Supplement to
“‘The Transition from Sensibility to Reason In Regressu’: Indeterminism in Kant’s Reflexionen”

In hindsight, I see that the paper is missing an abstract and a figure.

Abstract. According to Roman Ingarden, transcendental idealism prevented Kant from “even undertaking an attempt” at elucidating freedom “in terms of the causal structure of the world.” I show that this claim requires qualification. In a remarkable series of Critical-period Reflexionen (5611-4, 5616-9), Kant sketches a defense of the possibility of freedom that differs radically from his various published ones by incorporating an indeterministic account of the phenomena. Anticipating Łukasiewicz, he argues that universal causal determination is consistent with an open future: if an action is contingent, there is an infinite regress of determining causes, yet there is a prior time at which this infinite series of causes has not yet commenced. However, he concedes that on this account the unity of experience “cannot fully obtain in the case of free beings.” The fact that Kant even contemplated the indeterministic theory may carry implications for interpreting the argument of the Second Analogy.

Figure. “Someone entices me to drink” (R 5616)

At time \( t_A \), it is not settled what will happen to the wine Kant has been tempted to drink. At time \( t_B \), the wine is in Kant’s stomach (this is state \( s_0 \)). For every natural number \( i \), the state \( s_i \) is causally necessitated by an earlier state \( s_{i+1} \).

Commentary on figure
• The causal ground of Kant’s contingent action of drinking lies in the “regressus (between two states) to infinity (through decomposition)” (R 5614).
• The causal ground of the action can’t be “composed a priori,” i.e. starting with “smallest elements of the ground,” since the series \( s_i \) extends infinitely, whence the resulting decomposition has no smallest elements.
• There is no “moment of beginning” of the series \( s_i \) (R 5616).
• Hence, while no sensible event is the action’s earliest cause, this doesn’t mean that a nonsensible event is that cause—which would imply a “hiatus” in the appearances (R 5619). Rather, the action has no earliest cause. Nonetheless, at time \( t_A \) its “contrary is possible.” The future is open.
“The Transition from Sensibility to Reason In Regressu”:
Indeterminism in Kant’s Reflexionen

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I

In an appendix entitled ‘How Indeterminateness Becomes Determinateness’, Nuel Belnap calls attention to one feature of the version of indeterminism presented in his paper ‘Branching Space-Time.’ According to this theory, “a causal origin has always ‘a last point of indeterminateness’ … and never ‘a first point of determinateness’.” Belnap remarks: “I find the matter puzzling since it’s neither clear to me how an alternate theory would work nor clear what difference it makes.”

One philosopher who did take this feature to make a crucial difference, albeit at what was evidently a fleeting stage in his thought, is Kant. In a remarkable set of Reflexionen held to have been written around the time of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant adduces it in order to reconcile a principle of causal determination with the possibility of a will capable of spontaneously bringing about causal origins.

2 R 5611–20 (henceforth simply referred to as “the Reflexionen”) in vol. 18 (ed. Erich Adickes, 1928) of the Akademie edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902–), pp. 252–8. References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) will follow the usual A/B pagination; all other citations will be to the Akademie edition (Ak.). Translations are my own; I have modernized Kant’s German and Latin orthography. The notes at issue are marginalia in Kant’s copy of A. G. Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, 4th ed. (Halle, 1757). Since the methodology behind Adickes’ dating is controversial, it is on considerations of content that I wish to rest my entitlement to regard some of these notes as comprising a meaningful grouping. This paper should support the conclusion that R 5614, 5616 and 5618 make sense only when understood as expressions of the same idiosyncratic position. While R 5611–3 and 5617 cohere with that position and would often appear illuminated by it, they might also be amenable to more generic interpretations and will not be essential to my case. Neither R 5615 nor 5620 directly addresses the shared topic of the remaining notes. Moreover, there may be reason to excise R 5615 from Adickes’ grouping: it consists of a definition of “respect,” a notion conspicuously absent from the moral psychology of R 5612 and 5616 (see note 13 below). For a very different reading of the Reflexionen, according to which they are consistent with Kant’s position in the Critique of Pure Reason, see Heinz Heimsoeth, “Freiheit und Charakter: Nach den Kant-Reflexionen Nr. 5611 bis 5620,” in Tradition und Kritik, ed. W. Arnold and H. Zeltner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1967), pp. 123–44, or the same author’s Transzendente Dialektik: Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), vol. 2: pp. 397–406.

