The Humility Heuristic or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don't Know

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Abstract: People don't always speak the truth. When they don't, we do better not to trust them. Unfortunately, that's often easier said than done. People don't usually wear a 'Not to be trusted!' badge on their sleeves, which lights up every time they depart from the truth. Given this, what can we do to figure out whom to trust, and whom not? Here I attempt to provide part of the answer. I propose a simple heuristic—I call it the "Humility Heuristic"—which is meant to help guide our search for trustworthy advisors. In slogan form, the heuristic says: *people worth trusting admit to what they don't know*. I give this heuristic a probabilistic interpretation, provide a Bayesian argument for it, and demonstrate its practical worth by showing how it can help address a number of familiar challenges in the relationship between experts and laypeople. The hope is that the paper will make it a little easier for all of us to separate the truthtellers from the bunch; and, in the course of doing so, teach the epistemologists among us a lesson or two about the normative role of epistemic humility in our testimonial practices.

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> *So I withdrew and thought to myself: "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know."*
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> — Socrates (Plato's *Apology*, 21d)

1. The Search for Trustworthy Advisors

One of the most salient facts about our epistemic lives is that we know much of what we know because others have told us. Most of us have never excavated any dinosaur fossils or detected any Higgs fields. Yet, many of us know that dinosaurs used to walk the earth and that the Higgs field is all around us. We know this because others have done the requisite investigations and communicated their findings to us.

But despite the obvious benefits of knowledge sharing, the practice of relying on other people's say-so is fraught with pitfalls: lying (Fallis 2009), misleading (Stokke 2016), bullshitting (Frankfurt 2005 [1986]), and other forms of misinformation pervade social life.[1] Given that we live in a world of less than fully reliable advisors, each of us is confronted with a challenge of determining who deserves our trust. And it's a *non-trivial* challenge. People don't usually wear a 'Not to be trusted!' badge on their sleeves, which lights up every time they depart from the truth. The evidence we have to go on is much more scarce and indirect than that. Given this, what can we do to figure out whom to trust, and whom not?

My aim in this paper is to provide part of the answer to this question. I'll propose a simple heuristic (or "rule of thumb") to help guide our search for trustworthy advisors. In slogan form, the heuristic says:

Humility Heuristic: People worth trusting admit to what they don't know.

I'll give this heuristic a probabilistic interpretation (§2), provide a Bayesian argument for it (§3), defend it against some possible worries (§4), and demonstrate its practical worth by showing how it can help address a number of familiar challenges in the relationship between experts and laypeople (§5). The hope is that the paper will make it a little easier for all of us to separate the truthtellers from the bunch; and, in the course of doing so, teach the epistemologists among us a lesson or two about the normative role of epistemic humility in our testimonial practices.

2. The Humility Heuristic in Probabilistic Terms

Let me begin by introducing the problem in a little more detail. We consider an encounter between two individuals: an *advisor* and an *advisee*. The advisee, we

[1] For a book length treatment of how misinformation can spread in groups or whole communities, see O'Connor and Weatherall (2019). See also Hardwig (1985) and Lackey (2008) for some good entry points into the epistemological literature on testimony.

suppose, is uncertain about whether a given proposition is true or false. Fortunately (or not, as the case may be) the advisee is now given the opportunity to consult the advisor about whether said proposition is true.

That's the basic setup. To be able to reason about it in a precise manner, a bit of formal machinery will be helpful. Let P be the *rational credence function* of the advisee prior to consulting the advisor: that is, a function from propositions to numbers between 0% and 100%, representing the credences (or degrees of belief) that the advisee ought to have at this initial point. I'll make three assumptions about P, all of which lie at the foundations of orthodox Bayesianism:[2] (i) P obeys the probability calculus; (ii) P obeys the Ratio Formula for conditional probabilities; and (iii) P is conditioned on the advisee's background evidence. Apart from that, I won't make any controversial assumptions about what it takes for a credence function to be rational.

Next, we need to say something about what kinds of answers the advisor can give in response to the advisee's query. If p is the proposition that the advisee seeks advice about about, we'll be considering two general types of answers that the advisor might give in response to the question "Is p true?"

First, the advisor might answer "Yes." That is, the advisor might *testify* to p by way of *asserting p*. It won't matter for present purposes how, exactly, this assertion is made, whether it be made verbally, in writing, or through some other means of communication.[3] What matters is that the advisor outright asserts p in a way that is clear and unambiguous to the advisee. Let's write "Tp" to denote the proposition that the advisor *T*estifies to p.

Second, the advisor might answer "I don't know." That is, the advisor might admit to not knowing whether p is true. Again, the exact wording here is not important: instead of saying "I don't know," the advisor might as well say "I couldn't tell you" or "I'm afraid I'll have to owe you an answer on that one." In particular,

[2] For some excellent background readings on Bayesian epistemology, see Bovens & Hartmann (2003) and Titelbaum (forthcoming).

