Self-Documentation as Counter-Discipline in the Ethical Works of Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault’s enduring contribution to philosophy is his argument that power is dispersed throughout society and present in every social relation. Foucault identifies a range of techniques by which power operates, including the architectural partitioning of space in schools, hospitals, and prisons to maximize order and visibility, the accompanying partitioning of time into regular, repeating intervals across which activities are distributed, and the training of the body with respect to such details as posture and gait. Techniques such as these, which Foucault associates with a particular exercise of power called discipline, produce the individuals that become objects of knowledge. One key aspect of discipline is writing, or more specifically, documentation. Foucault convincingly shows that documents, such as medical records, prison intake forms, and school transcripts, extend knowledge to the level of the individual and facilitate the training of each individual for future use. Foucault paints such a stark picture of documentation that one could be forgiven for reading him as a strict social determinist. Yet, while Foucault is certainly at pains to point out how techniques such as documentation shape people’s lives, he also finds in writing a way out from under the yoke of such determinism. In his later works, Foucault turns to ancient practices of self-writing, such as note taking and letters to friends, making the case that self-writing allows the writer to participate in her own constitution as an object of knowledge, and to exert a degree of control over her own disciplining. In other words, self-writing co-opts one of the very techniques that turn people into objects of knowledge, and opens up possibilities for living that outstrip those dictated by prevailing mechanisms of power.

The first part of this essay will develop Foucault’s arguments with regard to the function of documentation and writing in the disciplinary society. I will show that documentation not only constitutes the living as objects of knowledge and extends visibility to each individual, it also spatially extends the living. Documents become physical appendages of the living that, although separable from them, remain capable of affecting their lives. The second part will present a reading of one of Foucault’s essays on literature in which documentation can be seen to play a similar function. However, in this case the documentation in question is self-documentation, and it is undertaken in order to reveal the self to the self and shape the self in accordance with criteria decided upon independently of any bureaucratic or institutional functioning. The third part of this essay will develop what this earlier writing hints at and what becomes more explicit in Foucault’s later writing: the possibility that documentation, one of the very cornerstones of power, can also be a tool of freedom when taken over by the self in an endeavor to know and shape the self. Self-documentation is thus a sly means of resistance to disciplinary techniques, or a kind of counter-discipline.

I.

*Documents and Discipline*

My concern in this first section is the disciplinary force of documents. Thus I will not address the role documents play for the historian, but will stick to the role documents play for the disciplinarian. Of course, these roles are related, especially if one considers the organization of documents into series on different levels, and efforts to discern what is relevant and what is irrelevant from a mass of documentation. In fact, one might say that the historian is a type of disciplinarian, a disciplinarian of documents who shuffles them in to various zones of visibility. Nonetheless, here I am interested in how documents discipline the living, and not the other way around. For this reason I will focus my attention on Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*, especially those sections in which he makes his case for the disciplinary function of writing.

The genius of *Discipline and Punish* lies in its exposure of modernity’s emphasis on production and the ensuing move from punishments, which are detrimental to productive bodies, to discipline, which makes bodies more productive and thus amplifies rather than reduces overall productivity. One aim of disciplinary power is to bind people together into the most useful, productive groups possible. While group cohesion is certainly at stake in this project, uniformity alone cannot guarantee the utmost productivity. To achieve that, discipline “‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements—small, separate cells, organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments. Discipline ‘makes’ individuals.”[[1]](#footnote-1) In other words, a living mass with productive potential needs to be broken down into smaller units who are then organized in accordance with the standards of the group and the production to be met. They are individuated and, in training, addressed as individuals, while remaining part of a larger social mass.

