God, Panentheism and Theistic Cosmopsychism: A Cross-Cultural Study Case

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1. Introduction

Although Western philosophy of religion has developed many useful tools for evaluating Abrahamic conceptions of God as they apply to different philosophical traditions, there is a growing awareness that such monotheistic Western approaches might conceal and prohibit a culturally sensitive and philosophically adequate appreciation of the numerous concepts of God found in religious traditions outside of the Abrahamic domain. This increasing awareness, which is part of the motivation beyond what has become known as cross-cultural and global philosophy of religion (Clayton 2006) (Nagasawa 2017), encompasses both the need for and the encouragement of new dialogues between Western philosophy of religion and non-Western traditions.

As a consequence of this, there has been a growing interest within analytic philosophy of religion towards alternative concepts of God (Buckareff; Nagasawa 2016) (Diller; Kasher 2013). Panentheism is a case in point. Panentheism holds that the Cosmos is in God (or in the divine), although God is more than the Cosmos.¹ Etymologically, “pan-en-theism” means “all is in God.” As Philip Clayton (2013, p. 372) puts it (perhaps suitably mentioning the Bhavagad Gītā): “The ‘en’ of panentheism is almost always a two-fold ‘in’: the transcendent is in the immanent, and the immanent is in the transcendent. Or, in the beautiful words of the Bhagavad Gītā, ‘He who sees Me everywhere and sees all in Me; I am not lost to him nor is he lost to Me’ (VI, 30).”

Panentheism has seen a revival over the past two decades in the philosophical literature. This has partially triggered an interest in Indian models of God, which have traditionally been seen as panentheistic. Ayon Maharaj (2018), for example, explores the role that panentheism plays in Ramakrishna’s (19th century) theology. Christopher Bartley (2002) and Ankur Barua (2010) deal with the panentheistic views on God of Rāmānuja (11th century), the Indian thinker most commonly associated with panentheism. Lorilai Biernacki (2014) analyzes the panentheism of the tantric thinker Abhinavagupta (10th-11th centuries).

¹ Many critics have pointed out the difficulty with defining the “in” in this characterization of panentheism. They complain that the “in” is fuzzy and that there is no widespread agreement on its meaning. See (Mullins 2016a), (Lataster & Bilimoria 2018), (Gasser 2019) and (Culp 2021) for a survey on this debate. A reply to this is that there is no need of widespread agreement. Panentheistic models, both ancient and contemporary, have provided minimally satisfactory accounts of the sense in which the cosmos supposedly is in God. The ‘etymological definition’ of panentheism is enough, leaving it to each individual model to provide an interpretation of the meaning of the “in” in the claim that the cosmos is in God. This seems to be the position defended in (Lataster & Bilimoria 2018), for example.
As far as Indian scriptures are concerned, the Bhagavad Gītā, one of the most important and often quoted texts in Indian religious and philosophical traditions, has been traditionally associated with panentheism. Franklin Edgerton (1944, p. 149), for example, says that “the Gītā’s theism differs from pantheism [...] in that it regards God as more than the universe.” Rāmānuja also seems to recognize this form of panentheism in the Gītā (Buitenen 1968, p. 139). From a more contemporary perspective, Delmar Langbauer (1985, pp. 25-26) compares the panentheism of Whitehead’s process theology with the model of God found in the Gītā, which according to him is indisputably panentheistic. Robert Whittemore (1985, p. 354) also recognizes that; he calls the panentheism of the Gītā panauxotheism (from the Greek auxesis, expansion, hence, “the all as the expansion of the One”). For Ricardo Silvestre and Alan Herbert (2023), the panentheism of the Gītā is fundamental for understanding its concept of God; they offer what they call a panentheistic reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God. Besides, as instantiated by Clayton’s quotation above, the Gītā is often mentioned in general philosophical accounts of panentheism that are minimally sensitive to the world’s religious traditions (Hartshorne & Reese 1953, p. 30) (Clayton 2013, p. 372) (Lataster & Bilimoria 2018, p. 51) (Culp 2021, p. 9).

Panentheism has been often associated with panpsychism, an old ontological view on consciousness that has also enjoyed a renaissance in recent decades. The way in which panentheism is connected with panpsychism largely depends on how panentheism and panpsychism are defined. It also depends on how one sees the connection that exists between panpsychism and cosmopsychism. For Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager (2017), for example, despite being strongly related, neither cosmopsychism nor panpsychism entail each other. On the other hand, Philip Goff (2017) and Joanna Leidenhag (2020) see cosmopsychism as a kind of panpsychism. If we define panpsychism as the thesis that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world, then depending on where one places fundamentality (whether on the micro-level or on the cosmic-level) there will be two types of panpsychism: micropsychism and cosmopsychism. Whereas micropsychism places fundamentality at the micro-level, cosmopsychism places fundamentality at the cosmic level. According to cosmopsychism, the Cosmos has some form of consciousness which ontologically supports not only the macro-consciousness we witness in human beings, but everything else: all facts, be they physical or mental, macro or micro, ontologically depend on consciousness involving facts at the cosmic level. Forms of cosmopsychism have been proposed, for example, in (Mathews 2011), (Jaskolla; Buck 2012), (Shani 2015), (Nagasawa; Wager 2017) and (Goff 2017).

If we agree on this taxonomy and define the Cosmos as all that is, then if we embrace a panentheistic view which contains the idea of God as the ontologically fundamental conscious entity, then panentheism entails a specific form of panpsychism, namely cosmopsychism. As a consequence of that, panentheism will be considered a kind
of cosmopsychism, and consequently a kind of panpsychism. We might term this theistic cosmopsychism.

This idea of theistic cosmopsychism has its precedents. On Yujin Nagasawa’s (2020) view that pantheism entails cosmopsychism, pantheism could be considered as a theistic form of cosmopsychism. David Chalmers (2020, p. 371) considers that the cosmic entity associated with cosmopsychism might be “a god”; he uses the expression “divine forms of cosmopsychism”. And if we accept Chalmers (2020) taxonomy (that asserts that idealism is a form of cosmopsychism), classical forms of idealism such as Berkeley’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s could also be seen as theistic versions of cosmopsychism.5

Despite this, recent interest within analytic philosophy on the connections between Indian traditions and panpsychism seems to be mostly focused on atheistic traditions, such as Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism.6 For instance, Douglas Duckworth (2017) investigates panpsychism in relation to Yogācāra Buddhism; Luca Gasparri (2017) and Miri Albahari (2020) explore Advaita Vedānta in relation to cosmopsychism. The special issue of The Monist dedicated to cosmopsychism and Indian philosophy (Ganeri; Shani 2022) almost exclusively analyses atheistic Indian traditions, though it does contain one paper by Anand Vaidya (2022) that associates Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta with cosmopsychism, and another by Swami Medhananda (2022) that examines the semi-theistic views of Aurobindo. Another exception is (Vaidya 2020), which comparatively examines analytic panpsychism in relation to both Advaita Vedānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.7