[3] For a detailed examination of what sets acts of assertion apart from other kinds of acts (and, in particular, other kinds of speech acts), see MacFarlane (2011).

nothing is going to turn on whether the advisor admits to lacking *knowledge* or *justification to believe*: instead of saying "I don't know," the advisor might as well say "I don't have sufficient evidence to answer that question." But since it's much more common in ordinary discourse to talk about what we do or don't know than to talk about what we do or don't have justification to believe, I've opted for "I don't know" as my locution of choice. Let's stipulate that an agent who admits to not knowing whether a given proposition is true expresses *epistemic humility* about that proposition.[4] And let's write "*Hp*" to denote the proposition that the advisor expresses epistemic *H*umility about *p*.

There are, of course, many other answers that one might give in response to a question of the form "Is *p* true?" For example, rather than outright asserting *p*, one might express a weaker kind of commitment to the truth of *p* by saying things like "I suspect that *p*" or "I'm fairly confident that *p*." As we'll see in §5, such "hedged" assertions raise interesting questions about how the Humility Heuristic, as I'll understand it, may be generalized. But for now, I'd like to keep matters relatively simple by restricting attention to the two answers described above.

With these preliminaries in hand, we're ready for the official formulation of the Humility Heuristic (where *p* and *q* are arbitrary propositions):

[4] Two remarks about terminology. One: the term "epistemic humility" (together with its close cousins like "epistemic modesty" and "intellectual humility") has been given a number of different meanings in the philosophical literature. For example, Elga (2016) stipulates that you're epistemically humble iff you're uncertain about whether your beliefs will converge to the truth given enough evidence; and Dorst (2019) stipulates that you're epistemically modest iff you're uncertain about whether your beliefs are rational. My use of the term "epistemic humility" is different from both Elga's and Dorst's. Note, however, that all three notions are introduced as (semi-)technical terms, not competing analyses of the same intuitive concept. For a discussion of what is involved in our ordinary thought and talk about intellectual humility, see Whitcomb et al. (2017).

Two: the term "trust" has likewise been given a number of different meanings in the literature. In particular, there is an ongoing debate about how best to capture our ordinary understanding of what it means to trust someone, and what it means to be worthy of being trusted; see, e.g., Baier (1986), Hawley (2014) and Nguyen (forthcoming). Again, however, my understanding for present purposes of what it means for a person to be trustworthy (although, I take it, not entirely divorced from our ordinary conception of trustworthiness) will be stipulative: you have reason to trust a person on a given occasion iff you have reason to think that the advisor speaks the truth on that occasion.

Humility Heuristic:[5] $P(p|Tp \,\&\, Hq) > P(p|Tp)$

In words, the Humility Heuristic says to treat Tp & Hq as stronger evidence for p than Tp alone. More precisely: it says that the advisee's credence in p given that the advisor testifies to p should be lower than the advisee's credence in p given that the advisor testifies to *p and* admits to not knowing whether q is true. That's what I mean by saying that "people worth trusting admit to what they don't know."

Before I present my argument for the Humility Heuristic, let me clarify a few aspects of it.

First, note that the Humility Heuristic is a purely "ordinal" claim: it says *that* $P(p|Tp \,\&\, Hq)$ is greater than $P(p|Tp)$, but it says nothing about *how much* greater $P(p|Tp \,\&\, Hq)$ is than $P(p|Tp)$. Put in more intuitive terms: all the Humility Heuristic says is that people who admit to what they don't know are at least *slightly* more trustworthy for that reason; compared, that is, to people who *don't* admit to what they don't know. In this respect, the Humility Heuristic is a rather weak claim. It's natural to wonder whether we might be able to strengthen the Humility Heuristic, without imposing too severe limitations on its range of applicability. I'll briefly return to this possibility in §4; but a detailed investigation must wait for another occasion. My primary goal in this paper is to establish the purely ordinal claim, which I hope will prove to be a worthwhile project in its own right.

Second, there are various probability claims in the vicinity of the Humility Heuristic, which might be thought to follow from the heuristic, but which *don't*. Here are two such claims:

$P(p|Tp) > P(p)$

(In words: the fact that the advisor testifies to p is evidence for p.)

$P(p|Hq) > P(p)$

(In words: the fact that the advisor expresses humility about q is evidence for p.)

[5] Here is an equivalent formulation of the Humility Heuristic, which some may find easier to parse: $P(p|Tp \,\&\, Hq) > P(p|Tp \,\&\, {\sim}Hq)$.

Neither claim is implied by the Humility Heuristic—in fact, the Humility Heuristic may be accurate even if *neither Tp nor Hq* supports *p*.[6] However, for illustrative purposes, I'll focus mostly on cases where *Tp* provides at least *some* evidence for *p*, in which case the Humility Heuristic implies that *Tp* & *Hq* provides *even stronger* evidence for *p*.

Finally, note that the Humility Heuristic is intended as a *heuristic*. There is nothing probabilistically incoherent about a credence function that violates the inequality $P(p|Tp \,\&\, Hq) > P(p|Tp)$, for some *p* and *q*.[7] The question we'll be interested in is whether the Humility Heuristic is *typically* accurate in the kinds of epistemic situations that we might realistically find ourselves in. And as I argue below, I think this question can be given a positive answer.

