1. Awareness
   a. **Objects of ‘is aware of’:** particulars (aware of the cat), properties of particulars (aware of the stillness of the cat), events (aware of the entry of the cat), propositions (aware of the meaning of the sentence ‘some cats are immortal’), facts (aware of the fact that a cat is nearby), skills (aware of how to scare cats), phenomenal qualities (aware of what it’s like to pet a cat)
   b. **Factual awareness:** ‘S is aware of the fact that p’ = ‘S is aware that p’.

2. Factual Awareness & Knowledge: What they have in common…
   a. **Speech Acts:** Commonly used in acts of admonition, excuse, testimony, and criticism.
   b. **Factivity.** Necessarily, S is aware of the fact that p only if p.
   c. **Conceptual Requirements:** Factual awareness is conceptually demanding: you can be aware of the cat without having the concept CAT, but you cannot be aware of the fact that the cat is nearby without having the concept CAT. Propositional knowledge and factual awareness are, in these ways, alike.
   d. **Non-Accidentality Requirement:** Factual awareness has some kind of non-accidentality requirement. Suppose you took a pill that randomly induced the belief *that a clown just stumbled into a tree near your home.* Even if that turned out to be true, you would not be aware that it was true. (Being aware of a proposition, which happens to be true ≠ being aware that a proposition is true)
   e. **No Attention Requirement:** Factual Awareness does not require attention.
      i. You learned and have not forgotten that 2+2=4. It’s a fact you are now aware of. But you were aware of it even before I drew your attention to it just now.
      ii. You were aware of the fact *that this is a philosophy talk given in the USA* even though you were not attending to that fact before reading this sentence. And in a moment your attention to it will fade away.
   f. **Amodal Relation.** Factual awareness, like knowledge, is a relation that *does not specify how* one came to stand in the target factive relation, e.g. perceptually, visually, introspectively, by memory, etc. (Contrast: seeing that p, hearing that p, remembering that p, and being informed that p each of which indicates something about how one came to be in the target factive relation.)
   g. **Propositional knowledge entails factual awareness**
      i. (K→A) Propositional knowledge entails factual awareness. Necessarily, if S knows that p, then S is aware of the fact that p. (#She knows that he arrived, but she’s not aware of the fact that he arrived.)

3. Factual Awareness* Is Logically Weaker Than Propositional Knowledge (Chapter 5)
   a. **The Generalization Argument:**
      Premise 1. Knowledge is a kind of *non-accidental true belief.*
      Premise 2. Non-accidental true belief is a kind of *non-accidental true representation.*
Premise 3. There are more representational states than belief, e.g., seemings, inferential representations.

Premise 4. Representational states other than belief can stand in generalized non-accidentality relations to facts. (Safe representation that \( p \), reliably formed true representation that \( p \), etc.)

Conclusion. Knowledge is but one kind of non-accidental true representation.

b. Let ‘factual awareness*’ name the general state of non-accidental true representation reached via this generalization from the knowledge relation. Factual awareness* names a state that exists and is logically weaker than knowledge.

c. Observe: all the cases below of factual awareness that fall short of knowledge are cases of factual awareness*.

4. Factual Awareness Is Logically Weaker Than Propositional Knowledge

a. Factual awareness does not entail propositional knowledge

   i. No belief requirement on factual awareness, unlike knowledge.

   - A Note About Belief: S believes that \( p \) only if S has the dispositions to rely on \( p \) that are constitutive of believing that \( p \). Arguably these include: the disposition to assert \( p \), act on \( p \), and treat \( p \) as a premise in deliberation. Working Assumption: lacking all those dispositions ensures a lack of belief.

   - Inferential Beliefless Awareness: Suppose you’ve never considered \( p \) before, and thus have no belief that \( p \). Suppose you expertly deduce \( p \) from your knowledge that \( q \). \( p \) seems to follow from \( q \), but you’re very cautious, knowing that you sometimes make mistakes. So you triple check your work and only then come to believe \( p \). So you first become aware of the fact that the conclusion \( p \) is true, and then you believe the conclusion after triple checking. But you were aware of the fact that the conclusion is true before you believed it.

   - Proprioceptive Beliefless Awareness: Christopher Peacocke (2006: 360) “You can be aware that you are doing something without perceiving that you are doing it. If you have a strong injection in preparation for a root canal operation at the dentist, you may have no sensation in and around your mouth and your jaw. If you are asked to open your mouth, you can do so, and you will be aware that you are opening your mouth. … The content of your action-awareness is [the fact] that you are doing something. … The content of the action-awareness is representational in the sense that in enjoying action-awareness, it seems to the subject that the world is a certain way. This seeming is belief-independent. … In my view, action-awareness should not be identified with any kind of belief, whether first- or second-order.”
- **Visual Beliefless Awareness**: Barney knows what barns are and he knows how to identify them in normal visual circumstances. He’s currently driving through a region that is filled with structures that include all and only barns. However, Barney has been given *some reason to think he might be in fake barn country*—a region populated with lots of fake barns that look just like real barns from the roadside. But Barney has been assured he’s *very probably not in fake barn country*. Indeed, *he is not in fake barn country and he is looking directly at a barn*. And it *seems to him that* the object he’s looking at is a barn. But due to an overabundance of caution he withholds forming the belief that a barn is nearby because he is focusing overly much on the highly unlikely possibility that he is in fake barn country. Accordingly, *Barney sees that a barn is nearby but he does not believe it*. (Cf. McDowell 2002; Pritchard 2012; Turri 2010; Schroeder 2015; cf. Bernecker 2010 on remembering that p without believing that p)
  a. The Point:
  i. If you see that p or remember that p, then you are aware of the fact that p.
  ii. So, if neither seeing-that or remembering-that require belief, then neither does factual awareness.

