## Psychological as Acute Codification of Physical

- Temporal Proximalization of Otherwise Nomologically Distal
- 1 Mental realism necessitates continuity of mental content which in turn implicates instantiation of a common mental property by two temporally distant events. For example in perceiving a singular causal relation that event c causes event e consists of transcendence over the causal-temporal order and separation of c and e to their predicative coincidence: convergence to a common mental property P. In acting towards a goal that involves c causing e one has a privileged non-observational knowledge of some (perhaps underspecified) mental property that is instantiated by e (if the goal is achieved in the right way). In this context e has causal efficacy in terms of causing e e.
- 2 (According to Davidson the antecedents and consequents of strict laws, when covering mental events, associate with broad descriptions covering large space-time regions.) Given psychological anomalism, the most conceivable way mental events can nevertheless be type-identical to physical events is for mental properties to be instantiated by temporally distant events.—Two mental contents are continually connected if they share a predicative family resemblance.
- 3 Temporal *inter*-event continuity manifested by instantiation of P by two temporally distant events as cause and effect translates to and from atemporal *intra*-event continuity manifested by instantiation of P by a subset of events carved out of c which are capable of functioning as both causal antecedent and causal consequents and likewise by that of e. We can say that the instantiation of P in effect encompasses singular causations seen either way. —In action and desire the incorporation of P is tilted unto antecedent content and in perception and belief unto consequent content.
- $\mathbf{4}$  When perception or action involves  $\mathbf{c} \rightarrow \mathbf{e}$  (via causing d in between), the agent may have better knowledge of far future (anticipation of mental property instantiated by  $\mathbf{e}$ ) than near future (that of by d). The double-function characteristics being responsible for mental continuity and anomalism also enables seamless adaptation to emerging further specification of anticipated mental properties by depriving a function from hitherto double-function events.
- $\mathbf{5}$  The adaptation phenomenon generalizes to no mologically much deeper: in between  $\mathbf{c}$  and  $\mathbf{e}$  there are countless mental properties in principle instantiatable and knowable but not actually materialized into knowledge simply because of a cute parsimony involved in psychological processes. There simply is no need for disclosure of every potential mental property there is. The disclosed mental properties are those implicated in the agent's deliberation or pause for example.
- **6** For any P embodying mental causation involving  $c \to e$  under the strict law L, and for any x such that  $c \to x$  and  $x \to e$ , there are strict laws L' covering  $c \to x$  and L'' covering  $x \to e$ . If nomological proximity  $\Delta$  between c and e is defined as predicative similarity between the two, then while  $\Delta = \|c e\| = \|c x\| + \|x e\|$  in physical vocabulary, in mental vocabulary  $\Delta = \|c e\| < \|c x\| + \|x e\|$ . The triangulation, temporal proximity between c and e, is explained by P in effect via proxies flanking both sides of L.
- 7 More extremely  $\Delta=0$  measured in mental predicative terms—because of transcendence of temporal events to their mental predicative coincidence. This could very well mean that in addition to  $\mathbf{c} \to \mathbf{e}$  being covered by a strict law  $\mathbf{e} \to \mathbf{c}$  is also covered by a strict law.—Retrocausal closure of psychological.