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The reconciliation here effected differs radically from the version of compatibilism Kant famously defends throughout his later career. For like Belnap’s theory of branching space-time, the account of the evolution of the phenomena found in the *Reflexionen* is in a strong sense indeterministic. More precisely, as Belnap notes, the existence of theories displaying the above feature “convincingly demonstrates how difficult it is to speak accurately about determinism/indeterminism.” For suppose we ask: “[O]n the present theory, does the past determine the future?” On the theories of Belnap and Kant alike, the correct answer turns out to be “yes and no.”

The *Reflexionen* contain multiple statements of Kant’s thesis of the causal determination of our actions, when the latter are viewed as happenings in the phenomenal world. “[A]s far as observation goes,” Kant writes, “everything occurs by means of sensible incitements [Triebfeder], through which the action is determined” (R 5617). The ground he offers for such causal determinism is the one familiar from the Second Analogy: the determination of each action by something prior in time is “required for the sake of the unity of appearances, in so far as this unity should provide a rule of experience” (R 5619). Finally, as in all of Kant’s writings on the subject, the principle of causal determination is taken to be compatible with freedom and responsibility: one “imputes [certain phenomena] to oneself, though they be in themselves determined by external causes” (R 5612).

What is striking is that these assertions of a familiar principle are juxtaposed with what can read like outright denials of the same principle. Admittedly, Kant’s claim that “we must regard future actions as undetermined by everything belonging to the *phaenomena*” (R 5612) can be recognized as another familiar point: in viewing someone as a rational agent, we undertake to construe his or her actions as intelligible in terms of self-determination according to grounds of reason, though viewed merely as happenings the same actions remain causally determined. But while this duality is indeed stressed throughout the *Reflexionen*, it does not appear to be the whole story. For we learn in passages shortly to be presented that it is precisely the “appearances” of free actions that we can “never determine” (R 5618), whence as an appearance (“quoad sensum”) not everything can be “predetermined”

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3 It differs equally radically from the Leibnizian compatibilism Kant had defended against Crusius in his *Nova dilucidatio* of 1755 (Ak. 1: pp. 398–405).

4 “Branching Space-Time,” p. 428. A third philosopher to return this answer is Jan Łukasiewicz, in a 1922 address published as “O determinizmie” in his posthumous anthology *Z zagadnien logiki i filozofii*, ed. J. Słupecki (Warsaw, 1961) and as “On Determinism” (trans. Z. Jordan) in *Polish Logic*, ed. S. McCall (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967). While the view embraced by Łukasiewicz very closely parallels Kant’s, the senses in which Belnap and Kant answer “yes” to the above question turn out to differ considerably, even at a structural level that precludes from any contrast between transcendental idealism and Belnap’s own realism about branching space-time (for details, see note 16 below).

5 This is essentially how Henry Allison reads a similar sentence from R 5611: “Now actions are in large part occasioned [veranlaßt] by sensibility, but not wholly determined; for reason must supply a complement of sufficiency [Komplement der Zadänglichkeit].” See Kant’s *Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 39.
Indeterminism in Kant’s Reflexionen

(R 5619). Moreover, this failure of determinability seems not to be a merely epistemic one: “given the same appearances [bei denselben Erscheinungen], the same human being can act differently” (R 5618).

