Affective Societies

Affect and emotion have come to dominate discourse on social and political life in the mobile and networked societies of the early 21st century.

This volume introduces a unique collection of essential concepts for theorizing and empirically investigating societies as Affective Societies. The concepts promote insights into the affective foundations of social coexistence and are indispensable to comprehend the many areas of conflict linked to emotion such as migration, political populism, or local and global inequalities. Adhering to an instructive narrative, Affective Societies provides historical orientation; detailed explication of the concept in question, clear-cut research examples, and an outlook at the end of each chapter.

Presenting interdisciplinary research from scholars within the Collaborative Research Center “Affective Societies,” this insightful monograph will appeal to students and researchers interested in fields such as affect and emotion, anthropology, cultural studies, and media studies.

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Routledge Studies in Affective Societies
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Routledge Studies in Affective Societies presents high-level academic work on the social dimensions of human affectivity. It aims to shape, consolidate and promote a new understanding of societies as Affective Societies, accounting for the fundamental importance of affect and emotion for human coexistence in the mobile and networked worlds of the 21st century. Contributions come from a wide range of academic fields, including anthropology, sociology, cultural, media and film studies, political science, performance studies, art history, philosophy, and social, developmental and cultural psychology. Contributing authors share the vision of a transdisciplinary understanding of the affective dynamics of human sociality. Thus, Routledge Studies in Affective Societies devotes considerable space to the development of methodology, research methods and techniques that are capable of uniting perspectives and practices from different fields.

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Acknowledgments

Affect is a matter of intensity. This, at any rate, was for some time the conventional wisdom in the field of affect studies. Usually, the compiling of academic volumes is a much less intensive affair: long-in-the-making, often cumbersome, neither the most dynamic nor the most exciting part of academic work. But our work on the present book turned out rather differently. Growing out of the Berlin-based Collaborative Research Center (CRC) Affective Societies during a demanding phase, work on this volume resembled a frantic race more than the usual drain and drag of academic publishing. Intensity reigned after all – and we are not sure whether the myriad affects stirred up during the process were always only positive ones. Here, the editors take full responsibility for this deviation from the routine dullness of academic publishing. It was us who imposed the strict regime the contributors had to struggle with. It was us who spurred the authors to embrace a weird format – chapters that are hybrids of glossary entries, review articles, and research reports. It was us who issued a new style sheet midway through the process and shortened the timeline for submissions by several months. And it was certainly us who kept pushing for more clarity, more stylistic amendments, and more cross-references right to the finishing line.

Thus, given all of this, we owe the 39 contributors to this book a massive thank you – for your excellent contributions, for your patience and resistance to stress, and for understanding (most of) our editorial requests. We also thank many of the contributors for participating in an internal peer-review process and an author’s workshop – extra efforts we did not take for granted. Working with such a committed and gifted group of both junior and senior researchers was a great pleasure. Moreover, we were blessed to be able to count on a team of aides that were not only highly motivated but above all extremely competent, reliable, and professional: Aditi Surie von Czechowski and Tamar Blickstein decisively improved the language of most contributions, teaching us a trick or two about academic English along the way. Shirin Weigelt and Marie Wuth took on tedious formatting tasks and solved them excellently, often helping authors improve clarity and style as well. Moreover, we benefitted enormously from regular advice and two last-second reviews.
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Behind the scenes and at all times, we could count on the diligent work and affective support of the staff at the CRC Affective Societies — thanks especially to Ulrike Geiger and Katharina Metz. We are also grateful for the enduring support of the editors of Routledge’s Series in Affective Societies, Birgitt Röttger-Rössler and Doris Kolesch, who motivated us to go ahead with the project from the very beginning.

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Berlin, August 2018

Jan Slaby and Christian von Scheve
This volume grew out of the research activities at the Collaborative Research Center (CRC) 1171 *Affective Societies – Dynamics of Social Coexistence in Mobile Worlds* at Freie Universität Berlin, generously funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), initial funding period 2015–2019. Unless otherwise indicated, all contributions to this volume are official publications of the CRC.
Affect and emotion have come to dominate discourse on social and political life at the beginning of the 21st century. In politics, the rise of populism and new styles of political contestation are frequently described with reference to their emotionalizing and affectively polarizing qualities. Surging religious conflicts across the globe are portrayed through an affective lens, highlighting the importance of anger, rage, offense, and indignation for prolonged conflict. Capitalist economies are increasingly understood as exploiting not only people’s cognitive and bodily capacities, but also their feelings and emotions. Practices of social media often come with intensified displays of affect, frequently addressed adversely at individuals or groups in an openly hostile or even violent manner.

This current “emotional reflexivity” – the tendency to understand and portray the social world in terms of feelings and emotions – is not confined to public spheres and political debates, but has been preceded by a “turn to affect” within different academic disciplines. This is neither a historical coincidence, nor academia’s talent for foretelling the future. Research in the social and behavioral sciences as well as in the humanities and cultural studies has long suggested that affect and emotion are so intricately and essentially human that they form the fundamental basis of being and sociality. As a consequence, these disciplines have continuously developed theories that account for the role of affect and emotion in social life, both in terms of general social and cultural theory and in terms of understanding their importance for historically and culturally distinct societies.