Three keys to this process are observation, normalizing judgments, and the examination.[[2]](#footnote-2) Observation makes each individual visible and allows adjustments and corrections in training to be made at this granular level. Observation is effective only if it is coupled with a standard of comparison, the “normal” or “norm,” against which each observed individual is evaluated. The examination combines observation and normalizing judgments into a single technique that allows individuals to be classified and made into objects of knowledge.[[3]](#footnote-3) In order to have this force, the examination has to be more than a ritual. It cannot be, for instance, a single observation and correction, or even an ongoing series of observations and corrections that are forgotten as soon as they are repeated, lest the same correction be repeated *ad infinitum*. If individuals are to be known, known as individuals, and if they are going to be subjected to cumulative training, they will have to be *recorded*. The examination fulfills this function because it “leaves behind it a whole meticulous archive constituted in terms of bodies and days.”[[4]](#footnote-4) With the creation of this archive, the examination brings to a culmination the constitution of individuals as objects of knowledge because they can now be seen and judged as well astraced in time and mapped spatially.

The technology that the examination leans on most heavily is writing. Specifically, it takes its cue from the kind of bureaucratic writing already found in armies, hospitals, and schools. These forms of writing allow armies to track down deserters, for example, and allow hospitals to track the spread of diseases.[[5]](#footnote-5) These forms of writing thus constitute the archive, both in the ancient sense of record keeping, and, although in a manner probably less present to the minds of those taking notes in armies and hospitals, in the sense that Foucault means archive, or that which defines the system of the sayable.[[6]](#footnote-6) These notes form a record of the makeup of armies and the patients in hospitals, and they make possible certain specific statements, such as whose troops moved where, or what course an illness is likely to follow.

Disciplinary writing adapts these archival modes of writing to new purposes. As Foucault puts it, disciplinary writing makes “it possible to integrate individual data into cumulative systems in such a way that they (are) not lost; so to arrange things that an individual (can) be located in the general register.”[[7]](#footnote-7) That is, disciplinary writing adds a new valence to the value of the archive while not abandoning its fundamental archival nature. In addition to making possible statements about troop movements or disease, it makes possible statements about individuals that circulate alongside and within statements about broader phenomena.

One way of describing this evolution of the function of the archive is in terms of *documentation*. Documentation is a hallmark of late modernity. Paul Otlet is widely considered the father and first proselytizer of “documentation,” which became information science, in Europe. His 1934 work, *Traité de documentation: Le livre sur le livre: Theorié et pratique*, preaches collecting and cataloguing an encyclopedia of facts, down to the atomic level, which he thought would lead to world peace.[[8]](#footnote-8) In the United States, the word “documentation” appears in English for the first time with the founding of the American Documentation Institute in 1937, an organization aligned with Otlet’s utopian aims.[[9]](#footnote-9) This early push toward documentation primarily sought to carry the idea of the public archive to its limit, but it also exposed the possibility of enlisting documents as agents. Whereas for Otlet documentation is a resource for settling disputes over facts, later “documentalists,” such as Suzanne Briet came to see more clearly the document’s potential as “a resource for industrial, ‘scientific’ production.”[[10]](#footnote-10) Indeed, the distinguishing feature of the document today has less to do with its medium and more to do with its use. As Lisa Gitelman writes in her book, *Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents*, “Any object can be a thing, but once it is framed as or entered into evidence—once it is *mobilized*—it becomes a document.”[[11]](#footnote-11) With the advent of documentation the archive is extended to cover the more and more granular, and mobilized specifically to increase production.

In order to be mobilized, documents need to be easily accessible. To this end, Otlet developed an 18 million item bibliography called the Répertoire bibliographique universal, and adapted the Dewey Decimal Classification system into a system he called the Universal Decimal Classification system in order to organize his bibliography.[[12]](#footnote-12) Not only did documentalists seek to collect a mass of documents that ostensibly represented the world down the atomic level, they also strove to make any document available with a quick search. Each document was itself documented, in other words, and classified according to a system that could make any document stand out depending on the purpose at hand. This emphasis on visibility and retrieval was an outgrowth of an earlier concern for accessibility and visibility in libraries. The British Museum Reading Room, which opened in 1857, employed a panoptic design, with a raised central area for the staff and reading spaces radiating star-like toward circular walls.[[13]](#footnote-13) Surveillance of readers and openness of information were conflated in this design. If anything, though, that conflation was only deepened with the development of the Dewey Decimal Classification system and others like it. As documents proliferated about the living, such classification systems increased panoptic penetration.

