Intuitive Learning in Moral Awareness.
Cognitive-Affective Processes in Mencius' Innatist Theory

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Abstract

Mencius, referred to as second sage in Chinese philosophy history, grounds his theory about original goodness of human nature on psychological components by bringing in something new down ancient ages. Including the principles of virtuous action associated with Confucius to his doctrine, but by composing them along psychosocial development, he theorizes utterly out of the ordinary that makes all the difference to the school. In his argument stated a positive opinion, he explains the method of forming individuals' moral awareness by means of inseparable integrity of feelings and thoughts, saying human being are born innately good. According to Mencius, heart-mind correlation is the motivational complement of inner incentives. Knowledge and virtue, which are extensions of inborn goodness, comprehended intuitively; then affective motives respond to circumstance, what is learned transmits to cognitive process and eventually behavior emerges. Comparing during the years of Warring State period he lived, in western geography Aristotle, who is one of the pioneers of Greek philosophy, argues deductive and inductive methods in mental activity. On the other hand, Mencius uses analogical reasoning throughout his self-titled work. This essay is an attempt to assert that most postulates of developmental theories, which have been considered an integral part of modern psychology, begin with Mencius in early era. Secondly, this study also aims to discuss the main paradigm of Mencius across emotivist-rationalist opposition, which keeps emotion above thought as well as reason above emotion.

Keywords: Mencius; moral psychology; intuitive learning; self-cultivation; heart-mind correlation.

Introduction

The Spring and Autumn period (771-476 BC), the late Zhou of China, was a stage of chaos due to various feudal states' revolt against royal authority. Despite bloody battles, turmoil of political system and disorder in society, it has been known as the golden age of Chinese philosophy since a broad range of ideas were put forward freely and grew up steadily. Each philosopher guided teachings on the purpose of restoring peace and welfare by ensuring sociopolitical order throughout the country. One of the intellectuals was Confucius (551-479 BC), who founded the Ru school of thought,

called Confucianism[1]. Being the first teacher, he idealized a vision of encompassing society within formal education and edifying human interrelation in accordance with traditional norms. His rectifying method in politics depended on governing by a sage ruler whom he characterized as superior man[2]. This term attributed to virtuous nobles follow the way of Dao, obey the laws of heaven and organize societal hierarchy on earth. Chinese philosophy draws a parallelism between cosmology and community, constituting a set of rules in the behalf of secular humanism. In Book of Changes[3], the earliest classics, we find out heaven, earth and man are correlated as three realms of cosmogony where Dao is located as the beginning of existence. Each phenomenon rises from metaphysical realm and takes shape in physical realm. This kind of metaphor makes conditional on mutual interaction between unearthly course and earthly route. In other words, human beings are responsible to behave appropriately to correlative cosmology. In this context, Confucius' superior man is a role model for harmonious living according to Dao, while inferior man[4] is the opposite. Despite categorizing virtuous-unvirtuous agency, he almost doesn't touch on endowments about human nature. Additionally the following idea appears in his Analects, part *17/2*: *"by nature humans are nearly alike; by practice humans are entirely different."* This sentence implies that human nature is indisputably neutral. So, we can sort out that such a dictum cannot characterize innate dispositions but rather acquired dispositions learned by experiences. Unlike Confucius, Mencius[5] comes up with an idea that human nature is originally good:

> The good disposition of human nature is like water's tendency to flow down. There are no men innately bad, just as there is no water that does not flow down. Now, by splashing you can make water leap up higher than your forehead, and by applying force

[1] Chinese ru (儒) means wise, scholar, sage; jia (家) means school, philosophical thought and movement. This etymological classification indicates that Confucianism is a system of thought which forms a basis for wisdom among individuals. Four Books and Five Classics have been historically related the written heritage of Confucianism and honored as classics by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) who was the calligrapher, historiographer and philosopher of the Song Dynasty (960-1279). Particularly Four Books, including Analects of Confucius, Mengzi, Doctrine of the Mean and Great Learning, composed curriculum of the civil service examinations of Imperial China, which have run from Han Dynasty (206 BC-206 CE) up until 1905. Thus they had great influence on cultural, educational and political life of Chinese people. For commentaries on these complete works see Zhu, 1983. For a good discussion on virtuous dispositions of sages, see Ivanhoe, 1990. Confucian Classics illuminate behavioral approach in morality; descriptions for ethical methods on behavior, see Gu, 1931; Huang, 2001.

[2] Chinese junzi (君子) has different translations to western languages like gentleman, exemplary person, virtuous man, superior man etc., however, common emphasis explains a human being living in harmony with natural order and moral principles.

[3] Among Five Classics works, Book of Changes stands closest to metaphysical narrative. Both being remembered as the oldest head of Chinese literature and imputed saying "the living water source of the endless flow of Chinese philosophy", it could be a tidemark on interpretation cosmic elements. (Cheng, 2006) In this classical text heaven, earth and man were imaged to three divided line, symbolizing creation, regulation and organization. Heaven generates, earth nourishes and man consummates. For more discussions on secular behaviors integrates heaven, earth and man see Sertdemir, 2021.

[4] Not only in Analects but also in other classics Chinese xiaoren (小人) has been compared with junzi in all aspects. This term is being used to describe people who are lack of moral conducts and lead the country to chaos. Among various versions listing up villain, mean man, small man etc., we prefer inferior man for this term because it is more explanatory for telling a sample of complete opposite of superior man.

[5] Mencius name is a Latinization of Chinese Mengzi (孟子) meaning "*Master Meng*". Mencius (372-289 BC), inherited Confucian doctrine and developed it with his ownmost theories. After Confucius, giving a name of Latinized form for Mencius by western missionaries proves that he is earned the qualification of being second sage.