In this paper I want to contribute to the two debates mentioned above—the cross-cultural debate over panentheism and alternative concepts of God, and the connections between cosmopsychism and Indian traditions—by examining the Bhavagad Gītā. My first goal is to offer a panentheistic reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God. To that, I will partially rely on the analysis of the Gītā’s panentheism presented in (Silvestre; Herbert 2023). The second goal is to show how the Gītā’s panentheistic model of God entails a form of theistic cosmopsychism, locating that Gītā’s cosmopsychism within a broader map of cosmopsychist views. To that, I will propose a taxonomy of

5 See (Meixner 2016).
6 We use the term “atheistic tradition” to refer to those traditions which do not accept the existence of a personal God.
7 The atheistic approach to cosmopsychism might be a reflection of the naturalistic and non-theistic framework within which most of the contemporary debates on consciousness take place. This is evidenced by that fact that even theories that go against or are inconsistent with physicalism such as panpsychism are also mostly seen as materialistic. Talking about Russellian panpsychism, Chalmers (2002) for example states that “[Russelian panpsychism] can be seen as a sort of materialism. If one holds that physical terms refer not to dispositional properties but the underlying intrinsic properties, then the protophenomenal properties can be seen as physical properties, thus preserving a sort of materialism.” Philip Goff (2007) also defends the idea that Russellian versions of cosmopsychism are materialistic: “Some might be tempted to describe cosmopsychism as ‘idealism.’ But if we can conceive of it as a form of constitutive Russellian monism, then we can equally describe it as a form of materialism.” Even contemporary dualistic approaches to consciousness tend to follow a naturalistic standpoint. Brie Gertler (2020), for example, states: “[…] most contemporary philosophical arguments for dualism are entirely naturalistic. And they do not aim to establish the existence of immaterial substances such as souls; rather, they aim to show that the qualitative properties of conscious experience are non-physical.”
cosmopsychist views partially based on the one presented in (Chalmers 2020). Finally, based on this reconstructive analysis of the Gītā’s cosmopsychism, I will outline some few reflections on the philosophical prospects of theistic cosmopsychism.

Before starting though, some terminological remarks are needed. A mental or psychological property (or still a mental or psychological state) is any state of mind; it includes conscious or experiential properties (what-is-it-like conscious states) such as pain, but also other states such as belief, desire and intention (which are traditionally associated with agency.) ⁸ I will most of the time adopt a property-based discourse; instead, for example, of speaking about consciousness, I will speak about experiential properties.

2. God and the Cosmos

2.1. God
While there is considerable controversy about the nature of God in the Gītā, most of its theistic interpreters agree that there is enough textual evidence to support the claim that, according to the Gītā, the speaker of the text, Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa, is God. ⁹ In the Gītā, Kṛṣṇa is said to possess attributes such as omnipotence (11.43, 11.40), omniscience (7.26, 13.3), omnipresence (9.4, 11.38), eternity (2.12, 11.18), aseity (9.4-5) and immutability (4.6). Besides, he is the source of all excellences (10.41), the supreme being (10.15, 11.43), the source, origin, and dissolution of the Cosmos (7.6, 10.8) as well as its sustainer and support (7.7, 9.4-6, 9.18, 10.42).

I will here follow this general theistic approach to the Gītā according to which Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa is God. ¹⁰ While I recognize that “God” might be a problematic term, I will loosely use it as referring to the ultimate, supreme divine being which is the support, source or cause of all reality. I also assume that God is a complete-in-itself object: in the case God is mereologically structured, God remains strictly identical to itself even in a contrafactual situation where one of its proper parts did not exist.

In the text, Kṛṣṇa or God plays the undoubtful role of a person, broadly understood as conscious entity ontologically distinct from other entities. In several places in the Gītā Kṛṣṇa is described as a puruṣa, a term usually translated as person which fits this general understanding of personhood. He is called the eternal divine (10.12, 11.18), primeval (11.38) and supreme puruṣa (13.23, 15.17, 15.19). He is said to be a special puruṣa distinct from ordinary puruṣas (13.21-24). But despite this, he can enter into loving relationships with other persons, especially with his devotees (bhaktas) (7.17, 9.26, 9.29, 12.20, 18.65, 18.69). This has the obvious consequence that God instantiates experiential properties such as feeling affection for others (7.17, 12.20, 18.65, 18.69). God also possesses rationality and agency, and instantiates mental properties such as belief (6.36,

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⁸ This use of the terms “mind” and “mental” is not exactly the same as the Sanskrit word “manas”, which is traditionally translated as mind. See Section 4 below.
⁹ The ones who do not agree on this are ready to concede some kind of divinity to Kṛṣṇa, or, in other words, to assign to Kṛṣṇa some role in the Gītā’s concept of God. For example, according to a traditional view, Śaṅkara (8th century) is said to identify Kṛṣṇa with sugna brahman, the illusory God of religion.
¹⁰ For a defense of this see (Resnick 1995).
And all this is first-personal, perspectival: it is God who feels affection, who believes and wills. Therefore, the following claim can be read from the Gītā:

(G1) God is a rational agent able to interact with other agents, and a conscious subject who instantiates, from a first-person perspective, experiential properties as well as other mental properties such as thought, belief, intention and desire.

The Gītā’s model of God might be characterized as panentheistic. In the Gītā, God has a close relationship with the Cosmos. In verse 7.12, for example, Kṛṣṇa says: “Know that all states of being, be they characterized by sattva, rajas or tamas, have their source in me alone; but I am not in them—rather they are in me.” (7.12). All states of being (bhāva) come from God and are in God. The text also depicts God as immanent to the Cosmos. He pervades this world (9.4, 11.38) and encompasses all (11.40). He is present in everyone’s heart (10.20, 15.15). God’s immanence in the world reaches what appears to be a kind of pantheism, where not only is he identified with distinguished items of the world (7.8-11, 10.20-38), but with all that exists (7.19, 11.40). In the often-repeated theological claim: Vāsudeva is everything (7.19).

But the Gītā also portrays God as transcendent to the Cosmos. Kṛṣṇa does not stand in beings, and beings do not stand in him (9.4-5). Verse 7.12 quoted above says that although all states are in God, God is not in them; he is different from them. The Gītā also describes Kṛṣṇa’s supreme and separate abode: Sun does not light it, nor moon, nor fire; going there, one never returns (15.6).

Thus, the following three claims can be read from the Gītā:

(G2) God is identical with the Cosmos.
(G3) God is different from the Cosmos.
(G4) The Cosmos is in God.

G3 (and G1) has to do with the transcendence side of the Gītā’s concept of God. G2 is a statement of the Gītā’s pseudo-pantheistic side, as I call it (the reason for this will be clear below). And G4 is a half-statement of the Gītā’s panentheism; the other half is G3.

G1 and G2 seem to entail the following claim:

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11 My Gītā translations are mostly based on those of (Theodor 2010) and to a lesser degree of (Sargeant 2009).