As Carol A. Heimer notes in “Conceiving Children: How Documents Support Case versus Biographical Analysis,” “The archives of a hospital are usually opened only if the patient becomes a legal case, a ‘mistake’ to be reviewed, or a ‘subject’ in research.”[[14]](#footnote-14) Indeed, the development of the examination, the spread of documentation, and the development of granular classification methods combined to produce the “case,” or “the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.”[[15]](#footnote-15) The mobilization of documents for the purposes of production means both the fixing of the individual in written, standardized terms developed according to different parameters (whether they be those of health, fitness for a certain task, mental aptitude for a certain position, etc.) and the ability to single out any individual for comparison to other individuals or groups or for study in a variety of contexts. The fact that the medical archive becomes useful only for such research, or to address mistakes at the level of the individual patient, highlights its function of extending visibility to the individual. On the one hand, the medical “mistake” can be compared to other individual cases, both those that were not mistakes, so the case can be corrected, and similar “mistakes,” forming a new group to be studied. On the other hand, even research that is concerned with broader trends across the species takes the individual as its base unit, requiring a certain number of cases to reach statistical significance. Either way, documenting individuals, and the organization and classification of the resulting documents in such a way that makes possible their individual retrieval, completes the reach of the panopticon. Now, anyone may be seen at any time in documentary form.

If the proliferation of documents about the living creates individual objects of knowledge, documentation also achieves a doubling of the living in space. Now the person exists where their body is *and* in the archive, or distributed across many archives, as the case may be (with the increasing connection of different archives, it may soon be unnecessary to distinguish between them, Otlet’s vision having more or less been achieved). Foucault characterizes documentation as the “turning of real lives into writing…(which) functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection.”[[16]](#footnote-16) As we have seen, this statement can be read as a statement of the method by which disciplinary power constitutes individuals in order to treat them as objects of discourse. That is certainly a correct reading, but this can’t happen unless real lives *are turned into* writing. That is, writing makes real lives become documents. The living continue to live, but documentation adds to lives a new appendage, a new physical dimension that becomes part of the life of the living. Documents take on lives of their own, furthermore, but they are lives that are reflected in the lives of the living people that they are about. The uses of documents for productive purposes, uses beyond the control of the living who have been documented, affect the lives of the living. The point might seem obvious, but it can be missed if one remains focused primarily on the epistemic function of documents. What I am saying is that documents have an ontological significance as well as an epistemological one, and that ontological significance has existential ramifications. Documentation is a procedure of objectification both epistemologically and ontologically, which is to say that documents turn lives into literal objects, not just objects for knowledge, but objects with their own ontological status.

If the panoptic character of the archive is to function properly, it must provide a view onto *actual* lives. Likewise, if documents are to have the fixing power that they apparently have, they must be strongly attached to the lives they describe. Foucault says as much when he says, “the individual is…a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’.”[[17]](#footnote-17) Indeed, the individual is a reality. Statements that circulate about individuals, statements made possible by documentation, are not pulled from thin air. They are not mere beliefs or opinions asserted without recourse to any game or ritual of truth. Rather, they may be true or false, but they are verifiable: the archive may be checked, statements evaluated accordingly, and the individuals in question seen. Individuals *are* the documents in the archive, and these documents are about the living. It is not a stretch, I think, to see documents as physical components of the lives in question. Documents about the living may be taken as extensions of living bodies.

II.

