

DETERMINISM

in Śramaṇic Traditions



Editors

Shrinetra Pandey

Sanjali Jain

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Theme of Cover:

The game of Snakes & Ladders is symbolic of a man's journey in life and is devoted into 84 numbered squares illustrated with the notions of karma and moksha. The ladders denote virtues such as faith, generosity, humility, and asceticism while the snakes represented vices such as anger, theft, lust, and greed. The last square represents the state of liberation. The ladders conveyed that virtues lead you to liberation and vices to a cycle of re-births. The number of ladders is less than the number of snakes, which means the path of virtue is much more difficult to tread, than a path of vice.

PREFACE

The human life and cosmic world are full of diversities. Every person tries to know these diversities. In this process of understanding these diversities, so many questions arise in the mind. One of the important questions is as how our life is regulated. Are we regulated by destiny or *niyati* or *prārabdha*? Or we are regulated by our own free will (*puruṣārtha*).

Fatalism, Determinism and Pre-determinism (*Niyativāda*) are the terms generally used interchangeably. Fatalism is a philosophical doctrine stressing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate. Determinism, in philosophy, implies that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes. Pre-determinism, a specific type of determinism, believes that every single event or effect is caused by an uninterrupted chain of events that goes back to the origin of the universe.

Jain, Bauddha and Ājīvaka belong to Śramaṇika tradition. Ājīvakas were firm believer of fatalism. But when we talk about *Niyati* as per Jain perspectives, there is doctrine of karma. According to karma theory, an individual's present condition is determined not by any absolute principle but by his own actions performed either in his past lives or in this life. By freely choosing the right course and following it faithfully, he could improve his destiny and ultimately win liberation. In accordance with their well-known doctrine of *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda*, they do not totally reject the doctrine of *Niyativāda*. In Sanmati tarka, Ācārya Siddhasena talks of five co-factors (*Pañcasamavāya*), the doctrine of *Kāla*, *Svabhāva*, *Niyati*, *Pūrvakṛta* and *Puruṣa*. Anyone these co-factors when taken singly is false but true when they are considered jointly.

Buddhist text Dīghanikāya talks of two types: (1) Theistic determinism (*issaranimmānahetu*), and (2) *Kammic* determinism (*pubbekatahetu*). Aṅguttara Nikāya says, "Don't blame me, it is the will of God" or inactivity, "What can I do? It's my past *kamma*." On the other hand, Buddhacarita points out that "If God is the cause of everything that happens, and then what is the use of human striving?" However, Buddha does not teach that we have complete freedom or that we are determined, but that our will is conditioned or limited to a greater or lesser extent.

It is against these śramaṇika expositions on Determinism/*Niyativāda*, International School for Jain Studies, New Delhi organized a 2-day International Seminar on ***Determinism in Śramaṇika Traditions (Particularly Jainism and Buddhism): Their Moral and Ethical Effects*** in collaboration with Mangalayatan University, Aligarh on 11th & 12th January, 2018. The seminar was organized at the newly built modern auditorium of Mangalayatan University.

The overall response from the academic community was very encouraging with 33 papers received from scholars and distinguished address by Pt. Dr. Hukam Chand Bharil, a strong

proponent of fatalism in Śramaṇa tradition and top academic management of the Mangalayatan University. The response was so overwhelming that 28 scholars could present their papers for discussions. We also had five papers which could not be presented in seminar but were distributed and informally discussed.

The proceedings of this seminar form the basis of this book in which ten papers, duly reviewed by academicians, are selected for printing. Appendix I is added to give a list of speakers, and their papers along with the papers which could not be presented. Appendix II gives the Bibliography for further reference by the readers.

We are also thankful to all the contributors of articles contained in this volume. We also thank the scholars who presented very good papers in this seminar but the same could not be included here due to management constraints.

Organizing this seminar was a mammoth task. During the course of organizing the seminar we incurred the debt of a number of people. We sincerely express our gratitude to all of them. I express my heartfelt thanks to Dr. Shugan C. Jain, Chairman International School for Jain Studies for his guidance and support to make this seminar academically rewarding and promote fraternity amongst scholars participating in the seminar. I also thank Brig. (Dr.) P. S. Siwach, Vice Chancellor Mangalayatan University for his guidance in different phases of organizing the seminar. My special thanks to Prof. Jayanti Lal Jain, (Dean, Humanities & Director-Centre for Philosophical Studies, Mangalayatan University, Aligarh) and his team for their outstanding contribution in organizing facilities at Mangalayatan University.