12 Despite the undoubtful connection that is between the words “bhāva” and “guna” in this verse, I follow (Theodor 2010) and translate “bhāva” as state of being, leaving the word “guna” untranslated (“guna” is usually translated as quality, mode of existence and state of being; it is of three kinds: sattva or goodness, rajas or passion, and tamas or darkness). Besides, I’m assuming here that the three states of being mentioned in this verse, which are produced by the gunas (7.13), are representative of all states of being, which are similarly produced by the gunas (7.14, 15.2).

13 Pantheism, the thesis that God and the Cosmos are identical, entails that God is immanent to the Cosmos (immanence: from Latin immanere, “to dwell in, remain”).

14 In (Silvestre; Herbert 2023) G2 forms part of the characterization of the Gītā’s panentheism, as do two further claims which also seem to be supported by the Gītā: that God is the source of the Cosmos, and that the Cosmos is pervaded by God. See (Silvestre; Herbert 2023).
The Cosmos instantiates mental properties.

In their turn, G1 and G2, and possibly G4 too (one might say that since the Cosmos is in God and God is divine, then it is likely that the Cosmos is also divine), seem to entail the following:

(G6) The Cosmos is divine.\(^\text{15}\)

I deliberately leave the term “divine” undefined. For my purposes, it suffices to understand it in a broad sense, somehow close to terms such as “Godly”, “godly” and “holy”. From the sociological viewpoint, the divine might be seen as that which is set apart from the everyday or profane. From the theological viewpoint, it might be connected with some key theological attributes (Kant famously identified the holy with the morally good.) From the believer’s phenomenological viewpoint, it might be seen as that which produces feelings of awe and complete ‘thereness’, possibly being beyond conceptualization and rationality.\(^\text{16}\)

Although the Gītā does provide textual support to these claims, as they stand, G1-G6 are in a very important sense pre-philosophical. How are we to understand the claim that the Cosmos is in God (G4)? How to make sense of the contradictory claim that God is at the same time identical with (G2) and different from (G3) the Cosmos? As one might suspect, answering these questions depends not only on the Gītā’s concept of God, but also on how the Cosmos is conceived.

2.2. The Cosmos

The word “Cosmos” is usually used to mean the same as “world” and “universe”: the totality of entities, the whole of reality, everything that is. In accordance with this, and generalizing from the definition given by Jonathan Schaffer (2010, pp. 33-35), I define the Cosmos (with bold capital “C”) as the totality of all actual concrete objects.\(^\text{17}\) By X’s being the totality of objects of a domain D I mean that (1) X is a maximal object of which all members of D, and only members of D, are proper parts and (2) X is not identical with any plurality of members of D. (2) is based on the thesis that composition is not the same as identity (Schaffer 2010, p. 35). A proper part of X is a part of X which is not identical with X. Following Chalmers (2020, p. 353), I take concreteness as involving both physicality and mentality (but excluding abstract domains, such as mathematics): a concrete object is a non-complete-in-itself object which instantiates physical or mental properties.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^\text{15}\) The inferential steps leading to G5 and G6 depend on the specific way I am interpreting verses 7.19 and 11.40, which is in terms of identity. But these verses, which claim Kṛṣṇa to be everything (vāsudevah sarvam iti; sarvam samāpnoṣi tato ‘ṣi sarvaḥ), could be interpreted differently. They could be, for example, interpreted in terms of ontological support: God is the Cosmos in the sense that God ontologically supports the Cosmos. As it will be seen below, this interpretation is also contemplated by my analysis.

\(^\text{16}\) As in Rudolf Otto (1923), for example.

\(^\text{17}\) The bold capital “C” is there to ensure that this is not confused with the narrower sense of Cosmos to be defined below.

\(^\text{18}\) The requirement that a concrete object be non-complete-in-itself is there to exclude God from the definition of the Cosmos (by definition, God is complete-in-itself.) If God exists, he is not part of the Cosmos.
The concept of proper parthood is crucial in this definition of Cosmos. Although parthood in this case is traditionally interpreted spatially (as in “the handle is part of the mug” or “that area is part of the living room”), I want to leave that open. “Cosmos” here means the totality of all actual concrete objects based on whatever interpretation of proper parthood is considered. If proper parthood is interpreted spatially, then Cosmos is the concrete object of which all actual concrete objects are (spatial) proper parts (and which is not identical with any plurality of actual concrete objects.) I call this the concrete cosmos, or simply cosmos, with lower case “c”. Trivially in this case the Cosmos is identical with the cosmos. It is also a non-complete-in-itself object: here the Cosmos does not remain strictly identical to itself in a contrafactual situation where one of its proper parts did not exist.

But proper parthood can be interpreted differently. If it is interpreted from Rāmānuja’s viewpoint, for example, who defines (proper) parthood in terms of ontological dependence and control—he says that the world is part (aṁśa) of God because it is controlled and supported by God (Barua 2010, pp. 15-17)—, then the Cosmos is whatever entity ontologically supports and controls all actual concrete objects. In this case, the Cosmos is not identical with the cosmos. More than that: the cosmos is a proper part of the Cosmos (for it is also ontologically dependent and controlled by God, or the Cosmos.) See that even being mereologically structured, the Cosmos here remains strictly identical to itself in a contrafactual situation where one of its proper parts did not exist: it is a complete-in-itself object.

The reference to Rāmānuja here is merely pedagogical. As far as the Gītā is concerned, the issue of proper parthood in the definition of Cosmos will be properly addressed in Section 4. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be achieved here. Considering G1, a trivial way out of the contradiction between G2 and G3 is to suppose that there is an ambiguity in the use of the word “Cosmos” there. While G2 is about the Cosmos, G3 and G4 are about the cosmos:

(G2) God is identical with the Cosmos.
(G3) God is different from the cosmos.
(G4) The cosmos is in God.

G5 and G6 are about the Cosmos. However, due to a possible role played by G4 in the inferential move leading to G6, it might also refer to the cosmos:

(G5) The Cosmos instantiates mental properties.
(G6) The Cosmos (and possibly all its proper parts, including the cosmos) are divine.

From G2 and G3, it follows that the cosmos is different from the Cosmos, which entitles us to call G2 “pseudo-pantheistic: since pantheism refers to the cosmos, G2 is not really pantheistic in the strictest sense of the term. It also entitles us to say that the Gītā requires a non-spatial interpretation of parthood in the definition of Cosmos. In Section 4 I elaborate more on that, providing independent textual evidences for the thesis that, in the Gītā, proper parthood in the definition of the Cosmos should be understood non-spatially. While this interpretation of proper parthood, as I will argue, should not be defined in
terms of ontological dependence, in a very important sense it does involve the relationship of ontological dependence that the Gītā seems to portray between God and everything else. I turn to this now.

3. Ontological Dependence

The Gītā depicts an unequivocal relation of ontological dependence between beings and God. In verses 9.4-6, for example, Kṛṣṇa says as follows:

[...] all beings stand in me, but I do not stand in them. And yet all beings do not stand in me; see my mystic splendour! I sustain beings but rely not on them; my very self is the cause of their being. As the great wind that goes everywhere is eternally situated in space, know that similarly all beings stand in me. (9.4-6)

The key term here is “stha”, which means amongst other things “to abide in; be situated in; rest in; stand in.” In verse 9.4, for example, Kṛṣṇa says maisthāni sarvabhūtāni, “all beings abide, are situated, or stand in me.” It seems uncontroversial among commentators, both traditional and contemporary, that statements like this mean (at least partially) the following: all beings ontologically depend on God. Notice that the dependence relation here is clearly asymmetric: although beings stand in God, God does not stand in them.

