 Krause, System, 368; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 117.
26 Göcke, ibid.
27 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 117f.
it as a higher synthesis: to God himself, whose infinite properties they are. \[28\]

“God is [...] not only infinite and unconditional, but also infinitely unconditional and unconditionally infinite, which in relation to God’s unity means that God’s unity is also the unity of the difference between that which is ever distinguished in God as unity. If something is distinguished in God, this distinction already names a higher, a primordial unity, which must again be thought united with what is distinguished in God”. \[29\]

I.3 The formal categories of SATZHEIT (positedness), RICHTHEIT (directionality) and FASSHEIT (comprehension):

All material category can be derived combinatorially from the categories of essencehood, selfness and wholeness. Moreover, to each material category corresponds a formal category. These include the formal categories of positedness (SATZHEIT), directionality (RICHTHEIT), and comprehension (FASSHEIT): Krause uses this to refer to the common term of Setzung (positing) in German Idealism: the finite Setzung or Satzheit of the I is determined by God’s Satzheit, by which is meant God’s infinite positivity or positive essence, from which any passivity in the sense of foreign influence is excluded. \[30\]

The formal category of directionality denotes “relatedness” or “relation,” i.e., relationality, and, first of all, the infinite self-reference of divine positivity: in this sense, God’s positivity is directionality directed toward itself or an “unconditional being-directed-at-itself”. \[31\]

Finally, the formal category corresponding to God’s wholeness is the so-called comprehension (Fassheit), “that is, the [category]: to grasp, to encompass, to apprehend”. \[32\] Again, there must be a higher unity of directionality and comprehension into which both are bound back: it is called the ‘primordial unity of positedness’ (SATZHEITUREINHEIT), which as such is the Wesenheithureinheit with respect to the

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28 Ibid., 118.
29 Ibid., 134: „Gott ist [...] nicht nur unendlich und unbedingt, sondern auch unendlich unbedingt und unbedingt unendlich, was in Bezug auf Gottes Einheit bedeutet, dass Gottes Einheit auch die Einheit des Unterschiedes zwischen demjenigen ist, was in Gott je als Einheit unterschieden wird. Wird etwas in Gott unterschieden, so ist mit dieser Unterscheidung schon eine höhere, eine Ureinheit benannt, die wieder mit dem an Gott Unterschiedenen vereint gedacht werden muss.“
30 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 119.
31 Ibid., 120.
32 Krause, System, 371; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 120.
form of essence: “Essence is therefore in itself also the higher unity of positivity relative to the difference between directionality and comprehension, since the positivity of essence is the unity of the positivity of what is positive about essence”.33 The formal category corresponding to the material category of the entity of essence is thus the ‘positedness-unity’ (SATZHEITEINHEIT), that of the positedness is the formal category of the directionality, and that of the wholeness is the formal category of the comprehension, and finally the formal category corresponding to the material category of the primordial unity of essencehood (Wesenheitserhebung) is that of the primordial positedness-unity (Satzheitserhebung); all further formal categories result from combinatorial combinations.34

I.4 The categories SEINHEIT (beingness), GEHALTSEINHEIT (content-unity), VERHALTSEINHEIT (fact-unity):

“God is infinitely unconditionally directed to himself as the all-embracing unity of infinity, unconditionality, directionality and comprehension”; thereby, the synthesis of essence and positedness now results in the formal-material categories or categories of beingness (SEINHEIT) as the third category class.35 It is true here that “The concept of existence [(Da)Sein] is thus not an immediate concept for Krause, but another name for the Posited Essencehood [Satzige Wesenheit]. [...] Only when we think the essencehood and the positedness together, we get the concept of Being.”36 In comparison with Hegel’s three category classes (categories of Being, categories of Essence, categories of Notion), a difference emerges here: for Hegel, the determination of Being at the beginning of the SL is the first immediate concept, even if the Absolute Idea itself is already hidden in it, which is why the immediate concept of Being also immediately shows itself as a mediated concept that contains the categories of Essence as its “inner side,” while the sphere of the categories of Notion is the sublation or synthesis of the sphere of Being and the sphere of Essence.