3. A Bayesian Argument for the Humility Heuristic

The backbone of the argument is the following formal result:

> **Sufficiency Result:** The Humility Heuristic is accurate provided that the following conditions obtain:
>
> C1: $P(Tp|{\sim}p \,\&\, Hq) < P(Tp|{\sim}p)$
>
> C2: $P(p|Hq) \geq P(p)$
>
> C3: $P(Tp|Hq) \geq P(Tp)$

This result is simply a theorem of the probability calculus (I've included a proof in the Appendix). But it holds valuable information about the conditions under which the Humility Heuristic is accurate: it tells us that the Humility Heuristic is accurate

[6] Here is a quick proof by counterexample: define a probability distribution over the set of propositional variables $\{p, Tp, Hq\}$ such that $P(p) = .5$, $P(Hq) = .4$, $P(Tp) = .2$, $P(p|Hq) = P(p|Tp) = .5$, $P(Tp\&Hq) = .1$, and $P(p|Tp\&Hq) = 1$. Given this, $P(p|Tp\&Hq) > P(p|Tp)$, $P(p|Hq) = P(p)$, and $P(p|Tp) = P(p)$, which means that the Humility Heuristic is accurate, although neither (a) nor (b) obtains.

[7] The simplest way to see this is to let the unconditional probability of *p* be extreme, that is, by letting either $P(p) = 1$ or $P(p) = 0$. In either case, it follows that $P(p|Tp \,\&\, Hq) = P(p|Tp)$, contrary to the Humility Heuristic (for the familiar reason that extreme probabilities are preserved conditional on anything). Later on, we'll consider some less trivial counterexamples to the Humility Heuristic.

whenever a certain set of conditions, C1-C3, obtain. This is interesting because it gives us a way of breaking down the problem at hand into simpler, more manageable parts.

Below I'll look at the three conditions one at a time, with an eye to explaining what they say, what role they play in establishing the Sufficiency Result, and why we should expect them to obtain in most (but not all) situations. As we'll see, there are some worries one might have about each of the conditions, as well as about the argument as a whole. I'll address some of these as we go along, but I'll defer my discussion of the worries that I take to run a bit deeper until §4, when the positive case for the Humility Heuristic is on the table.

Remarks on C1: The first condition is also the most crucial, for reasons that will become clear later on. It says, roughly, that people who are willing to admit to what they don't know are less likely to make false assertions than people who are *not* willing to admit to what they don't know. More precisely: it says that the advisee should consider it more likely that the advisor testifies to *p* given that *p* is false than given that *p* is false *and* the advisor admits to not knowing whether *q* is true.

The rationale behind this condition goes as follows: presumably, someone who is willing to admit to not knowing whether *one* proposition is true will, other things being equal, be more likely to admit to not knowing *various other* unknown propositions; compared, that is, to someone who *isn't* willing to admit to not knowing whether said proposition is true. After all, the fact that someone admits to not knowing whether a given proposition is true is typically at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making false assertions. In other words, the fact that a person expresses epistemic humility about *q* is typically going to be at least a weak *pro tanto* reason to think that the person wouldn't assert *p*, if *p* were false.[8]

Here is an example to illustrate this somewhat abstract line of thought:

[8] Doesn't this depend on the content of *p* and *q*? In particular, doesn't it depend on whether *p* and *q* fall within the same general domain? The short answer is "No." I'll return to this question in §4.1.

Press Conference: You find yourself at a press conference in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sitting alongside the rest of the press corps. When called upon, you're allowed to ask two questions directed to the foreign minister. You've decided to ask the following two questions:

Q1: "Does Country X possess weapons of mass destruction?"

Q2: "Would policy Y, if implemented, have effect Z?"

In response to these questions, the foreign minister answers:

A1: "I'm afraid we don't have enough evidence to answer that question."

A2: "Yes, it would."

How should you take the fact that the foreign minister expresses epistemic humility about Q1 to bear on the question of whether her answer to Q2 is correct? As always, this depends on your background evidence. But I take it that, on most realistic ways of filling in the details of the story, you should treat the fact that the foreign minister is willing to admit to not knowing the answer to Q1 as at least a weak *pro tanto* reason to think that they wouldn't have answered "Yes" in response to Q2, if the true answer had been "No." After all, the fact that the foreign minister is willing to express epistemic humility about Q1 makes it (at least slightly) less likely that they is systematically lying or bullshitting or otherwise being insensitive to the truth on this occasion.[9] And that's all it takes for C1 to obtain in this case.