Affective Societies is the theme of an interdisciplinary research initiative that acknowledges and systematically extends these insights to study the affective and emotional dimensions of contemporary social and societal coexistence. It is based on a theoretical and diagnostic approach centered on a social-relational and situated understanding of affect and emotion. This perspective comes with a methodological orientation focusing on empirically grounded approaches. These approaches are capable of illuminating the affective dynamics of societal coexistence in their local specificities within different domains of life in contemporary societies. The present volume develops a
tableau of key concepts that are foundational to this outlook. It offers a framework for the study of affect and emotion across a spectrum of disciplines in the social sciences, cultural and media studies, and the humanities. The book thus aims at contributing to and further developing in a systematic and innovative fashion work belonging to the broader theoretical movement in the humanities and cultural studies variously called “affect studies” or the “turn to affect.” It will do so in a way that re-connects these recent strands of theorizing with long-standing work on emotion and affective phenomena undertaken in other disciplines, in particular the social sciences, that has mostly remained outside the spotlight of these currently much-discussed lines of inquiry.

In this introduction, we will outline the overall perspective of this research initiative and explain the rationale of the present volume. We begin by discussing its title: Affective Societies. We will expound upon Affective Societies as both a theoretical designator capable of orienting productive work in social and cultural theory and a diagnostic-analytical lens for coming to terms with a salient range of recent societal developments. Along the way, we sketch the main theoretical trends that inform the approach to affect and emotion essential to all of the chapters in this volume. These include a dynamic-relational and situated understanding of affective phenomena, a perspective on embodied yet mobile repertoires of emotion, practices of mediation, and performativity. They encompass the global circulation of symbols, forms, and styles within public spheres and realms of political debate that have witnessed substantial changes over the past decade. We then introduce our understanding of concepts as dynamic templates for analytical articulation. We conceive of concepts as generative schemas linking disciplinary perspectives and bridging theory with research. At the same time, concepts are rallying points for contestation and debate, epitomizing what is not yet understood, and thereby propelling research forward. Furthermore, we explain the logic that informs the four thematic parts of the volume and outline the generic format of the 29 chapters. We close with an outlook on pressing issues for future research.

Affective Societies: theoretical and diagnostic perspectives

Human coexistence is profoundly a matter of affect and emotion. This is obvious for elementary forms of sociality unfolding in face-to-face interactions or close-knit communities. It is no less evident in the formation and makeup of larger-scale forms of social organization, with regard to questions of stratification and inequality, migration, integration, and social cohesion, institutional change and stability, belonging and identification, or conflict and conflict resolution. Political communication, for example, is an area of sustained, elaborate, wide-ranging, and often expertly performed emotionalization. Likewise, the creation
and circulation of cultural ideals of coexistence, forms of belonging, or ways of being a person or a citizen are thoroughly affective and often tied to specific emotions. Somewhat less obvious – at least by conventional standards of social and political theory – is the involvement of affect and emotion in the strategies of governance employed by state actors to secure allegiance and elicit conformity among its constituents. Here too, a perspective focusing on affect and emotion will reveal a range of important insights. For instance, it will bring to light strategies directed at the cultivation, regimentation, and discursive elaboration of sentiments, affective styles, and emotion repertoires, for instance, those pertaining to aspects of belonging and collective identity or to modes of compliance with the demands of prevailing political and economic powers. Governing subjects necessarily involves governing their hearts. Or, at any rate, it involves sustained and far-reaching attempts to do so, which are often met with resistance and may have profound unintended consequences, which are usually themselves matters of intensive affect.

Affect and emotion are also highly prevalent in those social structures and social situations in which inequalities and power relations bound to race, class, and gender are rampant. While these categories and their intersections have been investigated by various disciplines with regard to social, economic, and political standing and in view of identities and identity politics, their affective constitution has by and large received only scarce attention. Race, class, and gender, unlike many other forms of social differentiation, inherently involve affective processes of othering that go hand in hand with relational modes of address, distinction, and valuation. Memorably analyzed by Frantz Fanon (1952/2008) in the case of race, such historically grounded markers of human difference are established and sustained for the most part by way of antagonistic affective relations (→ affects of racialization). Such processes of categorical marking are inherently affective, that is, they involve potentialities for action which can manifest as (subtle or not so subtle) affective dispositions or as outright emotions, such as resentment, shame, fear, pride, and the like. In view of widespread xenophobia and the continued prevalence of structural discrimination and institutional racism, Fanon’s searing analytic of the affective and corporeal workings of racialization is certainly ripe for an emphatic revival.