ii. **No anti-luck requirement on factual awareness, unlike knowledge.**
- **Fake Barn Country.** Turri (2010), Pritchard (2012)Phil, McGlynn (2014), many others allow for *seeing that* in environmental luck cases. This ensures factual awareness in such cases, but not knowledge if knowledge has an anti-luck requirement. Turri (2010: 203): “Certainly [one] can still *see that* [and thus be *aware that*] a barn stands nearby, even if he lacks knowledge [due to environmental luck].”

- **Rarely Visiting Twin.** Craig and Brian are twins that Zenen cannot tell apart. Zenen lives only with Craig, he sees Craig every day, and Zenen only sees Brian–Craig’s twin–once each year as Brian lives in France. Zenen never knows in advance when Brian visits. Suppose Zenen looks directly at Craig in the house and then forms the belief that Craig is in the house. Unknown to either Craig or Zenen, Brian just arrived in a taxi and had Zenen been looking out the window (as he easily could have) he would have falsely believed Craig is not in the house. (Awareness Intuition: Zenen is aware of the fact that Craig is in the house, even though he could easily have formed a false belief about Craig’s location.)

iii. **No justification condition on factual awareness.** Factual awareness does not require ultima facie justification/having sufficient reason for belief, but knowledge requires this.

- Self-defeat cases one has insufficient reason to believe p, even though one is aware of the fact that p. ($S$ knows: $p \iff \neg S \text{bel}(p), \& S=\text{bel}(p)$).
- Strong misleading evidence cases. (Failing to Mislead Gödel: Gödel knows at t1 that A entails p via because he proved it expertly at t1. At t2 bad actors, that he has every reason to trust, provide strong evidence that he made a mistake. But he cannot shake his belief that A entails p.)

iv. (I) The Extension of Awareness. It is possible for S to be aware of the fact that p even if: S does not believe that p, or S lacks justification (=sufficient reasons) to believe that p, or S is beset by environmental luck. (Chapter 4)

b. Best Explanation of (I) and the fact that knowledge entails factual awareness:

i. (II) The Generality of Awareness. Factual awareness is a genus of which knowledge is but one species. (Chapter 5)

5. Concepts of Factual Awareness (Chapter 5)

a. Awareness Pluralism. For every state of non-accidental true representation, r, that constitutes factual awareness: r always does so in virtue of some non-accidentality condition, but not every non-accidentality condition is a requirement of knowledge.

b. Awareness Monism. For every state of non-accidental true representation, r, that constitutes factual awareness: r always does so in virtue of some non-accidentality condition c, and c is a non-accidentality requirement of knowledge.

c. Thick Awareness Monism. Knowledge and factual awareness share every non-accidentality requirement.

d. Thin Awareness Monism. Knowledge and factual awareness share some, but not all, non-accidentality requirements. (My preferred view.)

6. Awareness and Possessing Reasons (Chapter 6)

a. Reasons: reasons are facts (true propositions) that favor some response.

b. (III) Possession as Functional Factual Awareness. Necessarily, S possesses the fact that p as a reason for a response F iff S is in a position to be aware of the fact that p and S is reliably able to use p as a reason for F-ing.

7. Knowledge: Belief and Normativity

a. (IV) Belief Fundamentalism. The state of believing that p is fundamental to knowing that p (part of what it is to know that p is to believe that p) – (IV) is consistent with the concept of belief originating with our concept of knowledge. (IV) is the best explanation of the fact that knowledge entails belief and the practical value of knowledge, and counterarguments to (IV) are unconvincing. (Chapter 2)

b. (V) Knowledge Normativism. Part of what it is for S to know that p at t is for S to believe that p at t for sufficient reasons that S possesses at t. (Chapter 7)

i. Broadly Shared Intuition:: Plato, Descartes, Kant, Wittgenstein, standard skeptical assumption, C.I. Lewis, Sellars, Chisholm, McDowell, Dretske,
Schroeder, and many others treat it as a semantic truth that knowing that p constitutively depends on possessing sufficient reasons for believing that p.

ii. *Sosa’s Opposition*: cases of animal/basic knowledge are thought to be cases of “knowledge-constituting belief independent of reasons”. Response: really they’re just cases of knowledge-constituting belief without prior independent reasons. Cases of animal knowledge are just cases where one’s coming to know p at t coincides with one coming to have p at t as a reason to believe p at t.

iii. *Sylvan’s Opposition*: (III) Possession As Funct. Fact. Awareness allows us to avoid Kurt Sylvan metaphysical circularity puzzle:

- Knowledge is grounded in the possession of reasons (facts).
- The possession of reasons is grounded in knowledge.
- So the possession of reasons is grounded in the possession of reasons.
- There is a vicious regress lurking in this. Answer: observe that awareness is not a normative state: it does not depend on the possession of reasons, but, according to (III), awareness is a state that enables us to possess reasons without depending on them.