It seems to me that most ordinary situations are like Press Conference in this respect: that is, it typically seems reasonable to treat a person's expression of epistemic humility as at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making false assertions. I say "typically" because there may be exceptions. Suppose, for example,

[9] Of course, the foreign minister might be lying about whether she knows the answer to the first question. But that's a subtly different matter. It's one thing to lie about *p*; it's another thing to lie about whether you know *p*. Someone who lies about not knowing *p* doesn't thereby make a false assertion about *p*. As such, it's not clear that the possibility that the foreign minister lies about not knowing the answer to the first question has any significant bearing on the probability that her answer to the second question is false. But in any case, I doubt that this possibility will create problems for C1 in most ordinary situations.

that you have good reason to think that it would be in your friend's interest to lie about who invented the light bulb, but not in your friend's interest to lie about who is the current president of Switzerland (perhaps because you have good reason to think that your friend, being an aficionado of 19th century technology, would be embarrassed by not knowing who invented the light bulb, but not embarrassed by not knowing who is the current president of Switzerland). If that's your situation, the fact that your friend admits to not knowing who is the current president of Switzerland might not give you any reason (or perhaps only a miniscule reason[10]) to think that your friend won't lie about who invented the light bulb. But note that even if C1 isn't immune to counterexamples, it might still do its job in helping to establish the Humility Heuristic as a good rule of thumb. What matters for this purpose is that C1 *typically* obtains. And that's what I take to be plausible on the grounds that it typically seems reasonable to treat the fact that someone is willing to admit to what they don't know as at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making false assertions.

Remarks on C2: The second condition plays a somewhat more peripheral role. It says, roughly, that the fact that the advisor admits to not knowing whether q is true doesn't constitute direct evidence against p. More precisely: it says that the advisee's credence in p given that the advisor admits to not knowing whether q is true shouldn't be lower than the advisee's unconditional credence in p.

The reason why C2 is needed for the Sufficiency Result is fairly straightforward: in cases where Hq is direct evidence against p, Tp & Hq can fail to be stronger evidence for p than Tp alone, simply because Hq acts as a *rebutting defeater* of p. Suppose, for example, that you have good reason to think that your friend would have known q, if p had been true (perhaps because you have good reason to think that someone would

[10] On closer inspection, it's not immediately clear that you shouldn't become at least *slightly* more confident that your friend won't lie about who invented the light bulb. But I'm inclined to think (and, in any case, am happy to concede) that, with enough creativity, one can construct a genuine counterexample to C1 along these lines.

have told your friend that *q*, had *p* been true).[11] If that's your situation, you should take the fact that your friend admits to not knowing whether *q* is true to constitute evidence against *p*. After all, if *p* had been true, your friend would most likely have known *q*, in which case they most likely wouldn't have admitted to not knowing whether *q* is true. Thus, assuming that *Hq* is a strong enough rebutter of *p,* we have a case where *Tp* & *Hq* doesn't support *p* more strongly than *Tp* alone, contrary to the Humility Heuristic.

But again, what matters for present purposes is whether C2 *typically* obtains. And I think it *does*. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is by noticing that C2 will (at the very least) obtain whenever *Hq* is evidentially irrelevant to *p*, that is, when *Hq* neither raises nor lowers the probability of *p* (relative to the advisee's background evidence). And this already seems to cover a wide range of ordinary cases: the fact that your colleague admits to not knowing whether the Lakers beat the Celtics last night seems to have no (or at least only a minuscule) evidential bearing on whether Paris is the capital of France; the fact that your teacher admits to not knowing who was awarded the inaugural Fields Medal seems to have no (or at least only a minuscule) evidential bearing on whether the chemical structure of water is H_2O; and so on. More generally: unless you have a special reason to think that the question of whether your advisor knows *q* has a direct evidential bearing on whether *p* is true, C2 will (*a fortiori*) obtain.

Remarks on C3: The third condition also plays more of a peripheral role. It says, roughly, that the fact that the advisor admits to not knowing whether *q* is true doesn't make it any less likely that the advisor will testify to *p*. More precisely: it says that the advisee's credence that the advisor will testify to *p* given that the advisor admits to not knowing whether *q* is true shouldn't be lower than the advisee's unconditional credence that the advisor will testify to *p*.

The reason why C3 is needed for the Sufficiency Result is a little more subtle: in cases where *Hq* is evidence against *Tp*, the Humility Heuristic can fail to be accurate,

[11] This example is inspired by Goldberg's (2010, ch. 6) discussion of inferences from "absence of evidence" to "evidence of absence."

even if C1 and C2 both obtain. Here's an example: suppose you're about to ask your friend two questions: (i) "What is the capital of France?," and (ii) "What is the capital of Italy?" Suppose also that, given your background knowledge of what people tend to know about European geography, you find it highly unlikely that your friend would know the capital of France, but fail to know the capital of Italy. If that's your situation, your credence that your friend will assert that Paris is the capital of France given that your friend admits to not knowing the capital of Italy should, contrary to C3, be lower than your unconditional credence that your friend will assert that Paris is the capital of France. After all, the fact that your friend doesn't know the capital of Italy is strong evidence (for you) that your friend doesn't know the capital of France either.