The idea of ontological dependence also appears in other verses of the Gītā, some of which have already been mentioned. It appears, for example, when Kṛṣṇa says that all states of being are in him, but he is not in them (7.12), or when he is said to be the supporter (bhartā), foundation (sthānam) (9.18) and the supreme resting place of the world (viśva) (11.38), or still when he says that with a single fragment (aṁśa) of himself, he sustains this entire universe (jagat) (10.42). It also seems to be behind the beautiful analogy found in the seventh chapter where Kṛṣṇa says that all that exists rests on him like pearls on a thread (7.7).

But there is an important qualification in the Gītā on the way things ontologically depend on God. Right after saying in 9.4 that all beings stand in him, Kṛṣṇa paradoxically says that beings do not stand in him. Then he offers a way out of the paradox. It is an analogy. As the wind stands in space (ākāśa), all beings stand in him. Here “space” seems to be used more or less in accordance with what some call metaphysical space: the medium that holds, contains within it and allows physical things to exist, but which does not depend on them to exist. Space exists permanently and independently of whether there is any physical object in it. And while space contains physical things within it, it does not touch nor interact with them; it remains the same, aloof, distant and transcendent, we might say, to physical things. Thus, it seems that the Gītā supports the following thesis:

(T1) All beings ontologically depend on God (like physical things depend on space), who does not depend on anything; he is prior to everything else, being the fundamental entity that supports reality.

19 See (Theodor 2010, p. 82) and (Malinar 2007, p. 148), for example. See also (Chari 2005, pp. 97-99) for Śaṅkara’s, Rāmānuja’s and Madhva’s views on these verses.

20 See (Mullins 2016b).
T1 is at the heart of the Gītā’s panentheism. As a first approach, T1 can be said to explain G4. All beings and states of being are in God in the sense of ontologically depending on God. Second, T1 can also be said to explain G2: God is the Cosmos in the sense that everything that exists ontologically depends on God. In this case, proper parthood would be defined in terms of ontological dependence. Third, T1 contains a kind of aseity: according to the Gītā, God is a se, completely independent, self-sufficient. He does not depend on anything to be. T1 might be seen also as portraying a kind of transcendence: since God depends on nothing (he is absolutely independent, we might say), he is transcendent to everything. Thus, T1 might be said to explain G3. See that the dependence that all beings have on God does not affect his transcendence: beings depend on God analogously to how physical things depend on space.²¹

But T1 can also be arrived at through another route, one which more satisfactorily explains G2-G4. In verses 4 to 6 of chapter 7 Kṛṣṇa says as follows:

Earth, water, fire, air, space, mind, intellect and egotism—these eight comprise my separated (bhīnna) prakṛti (nature). But you should know that beside this inferior (aparā) nature, O mighty-armed one, there is another superior (parā) prakṛti (nature) of mine, comprised of conscious living beings (jīvabhūta), by which this world is sustained. Realize that all entities have their source in this [the two kinds of prakṛti]. I am the origin of this entire world and of its dissolution too. (7.4-6)²²

By saying that Kṛṣṇa is the origin and dissolution of the world, once more it is claimed, it seems, that all things ontologically depend on him. But this is structured. God has two kinds of prakṛti (or nature, as it is usually translated). There is God’s separated and inferior prakṛti, composed by the eight ‘material’ elements²³ (earth, water, fire, air, space, mind, intelligence and egotism), and there is God’s superior prakṛti, composed by conscious living beings, the macro-subjects that instantiate experiential macro-properties and other mental states. As I will argue below, these two kinds of prakṛti ontologically depend on God.

Translators disagree on the correct meaning of “jīvabhūta” in these verses. Although it literally means “living being”, many translators translate it with the help of terms like “individual self”, “embodied self”, “spirit” and “soul” so to emphasize a supposed ‘non-material’ or ‘spiritual’ connotation.²⁴ Furthermore, “jīvabhūta” is often identified with terms like “ātmā” and “puruṣa”, which have a similar ‘non-material’ connotation. Verse 13.22, for example, states puruṣaḥ prakṛtistho hi bhunkte prakṛti-jān guṇān: “indeed, the puruṣa, abiding in material nature (prakṛti), experiences the guṇas born of material nature.” That a puruṣa can experience something shows that it is conscious in the sense of being able to experience pain and joy, cold and heat, happiness

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²¹ See (Silvestre; Herbert 2023) for a better elaboration of these points.
²² There are interpretations to the expressions “parā prakṛti” and “aparā prakṛti” different from the one we are going to give here. For some of them, including Śaṅkara’s, Rāmānuja’s and Madhva’s, see (Jacobsen, 1999, p. 69-71). There are also other ways to understand the reference of the word “etad” (this) in verse 7.6; we are here following Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others and understanding it as referring to both kinds of prakṛti. See (Edgerton, 1944, pp. 95-96).
²³ The reason I am using the word “material” in quotes will become clear shortly.
²⁴ For a discussion on the translation of the term “jīvabhūta” in these verses, as well as a justification for attributing a ‘non-material’ or ‘spiritual’ aspect to it, see (Malinar, 2007, pp. 130-131).
and distress, which are phenomenological states with a distinctive qualitative experiential aspect of “what-is-it-like” to be in those states.

I therefore translate “jīvabhūta” as conscious living being, the macro-subjects that instantiate experiential macro-properties and other mental states. The capacity of experiencing “what-is-it-like” states is, for my purposes here, the distinctive, ‘non-material’ feature of the jīvabhūta.\(^{25}\) Moreover, at least some of those conscious living beings can enter into personal relationships with other conscious living beings, and with God himself (4.3, 7.17, 9.26, 9.29, 12.20, 18.65). Thus, they are Kṛṣṇa’s superior prakṛti. The eight ‘material’ elements are not conscious in this sense. Therefore, they are Kṛṣṇa’s inferior and separated (bhinnā) prakṛti.

Together, these two kinds of prakṛti are the source of all: all beings have their origin (yoni) in them (7.6). I then claim that the following thesis is supported by the Gītā:

(T2) All concrete objects are God’s prakṛti.

To justify this, as well as the claim made earlier that T1 can be arrived at through verses 7.4-6, I will have to elaborate more on the term “prakṛti” and the peculiar way it is used in these verses.