Thanks are also due to Ms. Sanjali Jain who accepted our request to edit this seminar transactions with me. Finally, I thank my colleagues at ISJS, Mr. Sushil Jana and Ms. Jyoti Pandey who presently did all word processing and electronic compiling of the seminar proceedings.

August 10, 2020

Shrinetra Pandey, PhD
Joint Director
International School for Jain Studies

ABOUT ORGANIZING INSTITUTIONS

Mangalayatan University (MU) is promoted by Acharya Kundkund Educational Society and Shri Pawan Jain, an eminent journalist, industrialist, philanthropist and dedicated to the cause of education. It has been established under "The Mangalayatan University, Uttar Pradesh Act, 2006" and notification issued on October 30, 2006, with the right to provide higher education and authorized to award degrees specified in UGC Act. The University is also a member of Association of Indian Universities (AIU). Programs offered by the University have regulatory approval by authorities like UGC, National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE), Bar Council of India (BCI), Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) and Council of Architecture (CoA).

The university offers higher education in the disciplines of Engineering, Biotechnology, Pharmacy, Business Management, journalism and Mass communication, Computer Application, Hospitality Management, Education and Research, Visual & Performing Art and Jain Philosophy. The faculty at MU consists of several highly qualified and motivated individuals from the IITs, NITs, foreign universities and other high-quality institutions. MU's vision is to give students from all kinds of backgrounds a quality educational experience leading to legitimately rewarding career opportunities.

It is ensured that the students acquire a strong sense of community responsibility thanks to the environment they live in, symbolized best by the grand Jain Temple on campus. With campus residents, the 72 acre lush green campus of MU sports a vibrant, energetic feel at all times. Some student initiatives like *Kadam* and *Parivartan* do stellar work in the nearby village areas in the fields of education, hygiene, health and environmental awareness. The Vision is to develop a spirit of inquisitive questioning, an ability to excel in the pressure of a fast-changing professional world and a desire to grow into a personality than a person, in an environment that fosters strong moral and ethical values, teamwork, community service and environmental consciousness. www.mangalayatan.in

International School for Jain Studies (ISJS) is a leading institution for academic studies of Jainism was setup in 2005. Its mission is to introduce academic studies of Jainism in the universities globally. So far 728 participants from 141 universities of 22 countries primarily from USA; 119 school teachers from 105 schools of USA have attended these programs. ISJS also conducts seminars, undertakes funded research projects, and publishes papers and books on various aspects of Jainism and its application and relevance in today's society. ISJS is associated with a number of universities and research organizations and leading scholars of Jainism globally.

The main objective of ISJS is to support a comprehensive, scholarly and experimental introduction of Jain academic studies in the universities around the world in general and North America in particular. Therefore, ISJS implements their programs by a process of careful screening of potential participants and faculty, well research curriculum, engaging participants in intensive academic studies, living in Jain hostels, enjoy Jain food, providing interactions with Jain laity and monks, observe and participate in rituals and pilgrimage to make it a lived Jain experience. www.isjs.in

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Determinism, Free Will and Morality: A Jain Perspective

Jinesh R. Sheth*

The problem of determinism and free-will has occupied the minds of philosophers for centuries. From one side, it is argued that since all the actions are causally determined, the belief that one is free is an illusion; from the other side, it is argued that since one knows that one is free and that one could have acted otherwise, universal determinism is false. The problem of moral responsibility is another issue that requires separate treatment.

Omniscience and determinism (*niyativāda*) are related in such a way that the former logically implies the latter, though it may not be *vice versa*. The answer to whether the Jain thinkers agree with determinism would be positive, given the fact that omniscience is strongly defended by them.¹ The task at hand is to then look for the consistency amongst the three – determinism, free-will and moral responsibility – within the theoretical framework provided by the Jains. Accounting for this consistency is one amongst the many unresolved problems in philosophy even today, which is what will be undertaken in this paper.

The paper is divided into three parts – the first part deals with the Jain account of *niyativāda* with reference to its position on omniscience, karma and *paryāya*. The second part discusses free-will and how Jain thinkers are able to accommodate both determinism and free-will. The third part will then talk of moral responsibility in line with the above two.

