

Nicolae Sfetcu

**Emotions and
emotional intelligence
in organizations**

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Email: nicolae@sfetcu.com



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Abstract

An argumentation for the dualistic importance of emotions in society, individually and at community level. The current tendency of awareness and control of emotions through emotional intelligence has a beneficial effect in business and for the success of social activities but, if we are not careful, it can lead to irreversible alienation at individual and social level. The paper consists of three main parts: *Emotions (Emotional models, Emotional processing, Happiness, Philosophy of emotions, Ethics of emotions)*, *Emotional intelligence (Models of emotional intelligence, Emotional intelligence in research and education, Philosophy of emotional intelligence, Emotional intelligence in Eastern philosophy)*, *Emotional intelligence in organizations (Emotional work, Philosophy of emotional intelligence in organizations, Criticism of emotional intelligence in organizations, Ethics of emotional intelligence in organizations)*). In the *Conclusions* I present a summary of the statements in the paper.

1. Emotions

Emotion is a mental state induced by one or more internal or external stimuli, (Panksepp 2004) (A. R. Damasio 1998) (Ekman and Davidson 1994) which determines chemical bodily changes, behavioral responses and a certain state. (Cabanac 2002) (D. L. Schacter, Gilbert, and Wegner 2011) Emotion is in a permanent interdependence with the mood, temperament, personality, disposition and motivation of the person. (.about.com 2019) The meaning of the word emotion in everyday language is quite different from that in academic discourse. (Fehr and Russell 1984)

The term "*emotion*" was introduced in research to designate passions, feelings and affections. (Dixon 2003) The modern concept of emotion appeared around the 1830s. "No one felt emotions before about 1830. Instead they felt other things - "passions", "accidents of the soul", "moral sentiments" - and explained them very differently from how we understand emotions today." (Smith 2016) Emotions can be defined as a positive or negative experience associated with a particular pattern of physiological activity. The initial role of emotions was to motivate adaptive behaviors that in the past would have contributed to the transmission of genes through survival, reproduction and natural selection." (D. Schacter et al. 2011) (Pinker and Foster 2014) The Oxford Dictionary defines emotion as "A strong feeling deriving from one's circumstances, mood, or relationships with others." (Oxford 2019) Joseph LeDoux defined emotions as the result of a cognitive and conscious process that appears in response to stimuli that act on the body. (Emory 2018)

Emotions can be events or dispositions, of variable duration, (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018) with an intensity on a continuous scale according to psychotherapist Michael C. Graham. (Graham, Priddy, and Graham 2014) Emotional responses may be verbal, physiological, behavioral, and / or neural mechanisms. (Fox 2008) Emotions result in physical and psychological

changes that influence behavior. (D. L. Schacter, Gilbert, and Wegner 2011) They are often the driving force behind motivations. (Gaulin and McBurney 2003) Emotions are responses to significant internal and external events. (D. Schacter et al. 2011) Emotions facilitate adaptation to the environment, resulting from evolution. (Ekman 1992) Emotions allow communication in a community, (Fielding 2015) with positive or negative ethical value.

The classification of emotions is not universal, and depends on the cultural context, (J. A. Russell 1991) although some emotions have an intercultural character, they are universal. (Wierzbicka 1999) Graham differentiates emotions as functional or dysfunctional and argues that all functional emotions have benefits. Another way of classifying emotions is according to the possible target. (Hume 2011) Depending on the length of life, one can distinguish between emotional (short-term) episodes and emotional dispositions (comparable to character traits). Other specialists include emotions in a more general category of "affective states". (Schwarz 2012)

Paul Ekman argued that emotions are discrete, measurable and physiologically distinct, some being even universally recognizable, independent of culture, respectively anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. (Handel 2011) Recent studies by Daniel Cordaro and Dacher Keltner have expanded the list of emotions. (Cordaro et al. 2016) (Cordaro et al. 2018) (Keltner, Oatley, and Jenkins 2013) Robert Plutchik developed the "wheel of emotions", suggesting eight primary emotions positively or negatively grouped: joy versus sadness; anger versus fear; trust versus disgust; and surprise versus anticipation. (Handel 2011) Complex emotions arise from the combination of basic emotions in a certain cultural context. (Plutchik 2001)

1.1 Models of emotion

Emotion may be different from other similar constructs, (Fox 2008) such as feelings (not all feelings include emotion; (Givens 2014) moods (they last much longer than emotions, are less

intense and often lack contextual stimulation (Hume 2011)), or affect (experience of feeling or emotion).

Plato, in *Republic*, proposes three basic components of the human mind: reasoning, desire and emotional parts. (Plato 2015) For Aristotle, emotions were important in the moral life, an essential component of virtue. (Aristotel 1566) The Stoics have emphasized the importance of emotions in judgment (in Stoic theories, emotions are considered a hindrance to reason, and therefore to virtue). In the Middle Ages the Aristotelian vision was developed by scholasticism, especially by Thomas Aquino. (Aquinas 2013) Avicenna (11th century) can be considered as a precursor to emotional intelligence, considering that emotions influence health and behaviors and suggesting the need to manage emotions. (Haque 2004) In ancient China, excessive emotions were considered harmful, including for vital organs. (Suchy 2011)

The theory of evolution, through Charles Darwin's 1872 book, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, influenced the perspective on emotions. (Darwin and Prodger 1998) Darwin argued that emotions evolved through the inheritance of acquired characters, (Sheldrake 2015) but that they do not serve now any evolutionary purpose for humans, neither in communication nor in survival. (Hess and Thibault 2009) From the study of non-verbal expressions, he concluded that some expressions have intercultural universality, exemplifying with homologous expressions of emotions that appear in animals. This aspect led to the neuronal study of emotions.

In the early modern era, emotions were addressed in the works of philosophers, such as René Descartes, Niccolò Machiavelli, Baruch Spinoza, (A. Damasio 2003) Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes 1651) and David Hume. Emotions were considered adaptive and, in sec. 18, have been studied mainly from an empirical psychiatric perspective. An emotion model developed by

Descartes and supported by many contemporary psychologists takes into consideration a few basic emotions from which all other emotions are composed. Hobbes has assimilated "passions" with specific attractions or aversions. Hume considered that reason is the slave of passions, and for Spinoza emotions make the difference between the best and the worst life, influencing the power of the soul. Kant saw emotions as essentially connotative phenomena.

There are alternative models, which are based on the evaluation of certain properties, based on physiology or evolutionary psychology. (Panksepp 2004) (Tooby and Cosmides 2008) Classical philosophers have addressed emotions as responses to certain types of events that are related to a subject, causing bodily and behavioral changes. In the last century emotions were neglected, being considered a disturbing factor. Lately, emotions have returned to the attention of philosophers and psychologists, corroborating them with other disciplines such as psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology and even economics.

William James argued in 1884 (James 1884) that feelings and emotions are secondary to physiological phenomena, considering that the perception of "exciting facts" directly determines physiological responses ("emotions") (Carlson 2012) According to him, stimuli trigger activity in the autonomic nervous system, which thus producing an emotional experience in the brain. He started from the idea that emotions are a class of feelings, different from sensations and perceptions by their experienced quality, developing together with Carl G. Lange the "James-Lange theory" of emotion. (James 1884) According to this theory emotions are specific feelings caused by changes in physiological conditions related to autonomic and motor functions. James stated that "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful". (James 1884, 190) Thus, a stimulus that evokes emotion triggers a pattern of physiological response that is interpreted as a particular

emotion, an interpretation supported by experiments. (Laird 2007) However, this theory does not distinguish between emotions, according to Walter Cannon. (Cannon 1929a) According to James, what distinguishes emotions is that each involves the perception of a unique set of bodily changes. The James-Lange theory is disputed in terms of causality (body states that provoke emotions and are *a priori*), (Reisenzein, Meyer, and Schützwohl 1995) but most contemporary neurologists use the components of the theory. (Dalgleish 2004) The main contribution of the theory is the emphasis on embodying emotions, the fact that changes in bodily correspondences of emotions can change the experienced intensity. (Dalgleish 2004, 583)

Walter Bradford Cannon has argued that physiological responses are too slow and often imperceptible, and thus could not represent the relatively rapid and intense subjective awareness of emotion, (Carlson 2012) resulting in rather undifferentiated responses. (Cannon 1929b) (Cannon 1987) An event that evokes emotion simultaneously triggers both a physiological response and a conscious experience of an emotion. Phillip Bard developed this theory, known as the Cannon-Bard theory. Following Bard's studies, Cannon argued that emotional stimuli trigger both physiological and experiential aspects of emotion simultaneously. (Cannon 1929b)

Taylor believes that emotions are closely related to the reasons that give rise to them. (G. Taylor 1975) Although the basic psychological processes depend on socio-cultural practices and meanings, (Triandis 2000) the concept of emotion being relatively new did not convincingly approach the intercultural aspect, (S. Sharma et al. 2009) culture influencing essentially understanding and expressing emotions. (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Barrett 2008) Psychologists use methods such as factor analysis to limit emotions to measurable and at the same time differentiable dimensions. (K. R. Scherer et al. 2013) Based on these dimensions, coordinate maps are constructed (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957) to highlight an important component of

emotion, the affect of the nucleus. (D. L. Schacter, Gilbert, and Wegner 2011) (J. A. Russell and Lisa Feldman 1999)

Contemporary views have focused on motivating, by emotions, adaptive behaviors in the ancestral environment. (Gaulin and McBurney 2003) Emotions are thus viewed as influencing decisions. (Lerner et al. 2015) Somatic theories from the 19th century, especially through William James, support the paramount importance of bodily responses to emotions. The theory lost ground in the 20th century, but has recently been resumed in the neurological studies (Pace-Schott et al. 2019) of theorists such as John Cacioppo, (Cacioppo 1998) António Damásio, (Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio 2008) Joseph E. LeDoux (LeDoux 1996) and Robert Zajonc. (Emerick 1997)

The two-factor theory of Stanley Schachter is based on the studies of a Spanish doctor, Gregorio Marañón, according to which physiological reactions contribute to the emotional experience, facilitating a focused cognitive evaluation of a given physiological excited event, and this assessment is what defines the subjective emotional experience . Emotions are thus a result of the process in two stages: general physiological arousal and experience of emotion. (D. L. Schacter, Gilbert, and Wegner 2010) The experiments on which this theory is based have been criticized by Jesse Prinz. (Prinz 2004)

Subsequently, several cognitive theories were developed that considered the cognitive activity required for an emotion to occur. Richard Lazarus, for example, argued that emotions must have a certain cognitive intent. Emotion would thus be a disturbance arising from a cognitive appraisal followed by physiological changes that cause an action. The quality and intensity of emotions would thus be controlled by cognitive processes. Another example is Robert C. Solomon, (Solomon 1993) who argues that emotions are judgements. His objection to cognitivism is that it can occur with or without emotion, so judgment cannot be identified with emotion.

Perceptual theories use perceptions to reach emotions, (Goldie 2007) being hybrid theories of somatic and cognitive theories. Such a theory argues that both bodily responses and the meaning of emotions are important to emotions, according to cognitive theories. According to this theory it follows that cognition on a conceptual basis is not necessary, as bodily changes causally include the significant content of the emotion, providing information about the relationship between the subject and the world. The theory was supported by philosopher Jesse Prinz in his book *Gut Reactions* (Prinz 2004) and psychologist James Laird in the book *Feelings*. (Laird 2007)

The theory of affective events was developed by Howard M. Weiss and Russell Cropanzano in the context of lucrative activities. (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996) They consider that emotions are influenced and caused by events that in turn influence attitudes and behaviors. The theory was used by researchers to better understand emotion from a communicative perspective, being reviewed by Howard M. Weiss and Daniel J. Beal. (Weiss and Beal 2005)

A situated perspective on emotion, developed by Paul E. Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino, addresses situationalism in psychology, (Griffiths 2004) focusing on external factors in the emotional process considered purely internal, the environment being only a stimulus of emotion. In contrast, the situationist perspective sees emotion as the product of an organism that is influenced by its environment and the responses of other organisms. Emotion thus becomes an active factor in social relationships.

Emotions being a motivating factor in social interactions and relationships, are directly related to basic physiology. Emotional phenotype temperament affects social connections in complex social systems, (Kotrschal 2013) due to genes, through information encoded in DNA sequences and natural selection of hereditary traits.

The neurobiological theory explains the emotion as an organized mental state in the limbic system of the brain, as patterns of general vertebral arousal with intensity depending on neurochemicals (dopamine, noradrenaline, serotonin, ...), mediated by pheromones and resulting in bodily changes. (Givens 2014) Emotions are related to certain brain activities that direct our attention, motivate our behavior and determine the significance of what is happening around us. Paul Broca, (Broca 1878) James Papez, (Papez 1995) and Paul D. MacLean (Maclean 1952) concluded that emotion is linked to the limbic system in the brain's center.

Other theories are based on the idea of the left prefrontal cortex activated by stimuli that provoke a positive approach. (Kringelbach et al. 2003) Selective activation of the specific region of the brain causes a positive stimulus. The theory was later expanded to include negative stimuli. (Merckelbach and Van Oppen 1989) Following verification of several neurobiological models of emotion in the prefrontal cortex, the so-called "directional" model was accepted, which made better predictions. (Harmon-Jones et al. 2004)

A neurological approach by Bud Craig in 2003 distinguishes two classes of emotions: "classical" (evoked by environmental stimuli) and "homeostatic" (which requires attention, evoked by the states of the body) that motivate the behavior and maintain the internal environment of the body in his ideal state. (Craig 2003) Derek Denton regards homeostatic emotions as "primordial emotions", defining them as "the subjective element of the instincts, which are the genetically programmed behavior patterns which contrive homeostasis. They include thirst, hunger for air, hunger for food, pain and hunger for specific minerals etc. There are two constituents of a primordial emotion--the specific sensation which when severe may be imperious, and the compelling intention for gratification by a consummatory act." (Denton et al. 2009)

Joseph LeDoux states that the amygdala can release hormones through a trigger (such as a reaction), but "then we elaborate it through cognitive and conscious processes." (Emory 2018)

Lisa Feldman Barrett highlights the differences in emotions between different cultures in the theory of constructed emotion, and states that emotions "are not triggered; you create them. They emerge as a combination of the physical properties of your body, a flexible brain that wires itself to whatever environment it develops in, and your culture and upbringing, which provide that environment." (Barrett 2017)

1.2 Processing emotions

The Scherer model of emotion processing includes five basic components, coordinated and synchronized. (K. R. Scherer 2016) The inclusion of cognitive assessment is challenged by theorists who regard emotion and cognition as separate systems:

- Cognitive evaluation of events and objects
- Physical, physiological symptoms
- The tendencies of action, motivational
- Facial and vocal expressions
- Feelings (the subjective experience of the emotional state).