For Krause, “Only when we think essencehood and positedness together do we get the concept of Being. Being as Being is ‘the One Being

33 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 122.
34 Cf. Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 122.
35 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, ibid.
36 Ibid., 122f.
[Sein], God is the One being [Seiendes], or being is the unity of being-unity [Seiendeinheit].37 For the BEINGNESS (Seinheit) of essence as unity-essence [Vereinwesen] (i.e., as synthesis of essencehood and positedness sublated into unity), it holds: “Since essence is the unity of that which is essence, essence is also the unity of beingness and selfhood, fact-unity [VERHALT-SEINHEIT], and essence is the unity of beingess-wholeness, content-unity [GEHALTSEINHEIT]. - From the synthesis of beingess and selfhood results the fact-unity, which means that ‘essence [...] is related to itself’.”38 From the fact that the concept of being is again referred back to the wholeness and selfhood contained in the essence of God, the categories of RELATION and IDENTITY follow: the content-unity is relation, in that it is being-directed-to-itself (while the category of directionality is being-directed-to-itself and that of being-hold is being-hold-by-itself) - it is the “supreme self-relation of the Absolute to itself”; and the content-unity is identity as unit of content resp. as having-itself-entirely-grasped, “since the identity of the essence consists in having ever already grasped itself as a whole”.39

Fact-unity (Verhaltseinheit) and content-unity (Gehaltseinheit), i.e., relation and identity, like wholeness and selfhood, in turn form a higher unity, the so-called unity-unity (VEREINSEINHEIT). In it, in God, relation and identity are actually the same (they are distinguishable but not separable) — after all, God himself is the category of Verhaltseinheit and Gehaltseinheit in himself. Now the higher unity relative to the distinction of content-unity and selfhood is the primordial unity of beingness (SEINHEIT-UREINHEIT). Therefore, in God being and essence are the same, it is not possible to think God without being.40 The “The primordial unity of beingness of the essence is nothing other than the unity of essence and the essencehood of essence” (ibid., 124). The categories that result from the synthesis of the material and formal categories are thus: SEINHEIT (beingness), SEINHEITUREINHEIT

37 Krause, System, 374; Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 123.
38 Krause, System, 374; according to Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 123: „Da Wesen die Einheit dessen ist, was Wesen ist, ist Wesen auch die Einheit der Seinheit und Selbheit, Verhaltseinheit, und Wesen ist dien Einheit von Seinheit Ganzheit, Gehaltseinheit. - Aus die Synthese von Seinheit und Selbheit ergibt sich die Verhaltseinheit, was bedeutet, dass Wesen [...] zu sich Selbst sich verhaltend [ist].“
39 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 124.
40 Ibid., 124f.
The categories of all cognition and all being are thus recognized in a combinatorial way from the One Essence or the supreme judgment of essence “Wesen weset Wesen”:42

Each category results from the fact that each category is united with every other category to a synthesis; if one designates the uppermost material and formal categories with letters A, B, C, the abstract scheme results:

These combinatorial compositions can be repeated infinitely often. For the formal and material categories it results that the following categories can be combined infinitely often because of the unity of the essence of God:43

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41 Ibid., 125.
42 Ibid., 126f.
43 Göcke, Alles in Gott?, 128.
This Krauseian category theory is meant to express the basic panentheistic idea that “the world is part of the categorical determinations of God”. The panentheistic basic idea states that “everything is in God.” The world is in God, but God is nevertheless not identical with the world, but is nevertheless distinct from the world—but as a difference in God himself. To this end, Krause distinguishes between ‘God in himself’ (Krause calls this the “Orwesen”), who is above all opposites, and ‘God in himself’ (according to Krause, the “Urwesen”), i.e., God who is in himself differentiated from the world. On this being-different-in-himself, Krause writes:

Thus the old controversy concerning the relation of God to the world, ‘whether God is an extra-worldly and the world an extra-divine being or not’, is no longer valid. God is an extra-worldly and the world an extra-divine being or not, satisfactorily solved; for it is seen by the distinction of essence himself as a primordial essence, that God, as one, the same, whole essence, is neither neither outside, nor above, nor on, nor in the world, but that God is in Himself, under Himself, and through Himself also the world. And through himself is also the world; likewise, that God as a primordial essence is outside and above the world, and the world is apart from him as the primordial essence, and finally also that God as a primordial essence is united with the world, united with reason, with nature and with the with the unity of both, as well as with mankind.
II. HEGEL’S COMBINATORIAL DERIVATION OF
THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE

II.1 The Dialectic of Being and Nothing at the Be-
ginning of Science of Logic (SL)

G.W.F. Hegel wants to present in his ‘Science of Logic’ (the great Nuremberg Logic, as well as the Logic in the Encyclopedia of Sciences) the (self-)unfolding of the determinations (categories) of the Absolute (the Absolute Idea). 47 The categories of the absolute are thereby divided into three large spheres: First, the sphere of the logic of being, which includes external determinations such as the categories of quality, quantity, and measure; second, the sphere of the logic of essence, which unfolds the categories of the “interior,” i.e., of being reflected in itself (such as the determinations of reflection and the categories of appearance and actuality); and third, the sphere of the logic of the Notion (Begriff), i.e. the unfolding of the notional moments up to the logical idea. All three spheres relate to each other like a dialectical three-step:

- Synthesis (mediated immediacy — Vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit): sphere of the categories of Notion.

