

Hidden Value Decision Theory

1 – According to Bernard Williams, one’s reason which explains one’s action is not external to one’s subjective motivational set S . The preferential aspects of rationalization, that one pursues one choice only in comparison to another choice rather than on its own, better reveals the explanatory structure of S .

2 – One is to decide between A or B one of which is to be found more preferable than the other. If one is to be compelled to the decision then one prefers not being in the position of making the decision—one prefers avoiding both options. Reason one has to avoid both has affinity with reason one has to prefer A to B and has affinity with to prefer B to A . Thus there is a common rational element between reason one has to prefer A and reason one has to prefer B .

3 – That one is compelled to decide and to rationalize one’s choice is caused and explained by the compulsory external factor x . Therefore x is the common causal antecedent for both the possible outcomes, whether one comparatively rationalizes A or B . Internal reasons are only *comparatively* explanatory in compulsory situations. They explain why one pursued A rather than B not why one pursued A *simpliciter*. Although the latter is explained by an internal reason exhaustively in voluntary decision situations in compulsory situations it is explained by an internal reason in combination with x —which is external to one’s S but also the shared explanans cited in explaining both outcomes A or B .

4 – The outcome of compulsory—as opposed to voluntary—decision situations which suffer from internal rational (even epistemic) deficiency and is explanatorily offset by the external factors implicates less *hermeneutic sacrificial*. One before the instant of decision at time t has psychological family resemblance to one after t pursuing A or B but also hypothetically to one ultimately discharged from the decision after all. The more pronounced the external factor, the more resemblance of the preferred choice to the hypothetical, the less causal agency, and hence the less scrutiny and the more leniency in the process of charitable interpretation, the less hermeneutical sacrificial and the higher hidden utility.

5 – According to Donald Davidson mental events are token-identical to physical events but lack the nomological status that allows them to be covered by strict laws. Mental is to be covered only by *ceteris paribus* generalization in order to protect the anomalism of mental. This is an over-reaction. Perhaps temporally forwardly *ceteris paribus* generalization is temporally backwardly strict law in disguise. Although that a mental event M causes another mental event N is *not* covered by strict laws, its temporal reversal is: M (the mental cause) as the physical (strict-law) *effect* and N (the mental effect) as the physical *cause*. The primordial possibility of the law morphs into primordial necessity.

6 – Let p_A be the mental property instantiated by the mental event that causes one to pursue A , p_B the the mental property if B , and p_0 the mental property if discharged from decision. —In *voluntary* situations where p_A is instantiated rather than p_B , thus establishing primordial necessity of a strict law LA rather than LB , one commits to occupying *exclusively* those possible worlds W in which LA rather than LB is nomologically indispensable. The nomological decree is for p_A to yield higher utility for all inhabitants of W than p_B and to have comparative instrumental hegemony *vis-a-vis* p_B . —In *compulsory* situations, in the possible worlds to which one exclusively commits as the result of pursuing A , the decree is for p_0 to universally yield higher utility than p_A and then higher than p_B . —As if eternal recurrence. What one decides secures a nomological necessity. What one does a bit or not by deciding one sees its undistorted reflection.