Tripathy describes this process: the emotional center of the brain gives birth to feelings and emotions, while the neocortex is responsible for thinking and reasoning. In the process of emotion development, a visual signal first goes from the retina to the thalamus, where it is translated into the language of the brain. The messages then reach the visual cortex, where they are analyzed and evaluated for meaning and appropriate response. If the response is emotional, a signal goes to the tonsil to activate the emotional centers. But a smaller portion of the initial signal goes directly from the thalamus to the amygdala in a faster transmission allowing faster response. Therefore, the

amygdala can trigger an emotional response before the cortical centers fully understand what is going on. (Tripathy 2018)

According to Antonio Damasio, the emotional process begins with conscious considerations about the object in the form of mental images. These images correspond to a neural substrate (topographic representations) influenced by the dispositional representations. At the unconscious level, the networks in the prefrontal cortex respond automatically and involuntarily to the signals derived from the processing of the above images, according to the dispositional representations, acquired based on personal experience rather than innate. The response is signaled to the tonsil and the anterior cingulate, by activating the nuclei of the autonomic nervous system and signaling to the body through the peripheral nerves; sending signals to the motor system; activation of endocrine and peptide systems, and by the activation, with particular pattern, of the non-specific neurotransmitter nuclei in the brain and basal brain stem. The first three modes of responses provoke an "emotional body state" and are subsequently signaled to the limbic and somatosensory systems. The last type of response "do not arise in the body proper but rather in a group of brain stem structures in charge of body regulation, have a major impact in the style and efficiency of cognitive processes, and constitute a parallel route for the emotional response. (Antonio R. Damasio 2005)

A common view is that there are primary, innate emotions that occur naturally when certain characteristics are perceived of internal stimuli or such as size, movement, sounds, certain body states, etc. These characteristics are processed and detected by a component of the limbic system of the brain, the amygdala, which triggers the adoption of a characteristic bodily state and modifies cognitive processing in an appropriate manner. The emotional response may meet some useful goals through bodily changes, but the process continues by triggering the emotion towards the

exciting and realizing the connection between the exciting and the emotional bodily state. The primary emotions (inborn, preorganized, Jamesian) depend on the circuits of the limbic system, the amygdala and the anterior cingulate being the primary factors. But the mechanism of the primary emotions is followed by the mechanisms of the secondary emotions, which appear after forcing connections between the experienced feelings, the categories of objects and situations, and the primary emotions. The process of secondary emotions is supported by an extensive network, which includes the prefrontal cortex and somatosensory agents.

It turns out that emotion is the combination of a mental evaluation process and responses to that process. But not all emotions generate feelings, and not all feelings originate in emotions. The emotion and the feeling are thus based on two basic processes, the visualization of a certain bodily state juxtaposed when collecting the signals of triggering and stimulating the muscles, and a cognitive process that accompanies the respective events but that working in parallel.

1.3 Happiness

” Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus, a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.” (Kant, Walker, and Meredith 2008)

In philosophy, happiness translates the Greek concept of *eudaimonia*. (Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, and King 2008) Utilitarianists, such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, have advocated the principle of maximum happiness as a guide to ethical behavior. Happiness, in the

broad psychological sense, is the label of a family of pleasant emotional states. In the last decades, the field of positive psychology has generated many different opinions on the causes of happiness and on the factors that correlate with happiness. Seligman summarizes five factors related to well-being: (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000)

2. (Bodily) pleasure
3. Commitment (coaching activities)
4. (Social) relationships
5. Meaning (purpose, ideal) and
6. Achievements (achievement of goals).

Several scales have been developed to measure happiness, such as Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS), Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS).

Ānanda from Hindu Vedas, Upanishads and Bhagavad gita, signifies eternal happiness, which accompanies the end of the rebirth cycle. According to the Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy, *ānanda* appears when the *jīva* (the individual soul) becomes free from all common sins, doubts, desires, actions, pains, sufferings and all physical and mental pleasures. Dvaita vedanta interprets *ānanda* as happiness which can be achieved through good thoughts and good deeds which depend on the state and control of the mind. Ramana Maharshi proposes that *ānanda* can be reached through introspection, using the thought "Who am I?" (Maharshi and Godman 1988)

Ataraxia is a Greek term used by Pyrrho and then by Epicurus for a lucid state of robust balance, characterized by the continuous release of negative emotions. Achieving *ataraxia* is an objective for Pyrrhonism, Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism as opposed to *ataraxia*,

apatheia is the absence of unhealthy passions, the release of the disorder of emotions, not the silence of the mind, being an intermediate state through which one can reach the stage of mental tranquility (*ataraxia*).

According to Al-Ghazali, a Muslim theologian, jurist, philosopher and mystic of Persian descent, there are four main constituents of happiness: self-knowledge, knowledge of God, knowledge of this world as it really is, and knowledge of the next world. (Griffel 2019)

Emotions are conceptualized in sociology usually in terms of multidimensional characteristics, such as cultural or emotional labels, physiological changes, expressive movements of the face and body, and appreciation of situational cues. (Thoits 1989) Jonathan Turner analyzed a wide range of emotion theories, identifying four primary emotions based on human neurology (Turner 2009) that, when combined, produce more elaborate and more complex (first order) emotional experiences. In the 1990s, sociologists focused on different aspects of specific emotions and how these emotions were socially relevant. (Cooley 1992) (Retzinger 1991) Scheff developed a micro-sociological theory of social connection according to which the formation or interruption of social bonds depends on the emotions that people experience during interactions. (Scheff 1990) Randall Collins formulated the theory of interaction ritual, according to which we experience different intensities of emotional energy during direct interactions. (Collins 2004)

1.4 The philosophy of emotions

The emotion was excluded from knowledge since ancient times, when Democritus stated that "Medicine cures diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from emotions". (Diels and Kranz 1951, 68 B 31) Such a view says that "reason should be the master of passion." The best-known inverted statement belongs to Hume, according to which reason is and should be the slave of passions. (Hume 1978, II.iii.3, 415) Emotions have been recognized as threats to rational and

epistemic decisions, (Sorabji 2002, 55) correlating emotions with will or desire (emotions would be a means by which will or desire they can distort reason or perception or a rational process). Therefore, emotions must be mastered (according to the Stoics) or accepted only the "right" (according to Aristotle).

Another criticism is that emotions do not contribute to knowledge, being too subjective or private to be relevant. Also, even if it is admitted that there are emotions related to knowledge by motivating and regulating cognitive activities, the motivational force is often rejected as epistemologically irrelevant. For example, Descartes considers that emotion may motivate us to acquire a belief, but does not enter into the epistemic evaluation of faith, based on the distinction between the validity of beliefs and theories and the history of their formation on which one believes that it is epistemologically irrelevant. (Descartes 1989, para. 69) In the case of emotions that involve an evaluation of a propositional content in relation to a certain cognitive standard, they are considered to be not sources of knowledge, because their affective attitudinal aspect does not contribute to the justification of the embodied belief, being no better than the guessing acts or cases of clairvoyance.

Descartes, in *Meditations*, considers certainty or infallibility as the requirements of knowledge, more important deductively than inferences for epistemic foundations and algorithms to choose between competing theories. (Descartes 2016) In this regard, emotions are not promising candidates, as their cognitive outcome seems particularly weak. The analysis in terms of true belief in contemporary analytical epistemology, as a model, is also unfavorable to emotions, since the condition of justification remains related to the inferential relations between beliefs. There have been attempts to eliminate the condition of justification under the cognitive control of the epistemic subject, using ideas such as appropriate causal chains, (Goldman 1967) reliable mechanisms of

belief formation, (Goldman 1976) or the proper functioning of cognitive systems. (Plantinga 1986) Such externalist tendencies in epistemic justification have blurred the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.

In the epistemological context, two questions have a special relevance: "are emotions knowledge?" and "is a uniform theory of emotions necessary to evaluate the epistemological state of emotions?". A restrictive interpretation of "knowledge" requires theories to have propositional content. In such a case, emotions are usually assimilated to normative beliefs or judgments. (Solomon 1993, chap. 5.3) More liberal interpretations of "knowledge" also include theories that interpret emotions on the perception model, such as De Sousa's study, *The Rationality of Emotion* ((de Sousa 1987); cf. (de Sousa 2004)) also supported by Sabine Döring, Elgin (Brun et al. 2008) and Prinz. (Prinz 2004) A minimal definition of cognitive theories of emotions includes the assertion that emotions are intentional. (Brun et al. 2008, 225–26) According to this criterion, strictly behavioral theories and theories that reduce emotions to feelings are not cognitive.

Recently, emotions have been re-evaluated as candidates for epistemic functions, often being rated as rational or appropriate. The cognitive rationality of emotions is their ability to represent the world as it is. (de Sousa 2011) The possibility of the adequacy of emotions being interpreted as emotional truth is disputed, (Salmela 2006) contrary to the opinion that they distort knowledge. It would be fair to specify the conditions under which they contribute to knowledge. Also, the claim is made that the confidentiality and subjectivity of emotions make them epistemically useless, (Goldie 2004, 94–95) (Solomon 2007, 150–58) highlighting the analogy between emotion and perception. (de Sousa 1987, 145–58) (Deonna 2006) Current philosophical theories about emotions claim that emotions include a cognitive element and can therefore be evaluated. Their cognitive functions require an epistemological analysis that can lead to an

epistemological reassessment of emotions. Thus, as opposed to the traditional properties of knowledge, by approaching cognitive activities, motivation, highlighting and relevance of emotions become epistemological aspects of interest.

According to Scarantino and de Sousa, there are three varieties of cognitive rationality for emotions: matching, assurance and coherence. (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018) Emotions are often devoid of reason, but in many cases manifest coherence, through cognitions that provide emotions with representations of their particular objects. When cognitions are beliefs, their change is consistently reflected in changes in emotions. As a special case of rationality in the coherence of emotion sets, Helm argued that emotions come in rational patterns centered around the things that are important to the agent. (Helm 2009) According to Brun, emotions are important in the context of discovery, because they influence the way researchers work, but they are irrelevant in the context of justification, because the validity of the results is independent of such emotions. (Brun et al. 2008)

Although emotions are often part of the processes of knowledge, it has been assumed that the function of the justification condition is to exclude beliefs that are only incidentally true. So, only the features that systematically contribute to the truth of knowledge have been seen as normative, and thus epistemologically relevant. From this perspective, emotions do not seem to be epistemologically relevant. Ernest Sosa, (Sosa 1985) James Montmarquet (Montmarquet 1993) and Linda Zagzebski (Zagzebski and Zagaebski 1996) adopted the notion of virtue from ethical theory, focusing on epistemic or intellectual virtues, reversing the direction of epistemological analysis. Virtue epistemologists begin with normative properties of epistemic agents. Emotions thus come to matter within such a strategy, contributing to the analysis of epistemic traits. The social epistemology of Lorraine Code (Code 1987) and Alvin Goldman (Goldman 1999) takes into

account processes in epistemic communities, and feminist philosophy examines the epistemic significance of agents with gender differences. (Jaggar 1989) (Diamond 1991) Quine and others initiated the project of naturalizing epistemology by assimilating it into psychology and cognitive science. (Quine 1969) Philosophical theories about emotions with their cognitive significance have been resurrected (for example, (Kenny 2003)), and psychology has begun to provide emotions with a central place. (Lazarus 1999)

Discussions about the nature of emotions address a confusing variety of characteristics, such as feelings, behavior, bodily reactions, cognitions, action dispositions, etc. Emotions are also associated with causes and intentionality, and may include certain evaluations, beliefs, or another knowledge. Emotions can be analyzed in terms of narrative structure, being incorporated into society and culture. Jesse Prinz states that this multiplicity of characteristics confronts the theories of emotions with a "problem of parts" (with different characteristics of the emotions and functions), as well as with a "problem of plenty".(Prinz 2004, chap. 1)

An emotion is intentional or object-oriented (Kenny 2003, 131–35) if it has a “formal” object, (de Sousa 2007, 5) defined as property x must have, or norm x must be respected, and if a specific emotional episode is oriented towards something (the “material” or “particular” object, which is in line with the formal object). Accounts that simply identify emotions with awareness of bodily change are not considered intentional. Alternatively to a general cognitive theory of emotions, it can be considered that certain emotions are specifically cognitive in one of the above senses.

Emotions motivate activities. (see case study from (Thagard 2002)). This makes them important for knowledge. Emotions are mechanisms that make us learn something. (Wilson and Keil 2001, 274–75) The distinction between discovery and justification contexts suggests that

emotion motivation is not epistemologically relevant. But it can be counter-argued by shifting the epistemological attention from the result pursued to the pursuit itself (from knowledge and / or true belief to epistemic activities and cognitive agents). Both Elgin (Elgin 1999, 121–22) and Hookway (Hookway 2000) believe that the justification of beliefs can be conceived as dependent on the history of their acquisition. "And since beliefs have to be evaluated in relation to cognitive actions, their evaluation may also depend on the identity and properties of desires, goals, mechanisms, motivations and virtues." (Brun) Because emotions with motivational force can be themselves normatively evaluated, they could be included. in the justifications of the beliefs. (Fairweather and Zagzebski 2001)

De Sousa believes that emotions can be a source for importance and relevance. (de Sousa 2007, 137) According to De Sousa's argument, emotions, acting as sources of cleanliness, influence the necessary reduction of the number of actions and consequences in the case of an extremely large number of such possibilities. (Ketelaar and Todd 2001, 200–203) Emotions can become evident when they focus on certain aspects of a situation, acting as "spotlights", (E. Peters 2006, 458) in extremely complex ways. Thus, Elgin regards emotion as "a frame of mind or pattern of attention that synchronizes feelings, attitudes, actions, and circumstances." (Elgin 1999, 148) As sources of relevance and highlighting, emotions are themselves assessments, and can in turn be evaluated.

Brun (Brun et al. 2008) also consider salience as an example of epistemic immediacy, and the relevance of emotions helps if distinction between alternative scenarios is needed. (Goldman 1986) Brun also argues that emotions are an additional source of knowledge, arguing that emotions provide epistemic access to otherwise inaccessible facts; a weaker argument is that emotions can be sources of true beliefs, but they are not indispensable. According to Elgin, emotions provide

epistemic access to certain response-dependent properties that are directly related to emotions.(Brun et al. 2008, 164–65)

Some authors argue that emotions are not just reactions to stimuli, they are influenced by beliefs, thus giving access to more general facts (e.g. (Goldie 2004, 94–99)) by being “sensitive to information”. (Elgin 1999, 156) In support of the strong claim that epistemically accessible facts exist only through emotions, Elgin refers to emotions that provide epistemic access to one's own propositional attitudes and commitments, provided that someone else knows how to interpret those emotions, (Elgin 1999, 159–61) an aspect imposed by the models of emotional intelligence. Cognitive theories of emotions claim that emotions embody beliefs or other propositional content. Critics of the epistemological significance of emotions invoke the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and consider that epistemological relevance cannot be claimed for emotions in general, but only for a subset of epistemically specific emotions, and some of the mental states that epistemologists have invoked recently as emotions are not really emotions.