4. Prakṛti

4.1. Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya

According to its earliest recorded use, “prakṛti” means “that which was first” or “the original.”\(^{26}\) It is best known as a technical term referring to the ultimate ‘material’ principle of Sāṃkhya system, although this is late in appearing.\(^{27}\) In fact, the term has a wide variety of meanings (Jacobsen 1999, p. 25). Knut Jacobsen has identified three clusters of meaning of the term “prakṛti” in Indian traditions:

1. Prakṛti is ‘that which precedes,’ the ‘first,’ ‘that which is in its own form.’ This is the ‘basis,’ the ‘original state,’ therefore the ‘natural,’ the ‘archetype,’ one’s ‘character,’ and ‘normal.’ […]
2. Prakṛti is the ‘material cause,’ the ‘producer of effects,’ the ‘innate power of transformation and manifestation,’ the ‘generative principle’ and the ‘ultimate material principle.’ […]
3. Prakṛti-s in the plural are the ‘principles,’ ‘constituents,’ ‘parts,’ or ‘components of a whole’ […] (Jacobsen 1999, p. 25).

The second cluster of meaning relates to Sāṃkhya’s traditional use of the term, which in turn is traditionally related to the Gītā’s inferior prakṛti, that is, the eight ‘material’ elements (earth, water, fire, air, space, mind, intelligence and egotism).

In Sāṃkhya, prakṛti is the subtle material power within phenomena that produces their manifest forms: it is the producer, the natura naturans, the productive aspect of nature, the inner principle which causes things into being (Jacobsen 1999, p. 52). Earth

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\(^{25}\) See that by doing that I am not denying that the term “jīvabhūta” might have a stronger ‘non-material’ component, referring to some kind of ‘spiritual’ aspect, whatever that might be.

\(^{26}\) Its root kṛ means to make, cause, create, produce, or perform. The prefix pra- shows that it precedes, it has the sense of forward movement, and it indicates a creative force, the urge to create, a biological and natural process.

\(^{27}\) Sāṃkhya is one of the six schools of so-called orthodox Indian philosophy. The Gītā contains strong Sāṃkhya (or proto-Sāṃkhya, as some call it) elements.
(bhūmi), water (jala), fire (āgni), air (vāyu) and space or ether (ākāśa) are called the five gross elements (mahābhūta).28 They are the products of prakṛti from which all objects are made or ‘emerge’. But from prakṛti there also ‘emerge’ subtler material elements: manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence) and ahamkāra (egotism). Although ‘material’, these elements are intrinsically psychological.

Paul Schweizer (1993, p. 848) explains the psychological aspects of Sāṃkhya’s manas, buddhi and ahamkāra as follows:

Manas [...] is viewed essentially as an organ, the special organ of cognition, just as the eyes are the special organs of sight. Indeed, manas is held to be intimately connected with perception, since the raw data supplied by the senses must be ordered and categorized with respect to a conceptual scheme before various objects can be perceived as members of their respective categories [...] This imposition of conceptual structure on the chaotic field of raw sensation is one of the basal activities of manas [...]. Hence ordinary perceptual experience is already heavily conditioned by the activities of manas, and manas is thus sometimes referred to as the sixth organ of sensation. In addition to its perceptual activities, manas is held to be responsible for the cognitive functions of analysis, deliberation and decision. It is closely allied to buddhi, which is somewhat roughly translated as the faculty of ‘intellect’ or ‘reason.’ Buddhi is a subtler and more powerful faculty than manas, and is responsible for the higher level intellectual functions, which require intuition, insight and reflection. [...] The combination of manas and buddhi roughly correspond to what is meant by the objective or ‘impersonal’ mental faculties in western philosophical discourse. In addition, [Sāṃkhya] recognizes a third component of mind, ahamkāra, which is the ego or phenomenal self. Ahamkāra appropriates all mental experiences to itself, and thus ‘personalizes’ the objective activities of manas and buddhi by assuming possession of them.

Schweizer continues and says that the “combination of these three faculties [...] approximately comprises the individual mind-self of the western philosophical tradition” (Schweizer 1993, p. 848). This is correct, but with a caveat: the complex manas-buddhi-ahamkāra does not encompass conscious. In Sāṃkhya, the realm of prakṛti is held to be inherently unconscious. Consciousness belongs to the realm of puruṣa, a different ontological category altogether which relates to the jivabhūta, the Gītā’s superior prakṛti. Sāṃkhya’s puruṣa is the absolute, unconditioned self, and the metaphysical principle underlying the individual person. It is described as pure and undifferentiated awareness, and is in some respects comparable to Kant’s noumenal self (Schweizer 1993, p. 849). The puruṣa is often compared to a light which ‘illuminates’ the mental processes and states produced by manas, buddhi and ahamkāra; these are conscious only to the extent that they receive external ‘illumination’ from puruṣa.

See that I am not equating the Gītā’s inferior prakṛti with Sāṃkhya’s prakṛti, or the Gītā’s superior prakṛti with Sāṃkhya’s puruṣa.29 All I claim is that these pairs of concepts are close enough for me to make the following (hopefully noncontroversial)

28 Other words such as “puṣṭhavī” (earth), “āpa” (water) and “teja” (fire) are also used.

29 The extent to which the Gītā supports Sāṃkhya’s ontology is debatable. First, as it will be seen below, the Gītā’s use of the term “prakṛti” is different from Sāṃkhya’s use. Traditional Sāṃkhya’s account of prakṛti is much more nuanced and detailed. Sāṃkhya speaks for example of twenty-four elements (tattva) that emerge from prakṛti while these Gītā verses mention only eight (although verse 13.5 mentions a more comprehensive list). There is also a Sāṃkhya’s ‘pseudo-causal’ relation between these elements, which is ignited by puruṣa: when associated with puruṣa, prakṛti produces buddhi, from which ahamkāra is produced, from which the other elements are produced. Second, Sāṃkhya is dualist: puruṣa and prakṛti belong to different ontological realms. On the other hand, the Gītā very strongly points to a kind of monism. In verses 7.4-6 in particular, both the inferior prakṛti and the superior prakṛti, conscious beings and the non-conscious-stuff, are prakṛti of the same thing, namely God.
claims. First, that the Gītā’s inferior prakṛti (and Sāṃkhya’s prakṛti) can be minimally seen as the stuff from which all non-conscious concrete objects are made. This allows me to drop reference to the term “material” altogether. As defined earlier, a concrete object is a non-complete-in-itself object which instantiates physical or mental properties; a conscious object is a concrete object which instantiates experiential mental properties. Thus, a non-conscious concrete object is a concrete object which does not instantiate experiential properties.

Second, that as long as it is connected with the Gītā’s superior prakṛti, the jīvabhūta, Gītā’s superior prakṛti instantiates mental properties in general, be then experiential or not (the same holding for Sāṃkhya’s prakṛtīl puruṣa).

Third, that the Gītā’s inferior and superior kinds of prakṛti encompass all concrete objects. While the inferior prakṛti encompasses the stuff from which non-conscious concrete objects are made, the superior prakṛti encompasses conscious concrete objects, that is to say, macro-subjects that instantiate experiential macro-properties and other mental states. Thus, it seems reasonable to claim that all concrete objects are God’s prakṛti (T2).

