

Automatic Conformity to Hermeneutic Charity

Abstract — A critical appropriation of the following against *reliabilism*: "How can a difference in respect of something conceived as cognitively inaccessible to both subjects, as far as the relevant mode of cognition goes, make it the case that one of them knows how things are in the inaccessible region while another does not? rather than leaving them both, strictly speaking, ignorant on the matter?" (John McDowell, *Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge*).

1 — There is a non-assertible but imminent item of evidence differentiating the subjects since there is only in the case of knowledge (u) a counterfactually proximal possible world (v) in which it is imposed on the evidence to manifest *empirically* not just vicariously by meaning as evidentially compensatory force in the absence of empirical evidence in u. In v there must be a criterial set (at most *countable* if not finite) that is satisfied by the empirical evidence.

2 — The only link that can sustain criterial continuity (a *guaranteed* epistemological family resemblance) between u and v is the *existence* of an item of *non-sentential* evidence-transcendent prophecy crucially in u: $\exists x k(x \rightarrow kx)$.

3 — In u, there is a *critical* set tailored to the evidence such that it is in the proximity of the criterial set in v. Proximity is achievable by reliance minimization on prophecy. —The less reliance, the less hermeneutically sacrificial. Because the reliance is but reliance on *future* physical and also mental events, no decision is ever made without *delineation* of future mental properties.

4 — Existential reason belief is a tacit premise in reasoning in any instance of *substantial* decision making where sentential reason alone cannot indicate the rational choice. The outcome of the decisions that implicate such existential reasons are to essentially constitute either utility or knowledge of some sort or both. The binding underwrites *some* aspect of mental content that is by design charitably interpretable—anytime the evidence emerges that the future mental property is delineated *correctly* even if it is causally efficacious without having (otherwise) *linguistic* content.—A blindness coming to terms with prophecy.

5 — It also underwrites a relation of family resemblance between two mental contents—linked through mental contents that have essential (in terms of psychologically explanatory) common feature. If we agree with Davidson "to associate physical properties that cover mental events with broad descriptions covering large space-time regions" (Steven Yalowitz, *Anomalous Monism*), then there can be two temporally distant physical events instantiating the same mental property. So is responsible for the quasi-logical connection that reason and the action they explain bear by virtue of the rationalizing relation between them.

Appendix — Involving a *fair* vendor capable of ever paying other participants in the game without ever going bankrupt resolves the St. Petersburg paradox. If ever so, there *always* is a *merely* possible world v, necessarily *not* the world of utterance u, that in which fair vendor exists. But in that world v, there is no other possible world in which a fair vendor exists. However in any possible world in which the vendor *continually* appears to be fair, whether in u or v, then, p being the proposition that vendor is fair, k ($p \rightarrow kp$). In all worlds of strictly such appearances, except v, in which it is *synthetically* but *utterly* *unreliably* true, p *appears* as *analytically* true.