A long-standing debate concerns the extent to which the objects of emotions must be identified with their causes. Scarantino and de Sousa consider that a taxonomy of the different types of possible emotional objects is needed, defining a formal object, essential for defining a particular emotion, as a property implicitly attributed by emotion to its objective or propositional object, by virtue of whose emotion can be seen as intelligible. (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018) Darwin considered that emotional expressions once served functions, but now accompany particular emotions because of their usefulness in communication. (Darwin and Prodger 1998) Paul Ekman argues that emotional expressions are important parts of "affect programs" - complex

responses found in all human populations that are controlled by mechanisms that function below the level of consciousness. (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1972)

Cognitivists usually argue that emotions involve propositional attitudes. Some of them universalize this feature and argue that any emotion must involve some kind of attitude toward a sentence. Critics of cognitive theories assume that there are various confusions in the very concept of "knowledge" that have blurred most of the concepts that invoke this term. (Power and Dalglish 2007) (Debes 2009) John Deigh states that these theories have the effect of excluding language-impaired animals and infants. (Deigh 1994) A frequent criticism is the "fear of flying" objection: propositional attitudes are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of an emotion, because I can be aware that flight is the safest means of transport and yet I am afraid of flight. (Stocker and Hegeman 1996) An analogy with perceptual illusions can be suggested here, which sometimes the right faith fails to dispel ("recalcitrant emotions"). It is impossible to assimilate at least some emotions, to judgment or to faith. (Solomon, Solomon, and Press 2004) (Brady 2009) One counterargument would be that this objection only sets the difference between the propositional content of emotion and that of belief, not that the emotions have no propositional content at all. (Peacocke 2001)

An important goal of the cognitivist theories is to avoid taxing emotions as merely "subjective". Sometimes emotions are subjective in the sense that they reflect only something that belongs exclusively and contingently to the subject's mind. The connection between emotion and knowledge can be argued by demonstrating the analogy between emotions and perceptions. Another way to argue this connection is to highlight the role of emotions as a framework for more conventional type of cognitions. (de Sousa 1987) (A. Rorty 1980) Under this framework, emotions are specific perceptions - ways of seeing. There is a long-term narrative approach to emotions, (A.

O. Rorty 1987) according to which a story unfolds during each emotional episode, (de Sousa 1987) to which a certain "paradigm scenario" corresponds. Later, the respective stories are completed and perfected by art. Scenarios involve both a type of situation that provides the characteristic objects and a set of answers. Thus, we get to interpret various real situations through the prism of different paradigm scenarios, modifying our inherent perceptual and cognitive dispositions.

There is a debate about the philosophical theories of emotions regarding the possibility of developing a uniform theory of emotions. Amélie Rorty and Paul Griffiths have argued that emotions are not a natural type. (Solomon, Solomon, and Press 2004, 269–78) (Griffiths 2004, 76–88) Thus, Rorty argues that there is no clear distinction between emotions and other mental states, and therefore the philosophy of emotions should be integrated into a comprehensive framework of a philosophy of mind. (Solomon 2004, 84) Griffiths argues that diversity of emotions does not allow for a unified scientific theory, that is, the category of emotions cannot be used to reliably obtain the inductive generalizations that scientists need to explain the mechanisms underlying emotions. Brun's conclusion is that certain emotions perform some epistemic functions - perhaps only in certain circumstances - while other emotions are not appropriate for these functions or are completely epistemologically irrelevant. (Brun et al. 2008)

In order to identify the basic teleology of emotions (for what they are), one can start from the trichotomy introduced by David Marr. (Marr 1982) For this purpose we take into the subfunctions that the natural selection has created to perform the functions that are said to be affected by the emotion, and the actual neuro-physiological processes through which these subfunctions are normally performed. Simpler, universal emotions are determined by the basic needs of organisms, (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth 1972) have proven to be universal. Griffiths argued that only Ekman's six core programs form natural types. Charland counter-argued that a sufficient

level of homology can be found to unite at least the basic emotions as a class,(Charland 2002) supporting Panksepp's integrated mechanism with seven basic emotions. (Panksepp 2000)

Dynamic systems theories have appeared relatively slowly, some of them relying on dynamic systems theory to model the evasive combination of unpredictability and patterned coherence found in evolution throughout individuality. (Magai and Haviland-Jones 2002)

1.5 The ethics of emotions

Emotions have often been considered a threat to morality and rationality; in the Romantic tradition, passions were placed at the center of both human individuality and moral life. This ambivalence has led to an ambiguity between the terms of emotions for vices and virtues. (Williams 1976) Epicureans and Stoics have argued that emotions are irrational. The Stoics believed that virtue is nothing but knowledge, and emotions are essentially irrational beliefs. Skeptics believed that beliefs were responsible for pain, recommending rejection of opinions of any kind. These schools emphasized the general value of "*ataraxia*", the absence of mental disturbance, the philosophy being regarded as therapy for the cleansing of the emotions in the soul. (Nussbaum 2009)

Max Scheler was the first to suggest that emotions are perceptions of the "tertiary qualities" that have survived, (Scheler 1954) a view taken by Tappolet. (C. Tappolet 2000) D'Arms and Jacobson believe that emotions may have intrinsic criteria of appropriateness that may conflict with ethical norms, and therefore emotions are not necessarily moral. (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000)

Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa, in *Emotion* (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018) point out that constitutive theories (dominant in philosophy) state that emotions are particular cognitions or evaluations, while causal theories (dominant in psychology) state that emotions are caused by particular cognitions or evaluations. C. D. Broad, (Cheney 2014) Errol Bedford (Bedford 1956)

and Anthony Kenny (Kenny 2003) have argued the constitutive approach in the sense that, to realize their intentionality, emotions must be cognitive evaluations of a different kind than feelings. Robert Solomon, (Solomon 2003) Jerome Neu (Neu 2002) and Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2003) support cognitive assessments, proposing that emotion be a judgment according to which the formal object of the emotion is instantiated by a particular object (judgmentalism). But judgmentalism does not explain how emotions can motivate (it can be judged without being motivated to act on it), it does not explain the phenomenology of emotions (it lacks the bodily dimensions, the valence and the excitement that typically characterize the experience of emotion), it fails to take into account the emotions of animals and children, and does not explain "recalcitrance to reason". (D'Arms and Jacobson 2003)

There are several strategies (the "protective belt" in Imre Lakatos' methodology (Lakatos 1978)) adopted by the proponents of cognitivism against counterexamples: reinterpreting the judgmental character of emotions, (Solomon, Solomon, and Press 2004, 105–6) (Nussbaum 2003, 45) the strategy of judicial completion, (Goldie 2002) which consists in explicitly adding judgments to other components of emotions rather than incorporating them into judgments through elastic strategy, (Gordon 1990) proposing that emotions be combinations of judgments, desires and feelings, (Lyons and Lyons 1985) the strategy of alternative cognitions (replacing the notion of judgment with other types of cognitive assessments), etc.

Emotional assessment theories are accounts of the structure of processes that extract meaning from stimuli and differentiate emotions from one another. Evaluation is an iterative process that monitors internal and environmental changes, appropriately modeling emotions.

Evaluation theories do not clarify what emotions are, except when they recognize that evaluations play an essential role in differentiating emotions. Lazarus (Lazarus 1994) introduced

a cognitive-relational-motivational theory with six structural dimensions of evaluation, criticized by Moors. (Moors 2013) Scherer et al. (K. Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001) considered sixteen evaluation dimensions, stimulus assessment checks, grouped into four classes. (K. R. Scherer 2016, 697) A variant of evaluation theories is the theory of belief and the desire for emotions, developed by Reisenzein, which argues that emotions are caused by a combination of cognitive evaluations (beliefs) and conative motivations (desires). (Reisenzein 2009) According to this theory, emotions are triggered by connected mechanisms that compare newly acquired beliefs with existing ones by updating the belief-desire system.

The gradual convergence between evaluative traditions and feelings, respectively between evaluative perceptions and evaluative feelings, has led to the development of theories in the philosophy of emotions qualified as hybrids. Prinz's neo-Jamesian theory is a strong perceptual theory. (Prinz 2004) Influenced by Damasio's neuroscientific works, (A. Damasio 2003) (Antonio R. Damasio 2005) Prinz suggests that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, in addition having distinct functions. Basically, the subjects actually perceive bodily changes (nominal content) and indirectly perceive the formal object (real content) due to bodily changes. Roberts argues that "emotions are a kind of perception" in the form of constructs based on concerns. (R. C. Roberts 2003, 87) Tappolet suggests that emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties (values). (Christine Tappolet 2016) Critics of perceptual theories of emotions (e.g. (Dokic and Lemaire 2013)) argue with their inability to consider emotional recalcitrance.

Several authors have proposed theories that endow feelings with intentionality. Goldie identifies the intentionality of the emotions with that of the feelings towards them. (Goldie 2002) Helm states that "emotions are intentional feelings of import". (Helm 2009, 8) Many of these theories are inspired by the representativeness of the philosophy of the mind, according to which

phenomenal properties are identifiable with the intentional properties or at least reducible to them. (Chalmers 2002)

Another recent approach is considering mechanisms that control salience. (de Sousa 1987) One variant is that the directional power that emotions exert on cognitions is in part a function of their essential dramatic or narrative structure. (A. O. Rorty 1987) De Sousa suggested that stories characteristic of different emotions are learned by associating with "paradigm scenarios" that involve a situation and a set of responses.

Another tradition identifies emotions with special types of motivational states (internal causes of behaviors aimed at satisfying a goal). The central problem would be to explain how emotions and actions are linked.

The basic emotion theory was developed by Silvan Tomkins, who stated that "the primary motivational system is the affective system". (Tomkins 2008, 4) Later came the modern theory of basic emotions, (Ekman 2003) (Izard 2007) an approach to the evolutionary psychology of emotions understood as solutions to recurrent evolutionary problems. (Plutchik 1980) (Tooby and Cosmides 2008) An alternative to basic emotion theory is behavioral ecology, which replaces the idea of facial expression of emotion with that of display produced depending on audience, without a necessary connection to a given emotion. (Fridlund 2014, 130)

In the motivational tradition of emotions, the fundamental aspect of emotions is the motivation for action. The phenomenological version of the motivational tradition, developed by Deonna and Teroni considers that emotions are feelings of preparation for action. (Deonna and Teroni 2012) The non-phenomenological version of Scarantino identifies the emotions with the causes of the states of action preparation. (Scartino 2015) Deonna and Teroni propose an

attitudinal theory of emotions, in which their cognitive bases give their content their emotional attitudes.

Two enactivist themes are relevant to the theory of emotions: the focus on the active role played by the connoisseur in his relationship with the external world, (E. Thompson 2010) and the embodied, embedded and extended character of cognitive processes. (Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011)

Feelings, along with the appetite and emotions that provoke them, play a decisive role in social behavior that includes ethical behaviors. (Humphrey 1992) In addition to humans, other species can behave in an ethical manner. But human ethical behavior has a degree of elaboration and complexity that makes it distinct. Ethical behaviors originate in a period that includes all the unconscious, automated mechanisms that ensure metabolic regulation; impulses and motivations; emotions and feelings whose solutions include cooperation. People endowed with emotions that enabled cooperative strategies have survived over time. This materialized through a consistent presence of genes that helped to develop these strategies, promoting the construction of certain components of the brain and their functioning. Due to the specific habitats, fine tuning of these systems has appeared over time.

Beautiful emotions and altruism belong to a group. Feelings can inspire the creation of conditions in the physical and cultural environments that promote pain reduction and improve welfare for society.

"Human beings are as they are—living and equipped with appetites, emotions, and other self-preservation devices, including the capacity to know and to reason. Consciousness, in spite of its limitations, opens the way for knowledge and reason, which, in turn, allow individuals to discover what is good and evil. Again, good and evil are not revealed, they are discovered, individually or by agreement among social beings." (A. Damasio 2003)

Spinoza states that ethical systems based on self-preservation also take into account social and cultural elements. (Spinoza 2017, pt. V) Spinoza tells us that happiness is the power to be

liberated from the tyranny of negative emotions. Happiness is not a reward for virtue: it is virtue itself.

The neural maps of the bodily state are critical to the governance of life, being a necessary basis for feelings. They offer limited assistance without conscious feelings, for problems with a certain limited degree of complexity; when problems get complicated, maps no longer help and feelings intervene.

Conscious feelings are prominent mental events that draw attention to the emotions that gave birth to them and to the objects that triggered those emotions. When one's feelings are made aware, they improve and amplify the life management process based on biological corrections.

It turns out that feelings are necessary being a mental expression of emotions. At this level it is possible for emotions to create, through feelings, self-care.

In general, the memory of the situation felt favors the avoidance of the events associated with the negative feelings and promotes situations that can provoke positive feelings. (Curley 1988)

2. Emotional intelligence

Emotional intelligence (EI) is a set of abilities for responses to events that constitute emotions. (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997) (Salovey and Mayer 2016) By integrating intelligence with emotion one can determine "at least some 'right' answers as to feelings" (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997, 9) to distinguish individuals according to EI in each cultural context. (J. K. Morgan, Izard, and King 2010) Steve Jobs's biographer, Walter Isaacson, attributed some of Jobs's success in leading Apple to its ability to identify, analyze and control emotions: "He knew, intuitively, how to create products that pleased, interfaces that were friendly, and marketing messages that were enticing." (Isaacson 2011) It turns out that not the traditional sense of intelligence made Jobs a

leader in his industry. He actually understood people better than his competitors, using this understanding to design Apple products.

Emotional intelligence is the ability of individuals to recognize their own and others' emotions, to discern between different feelings and to label them correctly, using emotional information to guide thinking and behavior, and to manage and adjust emotions to adapt to the environment or to achieve their own goals.

There are several models that aim to measure EI levels. Goleman's original model is a mixed model that combines abilities with traits. (D. Goleman 1998) A trait model was developed by Konstantinos V. Petrides in 2001 (Petrides and Furnham 2001) with a focus on self-knowledge, and an ability model was developed by Peter Salovey and John Mayer in 2004 focusing on social relationship. (J. D. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso 2004)

It has been found, without being scientifically proven, that people with high EI have higher mental health, better work performance and leadership abilities. Goleman indicated that EI represented 67% of the abilities required for performance as leaders and counted twice as much as technical expertise or IQ. (Daniel Goleman 1998)

Darwin emphasized the importance of emotional expression for survival. In the 20th century, researchers began to realize the importance of non-cognitive aspects for intelligence. (Darwin and Prodger 1998) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) distinguished "three types of actions": (i) technical action (how to manage objects), (ii) pragmatic action (how to deal with people) and (iii) ethical action (how to handle approach of moral values), (Kant, Walker, and Meredith 2008) transferred by Müller-Merbach to the level of intelligence. (Müller-Merbach 2007) The distinction between technical, pragmatic and ethical action helps to make agents fully aware of their responsibility. According to Kant, these actions correspond to the hypothetical imperative

subordinate to the categorical imperatives. There is a hierarchy between the three types of actions and the corresponding imperatives. The problematic and the affirmative imperative are hypothetical in that they are subordinate to the categorical imperative. According to Russell, the hypothetical imperative states how to act according to purpose, as opposed to the categorical imperatives that state the necessity of actions without regard to any purpose; thus the categorical imperative "act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law." (B. Russell 1967, 683)

In 1920, E. L. Thorndike, used the term social intelligence in human relations, proposing several types of intelligence. In 1940, David Wechsler, emphasized the importance of affective, personal and social factors in predicting one's ability to succeed in life.