Niyativāda in relation to Omniscience, Karma and Paryāya

Determinism is a philosophical position according to which all events are certain and that nothing can prevent them from happening at that particular instance of time. Due to diverse motives and considerations, there have been many versions of deterministic theories in the philosophical tradition – ontological, theological, physical, logical, psychological and ethical.

Against any form of determinism, the general argument which is put forth is summed up in the ‘idle argument’ which was articulated by Greek thinkers. According to Diodorus, there is no point in any man’s taking of any precautions or making preparation. The argument runs as follows: if, for instance, a man is ill, then it follows from Diodorus’s principle, that he is either going to recover or he is not going to recover. If he is going to recover, then he will eventually recover whether or not he summons a physician; similarly, if he is going to perish, then he will perish whether or not he summons a physician. Hence, there is no point in his summoning a physician in either case because the outcome is already inevitable. However, Chrysippus came up with a brilliant reply with the theory of co-destined facts – facts whose truths are dependent upon one another.²

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Thus, there is not only a temporal precedence of one cause over the other but also a logical connection between them. It also implies that there can be multiple causes in origination of one particular event. So, if the man is going to recover, it is also fated that he will see a physician and if he is going to perish, it is also fated that he will fail to see a physician. The five-fold causal theory (*pañca samavāya*) speaks exactly in similar fashion – an event or an effect always has multiple causes which are mutually dependent on each other for their being true. Ācārya Siddhasena discusses about them in his *Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa*:

‘To exclusively consider only one of the five – time, nature, destiny, instrument and effort – as the cause of the origination of an event is perverse belief and to regard the mass of all those as the cause of origination of an event is right belief.’³

Amongst these five, the instrumental cause is extrinsic in nature, while the remaining four are intrinsic or inherent in nature. A cause will be called a cause if and only if it is in harmony with the other four and thereby leading to a particular effect. There might be a difference of emphasis since all cannot be accounted together, a limitation of language, but none can be disregarded. Thus, even though *niyati* is one amongst many causes leading to the origination of an event, so is *puruṣārtha*.

Two of these will now be examined further from the Jain perspective in a theological manner, with reference to omniscience and in a metaphysical manner, with reference to karma and *paryāya*.

Theological Determinism

Omniscience, as defined in the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, refers to the knowledge of all the substances and their modifications – past, present and future.⁴ The fact that future events are foreknown by the omniscient being implies unconditionally, that they are not contingent; for they could have been known if and only if they were certain. This entailment, however, does not imply that the future events are caused by the omniscient being’s ability to know them. Neither the knowledge of the omniscient being is seen as a prediction of events; nor is it the case that the omniscient being wills for some particular events to happen in future. Both are independent of each other and as the saying goes – a sign shows that to which it points without thereby producing it; knowledge of an event thus cannot be the cause of its occurrence. Yet, there still remains a logical connection between the knowledge of future events and their being certain. Therefore, even if foreknowledge is not the cause of those things that are foreknown, it nonetheless renders them certainty and thereby the inevitability. The argument goes as follows:

- a. An omniscient being, say *A*, foreknows that *S* will do *P* at a particular instance of time.
- b. For *A*’s knowledge to be true, it is necessary that *S* must do *P* at that particular instance of time.

- c. If *S* does not do *P*, it follows that *A*'s knowledge that *S* will do *P* is false and hence *A* is not an omniscient being.
- d. And, if it is granted that *A* is an omniscient being, it inevitably follows that the future events are also determined and will inevitably occur at those particular instances of time.

As Richard says, "The extension of this [omniscience] thought to all actions of all men leads quite naturally to the view that no man's action are ever free or that nothing any man ever does was avoidable, it having always been true that he was going to do what he eventually did."⁵ Although this argument may not prove omniscience itself, it does prove that if omniscience is granted, determinism is a necessary corollary of it. We may refer to it as theological determinism, as it is based on divine omniscience. Whether such type of determinism is 'soft' or 'hard' and whether it issues any threats to free-will are some other questions which will be discussed in the second section.