Considering these involvements and intricacies, the long-standing assumption in social theory of a dichotomous opposition between affectivity and rationality turns out to be grossly inadequate. While it may still be reasonable to describe aspects of the formation of modern societies and nation states and their various agencies and institutions as processes of rationalization, the assumption that there is a corresponding de-emphasizing of affectivity is profoundly misguided. In research on affective phenomena, the dichotomy of emotion and reason has long given way to views that stress their entanglement and mutual co-dependence. Affectivity is indispensable for assessments of relevance, for the formation of value and valuation, and for keeping social
practices focused on what issues are of concern and what is at stake. Without affectivity, nothing resembling real-life evaluation and decision-making would be possible at either the individual or the collective level.

Accordingly, current theorizing on affect and emotion, especially (but not only) in fields such as cultural affect theory, philosophy and sociology of emotion, as well as cultural anthropology, favors a more elaborate and realistic picture of how contemporary forms of social organization, social collectives, and their many forms of governance and coordination operate, and of how they have emerged historically. Likewise, this more recent research enables scholars to better understand how the development of these social formations and agencies has been crucially involved in the genesis and subsequent modulation, disciplining, and governing of the classical “human subject” of Western modernity. By turning toward the affective and emotional dimensions of sociality, social theory catches up with state-of-the-art scholarship on emotion and affect. This work neither assumes a dichotomous opposition between affectivity and rationality, nor does it consider affect to be a private, inner, exclusively “subjective” affair. Instead, it foregrounds the situatedness of affect and emotion and emphasizes the dynamic relationality of affective processes in their embodied and embedded specificity and with regard to their efficaciousness as forceful relations in various local and translocal contexts. Here, affective, cognitive, and volitional elements are inextricably entangled. As such dynamic comportments, affects and emotions are indispensable driving forces in the constitution of practices, forms of life, institutions, groups, and social collectives. The title *Affective Societies* and the chapters comprising this key concepts volume take up several significant lines of work on affect and emotion with the aim of investigating the affective and emotional dimensions of social coexistence in contemporary societies.

**A social theory perspective**

*Affective Societies* is primarily a theoretical denominator of the systematic multi-faceted involvement of affect and emotion among the processes that enable, create, sustain – but also threaten or disrupt – human social and societal life. As an orientating concept, it covers the entire spectrum of social theorizing, combining elements of both general *social theory* and diagnostic *theories of societies*. This useful distinction, however, is more prominent in the German academic context and less widely used in the Anglophone world. In Anglophone contexts, the term “social theory” is commonly used to denote both general theories of the social (*Sozialtheorie*) and theories of historically specific societal formations or societies, often uniting diagnostic, critical, and normative dimensions (*Gesellschaftstheorie*). Yet these distinct types of theory are interconnected in that any social theory is developed within the specific social and historical context within which the researcher is embedded. In addition, any theory of society relies on concepts of social theory and corresponding
“middle range” theories (cf. Lindemann, 2009, who draws on Georg Simmel’s distinction of these types of theory).

In terms of social theory, *Affective Societies* addresses foundational problems and questions generally pertaining to the social as recurring in different disciplinary contexts, such as anthropology, philosophy, sociology, or cultural studies. From this perspective, affect is suggested as an essential social theoretical concept, much like other prominent concepts in existing social theory, for instance, agency, reciprocity, interaction, communication, or intention. Affect is hence not merely an add-on to these more established notions, but a foundational dimension of interpersonal relationality itself – it is the central dynamic force of social connectedness, ranging from face-to-face encounters to various interactive dynamics between individuals and collectives as well as inter- and intra-group relations. The latter examples, in particular, already permeate the borders of what is known as “middle range” theories in some disciplinary contexts (Merton, 1968), which take particular empirical social phenomena under scrutiny, such as racism, economic exchange, or social mobility. Theories of ritual interaction are a good example of a middle range theory, in particular because affect and emotion have traditionally played a central role therein. Durkheim (1912/1995) was interested in how solidarity can be maintained amongst group members and suggested that rituals and collective effervescence (which can be understood as a form of affective resonance) tie group members to one another and to the group’s shared values. Collins (2004) later extended this theory to include the concept of emotional energy as an outcome of ritual interaction. Theories like these are usually informed by or are extensions of specific social theories and, as becomes evident in the many examples in this volume, can provide novel understandings of both micro- and macro-level social phenomena as fundamentally rooted in affect and emotion. These include family relations, healthcare, audiences, literature and the arts, communities, political parties, organizations, or social institutions such as the law, religion, or mass media.

**A diagnostic angle**

Aside from this emphasis on social theory and corresponding “middle range” theories of and empirical research on concrete social phenomena, *Affective Societies* also bears a diagnostic and critical angle as it is found in many theories of societies. These theories circumscribe specific and historically situated larger societal formations, in most instances societies in modern (Western) nation states. They usually rely on specific assumptions and concepts of social theory and, more often than not, integrate and synthesize arrays of “middle range” theory and research on phenomena that scholars deem idiomatic and important for a specific (type of) society. Examples would include theories of the post-industrial (or knowledge) society (e.g., Bell, 1973), of modern capitalist society (e.g., Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), of the risk society (Beck,
1992), or of the information and network society (e.g., Castells, 2010) (see Schimank & Volkmann, 2007, for a broader assessment).

