

Lacanian Sword Over Humean Reason Enslavement

1 – According to reason internalism (Bernard Williams), it does not make sense to cite a reason in explanation of one's action which is independent of or external to one's subjective motivational set *S*. Any effort to secure an external reason for one's action is doomed to fail because even if it is not emitted from a readily available surface desire it betrays an artifact of a deep-rooted desire.

2 – If (I) there is a most deep-rooted desire, an element of *S*, such that it takes perpetual attempts to bring its *object* to consciousness—it gives rise to a reason that can only achieve definitive articulation asymptotically in a temporal unfolding—and (II) it gives rise to a reason or rational element automatically included in what causally explains one's action or propositional attitude, then external reasons are exactly the effortless type of reasons originating from the unfathomable depth of *S*.

3 – Automatic inclusion implies that *every* action or propositional attitude *A* is inherently subject to charitable interpretation: *A* is necessarily to yield interpretively-critical utility. Criticality to ensure the scant externality underlying *A*.—External reasons are minimally but *primordially* internalized in *S*. Such is the reach of charity.

4 – The interpretively-critical utility corresponds to the symptom-free object of desire whose descendant reason perpetually evades articulation or disclosure. Its ever elusive disclosure implicates an interpretation of *A* that is in motion towards its ever elusive supreme charity. Motion implicates change in proximity and temporality. The intention in intentional actions may be associated with what can be articulated at the time of action and stands in contrast to the external reason that is to be excavated ever more manifestly in the course of the interminable interpretation. The contrast hints at the degree of externality (proximity to symptom-freedom) in the reason for action facing the tribunal of interpretation not individually but as a *corporate body*.

5 – The implication of automaticity of externality is that at any instant of decision, an external reason leaves traces behind in the outcome of the decision either way. This is extreme perhaps amelioratable. The talk of contrast between the overt reason for action and its ultimate status in the external realm directly reflects issues of *evaluation* implicit or explicit in the whole business of internal-external categorization.

6 – Perhaps there are obvious obstacle to externality: audience, theatricality, ... besides plain lies: (Adopting from Dostoevsky's *The brothers Karamazov* Book II Chapter 4) One must avoid lying, especially lying to oneself, must avoid disgust and fear. An act caused by a truly (more) external reason, unlike that which is caused by a superficially (less) external reason, is hard and forbidding. The latter is motivated by yearning for an immediate heroic act that is achieved quickly and seen by everyone. People may actually reach a point where they are willing to sacrifice their lives, as long as the ordeal does not last too long, is quickly over—just like on the stage, with the public watching and admiring. The act caused by a truly (more) external reason, requires hard work and patience, and, for some, is *a whole way of life*.

7 – If a state of affairs *contra* Lacan is purported to end the perpetual elusiveness of the object of desire, the putative personalized paradise is utterly ephemeral because the *ubiquitous* force of emancipation inevitably leads the inhabitant to absolute madness. The absolute madness must be understood as an activity that necessitates the total absence of stage and audience, thus enables disclosure of the external reason.

8 – The primary thing that is revealed with resoluteness is Dasein (Heidegger). This is a rejection of individualistic conception of reason. Dasein is a temporal entity in severe continuity with past and future, not just an entity pouring reasons out of present consciousness. In any instant of decision one commits to the decision the *whole* of one's temporal being beyond present consciousness with a view as extended as possible into future not an isolated strand selected from one's *S*.—Though *Individualistically* reasons are the slaves of passions, *holistically* they are rebellious.