*Self-Writing in Fiction*

If I am correct about documentation, then the picture that Foucault paints in *Discipline and Punish* is certainly a pessimistic one. If documents aim to fix the living and open the living up to manipulation toward the end of increased production in a variety of contexts, and if documents are extensions of bodies, then what is at stake is nothing less than human bondage. The outlook is no less pessimistic where the possibilities of writing are concerned. Take, for example, “What is an Author?” In this essay, which Foucault writes just before turning his attention to power, he notes that writing no longer aims at expression, but “is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.”[[18]](#footnote-18) Despite the perseverance of the author function, Foucault looks forward to a time when “fiction and its polysemous texts will once again function according to another mode, but still with a system of constraint—one which will no longer be the author, but which will have to be determined, or, perhaps, experienced.”[[19]](#footnote-19) Unfortunately, it seems as though disciplinary techniques have surpassed the author function as the system of constraint that regulates texts. Of course, Foucault is concerned with fiction in “What is an Author?”, and disciplinary writing, at first glance, seems to be at a great remove from literary writing. Yet, as we have seen, disciplinary writing is a kind of fiction that has real effects; it produces reality. Furthermore, I have argued that disciplinary writing is a way of extending the object written about in space. If the writer writing fiction creates a space into which he may disappear, disciplinary writing likewise creates a space into which the person written about disappears, disappears as a subject, only to reappear as an object of knowledge. In other words, what Foucault saw as the promise of fiction, the emptying of subjectivity into the free play of language, gets turned on its head with the advent of disciplinary writing, so that at all times disciplinary power empties the subject, whether or not he writes, into language, only to fix him there more rigidly. The promise of writing becomes a trap.

I think Foucault’s discovery of writing’s role as a disciplinary technique accounts for the fact that he stops writing about fiction. It’s clear that Foucault sees in this period that language and writing are subject to the functioning of power, and that fiction does not provide the kind of escape of self that he hoped it might. However, in his writing on fiction, Foucault at times explores one way in which writing can function that veers very close to documentation. For example, in a lecture called “Why Did Sade Write?”, delivered in 1970 at the State University of New York at Buffalo, Foucault describes how writing can function as a practice of the self. He quotes a long passage from Sade’s *Juliette* in which Juliette addresses one of her friends. She counsels her friend to go two weeks without thinking any libertine thoughts. At the end of this time, the friend is to unleash all of her pent up fantasies, paying most attention to whichever one rivets her the most. She is then to write down this fantasy in great detail. The next day, she is to reread it and add to it whatever new comes to mind. After she has finished writing, Juliette tells her to carry out the fantasy.[[20]](#footnote-20) As Foucault points out, writing here becomes a tool for the development of some aspect of a person’s life, in this case a sexual fantasy. It serves its purpose by extending the imagination.[[21]](#footnote-21) That is, the writing of the fantasy quite literally extends the imagination into space. The written fantasy is the imagination in the form of *a document*. After having extended herself this way, the fantasist is then able to reconsider her own imagination, to make it an object of knowledge, and to discern in herself what needs *correcting* in order to live up to libertine standards of depravity. Thus writing here has a disciplinary function, but it is auto-disciplinary.

Self-documentation of this sort also has the effect of creating reality. In the Sade lecture, Foucault characterizes writing “as an intermediary element between the imaginary and the real.”[[22]](#footnote-22) Writing manifests the imaginary in space, fixing its particularities, allowing them to become known, and opening the imagination to training. More than this, according to Foucault, “the first function of writing…is to abolish the barrier between reality and imagination.”[[23]](#footnote-23) Writing and re-writing the fantasy organizes the life of the writer around the fantasy to the extent, Foucault thinks, that the work on the fantasy *becomes* reality. The command to carry out the fantasy no longer means executing it physically, or rather it means carrying it out *in writing*. The self-discipline of the libertine by means of writing makes the bodily accomplishment of the fantasy moot, the disciplining of the imagination having become an end in itself.

Foucault’s answer to the question “Why Did Sade Write?” previews many elements of what he later would call disciplinary writing, but it does so in a context wholly severed from economic production, and, indeed, any society whatsoever. Foucault himself notes that “Sade’s writing is an absolutely solitary writing.”[[24]](#footnote-24) In this asocial context it is no surprise that the training of the imagination comes to be an end in itself. However, writing’s function as self-discipline need not be restricted to such solitary endeavors. Foucault’s response to writing’s function as a disciplinary technique in the service of production is to retrieve writing’s potential as a communal discipline organized around shared standards, a function first articulated by the Greeks, and continued in ancient Roman life.

III.