How are we to explain this “yes and no” answer? Drawing for my slogan on one of several vocabularies he employs to express the relevant contrast, I take Kant to be maintaining that there is causal determination \textit{a posteriori} without causal determination \textit{a priori}. Here the contrasting qualifiers serve quite naturally to indicate what we can recognize as the difference in \textit{quantifier form} between the following two propositions:

(1) For every state $S_0$ obtaining at time $t_0$, there exist a time $t_1 < t_0$ and a state $S_1$ obtaining at $t_1$ such that the obtaining of $S_1$ at $t_1$ necessitates the obtaining of $S_0$ at $t_0$ (for Kant, this means that the transition from $S_1$ to $S_0$ is governed by a universal law).

(2) For every state $S_0$ obtaining at time $t_0$, and for every time $t_1 < t_0$, there exists a state $S_1$ obtaining at $t_1$ such that the obtaining of $S_1$ at $t_1$ necessitates the obtaining of $S_0$ at $t_0$.

Proposition (1) is an \textit{a posteriori} determination principle, in the sense that it guarantees the existence of (determining) states situated \textit{backward} in time. On the other hand, (2) is an \textit{a priori} determination principle: it guarantees the existence of (determined) states situated \textit{forward} in time (provided the world has not come to an end).\(^6\) In the Reflexionen, I intend to show, Kant embraces (1) while rejecting (2). He thus insists that whatever happens in nature is strictly causally determined, while at the same time denying that at each instant the appearances determine a unique future.\(^7\)

Bearing in mind this distinction, consider first the following rough summary of freedom’s implications concerning the causal nexus:

\[\text{E}\]verything \textit{quoad sensum} is necessary and can be explained according to laws of appearance. But it cannot be predetermined \textit{vorherbestimmt}, since reason is a \textit{principium} which does not appear, and so is not given among the appearances. Therefore causes and their relation to action according to laws of sensibility can indeed be known \textit{a posteriori}, but the determin-

\(^6\) The \textit{a priori}/\textit{a posteriori} opposition we will encounter in the Reflexionen is a traditional one generically characterizable as concerning \textit{direction} in a series of determining grounds. See Baumgarten’s introduction of this terminology in §24 of his Metaphysica, where we learn that everything is both “knowable \textit{a priori}” from its ground and “knowable \textit{a posteriori}” from that which it in turn grounds (reprinted in Ak. 17: p. 31). This usage also plays a role in Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}: as Heimsoeth has explained, the crucial occurrence of “\textit{a priori}” in the argument for the Third Antinomy’s thesis (KrV A 446/B 474) “must be taken in the sense customary before Kant: \textit{a parte ante} in the derivation” (Transzendentale Dialektik, p. 239 n 72).

\(^7\) The conceptual availability of this subterfuge was first suggested to me by Nicholas Rescher, in a discussion of Kant’s compatibilism as expressed in the first two \textit{Critiques}. It has since been pointed out in the same connection by Hud Hudson, who cites Łukasiewicz (Hudson, \textit{Kant’s Compatibilism} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 114, 115 n).
ing of them to the *actus* [Bestimmung derselben zum actu] cannot be known. This connection [Zusammenhang] of actions according to laws of appearance without determination [Bestimmtheit] by appearance is a necessary precondition of practical rules of reason that are in themselves the cause of a regularity in the appearances, because they proceed [übergegeben] to actions only by means of sensibility. (R 5619)

On the one hand, I will propose, Kant’s concession of the “a posteriori” explicability of an action’s necessity reflects his embrace of determination *a posteriori*. His denial of the possibility of “predetermination,” on the other hand, will be interpreted as his rejection of determination *a priori*. Here and in the following three passages, however, it may appear that Kant rests his vindication of freedom not on the distinction between (1) and (2), but rather on some obscure contrast between the “determination” of phenomena and their mere “explanation” (or “connection”) according to universally necessitating causal laws:

We explain already performed [begangene] free actions according to laws of human [the human being’s?] nature, but we do not thereby know them as determined; otherwise we would not regard them as contingent [zufällig] and demand that they should have happened and had to happen otherwise. (R 5612)