The term "emotional intelligence" first appeared in a 1964 work by Michael Beldoch, (Davitz and Beldoch 1964) and in B. Leuner's 1966 work entitled "*Emotional intelligence and emancipation*" in the *Practice of child psychology and child psychiatry*. (Leuner 1966) In 1983, Howard Gardner introduced the idea of multiple, interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences in *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences*. (Gardner 1983) The term reappeared in Wayne Payne's PhD thesis, *A Study of Emotion: Developing Emotional Intelligence* in 1985. (Payne 1985)

The first use of the term "EQ" (Emotional Quotient) was in an article by Keith Beasley in 1987 in the British magazine *Mensa*. (Beasley 1987) In 1989, Stanley Greenspan presented a model describing EI, followed by another by Peter Salovey and John Mayer published the following year. (Salovey and Mayer 2016)

Psychologists John Mayer and Peter Salovey introduced the concept of emotional intelligence as "the ability to monitor one's own and other people's emotions, to discriminate

between different emotions and label them appropriately, and to use emotional information to guide thinking and behavior.” (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1993) The term became popular with the publication of Goleman's book: *Emotional Intelligence - Why it can matter more than IQ.* (Daniel Goleman 1996) In 1996, Reuven Bar-On developed the first validated scientific measurement of emotional intelligence, with a test covering five areas: intrapersonal, interpersonal, adaptability, stress management and general disposition. (Bar-On 2004) The distinction between the emotional intelligence of the traits and the emotional intelligence of the abilities was introduced in 2000. (Petrides and Furnham 2000)

In the most general sense, emotional intelligence (IE) refers to the ability to recognize and regulate emotions in ourselves and in others. (Daniel Goleman 2002)

The relationship between emotional intelligence and personality has been considered in several models of emotional intelligence, such as the mixed models of Bar-On and Goleman. In these models, the components of emotional intelligence are like those of personality theory. (J. D. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso 2000) This overlap is evident in empirical comparisons of constructs. (Brackett and Mayer 2003) (F. Sala 2002) Even in Mayer and Salovey's model, significant empirical correlations with personality can be highlighted. Also, alexithymia is defined by four key characteristics: difficulty in identifying the feeling and distinguishing between feelings and bodily sensations of emotional arousal; difficulty in describing feelings towards other people; restricted imaginary processes highlighted by a lack of fantasy; and a stimulus-oriented, externally-oriented cognitive style that is based on external cues and signals rather than internal cues. Although the features of alexithymia show the construction to be a type of psychiatric diagnosis or diagnostic category, it is important to emphasize that there is none. Instead, it is a complex mixture of personality traits, which remains stable over time, even after stress or depression has

subsided. (G. J. Taylor and Bagby 2000) Researchers have pointed out an inverse association between alexithymia constructs and emotional intelligence. (Schutte et al. 1998) Researchers such as Robert Sternberg and Howard Gardner argue that IQ tests measure only a limited aspect of human intellectual capacity, and they depend on culture.

There are a multitude of definitions of emotional intelligence:

"The ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's thinking and actions." (Salovey and Mayer 2016)

"An array of non-cognitive (emotional and social) capabilities, competencies and skills that influence one's ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures." (Bar-On 2004)

"The capacities to create optimal results in your relationships with yourself and others." (Six Seconds 2010)

"Emotional intelligence is the set of abilities that we like to think of as being on the other side of the report card from the academic skills." (M. Elias 2001)

"The ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional meanings, and to reflectively regulate emotions in ways that promote emotional and intellectual growth.", (J. D. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso 2004) revised definition

"The mental ability we are born with which gives our emotional sensitivity and potential for emotional management skills that help us maximize our long-term health, happiness and survival." (Hein 2005)

"Knowing how to separate healthy from unhealthy feelings and how to turn negative feelings into positive ones." (Hein 2005)

"Emotional intelligence is the innate potential to feel, use, communicate, recognize, remember, learn from, manage, understand and explain emotions." (Stock 2008)

"Emotional intelligence is your ability to recognize and understand emotions in yourself and others, and your ability to use this awareness to manage your behavior and relationships." (Bradberry, Greaves, and Lencioni 2009)

The advantages of emotional intelligence: (Tripathy 2018)

- Improves relationships with people
- Improves communication with people

- Improves empathy skills
- By acting with integrity, it helps you to gain the respect of others
- Improves career prospects
- Safer management of change
- Increases the pleasure of work
- Makes you feel confident and positive in attitude
- Reduces stress level
- Increases creativity
- Helps you learn from mistakes.

EI influences a lot of factors, such as: (Tripathy 2018)

- Motivation and creativity
- Decision making
- Negotiation
- Leadership
- Personal development
- Education

In *Emotional Intelligence in Organizations*, Stéphane Côté classifies EI into several branches, with the specific abilities of each branch and the measurement of these abilities, as follows: (Côté 2014)

- Sequence and expression of emotions
 - The ability to identify the emotions that others feel, (Elfenbein and Eisenkraft 2010) also called empathic capacity, (Côté et al. 2011) the ability to recognize emotions

(Rubin, Munz, and Bommer 2005) and the nonverbal reception capacity. (Buck et al. 1980)

- The ability to detect the authenticity of the emotional expressions of others. (Groth, Hennig-Thurau, and Walsh 2009) (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997)
- The ability to evaluate one's own emotions. (Salovey and Mayer 2016)
- The ability to express clearly the emotions of others. (Buck et al. 1980) (Salovey and Mayer 2016) (Zuckerman et al. 1976)
- Using emotions (Salovey and Mayer 2016)
 - Knowledge of the systematic effects of emotions on cognitive processes. (Fine et al. 2003) (J. K. Morgan, Izard, and King 2010) (Salovey and Mayer 2016)
 - The ability to harness emotions to guide cognitive activities and solve problems.(J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997, 12)
- Understanding emotions
 - The ability to understand emotional language. (Fine et al. 2003) (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997)
 - The ability to analyze cause and effect relationships between events and emotions. (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997) (J. K. Morgan, Izard, and King 2010)
 - The ability to understand how basic emotions combine to form complex emotions (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997, 13)
- Emotion control (Côté and Hideg 2011)
 - The ability to set emotion regulation goals. (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997)
 - The ability to select strategies to regulate emotions. (Côté and Hideg 2011)

- The ability to implement strategies to regulate emotions. (Côté, Gyurak, and Levenson 2010) (Sheppes et al. 2014)

According to an article in the *Annual Psychology* journal, (J. D. Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade 2007) emotional intelligence is positively correlated with:

- Better social relations for children
- Better social relationships for adults
- Strong emotionally intelligent individuals are perceived more positively by others
- Better family and intimate relationships
- Better academic activity
- Better social relations during performance in the workplace and in negotiations
- Better psychological well-being
- Allows self-compassion

For most specialists, knowledge or cognitive intelligence may not be the only predictor of success. (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000) Boyatzis and Saatcioglu (R. E. Boyatzis and Saatcioglu 2008) have shown that the ability to predict a leader's performance depends on a series of competencies that can be grouped into three categories: (Howard and Bray 1988)

1. Cognitive intelligence competences: thinking systems
2. Emotional intelligence competences (intrapersonal abilities): the ability to adapt
3. Social intelligence competences (interpersonal abilities): social networking. (Tovar 2013)

Competence was initially defined as the ability of individuals to respond to the demands of their environment, offering satisfaction or a sense of effectiveness. (White 1959) Penrose suggested that the efficiency of a company increases in the case of distinctive competences. (Nordhaug and Grønhaug 1994, 91) McClelland stated that these abilities can be learned.

(McClelland 1973) Boyatzis defined the term "competence" as "an individual's underlying characteristic causally related with an effective or superior performance," (Gunz 1983) referring to the job requirements and the organizational context. Spencer and Spencer took up Boyatzis' idea of defining competence as "an individual's underlying characteristic causally related with an effective or superior performance in reference to a criteria". (Spencer Jr. and Spencer 1993) Lévy-Leboyer defined competencies as "codes of conduct that some people manage better than others and make them effective in a given situation." (Lévy-Leboyer 1997, 13) Beyond competencies, desire is also important. to use their own talent. (R. Boyatzis and McKee 2006)

Descartes said that "it is impossible for the soul to feel a passion without that passion being truly as one feels it," noting that "those that are most agitated by their passions are not those who know them best." (Descartes 1989) (Daniel Goleman 2002) (J. D. Mayer and Geher 1996) Emotions are both the cause and the subject of many failures of self-knowledge. Many are lost through self-delusion. (Fingarette 1969) (Mele 1992) Self-deception involves the failure of self-knowledge. There are certain underlying neurological processes for deception. (Hirstein 2005) Scarantino and de Sousa highlight three distinct sources of self-deception that depend on emotions: (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018)

1. The connection of emotion with bodily changes
2. The role of emotions in determining poverty among potential objects of attention or concern (Greenspan 2000)
3. Involving social norms in determining emotions. (Averill 1982)

2.1 Models of emotional intelligence

The emotional intelligence (EI) models have helped to develop different tools for construct assessment. (J. D. Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade 2007) Each theoretical paradigm conceptualizes

emotional intelligence from one of two perspectives: ability or mixed model. Ability models consider emotional intelligence as a pure form of mental ability and therefore as pure intelligence. Mixed models of emotional intelligence combine mental capacity with personality traits. The trait models of IE refer to the individual perceptions of their own emotional abilities.

2.1.1 Model of abilities of Mayer and Salovey

According to Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer, EI is "the capacity to reason about emotions, and of emotions, to enhance thinking. It includes the abilities to accurately perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth." (J. D. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso 2004)

Emotions are sources of information that help social networking. The model includes four types of skills:

1. Perception of emotions
2. Use of emotions
3. Understanding emotions
4. Emotional management

In Mayer and Salovey's model, each ability is measured using specific tasks, (Brackett and Mayer 2003) The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) is modeled on ability-based IQ tests. The authors state that emotional intelligence measured by ability framework meets some of the standard criteria for a new intelligence: operationalization as a set of abilities, objectivity of responses, correlation of scores with existing intelligences, unique variation, and scores increase with age. (J. D. Mayer et al. 2003) (Stys and Brown 2004) The MSCEIT is a consensual measure that compares individuals' responses with those of a sample of respondents.

The answers are considered emotionally "intelligent" only if the majority of the sample gave similar answers.

Other measurements of the ability model include:

- Diagnostic analysis of non-verbal accuracy
- Japanese and Caucasian rapid recognition test
- Scale of levels of emotional awareness

There are studies that contradict the validity of these tests. The ability model has been criticized in research for equivocality and lack of predictions in the workplace but, compared to the self-reported scales of EI, this model is not based on the opinion of individuals about themselves.

2.1.2 Goleman's mixed model

Daniel Goleman defines emotional intelligence as "the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships." (Daniel Goleman 1998) Daniel Goleman's first model focuses on the abilities required for leadership performance, including five main EI constructs, with twenty-five competencies:

1. Self-awareness
2. Self-regulation
3. Social ability
4. Empathy
5. Motivation

Further analysis of Richard Boyatzis (Daniel Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee 2002) reduced the number of skills to twenty, and the areas to four: (R. E. Boyatzis, Goleman, and Rhee 2000)

1. Self-awareness
 - a. Awareness of one's emotions
 - b. Accurate self-assessment
 - c. Self-confidence
2. Self-management
 - a. Emotional self-control
 - b. Transparency
 - c. Adaptability
 - d. Orientation of efforts
 - e. Initiative
 - f. Optimism
3. Social awareness
 - a. Empathy
 - b. Organizational awareness
 - c. Orientation of services
4. Relationship management
 - a. Managing others
 - b. Inspired leadership
 - c. Influence
 - d. Conflict management

- e. Teamwork and collaboration

Goleman's model can be measured based on:

1. The Emotional Competency Inventory (ECI) created in 1999, revised as the Emotional and Competency Inventory (ESCI) in 2007.
2. Emotional Intelligence Appraisal developed in 2001 as a self-report.

This model has been criticized as simply "popular psychology"

2.1.3 The mixed model of Bar-On

Reuven Bar-On considered that emotional intelligence develops over time and can be improved through training, programming and therapy. (Bar-On 2004) He considers emotional-social intelligence to be "a cross-section of interrelated emotional and social competencies, skills and facilitators that determine how well we understand and express ourselves, understand others and relate with them, and cope with daily demands, challenges and pressures".

Bar-On's model of emotional intelligence refers to performance potential rather than performance itself, being process-oriented rather than results-oriented. (Bar-On 2004) EI focuses on

1. a group of emotional and social skills
2. the ability to cope and adapt

Its mixed model includes five components of emotional intelligence

- Intrapersonal
 - Self-respect
 - Awareness of one's emotions
 - Assertiveness
 - Independence

- Tenacity
- Interpersonal
 - Empathy
 - Social responsibility
 - Interpersonal relationship
- Adaptability
 - Reality testing
 - Flexibility
 - Problem solving
- Stress management
 - Stress tolerance
 - Impulsivity control
- General mood
 - Optimism
 - Happiness

Bar-On has developed several versions of Emotion Quotient Inventory depending on groups and specific situations. (Bar-On 2004) The Emotion Quotient Inventory correlates only minimally with the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, but more significantly with another self-report measure of emotional intelligence, the Self Report Emotional Intelligence Test. (Schutte et al. 1998)

2.1.4 Petrides' model of traits

Konstantinos V. Petrides developed this model as "a constellation of emotional self-perceptions located at the lower levels of personality." (Petrides and Furnham 2000) The trait

model refers to the individual's self-perceptions of his or her emotional abilities, being labeled as trait emotional self-efficacy. It is a construct outside the taxonomy of human cognitive ability.

For self-report measurements of EI, EQ-i can be used, Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT), EI Schutte model, etc., being rather limited measurements of emotional intelligence. EQ-i 2.0, initially known as BarOn EQ-i, was the first self-report measurement of emotional intelligence, having the best rules, reliability and validity from self-report measurements. Another measuring instrument, TEIQue, offers an operationalization for Konstantinos V. Petrides' model with reference to some of the Big Five personality traits.