The sphere of the Logic of Essence is thus the sphere that mediates between categories of Being and categories of thought, a sphere of objective being and of mind at the same time. In Krause we have seen that this sphere of Essence is the central sphere which unfolds the determinations of the Absolute or God from the immediate beginning of the judgment of essence “Wesen weset Wesen”. In Hegel’s Logic, the three spheres of Being, Essence, and Notion are in turn divided into three-steps of “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” or immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy. Thus, all three spheres possess their respective immediate beginnings, which in turn are strictly parallel according to the parallelism of the spheres. The sphere of being begins with the pure self-identical being as immediacy: Being = Being. Existence, in turn, is the beginning of the reflection

of Essence. In the Logic of Essence the beginning shows up as existence and as actuality of the substantiality (which is the return into the Notion), and in the Logic of Notion the first beginning is finally the abstract generality, and objectivity as the beginning of the return into the Idea.\(^48\)

On the beginning of the Logic of Being, the being-nothing dialectic is the first case of the direction of the logical idea: at the beginning of the SL is ‘Pure Being’, in which, after reaching the standpoint of absolute knowledge at the end of the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} (PhS), thinking is itself given in pure immediacy. Nothing is external to the absolute self-consciousness at the end of PhS, but nevertheless it is not without any relatedness: the empty thinking at the beginning of SL is its other, which, however, is sublated in its otherness. ‘Being’ at the beginning of SL is the Notion \textit{in itself} (\textit{Begriff an sich}), which has not yet become the Notion \textit{for itself} (\textit{Begriff für sich}).\(^50\) In the immediately posited beginning, being is present as absolute indeterminacy and indistinguishability (identity with itself), which thus also negates nothing, especially not the distinctness from others. Being is simple totality, which knows no ‘outside’, no external relation to an other of itself. Consequently, the immanence of dialectics appears here: Being S in its pure self-identity S = S knows no outside,\(^51\) but precisely through its self-identity it is mediated with itself (the un-mediated itself already states a negative reference to mediation and is thus related and mediated). It is the other of itself, the mediating ‘nothing’ as absolute difference in itself. ‘Being’ thus disappears in its opposite, which is nothing other than itself.\(^52\) If one takes ‘being’ as subject and ‘nothing’ as predicate, the structure of the \textit{Speculative Sentence} (\textit{Spekulativer Satz}) emerges: ‘The immediate is the mediated’.\(^53\)

The self-identity of Pure Being of the beginning, S = S, is the \textit{analytic aspect}, the mediation is the synthetic aspect, and the fact that it remains an

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immanent mediation is again to be regarded as a (higher) analytic moment. “This progress is just as analytic, in that through the immanent dialectic only that is posited which is contained in the immediate concept, - as synthetic because in this concept the difference was not yet posited”.54 The analytic beginning is already differentiated in itself and thus a synthetic one - the positing of a pure X as an abstract immediate leads precisely to immanent mediation: being is the pure relation of self-identity as a relation without (abstractly fixed or fixable) relata - thus ‘being’ is not equal to itself as a (fixed) relatum, nor is it unequal to a hypostasized ‘nothing’.55 ‘Being’ and ‘nothing’ are not both identical and non-identical, since there is no relation of identity or difference between them as (completed) relata. The resulting synthetic category of ‘Becoming’ (Werden) is thus not to be understood in such a way that initially an empty ‘being’ exists for itself and that this would subsequently pass into ‘nothing’ or into which it would disappear, but rather ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ exist only in a Ceasing-to-be (Verschwinden) that is in itself Coming-to-be (Entstehen): in a non-completed passing and coming into being of both.56 In Krause’s terminology, the category of Becoming would probably have to be called SEINNICHSTVEREINTHEIT (being-nothing unity).

II.2 The Hegelian Speculative-dialectical Method and its Modes

First, it should be noted that there is not ‘the’ dialectic in Hegel as an abstract and superordinate method equally applicable to everything — this understanding would be too extrinsic.57 The dialectical-speculative method is analogous according to the different dimensions and spheres in which it is at work. Dialectical contexts are such that an X is to be determined by being differentiated from its negative ~X by negation, and that this first negation is in turn negated (negation of negation) and leads back to a new and higher form of X mediated by the negative. Let this “dialectical-speculative method” be illustrated (inadequately, of course) in the following scheme.58

54 Enz., § 238, addendum; cf. Knauer, Synthesis und Analysis, 41.
55 Grotz, Negationen, 294–303.
56 Ibid., 258–282, 315–326.
(1) The assertion of the understanding: Let X be an abstract (indeterminate) immediate. This is a first analytic moment of the method.