*A posteriori*, we will then have cause to find the action’s ground, namely its explanatory but not its determining ground, in sensibility. *A priori*, however, when the action is imagined as in the future (*antecedenter*), we will feel ourselves undetermined to it, and capable of making a first beginning of the series of appearances. (R 5616 [Kant’s emphasis])

The animal will proceed according to sensibly determinable laws. The mixed human will (*libertas hybrida*) also acts according to laws, but whose [sic] grounds are not fully found in appearance, whence, given the same appearances, the same human being can act differently. Here one must first await a character, and then one has a law [with which] to explain but never to determine the appearances. (R 5618 [Kant’s emphasis])

If it is to underwrite the vindication of freedom, the distinction between determination and explanation can hardly be an epistemic one. More promising, if at odds with Kant’s usage elsewhere in these notes and in his published works, would be a construal according to which all talk of an action’s “determination” is reserved for the perspective from which acts of reason (and, derivatively, the appearances for which they are responsible) are determined spontaneously, while it is “explanation” that figures in talk of the law-governed succession of appearances. Alternatively, one might try to

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8 Heimsoeth nonetheless reads Kant as distinguishing between the availability in principle of deterministic explanation and the epistemic possibility of “actual and certain predetermination” (“Freiheit und Charakter,” p. 130; *Transzendental Dialektik*, p. 369). Allison similarly construes the contrast in the *Reflexionen* as one between “causal explanation after the fact and predetermination, which would be required for prediction” (*Kant’s Theory of Freedom*, p. 254 n 30), evidently taking Kant’s denial of *predetermination* to be based on his “denial of nomological status to the empirical generalizations of psychology and anthropology” (p. 43). This denial, Allison holds, is compatible with a thoroughgoing “causal determinism,” even one according to which actions are in principle explicable in terms of causes irreducibly “psychological” in nature (pp. 31, 34). Allison does admit that it is unclear how any such contrast could be seen as the key to dissolving a threatened contradiction between freedom and nature.
identify the denial of a “determining ground” in sensibility with the denial of an ultimate, itself unconditioned causal ground among the appearances. Neither of these approaches however takes seriously Kant’s apparent endorsement of alternative futures. Instead, I believe that each of his above formulations aims to render the distinction in quantifier form between (1) and (2). The attractiveness of this reading should become apparent as soon as we examine Kant’s detailed account of how determination a posteriori is to be reconciled with a denial of predetermination.

II

In two succinct sentences, Kant reveals how the appearances at a time prior to an action can be compatible with both that action and its “contrary” (Gegenteil):

As an appearance, not only an action but also its contrary would be able to have its sufficient ground in the regressus (between two states) to infinity (through decomposition). But this series of grounds can never be complete and cannot be composed [zusammengesetzt] a priori starting with the smallest elements of the ground. (R 5614)

The first of the two states (Zustände) mentioned here must be an initial state obtaining at a time when the agent’s will, as regards its “empirical character,” remains undetermined with respect to the action in question.9 The second, subsequent state is the action’s phenomenal manifestation. In describing the causal determination of the latter state, we may appeal to an infinite regress of ever-earlier prior determining states, each of which however succeeds the initial state! This is perfectly clear from Kant’s parenthetical qualifications, which indicate how the regress is to be understood as proceeding: it takes the form of the infinite decomposition of a finite temporal interval, rather than reaching infinitely far into the past.10 Such a process of decomposition will never yield any “smallest elements” out of which the action’s complete causal ground could in turn be “composed a priori,”11 since each series

9 Kant defines the will’s empirical character as “a certain causality of [the agent’s] reason” that can be gleaned from behavior and appealed to (along with “other cooperating causes”) in its empirical explanation (KrV A 549–50/B 577–8). This is evidently the notion in play in the passage already quoted from R 5618, where Kant says that in order to explain as-yet-undetermined behavior “one must first await a character [einen Charakter abwarten].” See also R 5611–2, especially the claim that “actions here in the [phenomenal] world … cohere according to empirical laws, when one views reason itself according to its expressions as a phaenomenon [of the character]” (R 5612).