Metaphysical Determinism

There are two notions through which determinism will be discussed – one is *karma* and the other one is that of *paryāya* (modification of a substance).⁶

In the karma theory, unlike the other systems where it is usually seen as a law of moral retribution, it must be noted that, here, karma is conceived as a physical matter.⁷ The *Siddhas* have become free from all types of *karmas* and hence, they are not subject to any karmic fruition. One must remember that karma is an extrinsic cause amongst the five causes that we had discussed earlier. Nevertheless, it still has a strong influence on the actions of the soul and whether it will attain liberation, for *mokṣa* is defined as "an absence of the causes of bondage and on account of *nirjarā* there takes place an utter annihilation of *karmas*. The annihilation of all *karmas* – that is called *mokṣa*."⁸ The *karma* theory, on one hand, can lead to a straightforward causal determinism given the fact that each and every action of the soul is an outcome of the fruition of past karma; whereas, on the other hand, due to its own subtleties and various nuances, one can also entail that it does not lead to complete fatalism.

The Jain thinkers have systematised the *karma* doctrine to such an extent that it is possible for them to account for every disposition in a soul with its corresponding *karma*, albeit with one exception, *jñāna*.⁹ So whether it is the soul's attainment of the three jewels; miserable suffering in the world while going from one phase of life to another; or any other activity – in all of them, karma plays a vital role.

Coming to the notion of *paryāya*, which represents the changing aspect of reality, there is a scope for determinism which is neither theological nor causal. The origination and cessation of a modification happening at every instance of time is in a particular sequence which is determined by the thing itself. The substance cannot be without a modification for any given instance nor is it the case that a new modification originates without the destruction of the

previous one. However, the change cannot be so radical that a *jīva* will get transformed into an *ajīva*. As said by Amṛtacandra in his commentary of verse 308 in *Samayasāra*;

“Whatever is produced by the direct self-manifestation of *jīva*, the living being, is also of the nature of living being, and cannot be a non-living thing. In the same manner whatever is produced by the direct manifestation of the non-living material must also be of the nature of the non-living material, and cannot certainly be of the nature of living being.”¹⁰

The term *kramaniyamita* suggests that the sequence of modifications cannot occur by chance. This is again proved by Amṛtacandra in his commentary on one of the verse in *Pravacanasāra* with the example of a necklace;

“As in the case of a hanging necklace of pearls, of definite length, the threefoldness [origination, destruction and stability] is obvious, because, whilst all the pearls are visible each in its place, each subsequent pearl arises (before our perception) in a subsequent place, each precedent pearl does not arise in the subsequent place, [and] the whole necklace, which strings-them-together by means of a mutual stringing together, is present in all their places; in the same manner in the case of a substance, developing with definite eternal activity (*vr̥tti*), the threefoldness is obvious, because, whilst all the evolutions are visible each in its own point-of-time, each subsequent evolution arises in a subsequent point-of-time, each precedent evolution does not arise in the subsequent point-of-time, [and] the whole process (*pravāha*), which strings-them-together by means of a mutual stringing together, is present in all their points-of-time.”¹¹

It is clear that each modification in its own time is born in its own shape, destroys its own previous form and continuity of modifications being there, every modification retains its own shape. From the example of the necklace of pearls, just as the location of the pearls is fixed in the necklace, the time of appearance of the pearls in the looming necklace is also fixed. Every modification takes place in its time only.¹²

Co-existence of Free-will and Determinism in Jainism

It is generally observed that any form of determinism poses challenge to the doctrine of free-will, the capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action among various alternatives.¹³ Much of the debate about free-will revolves around whether we have it. It also depends on how one defines freedom. Philosophers are widely divided over which sort of action could be called ‘free’ and they have debated over this question for about two millennia and almost every major philosopher had something to say about it.¹⁴

Free-will cannot be always equated with the statement that the person is free if and only if he could have acted otherwise; this phrase is rather misleading and deceptive. Although it has been argued that ‘he could have acted otherwise’ is inconsistent with determinism, one must reconsider the very notion of freedom itself. As Richard points out, “Hobbes dismissed the question whether men’s wills are free as ‘improper’ or meaningless. Generations of philosophers, while for the most part rejecting Hobbes’s materialism, have nevertheless

followed him in this and in his conception of liberty. His concept of free and voluntary behaviour is nothing but an unconstrained and unimpeded behaviour that is caused by an act of will, a motive, or some other inner event. In the twentieth century, Moritz Schlick, A. J. Ayer, and many others made the point that freedom is not opposed to causation but to constraint.”¹⁵