(2) Step of dialectical (negative) reason: in the attempt to determine X, it is determined via the (formal) negation n^X to its negative ~X,59 with n^X as morphism60 symbolized by: X → n^X ~X. In doing so, and this is the incipient dialectical moment, the structure of X inheres in ~X. This means that X contains its negative “in its concept” and through this negative X is internally (further) determined or “mediated”: X is “posited” by ~X. I.e., dialectical mediation likewise implies a transition into the “dialectical (internal) identity” i^X of X and ~X: X → i^X ~X. The interplay of negation n^X and (internal) identity i^X is the dialectical determinate negation D^X: X → D^X ~X.

(3) Step of speculative (positive) reason: However, X negates this positing by ~X in a negation of negation (or absolute negation) D^2X. This negation of negation bespeaks a re-reference, a sublation, and a new self-relation of X to itself: X → D^2X ~X → D^2X.

(4) The same happens with ~X, it contains its negative, X, “in its concept” and is set by its negative (step of dialectical reason): ~X → D^X X, but it negates this, however, in a negation of the negation D^2X (step of speculative reason) and thus returns to itself “enriched” by the “passage” through its negative (re-reference, sublation, new self-expression relation):~X → D^X X → D^2X ~X.

This is the synthetic moment of the method.

59 The symbol ‘~’ is not to be understood here as a negation symbol in a propositional calculus, but in a broad sense as a symbol for dialectical negation in the sense to be explicated. The propositional negation sign is denoted by ‘¬’.

60 Hereby a morphism is understood in the sense of the Mathematical Category Theory. Such a morphism is neither a relation nor a function in a set-theoretic sense. The category of pure morphisms in Mathematical Category Theory is independent of set theories, it consists only of morphisms without objects, respectively the ‘termini’ of a pure morphism are again morphisms (e.g. the identity morphism, which can operate like an object). In this sense, X would be taken to be id(X) and the formula would correctly be id(X) → D id(~X), etc. In my opinion, the category of pure morphisms in Mathematical Category Theory is the adequate formal tool to formally reconstruct Hegel’s Science of Logic. However, this will not be further discussed here. Cf. in detail Schneider, Fundamentalstruktur, 249–329.
In the end, a “higher unity” results, in which X and ¬X are dialectically identical and different at the same time: The first immediacy is re-established, but as a higher unity of the immediate with the mediated/mediating (i.e., as mediated or concrete immediacy, or as identity of identity and non-identity). This is a second, higher analytic moment of the method, represented by a comprehensive bracket:

\[ X = (X \leftrightarrow ^{D} \sim X). \]

Another essential observation is important: While in a propositional calculus, where a negated X, i.e. \( \neg X \) is “in itself still completely indeterminate” and accordingly there is an indirectly proportional relation of determinacy and indeterminacy of X and \( \neg X \) (the more determinate X is, the more indeterminate \( \neg X \) is), in the dialectical-speculative method it is a matter of direct proportionality: “The determinacy resp. indeterminacy of both members is perfectly parallel, in direct proportion”\(^{61}\). The absolute negation is affirmation and negation (positivity and negativity) in one, which leads to the doctrine of the speculative sentence as the primordial unity of analysis and synthesis.\(^{62}\)

This “basic structure” of the Hegelian Dialectic becomes really intelligible only if it is seen in connection with the whole of Hegel’s system — i.e. the meaning of “certain negation” and “absolute negation” can only be understood if they are not seen as isolated steps of thought in the progress of logic, but as moments of the thought process as (logical) totality. This will be explained in the following.\(^{63}\)

Immanuel Kant left behind two basic problems, to which Hegel links once negatively and once positively: (1) As epistemic-metaphysical problem the dichotomy of appearance and thing-in-itself, and (2) the problem of transcendental apperception as unity of analytic and synthetic unity of understanding. Hegel rejects the dichotomy between appearance and thing-in-itself and between subject and object: pure thinking (not conceived as thinking of a particular subject, but as the logical dimension of thinking in general) is a coherent totality that admits no gap and no outside in the Kantian sense. In

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\(^{61}\) Coreth, Das dialektische Sein, 41.