10 The possibility of an infinite “regress of decomposition” (cf. KrV A 514/B 542; A 523/B 551) in the case of a finite temporal interval rests on a principle enunciated in the Second Analogy: “neither time nor appearance in time consists of parts that are the smallest” (KrV A 209/B 254).

11 The relation of grounding with respect to which Kant here uses the term “a priori” (recall note 6) is not a causal, but rather a compositional one. In this sense, one progresses a priori from constituent elements to whole, and a posteriori from whole to constituents. Where the latter decomposition yields ultimate constituents (“the simple”), these may now be called the “terminus of coordination per analysin, i. e. a priori” (R 4201, Ak. 17: p. 454).
of successively determining causes ending in the action can be extended while remaining within the finite interval’s bounds. In Belnap’s language, there is no “first point of determinateness,” but this does not preclude the infinite regress from having as its lower limit a “last point of indeterminateness.”

A second Reflexion offers a more detailed elucidation of this account of phenomenal indeterminism, while also specifying the “intellectual” role of the will in supplying the “moment of determining” needed to tip the scales between alternative courses of action:

[W]ith freely acting beings there is a constant influence of intellectual grounds, as the contrary is possible as appearance. But the action or its contrary will be grounded among the appearances in such a manner that only the moment of determining [das Moment der Bestimmung] is intellectual. This moment cannot however be used in the empirical explanation, because it is not perceived. For from the intellectual [determining moment] to the determined action there is an infinite intermediate series of incitements [Triebfeder], whose connection with the given state can only be known according to general laws of possibility. (R 5616 [my emphasis])

“Given” an initial state preceding the determination of the will’s empirical character, both the action and its contrary remain possible, explicable in either case by an infinite regress of successively determining prior causes. The invocation of “laws of possibility” in the last clause is Kant’s acknowledgment that we may come to recognize limitations on the differences we can make in the world through action. Knowledge of an agent’s “given state” may indeed enable us to rule out some conceivable subsequent actions as contrary to laws of nature and therefore impossible. What it will not reveal is which of the remaining possible actions the agent will actually perform.

Kant next provides an everyday illustration of how an agent’s will can “intervene” in favor of one possible course of phenomena:

For example: Somebody entices me to drink [Es reizt mich jemand zum Trunk], this enticement [Reiz] leads me astray and can thus be explained according to laws of the senses. My being led astray would also be necessary were I a mere animal. However, it is possible that the intellectual will, which is exempted from the laws of dependence on senses, might intervene [sich einmischen]; it only determines a different course of sensibility. This course can also be connected with the first given state according to laws of nature, but only through an infinite intermediate series of appearances … Only the first directing [Direktion] of these causes, the moment of determining them, is not encountered among the appearances, but neither can it be missed among them, since we cannot observe the appearances [back] to the moment of their beginning. (R 5616 [my emphasis])

12 Kant’s pronouncement that the regress “can never be complete” is based on the transcendental idealist stricture articulated in his resolution to the Second Antinomy: whereas a “whole given in intuition” must be regarded as “infinitely divisible” [ins Unendliche teilbar], we can never represent it as infinitely divided, as composed of a “whole” infinite series (KrV A 524/B 552). When Kant uses the phrase “infinite series” in R 5616, this should be understood in accordance with the terminology proposed in R 4098: “The infinity of the series as such is possible, but not the infinity of the aggregate. The former is an infinite possibility (of additions), the latter an infinite (actual) collection” (Ak. 17: p. 414).
In short, reason freely “avails itself of” (bedient sich: R 5612, 5616) particular desires and inclinations, which in turn causally necessitate the agent’s behavior. Naturally, reason’s act of intervening in the causal nexus is not itself observable. What Kant emphasizes in this passage is that there does not even exist a time at which this intervention is effected — the spontaneously originated causal series has no “moment of beginning” in time, i. e. there is no first point of determinateness. This is why the empirical inaccessibility of reason’s intervention does not entail the occurrence of an event that is the object of no possible experience (one that would be “missed” among the appearances). And that, in turn, explains how Kant is able to deny that his interventionist account of an action’s causal origin leaves the understanding facing a gap in the world: “In the appearances, there is no hiatus for the understanding, but neither do they let themselves be determined a priori, i. e. starting with what is absolutely first” (R 5619, continuing the passage displayed above). While no sensible event can play the role of an action’s “absolutely first” cause, we should not conclude from this that there must be nonsensible events (gaps in the phenomena). Even though the action is preceded by a “given state” at the time of whose obtaining it remains indeterminate, it has no temporally first cause.