In the Indian tradition, although both the elements – fate and perseverance – have been recognised, it is not articulated in the form of a philosophical problem for some unknown reasons.¹⁶ In Jainism, Samantabhadra was perhaps the first one to explicitly deal with the problem, and with the help of *anekāntavāda*, he was able to argue for a position which can be called as close to ‘compatibilism’ against absolute reliance on fate, as well as on perseverance, he argues:

“If it is maintained that all attainment of desirable objects is due to fate, then the question arises how it somehow happens that perseverance creates (i.e., decisively influences) fate. And if it is replied that fate is always a creation of fate, it follows that a man should never attain liberation and that all of his endeavour should always prove futile. If it is maintained that all attainment of objects is due to perseverance, then the question arises how it sometimes happens that fate creates perseverance. And if it is replied that perseverance is always a creation of perseverance, it follows that the endeavour of all people should always prove a success.”¹⁷

These arguments against absolute reliance on fate, on one hand, and absolute reliance on perseverance, on the other, are one step towards articulating the Jaina position. This neither proves that fatalism is false, nor it is the opposite; what it does prove is that absolute fatalism is false and so is absolute reliance on perseverance. So, the emphasis here is more on avoiding absolute non-relativistic positions. Against these two exclusive and absolute positions, Samantabhadra argues for the Jain position:

“The happy and unhappy circumstances available to one that involve no premeditation on one’s part are said to be due to one’s fate; (whereas) the happy and unhappy circumstances available to one that involves a pre-meditation on one’s part are said to be due to one’s perseverance.”¹⁸

Buddhipūrvaka and *abuddhipūrvaka*, with premeditation and without premeditation respectively, hold the key to this entire debate. What it seems to convey is that it is completely subjective to call a particular event as occurring due to fate or due to perseverance. For instance, if a person intends or premeditates to have a glass of water and eventually gets one, Samantabhadra would like to call it as an act of perseverance; whereas, on the other hand, if a person does not premeditate upon having a glass of water and still ends up drinking a glass of water, it would be called as an act of fate. In a way, this solves the problem when one analyses an event by taking into consideration the criteria of ‘premeditation’. The message is that one can always take care of what one can and cannot premeditate upon. To put it in other terms, in cases where one has premeditated for a particular act to happen at a given instance of time, it is compatible with the oft-quoted

phrase – ‘could have acted otherwise’ – supporting free-will; whereas, on the other hand, cases wherein one did not premeditate, it can be referred as an event where one ‘could not have acted otherwise’ – supporting determinism.

Moral Responsibility in relation to Free-Will and Determinism

The notion of free-will also has many repercussions on the problem of moral responsibility; the central question being whether individuals are ever morally responsible for their actions and, if so, in what sense. It is indeed difficult to hold someone morally responsible if the act was not free from any external constraints or if it was not voluntary and thus determinism is cited as an excuse for not being morally responsible. To give an example, suppose a man is often motivated to steal and in accordance with determinism, he always does steal when his efforts to do so are unobstructed. But, according to determinist theories, he couldn’t have acted otherwise. It follows that he cannot help being whatever he is. And thus, it is difficult to hold that man morally responsible for his act of stealing. Intention then seems to play a vital role, for it is quite possible that the man never intended to steal and yet, due to some psychological or neurological disorders, he couldn’t help himself from stealing. The man cannot be held morally responsible for the act then. We come across one aphorism in the sixth chapter of *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, which talks about the variation in bondage caused due to intention;

“Influx is differentiated on the basis of intensity (acute or mild) of thought-activity, intentional or unintentional nature of action, the substratum and its peculiar potency.”¹⁹

Intention, thus, plays a key role in determining whether the agent could be held morally responsible for any activity. Further, while discussing about the substratum related to *karmic* bondage, it is *jīva* and *ajīva*.²⁰ What is worth noticing is that this intention has been extended to such levels that even an approval/praise of a thing which was done by someone else attracts *karmic* bondage on the part of the one who had approved that activity.²¹

Moreover, when determinism is cited as a refuge from one’s moral commitments and responsibilities, it is not applied in totality. So, in cases where the person just wants to escape and get away, determinism becomes true; whereas, on the other hand, when that same person wants to achieve something or is aspiring for a goal which he/she really wants to accomplish, determinism is nowhere near to the discussion. In one of the *ślokas* in Amṛtacandra’s *Ātmakhyāti*, it is said –

“Those *jīvas*, who regard the alien substance as absolutely responsible for the evolution of passions, like attachment, are devoid of right faith and are blind witted, being so, they are incapable of crossing the river of delusion.”²²

What is surprising is that this verse and the quotations supporting determinism (as stated in the earlier section on metaphysical determinism) are from the pen of the same author albeit in different contexts. This certainly means that he wanted to maintain determinism and at the

same time speak of *jīva* being morally responsible for his acts. This cannot be possible without the help of different standpoints.

