

Nomothetic Mythology of Propositional Attitudes

1 – Physical translation of a mental content must incorporate a set of causal antecedents **A** and a set of causal consequents **B** which instantiate properties that figure in strict laws as antecedent and consequent conditions respectively.

2 – Only if there are double-role events in common between **A** and **B** capable of migrating to purely **A** or to purely **B** in future depending on the role the mental content play then, psychological anomalism can be established but also *without* any need to give up the type-identity of mental and physical events.

3 – Thus effectively there are proxies of future causal consequents **F** at present acting as causal antecedents. This can only be accounted for by there being an item of causally efficacious *privileged* non-observational knowledge (which causes **F**) of future mental property instantiated by **F**. —Continuity of mental content consist of instantiation of the same property by both **F** and its proxy.

4 – Any element migrating to purely **A** implicate another element migrating to purely **B** and thus can be described as causing it. Ability to migrate is responsible for the richness of a perceptual experience **E** which contains elements awaiting eventual assignment to purely **A** or to purely **B** (although both sets can play role in the etiology of behavior even before the assignment).

5 – If the rich content of **E** implicates overlapping of causal antecedent and consequents and if both the attitudes and their contents that are caused by the experience are delineated by their clear-cut functional roles (cause or effect), and if their contents can be all captured by context-free sentences then the propositional attitudes must be inextricable from each other to account for the causal overlap.—There are elements in **E** awaiting deployment as belief or desire.

6 – According to Davidson, reasons are causes because one acts because of some specific beliefs and purposes rather than some other reason also capable of rationalizing the action. However demanding *specific* beliefs and purposes may be too stringent of a requirement: one has to decide between two choices, bearing only *one* degree of freedom, but the sheer possibility of a *posteriori* rationalization of action points to there being *many*, if not infinitely many, degrees of freedom concerning the reason concocted for the decision.

7 – Non-specificity (the massive degree of freedom) is also crucially visible for the cases where one is not able to amass specific reasons for either alternative and has to take a *leap of faith* in order to neutralize the epistemic and rational deficiency.—"The instant of decision is madness" but "there always is some reason in madness"—. We can insist that that reasons cause and rationalize actions entails that by necessity outcomes of decisions are impeccably rationalizable after all, but allow rationalizability to be emitted, beyond present consciousness, from sources the exact nature of which is constituted by the agent's acquired beliefs and purposes in one's encounter with *future* contingencies.

8 – If reason is exhausted by a separable belief and desire pair then *no* choice ever made precedes its rational credentials. Alternatively it can be said that reason is *never* devoid of an inextricable compound of belief and desire. In functionalist terminology, beliefs and desires are brought to unification in terms of sharing their physical *realizing media*. Some belief-desire psychological explanations of actions fail so spectacularly to adequately capture the constitutive force of rationality that render perhaps *all* such explanations susceptible to failure.