With regard to contemporary societies, there seems to be something novel and urgent going on when it comes to manifestations of affect in public discourse, as part of political communications, in mediatized social interactions, and in more overarching attempts at managing, controlling, and governing affect and emotion. In the economy, for example, a neoliberal ideology increasingly addresses — and exploits — people’s emotions and seeks to establish forms of affective governance that aim at maximizing corporate revenue. The infamous Facebook experiment in 2012 that manipulated users’ newsfeeds according to their affective implications, pertinent cultural programs that emphasize happiness, well-being, and emotional intelligence, and online and offline assessments of users’ emotional states for the purposes of targeted and personalized advertising are but some of the developments we have in mind. Another example is a series of recent political events and developments that have signaled a sea change in public communication and global politics. New forms of social media activism bring politically pressing issues onto the public agenda and mobilize attention and involvement rapidly and with unprecedented reach. Political parties and protest movements emerge and rally around salient issues as a result of novel forms of mediatized interaction in a decentralized landscape of communications. In general, there is a heightened sense of — or one might say even hunger for — spontaneous, informal, highly sensuous modes of affective associations, resulting in transient collectives or affective communities (→ affective communities). At the same time, one cannot fail to notice the widespread emergence, public appeal, and sustained success of right-wing populist parties across Europe and the world, and their reliance on highly affective modes of communication. This accompanies a substantially altered political climate, evidenced by the increasingly divisive nature of political debate and practices in the context of the so-called European “refugee crisis” since 2015. Other landmark events in this regard are the successful Brexit campaign of 2016 with its polarizing debates, the shameless recourse to fake news, the election and subsequent public displays of “twitter president” Donald Trump, or more generally the emergence of and support for illiberal and anti-democratic regimes and dictators across Europe and the world. Concomitantly, rumors, smear campaigns, and conspiracy theories are in high demand — it seems that what “feels true” increasingly wins the day over knowledge claims grounded in evidence, including those brought forth by acclaimed experts or members of the intellectual establishment. No less significant are the rampant forms of trolling, countless instances of hate speech, or the strategic circulation of misinformation online (as well as offline) that have begun to profoundly affect the social life and political culture of many societies around the globe.

All of these examples, many of which are addressed by ongoing research in the Affective Societies Center, suggest that a range of social, cultural, and political
phenomena that are characteristic of the present state of social coexistence in mobile and networked worlds revolve around affect and emotion. “Affective societies” in this respect functions as a sensitizing concept apt to direct focused attention to the increasing intensification and reflexivity of affective modes of interaction and communication that can be witnessed in the frantic and fragmented realms of what was formerly known as the “public sphere.” In times of social media and individualized media practices, the orientating fiction of a single common realm of public debate governed by agreed-upon rational norms of communication and grounded in at least the semblance of a moral consensus no longer seems tenable. Instead, its place has been taken by a fragmented landscape in which a plethora of local or identity-focused in-groups, parties, small-scale communities, or factions rally around symbols, styles, or ideals, often in ways that are highly affective (cf. Papacharissi, 2015). Within these emerging practices and their mediatized spaces, affective modes of address have assumed center stage, often to the detriment of most other forms and styles of interaction. It is as of now unclear, however, what specific forms of sociality and what modes of political participation will consolidate and prove consequential in this thoroughly reformatted and vigorously contested public landscape. Some of the few existing attempts at describing the specifically affective and emotional “modern condition” (Dennis H. Wrong) may provide valuable orientation and inspiration in developing the diagnostic potential of Affective Societies (e.g., Illouz, 2007; Furedi, 1997; Mishra, 2017; Lordon, 2013).

Beyond the relevance of affect and emotion for general social theory, Affective Societies thus also designates a historical formation of a specific kind: societies whose modes of operation and means of integration increasingly involve systematic efforts to mobilize and strategically deploy affect and emotion in a highly intensified and often one-sided manner. This calls for focused attention to new and intensified ways in which affective modes of communication take on an increasing salience both in mediatized public discourse, and for the actors and agencies that aspire to take advantage of these developments, for instance, by devising focused campaigns for emotionalizing debates or creating or intensifying a narrow range of collective sentiments (such as fear of or hatred against migrants, anger at the government, or distrust of elites).

As a directive for research, this diagnostic angle of the title Affective Societies calls for a refined sensibility for what is truly substantive and specific to contemporary societies. While it is important to keep attempts at social and political diagnosis grounded in careful scholarship on historical developments, empirically grounded “middle range” theories, and reference to existing theories of societies, it is likewise key to cultivate a sense for what is (historically) peculiar and unique to present-day social and cultural life. This diagnostic sense for what is new should include an educated audacity, a daringness to undertake imaginative larger-scale assessments of present developments under conditions of incomplete knowledge. Strategies of interpretive extrapolation
and dramatization could play a role in bringing notable developments into clearer focus and rendering salient aspects that might otherwise escape attention. A central aim of our work is to equip scholars and researchers with conceptual and methodological tools that are up to this task. The affect- and emotion-theoretic concepts sketched in this volume are potential building blocks for an endeavor of this kind.