> you can make it stay up on a mountain, but how could this be the nature of water? It is merely a result of circumstances. *(Mencius, 6a/2)*

In this passage we clearly read an innatist theory in which clarifies a thesicle of moral psychology. The main motivation for Mencius might be to elaborate on the issues Confucius avoided discussing with his disciples. Besides, contrary to the traditionalist perspective which distinguishes nobles' class, Mencius focuses on social equality and proclaims intrinsic goodness is universal because all men have natural potential to become wise. Behind the saying of *"the sage and we are of the same kind"*, we can notice the shared ability of human being, regardless of hereditary status. He provides a transcendent basis for human goodness and he attempts heaven as the source of inborn tendencies explaining *"man who knows his own nature will know heaven*". [6] Starting from this point of view, we firstly observe that Mencius claims knowledge and virtue are innate. Refusing the idea about humans are born as a blank slate, his innatism takes a stand against empiricists who maintain neutrality of human nature in just the same way as the theory of tabula rasa suggested by John Locke. Secondly, we observe that Mencius turns our attention to natural constancy to realize internal potential endowed by heaven. Everyone spontaneously perceives doing good by means of substantive motives which are naturally endowed, so being prone to doing bad is the result of external desires which stimulate to satisfy physiological needs. Even though he does not directly engage metaphysical inquires, his normative framework on metaethical study relies heavily on intuitive senses. Mencius explicitly expounds moral progress, which integrates conative component to cognitive-affective components. This progress could be addressed as if moral agents begin with feelings, continue by thoughts, end in attitudes. The mainstay of this process is the self-reflection *(xiushen* 修身) which is the essential part of cultivating one's own nature by favour of the guideline termed as "repairing heart-mind, raising disposition (*xiuxin yangxing* 修心养性)".

Alongside his human nature theory, self-reflection means to know innate goodness and regulate behaviors in compliance with endowed potential. He says, *"as for emotions inherently good, is called being good, what is called being bad is not the fault of natural potential."* (Mencius, 6a/6) Chinese term xiu (修) includes the verbs repair, build, cultivate; and shen (身) verbalizes nouns such body, life, oneself. If someone is aware of original goodness, there makes a way to follow spontaneous intuition for improving own character. That's why xiushen is referred to self-reflection which emphasizes cultivation on both heart-mind (*xin* 心) and disposition (*xing* 性). The central theme of Mencius' innatism is xin, attributing emotion and reason to the same faculty without sharp distinction, presents a new viewpoint assumed mental-spiritual collective. Here it seems being a function rather than organ, xin is not simply defined either pure heart

[6] Mencius, 6a/7; 7a/1.

or pure mind, it is identified as the correlation of heart and mind. Professor James Behuniak points out that Mencius intends to foreground feelings against a more technical mode of moral deliberation and reasoning. But then Professor Chad Hansen remarks that heart-mind comes with all the internal dispositions to moral behavior innate in its own structure. [7]

We coincide the passage *4b/40* of saying *"a great man is one who never lose the heart-mind of a newborn babe"* which explains innocence of xin should be kept as if original status when coming into the world. In Mencius' writings human being becomes evil as a result of losing this original simplicity and childlike naiveté. Since he directly speaks of human nature is good, the cultivation of heart-mind reflects to nourish inborn knowledge and virtue for obtaining both intuitive senses and moral awareness. But Mencius thinks that some people cannot cope with instinctive desires and needs which stimulate self-interested actions preclude natural potential. Using some botanical metaphors to describe innatist potential, he matches Confucian norms with some feelings highlighted as four sprouts (*siduan* 四端), morally inclinations to behave, likens seeds of a plant growing. The sprouts are manifested in cognitive and affective reactions, on which background is human psychology.

Four Sprouts and Intuitive Learning

Mencius is a Confucian philosopher, seeking to reinforce moral values brought into prominence by Confucius, but yet aspiring to detail what these moral values represent. The main virtues are arranged in humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. In his Analects, part *7/1*, Confucius says, *"I am not an originator but a transmitter."* This anecdote most notably evokes that moral judgments and regulations of previous period were reintroduced by Confucius. As for Mencius, however, each norm of virtue corresponds to inner feelings intimated with four sprouts which symbolize tendencies to perceive, think and act in virtuous ways:

> The sense of compassion is the seed of humaneness, the sense of shame is the seed of righteousness, the sense of deference is the seed of propriety, the sense of right and wrong is the seed of wisdom. All men possess these four senses just as they possess four limbs.[8]*(Mencius, 2a/6)*

[7] Behuniak, 2005; Hansen, 1992. This kind of nation equalizes feelings and thoughts. Hence Mencius' assumption is utterly different from rationalists who prioritizes mind before heart like René Descartes and also virtually discrete from emotivists who affirm importance of feelings more than thoughts like David Hume. Chinese philosopher, historian, and writer Feng Youlan underlines that Mencius teaching embodies that moral principles of man concur metaphysical principles of cosmogony and human nature is an exemplification of all these principles. Thusly when we know our nature, we know heaven. Seen in this way, mental-spiritual correlation connotates developing heart and mind simultaneously. (Feng, 2009)

[8] Chinese ren (仁) means humaneness, yi (義) means righteousness, li (禮) means propriety and zhi (智) means wisdom. Ceyin (惻隱) signifies compassion, xiuwu (羞惡) signifies shame, cirang (辭讓) signifies deference, and shifei (是非) signifies right and wrong.

Four sprouts substantiate Mencius' human nature thesis against certain theories that evaluate inborn disposition as either neutral or changeable.[9] Every person has these feelings, which are the roots of Confucian virtues and arise from spontaneous ways. Each one guides intentions and decisions of moral behaviors in concrete circumstances. If only they are enhanced compatibly, they will grow and turn into appropriate attributes on character cultivation. In addition to this, all tendential senses are paraphrased by xin which carries the meaning of heart-mind. By this way we might conceive a model aggregates reason and emotion rather than contradistinctive theoretical, discussed by western philosophers, recognizes reason as governing emotion and as emotion governing reason. The very first sprout is the sense of compassion, the most impressive statement of inborn goodness in an allegory given out *"all humans have a heart-mind which cannot bear to see other people' suffering"* is written in the same passage.[10] In this regard, relying on heart-mind correlation enlarges this conceptual range; we can say affective impulses awaken cognitive process. Seeing a person meets with a disaster or comes to grief, makes man internally reacts to that person. Mencius exemplifies this intuitive sense by analogy continuing of the same passage:

> Nowadays if any individual comes across a little child is about to fall into a well, will indisputably experience the sense of compassion in a state of fear. It is not because gaining the favour of the child's parents, it is not because seeking the praise of their neighbors and friends, and it is also not because building up a reputation among inhabitants of township.