the unfolding of logic, thought conceives the categories ‘at them themselves’ *(an ihnen selbst)*, i.e. it conceives their coherence as the arising of one category from the other (the unity of analytical and synthetic unity of thought). According to Hegel, this *act of coherence of thought* can be differentiated into the individual moments of the dialectical-speculative method, which in particular makes clear the role of the ‘determinate negation’ or the ‘positivity of negation’ as the inner structure of the comprehensive coherence:64

Hegel thus asserts that negation understood dialectically is to be grasped as determinate negation because it is negation of a determinate thing, or: because the result of negation contains what it results from. Is this assertion intelligible? The crux of the matter lies in the asserted necessity of a turning back [Rückwendung] the movement of thought or concept into the first or immediate. This necessity can be shown as follows: If negation is not conceived as an abstract or isolated step of thought, but as a moment within the process of thought, then negation necessarily implies reference to the preceding moment; but this reference is consequently a backward-reference [Rückbezug]; for negation was a movement of going away or going on [des Weg- oder Weitergehens]. The backward-reference, however, then means that the negation as movement does not run into emptiness, but ‘grasps’ the initial thing again, i.e. restores or fulfills it, in short: determines it. Thus the negation proves to be a determinate one.65

These categories are, on the one hand, abbreviations for the propositional schemes of object-related speaking (the object language), on the other hand, they are already ontological structures themselves (semantics is the real *qua* semantics).66 ‘The coherence as totality conceives thinking here in an...
encompassing illocutionary act, through which all further object-language determinations take place and whose individual modes (the categories) are explicated in a metalanguage (self-interpretation of thinking) (cf. this with Krause’s WESENSCHAU as “the One Activity of Reason”, i.e. as the single, holistic basic act of reason, as explained above). Thought thereby reflexively realizes its coherence by breaking the separation of meta- and object-language in particular illocutionary (sub-)acts, which are exactly the modes (categories) of the all-encompassing illocutionary act. At the level of the metalanguage, these modes/expressions are already used to articulate the determinations of the object language in its passage, even if they have not yet occurred in the object language at that particular stage. At the end of the whole course stands the absolute idea as culmination and total mediation of all determinations of the object-logical language and all meta-linguistic (methodological) determinations necessarily arising on the way towards it. The absolute idea is the unity of object- and meta-language (methodological language) and therefore method in itself. As method it is itself the insight into the negative activity of the absolute, which on the one hand sets and on the other hand abolishes every limited, finite single determination. As a fundamental-semantic structure, it is also not only empty formal method, but method and thing are ultimately one and the same.  

Only in this comprehensive context “determinate negation” and “absolute negation” are explicable. The absolute idea itself is absolute negativity, the method here is ultimately the analytic-synthetic structure of the Speculative Sentence, and this runs through all individual dialectical steps of the lower spheres up to the absolute idea as unity of subjective and objective concept / subjective and objective idea. Thus, quite fundamentally, “absolute negation” is the relation of absolute concept or absolute idea to its (finite) posittings. The lower spheres (logic of being and logic of essence) are only comprehensible as posited by (gesetzt von) the Absolute Idea: “The question about the method is the question about the idea, which is therefore qua method in all its forms the idea realizing itself, positing the individual stages. These lower levels are the

68 Ibid., 40 and 67.
idea in the form of being, essence etc. The dialectical-speculative method shows itself in the individual settings in three basic “modes”:

1. **External transition** (Äußerliches Übergehen): The opposite determinations ‘transit into each other’, i.e. they do not preserve themselves as such in the higher unity or in the dialectical-speculative progress (example: being and nothing are not sublated as such in the category of becoming, but only as “disappearance” and “arising”). This is the mode of the method in the lowest sphere, the sphere of Being.

2. **Reflection** (Reflexion): The opposite determinations preserve themselves in the higher unity as such, they are “posited” in the respective correlate and are “reflections in each other” (example: The dialectic of the positive and the negative). This is the mode of the method in the middle sphere, the sphere of Essence.

3. **Development** (Entwicklung): The three determinations in a dialectical-speculative step are in each case themselves the sublation, or higher unity of the respective other two moments (example: the dialectical-speculative relation of the notional moments universality, particularity and individuality [Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit, Einzelheit]). This is the mode of method in the third and highest sphere, the sphere of Notion. The higher mediation of universality, particularity and individuality happens via the doctrine of judgment and syllogism in the Subjective Logic of the sphere of Notion.

II.3 The Combinatorics of the Categories of Notion in the Doctrine of Judgment and Syllogism

Again, combinatorial iterations within the spheres are possible, as a

- universal universality (allgemeine Allgemeinheit),
- particular universality (besondere Allgemeinheit),
- individual universality (einzeln Allgemeinheit),
- etc.