There is causal determinism as far as *karma* theory is concerned; there is theological determinism when we take into account the omniscience of God; and there is metaphysical determinism in terms of the Jain position on changing aspect of reality, the modification of a substance. In a way, there is determinism everywhere. But, as *anekāntavāda* would not allow us to take an absolute stand on this problem, there is scope for free-will as well, albeit in a different sense – it cannot grant contingency to the future events. Some might object that this is relativism, which is not giving any certain answers and also not what they were looking for, to which one could argue that it is relativism, no doubt, but of a different kind. There is a hint of certainty in each and every relative truth. It is relative insofar as it does not seek to repudiate the other aspects of the reality; it is certain of the particular viewpoint.²³

The argument given by Samantabhadra which is based on subjective criteria might not be as appealing as his other arguments in the text. One needs to closely examine Samantabhadra's other works like *Svayambhū Stotra*, *Stuti Vidyā*, *Ratnakaraṇḍa Śrāvakācāra*, to find a clue as to whether he has given any arguments from the objective point of view in support of either or both the positions. Nevertheless, it once again motivates mankind to reconsider the problem of free-will and see whether it is a problem at all – a trend more common among philosophers in the last few decades. Samantabhadra's argument from the subjective point of view attempts to dissolve the problem rather than assume that there is a problem and try to solve it. It can be said that the Jain position is quite close to the widely held view of compatibilism, wherein free-will is said to be compatible with determinism and that neither of them are absolutely true or false.

References

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- ¹ Jainism, as a system, is based on the teachings of the omniscient being. It is but obvious that the very possibility of omniscience and its presence in the Arhats needs to be thus proved rigorously. This also justifies it being called an exegetical school, though not exclusively. *Pravacanasāra* (book I) of Ācārya Kundakunda was perhaps the first philosophical text in the tradition to give a proof of omniscience. Later on, Ācārya Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* was another significant text wherein arguments are found for the possibility of omniscience, in general, and its existence in Arhats, in particular (verses 5-6). Moreover, the commentaries of Akalaṅkadeva and Vidyānanda, viz., *Aṣṭaśatī* and *Aṣṭasaḥaṣṭī*, especially the latter, discussed at length omniscience while commenting on those verses. Ācārya Prabhācandra, in his *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa*, a commentary on Ācārya Māṅikyanandi's *Parikṣāmukhaṃ*, offered as well quite a few interesting arguments for omniscience while discussing about *mukhya pratyakṣa* in the second chapter. Ācārya Malliṣeṇasūri, in his *Syādvāda Mañjarī*, also deals with the problem in the commentary on the first verse (see Thomas, F. (Trans.). *Syādvāda Mañjarī: a commentary by Ācārya Malliṣeṇasūri on Ācārya Hemacandra's Anyayoga-vyavacchedikā*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1968.). The list is endless and it is clearly evident how important this doctrine has been to Jain thinkers throughout history. For a more detailed study on the Jain notion of omniscience, arguments for its existence and some debates with other philosophical systems, see Singh, Ramjee. *Jaina Concept of Omniscience*. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1974. Print.
- ² Brochert, Donald M. Ed. "Determinism, A Historical Survey". *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2nd ed., Vol. 3.). New York: Thomson Gale, 2006: 4-23. Print.