We can then ask: should you, as the Humility Heuristic dictates, be less confident that Paris is the capital of France given that your friend asserts that Paris is the capital of France than given that your friend asserts that Paris is the capital of France *and* admits to not knowing the capital of Italy? Presumably not. After all, you should find it highly unlikely in advance that your friend would know the capital of France, but fail to know the capital of Italy. Thus, you should take the fact that your friend both asserts that Paris is the capital of France and admits to not knowing the capital of Italy to be a strong indication that your friend is either confused or insincere or otherwise insensitive to the truth on this occasion.

Here is a case, then, where C3 fails to obtain, and where, as a consequence, the Humility Heuristic fails to be accurate. But, once again, what matters is whether C3 *typically* obtains. And, once again, I think it *does*, for reasons similar to those laid out in my remarks on C2: C3 will (at least very least) obtain whenever *Hq* is evidentially irrelevant to *Tp* relative to the advisee's background evidence. And this seems to cover a wide range of ordinary cases: the fact that your mother admits to not knowing who founded Marlboro seems to have no (or at least only a minuscule) evidential bearing on the question of whether she will tell you that it will be rainy tomorrow; the fact that your business partner admits to not knowing who arranged last year's office party seems to have no (or at least only a minuscule) evidential bearing on whether she will tell you that today's meeting is cancelled; and so on. More generally: unless you have a special reason to think that the question of whether your advisor knows *q* has a direct evidential bearing on whether your advisor will testify to *p*, C3 will (*a fortiori*) obtain.[12]

So far, so good. We've now seen that the Humility Heuristic is accurate whenever the conditions C1-C3 obtain; and we've seen some reasons to think that these conditions obtain in a wide range of ordinary situations. But what happens when they *don't*? Is the Humility Heuristic inaccurate in all such cases? No. Just as none of the conditions is individually sufficient for the Humility Heuristic to be accurate, none of them is individually necessary either. In fact, the strongest logical combination of C1-C3 which is necessary for the Humility Heuristic to be accurate is their *disjunction*. That's our next result:

> **Necessity Result:** The Humility Heuristic is accurate only if at least one of C1-C3 obtains.

Like the Sufficiency Result, the Necessity Result is a theorem of the probability calculus.[13] It tells us that the Humility Heuristic is guaranteed to be inaccurate when C1-C3 all fail to obtain at the same time. Obviously, if the foregoing remarks are on

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[12] Let me add a subtle point here: I've said that the fact that an advisor expresses epistemic humility on a given occasion is typically at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making *false* assertions. By the same token, doesn't the fact that an advisor expresses epistemic humility on a given occasion typically provide at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making assertions *simpliciter*? And if so, doesn't this generate a broad class of counterexamples to C3? That may well be right, I think. But the relevant class of counterexamples to C3 wouldn't carry over as counterexamples to the Humility Heuristic. When a counterexample to C3 constitutes a counterexample to the Humility Heuristic, it's because it describes a situation in which the fact that the advisor expresses epistemic humility about *q* makes it more likely that the advisor would falsely assert *p*, if she were to assert *p* at all. That's what made the "European geography" case discussed above a counterexample to the Humility Heuristic. But the class of counterexamples to C3 under consideration here don't share this feature with the European geography case; they simply describe cases in which the fact that the advisor expresses epistemic humility about *q* makes it less likely that the advisor will assert *p* in the first place.

[13] The proof of this result is similar to the proof of the Sufficiency Result included in the Appendix; the details are left out. The same goes for the "Equivalence Result" below.

the right track, we should expect such situations to be quite rare. But there is a different result in the vicinity which promises wider applicability:

Equivalence Result: The Humility Heuristic is equivalent to C1 provided that the following conditions obtain:

C2*: $P(p|Hq) = P(p)$

C3*: $P(Tp|Hq) = P(Tp)$

This result tells us that C1 is both necessary and sufficient for the Humility Heuristic to be accurate, provided that we replace C2 and C3 by two stronger conditions, C2* and C3*, which say that *Hq* is evidentially irrelevant to both *p* and *Tp*. Given that C2* and C3* are logically stronger than C2 and C3, they will, in a trivial sense, obtain less often. Still, I think we should expect C2* and C3* to obtain in a fairly wide range of situations. As suggested in my remarks on C2 and C3, it often seems reasonable to assume that *Hq* has no (or at least only a minuscule) evidential bearing on *p* and *Tp*. Whenever this is the case, the Equivalence Result tells us that the question of whether the Humility Heuristic is accurate comes down to whether C1 obtains. That's why I said earlier that C1 is the most crucial condition for present purposes.

4. Worries about the Humility Heuristic

I find the case in favor of the Humility Heuristic compelling. Nevertheless, there are some worries one might have about it. In this section, I'll look at two of the most interesting worries that have been brought to my attention. I don't think either worry ultimately has much force against the central thesis of this paper. But they raise important questions about the scope and limitations of the Humility Heuristic worth examining in their own right.