**Connection and contestation: the role of concepts in research**

**Challenges of a research program**

Taken together, the theoretical and the diagnostic understanding of our title has provided the rationale of the Collaborative Research Center (CRC) *Affective Societies* at Freie Universität Berlin. The premise of this interdisciplinary initiative is that a dynamic-relational account of affect and emotion can guide a heterogeneous cluster of research perspectives that all study aspects of the affective and emotional underpinnings of contemporary societal coexistence. In particular, emphasis is placed on the affective dynamics of transnational migration, on processes of societal transformation due to increased mobility, on changing emotion repertoires in a rapidly transformed global media landscape, and on various forms of collectivization and emerging communities, for instance, in politics, as part of social movements, in local or social media communities, in the arts, or in entertainment. This includes focusing on sources of inequality and stratification, intergroup conflict, and processes of social exclusion and disintegration within contemporary societies. Disciplines contributing to the Center range from social and cultural anthropology, sociology, theater and performance studies, literature, communication, media and film studies to art history and philosophy – a unique combination of fields that may well be unprecedented within affect and emotion research.

The initiative as well as this volume are thus highly interdisciplinary in nature and bring together theory and research from various areas of the social sciences, cultural studies, and the humanities. A major challenge for an endeavor of this kind is to devise a conceptual repertoire that is firmly anchored in its subject matter while versatile enough to find application across such a range of disciplines. We envision that these carefully crafted concepts work as bridges between fields as they link distinct theoretical concerns, facilitate the transfer of insights, ignite novel questions and methods, and sensitize theorists and researchers to the intricacies of different domains of study. In the day-to-day work of the Center, a number of focal concepts have instigated collaboration, inspiring the search for connections as well as critical debate. Projects from different disciplines, with different aims and, at times, widely diverging methodological repertoires find common ground by focusing jointly on a set of focal concepts. A key advantage of singling out concepts – instead
of more encompassing formulations of “theory” – is that they are capable of providing a shared understanding in the face of significant differences in research perspectives, and even where there may be disagreement and critical disputes concerning specific issues pertaining to a given subject matter.

Because concepts, as we understand them, are primarily means to provide, focus and frame access to salient objects and phenomena of social and cultural reality, their productive role is best illustrated by way of examples from the work of our initiative. We briefly outline two areas of interest. The first concerns social collectives; the second concerns what we call emotion repertoires.

Several of the Center’s projects tackle the question of how social collectives are formed and how they become more integrated and sustained under present-day conditions and with regard to affective modes of interaction. Nevertheless, the ways in which these undertakings approach their common theme differ markedly. They range from ethnographic field work in religious communities and participant observation of political movements, new forms of affect-aware discourse analysis, and the employment of video and audio recordings in the study of audience emotions to the in-depth study of theater performances or the minute analysis of film sequences and their recurring audiovisual patterns and dynamic forms in the sense of a genre-specific poetics of affect. While vastly different in terms of materials, methods, and disciplinary orientation, these separate projects coalesce around several guiding concepts. These include a newly introduced notion of social collectives that emphasizes dynamics of collectivization based on affective relations and shared self-understandings (→ social collectives) and a specifically affect-theoretic understanding of communities and forms of commonality, in part based on episodes of high-intensity relational affect (→ affective communities). These concepts are, moreover, closely linked to an understanding of the political that refers to formative relations of power and the dynamics between social cohesion and social disintegration while drawing on the integrative potentials of aesthetic forms and shared imaginaries (→ political affect; → poetics of affect; → Midān moments; → affective citizenship). All these concepts work as dynamic connectors of different scholarly orientations. Their partial openness invites productive elaboration in different domains.

Several of the center’s other research endeavors find common ground in a performative understanding of consolidated emotion repertoires (→ emotion repertoires). These projects likewise diverge significantly in their aims and orientations, for example, between actor-centric approaches and approaches that focus on the collective or institutional level and processes of mediation. The latter understand emotion repertoires not primarily as individually embodied, enactive and expressive capacities or dispositions, but rather as repositories of affective forms and modes of expression implemented in and regulated by social domains, subcultures or organizations. Here, emotion repertoires are dynamic, mobile, and prone to travel, transform, and hybridize. At first glance, this stands in tension with the actor-centric approach that stresses the stability and resistance to change of embodied repertoires acquired at early
stages of enculturation (→ attachment; → Gefühlsbildung). However, when these two contrasting perspectives on the modus operandi and the levels of implementation of emotion repertoires are conjoined, a productive angle for research ensues. New questions become pressing, such as those pertaining to the relationship of individual embodiment and the mediation and circulation of repertoires. Specifically, how might emotional expressions be stabilized into dynamic yet embodied forms capable of circulation and apt to instigate corporeal reenactment by differently socialized individuals at different times or places (→ Pathosformel)? “Emotion repertoire” and its conceptual surroundings are thus exemplary for the way we envision concepts working in affect and emotion research: not as homogeneous constructs with a fixed meaning, but as partially open and unfinished formations that inspire efforts to elaborate on, embellish, and concretely situate them. As we have seen, the “life” of a concept within interdisciplinary scholarship may encompass disputes about a certain dimension of its meaning or about a theoretical orientation more broadly. In the case at hand, this is evidenced by disagreements about the degree and robustness of the bodily “grounding” of emotion repertoires and thus the question of the relative stability and intransigence of such repertoires versus their malleability, fluidity, and capacity to circulate and hybridize.