With such a prespecified sensitivity, the heart-mind will respond empathetically and compassionately to the perception of a child falling down a well, probably because inner emotion becomes aware with feeling uncomfortable to the pain and grief the child goes through. In its affectionate sense, heart-mind correlation is going to close particularized ambitions, such as the ambition of saving a little child's life, accords with the principle of humaneness which is the greatest virtue of cultivation of natal nature. Obviously for Mencius, people do right things on the occasion of spontaneous incentives; likewise the sense of compassion is foremost for doing someone a favor without heed of personal profit and interest. Moreover, owing to the fact that sense of shame is explained after compassion and is directly linked to righteousness, we can guess that Mencius holds out a moral pattern rooted in positive feelings. In the chapter *7a/6*, he says: *"man is ought to have shame, if one is not ashamed of having been without shame, then should feel ashamed of oneself."* To some degree, this explanation

[9] Mencius has his opponents who argue originality of human nature. As far as we know from the classical text of Mengzi, Gaozi claims that man is born without good or bad dispositions. Again, the other Confucian representative Xunzi (310-235 BC) criticizes Mencius' view of childlike innocence saying human nature is inherently bad. See Mengzi, 6a/2; Xunzi, 23/3, 4.

[10] (Mencius, 2a/6). He also establishes a connection between buren (不忍), which we translate as 'being unable to bear' and humaneness saying, "*if one can extend this feeling which is far from hurting and harming others, humaneness will come forward*." (7b/77) Admittedly, those anecdotes show that the term of buren plays a key role on morality teaching of Mencius subsuming ability to empathize.

lays stress on the importance of honesty in attitudes conforms to good disposition. Substantially as a motive, shame elicits internal remorse caused by wrong acts.

Bryan Van Norden, who is the translator of Chinese philosophical texts and scholar of Chinese and comparative philosophy, determines Mencius' shame in two contents. In a narrower sense, being ashamed is a disposition to feel shame in situations that one recognizes are shameful for oneself or for those with whom one identifies. In a broader sense, it is a disposition to recognize when actions or situations are shameful (whether for oneself or for others, and whether past, present, future or hypothetical), and to have appropriate emotional and behavioral reaction to this recognition.[11] What Norden set forth as a thesis is an appropriate form of orientation to moral conducts inasmuch as Mencian doctrine evidently cites the introspection (*zifan* 自反) and conscience (*liangxin* 良心) through which we coincide with the concepts of modern psychology. For instance, he speaks of self-criticism in a passage about ruler of the country, ascribed as superior man, has to face himself asking *"I expect absolute loyalty from my people but how much confidence I give to them?"*[12] *In a similar manner, western arguments regard shame as feeling guilty. For instance, Bernard Williams, who was a moral philosopher, articulate 'what I have done*' in one direction towards what has happened to others and in other direction to what I am.[13] Namely, feeling guilty runs through the minds about casuistry. Mencius persuasively talks on whether feeling self-reproach or not in pursuant of acting adaptable to four sprouts. In the sixth chapter of his book, he tells a story concerning mount Niu. Once upon a time, although the sight of that natural area had been extraordinarily beautiful, the spontaneous balance of nature was destroyed as a consequence of the axes cutting trees with the aim of expanding the borders of the state established in the surroundings. Immediately afterwards he says:

> What exists in the heart-mind if ever people possibly be far apart from humaneness and righteousness? The way in which a man abandons sincere conscience, indeed bears a striking resemblance to hewing down on the mountain's trees? – hewing down day after day, how the heart-mind retain its beauty? *(Mencius, 6a/8)*

[11] Norden tries to argue for the purposes of demonstrating that there is a sprout of righteousness within the scope of Mencius' claim: for every human, there are some things that he or she avoids doing because he or she believes they are shameful. (Van Norden, 2002: 49-52) For a similar commentary see Jiao 1987.

[12] (Mencius, 4b/56) Additionally, throughout the paragraph, Mencius instantiates patterns of behavior within introspective methods whereby superior man is distinguished from inferior man by keeping emotional seeds in his heart-mind. Connecting humaneness to compassion and righteousness to shame, he repeatedly goes into the idea that original goodness intuitively reflects upon moral motivation. The term cunxin (存心), which we translate here as keeping the heart-mind, would implicate a motivational force to guide natural standards. Moreover, this conceptual is directly related to the discourse of remaining heart-mind of a newborn babe (chizi zhixin 赤子之心) explained above. A superior man is distinguished from others by keeping his heart-mind and a great man is adhered to inborn goodness by remaining innocent. Both put emphasis on Mencius' innatist theory.

[13] What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or omission of a sort that typically elicits from other people anger, resentment, or indignation. What arouses shame, on the other hand, is something that typically elicits from others contempt or derision or avoidance. (Williams, 1993: 89-93)

Here is coherence between lack of conscience and damaging nature. Mencius reproaches people for cutting down all those trees and ties them into growing away from remorse. In case locals do not have a guilty conscience by reason of harming the nature, they are definitely on the edge of losing original goodness. Concordantly, the sense of shame could be identified as regret, guilt, and disquiet owing to behaviors contrary to the inherent virtuous dispositions. It has therefore been predefined as the seed of righteousness because while introspection and conscience apply to an individual's internal reckoning, questioning, and examining events in a cause effect relationship, shame requires consistency in actual action norms. Exactly like these two major sprouts constitute source to humaneness and righteousness, the sense of deference is depicted as the beginning of propriety, which mainly laid to ceremonial rules and procedures though, is truly another virtue of personal growth model. Unlike Confucius, Mencius terms propriety for establishing an environment that is based on mutual respect and trust. When analyzing the words of Confucius, we may discern a prescriptive approach concentrated on the nobility, whereas Mencius provides an equal and fair exemplification by canalizing etiquette to social norms. At the basis of his non-discriminatory understanding, there is the ethical judgement that each individual descends to earth with good tendencies and has temperamental potential to attain the qualification of wisdom. In this context, propriety could be learned by inherent deference and subsequently extend to human relations through practice of moral values taking form among family members, and then spreading to the communal environment. Mencius says:

> If a man treats others in propriety but they response negatively let that man turn towards himself and examine the sense deference. If in any action there occurs a failing, seek the main cause by turning inward. As long as a person is on the right path, the world will appreciate. *(Mencius, 4a/4)*

Being on the right path ensures keeping original goodness for perpetuity. What Mencius alludes to is accurate consistency among emotion, reason and action, which is undoubtfully expressed not only for deference but also for other sprouts. Just like respect and trust, compassion and shame are those generated learning intuitively and put into practice over effective communications with parents in babyhood. Before moving on to the personal development stages, the fourth seed should also be mentioned. In compliance with doctrinal explanations, the sense of right and wrong will grow into wisdom. This claim is about deciding how close intentions are to the moral comprehension at first initiating virtuous and unvirtuous behaviors. In other words, it is the ability to distinguish good from bad and right from wrong.

Chad Hansen interprets the term shi-fei (是非) as a place-maker for classifying things as approved and disapproved.[14] In our opinion, this interpretation might be plausible because making distinctions on correct and incorrect is accommodated with guiding well-behaved deeds. As Mencius says, *"the sense of right and wrong is the path of superior man; the ones unable to distinguish right from wrong are none the wiser",* so in the event that people are uncomprehensive on what is right to do and what is wrong to do, they inarguably go without wisdom.[15] Yet already remembering the aphorism of "*what is called being bad is not the fault of natural potential"*, we clearly re-express that malicious tendencies, caused in doing something wrong, extend from unfavorable effects of external factors to natural dispositions since they are not inborn. When someone is inclined to the unvirtuous in actions despite being conscious of the virtuous, the root of the issue lies behind not in internal dispositions but environmental conditions. Seeing that mankind is born with the seeds of a good heart-mind there is left poorly marks on elitist strategy since Mencius advocates political and social equality, individuals from every walk of life are internally good, and what led them to become bad is externally. At this point, we must pass on to the stages of personal development in comparison with modern psychology theories.

First of all, introspection method in Mencius, which wholly mirrors reflexive self-cultivation, can be caught up in grounded theory of Wilhelm Wundt, who is known today as one of the founders of modern psychology. His epistemological position reposes on the analysis of cognitive-affective processes, where sensitive and voluntary functions are integral. This means that feelings and thoughts are not separated, sensation and perception are evaluated structurally, and behavioral development is not leaned on a one-sided methodology.[16] The preference for integrative agency sets a good example of how people are frequently unaware of their cognitive bias modification and affective arousal. Due to emotion and reason aren't categorized with different structural characteristics, a postulate that is largely over-identified to the heart-mind correlation in Mencius, can be perceived. Furthermore, reflexivity technique, being similar in content to introspection, by activating affective reactions transfers them to cognitive functioning. Both situatives are induced on the part of awareness to what innately endowed. Once awareness appears, cognitive-affective motives improve onto better, in the contrary case they reduce worse. Ulf Hannerz, who is a Swedish anthropologist, evaluates sense-making and clear-thinking attended

[14] He also addresses that the mature virtue associated with shi-fei disposition is wisdom, the expert control of important action-guiding distinctions. All the correct ways to make all the practically required distinctions must be implicit in our heart's disposition in order to assign shi-fei to things. (Hansen, 1992:166)

[15] Mencius, 3b/13; 4b/59.

[16] According to Wundt, this type of process embodies mental changes and functional relationships between perception, cognition, emotion and motivation. Psychological phenomena are variably changing processes of consciousness. They are experienced as a whole, so the process provides knowledge by introspection. When people observe themselves using reflexivity technique, exploring cognitive-affective motives will get easier. (Wundt, 1973)

to sighting, hearing, touching, smelling and tasting in learned behaviors.[17] Hence, the first step of learning moral agency is predetermined intuition. Now we have to instantiate this assumption over the texts of Mencius. There is a detailed passage in *7a/15* about child development which reminds us the psychosocial theory of Erik Erikson. Master says:

> Those who are able to learn without having been acquired by concrete learning possess intuitive ability; those who are able to know without having been exercised by concrete thinking possess intuitive knowledge. During the infancy, children carried in the arms all know to love their parents and as time goes on they all know to respect their elders. Affection develops humaneness, esteem develops righteousness. All that need be done is to extend these feelings throughout the world.

It's necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by intuitive ability (*liangneng* 良能) and intuitive knowledge (*liangzhi* 良知). Mencius states that people learn spontaneously since teachable moments are supported by activities of parents. And also people know spontaneously, since comprehensible experiments are encouraged by touches of parents. Inner feelings such as love and respect are nourished intuitively by the interaction field of individuals in infancy. Within this framework, we can find out that innate senses aren't acquired through studying or deliberating. There might have been a way of learning for loving parents and respecting elders, however, it is formed as a result of affectionate and companionable physical touches of parents. Emotional engagement boosts early childhood development, so children recover from neglected environments.