4.1. Domain-Relative Trustworthiness

The first worry goes as follows:

> The Humility Heuristic, as stated, doesn't say anything about whether *p* and *q* must fall within the same general domain. Yet, people's degree of trustworthiness clearly varies from domain to domain: someone who is trustworthy on matters of cosmology needn't be trustworthy on matters of developmental psychology; someone who is trustworthy on matters of English literature needn't be trustworthy on matters of US foreign politics; and so on. More generally, someone who is trustworthy in one domain needn't be trustworthy in other, far removed domains. Doesn't this suggest that we should only expect the Humility Heuristic to be accurate when *p* and *q* fall within the same domain, or at least suitably similar domains?

There is clearly something right about the observation that people's degree of trustworthiness varies from domain to domain. One can, of course, quibble about how to individuate domains; but that's beside the point here. Regardless of how we choose to individuate domains, people's degree of trustworthiness is presumably going to vary from domain to domain. The question is whether this elementary fact spells trouble for the Humility Heuristic. And that's where I think the worry misfires.

The thing to keep in mind here is that the Humility Heuristic is a purely ordinal claim: it says *that* *Tp* & *Hq* supports *p* more strongly than *Tp* alone, but it doesn't say anything about *how much* more strongly *Tp* & *Hq* supports *p* than *Tp* alone. The relevant question for present purposes, then, is whether this purely ordinal claim is true (or rather *typically* true) in cases where *p* and *q* fall within very different domains. And I think this question can be given a positive answer.

The easiest way to see this is by looking at the main condition, C1, which says that the advisor is less likely to assert *p* given *~p* & *Hq* than given *~p* alone. Is this condition satisfied even if *p* and *q* fall within very different domains? In particular: is it satisfied even if the advisor is much less trustworthy relative to the "*p*-domain" than relative to the "*q*-domain"? Given that the remarks on C1 in §3 are correct, the answer is positive: even if *p* and *q* fall within very different domains, the fact that the advisor admits to not knowing whether *q* is true is still at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making false assertions, including about matters within the *p*-domain. To be sure, this is not to say that the fact that the advisor admits to not knowing whether *q* is true raises their degree of trustworthiness relative to the *p*-domain by a *large amount*. The claim is just that the fact that the advisor admits to not knowing whether *q* is true makes it at least *slightly* less likely that the advisor will make false assertions about matters within the *p*-domain, including about *p* itself.

Here is an example to illustrate the point: suppose (as seems reasonable) that you consider your physics professor to be more trustworthy on matters of cosmology than on matters of developmental psychology. Suppose also that, on a given occasion, your physics professor admits to not knowing whether the universe has a flat or curved geometry. Should this expression of epistemic humility about the geometry of the universe make you more confident that your professor won't make false assertions about matters related to developmental psychology? Presumably, yes: once again, you should take the fact that your professor is willing to admit to not knowing whether the universe has a flat or curved geometry to be at least a weak indication of a general aversion against making false assertions, including about matters related to developmental psychology. This is not to say that your professor's expression of epistemic humility about the geometry of the universe raises their degree of trustworthiness on matters of developmental psychology by a *large amount* (indeed, that may seem doubtful). The claim is just that your professor's expression of epistemic humility about the geometry of the universe makes it at least *slightly* less likely that they will make false assertions about matters of developmental psychology.

In sum: the fact that people's degree of trustworthiness tends to vary from domain to domain doesn't seem to cause trouble for the Humility Heuristic, understood as a purely ordinal claim. Nevertheless, I think the worry discussed here brings out an interesting point about when the Humility Heuristic may prove most *useful*. Suppose we wanted to go beyond the purely ordinal claim, and say something more substantial about when expressions of epistemic humility have the most epistemic value: that is, when the difference between $P(p|Tp \& Hq)$ and $P(p|Tp)$ is most significant. If that was our goal, we'd perhaps do well to pay closer attention to the specific content of *p* and *q*, and, in particular, whether they fall within suitably similar domains. But that's a bridge we'll have to cross when we get there.

4.2. Hedged Assertions

The second worry I'd like to consider goes as follows:

> The Humility Heuristic, as stated, doesn't say anything about whether *p* and *q* must be *distinct* propositions. Yet, the Humility Heuristic doesn't seem to provide accurate guidance in cases where *p* and *q* are identical. The problem is not so much to do with "Moorean" assertions of the form "*p,* but I don't know *p*." Such assertions are presumably quite rare anyway. Rather, the trouble is to do with "hedged" assertions such as "I believe she's gonna make it, but I might be wrong" or "I suspect he committed the crime, but I don't know for sure." Such assertions are pervasive in ordinary discourse. And their logical form seems to be well captured by the conjunction "$Tp \& Hp$." However, hedged assertions, by their nature, serve to express a relatively weak kind of commitment to the truth of the asserted proposition, thereby providing the hearer with a correspondingly weak reason to believe the asserted proposition. For example, if I say "I believe she's gonna make it, but I might be wrong" this will (at least typically, if not always) give you *less* of a reason to believe that she's gonna make it than if I say outright "I believe she's gonna make it." Doesn't this impose quite significant limitations on the scope of the Humility Heuristic?

