

Hidden Value Decision Theory

1 – Bernard Williams convincingly argues that one’s reason which explains one’s action is not external to one’s subjective motivational set S . However decision-theoretic interests are observed adequately in bringing into focus the preferential/comparative aspects of reason-explanation of one’s action.

2 – In deciding between A or B one of which one is to find more preferable, if one is in effect compelled to the decision and finds both A or B less preferable to neither of them at all, there is a hidden and blocked but *auspicious* third option that has rational affinity to $\text{not-}A$ and $\text{not-}B$. Thus if one ends up pursuing A one’s reason has some affinity with the reason one would have if one pursued B .

3 – The external reason by its very concept is that which contributes to the explanation of action by being caused by the compulsory external (to one’s S) factor x which constitutes common causal antecedent between both possible outcomes, A and B . Internal reasons are only *comparatively* explanatory in compulsory decision situations. They explain why one pursued A rather than B not why one pursued A *simpliciter*. The latter is explained by an internal reason exhaustively in voluntary situations and in compulsory situations by an internal reason tied up by x which is the shared explanans cited in explaining A or B .

4 – The outcome of compulsory—as opposed to voluntary—decision situations which suffer from intrinsic rational (even epistemic) deficiency, explanatorily offset by the external compulsion, implicates less *hermeneutic sacrificial*. One before the instant of decision at time t between A or B has psychological family resemblance to one after t pursuing A or that of pursuing B but also hypothetically to one after t but pursuing neither A nor B . The more resemblance to the hypothetical, the more pronounced the external factor, the less causal agency, the less scrutiny and the more leniency in the process of charitable interpretation, and hence the less hermeneutical sacrificial and the higher hidden utility.

5 – Donald Davidson convincingly argues that mental events are token-identical to physical events but stop short of assigning them nomological status that allows them to be covered by strict laws. Mental is deprived type-identity and can only be covered by *ceteris paribus* generalization in order to protect the anomalism of mental. At theoretical loss. However a forwardly *ceteris paribus* generalization can be explanatorily backwardly strict law. If a mental event M causes another mental event N *not* covered by strict laws *before* the occurrence of N , there is a strict law covering M (the mental cause) as the *effect* and N (the mental effect) as the *cause* covered by the strict law. Thus primordial possibility of the law is superseded by its primordial necessity.

6 – Let pA be the mental property instantiated by the mental event that causes one to pursue A , pB the the mental property if B , and pO the mental property if avoiding pursuit of any of them at all if ever presented with the decision. —In *voluntary* situations where pA is instantiated rather than pB , establishing primordial necessity of a strict law LA incorporating pA rather than LB , one commits to occupying exclusively possible worlds W in which LA rather than LB is nomologically necessary. Thus pA yields higher utility for all inhabitants of W than pB and has comparative instrumental hegemony over pB . —In *compulsory* situations, in the possible worlds one exclusively commits as a result of pursuing A eventually, pO universally yields higher utility than pA in turn higher than pB . —As if eternal recurrence. What one decides reinforces a nomological necessity. What one does a bit or not by deciding one does see its flawless reflection.