Prof. Dr. Ann Bigelow of developmental psychology, whose researches are into parent behavior and infant development, underlines that close contact between mothers and babies particularly in the newborn period helps young children to learn affection of others' responses so that they sense active agents in their environment.[18] It is understood that an infant' first experience with the surrounding environment occurs through compassionate touches of parents. Intuitive perception is essential to children' growth of mental abilities, cognitive skills and social-emotional competency. As Mencius says children carried in the arms, tend to learn affection instinctually and intuitively. Providing that parents treat their children with affection and compassion, development process is influenced positively. On the contrary, supposing that parents ignore their needs and neglect giving close attention the process is affected negatively. Apparently, parents are primarily responsible for the stages in exploring innate goodness and self-improvement of infants. When we consider intuitive learning as

[17] For more see Hannerz, 1992. In the same vein, Jean Piaget suggests a growth pattern going into intuitive thinking throughout his theory of cognitive development and epistemological view. Piaget focuses on children have specifical reflexes that enable them to interact with their environment. Along with intuitive thinking they make progress in cognitive skills. (Piaget,1995)

[18] Bigelow also specifies that infants with parents' closely contacts which develops affectionately, makes a huge contribution to learn feelings and thoughts most correctly. Therefore, establishing healthy dialogues indoors is critically has importance on cognitive and behavioral development of the babies. (Bigelow, 2005)

the first stage, it is needed to shed some light on what the next stages phase. An unattended child is more likely to experience whatever bad tendencies arise from external factors. To set an example, individuals with disconnected family bonds, intimated partner violence and indifferent, dismissive or even completely neglectful to the needs of their children, cause them to become self-centered and self-interested, unaware of moral awareness.

Psychology refers to this style of parenting as uninvolved parenting which is low on both parental responsiveness and parental demandingness.[19]An authoritarian parent uses regimental punishments to control behaviors. Children growing up under such circumstances are unable to learn the senses of compassion, affection or deference and shame, having an unhappy disposition and low self-esteem. A permissive parent chooses to decontrol to remove boundaries. Children, raised by doing whatever they want to do, always have egocentric tendencies and encounter problems in social interactions. In respect to this, we can say that Mencius makes it clear that he favors the authoritative style. As described in the passage, young children carried in the arms of their parents incontestably own to love family members in order that affection and compassion will be extended to others. Exhibiting love for other people thusly arises out of unconditional compassion, holding in high esteem by parents. As written in continuation of the same passage, individuals are generally able to feel deference for elders in order that esteem and reverence will be extended to others. Paying respect for other people becomes manifest by voluntary control because what children experience runs in the family reflects to outside world at the hands of parental attitude. So it seems that familiar contexts typically feature in superiority and inferiority of self-improvement as well as intuitive learning which traces spontaneous moral cultivation.

On this assumption, it might be possible to deduce that Mencius' philosophical theory approaches to Erik Erikson' stages of psychosocial development. In his studies, Erikson stays focus on child development in terms of interpersonal relations since the environment in which a child lived was crucial to providing growth, adjustment, a source of self-awareness and identity.[20] Early childhood is the most important for learning secure attachment, whose style has direct influence on the rest of infants and toddlers' lives. Development of trust can help to feelings of hope and confidence, by contrast, development of mistrust can lead to feelings of frustration and lack of

[19] During the 1960s, developmental psychologist Diana Blumberg Baumrind described three different parenting styles based on her research with preschool-age children: authoritarian, authoritative and permissive parenting. While authoritarian parents harshly set up strict rules and demand obedience, permissive parents are overly responsive and far apart from enforcing rules. On the other hand authoritative parents are usually firm but not rigid, responsive to the child's needs but not indulgent. See more Baumrind, 1966. In later years, researchers added a fourth style known as uninvolved parenting, on which individuals may have mental issues, and they raise their children regardlessly. As a consequence, those kids cannot regulate emotion and reason, being more prone to criminal commitment, drug addiction and suicide attempts.

[20] Although Erikson' theory of personality development contains eight phases, the first phase centers around parenting on basic needs of infants. If parents provide their children to dependable affection, the infant is going to learn to trust. But if parents fail to provide a secure environment, a sense of mistrust will spring. For details see Erikson, 1994.

confidence. Should courage and independence area sets correctly by parents until school-age, sense of judgement can be revealed. Otherwise, toddlers in this stage may be exposed to struggle with self-regulation and self-control. According to Mencius, learning the feelings like affection and compassion cannot be qualified for moral awareness alone. Virtues must expand to the social environment through reasoning as well as the power of discernment which explained as the sense of right and wrong. It goes without saying that each stage of learning moral behaviors is elaborated on heart-mind correlation; emotion is therefore not motivated separately from reason. In fact, exploring all innate seeds from compassion to wisdom actuating virtuous action triggers by spontaneous intuition, but nevertheless it could be the thoughts which completes feelings and evokes performative acts. What Mencius wishes to emphasize with cognitive-affective process is implicitly based upon mental-spiritual collective is being interconnected with inseparable integrity.

Analogical Reasoning and Cognitive-Affective Processes

When we look through the classical text of Mencius, it can discriminately be articulated that there are many stories telling of by analogy. In those years western philosophers, like Aristotle, had been using deductive and inductive methods on mental activities, so Mencius had opted for a brand-new method via analogical reasoning. Professor David Wong exhaustively writes out distinctions of identification on logical reasoning. As a notable example to Aristotelian model he states that since practical wisdom is acquired through experience, inputs of new information simply repose on specifical process of mind employing both deductive and inductive methods.[21] In our opinion, Wong' thesis substantially reflects the truth because Mencius evaluates cognitive and affective processes without exception. In the first chapter of the book, we come up to a dialogue between governor Xuan of Qi and Mencius, which is about how to govern the whole country virtuously. When he observed an ox being sacrifice, he commanded to replace the ox with a little sheep unseen. Mencius confirms his merciful act[22], additionally, reminds him to treat in the same compassion to his people by analogical reasoning:

> There was no harm in what you did, your conduct was a method of humaneness; you had seen the ox but had not seen the sheep. A superior man is always compassionate

[21] In his paper, Wong argues that in Mencius there is a conception of ethical reflection giving justificatory priority to the particular disposition which is completely different from western techniques and tries to maintain that this conception is a genuine contribution to individuals' understanding of moral reasoning. See more Wong, 2002. Along similar lines, Professor David Shephard Nivison defines analogical reasoning within the meaning of heart-mind correlation saying; "*Mencius makes a commonsense distinction between judging something or believing one should do something and actually doing it, and given his view of motivation*." In Nivison' reading, we might figure out those emotional and logical decisions are stimulated successively. At first, we feel innately by virtue of the heart, and then we put what we feel into action through the mind. Extensions of moral actions are coordinately applicable as long as one decides to do virtuous behavior. See more Nivison, 1996.