I think this worry is basically sound… exception for one key point: the logical form of a hedged assertion is not well captured by the conjunction "$Tp \& Hp$." As we recall from §2, the intended interpretation of "Tp" is as an outright assertion of *p*, and a hedged assertion like "I believe she's gonna make it, but I might be wrong" presumably doesn't contain an outright assertion in its first conjunct, despite surface appearances to the contrary.[14] As such, the Humility Heuristic was never supposed to say anything about hedged assertions in the first place. In particular, it doesn't say that the hedged assertion "I believe she's gonna make it, but I might be wrong" gives you more reason to believe that she's gonna make it than the outright assertion "I believe she's gonna make it."

Nevertheless, I find the worry discussed here illuminating, because it reminds us to be careful about how we go about *generalizing* the Humility Heuristic, should we want to do so at a later point. In particular, it teaches us that we can't straightforwardly generalize the Humility Heuristic to cover hedged assertions without running into a broad class of counterexamples.

5. Putting the Humility Heuristic to Work: Experts *vs.* Laypeople

Although the central aim of this paper is to lay the theoretical foundations of the Humility Heuristic, I'd like to end by looking more closely at a specific application of the heuristic, in the hope of demonstrating the practical significance of what has been said so far. I've chosen to focus attention on a set of issues related to *expert testimony*. There are, no doubt, many other potential applications of the Humility Heuristic that deserve a separate discussion of their own. But I hope that the following discussion touches on some challenges that many of us will be able to recognize from our own epistemic lives.

Here goes, then: it's well-known that expert testimony plays a central role in communities with a high degree of division of cognitive labor.[15] Yet, the dissemination of knowledge by expert testimony is complicated by the fact that experts don't always agree among themselves. When they don't, it can be difficult for the rest of us to figure

[14] For further discussion of the role of hedged assertions in ordinary discourse, I refer to Benton and van Elswyk (2020).
[15] See Hardwig (1985) and Kitcher (1990; 1993) for some excellent discussions on this point.

out who's on the right side of the debate. After all, we, as laypeople, usually aren't in a position to adjudicate expert disagreements by looking at the relevant first-order evidence and arguments ourselves. We simply don't have the requisite knowledge and competencies to do so. Given this, what can we do to help?

In his seminal discussion of this problem, Goldman (2001, p. 94) introduces what I think is a helpful distinction between *esoteric* and *exoteric* information in an expert's discourse. Esoteric information belongs to the relevant area of expertise, and hence isn't the kind of information that laypeople are usually in a good position to rely on. Exoteric information, on the other hand, doesn't belong to the relevant area of expertise, and hence is more readily accessible to the layperson. Needless to say, this distinction between esoteric and exoteric information isn't sharp; it admits of degrees, just like the distinction between "expert" and "layperson." But for present purposes, it won't hurt to talk about esoteric and exoteric information in categorical terms.

The central lesson of Goldman's discussion, then, is that, even if laypeople can't rely on esoteric information to adjudicate expert disagreements—that is, even if they aren't in a position to judge the bearing of the first-order evidence and arguments put forward by the experts—they might still be able to rely on various kinds of exoteric information to make an informed judgment about which expert is most worthy of being trusted. This raises a further question: what kinds of exoteric information do laypeople typically have at their disposal? Goldman himself discusses five broad categories of exoteric information related to, among other things, "dialectical superiority," past "track-records," and appraisals by "meta-experts." I won't go into detail with these here. Let me instead mention a different kind of exoteric information, which has been brought to my attention by Dellsén (2016).

Dellsén argues that the fact that there is disagreement among a group of experts on a given issue constitutes a *pro tanto* reason for the laypeople among us to trust the group of experts on issues on which they *agree*. For example, if I learn that a group of cosmologists disagree among themselves about whether the universe has a flat or curved geometry, I may treat this fact as a *pro tanto* reason to trust their consensus, if there is one, on the age of the universe. As Dellsén puts it: "expert disagreement supports the consensus." One can, of course, take issue with this claim. But if it's right, it shows something interesting about expert disagreement, namely that *it itself* can be seen as a kind of exoteric information, which laypeople may use to judge the relative trustworthiness of different groups of experts.[16]

Let me now add my own two cents: the suggestion I want to make here is that we can view epistemic humility as yet another type of exoteric information in an expert's discourse. When seen through this lense, the Humility Heuristic becomes a heuristic about how to incorporate a particular kind of exoteric information. To take a simple example, suppose you're confronted with a disagreement between two medical doctors about the effects of cannabis on clinical depression: Doctor A believes that cannabis *is* an effective treatment of depression, whereas Doctor B believes that it *isn't*. Suppose also that you know (perhaps from a previous encounter) that Doctor A has expressed epistemic humility about a different medical issue—about, say, the effects of musical treatment on epilepsy—whereas Doctor B *hasn't* (to your knowledge) expressed epistemic humility about this other medical issue. Given this, the Humility Heuristic tells you to treat this fact as a reason to think that Doctor A is more likely than Doctor B to be right about the effects of cannabis on clinical depression.

