LIAR SENTENCES ARE TRUTH-APT

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Lycan (2010: 617) maintained that if we know about a deductive argument P1, P2…, ∴C that it is valid, this shows that a set containing the premises and the negation of conclusion is internally inconsistent {P1, P2,…, ~C}. Using a similar reasoning, we should conclude that an invalid deductive argument shows that a set containing the premises and the negation of conclusion is internally consistent. This implies that premises and conclusion of any deductive argument are truth-apt. Since it is uncontroversial that the argument that motivates the liar paradox is deductive, it follows that the liar sentences are truth-apt. The reason is obvious: if a sentence can't be true, it can't be a part of a consistent or inconsistent set, by definition. Consequently, the liar paradox cannot be solved by arguing that liar sentences are truth-valueless.

REFERENCES

Lycan, W. G. 2010. What, exactly, is a paradox? *Analysis*, 70(4), 615–622.