[22] What is meant by compassionate behavior is to avoid hurting and harming others (buren ren 不忍人). All human beings have the natural tendency for acting altruistically. See other explanations in Xu, 2002.

> towards animals, when he sees beasts alive, he cannot bear to watch them die. Now here is your kindness could extend even to the beasts but could not extend to your people. If your people are lack of protection it is because you are not compassionate to them. Hence you might not rule the country as a virtuous ruler only because you won't not because you can't. *(Mencius, 1a/7)*

Having a heart-mind that cannot bear to see living creatures suffering gives us clues in natural compassion. For Mencius, it is the prerequisite skill motivated by intuitive learning. All people feel the sense of compassion since because they are unable to stand someone runs into a difficulty or grief and disaster. Accordingly, he verifies affectionate attitude of Xuan but still advises him to extend his mercy and leniency on behalf of every segment of society for being a true virtuous ruler. In short, Mencius thinks that if governor of Qi wish to become a superior man, he has to make great effort to utilize his inborn potency and ability. This is both about political regularity and social equality. We should take note here that to respond the pain of an animal but not to respond the pain of a person conflicts with moral behavior. Mencius' claim could be understood as extension of knowledge and virtue conforms to maintaining emotional commitment and relational judgement. Professor Kwong-loi Shun argues that four sprouts must be nurtured by an appropriate upbringing to develop into the cultivating forces. So he points out that Mencius associates Xuan's compassionate response to the sacrificial ox with the execution of an innocent person.[23] This sort of connection is presupposed both cognitive and affective processes, since feeling phases analogical reasoning into acting. Methodologically, the ranges of moral activity progress not only by the sense of compassion, but also by the practice of compassion. If someone does not conduct in conformity with affection on the stability of intention and decision despite possessed inherently, affection remains only an internal feeling. Taking this into account, convincing people to pertain sage-like behaviors, Mencius exemplifies what is sufficient for true virtue in conversation above is responding compassionately to the suffering of human beings as well as responding compassionately to the sufferings of other living creatures.

From Mencius' standpoint, each individual is emotionally affected and motivationally has potential to respond with spontaneous intuition. The reason why Xuan fails to govern his people with humaneness is because he is unaware of his own capacity and ability. Feeling compassion for an ox is inadequate to extend humaneness. The necessity of analogical reasoning is an indication that moral attitudes and behaviors properly passes through the stages of intention and decision. Later in their conversation, we also see the hidden meanings of sensitive desires which cause us to be prone to malicious intentions and decisions related to self-centered and self-interested motives.

[23] In the meantime, Shun contends that Mencius' opinion for being wise denotes high capacity to act virtuously due to original goodness. Furthermore, as emotional dispositions of the heart-mind correlation are directly emerged by four sprouts, logical thinking guides people to the path of goodness and moves away from the path of badness. See Shun, 1997.

Mencius thinks that being greedy for having more interferes with sageliness. If people from propertied class like Xuan and other rulers around the country concentrate on satisfaction of their physiological needs along the lines of appetitive desires, it might be unfeasible to improve inborn potential. Proposing a heart-mind correlation within feelings and thoughts, each level of self-cultivation is linked to both emotion and reason. But by yielding to material desires, intentions turn towards unvirtuous action and decisions diverge away from moral awareness. Along the text, it can be seen the integrity between the concepts qing (情) and si (思) to expand original goodness in every division of lifetime. Notionally, qing is referred to feel and si referred to think. Once four sprouts are motivated by qing, the next phase is to provide motivation by si. From this point of view, it is understood that the heart-mind correlation forms the basis for both feelings and thoughts to act virtuously at the same time. Mencius says:

> Ears and eyes are organs that do not think. Their perception is only veiled by external things. The organ which thinks is heart-mind. If you think you will gain if you don't you will fail. This is the potential endowed in us by heaven. When a man chooses to stand by his superior parts, his inferior parts are unable to seize him. Being a great man is no more than this. *(Mencius, 6a/15)*

There is a whole range of points about intuitive learning rather than empirical learning and functions of brain coordinated with emotional dispositions. As Mencius writes here, physiological needs along the lines of appetitive desires cannot think, the only thing they make people do is to move directly what sensory organs is being attracted to. On the other hand, the heart-mind guides people to think rightly because it spontaneously actuates innate senses and more importantly emphasizes mental suggestions restraining us from the needs of physical nature. At the prologue of this passage, Mencius speaks of two opposite ways of personal growth, one is named as qualified the substance (*dati* 大體) and the other is named as unqualified the substance (*xiaoti* 小體). In Chinese etymology, ti (體) means body, characteristics, essence and personal experience. But we mostly observe it throughout classical texts using as a noumenon which evokes functional sense of being fundamental, arising internal and reflecting external. In this context, improving superior parts is equal to qualified the substance and following inferior parts is equal to unqualified the substance. How we morally grow by accumulating four sprouts stem from the motivation that appropriately extends cognitive-affective process. Through the agency of intuitive learning we begin to feel what is originally endowed, through the agency of analogical reasoning we move to think what is innately possessed. When people prefer to be guided by physiological needs and instinctive desires but not to be emerged by natural core planted for moral virtue, nourishment of the heart-mind can be left beyond the realm of possibility. Thusly, instead of being responsive to tendencies to support fulfilling desires, Mencius offers being responsive to dispositions to nurture fulfilling virtues.