*Self-Documentation in the Care of the Self*

The major theme of Foucault’s interest in ancient philosophy is the care of the self, or the mastery or perfecting of the self. The care of the self requires an *askēsis*, or a practice, exercise, or training of the self. It is to this end that ancient thinkers sought self-knowledge, so that the much vaunted “know thyself” is in fact only an aspect of a broader procedure of self-mastery. Writing plays a central role in both knowing the self and mastering the self. For instance, Socrates prescribes a regimen of self-observation in the *Memorabilia*. He says that one should monitor what one eats and drinks throughout one’s life, and also find out what kinds of exercise suit one’s constitution. Such self-observation should be accompanied by note-taking. Foucault summarizes Socrates’ position as, “To become an art of existence, good management of the body ought to include a setting down in writing carried out by the subject concerning himself.”[[25]](#footnote-25) It is not enough just to pay attention to what one eats, etc. Rather, to master oneself and to perfect how one should live, one should constitute oneself as an object of knowledge. In short, one should *document* oneself, noting daily what one eats, how much one eats, the results of various exercises, and so forth. These documents of the self can then be examined and compared later, helping one determine what regimens are the most successful in promoting health, and revealing where diet and exercise can be corrected and improved.

Socrates intends note-taking on the self in this manner to make one capable of governing oneself without the need for a master. However, learning the proper use of note-taking calls for a period of supervision. It is no coincidence that Socrates sounds like something of a doctor in advocating attention to one’s diet and exercise. Indeed, especially where the health of the body is concerned, Greek doctors would often play the role of master in relation to their patients. More than prescribing medicine, the doctor would “enter into conversation with the patient and gather information from him and his friends” and instruct the patient on techniques of living.[[26]](#footnote-26) Only after a period of instruction, then, would the striving self-master fully take over his own care. Moreover, this instruction did not have the character of the imposition of laws, but instead was something like the creation of a loose structure of shared ethical standards that each patient would fill in differently.[[27]](#footnote-27)

We are clearly far from the hospitals of the 19th, 20th, or 21st centuries, then. Nevertheless, some of the disciplinary techniques that came to define those institutions are already present in the ancient relationships that cultivated bodily health, although they function differently. As we have seen, the use of documentation in hospitals has the effect of creating individuals and extending panoptic vision to each “case.” When researchers open the hospital archive, they are able to compare each case to others alike and dislike. This information allows them to suggest corrections in the case of mistakes, or detect patterns in the natural history of an illness. So, although each individual is seen and becomes an object of knowledge, the use to which they are put aims at a kind of uniformity. Either a case in question is aberrant in some way and needs to be corrected and brought back into line with the mean, or each case can help complete a picture of a what happens during the course of a disease, so that treatment may become standardized.

Ancient medicine, too, creates cases and turns the living into objects of knowledge. Ancient doctors gather information about individuals just as hospital doctors do. However, the function of documentation in ancient medicine is radically different. Instead of opening up each case to comparison with other cases, ancient doctors facilitate each individual’s self comparison with a set of shared ethical standards. The individual’s participation in their own becoming-a-case is thus much richer, and the use to which they are put, as documented cases, is determined in conjunction with them. Furthermore, control of themselves, as documented cases, is eventually returned to them. So while ancient patients are constituted as objects of knowledge, they are not so constituted with an eye to returning them to a productive mean, but with the goal of helping them shape themselves to their own satisfaction.

Independent self-mastery need not mean the end of social engagement, either. In a remarkable passage from his 1981-1982 lecture series at the Collège de France, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Foucault describes one of Marcus Aurelius’ letters to his friend Fronto. In the letter, Aurelius recounts his daily routine. He includes details about how he clears his throat, what he eats, how he bathes, and how he reflects on the day before he goes to bed.[[28]](#footnote-28) In other words, he engages in the very kind of self-documentation that Socrates recommends. In this case, of course, he is doing so in a letter that will be sent to someone else to read. Foucault points out that the letter, written in the morning after the day that it describes, repeats the reflective task that Aurelius mentions completing before bed.[[29]](#footnote-29) In so doing he at once reflects again, and, to facilitate such reflection, makes himself an object of knowledge. In this respect, Marcus Aurelius resembles the aspiring libertine from *Juliette*. However, where the libertine writes her fantasy in order to privately discipline her imagination to the point that the question of reality becomes moot, Aurelius writes so that he may better shape himself according to a shared reality. The point of constituting himself as an object of knowledge *for Fronto* is to allow Fronto to see him in his routine and make suggestions that may help Aurelius better master himself.