4.1. Prakṛti in the Gītā

Although the Gītā’s inferior prakṛti can be understood, as it is generally so, according to Jacobsen’s second cluster of meaning—approaching thus the traditional meaning associated with Sāṃkhya—, there is a distinctive uniqueness about how the term “prakṛti” is used in verses 7.4-6. It is used in a relational way. The verses speak about prakṛti of God, meaning what seems to be an intimate relation between God and something else. “Prakṛti” in this sense is an incomplete or unsaturated term: to be prakṛti is to the prakṛti of something.30

This sense of “prakṛti” can be further understood according to Jacobsen’s first and third clusters of meaning. It involves Jacobsen’s first cluster of meaning in that God’s two kinds of prakṛti precede God in the sense of being or belonging to his character, his original state, his nature, which conveys a sense of intimacy. And it involves Jacobsen’s third cluster of meaning in that God’s two kinds of prakṛti are principles, parts or components of a whole (in this case God himself), which also conveys a sense of intimacy. This is partially corroborated by verse 15.7, which says that the jīvabhūta is part (āṁśa) of Kṛṣṇa.

This has some important philosophical implications. First, if for example we take a person X’s character or original state as something unique to X, then it makes sense to say that X’s character, which in some sense precedes X, ontologically depends on X (like physical things depend on space, we might add). Therefore, in this relational sense of “prakṛti”, if Y is prakṛti of God, then Y ontologically depends on God. Second, assuming, as I think we should, that X’s prakṛti is different from X, in this relational sense of the word, if Y is prakṛti of God, then Y is a proper part of God. Or, to put it better: this relational use of “prakṛti” expresses a proper parthood concept.

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30 Jacobsen (1999, p.69-71) recognizes this as a particular meaning the Gītā attaches to the word “prakṛti”. 
If I were to offer an analogy to clarify the meaning of the proposition “X is a prakṛti of God” I would mention trope theory. Trope theory is the view that reality is wholly or partly made up from tropes. Tropes are the particular qualities of objects. Socrates’ charisma is a trope. As such, it is a particular, a thing if you will. Second, it is ontologically dependent on Socrates. The existence of Socrates’ charisma depends on Socrates. Third, it is something intimately related to Socrates. And finally, Socrates’ charisma is in a very important sense a part of Socrates.

Another way to help us grasp this Gītā’s concept of prakṛti is to refer to Philip Goff’s (2017) concept of aspect. Aspects are constituents of structured wholes that can be considered in isolation from the wholes but which are (at least contingently) ontologically dependent on the whole of which they are constituents. Goff takes aspect to be a primitive not admitting of more fundamental analysis. As with the other primitives, the best way to get a grip on it is through examples. Take one’s current conscious experience. It might be seen as having ‘parts’, involving, for example, visual experience of colors, auditory experiences of sounds, and emotional experiences of joy, etc. One way to make sense of this is to see the total experience as fundamental, as a unity of which the experiential parts are aspects. Naturally these aspects are unsaturated beings: we cannot capture the essence of the aspect without reference to the whole of which it is an aspect. All this seems to be true of the Gītā’s concept of prakṛti, especially as it is understood in accordance with Jacobsen’s third cluster of meaning.

I propose here to understand prakṛti as a metaphysical primitive denoting this intimate relation that exists between non-conscious concrete objects and living conscious beings on one hand, and God on the other. It is a primitive proper parthood concept. As a primitive, it cannot be explained or defined in terms of simpler concepts. Despite this, it does involve ontological dependence: if Y is prakṛti of God, then Y ontologically depends on God.

I also propose that in the definition of the Cosmos proper parthood be understood in terms of prakṛti. In other words, I propose that the Gītā’s concept of Cosmos be defined as the maximal object of which all actual concrete objects are prakṛti (and which is not identical with any plurality of actual concrete objects.) As a consequence of this, there is an intimate relation between all actual concrete objects and the Cosmos: they ontologically depend on it. See that, unlike Rāmānuja, I am not defining proper parthood in terms of ontological dependence. Instead, I am using a specific proper parthood notion in the definition of Cosmos which involves, but is not defined through, ontological dependence.

Here we have a final explanation for the Gītā’s panentheism. First, along with T2, this definition of the Cosmos in terms of prakṛti entails and explains G2. By definition, the Cosmos is identical with God. It also explains G3: by definition the Cosmos, which is identical with is God, is different from the cosmos. And, finally, it explains G4. The cosmos is in God in the sense of being a prakṛti of God (the cosmos is a concrete object).

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31 An object might be seen as possessing universals like the property of redness, but it might also be seen as the bearer of a particular and unique quality, a trope, which is that particular redness, that object's redness. See (Maurin, 2018).
5. Cosmopsychism

5.1. The Cosmos

From a minimal point of view, cosmopsychism is the thesis that the Cosmos instantiates mental properties.\(^{32}\) I call this minimal cosmopsychism. Insofar as G5 is supported by the Gītā and its panentheistic model of God, the Gītā can be said to support minimal cosmopsychism. But what more can be said about the Gītā’s cosmopsychism? To answer this question, I need to distinguish other types of cosmopsychism.

To the extent that one might posit non-spatial views of proper parthood in the definition of the Cosmos, we can distinguish between ontologically narrow cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the cosmos and the Cosmos are identical) and ontologically broad cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the cosmos and the Cosmos are not identical.) Insofar as the Gītā postulates that the Cosmos is different from the cosmos (G2 and G3), it supports ontologically broad cosmopsychism.

Second, since the Cosmos might be seen as either divine or not, we can distinguish between theistic cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the Cosmos is divine) and non-theistic cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the Cosmos is not divine.) Theistic ontologically narrow cosmopsychism is called pantheistic cosmopsychism; theistic ontologically broad cosmopsychism is called panentheistic cosmopsychism. It seems clear that the Gītā supports panentheistic cosmopsychism (entailed by G2, G3 and G6).

Third, we can distinguish between psychologically narrow cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that experiential properties are the only kind of mental properties that the Cosmos instantiates) and psychologically broad cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the Cosmos instantiates experiential properties as well as other mental properties such as thought, belief, desire and intention.) Due to G1 and G2, the Gītā seems to support psychologically broad cosmopsychism.

Finally, we can distinguish between personal or perspectival cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the Cosmos is itself an individual subject, owner of its mental states and with its own unique first-personal point of view) and impersonal or aperspectival cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus the denial of the thesis that the Cosmos is an individual subject with its own unique first-personal point of view.)\(^{33}\) Once again, due to G1 and G2, the Gītā seems to support personal or perspectival cosmopsychism.

\(^{32}\) Chalmers (2020, p. 359, 371) defines cosmopsychism as the thesis that the Cosmos has mental states. Elsewhere (2015, p. 247) he presents the narrower view that cosmopsychism is the view that the Cosmos as a whole is conscious, that is to say, that it instantiates experiential mental properties, which is the same definition given by Philip Goff (2017, p. 234). We address this distinction (between the Cosmos having mental states and it having only conscious or experiential states) a bit later in this section.