As we may restate that in the fourth chapter of the book he mentions cunxin (存心) which signifies fulfilling the heart-mind as well as keeping the heart-mind.[24] His repeated discourses on integrity of emotion and reason reflect that the primary motivational baseline of four sprouts activates spontaneity arisen from innateness. Maintaining original goodness (善性), keeping the heart-mind (存心) and remaining the heart-mind of a newborn babe (赤子之心) are equivalent to being a great man. Just as feelings are not superior to thoughts, thoughts are not superior to feelings. In this regard, it is plausible to think that self-cultivation model of Mencian idea practices ethical epistemology, which is opposed by empiricists and rejected by rationalists. Such an understanding paves the way for Mencius to assert a new thesis in ancient times.

During the same period in the west in Aristotle's Nicomanian Ethics, we noticeably see that the theory of knowledge allows reasoning techniques but not discuss analogical reasoning or analogical argument. He says; *"since the perception is the same, so is the knowledge also."* [25] It is stated that the degree of likeness between two concepts generalizes by virtue of induction and deduction. Although theoretical components roundly hit analogical perceptions, the method of comparing old knowledge with the new is typically apart from analogy. Starting from this, we might conjecture that Aristotelian perspective organizes similarities with computational forms. Reasoning from special statement to reach a conclusion on general truth involves in deduction, and reasoning from general statement to reach a specific derivation involves in induction. Deductive-inductive synthesis constructs the interference onto likeness among various events and features, but however, is derived from analogical arguments in drawing a comparison. In our opinion, the main reason about this line of reasoning is that Aristotle does not put forward an idea in innatism. His postulate is based upon the acquisition of knowledge and virtue learned through experience. Another discussion is found in David Hume, who was one of the enlightenment philosophers. Even though his own thesis on intuitive learning touches on some points similar to Mencius, he claims that human nature is neutral. We can easily say that both of them agree on sensibility theory, but it should be known that Hume concentrates on feelings rather than thoughts. Since moral agency has its source in emotional dispositions, the assumption of Hume cannot integrate cognitive-affective processes. He maintains a sentimentalist principle which holds ethical behavior grounds in internal senses,

[24] Neo-Confucian philosopher of Qing Dynasty, Wang Fuzi (1619-1692) explains this notion on the centerline of analogical reasoning. According to Wang, the heart-mind correlation and fulfilling it with moral agency is closely related to personification. If humans cannot strengthen original goodness by way of emotional and logical constituents, the motives for ethical attitudes won't stimulate questioning intentions and decisions. See Wang 1975. In addition to this, Professor Keqian Xu clarifies this notion as a part of conscience (liangxin 良心) and endowed nature by heaven (tianxing 天性). See Xu, 2006. Those commentaries indicate that what is meant by fulfilling and keeping the heart-mind is approached to inner knowledge and virtue in some ways. With reference to this, we should mind out the evidence on cognitive-affective process is a complement in self-cultivation as a result of mutual interaction.

[25] (Topics, 156b10-17) Aristotle also draws attention to the principles of two phenomena being compared saying; "*everything that grows and is naturally generated always leaves a residue, like that of things burnt, consisting in this sort of earth*." (Mete, 358a17)

explaining *"reason can only be the slave of the passions"*.[26] Keeping this reading in mind we may see reflexive and intuitive learning methods of Mencius in Hume, but it is out of the question to observe a heart-mind correlation because of the fact that Hume disclaims logical inference assuming ethical distinctions are rooted in emotional immanence. The common ground where they meet is their opposition to rationalists and psychological egoism. So, it can easily be expounded that Hume has embarked on a close understanding of emotivism.

While rationalists regard reason as the origin of knowledge, emotivists regard emotion as the origin of knowledge. When considered this divergence on the source of knowledge, we arguably sort out that Mencius' theory is exactly different from all debates. Due to the heart-mind correlation, which performs the motives to activate thoughts by feelings, four sprouts enhance moral agency with the integrity of supervising intentions and decisions. It is the way to occur superiority predominating inferiority. Mencian doctrine on behavioral development bases the spontaneity sensibility. In the beginning of ethical courses, two explanations have been keynoted: having a heart-mind of being unable to see other people suffering (不忍人之心) and preserving the innocence of infantile heart-mind (赤子之心). Senses of compassion, shame, deference, right and wrong configure moral dispositions into actions with the sensibility of heart-mind, as seen in the example of responding little child who is about to fall down a well. Mencius emphasizes that whose intuitive ability and intuitive knowledge are complete, could be vulnerable to react to others' experience of grief and trouble. The same response is held true for the governor of Qi, who felt pity for the sacrificial ox. It proves that the affective process, which begins with inner feelings, extends to cognitive process with analogical reasoning in the phases of intentions and decisions. As mentioned in many passages, self-cultivation is adhered to rules of nourishing four sprouts, fulfilling constitutive social roles and engaging relational unity.[27]

Mencius describes four sprouts using the term of xin, which gives the definition to heart-mind: the heart-mind of compassion (惻隱之心), the heart-mind of shame (羞惡之心), the heart-mind of deference (辭讓之心), the heart-mind of right and wrong (是非之心). These innate feelings make us apprehend our shared humaneness and righteousness, teaching to affection and esteem. Once we explore original goodness,

[26] According to Hume, mind is not just an evidentiary field of thoughts; it is a faculty surrounds the origin of feelings, desires and actions. Being the center of all perceptions, emotions pervade within the function of our minds. Hume says: "*Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason*." He clearly denies practical reason as thoughts have less importance than feelings to behave virtuously because thinking has no original influence without the existence of feeling. For more see Hume, 2000.