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69 Ibid., 41, fn. 84.
Also the spheres of Being, Essence and Notion themselves stand, as already indicated above, again in a dialectical-speculative relation, already according to the notionallogical mode. With the iteration of the modes, it should also be pointed out that in Hegel, via the Gestalt transformation through its modes, the method itself is woven into the dialectical-speculative totality of the system and cannot be separated from it.

The Absolute Idea is thereby the concrete totality, or totality of totalities, since its positing activity first brings forth all totalities (as an analytic moment of its activity), releases them into their own state (synthetic moment) and takes them back into itself into higher unity that does not annihilate multiplicity (again an analytic moment): analysis folds unity into multiplicity apart without separation, synthesis unites without producing abstract identity. This synthesis (via absolute negation) is thereby only comprehensible because it takes place against the background of primordial unity. The idea as a method has thus essentially the judgment-structure (Urteilsstruktur) of the Speculative Sentence, it is the Notion dividing itself into the extremes of the judgement (this is the ‘Ur-division’ [Ur-Teilung] of the Notion), whereby these extremes are bound back by the absolute-negative metastructure of the idea into its primordial unity, which is represented by the copula of the judgement. The idea is hereby the fulfilled copula (erfüllte Kopula) itself. The fulfilled copula is then already a merging (Zusammen-Schluss) in the form of the terminus medius of the syllogisms, and the full mediation of the extremes back into the unity of the Notion is then provided by Hegel in the explication of the doctrine of the syllogisms.

If one designates the notional moments of universality with “U”, of particularity with “P” and of individuality with “I”, the basic form of the positive judgment “The individual is a universal” (a subject is a predicate, “S is P”) is: “I is U” or simply “I - U”, the judgment “The individual is a particular” is “I - P”, and so on. A syllogism can then have the form:

1st premise: I - P (e.g., “Socrates is a human being.”)

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70 Cf. correspondingly Georg Werckmeister, Hegels absoluter Schluss als logische Grundstruktur der Objektivität (TU Kaiserslautern, 2009); Schäfer, Die Dialektik; Coreth, Das dialektische Sein, 97–102; Georg Sans, Die Realisierung des Begriffs. Eine Untersuchung zu Hegels Schlusslehre (De Gruyter, 2004).
71 Cf. Puntel, „Hegel heute“, 157
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2nd premise: P - U (e.g., “All human beings are mortal.”)

Conclusion: I - U (“Socrates is mortal.”)

Or in short: I - P - U, or IPU.

In his doctrine of syllogisms, Hegel goes through the following combinatorial possibilities, each corresponding to the modes of the sphere of Being and the sphere of Essence, which repeated in the doctrine of syllogisms in this way as well (after Werckmeister, Hegels absoluter Schluss, 40):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllogisms of Existence</th>
<th>Science of Logic:</th>
<th>Encyclopedia:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st figure</td>
<td>I — P — U</td>
<td>I — P — U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd figure</td>
<td>U — I — P</td>
<td>U — I — P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd figure</td>
<td>I — U — P</td>
<td>[P — U — I ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematical Syllogism</td>
<td>A — A — A</td>
<td>A — A — A</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllogisms of Essence</th>
<th>Science of Logic:</th>
<th>Encyclopedia:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allness</td>
<td>I — P — U</td>
<td>I — P — U</td>
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<tr>
<td>Induction</td>
<td>U — I — P</td>
<td>U — I — P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analogy</td>
<td>I — U — P</td>
<td>[P — U — I ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Syllogisms of Necessity</th>
<th>Science of Logic:</th>
<th>Encyclopedia:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categorical Syllogism</td>
<td>I — P — U</td>
<td>I — P — U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothetical Syllogism</td>
<td>U — I — P</td>
<td>U — I — P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disjunctive Syllogism</td>
<td>I — U — P</td>
<td>[P — U — I ]</td>
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In Hegel’s theory of syllogism, the last, the disjunctive syllogism, represents a structure in which the all-encompassing unity seems to be achieved, and which makes the concrete universal and the full self-mediation of universality, particularity, and individuality completely explicit as moments of the absolute. The concrete universality is that unity which does not exclude multiplicity. Likewise, the external conclusion of understanding seems to be finally overcome, and with regard to the comprehensive unity articulated in the terminus medius, it is true that it no longer stands abstractly and externally op-
posite the extremes of the conclusion like a further, differentiated extreme - it is rather the “holding ground” encompassing the opposites.73