As always, there might be other (potentially more weighty) reasons to think that Doctor B is more trustworthy than Doctor A. Perhaps a third expert has appraised Doctor B, but not Doctor A. Or perhaps Doctor B's past track-record is more impressive than Doctor A's. The Humility Heuristic doesn't say anything about how to incorporate these other kinds of exoteric information. It just says that you should treat the fact that Doctor A has expressed epistemic humility about the effects of musical treatment on epilepsy as at least a weak *pro tanto* reason to think that Doctor A

[16] I should note that Dellsén doesn't frame his proposal as one concerning exoteric information, but I hope that he will nevertheless be sympathetic to the spirit in which his proposal is put to use here.

is more likely than Doctor B to be on the right side of the disagreement about the effects of cannabis on clinical depression.

What about cases where a layperson receives testimony from a *single* expert who isn't (to the layperson's knowledge) in disagreement with any other expert on the relevant issue? In such cases, we still seem face a challenge of determining how much trust to place in the expert's testimony. After all, not all *alleged* experts are *genuine* experts, and it can be difficult to figure out who is who. A particularly salient example of this comes from a phenomenon that Ballantyne (2019) and Gerken (2018) call *epistemic trespassing*: roughly, the phenomenon of experts testifying outside their area of expertise. Consider the following real-world example, which Ballantyne uses to illustrate the phenomenon:

> Linus Pauling, the brilliant chemist and energetic proponent of peace, won two Nobel Prizes—one for his work in chemistry, and another for his activism against atomic weapons. Later, Pauling asserted that mega-doses of vitamin C could effectively treat diseases such as cancer and cure ailments like the common cold. Pauling was roundly dismissed as a crackpot by the medical establishment after researchers ran studies and concluded that high-dose vitamin C therapies did not have the touted health effects. Pauling accused the establishment of fraud and careless science. This trespasser did not want to be moved aside by the real experts. (Ballantyne 2019, p. 367)

I take this sort of epistemic trespassing to be (all too) familiar. And I take it that we would prefer not to trust an epistemic trespasser (at least not to the extent that we would a genuine expert). But how can we tell when someone is engaging in epistemic trespassing, and when not?

Once again, I want to suggest that the Humility Heuristic provides part of the answer: if you know that a given expert has (perhaps on a previous occasion) declined to testify outside their area of expertise, the Humility Heuristic tells you to treat this fact as at least a weak *pro tanto* reason to trust the expert on this occasion. Admittedly, I don't know how often we may hope to have access to information about whether a given expert has declined to testify outside their area of expertise. But when we *do*, the Humility Heuristic says that we can use this information as a basis (albeit a fallible and defeasible one) on which to distinguish cases of genuine expert testimony from cases of epistemic trespassing.

6. Conclusion

We live in a world of less than fully reliable people: people who sometimes, but not always, speak the truth. My aim in this paper has been to provide a bit of guidance as to how to navigate this predicament. More specifically: I've proposed a heuristic—the Humility Heuristic—which, in slogan form, says that *people worth trusting admit to what they don't know*. I've given this heuristic a precise probabilistic interpretation; and I've argued that it provides accurate guidance in a wide range of situations.

The qualification "in a wide range of situations" has been left vague; and deliberately so. The question of how often, exactly, the Humility Heuristic provides accurate guidance is ultimately contingent on the epistemic situations that we happen to find ourselves in. Nonetheless, even if it should turn out that I've overestimated how often the Humility Heuristic provides us with accurate guidance, I hope that a better understanding of the conditions under which the Humility Heuristic *does* provide accurate guidance may prove useful in determining when to rely on the heuristic, and when not.

Appendix: Proof of Sufficiency Result

By Bayes' Theorem, C1 is equivalent to:

$$P({\sim}p \mathbin{\&} Hq|Tp)P(Tp)/P({\sim}p \mathbin{\&} Hq) < P({\sim}p|Tp)P(Tp)/P({\sim}p) \tag{1}$$

By the Ratio Formula, C2 is equivalent to:

$$P({\sim}p \mathbin{\&} Hq) \leq P({\sim}p)P(Hq) \tag{2}$$

From (1) and (2), it follows that:

$$P({\sim}p \mathbin{\&} Hq|Tp)/[P({\sim}p)P(Hq)] < P({\sim}p|Tp)/P({\sim}p) \tag{3}$$

By the Ratio Formula, (3) is equivalent to:

$$P(\sim p \,\&\, Hq \,\&\, Tp)/[P(Tp)P(Hq)] < P(\sim p|Tp) \tag{4}$$

By the Ratio Formula, C3 is equivalent to:

$$P(Tp)P(Hq) \leq P(Tp \,\&\, Hq) \tag{5}$$

From (4) and (5), it follows that:

$$P(\sim p \,\&\, Hq \,\&\, Tp)P(Tp \,\&\, Hq) < P(\sim p|Tp) \tag{6}$$

By the Ratio Formula, (6) is equivalent to:

$$P(\sim p|Tp \,\&\, Hq) < P(\sim p|Tp) \tag{7}$$

Since $P(\sim p|\cdot) = 1 - P(p|\cdot)$, (7) is equivalent to the Humility Heuristic. ▮

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