[27] Throughout his classical text, Mencius repeats that four senses are essential to human beings and goes further in the second chapter saying: "*anyone who is lack of the heart-mind of compassion could not be human, anyone who is lack of the heart-mind of shame could not be a human, anyone who is lack of the heart-mind of deference could not be a human, anyone who is lack of the heart-mind of right and wrong could not be a human. We all have these four sprouts, but yet if one claims not to have them, is nothing less than a thief.* " (Mencius, 2a/6)

our attitudes and behaviors will be altruistically directed in certain ways. Approving the right and disapproving the wrong will guide us to corroborate our knowledge and virtue. The prerequisite to follow endowments is to extend moral agency for all living creatures without any exceptions, as Mencius advises the governor of Qi using analogical reasoning to weigh his heart-mind in order to become aware of the extension of his compassion to his own people.[28] Here, we should render the idea of weighing the heart-mind most likely indicates simultaneity between emotional motives and perceptual patterns before acting in accordance with reasonable decisions. What keeps down individuals from treating others in tenderness are the supreme desires tended to be satisfied. Mencius says: *"to nourish the heart-mind, nothing is better than having few desires."* (7b/81)

It is our contention here that distinguishing right from wrong has a basis for reducing appetitive desires to facilitate the nurturance of original goodness. When Mencius speaks of adverse effects on the greed of governor of Qi, we can evidently see in the texts that pursuing ambitions such as broadening territories, having more bondmaid, getting richer and eating redundant foods, is like trying to catch fish by climbing a tree.[29] In any case, a true virtuous ruler, who deserves to qualify as superior man, should engage with his people because to alleviate their sufferings compassionately is much more important than to satisfy his own desires self-interestedly. Engagements in the motives of emotion and reason therefore enable us to improve moral agencies to predominate appetitive desires. What Mencius emphasizes is that human beings have the natural potency and congenital capacity to activate four sprouts along with correlation of the heart-mind:

> Original nature of superior man is belonged to humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom which are rooted in his heart-mind. They bloom in his countenance, brighten in his appearance, widen in his shoulders and complete in his four limbs. The four limbs are comprehended without being told. *(Mencius, 7a/21)*

This is all to say that four sprouts fulfill four standards of virtuousness unless they grow by favor of physiological needs being responsive to desires. To attain moral behavior in accordance with inborn nature requires people to follow the norms which carry out self-cultivation. Just as the sense of compassion cultivates humaneness, the remaining three senses cultivate other norms of virtuous actions. At this point, we can say that feelings and thoughts integrate cognitive-affective processes in a pattern of personal growth. Since Mencius theorizes a pattern completely different from

[28] "*It is by weighing that the weight can be known; it is by measuring that length can be notified. All things are determined like this, particularly the heart-mind*." (Mencius, 1a/7)

[29] (Mencius,1a/7) Mencius diffusively lays open distortive desires through his dialogue with governor Xuan of Qi giving a set of examples about what is appetizing to possess as abundant foods, fine clothes, colorful objects, obedient servants wide borders and so on. Using analogical reasoning he draws a correspondence between longing for satisfied needs and catching fish from improbable point. Jiao Xun also works through on the dialogue expounding which desires are unvirtuous. See Jiao, 1987.

empirical and sentimental suggestions in regard of the heart-mind identified as the core of innate dispositions, there might be observed certain structures of attitudes includes motivational phases explained in modern psychology. The first phase is to know intuitively by virtue of four senses what is essential for orientation to moral agency. The second phase is to think thoroughly using analogical reasoning about how four sprouts activate intentions and decisions. The third phase is to expand all sprouts from compassion to wisdom equally and fairly with moral awareness. It is unarguably seen that Mencius assumes a comprehensive process which accommodates cognitive and affective components. Although main principles of his theory based on human nature is originally good are explored spontaneously, human effort is necessary to raise innate dispositions. With the heart-mind correlation being offered, he is neither an emotivist nor a rationalist. In the ideological idea coordinating emotion and reason, we should figure out that he stands for ethical epistemology.

Conclusion

In this essay, we examined Mencius' innatist theory with reference to the distinctions on traditional normativity of Confucianism. Being honored as second sage, he inherited and carried forward the principles transmitted by Confucius such as humaneness and righteousness, but the fact remains that he creatively developed a nonconventional hypothesis claiming human nature is originally good. In order to enhance the persuasiveness of his argument, Mencius adopted a method using metaphors to associate human nature with flowing water and innate dispositions with botanical growth. To illustrate the idea of moral awareness, we discussed positive-negative effects of reinforces and interferences to both intentions and decisions. To our quest for the essence of Mencian thought, emotion-based and reason-based approaches indicated a fundamental question about whether feelings or thoughts are the motives of moral progress. Taken the heart-mind correlation into consideration, we found that stages of personal development are suggested a mental-spiritual collective which explains feelings and thoughts have the equally significance.

We have drawn three phases of Mencius' metaethics of self-cultivation to assert his theory holds an early model of modern psychology. The first and most substantial phase is to learn incipient tendencies intuitively. According to Mencius we all have inborn dispositions to feel virtuously owing to the senses of compassion, shame, deference, right and wrong which are endowed by heaven. How those four sprouts make it possible to improve original goodness underlines an internal intention before action spontaneously. The second phase is analogical reasoning, which provides feelings for integration into thoughts compatible with inborn virtues. If individuals decide to act in pursuance of four sprouts, moral agency can be utilized in accounts of

humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. The third phase is to expand four sprouts so as to adjust environmental experiences. In our opinion, Mencius's claim on innate moral intuitions begins with awareness of natural potency and capacity manifested in spontaneity, continues with introspective method on which people search the truth in their conscience by reason of the norm remaining heart-mind of a newborn babe (赤子之心).

In furthering our understanding of the relation between cognitive and affective processes, we also found that Mencius states original goodness of human beings forms motivational foundations, since knowledge and virtue are accidents of birth. Reflective functions between emotion and reason verifies that there is neither a rational nor an emotional thesis. Instead, in his teaching, Mencius guides us to follow innate morality fulfilling the heart-mind (存心). Alongside undeniable effects of being responsive to others' sufferings learned intuitively as well as four sprouts during the infancy supported with responsibilities of parents, we can affirm that Mencian self-cultivation specifies the theory of psychosocial development down to the last detail. Consequently, unlike his contemporaries who accept human nature is neutral or social, Mencius idealizes the goodness of original nature which is emerged spontaneously but is maintained extensively. As it turns out that this apprehension had built a constructivist perspective to ethical epistemology more than two thousand years ago, but it must also be known that Mencian doctrine lays the practical base in today's psychological issues.

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