Other models and measurements:

- Levels of the emotional awareness scale (LEAS) (Lane and Schwartz 1987)
- Self-Reporting Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT) (Petrides and Furnham 2000)

There are theoretical and statistical similarities between the different models of EI. All models aim to help understand and develop emotional intelligence, based on key components of intelligence (such as awareness or perception of emotions and management of emotions as key elements). Brackett and Mayer (Brackett and Mayer 2003) found significant similarities between the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso and Bar-On models.

2.2 Emotional intelligence in research and education

Daniel Goleman (Daniel Goleman 2002) states that there are no gender differences in EI. But studies by Mayer and Geher, (J. D. Mayer and Geher 1996) Mayer, Caruso and Salovey, (J. D. Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey 1999) and more recently Mandell and Pherwani, (Mandell and Pherwani 2003) show that women are more susceptible to achieve a higher level of emotional intelligence than men. The discrepancy may be due to the choice of measurements (Brackett and

Mayer 2003) when someone defines EI. in a purely cognitive way rather than a mixed perspective. Overestimation of ability on the part of men is more likely to occur with self-report measures.

Emotional intelligence can have a significant impact on the various elements of everyday life. (Palmer, Donaldson, and Stough 2002) Higher levels of EI are associated with an increased likelihood of health and appearance, positive interactions with friends and family. Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (J. D. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso 2000) found that lower emotional intelligence was associated with lower self-reports of violent behavior. Lower emotional intelligence (MSCEIT) has been significantly associated with higher drug and alcohol use. Sexual offenders have difficulty identifying their feelings and those of others. (Moriarty et al. 2001)

Goleman argues for the higher predictive significance of EI than IQ, saying that emotional intelligence could be "as powerful, and at times more powerful, than IQ." (Daniel Goleman 1995, 34) Current theories tend to be more cautious about the incremental benefits of EQ over IQ. (Lam and Kirby 2002) Goleman, (Daniel Goleman 1998) and Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (Sternberg 1982) state that emotional intelligence alone is not likely a strong predictor of work performance but provides a basis for emotional competencies that are strong predictors of job performance.

Later Goleman (Daniel Goleman 2002) describes IQ as playing a sorting function in determining the types of jobs that employees can occupy and a strong predictor of overall success. In a comparison with a specific group of people the predictive power of IQ for performance can be replaced by EQ.

In training in management, in communication and empathy, in conflict resolution and stress management, and in training and self-management, (Cherniss 2000) the traditional training curriculum fails, as it ignores individual complexities, focusing exclusively on cognitive learning. (Dearborn 2002) Cognitive learning involves placing new information into existing frameworks

and modes of understanding, (Adler et al. 1998) being ineffective in teaching emotional intelligence abilities. Thus, less traditional techniques of emotional learning are recommended. Goleman has established an optimal process for developing emotional intelligence in organizations, in four phases: preparation for change, training, transfer and maintenance abilities, and evaluation.

Goleman notes that motivational factors could be a problem through the opposite resistance. (Adler et al. 1998)

Possible programs for developing emotional intelligence:

- Mastering Emotional Intelligence Program (MEI): Designed by Goleman and Boyatzis, it helps identify and address emotional intelligence issues in the workplace, while supporting the development of emotional intelligence abilities. (R. E. Boyatzis, Goleman, and Rhee 2000) (Fabio Sala 2001)
- Emotional Competence Training Program: In order to increase the ability of counselors to cope effectively with emotions. (AMEX Program 2003)
- Customized Leadership Development Program: Allows managers to identify areas where behavioral changes are required. (Daniel Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee 2002)

Best practices for developing emotional intelligence theory: (Côté 2014)

1. Select an EI ability model according to its component definitions and reject the trait/mixed models.
2. Consider the three global models of how EI can relate to the working criteria: generalization of validity, situation-specific model and moderator.
3. Checking the conditions in which the higher EI can be related to adverse results.

4. Specify whether the EI theory and working criteria relate to the broader EI construct, a specific EI branch, or a specific emotional ability.
5. Separate theory development from measurement methods. Decide how to measure the EI only after the theory is fully developed and the hypotheses arising from the theory are stated.

Best practices for measuring emotional intelligence: (Côté 2014)

1. Select performance based EI measurements and reject self-report measures.
2. Describe the process of EI variations according to the selected measurements, justifying how to determine the correct answers to the measurements.
3. Consider the potential cultural variations of the correct responses to EI measurements.
4. Measure the following control variables, which could be correlated with both EI and criteria, to check if they do not cause false associations: cognitive intelligence, Big Five personality traits, and demographic factors. Measure other control variables relevant to the specific context and criterion of interest.
5. If the theory focuses on a specific facet of the EI, include measurements of the other facets to verify the eventual similarity of the associations or the specificity of the theoretical results of the EI. This is not always possible due to the challenges (e.g., time and attention of participants) involved in measuring multiple facets of EI.

2.3 The philosophy of emotional intelligence

A concept adjacent to emotional intelligence, *apatheia*, often incompletely translated by apathy and incorrectly by indifference, was considered by the Stoics as a state of mind not disturbed by passions, being seen as a quality that characterized the philosophical wisdom. Aristotle considers virtue to be the fair middle way between excess and deficiency of emotion

(*metropathia*), implying the management of emotional or selfish reactions to external events that cannot be controlled. For the Stoics, *apatheia* was the optimal rational response to a reality caused by the will of others or by nature and which cannot be controlled. Only his own will can be controlled, through correct (virtuous) judgments and actions, experiencing contentment (*eudaimonia*) and good feelings (*eupatheia*). Seneca also affirms the importance of virtue in our own happiness, to "win the way to victory in all our struggles, – for the reward is... virtue, steadfastness of soul, and a peace that is won for all time." (Seneca 1917, chap. Lxxviii 13-16)

Pironism states that through *epoché* (suspension of judgment) the mind is brought to *ataraxia*, a state of soul balance. As in Stoicism and Epicureanism, *eudaimonia* is the pyronistic goal of life and all three philosophies have placed it in ataxia or *apatheia*.

Kant distinguished three types of "actions" (Müller-Merbach 2007) for which he develops three types of intelligence:

1. *Technical intelligence* (Kant: *skill*) is required for technical actions. Technical intelligence cannot be measured precisely by intelligence tests. It is an indicator of how well one understands objects. Technical intelligence must refer to specific areas of tasks. Technical intelligence is important for almost any position on the labor market.
2. *Emotional intelligence* (Kant: *pragmatism*) was largely ignored before 1995. The core of emotional intelligence is self-control. He was highlighted by the Chinese philosophers Confucius (Confucius 2013, bk. XIII) and Lao-Tzu in Daoism, (Tzu 1992, chap. 33) but also by the Greek and Roman philosophers Seneca (4 BC - 65), (Seneca 1917) Epictetus (50-138), (Epictetus 1928) and Emperor Marcus Aurelius (120-181). (Marcus Aurelius et al. 1990) Epictetus states that: "No man is free who is not master of himself" (Epictetus 1928, 477) and that "Some things are under our control, while others are not under our

control." (Epictetus 1928, 483) Goleman (Daniel Goleman 1996) and Steiner (Steiner and Perry 1997) argue the importance of self-control on the basis of current empirical experience. Emotional intelligence is based on humanism, human relationships, and social responsibility. Emotional intelligence involves the ability to understand other people, to cooperate and to influence them.

3. *Ethical intelligence* (Kant: *wisdom*) involves many ethical doctrines that offer partially opposite advice, such as teleological ethics versus deontological ethics, normative versus descriptive ethics or normative versus intuitive ethics. In addition, many objective ethical concepts are competing.

For Kant, technical and pragmatic action are subordinate to ethical action, and the categorical imperative is superior to the two hypothetical imperatives of technical and pragmatic action. It follows that ethical intelligence will be considered superior to technical (skill) and emotional (pragmatic) intelligence. Ethics will provide the final judgment. But the wide variety of ethical concepts makes it difficult to accept the superiority of ethical intelligence over other intelligences. (Kant, Walker, and Meredith 2008)

The critical reflection of the aspects of emotional intelligence (EI) can be put on account of the different epistemological perspectives, reflecting a maturity of the concept. (Meleis 1998) Chan and Latham stressed the need to find consistent empirical evidence for the dimensionality of EI and to develop appropriate methods for its correct and useful measurement. (Sue-Chan and Latham 2004)

A concern of researchers is whether EI is a theory of personality, a form of intelligence, or a combination of both. Many studies consider EI to be a personal factor associated with competence. (Spence, Oades, and Caputi 2004) But most researchers consider EI as an emotional

awareness of oneself and others, in addition to professional efficiency and emotional management. According to Dulewicz and Higgs, EI is considered a capacity at the ontological level including personal and social competence, (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000) which promotes a positive state of mind despite environmental demands, (Cummings, Hayduk, and Estabrooks 2005) and which helps to solve problems related to both emotional and cognitive abilities. (Ciarrochi, Dean, and Anderson 2002) It is also considered that EI has an inherent potential to be further developed and refined through reflection, thus promoting emotional and intellectual growth. (Caruso, Mayer, and Salovey 2002) Spence sees emotional intelligence from a public health perspective as an adaptive ability that promotes well-being. (Spence, Oades, and Caputi 2004)

The EI critique addresses the limitations of empirical research and unsubstantiated generalizations, (S. Fineman 2004) considering that ontological and epistemological assumptions determine the research methodologies. (Monti and Tingen 1999) It is now considered that the only way that "emotions" can be identified is through measurements and quantifications related to the methods of descriptive and statistical analysis, using different methods of self-reporting and psychometric measurements. (S. Fineman 2004) Recommendations have been made regarding the application of qualitative approaches in future research within EI. (Sue-Chan and Latham 2004)

Effective and creative manipulation of emotions is a gateway to a type of self-knowledge that leads to the freedom to be authentic in oneself at any given time. (Hammer and 常二 1999) In this context, an essential question is whether the EI phenomenon can more clearly articulate humanist existentialism in relation to the healthcare discipline. (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000)

Emotional intelligence is considered an ability at the ontological level, important for promoting positive moods independent of the environment. (Cummings, Hayduk, and Estabrooks 2005) Cummings's work places perception and cognition in the context of adaptive human

endeavors to effect change in oneself and in one's own environment. (Dai and Sternberg 2004) According to Dulewicz and Higgs, future epistemological studies of EI will approach EI conceptualization as a starting point for theoretical development, philosophical support structures for different conceptualizations of EI for methodological and theoretical purposes, and EI in the context of developing professional knowledge. (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000) EI is a human state that encompasses *a priori* potentialities, updated as emotional experiences.

Wisdom is the ability to think and act using knowledge, experience, understanding, common sense and intuition. It is associated with attributes such as judgment, emotions (Grossmann 2017) and virtues. (Staudinger and Glück 2011) (Walsh 2015) In this regard, empirical scientists have begun to focus on the role of emotions in wisdom, (Kunzmann and Glück 2019) agreeing that emotions are essential for the efficient management of complex situations that demand wisdom. An important finding relates to the positive relationship between the diversity of emotional experience and wise reasoning, independent of emotional intensity. (Grossmann, Oakes, and Santos 2019)

2.3.1 Emotional intelligence in Eastern philosophy

Wisdom in Hinduism regards self-knowledge as the truth, the basis of all Creation, of Shristi. It would turn out that the wise is a person with the self-consciousness of the whole creation in all its facets and forms. There are not many studies regarding emotional intelligence (EI) from the Indian perspective, (R. Sharma 2012) although EI is found in every text in ancient Indian literature (*Rig Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, *Ayurveda*, etc.). The Indian philosophical tradition emphasizes the strong nature of emotions, which must be harnessed for a harmonious life. (Gayathri 2015) Patanjali, "the father of Indian psychology," studied the human mind thousands of years before Western philosophers. (Tattwamayananda 1994) Hinduism is more a way of life than a religion,

combining the fundamental principles of social, political and economic life. (Engardio and McGregor 2006)

Indian philosophy is based on three fundamental beliefs: (Dasgupta 2009) "*Karma*", "*Atma*" or "Soul" which is indestructible, and "*Mukti*" or "Salvation". "*Karma*" emphasizes the responsibility of a person to decide his happiness through his actions, which have the power to change his destiny. The individual is influenced by society to choose a harmonious lifestyle. "*Atma*" ("Soul") is true "Self", different from biological self. (Swarupananda 1996) The "Self" has as many rebirths as are necessary to cancel the "*Karma*" accumulated before merging with the Supreme Being in eternal peace and happiness. (Gayathri 2015)

The Western concept of the "Self" has been influenced by several philosophers and psychologists such as Descartes, Freud, Adler and Jung, differentiating between "I" and "Me". (Spiro 1993) As opposed to the western philosophy that made the difference between "Self as knower" and "Self as known", in Indian philosophy there are "*Kshetra*" (body, "field") and "*Kshetragna*" ("knower of the field"). (Radhakrishnan 2010) Indian philosophy speaks of "Self" as "Brahman", the almighty force that is present in every individual, which has no beginning, no end, (Gayathri 2015) highlighting the need to unite "Self as knower" and "self as known". (Ho 1995) "Man, the subject, should gain mastery over man, the object", (Ho 1995) gaining control over the "Self", releasing the individual of pain and suffering and thus tending to eternal happiness. *Bhagavad-Gita* emphasizes introspection, a journey towards understanding the "Inner Self", "*Kshetragna*", which helps a person to attain eternal happiness. (Gayathri 2015)

When Mayer and Salovey talk about the realization of the Self, it refers to the "Self" in relation to the external world, the one influenced by external forces, and not to the "Inner Self", "Self as Knower".

There is research on the generalizability of emotional intelligence constructs in different cultures, including in Indian culture. (Narayanan and Krishnan 2003) (Bamel, Rangnekar, and Rastogi 2011) Studies by Mulla and Krishnan (Z. R. Mulla and Krishnan 2012) examined the concept of "Karma Yoga", as in *Bhagavad-Gita*, as complementary to emotional intelligence. According to him, (Gayathri 2015) "Karma Yoga" proposed by Lord Krishna is a universally applicable concept, which can be understood by people from all cultures, being the first work trying to identify a universal construct for EI based on "Nishkama Karma".

Bhagavad-Gita (The Song of God), considered to be the fifth *Veda*, is the moral guidance of Lord Krishna to Arjuna on the battlefield. It is considered to be the essence of the four *Vedas* (*Rig, Yajur, Sama* and *Atharva*). (Robinson 2014) The *Mahabharata* is the epic saga of the conflict between Kauravas and Pandavas. On a superficial level, it is about confrontation with power. But on a deeper level, it is the war between "*Dharma*" and "*Adharma*", right and wrong. The war in Kurukshetra is thus synonymous with the complex circumstances that the living individual faces. The fear, anxiety, wisdom and despair of the individual are symbolized by Arjuna's situation. As Arjuna struggles with his emotional disorders, the reader receives a perspective on the struggle of an emotionally disturbed person for clarity of thought and action. Krishna's guidance to Arjuna offers a practical solution to get out of this fight. (Gayathri 2015) Striking similarities can be observed here between the emotionally stable person of Krishna (Sthithapragna) and the emotionally intelligent person of Mayer and Salovey. Arjuna has what we might call the qualified qualities of an emotionally intelligent person, that is, emotional perception and assimilation. Krishna provides a systematic analysis of the available problem and a solution, identifying desire and anger as the two vices that lead an individual to his or her decay:

"Thinking of objects, attachment to them is formed in a man. From attachment longing, and from longing anger grows.

