

Rational choice and moral judgment as an insurmountable dichotomy for a theory of decisions

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Abstract:

From a philosophical point of view, in general we can clearly distinguish two cultures, that is, culture in the context of the natural sciences and culture in the context of the humanities. Attempts are now being made to propose a third notion of culture, one that involves rational choice and moral judgment in this discourse. Before the 2000s, people tended to separate rational choice from moral judgment. However, for some years now, Kant's concept of pure reason as the self-sufficiency of the subject has been questioned by intellectuals. There is a new definition of rationality, that is, rationality must be placed in a given situation to make sense, and it is context dependent, so it can be called situational rationality.

Rational choice and moral judgment as an insurmountable dichotomy for a theory of decisions

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From a philosophical point of view, in general we can clearly distinguish two cultures, that is, culture in the context of the natural sciences and culture in the context of the humanities. Attempts are now being made to propose a third notion of culture, one that involves rational choice and moral judgment in this discourse (Semenova & Kotik-Friedgut, 2021; von Braun et al., 2021).

Before the 2000s, people tended to separate rational choice from moral judgment. However, for some years now, Kant's concept of pure reason as the self-sufficiency of the subject has been questioned by intellectuals (Berns et al. 2012).

There is a new definition of rationality, that is, rationality must be placed in a given situation to make sense, and it is context dependent, so it can be called situational rationality (Beauregard & Paquette, 2021; Lee, 2021; Morandín-Ahuerma et al., 2023; Stamatoudi & Edward Elgar, 2022).

At the same time, the concept of morality also began to deviate from the scope framed by Kant (Kant, 1996/ 1784; Kinkaid, 2019). Under the influence of scientific philosophers like Greene, morality is no longer the realization of a set of sacred orders but is constantly evolving in the specific process of history and development (Brunye, 2021).

Based on this, Darwin believed that animal morality and human morality are a coherent chain of existence, and that there is no insurmountable gap between them. In short, rationality is rooted in the scene, making this situational rationality dependent on various appropriate forms of scene acquisition, which means that rationality and morality are intertwined and cannot be neatly separated (Lee et al., 2021; Reichberg & Syse, 2021).

This allows us to ask two questions. One is how rationality depends on the situation, and the other is how morality evolves. My basic point of view is that, on the one hand, it is the unity of opposites between situational rationality and morality that constantly makes judgments (Morandín-Ahuerma, 2022a, 2022b; Cameron, 2018).

The unity of these two opposites constitutes the third cultural perspective. Clearly, there is a conflict between the first and second culture approaches. Natural Singh, M. (2023). Rational choice and moral judgment as an insurmountable dichotomy for a theory of decisions. *Journal of Exp. and Rev. in Neurosciences*, Vol. 8, Num. (2), 119-132. ISBN 2469-407X. DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.85.3.445

scientists use the language of mathematical logic to build their theoretical systems, emphasizing the rigor of knowledge (Christensen, 2012).

In his review of the sociology of knowledge, Wallenstein pointed out that after the initial formation of the social sciences in the mid-19th century, that is, around 1850, disciplines such as literature, history and philosophy based on narrative language were compared with those supported by the language of the natural sciences (Akiyama, 2021).

There are inherent tensions in disciplines such as anthropology, law, and economics. With the establishment and improvement of the university system, this tension has turned into an institutionalized allocation of resources and division of interests (Abdelaal, 2020).

According to Wittgenstein's analysis in "Lectures on Ethics", what can be said is a statement of facts, and once the words are spoken, it is a kind of nonsense based on understanding, intuition and experience of expressing the facts. But the meaning of humanist discourse is inherent in this absurdity. No matter how he tries to understand the facts through language in a value-neutral way, the subject has presupposed the meaning system a priori.

Between a fact and its attached meaning, there is no one-to-one correspondence similar to natural science, and there is no fact that Popper's so-called meaning can only be so. All meanings are constructed by the subject through discourse, and the facts are given meaning.

Defenders of a third culture reflect deeply on fact and meaning, and at the same time redefine the boundaries between science and philosophy, so in this sense they can be considered true public intellectuals. The result of this type of reflection is that intellectuals have a new perspective on issues such as the origin of conscience, moral philosophy and the meaning of life. This is the perspective of the third culture. Measured by this standard, even the most authoritative scientific page has many misrepresentations of the human experience.