The practice of writing letters to friends in which the writer documents himself and reveals himself to others is social because it requires at least two participants to work together toward a shared goal. It is social in the further sense, though, that letters like these, self-documents, manifest the self before another in a bodily way. If documents are extensions of the body, then a letter to a friend brings the writer before his friend physically. Such a letter has the effect of a face to face encounter. That is, it places a strong demand on the friend for a response, and it helps ensure that the first writer will heed the response. Seneca notes as much when he tells Lucilius, “When I send you a letter giving you advice, in a way it is as if I myself were coming to see you and check what you are doing.”[[30]](#footnote-30) Foucault calls correspondence “life under the both real and virtual eye of the other.”[[31]](#footnote-31) Letters can have an effect on the living akin to the watchful eye of the panopticon.

Yet letters to friends do not expose the writer to general panopticism in the way that modern documents do. First of all, friends are self-chosen, a fact that gives the letter writer say in who sees his documents, who sees him. This is important not least because those who see the writer will partially determine what corrections in regimen he makes. Since he is unlikely to write letters to people who maintain drastically different regimens than the one he strives to follow, he will receive instruction from those who adhere to a shared standard of self-care. In this way the letter writer is a participant in guiding his own training, unlike the prisoner or the soldier, who is subjected to a standard, universal regimen determined without his say.

Second, the letter writer documents himself, determining what to record about his life and what to leave out. Certainly the watchful eyes of his friends will not let him keep many secrets, but nonetheless he decides what details about his own life and health are important to record. He therefore plays a direct role in how he is constituted as an object of knowledge, unlike the aforementioned prisoner or soldier, who is documented, again, according to standards that apply to all others like him. Although documentation is a disciplinary tool in each case, after several rounds of documentation and correction it is difficult to imagine the letter writer having fashioned himself into anything resembling the soldier or prisoner. Because the latter are constituted as objects of knowledge from without, by forces that they do not control, forces that aim to shape them for productive purposes, they will become more or less interchangeable. Meanwhile, the letter writer who has a degree of control over how he is constituted as an objet of knowledge, and what kind of corrections he receives, may end up unrecognizable to the productive worker. Self-documentation, especially social self-documentation, usurps one of disciplinary power’s foremost techniques and employs it in clandestine communities that pursue ends other than economic production.

*Conclusion*

What I hope to have shown is that Foucault’s work, especially his later work, suggests a response to the very problem of disciplinary power that he so forcefully identifies earlier in his career. Disciplinary power operates by means of a variety of techniques that shape institutions and society. One of these techniques is documentation, a procedure that forms the living as objects of knowledge, manifests them in space, and extends visibility to each individual. This disciplinary writing appears to reverse the liberating possibility of fiction, understood as a space into which the subject may dissolve. Disciplinary writing does create a new space for the subject, but one that reconstitutes the subject as a bound object of knowledge bent toward production. All is not lost, though, if one considers that self-documentation may retrieve the possibility of fiction, albeit with disciplinary overtones. Of course, one can never escape the play of power/knowledge. Yet self-documentation allows the self to take over its own constitution as an object of knowledge, at least in certain contexts that are insulated from the institutional and the bureaucratic. Self-documentation, then, is one way in which new possibilities of thought may be explored, and new modes of living developed, as we continue to come to grips with the forces that shape us.

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1. Foucault 1995: 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ibid.: 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid.: 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid.: 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid.: 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Foucault 2010: 129 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Foucault 1995: 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Day 2001: 727. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Riles 2006: 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Day 2001: 728. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Gitelman 2014: 3 (my italics). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Day 2001: 727. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Joyce 1999: 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Heimer 2006: 117 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Foucault 1995: 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid.: 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid.: 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Foucault 2010: 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid.: 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Foucault 2015: 103-104. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid.: 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid.: 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Ibid.: 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid.: 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Foucault 1990: 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid.: 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid.: 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Foucault 2005: 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid.: 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Foucault 2011: 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid.: 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)