\(^{33}\) This terminology is due to Jonardon Ganeri and Itay Shani (2022, p. 3). Chalmers (2020, p. 367) uses the terms “subject-involving” and “non-subject involving”. Because of this distinction, Chalmers avoids saying that the Cosmos has mental states; instead, he speaks about the mentality associated with the
5.2. Fundamentality

These kinds of cosmopsychism are minimal in the sense that they abstract from the fact that the Cosmos is a metaphysically structured entity. As Schaffer (2010, p. 35) points out, the Cosmos is supposed to have a metaphysical structure of ontological priority and posteriority, which reflects what depends on what and reveals the fundamental kind of entities that support reality. I turn to this now.

The thesis that the Cosmos is ontologically prior to its proper parts, even though they are entities on their own, is known as priority monism (Schaffer 2010). Everything ontologically depends on the Cosmos, except the Cosmos itself, which does not depend on anything. The Cosmos is the only fundamental entity. Combining this with the thesis the Cosmos instantiates mental properties gives us priority cosmopsychism (minimal cosmopsychism plus priority monism). G2 and T1 entail that the Gītā supports priority monism. Along with G5, this in turn entails that the Gītā supports priority cosmopsychism.

Due to the way I defined the Cosmos, my definition of priority monism differs from Schaffer’s—priority monism’s main defender35—in two ways: it is open to non-spatial interpretations of proper parthood, and it includes mentality in the definition of concreteness. It also differs from Schaffer’s in that while Schaffer takes the priority relation of ontological dependence as a grounding, constitutive relation, I take it more broadly so to allow emergentist relations as well.36 Either way, a priority relation of dependence must be a well-founded partial ordering: irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive (partial ordering) such that all chains terminate (well-foundedness).37 It also must be such that if X depends on Y, then X is actual because Y is actual. Facts about X obtain (at least partially) in virtue of facts about Y.

The main difference between a grounding or constitutive dependence relation and an emergentist dependence relation has to do with what David Armstrong famously termed “ontological free lunch”: the idea that an entity is nothing over and above other entities, or already postulated facts. In the case X ontologically depends on Y in a constitutive way, Y does not causally bring X into being. Y is nothing over and above X. X is constituted by, or grounded in Y. Consequently, all facts about X necessitate on (or equivalently are grounded in, constituted by) facts about Y. In the case X ontologically depends on Y in an emergentist way, Y causally brings X into being. X is an autonomous

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34 The term “priority cosmopsychism” is from Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager (2017). Although they refer and elaborate on priority monism, they do not define priority cosmopsychism in terms of priority monism. Chalmers (2020, p. 371) roughly equates priority monism with what he calls constitutive cosmopsychism (see below).

35 See (Schaffer 2010) and (Schaffer 2013), for example.

36 I am also most of the time taking it as holding between entities. It can be thought as holding between facts as well.

entity over and above Y. Consequently, it is not true that facts about X necessitate on facts about Y.\textsuperscript{38}

Depending on the kind of ontological relation at hand then, we can distinguish between \textit{constitutive} priority cosmopsychism (priority cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the ontological relation between the Cosmos and its parts is a constitutive one) and \textit{non-constitutive} priority cosmopsychism (priority cosmopsychism plus the thesis that the ontological relation between the Cosmos and some of its parts is a non-constitutive one.) \textit{Emergent} priority cosmopsychism is a special kind of non-constitutive priority cosmopsychism which claims that some mental macro-facts are emergent from Cosmic facts.\textsuperscript{39} It its perspectival version, for example, emergent priority cosmopsychism might claim that macro-subjects themselves are emergent from the Cosmic subject. Although ontologically dependent on the Cosmos, macro-subjects are autonomous entities, something over and above the Cosmos. Facts about them do not necessitate on Cosmic facts.\textsuperscript{40} In contrast to that, in constitutive priority cosmopsychism all facts, in particular all macro-facts, be them physical or mental, necessitate on, are grounded in or constituted by Cosmic facts.\textsuperscript{41}

Whether the \textit{Gītā} supports constitutive priority cosmopsychism or emergentist priority cosmopsychism is an open matter. It might be seem as favoring both. One might say that the autonomy the \textit{Gītā} seems to attribute to macro-subjects might favor an emergentist perspective. At the end of the dialogue, for example, Kṛṣṇa advises his student Arjuna to reflect on what Kṛṣṇa has taught and do as he wants (18.63), entailing that macro-subjects have freedom of will and freedom of action, which seems to be incompatible with the idea that physical and mental macro-facts necessitate on Cosmic facts. On the other hand, verses such as 5.8-9, 3.27 and 18.60—3.27 for example says

\textsuperscript{38} Philip Goff (2017, p. 42) gives the following example. Suppose Rod, Jane and Freddy are dancing, drinking and generally having fun one evening at Jane’s. It follows from that that there is a party at Jane’s. The party ontologically depends on the reveling—there is a party at Jane’s because Rod, Jane, and Freddy are dancing, drinking, and so on at Jane’s—, but the reveling does not causally bring into being the party. There is no autonomous entity that emerges from the reveling. The party is nothing over and above Rod, Jane and Freddy dancing, drinking, and so on. It is \textit{constituted by}, or \textit{grounded} in Rod, Jane, and Freddy dancing, drinking, and so on. Contrast this with the case of a recently born infant. There is a clear relation of ontological dependence between the infant and her parents: the infant exists because her parents had sexual intercourse in the appropriate conditions. But in this case there is an autonomous entity that emerged from the sexual intercourse, namely the infant. The parents causally brought into being an entity which is something over and above the parents.

\textsuperscript{39} The example given earlier to explain Goff’s notion of aspect—that of one’s current mental experiential state involving visual, auditory and emotional experiences—can be used to make sense of a constitutive dependence relation between the whole and its parts. Despite being in one sense entities on their own, these are nothing over and above one’s total experience. In other words, one’s total experience might be seen as a fundamental unity of which the visual experience of colors, the auditory experiences of sounds, etc. are parts or aspects. As a consequence of that, all facts about one’s visual experience of colors, auditory experiences of sounds, etc., necessitate on, are grounded in or constituted by facts about one’s total experience. Examples of emergentist dependence relation are harder to find.

\textsuperscript{40} In addition to emergent cosmopsychism, Chalmers (2020, pp. 363-364) also mentions autonomous cosmopsychism as a second subcategory of non-constitutive cosmopsychism. (Chalmer’s autonomous cosmopsychism does not seem to be a subcategory of priority cosmopsychism as I have defined it.)

\textsuperscript{41} Usually, constitutive cosmopsychism sees experiential Cosmic facts as fundamental, so that all other facts, macro and micro, psychological and non-psychological, experiential and non-experiential, are seen as grounded in experiential Cosmic facts.
that all actions are performed by nature’s modes, and that one who is bewildered by egotism (ahamkāra) mistakenly believes that one is the doer—seem to imply that macro-subjects do not have freedom of action, which might favor a constitutive perspective (although some of them, such as 18.60, still corroborate free-will.)

One might point out that besides saying that the non-conscious stuff and the macro-subjects are both prakṛti of the same entity, namely God or the Cosmos, the Gītā does not say much about how the interaction between these two kinds of prakṛti take place. This is true. But the fact the Gītā presents a clear monist view allows us to speculate on the ways the Gītā’s view might be extended so to explain the relation between these two kinds of prakṛti. One can, for example, try to see to what extent the Gītā’s cosmopsychism might be extended into a Russellian kind of cosmopsychism. This is where the psychological elements of God’s inferior prakṛti might play a role. For space reasons, however, I will not elaborate on this further.