13 In the two sentences I have elided from the displayed passage, Kant emphasizes that not only vice but “even virtue occurs according to laws of nature and must be explained according to them.” When he chooses virtuously to resist the stimulus of drink, this too must be explained in terms of the “incitements” of “honor, health, rewards,” together with upbringing and temperament (R 5616). We may find here one component of the conception of rational agency Allison views as underlying “Kant’s moral theory circa 1781,” a theory that is supposed to predate the introduction of the concept of autonomy and of respect for law as the sole moral incitement (Kant’s Theory of Freedom, pp. 66–70). Among the texts Allison mentions in this connection is R 5612, where Kant claims that “reason avails itself of the natural constitution according to its laws as incitements (honor, peace of mind).”

14 I take it that the final occurrence of ‘moment’ in R 5616, unlike the previous three, is intended temporally. The word ‘das Moment’ was introduced into 17th century philosophical German from Latin, where the meanings of ‘momentum’ include both ‘ground of motion’ (originally: the weight difference required to tip a balanced scale) and ‘critical instant’ (from which, via French, the distinct ‘der Moment’ derives). Cf. Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen, ed. Wolfgang Pfeifer et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993). Kant himself introduces the causal sense by deriving it from the temporal one: the reason “the degree of reality, as cause, is called a moment” is that it is a “magnitude whose apprehension is not successive but rather instantaneous [augenblicklich]” (KrV A 169/B 210). A few pages later, we find the word ‘Moment’ used in a plainly temporal context (A 176/B 218; compare A 167–8/B 209–10).

15 Kant defines ‘hiatus’ as an “empty space or empty time,” ruling these out on the grounds that “ neither is an object of possible experience” (R 5973, Ak. 18: p. 411; Metaphysik Mrongovius, Ak. 29: p. 922). In the above sentence, I take it, Kant uses the word in a somewhat broader sense, according to which any occurrence in time that is not the object of possible experience would count as a “hiatus for the understanding.”

16 On the Reflexionen theory of intellectual intervention, the occasions for willing are precluded from being dense: there is a last point in time at which Kant remains undetermined to drink, followed by an interval during which it is no longer in his power to turn back. This is an important disanalogy to Belnap’s branching space-time, where the “choice points” along a history (the “last points of indeterminateness” for each causal origin) need
Assuming that the “regressus” referred to in R 5617 is again intended as a regress of decomposition, we find here one more summary of the same fundamentally indeterministic picture, including the arresting phrase displayed in my title:

Correspondence with laws of reason does not belong among appearances, nor can the transition [Übergang] from sensibility to reason in regress be observed; rather, as far as observation goes, everything occurs by means of sensible incitements, through which the action is determined. (R 5617)

It should by now be clear what Kant means when he speaks of a “transition in regressus” between sensibility and reason. In the limit, we might say, determination by causes yields to reason’s self-determination.  

III

Viewed from Kant’s transcendental idealist standpoint, how satisfactory is this mixture of determinism and indeterminism? After presenting the example of the drink, Kant immediately reminds himself of the status of the causal principle to which he has been appealing:

not even be discrete. This difference between Kant and Belnap finds expression in their respective requirements of causal determination a posteriori. On Belnap’s account, “to put the matter in pseudo-epistemic terms, if you know the entire proper past of a point event, then you know what will happen next” (“Branching Space-Time,” p. 429 [my emphasis]). There is no requirement that the event be thus necessitated by any particular prior state, as there is in Kant’s version (and that of Łukasiewicz as well).

