

# Semiological Conception of Analyticity

**1** – According to Gareth Evans, in order for one to think of an object  $X$  one must have a discriminating knowledge of the object. For any other object  $Y$  which is not  $X$ , the subject must have access to an item of knowledge which consist of there being a predicate true of  $X$  but not true of  $Y$ .

**2** – Any object  $X$  that can be identified and differentiated from other objects, descriptively or demonstratively, is that of which a collection of predicates  $C$  are true.  $X$  may also be uniquely identifiable by multiple subsets of  $C$  for example  $c1$  and  $c2$ . There is in principle nothing to rule out the possibility that  $c1$  and  $c2$  have no or only minimal elements in common. —*Surplusage* of signs.

**3** –  $X$  as identified by *only*  $c1$  may be an object of interest in a semiotic system whose sign is distinguished form other signs associated with objects other than  $X$  those of which at least one element of  $c1$  is known not to be true. Similarly  $X$  as identified by *only*  $c2$  may be an object of interest in another semiotic system. Distinct signification of  $X$  implies it bears distinct meanings. But both significations are concerned with the very same object—referentially speaking.

**4** – In Kripke's puzzle about propositional attitude reports, Paderewski-the-pianist and Paderewski-the-politician are the very same object but sustain different significations. Their respective tokenings in thought or language are based on two informational contents both caused by the same object but emitted through two distinct causal pathways. The same object is operative in two different semiotic systems whose relativizations to each represent elements of a set of **coreferential homonyms**. A signifier does not refer to an object. A signifier in linkage with a concept (signified) refers to its object *qua* in linkage with the informational content that contributes to the signification of the concept.

**5** – Paderewski in one semiotic system is the very same Paderewski in another. Every  $F$  is an  $F$ . Every thing that is  $F$  in one semiotic system as opposed to being  $G$  and other relevant things in the system *is* the very same thing that is  $F$  in another semiotic system as opposed to being  $H$  and other things in this system.

**6** – Every  $F$  is an  $F$ . Everything  $X$  that is conspicuously or demonstratively an  $F$  is something  $XX$  which is systematically or descriptively an  $F$ . And  $X$  is the very same thing as  $XX$ . Something that appears to be an  $F$  reveals to be, lo and behold, also an  $F$  under specialized scientific investigation. Everything that is an  $F$  for purposes of various speech acts, a temporal unfolding, is also a matter of concern for synchronic presence of knowledge conveyed linguistically.

**7** – Every vixen is a female fox. There are other languages in which there is no single-word translation of "vixen" which has to share translation with "female fox". One must somehow accommodate awkward inter-language tricks to translate the statement to convey its assertibility. In the target language, for no particular reason, a specialized signification is yet to be designated to female foxes to which it is designated a specialized signification in english. What seems to serve certain communicative interest via phonetic contraction (semiotic fusion of gender and animal taxonomy) in english is semiotically redundant otherwise.

**8** – Personal identity enduring temporality. One at time  $t$  is one at time  $t+1$ . They refer to the same entity but slightly or strikingly different collections of predicates are true of the two cross-sections. Such an entity has characteristics of a river any two parts of which that exhibit far family resemblance are connected by a sequence of parts exhibiting near family resemblances.