8. Constraints on the Accounts of the Nature of Knowledge and Awareness (Chapter 8)

   a. *(VI) The Virtue Insight*. Knowledge is owed to exercises of an agent’s sufficiently reliable cognitive abilities.

   b. *(VII) The Anti-Luck Insight*. Knowledge is incompatible with the kind of luck found in standard cases of environmental luck as well as standard lottery cases.


   d. *Avoiding the Safety Dilemma*: Anti-Luck Epistemologies struggle here: safety rules out knowledge in both Fake Barn and Frankfurt Barn. But there is knowledge in Frankfurt Barn.\(^1\)

   e. *Avoiding the Methodological Dilemma*: Explain why the folk and many philosophers accept knowledge in fake barn cases. But most epistemologists who publish on environmental luck hold that knowledge is absent in such cases. Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies struggle to explain this set of conflicting intuitions.

9. The Natures of Knowledge and Awareness (Chapter 9)

   a. **Guiding Question**: Conditional on (I)-(VII), what is the best theory of both factual awareness and knowledge?

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\(^1\) *Frankfurt Barn*. You’re remotely monitoring a region of the country via a satellite video feed at NASA. There’s a bet on whether you’ll believe you’re looking at a barn at 8:22. Your colleague is poised to hack the video feed and to insert an image of a fake barn into the video feed at 8:22 if you are not looking at a barn at 8:22. If your colleague hacks the video, she will not alter any other feature of the video feed, and adding the barn will only distort the small region of the video where the apparent barn appears. But, as it happens, you are looking at a real barn at 8:22, your video feed functions completely normally, and upon seeing the barn you form the belief that the object you’re looking at is a barn. Since you’re looking at a barn your colleague does not hack and alter the video feed. (Silva 2023; cf. Neta & Rohbaugh 2004, Kelp 2019)
b. The Extension of Awareness says that factual awareness does not require belief, justification, or the absence of luck. States of factual awareness are states of true representation. They require reliability and an absence of deviance. Factual awareness is incompatible with lesion cases and Temp cases. By inference to the best explanation we get:

i. **Factual Awareness: A Virtue Epistemology (FAVE):** What it is for S to be aware of the fact that p just is for S’s true representation that p to be owed to an exercise of S’s relevant and sufficiently reliable cognitive ability to form true representations. (For a circular non-reductive virtue theory, replace the italicized text with ‘to be aware of facts’.)

c. Knowledge Normativism says that knowledge is constitutively a state of justified belief, i.e. belief for sufficient reasons (=facts). So we need an account of this normative relation:

i. **Factually Justified Belief (FJB).** What it is for S to have a justified belief that p is for S to believe that p for sufficient reasons, where: S believes that p for sufficient reasons just in case: (i) S’s belief that p is owed to an exercise of S’s reliable ability to respond to reasons that S is factually aware of (and thus possesses), and (ii) those reasons provide S with sufficient reason to believe that p.

d. The Anti-Luck Insight: knowledge excludes luck.

i. **Knowledge: an Anti-luck Normative Theory (KANT).** What it is for S to know that p is for S to have a safe justified belief that p, i.e. S safely believes that p for sufficient reasons.

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<th>Table 9.1 Mapping examples of awareness-constituting beliefs</th>
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10. Improving on Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

a. **The Normativity of Knowledge.** Since knowledge requires factually justified belief according to KANT, knowledge is constitutively normative.

b. **Generic Generalization:** People who are aware of facts know them. **Normic Formulation:** It’s normally the case that if someone is aware of the fact that p, then they know that p.
(Perhaps this is better: in the most normal situations, if someone is aware of the fact that p and has their attention drawn to p, they know that p.)

c. *Answering the Safety Dilemma.* In Frankfurt Clock/Barn: there is no knowledge, but there is justified factual awareness. E.g. S is aware of the fact *that he's looking at a barn,* he believes it for that reason, and he has no reason to think that any funny business is going on. This is an awareness state that comes so close to knowledge (on the KANTian view) that we should expect mistakes in knowledge-ascriptions if people conflate factual awareness with knowledge.

d. *Answering the Methodological Dilemma:* same as above. In environmental luck cases S is aware of some fact p, S believes p for sufficient reasons, and S has no reason to think any funny business is going on. This is an awareness state that comes so close to knowledge (on the KANTian view) that we should expect mistakes in knowledge-ascriptions if people conflate factual awareness with knowledge.