

Proliferation of Coreferential Homonyms

1 – According to David Kaplan, names are to be individuated by their *referents*. Therefore names identically spelled and pronounced can be said to constitute a set of referentially distinct *homonyms*.

2 – There are reasons to suspect radicalized edition of Kaplan's proposal is better placed to explain the rise and demise of phenomena—for example due to *split* division of linguistic labor—where a sentence that has conspicuously no cognitive significance is as a matter of fact first known *only* empirically (though in a very weak sense evidence-transcendent both before and after).

3 – Suppose there are two linguistic communities isolated enough such that in one Feynman is only known as a drummer and not as a physicist and in another he is only known as a physicist and not as a drummer. Having been sufficiently exposed to the practices of the two communities, one renders the analytically-disguised identity statement that

"Feynman = Feynman"

as synthetic upon the discovery that

Feynman-the-drummer *is* Feynman-the-physicist.

or vice versa. Perhaps sentential working of memory can be described as the process of turning analytic once upon a time a synthetic statement.

4 – Perhaps nothing more than a truism: a name that is essentially associated with a description—so that its description contributes to the psychological explanations in which it figures—refers not to its referent *simpliciter* but to its referent *relative* to the information that is mirrored by the description.

5 – (In words of Kafka, all language is but a poor translation) To borrow a Fregean phrase, complete parts of language are inter-translatable *only up* to the layer that is statable by behavioristic terms if reference is a matter of public evidence and a proper name a matter of public language. Indeterminacy of translation is more disastrous than usually suggested.

6 – (In words of Heidegger, *Dasein* is essentially *ahead* of itself) At the worst case a truism: meaning of an analytic statement awaiting to be known based on an item of evidence consists of the evidentially *compensatory* role meaning *wholeheartedly* undertakes in the absence of *future* evidence until its emergence. —Assigning a meaning is but making a decision and we know from Kierkegaard that the *instant* of decision is madness and from Nietzsche that there *always* is some reason in madness.