II.4 The Three Syllogistic Combinations of the Hegelian System

The total mediation of all determinations is finally achieved by the complete combinatorial permutation of the notional moments. However, in the doctrine of syllogism this does not seem to have succeeded yet — some permutations are missing. The incompleteness of the Schlusslehre is also indicated by the lack of a ‘syllogism of the concept’74 According to Schäfer, Die Dialektik, completeness is only reached in the methodological-dialectical syllogism of the absolute idea; other interpreters, however, see completeness only reached when the ‘absolute syllogism’ or the three major syllogisms of the system are added at the end of the encyclopedia. These three syllogisms are briefly given in the following:

After philosophy emerged from art and religion as their unity at the end of the Encyclopedia, the spirit ultimately rejoined the unity. Hegel now presents religion and philosophy as a threefold system of syllogisms in which each terminus totally mediates the others.75 In § 575ff. of the Encyclopedia, the three great syllogisms of philosophy are now the three figures of the syllogisms of the spheres of the SL (the Logical / the Logos), nature, and spirit, which represents the absolute syllogism:76

1) The first syllogism of the system is the one “which has the logical as its ground as its starting point and nature as its center, which unites the spirit with it. The logical becomes nature and nature becomes spirit” (Enz. § 575): the logical idea brings forth nature from itself and operates in it as its deep structure, and in its course through history brings forth the spirit and unites nature with it. Nature as the particular (P) thus mediates between the logical as the universal (U) and the spirit as the individual (I).77 The premises of this syllogism have the form “The logical becomes nature” in the definitions U — P (1st premise) and “Nature becomes spirit” in the definitions P — I. The conclusion is “So the logical becomes spirit”, in the definitions U — I.

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74 Cf. Werckmeister, Hegels absoluter Schluss, 43.
75 Werckmeister, Hegels absoluter Schluss, 58.
76 Cf. for this and the following Werckmeister, Hegels absoluter Schluss, 46–57.
77 Cf. Encyclopedia, § 187; cf. Werckmeister, Hegels absoluter Schluss, 47.
Thus, the conclusion has the form $U - P - I$. This is the course of the representation in the encyclopedia. In this conclusion, the dialectical-speculative method is in the mode of external transition of the sphere of Being, this is the way of looking at the system from an external-objectivist perspective.\footnote{Cf. Puntel, \textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}, 322–333.}

2) The \textit{second syllogism of the system} (§ 576) is the syllogism from a phenomenological perspective:\footnote{cf. Lorenz B. Puntel, „The Phenomenology of Spirit and the Unity of Hegel’s Philosophy. A Systematic Reappraisal“, in \textit{Still Reading Hegel. 200 Years after the Phenomenology of Spirit}, ed. Pires, E.B. (Coimbra, 2009).} In it, the spirit forms the mediating middle member and connects nature with the logical. Again, the logical is the universal ($U$), nature is the particular ($P$), and spirit is the individual ($I$), and the premises of this syllogism have the form “Nature becomes spirit” or $P - I$ (1st premise), “Spirit becomes logos” or $I - U$. The final sentence is “So nature becomes logos”, or $P - U$. The syllogism therefore has the form $P - I - U$. In this syllogism the dialectical-speculative method is in the mode of the external reflection of the sphere of Essence, this is the perspective of transcendental philosophy.\footnote{Cf. Puntel, \textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}, 324f.}

3) The \textit{third syllogism of the system} (§ 577) is the syllogism from an absolute perspective (cf. Puntel 2009): In it, the knowing reason itself has become the object - it is Aristotle’s ‘thinking of thinking’ ($\textit{noesis noeseos}$), which is also explicitly cited by Hegel.\footnote{Cf. Werckmeister, \textit{Hegels absoluter Schluss}, 51.} The knowing reason as the center of the conclusion is the logical idea itself as the Absolute-All, and nature and spirit are the self-manifestations of the knowing reason. The 3rd conclusion has thereby ultimately as terminus medius the “freedom of the whole” (Enz., § 14), which is identical with the knowing reason (cf. Puntel, \textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}, 344f.). Thus, freedom is at the heart of Hegel’s determination of the relation between the absolute and the finite, and it is from this 3rd conclusion that the question of the closedness of Hegel’s system must be answered.\footnote{Puntel, \textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}, 345f.} The presentation of the system in the 3rd conclusion
is elaborated only partially by Hegel in his lectures on religion and history, and in this the historicity of the absolute method is revealed.\textsuperscript{83}