While I have presented several passages that appear intelligible only in the light of the reading here proposed, the Reflexionen do contain two remarks this reading renders puzzling. Rather than characterize the phenomenal determinants of our behavior as “incitements,” as he typically here does, Kant twice refers to them as actions. Once the claim is explicit: “Each action as an appearance has its determining ground in another positive or negative action of mine, this one in turn in another, and so to infinity” (R 5613). And even in R 5619, a natural reading has Kant implying that every action is “determined by means of a preceding one.” This would entail that each action’s finite “interval of no turning back” contains an infinite number of temporally successive actions or refrainings, concerning which independent intervention by the will would not be possible.

Hudson observes that views of the type we have found in the Reflexionen would need to be ruled out before one could infer from Kant’s “causal principle” that every event has a prior determining cause to a stronger “causal determinism,” i.e. from (1) to (2). Disavowing any suggestion that Kant concerned himself with this issue, he sketches a transcendental argument that Kant should have given against such an account had it ever occurred to him (Kant’s Compatibilism, pp. 114–5, 146–7). In what follows, I show not only that statements in the first Critique really do rule out the Reflexionen account, but that comments in R 5616 reveal that Kant was aware of the very considerations Hudson adduces. Although the theory of the Reflexionen is ultimately incompatible with Kant’s transcendental commitments, this paper could be viewed as a qualification of Roman Ingarden’s claim that transcendental idealism prevented Kant from “even undertaking an attempt” at an elucidation of free choices “in terms of the causal structure of the world” (Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt, vol. 3 of Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1974), p. 4).
The law of cause and effect (causalitatis) rests on the condition of the possibility of a unity of experience. (R 5616)

This, of course, is the upshot of his transcendental argument in the Second Analogy: without the “a priori unity” reflected in the causal principle, “no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience would be possible” (KrV A 216/B 263). But while the nature of that argument remains a notorious matter of controversy, Kant’s summary of the Analogies suggests that he takes it to yield a principle of determinism stronger than (1). Their conclusion is said to be that “all appearances lie in one nature,” where nature is defined as “the connection of appearances, with respect to their existence, in accordance with necessary rules, i.e. with laws” (ibid.). While there might be other structures of causal determination that would in some sense ensure the connection of all appearances according to laws, it should already be plausible that Kant views his argument from the unity of experience as establishing principle (2), the strong brand of determinism denied in the Reflexionen.

This hypothesis would explain why R 5616 continues with a frank concession that the account of an action’s contingency Kant has just outlined conflicts with the unity of experience for beings whose will is affected by sensuous motives, beings for whom objectively necessary actions remain subjectively contingent:

This unity cannot fully obtain in the case of free beings [kann bei freien Wesen nicht völlig statthaben], except if they be fully intellectual. (R 5616)

Unfortunately, it is not easy to decide how Kant’s actual reasoning should be construed. Is he arguing that an event “can only obtain its determinate temporal position” (KrV A 198/B 243) relative to any prior event in virtue of their subsumption under a “universal rule” (A 200/B 245) of succession? Or is it merely that for any event, there must exist a prior state such that the determinacy of their mutual temporal relation presupposes such a rule? On the former construal, the Second Analogy argument supports a determinism as global as (2), while on the latter it supports only a corollary of (1), the “Principle of Production of the A-edition: “Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule” (A 189). Allison insists on the latter construal, according to which Kant’s argument “attempts to prove that the concept or schema of causality is a necessary condition of the experience of … an event, not that it is a condition for the ordering of distinct events” (Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 229). If we assume that the Reflexionen predate at least the B-edition, they may constitute evidence against this aspect of Allison’s reading. For here Kant explicitly recognizes a distinction whose possibility directly entails that the Second Analogy argument as construed by Allison would fail to establish a sufficiently thoroughgoing applicability of the schema of causality to experience.