- ³ *Kālo sahāva ṇiyaī puvvakayaṃ purisakāraṇegamītā/ Micchattāṃ te ceva u samāsao hoṃti sammattāṃ// Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa 3/53.*
- ⁴ *Sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya, Tattvārtha Sūtra 1/30.*
- ⁵ Taylor, R. “Determinism, A Historical Survey”. op.cit. 4-23.
- ⁶ According to Jainism, everything that is real must have the triple character of origination, cessation and at the same time, continuity or persistence. And that which lacks one or the other cannot be termed as real. The former two constitute the changing aspect of reality whereas continuity is an aspect representing permanence and thus the position permanence-cum-change. See Tattvārtha Sūtra, 5/29.
- ⁷ For a discussion and some good arguments on how something physical can make an impact on something which is not, see Jain, Jamnalal. Ed. *Moksha Marg Prakashak of Pt. Todarmal* (2nd Ed.), Bombay: Shri Kund-Kund Kahan Digamber Jain Tirth Suraksha Trust, 2005: 32-33.
- ⁸ Dixit, K. K. *Tattvārtha Sūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāti*. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. 2000: 56. Print.
- ⁹ Amongst the five *bhāvas* mentioned in *Tattvārtha Sūtra* (2/1), only the fifth one, *Pāriṇāmika bhāva*, is unrelated to *karma*; whereas all other *bhāvas* exactly correspond to the four types (and also sub-types) of *ghāti karma* (those which directly affect the soul). There is a difference between an ability to know and knowledge itself. Although there is one karma known as *jñānāvaraṇa*, it is related to how much a soul can know and not to whether it can know at all; for it is the differentia of the soul and it is quite obvious that it is not subjected to any kind of karma.
- ¹⁰ Chakravarty, A. Ed. *Ācārya Kundakunda’s Samayasāra*. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 2008: 414-415. Print.
- ¹¹ Thomas, F. Ed. *The Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda Ācārya: Together with the commentary, Tattva-dīpikā, by Amṛtacandra Sūri*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014: 74-75. Print.
- ¹² For a more detailed account on this, see: Jain, M. *Kramabaddha Paryāya of Hukam Chand Bharill*. Jaipur: Pandit Todarmal Smarak Trust, 1987: 36-39. Print.
- ¹³ O’Connor, Timothy. “Free Will”. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 7 January 2002. Web. 14 December 2017. <<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/>>.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Taylor, R. “Determinism, A Historical Survey”. op.citt. 4-23.
- ¹⁶ Every school of thought in Indian tradition talks of *puruṣārtha*. Thus one may not find discussion of free-will in terms of free-will but the doctrine of *puruṣārtha* obviously throws some light on it. Another reason might be that the problem was never at the centre stage in classical Indian philosophical debates. As the saying goes, *vādevādejāyatattvabodhah* – had it been accounted by one of the major thinkers who were at the helm of philosophical debates, there is no doubt that we might have seen a vast source of literature on the problem of free-will.
- ¹⁷ *Daivādevārthasiddhiśced daivaṃ pauraṣataḥ katham/ Daivataścedanirmokṣaḥ pauraṣam niṣphalaṃ bhavet// (88)*
Pauruṣādeva siddhiścet pauraṣam daivataḥ katham/ Pauruṣāccedamoghaṃ syāt sarvaprāṇiṣu pauraṣam// (89)
Shah, N. J. *Āptamīmāṃsā of Ācārya Samantabhadra*. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1999: 79-80. Print.
- ¹⁸ *Abuddhi-pūrvāpekṣāyāmiṣṭāniṣṭam svadaivataḥ/ Buddhipūrvavyapekṣāyāmiṣṭāniṣṭam svapauraṣāt// (91) Ibid, 80.*
- ¹⁹ “*Tivramandajñātābhāvavīryā dhikaraṇaviśeṣebhyastadviśeṣaḥ*” *Tattvārtha Sūtra 6/7.*
- ²⁰ “*Adhikaraṇam jīvājīvāḥ*” Ibid, 6/8.
- ²¹ “*Ādyaṃ samrambhasamārambhārambhayoga kṛtakāritānumatakaśāyaviśeṣaistristriṣcatu-ścaikaṣaḥ*” Ibid, 6/9.
- ²² *Rāga janmanimittatāmparadravyamevakalayanti ye tute/ Uttarantina hi mohavāhinīmśuddhabodhavidhurāndhabuddhayaḥ// Ātmakhyāti 221.*
- ²³ It is not the subject matter of this paper to deal with *anekāntavāda* in detail. However, *anekāntavāda* is not absolute non-absolutism. There have to be certain truths without which the system would collapse. See *Āptamīmāṃsā*, 108. (Shah, N. J. op.citt. 1999: 93.)