"From anger comes delusion, and from delusion loss of memory. From loss of memory comes the ruin of discrimination, and from the ruin of discrimination, he perishes." (Swarupananda 1996)

(*Bhagavad-Gita*, Ch. II, Slokas 62, 63)

Bhagavad-Gita refers to the emotionally intelligent person as "Sthithapragnya" (the emotionally stable person). Aijuna asks Krishna who is a sthithapragnya, Krishna describes in detail the nature and qualities of a sthithapragnya.

"What, O Kesava, is the description of a man of steady wisdom, merged in Samadhi? How (on the other hand) does the man of steady wisdom speak, how sit, how walk?" (Swarupananda 1996)

(*Bhagavad-Gita*, Ch. II, Sloka 54)

Krishna tells him:

"He whose mind is not shaken by adversity, who does not hanker after happiness, who has become free from affection, fear, and wrath, is indeed the Muni of steady wisdom.

"He who is everywhere unattached, not pleased at receiving good, nor vexed at evil, his wisdom is fixed.

"When also, like the tortoise drawing its limbs, he can completely withdraw the senses from their objects, then his wisdom becomes steady." (Swarupananda 1996)

(*Bhagavad-Gita*, Ch. II, Slokas 56, 57 & 58.)

The difference between Krishna and the proponents of EI theory is that Krishna has a more comprehensive view of the problem. EI studies the cause, discusses the effect and also offers the means to successfully solve the problem, the "Nishkama Karma" path: action with detachment from the result of the action. Mulla and Krishnan pointed out in their research that "Karma Yoga" and emotional intelligence are strongly correlated. (Z. Mulla 2007) The ability model of emotional intelligence can be effectively applied in the Indian context, (Thingujam 2002) which would allow a universal application of emotional intelligence.

This analytical sloka from Bhagavad-Gita (chapter II, verse 15):

"Yam hi na vyathayanthyethe purusham purusharshabha samadhukha sukham dheeram somruthathvaya kalpathe." (In Sanskrit)

"That calm man who is the same in pain and pleasure, whom these cannot disturb, alone is able, O great amongst men, to attain to immortality." (Swarupananda 1996)

(*Bhagavad-Gita*, Ch. II, Sloka 15)

summarizes the whole concept of emotional intelligence (EI, stating that a person who is calm and remains undisturbed either in pain or pleasure, is the one who reaches immortality).

Oriental philosophy sees mind control as a way of life and not as abstract philosophical thinking. The mind has the potential to shape a man's destiny, helping him to achieve inner peace when it is acknowledged and controlled. EI focuses on the success of a man from a materialistic point of view, while the Indian texts have a more holistic approach. *Bhagavad-Gita* is considered an authority not only to identify the nature of emotions, but also to show a way out of the darkness of emotional instability, in the form of a dialogue between emotional disturbance (*Aijuna*) and the universal master (Krishna), and remains an irrefutable answer to many dilemmas or confusions of modern man.

According to *Bhagavad Gita*, selfless service for a good cause and for others, with the right feeling and attitude, is a form of worship and spirituality. (McDermott 1975) (Phillips 2009) Verse 3.4 of *Bhagavad Gita* states that avoiding work or eating is not the way to become free from bondage. (Bhawuk 2011) Inaction is itself a form of action with consequences and karmic impact, according to verse 3.5. (Bhawuk 2011) (Krishan 1997) Verses 3.6 - 3.8 of the *Bhagavad Gita* states that action can be motivated by the body or manipulated by external influences (bondage), or it can be motivated by inner reflection and true self (freedom). (Z. R. Mulla and Krishnan 2014) (Bhawuk 2011) (Bhawuk 2011) (Deutsch and Dalvi 2004) The more "selfless action" is engaged, the more it is considered that *dharma* (the ethical dimension) focuses on other aspects of the action, the more effective it is, and this leads to freedom. (Ganeri 2007)

The path to emotional stability is to remain unaffected by the fruits of action. Thus, one can reach "*karma yogi*", which is the first step towards becoming a "*sthithapragna*" - the emotionally stable person. Karma Yoga, also called Karma Marga, is one of the four spiritual paths of Hinduism, one based on "yoga of action". (Raju 1954) Of the ways to spiritual liberation in Hinduism, karma yoga is the path of selfless action (McDermott 1975) (Coward 2012) without being attached to the results of personal actions. (McDermott 1975) According to James Lochtefeld, Karma yoga is the spiritual practice of "selfless action performed for the benefit of others," (Lochtefeld 2001) (Brodd 2009) a way to reach *moksha* (spiritual liberation) through work. (Z. R. Mulla and Krishnan 2014) Karma yoga, says Bilimoria, does not mean the loss of emotions or desires, but an action led by "calm, balance", with "disinterest". (Hooft et al. 2013) According to Phillips, Karma yoga applies to "any action in any profession or family activities", in contrast to other forms of yoga that focus on isolated actions and meditative introspection. (Phillips 2009)

Emotivism claims that ethical statements serve only to express emotions. Ayer says that ethical statements are expressions of approval or disapproval, not statements. Emotivism is thus a metaethical vision, claiming that ethical judgments are not statements, but emotional attitudes. (Ayer 2003) The theory was strongly promoted by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book, *Language, Truth and Logic*, and further developed by C. L. Stevenson. (Stevenson 1944) Emotivism can thus be considered a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism. It was modified in the 1950s as universal prescriptivism by R. M. Hare. (Hare 1952) The mind is responsible for processing feelings and emotions, resulting in attitudes and actions. There are divergent opinions whether or not emotions are part of the mind. Moral decisions are emotionally sensitive and therefore EI can moderate the

framing of different moral attitudes. (Greene and Haidt 2002) EI presupposes a balance between emotion and reason in which neither is fully controlled.

3. Emotional intelligence in organizations

Currently, organizations must face, in addition to increased competition, also to exponential technological development and innovation, and to change processes that affect all emotional states of employees. All these challenges, along with the imposed changes and the complexity of organizational and managerial tasks, involve new emotional demands and more effective actions at the corporate level, including by managing emotions in most circumstances. Thus, emotions represent valuable "resources" for innovation and added value in an economic process. (Küpers and Weibler 2005) Emotions were thus given an important role in provoking, moderating or mediating events and interactions in organizations. (Ashkanasy 2004) The different aspects of organizational life are now evaluated through the emotions, (Stanley and Burrows 2001) including in the economic field. (Bowles and Gintis 2002)

The researchers reconsider the processes and the emotional impact as an integral element of the organizational life, (Schreyögg 2004) although they have difficulties in the methodological and epistemological aspects, as well as in the moral-political ones. Fineman argues that the researchers failed to examine the interaction between emotions and organizations for four reasons: because the researchers wanted to "separate conceptions of people from those of organizations", because they wanted to "reify organizations", because it was considered important to "separate processes of rationality from those of emotion", and because they wanted to "suppress, deny or minimize emotions". (S. J. Fineman 2005, 180)

Emotions contradicted the idea of rationality predominating in the economy, (Putnam and Mumby 1993) contradicting Western thinking that could not conceive that emotionality can

coexist with rationality. (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987) Emotions were viewed as disruptive (Albrow 1997, 30) (Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987) or a barrier to rational and effective management (Ashforth and Humphrey 2016) and marginalized or considered to be illegitimate or inadequate of organizational life, (Putnam and Mumby 1993, 39) and thus a topic not appropriate for scientific research. (Ashforth and Humphrey 2016) Emotions inform, shape and reflect the life of organizations. They influence the way employees perceive, interpret, control and evaluate their own and shared states and actions. (V. R. Waldron 2000) Emotions affect organizations at all levels and in all spheres, including their external relations. (Ostell 1996, 552)

Cote and Miners developed a compensatory model between emotional intelligence (EI) and IQ, (Côté and Miners 2006) which assumes that the association between EI and performance at work becomes more positive as cognitive intelligence decreases. (Relojo 2015) Most researchers agree that EI is an undeniable predictor of traditional employment methods commonly used in companies (reference letter, letter of intent, etc.). (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2004) According to Daniel Goleman, emotional intelligence contributes more to career success than IQ. According to Lopes and his colleagues, (Lopes et al. 2006) EI contributes to the development of strong and positive relationships between colleagues and to higher performance in the work teams. Intelligent emotional employees cope better with stressful situations and demanding tasks. Law et al. found that EI is a better predictor of job performance than ability. (Law, Wong, and Song 2004) The concept of EI has gained ground lately, both in secular and academic discourse. EI has become a prominent topic in the specialized literature on human resources management, training and leadership (Dulewicz and Higgs 2004) and has already begun to influence practices in these areas. EI critics argue that its popularity studies is due to media advertising, rather than objective

scientific findings. Goleman regards the development of EI as due to recent scientific discoveries (especially brain functioning, (Ledoux 1991) but also to his ascendancy as managerial discourse.

Westbrook defines affection as a "class of mental phenomena uniquely characterized by a consciously experienced, subjective feeling state, commonly accompanying emotions and moods," (Bagozzi 2009) suggesting that these concepts are closely linked. (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) The researchers noted the difficulties that separate the concepts of affect, emotions, feelings and mood, often used interchangeably. (McPhail and Mattson 1996)

There are several models of how EI is associated with the working criteria: (Lievens and Chan 2010)

- *Generalization model of the validity of emotional intelligence and work criteria:* Generalization of validity occurs when the association between a predictor and a criterion (i.e., validity) is constant between jobs and employment settings. (Schmidt and Hunter 1977) The model proposes that EI provide a number of benefits to members of the organization that generally translate into more favorable work criteria. It predicts that EI will present bivariate associations with criteria in organizational contexts and employee dispositions, and that EI will present incremental validity to competing predictors, especially other individual differences, because EI's benefits are unique. *Conclusions:* EI has small correlations with several working criteria, but not with transformational leadership. EI presents an incremental validity for some criteria, including the emergence of leadership, the value created and the claimed value in negotiations and affective forecasts, but not for the performance of the workplace. (Côté 2014)
- *The model of the specificity of the emotional intelligence situation and work criteria:* An alternative to the validity generalization, whereby the association between a predictor and a criterion varies depending on the work or employment setting. (Schmidt and Hunter 1977)

Predict that EI explains the unique variation of criteria when organizational context or employee dispositions facilitate its deployment, (Lievens and Chan 2010) (Wong and Law 2002) and that EI has lower or no criteria at all in the absence of implementation opportunities. There may be conditions where EI implementation is harmful to individuals and/or organizations. (Dasborough and Ashkanasy 2002) (Salovey and Mayer 2016) Employees with certain dispositions may have more opportunities to implement EI and, in turn, will have stronger associations between EI and criteria than other employees with different dispositions. (Côté 2014) Also, EI can have stronger associations with performance in the workplace when high performance is not already achieved through other skills or dispositions. (Côté and Miners 2006) Another hypothesis states that EI is more strongly associated with criteria among motivated individuals than among those without motivation to perform their skills. (Rode et al. 2007) *Conclusions:* EI is associated with workplace performance compared to competing predictors in emotionally demanding jobs, but not in jobs that have lower emotional demands. (Côté 2014)

- *Moderator model of emotional intelligence and working criteria:* The EI levels of the members of the organization shape the way they express their dispositions and how they react to the organizational contexts. Predict that EI serves as a moderator variable that enhances or mitigates the effects of various contextual or dispositional factors on work criteria, and that the moderating effect of EI is unique and will occur in the case of competing moderators. (Kilduff, Chiaburu, and Menges 2010) The model also adapts the possibility that certain organizational and dispositional factors may have more harmful effects on employees with a higher EI than on those with a lower EI. *Conclusions:* A moderator model is favored that proposes that EI improve or mitigate the effects of contextual and dispositional variables on criteria. EI

enhances associations between goals and goal-oriented behavior and mitigates associations between stressors and adverse reactions. (Côté 2014)

Cherniss presents four main reasons why the workplace would be a logical framework for evaluating and improving emotional intelligence: (Cherniss 2000)

1. Emotional intelligence is essential for success in most jobs
2. Many people are hired without the necessary skills to succeed in the workplace
3. Employers have the means and motivation to provide training on emotional intelligence
4. Most employees spend most of their time at work.

Research in the field of emotional intelligence has focused on leadership, a fundamental quality in the workplace. (Fleishman and Harris 1962) (Mumford et al. 2000) Academic research describes two distinct types of leaders: transformational and transactional. (Mandell and Pherwani 2003) The *transformational leader* stimulate the interest of colleagues, inspires a different perspective on work, raises awareness of the organization's goals, develops others at higher levels of ability and motivates others to consider the interests of the group towards their own interests. (Stys and Brown 2004) Transformational leadership comprises four dimensions: idealized influence, inspiration motivation, intellectual stimulation and individual consideration. (Bass 1993) The *transactional leader* is the one who rewards (or disciplines) staff based on their performance. It emphasizes work standards, task completion and employee respect, while relying heavily on organizational rewards and punishments to influence employee performance. (Bass 1993) According to Stys, (Stys and Brown 2004) transformational leadership predicts higher ratings of efficiency and satisfaction, (Hater and Bass 1988) higher group performance, (Keller 1995) and greater effort on the part of the group subordinates (Seltzer and Bass 1990) compared

to transactional management. Efficient transformational leaders have developed social and emotional intelligence. (Mandell and Pherwani 2003)

Goleman believes that leaders with high emotional intelligence are the key to organizational success (Daniel Goleman 2002) by establishing a special work environment. The research concludes that the most efficient leaders integrate several of the six leadership styles highlighted by Goleman, using one or the other depending on the situation. (McBer 2000) Yiannis Gabriel observes that today's managers help fill the void of identity, meaning and achievement that results from the discontent of the present - a flexible workplace, with modern institutional networks oriented more towards the "fantasizing consumer" than to the "toiling worker". (Gabriel 2001)

Mike Bagshaw speculates on the implications of EI for the future of work:

"The future role of the management trainer may not just be to codify and disseminate knowledge effectively but also to entertain ... [T]he manager's role becomes one of human psychologist and facilitator where he/she guides people to find their own learning and sense of purpose... [the manager would] ensure the knowledge is gained in an entertaining way that harmonises any conflict between an individual's and the organisation's goals. Training companies, consultants and business schools may be forced to compete on how pleasurable, innovative and entertaining their teaching methods are..." (Bagshaw 2000, 181–82)

These statements confirm George Ritzer's concerns in *Enchanting a Disenchanted World* about the emergence of "shopping mall high schools," "... places to meet friends, pass the time, get out of the rain, or watch the promenade. Shopping malls or their high school equivalents can be entertaining places to onlookers with no intention of buying anything". (Ritzer 1999)