6. On Theistic Cosmopsychism or “So What?”

From the viewpoint of the Cosmos alone, the Bhavagad Gītā’s cosmopsychism is theistic and ontologically broad (or equivalently: panentheistic), psychologically broad and perspectival. From the viewpoint of the metaphysical structure of ontological priority and posteriority, it is a kind of priority cosmopsychism which might be understood either from a constitutive or emergentist perspective. In a very important sense the Gītā’s cosmopsychism follows from its panentheism. We therefore have a case of a ‘native’ panentheistic model of God that implies a cosmopsychist model that, to a certain extent, coincides with current cosmopsychist views.

Now one might say: So, what? Besides being a somewhat valuable contribution to the debate over the relationship between panentheism and panpsychism and to the cross-cultural debate over the connections between cosmopsychism and Indian traditions, does the Gītā’s cosmopsychism have something to offer to the philosophical debate about the nature of consciousness? More generally, is theistic cosmopsychism philosophically defensible, or is it a mere theoretical curiosity? While I don’t have the space to adequately address these questions, I would like to offer some very brief reflections on the philosophical perspectives of theistic cosmopsychism using my analysis of the Gītā as a case study.

I would first point out the following: as far as my analysis of the Gītā’s cosmopsychism is concerned, theistic cosmopsychism need not differ much from more

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42 Russellian monism is a view based on Bertrand Russell’s insight (contained mainly in his The Analysis of Matter) that physics reveals only the relational causal structure and dispositional properties of basic physical entities, but not their intrinsic nature. All properties physics ascribes to fundamental entities are characterized in terms of behavioral dispositions and causal relations. What mass does? It resists acceleration, attracts other masses, and so on and so forth. But physics says nothing about what mass intrinsically is, about its categorical properties. More generally, physics describes the causal structure of the world but is silent on what has the structure in itself. Russellian monism then proposes that these hidden categorical/intrinsic properties are experiential or proto-experiential properties, or something else of which experiential properties are an aspect. In my taxonomy, Russellian cosmopsychism would roughly be Russellian monism plus priority cosmopsychism.
orthodox forms of cosmopsychism.\footnote{See the taxonomy presented in (Chalmers 2020).} Being theistic as well as ontologically and psychologically broad seem to be the most unorthodox features of the Gītā’s cosmopsychism.

For ontological broadness, the whole thing has to do with how one defines the Cosmos, or to be more specific, how one understands proper parthood in the definition. At first glance, this might seem a terminological issue. But it is not. As far as priority cosmopsychism is concerned, the Cosmos is the fundamental entity: everything ontologically depends on it, and it is does not depend on anything. Thus, the Cosmos should be defined in such a way as not to conflict with this fundamentality claim. But if God does exist and is the ontological support of all that is, then the cosmos cannot be that fundamental entity; in other words, the cosmos cannot be the Cosmos. Instead, God must be the Cosmos.

For psychological broadness, most philosophers seem reluctant to attribute to the Cosmos a mental life similar to that which we experience in ourselves. Goff, William Seager and Sean Allen-Hermanson (2022) for example say as follows:

Cosmopsychism is not to be confused with pantheism: the view that the universe is God. Just as the micropsychist holds that electrons have experience but not thought, so the cosmopsychist holds that the universe has some kind of experience, but may refrain from attributing thought or agency to the universe. It could be that the consciousness of the universe is a gigantic mess that doesn’t add up to anything coherent enough to ground cognition.

Although undoubtedly simpler, the assumption that the Cosmos only instantiates unstructured, messy experiential properties gives rise to some problems. Chalmers (2020, p. 368) describes what he calls the *austerity problem* as follows:

The issue here is that the cosmic mind in the present picture (whether relational or nonrelational) looks extremely austere, and very much unlike a mind as we normally think of it. Its basic experiential structure and dynamics is tied to the structure and dynamics of physics. There seems to be little or no rationality in this structure. There seems to be very little thinking, valuing, or reasoning. It is not really clear why, if there is to be a cosmic mind, it should be as austere as this.

An obvious possible solution to this problem is psychologically broad cosmopsychism. Chalmers, for example, proposes a version of Russellian cosmopsychism which he calls enriched Russellian cosmopsychism. According to enriched Russellian cosmopsychism, the Cosmic subject has experiential states, but also has other mental states with further structure and dynamics. On a kind of enriched Russellian cosmopsychism, “the cosmic subject is a rational being somewhat like you and me, except vastly more intelligent and with enormously greater cognitive resources.” (Chalmers 2020, p. 369). Chalmers further argues that this extra mental structure might play a role in sustaining physical dynamics. Thus, as with ontological broadness, it is not that trivial ontological broadness is a useless violation of Ockham’s razor.

But the real distinguishing feature of theistic cosmopsychism is that the Cosmos is divine. Even pantheistic cosmopsychism, which is ontologically narrow (the Cosmos is identical with the cosmos), claims that the Cosmos is divine. We then might ask: Are there positive reasons for defending theistic cosmopsychism against the charge that it is
just excessive and problematic baggage for cosmopsychism? That of course depends on how one understands divineness.

Considering a panentheistic cosmopsychism in which something like G1 holds, divineness can be connected with the divine attributes that God supposedly possess. One might say, for example, that because God is divine, it is maximally perfect; and because God is maximally perfect, it is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, perfectly free, etc. It is reasonable to suppose that a conscious maximally perfect being will have a maximally perfect conscious mental life, in some sense of the term. A maximally perfect conscious mental life might be, for example, a maximally varied, perfectly structured and transparent one in which the ‘pure’ qualitative experiential aspect of phenomenal states are clearly and distinctively experienced. It also seems reasonable to that the cosmic consciousness on which everything ontologically depends must be at least as varied, structured, transparent, etc. as the macro-consciousness we witness in human beings. If the Cosmos has a maximally perfect conscious mental life this criterion is automatically satisfied.

Going a bit beyond the scope of a theory of consciousness, divineness might be shown to be a philosophically fruitful concept. Richard Swinburne has forcefully argued that a concept of God similar to the one described above might be fruitful to explain not only the existence of conscious objects themselves, but the very fact that the world we live in is an orderly world, with scientific laws operating within it, and regularities in the behavior of medium sized objects. He argues that that the world we live in is an orderly world is exactly what we would expect in the case God, understood as an essentially all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly free person, exists:

God being omnipotent is able to produce a world orderly in these respects. And he has good reason to choose to do so: a world containing human persons is a good thing. [...] God, being perfectly good, is generous. With a body humans have a limited chunk of matter under our control, and, if we so choose, we can choose to learn how the world works and so learn which bodily actions will have more remote effects. We can learn quickly when rocks are likely to fall, predators to pounce, and plants to grow. Thereby God allows us to share in his creative activity of choosing. (Swinburne 2010, p. 48)

References