The scientific journal "Nature" has published several brain science articles in a row, which strongly refute the concept of ruling circles, that is, rational choice and moral judgment are distinct. According to Hume's analysis, fact and value are separate, and the former implies the perspective of the third culture (Morandín-Ahuerma et al., 2022).

The unity of opposites between the self and social cognition that is constantly repeated. The unity of these two opposites constitutes the third cultural perspective.

My basic point is that, on the one hand, there is a unity of opposites between situational and moral rationality that constantly makes judgments, and on the other hand, symbolic communication.

It refers to the real problems that the natural sciences must solve, and the latter are the natural problems that scholars of the humanities must take seriously. The two have strict limits and cannot be confused with each other, that is, a certain value cannot necessarily be derived from the facts. Based on such a basic

assumption, scientists believe that a dominant rational choice model can be derived with its own strict scope that does not involve morality.

In fact, this is just scientific and reasonable imagination. It cannot withstand the challenge of experimental economics or the test of actual experience. Although mainstream economics is unwilling to admit that rational choice has an ambiguous connection to moral judgment, experimental economics has shown that this can only be self-delusion. Through the simplest benefit distribution experiment, experimental economists have shown that human beings do not only pursue the maximization of personal interests but must consider the relative fairness of the distribution plan. Only a fairer solution can be accepted by both parties.

At the same time, economists choose different groups of people as indigenous people in the real society to conduct experiments, and the results obtained are almost the same as those in the laboratory. As a result, the scientific narrative of the leading humanists has been widely challenged. If rational choices do not take into account the influence of morality, culture, customs and traditions, but simply deduce and reason according to mathematical models, systematic deviations will inevitably occur.

Discussion

Smith, an experimental economist who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002, discovered through a series of scientific experiments that when people make decisions, areas of the brain delineated according to medical principles that act on

rational choices have no an obvious answer and instead undertake the task based on moral judgment (Morandín-Ahuerma, 2019; Dixon & Christoff, 2014).

At the same time, he discovered that an important difference between humans and animals is that there is a mirror neuron in the human brain that carries out the imagination function of his mind. It is their function between the ages of 2 and 5 that makes young children aware of others as independent free will, seeing others as transformed beings. In this way, talents can form social awareness and social cognition (Morandín-Ahuerma, 2022c; Gillett & Franz, 2016).

Based on brain science research, we can know that when an individual makes a moral judgment, two iconic areas of the brain are activated at the same time, the moral subject as self-awareness and social cognition as their mental imagination. And the scene memory area has also been discovered, which is extremely valuable in understanding human rationality and morality. The difference between scene memory and episodic memory is that the former is a type of memory capacity unique to humans in a biological sense, while the latter is more humanized or culturally colored.

Its essence is a kind of psychological state that allows the subject to return to the past in the emotional experience through the triggering of certain scenes, triggering a kind, warm and deep feeling of time. The corresponding semantic memory occurs in the long-term evolution of scene memory. Semantic memory is the process by which the cognitive subject confirms or reencounters social,

behavioral and grammatical rules through symbolic memory, it is more of an objective symbol processing mechanism and eliminates the sense of time.

It can be said that scenic memory is a historical and retrospective display, while semantic memory is instant determination and identification. So obviously, people must rely on scene memory when making moral judgments, and relying on scene memory naturally involves the individual's emotions. In other words, value neutrality is impossible to achieve (Lopez-Paniagua & Seger, 2013).

Conclusion

The development of social theory shows that human beings will build mechanical and organic social networks based on the desire for security and efficiency. The social theory built on the basis of this social network demonstrates that human society needs strong altruists and needs to be compensated in some way.

In other words, social rationality and social morality are intertwined, and it is impossible for people to be separated from them when making decisions and making judgments. It is on this basis that the concept of social theory must be perceptual rather than a purely logical deduction, and the construction of social science must be based on common sense knowledge, to maintain its vitality forever. All in all, through this series of investigations, we can come to the conclusion that rational choice and moral judgment are almost identical, which is a basic emerging fact in the development of social history.

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