

Hidden Value Decision Theory

1 – Bernard Williams convincingly argues that one’s reason which explains one’s action is not external to one’s subjective motivational set *S*. However decision-theoretic interests are observed adequately in bringing into focus the preferential/comparative aspects of reason-explanation of one’s action.

2 – In deciding between *A* or *B* one of which one is to find more preferable, if one is in effect compelled to the decision and finds both *A* or *B* less preferable to avoiding both, there is a hidden and blocked but *auspicious* third option that has rational affinity to cases where avoids *A* and cases where one avoids *B*. Thus if one ends up pursuing *A* one’s reason has some affinity with that if pursuing *B*.

3 – The external reason by its very concept is that which contributes to the explanation of action by being caused by the compulsory external (to one’s *S*) factor *x* which constitutes common causal antecedent for both the possible outcomes, *A* and *B*. Internal reasons are only *comparatively* explanatory in compulsory decision situations. They explain why one pursued *A* rather than *B* not why one pursued *A simpliciter*. The latter is explained by an internal reason exhaustively in voluntary situations and in compulsory situations by an internal reason added to *x* which is the shared explanans cited in explaining *A* or *B*.

4 – The outcome of compulsory—as opposed to voluntary—decision situations which suffer from internal rational (even epistemic) deficiency, explanatorily offset by the external compulsion, implicates less *hermeneutic sacrificial*. One before the instant of decision at time *t* between *A* or *B* has psychological family resemblance to one after *t* pursuing *A* or that of pursuing *B* but also hypothetically to one pursuing neither *A* nor *B*. The more resemblance to the hypothetical, the more pronounced the external factor, the less causal agency, the less scrutiny and the more leniency in the process of charitable interpretation, and hence the less hermeneutical sacrificial and the higher hidden utility.

5 – Donald Davidson convincingly argues that mental events are token-identical to physical events but refusing to assign them the nomological status that allows them to be covered by strict laws. Mental is deprived type-identity and can only be covered by *ceteris paribus* generalization in order to protect the anomalism of mental. At theoretical loss. To overcome the loss ... a forwardly *ceteris paribus* generalization can be explanatorily backwardly strict law. Although that a mental event *M* causes another mental event *N* *not* covered by strict laws *before* the occurrence of *N*, there is a strict law, covering *M* (the mental cause) as the *effect* and *N* (the mental effect) as the *cause* covered by the strict law, whose primordial possibility is superseded by its new primordial necessity.

6 – Let *pA* be the mental property instantiated by the mental event that causes one to pursue *A*, *pB* the the mental property if *B*, and *p0* the mental property if avoiding pursuit of any of them at all if ever presented with the decision. —In *voluntary* situations where *pA* is instantiated rather than *pB*, established primordial necessity of a strict law *LA* incorporating *pA* rather than *LB*, one commits to occupying exclusively possible worlds *W* in which *LA* rather than *LB* is nomologically indispensable. Thus *pA* yields higher utility for all inhabitants of *W* than *pB* and has comparative instrumental hegemony *vis-a-vis* *pB*. —In *compulsory* situations, in the possible worlds one exclusively commits as a result of pursuing *A* eventually, *p0* universally yields higher utility than *pA* in turn higher than *pB*. —As if eternal recurrence. What one decides reinforces a nomological necessity. What one does a bit or not by deciding one does see its undistorted reflection.