According to Gross, emotional response tendencies can be regulated by manipulating either the "input to the system" (background-focused emotion regulation) or the "output" (response-focused emotion regulation). (Gross 1998) According to Chi-Sum Wong, when these models are applied to emotional intelligence within the organizational framework, employees will be able to

modulate their perception of the work environment, focusing on specific aspects of the environment or changing their opinion about it. (Wong and Law 2002)

According to Weiss and Cropanzano, work experiences comprise a succession of events with positive or negative effects. (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996) The effect of ambivalent emotions can also be positive or negative. (Pratt and Doucet 2000)

3.1 Emotional labor

Working with emotions is an attempt to change the level or quality of an emotion, (Ferrara 1993) being defined as the management of one's emotions or the work done in the effort to maintain a relationship; (Cook and Berger 2000) there is no agreement if it only involves regulating one's own emotion or extending to work with the emotions of others. (Oliker 1989) Arlie Russell Hochschild introduced the term in 1979, distinguishing between working with emotions (unpaid, in private life) and emotional labor that is done in a paid work environment. (Hochschild 1979) (Hochschild 1990) (Callahan and McCollum 2002) Hochschild distinguished between two types of work with emotions (evocation and suppression of emotion) (Hochschild 1990) and three techniques of working with emotions (cognitive, bodily and expressive). (Hochschild 1990) (Turner 2009) Working with emotions involves orienting one's own or others' emotions in accordance with certain rules of emotional expression. (Ruberg and Steenbergh 2010) The concept of working with emotions has in itself been criticized as a simplification of the mental processes that occur continuously in everyday life. (Seidler 2002)

Emotional labor can be defined as a form of emotional regulation in which employees have to display certain emotions as part of their work and promote organizational goals. Such organizational control of emotions can lead to suppression of feelings through emotional dissonance, altered relational perceptions, changed communication patterns, and other negative

and counterproductive (Anat Rafaeli and Sutton 1987) personal and work effects (King and Emmons 1990) including stress, demotivation and exhaustion. (Schweingruber and Berns 2016) Emotional labor involves managing feelings and emotions to meet the demands of a job. (Hochschild 2012) (A. A. Grandey 2000) Jobs where emotional labor is needed are defined as those that:

1. requires direct, visual or auditory contact with customers
2. requires the employee to induce an emotional state to another person
3. allows the employer, through training and supervision, to exercise a certain control over the emotional activities of the employees. (Hochschild 2012)

Hochschild argues that in this process, employees are alienated from their own feelings at work. (Hochschild 2012) Determinants of emotional labor:

1. Social, occupational and organizational norms (A Rafaeli and Sutton 1989) (A. A. Grandey, Fisk, and Steiner 2005)
2. Dispositional traits and internal feelings in the workplace (Friedman et al. 1980) (Wilk and Moynihan 2005)
3. Supervisory regulation of expression rules. (Diefendorff and Richard 2003)

Hochschild divided emotional labor into two components: surface actions (when employees display the emotions needed for a job, without changing how they actually feel), (Hochschild 2012) and deep actions (employees change their internal feelings to align with organizational expectations). (A. Grandey, Diefendorff, and Rupp 2012) Research has shown that surface actions are more harmful to employees' health. (Qi et al. 2017)

Hughes states that emotional intelligence (EI) has all the characteristics of an emotional labor, implying as a central principle the idea that emotions can be used for a competitive

commercial advantage, can have an exchange value. (Hughes 2010) EI involves deep action, by developing emotional skills and commercializing feelings by stylistically blurring the distinction between emotionality and rationality. For Hochschild, the risk lies in increasing managerial control that facilitates the control of emotional subjectivity. Therefore, employees should develop self-distancing protection strategies, maintaining a clear distinction between "personal and professional ,self". Goleman explicitly states that "a blurring of the distinction between work and private life... itself signifies poor emotional competence." (Daniel Goleman 1998)

Recent research on organizational behavior shows that, through recruitment, selection, socialization and performance appraisals, organizations develop a social reality in which feelings become a commodity for achieving corporate goals. (Mumby and Putnam 1992) The evolution of research on emotion in organizations reveals the shift from studying normative practices to discovering differences in employees' use of emotional displays. (Anat Rafaeli and Sutton 1990) Emotional labor is experienced most strongly when employees are asked to express emotions that contradict their inner feelings. (V. Waldron and Krone 1991)

According to Putnam and Mumby, there are two dominant traditions in organizational life that contribute to the presumption that emotional labor is immutable and unavoidable: (Putnam and Mumby 1993) the dualities surrounding the use of emotion in Western culture ("black" or "white"), (Lakoff and Johnson 2008) and the myth of rationality in Western culture (a set of values and beliefs that attribute certain concepts to rationality, and others to emotionality). According to the traditional system of dualities, rationality, cognition and order are positive descriptors of masculinity, while emotionality, affectation and chaos are negative descriptors of femininity. (Mumby and Putnam 1992)

Feminist theory of emotions offers possibilities for reconceptualizing the nature of organizations. Postmodern feminism treats gender as a form of power-knowledge relationship that underlies bureaucratic rationality. Treating the individual as a product of a certain power-knowledge relationship gives us the opportunity to discover the links between patriarchy, bureaucratic rationality and emotional labor. (Putnam and Mumby 1993) According to Derrida, the meaning of a certain term depends on its connection to an opposite concept, even if that opposite term is missing from a text. (Derrida 1998) Thus, the sense of rationality depends on both the existence and the absence of emotionality. (Martin 1990) This system of meanings has contributed, in Western culture, to the belief that bureaucratic rationality and emotional labor are fixed social relationships.

Emotions in organizations are treated as commodities, being appropriated by the organization for instrumental purposes. By treating emotion as a commodity with a certain exchange value, feelings become public spectacles. (Putnam and Mumby 1993) Hochschild (Hochschild 2012) identifies alienation as a harmful side effect resulting from the emotional labor that treats the body and mind as separate entities. (Ferguson 1984, 54) Van Maanen and Kunda note that emotional numbness and exhaustion frequently accompany the inconsistency of the emotions felt and displayed. (Staw and Cummings 1981) In general, organizational control of emotions often leads to suppressing disagreements, eliminating the voice of employees, and reducing the upward flow of information. (V. Waldron and Krone 1991)

Emotional labor also affects collegial relationships, which can lead to the relegation of an intense friendship to the status of casual cooperation. These changes can keep working relationships short-term, while endangering long-term friendships, (Putnam and Mumby 1993) which can lead to perceptions of mistrust and disrespect among employees in the case of extremely

intense negative emotions. Organizational training sessions could help employees understand the complexity of emotional displays and introduce alternatives for managing situations. "Having employees develop skills in listening, negotiating, and understanding feelings is more liberating than turning them into emotional robots." Instead of functioning as an instrumental value commodity, emotions should serve the expressive functions that create the interrelation.

3.2 The philosophy of emotional intelligence in organizations

In 1993, Putnam and Mumby observed that:

"People regard emotion as a value-laden concept which is often treated as 'inappropriate' for organizational life. In particular, emotional reactions are often seen as 'disruptive', 'illogical', 'biased' and 'weak'. Emotion, then, becomes a deviation from what is seen to be sensible or intelligent... linked to the expressive arenas of life, not to the instrumental goal orientation that drives organizations." (Putnam and Mumby 1993)

The business culture of the West until the early 1990s was based on the understanding of an axiomatic, antithetical division between emotionality and rationality. According to Hughes, the current concept of emotional intelligence (EI) dissolves the traditional opposition between emotionality and rationality, cognition and affect, thinking and feeling. (Hughes 2010) In business, demands for emotionally intelligent employees are on the rise. A large-scale recruitment survey conducted by Reed Group's GRADdirect found that 42% of British employers consider EI characteristics as the most important when recruiting new employees, compared to a prioritization of only 27% for academic skills. (Reed Consulting 2008) The main criterion for recruiting, promoting, retaining employees is no longer just "how smart we are" but "how well we handle ourselves and each other." (D. Goleman 1998) Thus, EI changes "The rules of work."

Hughes considers EI as a sociogenetic field of discursive affects, conditions and possibilities - a discourse that consecrates the ways of seeing, saying and doing so in itself, and constitutes a legitimate empirical object for investigation and analysis. (Hughes 2010) The EI

discourse would thus mark an intensification of processes that involve increasing corporate "colonization" of employees' affects and subjectivities. (Fleming and Spicer 2003) But these strategies have inherent limitations: management cannot simply rewrite employees' emotions. It turns out that EI is not simply "bad" but remains "dangerous"; EI implies a discursive shift towards implicit, undeclared and mobile standards of what is emotionally "suitable", "relevant", "appropriate" or "intelligent". And these changing and flexible behavioral standards are, in many ways, more demanding, more difficult to negotiate than the clearly defined formal scriptures or rules about what is allowed and "right" and what is not ... EI serves empirically to demonstrate a key point of intersection between the respective theses developed by Elias and Foucault regarding the long-term changes in the character of social/self-control: where freedom and coercion are conceived not as opposites but as two sides of the same coin. (Hughes 2010)

Goleman proposes a model of EI consisting of three intrapersonal "competences" - knowledge of emotions, management of emotions, self-motivation; and two interpersonal skills - recognizing of emotions in others and managing relationships, (Daniel Goleman 1996) based on the psychologist Jack Block's descriptions of "pure IQ type" and "pure EI type." These ideal types are further divided by gender: pure male IQ; purely male EI; Pure female IQ; and pure female EI.

According to Hughes, Hochschild's analytical division between private and public, real and false, authenticity and action, can be understood as an expression of socially instigated reification based on an image of human beings that Norbert Elias called *Homo clausus*: "a human self-image according to which the true self of a person is hidden deep inside — one cannot be quite sure inside of what", (N. Elias 2016) a dividing line between "the real me in here" and "the society out there" (N. Elias 1984)

According to Elias, as the civilization processes developed, the social demands for the management of the affects became more and more "internalized", the social rules and the explicit sanctions regarding the behavior lost their importance, and an apparent approach appeared, more relaxed, playful and informal, of the codes of etiquette and emotional conduct. (N. Elias 2000) In the processes of informalization, the "dominant modes of conduct symbolizing institutionalized power relationships, came to be more and more ignored and attacked, leading to growing negotiability and leniency in the ways people oppose and cooperate with each other." (Wouters 2016) In the case of organizations, informalization can be seen in the decentralization of decision making; the increasing complexity and the "flexibility" of the work roles; dissipating organizational boundaries; and less formal relationships between superiors and subordinates. (Iterson, Mastenbroek, and Soeters 2016)

Foucault observes that, in relation to power relations, a person is always "faced with complex phenomena which don't obey the Hegelian form of the dialectic... Suddenly, what had made power strong becomes used to attack it." (Foucault 1980) Power is invariably withdrawn, reorganized, and reinvested in new forms and modalities. In a heterotopic approach, emancipation from emotional uniformity and resistance to emotional scripts quickly turns into a new form of governance where resistance becomes a discipline that, in turn, provides opportunities for resistance. EI seems to exemplify Foucault's arguments that power is exercised both by what is allowed and by what is forbidden, both through collusion and opposition. (Hughes 2010) Thus, Foucault asserted that "A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more with the chain of their own ideas [which is] all the stronger if we do not know of what it is made and we believe it to be our own work." (Foucault 1991) In this sense, if emotional labor could be understood as a technology of domination, EI seems to be a

technology of the self, with techniques that ",
<permit individuals to effect, by their own means, or
with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts,
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality." (Foucault 1988) Foucault asserts that
technologies of the self are perpetuated by claims of expertise that are usually extracted from
scientific or scientist discourses, in the case of EI resorting to neuroscience, including by Goleman.
(Daniel Goleman 1996)

Michael Polanyi (Polanyi 1974) (Polanyi 1969) (Polanyi 1966) identified two different types of knowledge: explicit (transmitted using formal language that can be encoded by artifacts) and tacit (implying direct experience that cannot be communicated in no coded mode). (Howells 2002) Rosenberg defines tacit knowledge as "the knowledge of techniques, methods and designs that work in certain ways and with certain consequences, even when one cannot explain exactly why." (M. G. Morgan 1983, 143) Wagner and Sternberg define tacit knowledge as unspoken knowledge gained from experience, having three main forms: (Wagner and Sternberg 1985, 6–7) self-management, managing others, and managing tasks. Tacit knowledge is the main element in creating new knowledge and innovation. (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) The difficulty of disclosing tacit knowledge is an advantage for the company as it can more easily protect it. According to Lubit, tacit knowledge is only effective when it is rooted in a company's culture, norms and set of processes and routines. (Lubit 2001)

3.3 Critique of emotional intelligence in organizations

Locke considers the concept of emotional intelligence to be invalid, both because it is not a form of intelligence, and because it is so broad and inclusive that it has no intelligible meaning. (Locke 2005) The extension of the term "intelligence" distorts the meaning of the concept. The

final reason would be egalitarianism, so that everyone would be considered equal in intelligence. He sets the example of Mayer, (J. Mayer 1999, 50) who defines emotional intelligence (EI) as "the capacity to reason with emotion in four areas: to perceive emotion, to integrate it in thought, to understand it and to manage it", but to "reason with emotion" is a contradiction in terms. EI would not, in fact, be another form or type of intelligence, but intelligence (the ability to understand abstractions) applied to a particular domain, namely emotions. Locke finally wonders: since EI-based leadership involves an extremely long list of characteristics associated with effective leadership, what does not include EI? One thing is missing from the list: real information!

Goleman argues that "The fundamental task of leaders is to create good feelings in those they lead", a statement considered false, as the function of organizations is to achieve goals, profitability for private organizations. (Daniel Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee 2002) Also, Goleman (Daniel Goleman 1995) is almost entirely confined to the brain structure, an incomplete approach to neurophysiology. (Bandura 1997)

Locke concludes about EI that:

1. The definition of the concept is constantly changing.
2. Most definitions are so comprehensive that they make the concept unintelligible.
3. Some definitions (for example, emotional reasoning) involve a contradiction.
4. There is no real emotional intelligence, although intelligence can be applied including emotions,

proposing to replace the term EI with the concept of introspective ability.