The idea of the present volume on the key concepts of Affective Societies has grown out of this productive employment of concepts as devices that “travel” between disciplines, research domains, and methodological orientations. As we have seen, this may crucially include focused clashes between their respective outlooks – conflicts and quarrels that drive research forward.

**Working concepts: theory and research**

It will be helpful to briefly elaborate the understanding of concepts we draw on. Concepts are primarily means to enable controlled and focused access to objects and phenomena. This qualified realist orientation is the starting point of our understanding. To prevent a futile debate about representational accuracy or about “realist” versus “instrumentalist” understandings of research, we will not argue for it here. Importantly, however, concepts function as connectors between fields and as rallying points for the convergence of perspectives, but also as matters of contestation and debate. In such cases of dispute, what a concept does is help “contain” disagreement by providing a common – if tentative and shifting – frame of reference for diverging perspectives. Accordingly, points of conflict – and concomitant open questions or unresolved issues – may be identified with precision against a background of shared understanding, even across disciplinary boundaries. Often, what happens is that a conflict about certain components of a concept will inspire the forming of novel concepts, ideally in ways that render the initial problematic more tractable. Thus, when all goes well, such conflicts advance understanding by informing and driving conceptual development (cf. Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2019).
Obviously, then, concepts are crucial to interdisciplinary work. They operate as hinges between distinct fields, they can bridge theory with methodology, and they are specifically prone to “travel” through different subject areas, informing and inspiring specific elaborations in these respective fields, while taking up and incorporating new elements in turn. With this, our understanding of working concepts aligns with Mieke Bal’s (2002) influential approach to “traveling concepts,” put forth specifically as a methodological orientation for the interdisciplinary humanities and cultural studies. Besides a rigorous orientation to accessing objects of research “on their own terms” (Bal, 2002, p. 8), and underscoring the power of concepts to “organize a group of phenomena, define the relevant questions to be addressed to them, and determine the meanings that can be given to observations regarding the phenomena” (Bal, 2002, p. 31), Bal emphasizes the generative nature of traveling concepts. This echoes the philosophical approach to concepts of Deleuze and Guattari (1994) as well as Isabelle Stengers’ innovative discussion of concepts in the natural sciences (Stengers & Schlanger, 1991). Bal’s own case studies feature concepts that work as dynamic templates for the further articulation and refinement of existing notions, but especially illustrate the development of new domain-inherent concepts derived from a specific conceptual source in response to concrete problems. She discusses the example of “performativity,” a concept that has left significant imprints on an enormously wide swath of fields and disciplines, each time with a different emphasis. Less attended to in recent scholarship is the man who helped initiate the performativity trend, sociologist Erving Goffman. His bold conceptual move was the transposition of an entire cluster of concepts from the domain of theater to social life at large, resulting in a creatively formulated account of situated social interaction in terms of social roles, performances of self, ostentative public displays and stagings, and the intricate arrangement of interactional settings (Goffman, 1956, 1967; see Knoblauch, 2009, for discussion). This provided, in effect, a “new and effective organization of the phenomena” of micro-social interactivity (Bal, 2002, p. 31). A comparable conceptual move, albeit in a different contexts and sourced from a rather different domain, happens in the present volume, when Rainer Muhlhoff transposes the technical concept of resonance from classical mechanics (especially from the physics of dynamic oscillators) to the realm of affective relationality. Muhlhoff thereby provides a new way to spell out a relational understanding of affect in detail. Since physical resonance is a case of dynamic coupling irreducible to the mere addition of separately individuated entities, this engenders an understanding of affect as profoundly and irreducibly relacional (→ affective resonance). The significant ramifications of this proposal are evident in several of the chapters in this volume.

As these examples show, concepts also inform the theoretical sensibilities and perceptual habits of researchers. They help shape viewpoints and angles on complex subject matters and research domains (sensitizing concepts, Blumer, 1954), and they can specifically “sharpen the senses,” in particular when a
new conceptual articulation breaks with established habits of sorting and judging matters, offering novel modes of cognitive access to reality and thus accompanied by newly configured capacities for recognition and judgment on the part of researchers (cf. Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2019). When successful, this may help initiate entire research programs, and inspire further conceptual development down the road, as the echoes of Goffman’s work in later articulations of the performativity paradigm illustrate (e.g., Butler, 1993).