The distinction between beings for whom “reason inevitably determines the will” and those for whom “the will is not in itself conformable to reason” is articulated in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Ak. 4: pp. 412–3); see also R 5613. In the sentence displayed above, Kant should not be understood as implying that “fully intellectual” beings enjoy “experience.” His point seems to be that the subjective contingency that, on the account being entertained, compromises the unity of our (empirical) thought does not pertain to fully intellectual beings, and therefore cannot be viewed as compromising the unity of such a being’s (non-empirical) thought. Kant stresses that “one cannot say that the contrary of
Since however the absolute unity of our own experience is an essential presupposition in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, this observation would suffice to explain why the indeterminism of the *Reflexionen* is not advocated here.\(^{21}\) In particular, phenomenal indeterminism contradicts Kant’s claim that the understanding sees to it “not to admit anything in the empirical synthesis that could interfere with or detract from … the continuous connection [kontinuierlicher Zusammenhang] of all appearances” (KrV A 229/B 282):

If there is free will, then the appearances of rational beings constitute no continuum, except in the case of firm principles of the understanding. (R 5616)\(^{22}\)

Admittedly, the account of the *Reflexionen* implies neither a gap (hiatus) nor a leap (saltus, an alteration in magnitude without intermediate states), and thus does not strictly violate the version of Leibniz’s “principle of continuity” programmatically defended at KrV A 228–9/B 281. Nonetheless, in allowing causal series none of whose members are causally related to any state obtaining prior to some given instant, phenomenal indeterminism would preclude the “continual determination of all positions for the appearances in this [sc. one] time, by means of the series of causes and effects” (A 211/B 256). By failing to underwrite this “thoroughgoing [durchgangig] and necessary temporal determination of all existence within experience” (A 217/B 264), such a view would presumably threaten to replace experience of objects with a mere “subjective play of my imaginations” (A 201/B 247).\(^{23}\) And indeed, when Kant comes to treat of the causal pedigree of action in the resolution of the Third Antinomy, he specifies that all actions, viewed “as appearances,” cohere with the other appearances as “elements of a single series [einer einzigen Reihe] of the natural order” (A 539/B 567). It is freedom’s compatibility with determination a priori that from this point on remains the topic of Kant’s several published attempts at a “defense” (Gr 4: p. 459) of that transcendental idea.\(^{24}\)

all our actions must be subjectively possible, in order that we be free,” for that conditional fails in the case of “good actions” (R 5619). Rather, freedom only requires the possibility of doing otherwise when doing otherwise is objectively necessary (cf. R 5613, 5616). This circumstance never obtains for beings whose will is in itself conformable to reason.

\(^{21}\) See also KrV A 157–8/B 197–8; A 229–30/B 282). Kant’s discussion of the unity of experience in R 5616 is the sole passage I have cited from the *Reflexionen* that is left entirely unmentioned by Heimsoeth, who regards their account of freedom as of a piece with Kant’s “definitive” position as stated in the *Critique* (“Freiheit und Charakter,” pp. 123–4).

\(^{22}\) Contrast R 5378: “The world is no interruptum, but rather a continuum” (Ak. 18: p. 509). Kant again implies that in the exceptional case of a “perfect understanding” one can “know [such a being’s action] a priori” on the basis of its objective grounds (Ak. 17: p. 509).

\(^{23}\) Notwithstanding the difference between the indeterminism of the *Reflexionen* and that presented in the Third Antinomy’s thesis (where the causal principle is simply rejected, whence putative “laws of [nature] are incessantly altered through the influences of [freedom]”), the former variety should thus lie within the target range of Kant’s charge that indeterminism cannot provide for the distinction between experience and dreaming (KrV A 451/B 479).

\(^{24}\) I thank Nuel Belnap and Stephen Engstrom for their helpful comments.