

Molecular Psychology

Abstract — The realm of non-sentential propositionality and *purely* functional rationality the constitutive force of which enables (*otherwise* non-sentential) incessant *subconscious* inter-translation of psychological and physical. Nietzsche: there are more wisdom in your body than in your deepest philosophy.

1 — Sentential content does not exhaust propositional content as that of which the "that" clause of propositional attitudes consist—paradigmatically so in direct perceptual experiences which cannot be precisely ever captured by propositional if both the attitude and the content are to be linguistically differentiated only in finite or countable ways.

2 — Only if content has a utility it exists. The non-sentential content is recyclable only by virtue of being interminably instrumentalizable (or interpretable). The content is less than full-fledged sentential if its utility is *hidden*—a *merely* existential item of prophecy based on an existential reason belief.—And the concealment implicates some interpretation for disclosure.

3 — Linguistically weightless items that are causally efficacious are secured to play causal roles (clearly) without reliance on sentential resources—resources beyond *superfluous* translation of their causal role. Any causal role becoming amenable to translation to substantially sentential (because of future contingencies and sharpened utilities) first duplicates to its residue to maintain its interminability. —Any such linguistically weightless items are so unproblematically fluidly translatable to and from *physical* causal roles such that if *mental* causal roles are *ever* linguistically weightless, then mental events are *type*-identical to physical events. —Psychological anomalism is due to another source.

4 — (Freud: the business of the analysis is to secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego.) Interpretational items that are linguistically weightless are propelled to *future* functionalities. Every such functionality is *conceived* by potentially eventually *conceivable* functionalities of higher hermeneutic precision—better interpretations and sharper utilities owing to the ubiquity of extra-sentential existential.

5 — There are substantially non-sentential items of knowledge that are hence non-assertible but *known* in the sense of having a *guaranteed* functionality to disclose an item of truth. They constitutes a tacit promise in one's reasoning. For any sentence p there is x such that it is non-assertible but *true* that one knows (x and one does not know x). So is x capable of encapsulating inexhaustible interpretations of p to which it is attached.

6 — A case for weak verificationism: in all possible worlds

$\exists x, y \text{ } k(x \wedge \sim kx) \iff k(y \rightarrow ky) \text{ but } x \iff y \text{ in all possible worlds.}$

References — Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Timothy Williamson.