All three syllogisms map the course of the modes of the method; they are, respectively, the sequence of the mode of transition of the sphere of Being, the mode of reflection of the sphere of Essence, and the mode of development of manifestation of the sphere of Notion. They are briefly summarized in the following table:\textsuperscript{84}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Three Syllogistic Combinations of the Hegelian System</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Syllogism</td>
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<td>2nd Syllogism</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Syllogism</td>
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In the order of the first syllogism it is often claimed (i.e. the so-called ‘theological interpretation of the Hegelian system’) that the SL is the essence of God ‘before’ the act of creation (i.e. that God is the Absolute Idea), and that the dimensions of nature and spirit (the so-called ‘real-systematic dimensions’) are the world created by God. But every determination of the difference of the absolute and the finite always takes place only according to the categories of the respective logical sphere (Being, Essence, Notion). And the spheres of the SL are in each case only inadequate, limited dimensions (only the dimension of the adequate Notion at the ‘end’ of SL is the full explication). I.e., the dimension of the SL as such and as a whole is not adequately expressible, since this is always only achieved by limited categories within the SL (such as form/matter; universal/particular,...). The relation of the SL as a whole to the dimensions of nature and spirit (for example: logic as form, and nature as matter) is thus in principle no longer adequately expressible by logical determinations. As soon as the SL explicates itself as a whole, this coincides with the ‘shifting’ (\textit{Umschlagen}) into the dimensions of nature and spirit. In Hegel’s entire system, world history is the model of the pure logical

\textsuperscript{83} Cf. Puntel, \textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}, 325–331.
\textsuperscript{84} Cf. Werckmeister, \textit{Hegels absoluter Schluss}, 51–55.
structures, as self-interpretation or deepening of the logical dimension. The SL is ultimately only articulable as a whole from its historical self-interpretation. This leaves the classical theological interpretation as meaningless.\footnote{Cf. Puntel, \textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}, 72–92, 101–109.}

**CONCLUSION: KRAUSE IS THE BETTER PANENTHEIST — BUT IS HEGEL A PANENTHEIST AT ALL?**

Both Krause and Hegel tried to derive all categories of the Absolute in a combinatorial way from an immediate judgment (Krause: “Wesen weset Wesen”, Hegel: the Speculative Sentence of the self-identity of Pure Being at the beginning of SL). With Krause this was clearly in a panentheistic interest: the Krauseian category theory was meant to express the basic panentheistic idea that “the world is part of the categorical determinations of God”.\footnote{Göcke, \textit{Alles in Gott?}, 105.} Thus the world is in God, but God is nevertheless not identical with the world, He is distinct from the world — as a difference within God himself (cf. the distinction between Orwesen and Urwesen). Krause is not only the name giver of panentheism, his system also represents the paradigm for panentheism par excellence.

Hegel, too, has often been called a panentheist. But is Hegel really a panentheist? Also his category theory tries to show all determinations of the absolute as determinations of all being. Last but not least, the determinations unfold in a kind of concretization in the course of world history itself. But does this mean that the world is in God? To this it must be said that the status of the concept “God” in Hegel, unlike in Krause, is highly ambiguous and confused.

As mentioned above, it is often claimed that in Hegel “God” is identical with the Absolute Idea at the end of the SL. After that, the SL explicates the essence of God “before creation”, and the philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit (Geist) then unfold the manifestation of the divine Trinity in world history. But the three major syllogisms of the system presented above show that this equation does not work out so easily. As for the first syllogism, Puntel (\textit{Darstellung, Methode und Struktur}) has shown that the identification of Absolute Idea and God is nonsensical. And the Encyclopedia, the outline of Hegel’s mature system, shows insurmountable difficulties: Where is the place for “God” here? In “religion” as the realm of “Vorstellung”? But the Vor-
stellung is, according to Hegel, that “stage” of the spirit or of thinking (“das vorstellende Denken”) which is to be abolished by the dialectical-speculative thinking. There is no sign of panentheism here. For the Second Syllogism the whole status of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the overall system would have to be clarified, but this status can be described as dark and confused. And the system according to the presentation of the third syllogism was not really elaborated by Hegel. In order to clarify the question of a “Hegelian panentheism,” it would be necessary to fundamentally clarify how Hegel’s writings on the philosophy of religion are related to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Science of Logic, and the Encyclopedia. This is a herculean task, which, due to the obscurity of Hegel’s overall system (notwithstanding the brilliance of the individual parts of the system), is far from being considered as clarified. The term panentheism should therefore be reserved for Krause’s system, which is the gold standard of panentheism — despite all similarities between the two German Idealists in their combinatorial deductions of the categories of all beings.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