Traveling concepts may be promising, but using them without reflection also has considerable pitfalls. Concepts that are meaningful and instructive to theoretical or empirical analysis in one disciplinary context may obfuscate careful and precise analysis and rather lead away from producing meaningful insights in others. This is especially the case when it is not actual concepts that travel, but merely terminology, labels, or metaphors that are halfheartedly adopted in another disciplinary context. Concepts such as “swarm” and “herding” might serve as examples here. As biological concepts describing specific kinds of animal behavior, they have successively made their way into the social sciences and are widely used to denote phenomena of mass behavior, for instance, in finance or collective decision-making. By being too quick or imprecise in employing concepts which have traveled, however, researchers might lose sight of alternative mechanisms or explanations underlying the phenomenon of interest or extend the concept in ways that renders it close to meaningless (sometimes referred to as “concept stretching,” cf. Sartori, 1970). Early in the “turn to affect,” similarly problematic maneuvers were made with regard to concepts from neuroscience and developmental psychology, as putative scientific findings and their conceptual articulation were adopted into cultural theory in an uncritical fashion (Brian Massumi’s invocation of the “missing half-second” between neural impulse and conscious decision in the experimental work of neuropsychologist Benjamin Libet is exemplary in this regard; see Massumi, 1995). Such near-indiscriminate “poaching” of concepts, while sometimes productive as an initial impulse engendering novel articulations, often causes confusion on both sides. Used as catchwords, these terms misrepresent the complexity and contested nature of the scientific domains of their origin, elide the high degree of craft that comes with their adequate use, and create mere semblances of understanding in the target domain (see Papoulias & Callard, 2010). Accordingly, the practice of conceptual articulation requires critical vigilance with regard to such unfounded and under-developed transpositions – “semantic detoxification” is needed from time to time, to use a term employed by philosopher of science Mark Wilson (2006, pp. 516–518) in a related context. Other philosophers currently even call for encompassing ameliorative projects designed to battle “representational complacency” (Cappelen, 2018). Besides a constructive approach to developing and refining concepts, the chapters in this book thus also have the task of critically increasing precision and, where necessary, dismissing certain conceptual options as inadequate.
Importantly, concepts also essentially bridge theory and research in a twofold way, in particular when it comes to the acquisition and analysis of empirical data. Concept formation can proceed in an inductive fashion, wherein concepts are developed from examples and observations of empirical reality. In the social sciences, there is an abundant literature on the various techniques of data-driven concept formation (e.g., Corbin & Strauss, 2008). However, concepts are also widely used in more deductive ways, where a description of a concept is already known, which is then used to make sense of empirical observations. In the case of the latter, many works have discussed the criteria that useful concepts should fulfill, such as resonance, consistency, or fecundity, to name but a few (e.g., Gerring, 2012). This is not the place to delve into these methodological intricacies in detail. Rather, we are more concerned in this volume with assembling concepts that form a common conceptual field, in the sense that the different concepts are meaningfully related to one another and thereby facilitate relations to observable phenomena in the empirical world. This distantly resembles what Max Weber (1922/1988) suggested with regards to the formation of concepts in social science, namely that fruitful efforts are less concerned with establishing “factual relations” between empirically observable phenomena (in the sense of “neutral objectivity”), but rather between the problems that are of paramount interest to researchers. This does not mean, however, that “problems of interest to researchers” do not correspond to meaningful configurations of social reality. Well-made concepts embody and concretize this very correspondence.

Having said this, some words on the broader methodological approach of the Affective Societies research perspective might be instructive. Given its strongly interdisciplinary approach spanning research on affect and emotion in the humanities, cultural studies, and the social sciences, there is no unified set of methods or analytical techniques that would do justice to the broad variety of research questions that are pertinent in the different disciplines. However, the overall perspective is characterized by a common methodological orientation that implies an inductive and interpretative-hermeneutic approach to research. Because this approach is specifically geared toward an empirically grounded development of concepts and hypotheses, it differs notably from deductive approaches aimed at testing theories and hypotheses. Most of the concepts presented in this volume can therefore be understood as outcomes of this inductive and interpretative research process, whereas others have been put to use as explorative or sensitizing concepts. However, more often than not, the overall research process proceeds in a circular fashion in that concepts that have been derived from examples and observations of empirical reality are used as sensitizing concepts in a different context. Based on this methodological orientation, researchers in the Affective Societies initiative use and further develop a variety of established methods to study affect and emotion in different contexts, including the analysis of qualitative interviews, the photo-voice technique, the analysis of images, films, and videos,
and phenomenological analyses, as well as ethnographic, literary, and theater studies approaches to performativity. All these approaches and tools are presented and discussed in detail in what is, in effect, the “sister volume” to the present book, appearing simultaneously in this Routledge book series: *Analyzing Affective Societies*, edited by Antje Kahl (2019).

As an evolving field of interrelated notions, then, a set of working concepts gives shape to a research perspective as it carves out a domain of phenomena and opens up routes to access them in a systematic fashion, often giving rise to surprising cross-references. Moreover, concepts, while dynamic and open-textured, also function as repositories of the past, as their genealogies embody previous stages of understanding and states of research, including paths no longer taken but still instructive in hindsight. Our work with and “on” concepts in this volume will accordingly include historical perspectives, where earlier stages of conceptual articulation with regard to affect and emotion will be illuminated and brought into contact with contemporary work.