Eysenck states that Goleman's description of EI contains ungrounded assumptions about intelligence, even contrary to research methodology:

"[Goleman] exemplifies more clearly than most the fundamental absurdity of the tendency to class almost any type of behavior as an 'intelligence'... If these five 'abilities' define 'emotional

intelligence', we would expect some evidence that they are highly correlated; Goleman admits that they might be quite uncorrelated, and in any case, if we cannot measure them, how do we know they are related? So the whole theory is built on quicksand: there is no sound scientific basis." (Eysenck 2000)

Locke states that EI should be re-labeled as an ability. (Locke 2005) Adam Grant warned of the wrong perception of EI as a right moral quality, so that EI is not only a tool for achieving the goals but can also function as a weapon for manipulating others. (Grant 2014) Landy argued that EI has a small predictive value, due to a methodological problem, that the alternative explanations were not fully considered:

"EI is compared and contrasted with a measure of abstract intelligence but not with a personality measure, or with a personality measure but not with a measure of academic intelligence." (Landy 2005)

Other researchers have expressed concern about the correlation between self-reporting measures of EI with established personality dimensions. Roberts et al. criticizes the works of Mayer and Salovey, suggesting that EI measured by MSCEIT can only confirm compliance with the community, by consensus as the basis of the measurements.(R. D. Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews 2001) Brody stated that MSCEIT "tests knowledge of emotions but not necessarily the ability to perform tasks that are related to the knowledge that is assessed," due to the possibility of unpredictable behavior in an emotionally charged situation. (Brody 2004) A bias found in EI measurements is the desirable social response, the false good defined as a pattern of response in which testers systematically exhibit excessive positive bias. This contaminates responses in self-report measurements.

EI can increase performance and productivity, (Cherniss, Adler, and Goleman 2000) but there is no independent and systematic analysis to confirm this statement. (Lam and Kirby 2002) Some critics have referred to EI more as "a myth than science." (Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts 2002, 547) EI studies are more commercial literature than scientific research, (Davies, Stankov,

and Roberts 1998) and other studies conclude that EI is just a new term for old concepts and measurement. (Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, and Pluta 2005)

Among the criticisms EI may include: (Côté 2014)

- Disagreement about the meaning of emotional intelligence - The structure of EI can be refined as new findings about emotions are made. (Van Kleef 2009) (Côté and Hideg 2011)
- How emotional intelligence relates to existing constructs - Small meta-analytical correlations between EI and other individual differences. (Joseph and Newman 2010)
- Validity of measurements of emotional intelligence. (Conte 2005)
- Dimensions of the effect for emotional intelligence - A way of assessing the importance of EI involves comparing the sizes of the meta-analytic effect of EI with the sizes of the effect of cognitive intelligence and personality traits. (Joseph and Newman 2010)
- Emotional intelligence can be learned - Evidence that EI can be improved is rare (Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts 2002) (Landy 2005) or there is no EI. (Murphy 2006)
- Intercultural variations in emotional intelligence - EI research does not incorporate enough culture. (Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts 2002) (Moon 2011) (Wong, Law, and Wong 2004)

Landy argues that research in the field of emotional intelligence is "outside the scientific tent" being a continuation of the discredited "social intelligence," referring to three aspects: there is no scientific examination of the measurements; the construct is rooted in the (discredited) concept of "social intelligence", and the research in emotional intelligence is based on weak models, without an incremental validity compared to the traditional models of personality and behavior. (Landy 2005) Emotional intelligence has been developed by commercial test providers, without critical scientific data. Goleman support his ideas through selective anecdotal evidence.

Locke argues that the construct is inadequate and even contradictory. For Locke, "emotional intelligence" seems like an oxymoron, and he claims that supporters of emotional intelligence seem to be motivated by a certain form of political agenda. (Locke 2005) (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2004) Locke suggests that a more fruitful area for research is "introspection", considered "an important human skill." Ashkanasy and Daus claim that Locke's views are representative of an outdated model of organizational behavior, while modern theories of organizational behavior have evolved. (Ashkanasy and Daus 2005)

Conte criticizes the measurement of emotional intelligence. (Conte 2005) The main criticism of his argument is that he fails to give sufficient recognition to the primacy of Mayer and Salovey's definition of emotional intelligence, (J. D. Mayer and Salovey 1997) considering alternative models proposed by Goleman (F Sala 2002) and Bar-On (Bar-On 2004) as legitimate alternatives. Ashkanasy and Daus criticize Conte for "comparing apples and oranges". (Ashkanasy and Daus 2005)

Hughes writes that "Sennett contrasts the Weberian image of individual workers trapped in the 'iron cage' of rationality, seeking to gain power over themselves through endlessly toiling to prove their moral virtue, with the ephemeral and superficial engagement characteristic of teamworking in the present-day workplace". (Hughes 2016, 99) "Teamworking helps obscure domination: it creates the illusion that no one has responsibility, and thus those in control are able to act without needing to justify themselves or their acts." Sennett observes a dissipation of ethics with an emphasis on authority, leading to a corrosion of the moral character. It follows that EI changes the characters, aligning them with the new work organization. (Sennett 2000)

Grugulis et al. states that this makes it more difficult for employees to support the boundaries between home and work, as managerial control is becoming more and more widespread

and increasingly capturing all aspects of employees' lives. (Grugulis, Dundon, and Wilkinson 2016, 112) "The rise of EI may thus signal a further move towards more totalizing regimes of organizational domination in which employee identity becomes effectively subsumed within the workplace and opportunities for resistance are greatly limited." (Hughes 2016)

Through its (pseudo)scientific natural and social foundations, EI legitimizes an irresistible authority, harder to reject as mere "managerial rhetoric". (S. Fineman 2004)

Dulewicz and Higgs noted that, although the concept of EI is based on research evidence, EI's organizational applications "tend to be based on derivative arguments and largely anecdotal descriptions", (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000, 341) impressionist or collected by consulting companies and not published in the specialized literature. (Barrett 2017) The vision of EI as an emotional competence has not been clearly established and there are other, equally viable, conceptions measured by EI tests. (M. Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts 2001) EI and its components should be differentiated from those related constructs, such as wisdom. (Izard 2001)

Ackerman demonstrated that intellectual knowledge is distinct from fluid and crystallized intelligences. (Ackerman 1996) Informal "tacit knowledge" could also be evaluated. (Sternberg and Grigorenko 2000) A science of EI requires the definition, number, type and range of primary emotional abilities within a formal psychometric model. (Moshe Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts 2004)

An essential aspect in organizational EI is the precise identification of specific contexts, needs and goals. We may need different levels of analysis for the emotional demands of the jobs. As the theory of emotional competence becomes more fully articulated, a better theory-based analysis of emotional tasks in the workplace may be possible. The validation of an EI measurement requires convincing empirical and predictive evidence. Validation research addresses EI

measurements by differentiating between low-performing and high-performing groups according to job specificity. What EI could predict over IQ is another unanswered question, as well as uncertainty about the causal role of EI in job success. Zeidner et al. concludes that organizations using EI tests must carefully select the qualities and how they will influence the organization over shorter and longer periods. (Moshe Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts 2004)

Daus and Ashkanasy reject the criticisms that emotional intelligence is dominated by opportunistic "consultants transformed into academics" who have accumulated much fame and wealth based on this concept; that the measurement of emotional intelligence is based on unstable instruments, psychometric defects, which have not demonstrated adequate discriminative and predictive validity to justify their use; and that there is weak empirical evidence that emotional intelligence is related to anything that is important in organizations. (Daus and Ashkanasy 2005)

3.4 Ethics of emotional intelligence in organizations

According to Richard Sennett, concepts such as flexibility, decentralization and control, work ethic and teamwork in the New Economy have led to disorientation and emotional and psychological undermining of the individual, stating that "a regime which provides human beings no deep reasons to care about one other cannot long preserve its legitimacy." (Sennett 2000) He defines the New Economy as the new form of "flexible capitalism".

According to Willmott, the purpose of corporate culture is to win the "hearts and minds" of employees: to define their goals by managing what they think and feel, and not just how they behave. (Willmott 1993) It is claimed that the strengthening of corporate cultures provides the key to ensuring the "unusual effort on the part of apparently ordinary employees," (Piereson 1983, xvii) Transforming them into "winners", "champions" and "everyday heroes". Willmott paraphrases Harvey (Harvey 1991) by stating that "within a broader context, corporate culturism

can be seen to form an important ideological element within a global restructuring of capital, labor and product markets that involves a movement away from the '5 dollars a day' logic of Fordism towards the contingent, fluid organizing philosophy of 'flexible accumulation'"'. (Willmott 1993) Corporate culture expects and asks employees to internalize the new values of "quality", "flexibility" and "added value" - to adopt and value them as their own people. Within organizations, corporate culture programs, human resources management and total quality management promote a corporate ethos that demands loyalty to employees because it excludes, silences or punishes those who question its belief. (Willmott 1993)

Critical analysis explores how employees are determined to think and feel about their activity, how managers offer employees "a mission as well as a sense of feeling great." (Staw and Cummings 1981) Wilkinson et al. notes that corporate culture programs (and HRM/TQM) are trying to "immerse employees in the "logic" of the market". (Wilkinson, Allen, and Snape 2013) According to Thompson and McHugh, employees "are encouraged to perceive their performance and utility to the enterprise as their responsibility." (Thompson and McHugh 1990, 241)

Corporate culturism systematizes and legitimizes a control mode by which employees' consciousness is modeled, thus becoming an environment of new type totalitarianism. This is how *doublethinking* is promoted, a term coined by George Orwell in his dystopian novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, (Orwell 1990) by simultaneously affirming and denying the conditions of autonomy. Respectively, employees are suggested that identification with corporate values ensures their autonomy. According to Willmott, if in Orwell's *Oceania*, "freedom is slavery" and "ignorance is force", in the corporate culture world "slavery is freedom" and "power is ignorance". By strengthening corporate cultures, employees' lack of control over the means of production (Edwards 1979) is compounded by a (more systematic) lack of control over the means of choosing

the value and formation of identity, (Willmott 1990) individualizing and segmenting capitalist market relationships. (T. Peters 1988)

For Weber, the alternative to expanding corporate culture is the deliberate choice and refinement of the values that guide individual action. A paradoxical consequence of the consolidation of the corporate culture is a degradation and distortion of communication, through an instrumentalism induced by the employees (Anthony 1990) that can turn into skepticism regarding the values of the corporate culturalism. Many employees may find that their professional lives turn into a vicious cycle. Corporate culturism thus reproduces the conditions of demoralization and degradation for which it is presented as a remedy.

The objection to the philosophy of corporate culture is that corporate culturalism consists in eliminating pluralism and the associated conflict of values in order to facilitate the social process of emotional and intellectual struggle for self-determination. In the name of moral renewal, corporate culture programs celebrate, exploit, distort and drain the declining cultural resource of democratic values. The well-socialized and self-disciplined corporate employee "is expected to have no private emotions and no respite from enthusiasm . . . the speculations which might possibly induce a skeptical or rebellious attitude are killed in advance by his early acquired inner discipline." (Orwell 1990, 220) Corporate culture threatens to promote a hypermodern neo-authoritarianism that is potentially more insidious and sinister than its bureaucratic predecessor. (Willmott 1992)

Conclusions

Emotion regulation is usually accomplished in accordance with social conventions and personal expectations, (Blair 2018) (Jamison 2018) through their own cognitive and behavioral strategies. (D. L. Schacter, Gilbert, and Wegner 2010)

EI remains a controversial topic regarding the legitimacy of the construct, the superiority of one type of model over the other, the measurement of EI, as well as the ability to "learn" emotional intelligence. Becker criticized emotional intelligence for lack of valid and reliable measurements and because emotional intelligence is based on problematic conceptualization. (Becker 2003)

Research in the field of affective neuroscience supports the existence of a set of emotional abilities that comprise a form of intelligence distinct and different from standard intelligence or IQ. (Bar-On and Parker 2000) While intellectual abilities, such as verbal fluency, spatial logic, and abstract reasoning (IQ components) are primarily based in the neocortex, components that constitute emotional intelligence have been found to exist more from a neurological circuit that connects the limbic areas for emotion (the amygdala and its corresponding networks) to the prefrontal cortex (the executive center of the brain). (Stys and Brown 2004) The amygdala is essential for recognizing emotions through facial expressions and appreciating the confidence of a particular individual. (Bar-On and Parker 2000) Effective emotion management is a universal aspect of emotional intelligence. Research by Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin using PET scans (positron emission tomography) has found that increased activity in the amygdala has increased negative emotions, but this activity is mediated by the medial prefrontal cortex, which produces neurons that inhibit the activity of amygdala. In the circuit between the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex, there is the capacity to regulate the negative affect. (Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin 2000)

Although supporters of the development of emotional intelligence, such as Goleman, argue that adequate programs can help individuals change, (D. Goleman 1998) there are several arguments that support the idea that emotional intelligence cannot be learned logically. Personality

traits are strongly influenced by genes and persist from childhood to adulthood, remaining static over time. If emotional intelligence is distinct from cognitive intelligence, since it is not made up of neocortical connections (which can be developed by learning), how can emotional intelligence abilities be learned or developed? Neurological support for emotional intelligence confirms the idea that emotional intelligence is genetically and static determined in nature, rather than dynamic.

In extreme situations, however, negative emotional states can lead to "oppositional practices" (Collinson 1994) and "organizational retaliatory" or "anti-citizenship" (Folger and Cropanzano 1998) or "recalcitrant" behaviors. (Ackroyd and Thompson 2003) Thus Cameron states that emotions can be manipulated to serve certain interests or ideologies. (Cameron 2000) Emotions can be powerful agents of social control (Scheff 1997) and politically within the ubiquitous organizational micro-hierarchies. (Clark 1997) Emotions and their management can thus become a powerful tool, (Downing 2016) through direct or side effects. Thus, EI can be understood as intrinsically linked to a broader, well-documented tendency that involves the growth of corporate "colonization" (Casey 1995) by adopting normative control strategies. (Grugulis, Dundon, and Wilkinson 2016)

The ontological and epistemological bases of the development of professional knowledge in the EI area are based on specific fundamental questions. Various philosophies with ontological and epistemological implications such as dualism, holism and contextualism indicate the existence of different notions about the meaning of emotion and EI in human life. It is essential for professionals to reflect on how different philosophies approach these issues, leading to various epistemological complications, especially in relation to generalizations and methodology. (Dulewicz and Higgs 2000)

Stys and Brown suggest several directions for future research and application: (Stys and Brown 2004)

- The relationship between emotional intelligence and personality
- The validity of modeling emotional intelligence on cognitive intelligence
- Measuring emotional intelligence
- The extent to which emotional intelligence can be learned
- The extent to which training in emotional intelligence is more beneficial than other leadership or "people ability" training
- Efficiency of emotional intelligence programs
- The role of emotional intelligence in the public service.

Elias and Foucault's works offer potential complementary ideas about EI and changing emotional rules for work.

EI should probably not currently be included as part of standard job selection (or classification) sets. Currently, there is an urgent need for sound taxonomic research that focuses on determining EI constructs. (Moshe Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts 2004)

My final conclusion, based on the current study, is that emotions have always played an important role in personal development and in all aspects of social relationships. But research in emotional intelligence has a long way to go until it reaches the level of science. And they will never reach the universality of an exact science, EI being far too dependent on the cultural environment. As a practice, emotional intelligence is a concept that is based on both heuristics and research in the field, but that is precisely why there is a risk that, if it develops on the wrong path, it will produce far more harm than good to the target people and social groups.

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