Against this background, the present volume will chart a comprehensive set of concepts elucidating affect, emotion, and affective relationality from different interlocking angles, anchored in the idea that “affect” primarily refers to dynamic processes between actors and in collectives, whereas individual affective states, emotions, and affective dispositions are derivative. This founding idea – affective relationality, in short – is a key principle driving conceptual development. Accordingly, a number of chapters in this volume will elaborate varieties and local specificities of such dynamic relations, as well as their formative effects. They are also informed by several other principles, including, but not limited to the idea of a complex discursive and socio-material constructivism with regard to emotions and emotion categories (→ emotion, emotion concepts; → emotion repertoires) and an elaborate understanding of mediation that links a basic dimension of affective and emotional embodiment with several registers of dynamic forms as well as with advanced techniques and practices of mediation (→ affective economy; → Pathosformel; → poetics of affect; → (p)reenactment; → affective publics). Furthermore, in such affective and emotional practices, elements from established praxeological accounts and notions of performativity are put to use specifically in the context of affect-based practices (→ affective practice; → affective witnessing; → writing affect). Drawing from, but not identical to, the idea of affective relationality, the specific capacity of affect and emotion to instigate and help enact processes of collectivization is emphasized in several chapters. At the same time, chapters focusing on these processes also display an awareness of the heterogeneity, precariousness and fragility of transient, affect-driven collectives (→ affective communities; → audience emotions; → Midān moments; → social collectives). The encompassing conceptual tableau that emerges thus concretizes the relationship between affectivity and the formation of communities, social and political movements, and individual and collective repertoires of emotion and their wide-ranging circulation through spaces of contemporary media.
Format of the chapters

All chapters are similarly formatted, except for differences in style and disciplinary habits. The texts combine the manner of a glossary entry with a concise review article. Working concepts will be defined, historically and systematically elucidated, and related to ongoing research by way of examples and case studies. Entries will be non-authoritative in the sense that “work on the concept” is ongoing, so that novel directions and expansions but also debate, criticism, and revisions are inspired. Readers will be both informed and enabled to proceed with further elaborations of their own. The entries stand alone, yet significant interrelations will be highlighted in the form of easily discernible (→ cross-references). With these parameters, we hope that the book might be read as a unified conceptual exploration of a research field, approaching the style of a team-authored monograph. At the same time, chapters will be separately usable as glossary-style explications of key notions. That is why each chapter begins with a concise elucidation of the concept in question.

The main body of most of the chapters will comprise four subsections offering roughly the following perspectives on a given concept: (1) a brief historical orientation with gestures to neighboring concepts; (2) a detailed systematic explication of the concept at issue; (3) illustrations of the concept in action, ideally drawn from current research practice; (4) an outlook with an orientation toward open questions, further directions, and/or critical contestations. Wherever possible, entries are developed from the perspective of concrete, case-based affect and emotion research in all disciplines contributing to the CRC Affective Societies. We have encouraged the contributors to relate either to their own research or to extant research from their own or neighboring disciplines. Most chapters have been written by current members of the CRC Affective Societies. In addition, for some of the chapters, we have recruited expert researchers with a track record in innovative work on affect and emotion. During the editing process, we have put a premium on ensuring that all entries are stylistically sufficiently similar. At the same time, we have encouraged strong authorial voices and intellectual independence, which makes for variation in both style and content.

Thematic parts

It should be clear, given our understanding of the nature of concepts and their role in research, that our volume is not merely offering explanations of a range of technical terms. We do not aspire to a classical “keywords” format, nor do we aim at devising a theoretical dictionary or scholarly lexicon. This is why we have arranged the concept entries thematically, not alphabetically. With this choice of format, we do justice to the insight that concepts, while separately intelligible and operative, usually coalesce into interrelated
conceptual fields. We decided to sort the concepts into four thematic sections, roughly indicating a movement from “foundational” to “applied,” from “ontological” to “political,” and from “micro-relational” to “collective.”

We open the volume with a section on basic affect- and emotion-theoretic concepts (Part I: “Affect and emotion: charting the landscape”). This section is headlined by the entries on affect and emotion, and followed by entries on several other basic categories of affective phenomena, such as feeling, attachment, atmosphere, and sentiment. Part II is entitled “Elaborating affect,” comprising chapters that demonstrate our general allegiance to, but also some critical reservations about, the so-called “turn to affect” and cultural affect studies more broadly. Part III is entitled “Resonances and repertoires.” Here, emphasis is placed on processes of mediation, circulation, and on the radiating and resonating capacities of bodies that are affectively “in touch” with one another and with their surroundings. Finally, Part IV: “Collectives and contestations” brings together chapters focusing on the collectivizing dynamics of affect and emotion and especially on the political dimensions or ramifications of affect and emotion at the present juncture. In the following, we outline the central conceptual and theoretical ideas informing the four parts and briefly highlight some points of convergence as well as critical fault lines.

**Part I: affect and emotion: charting the landscape**

Obviously, there is a wealth of proposals on conceptualizing affective phenomena. As has often been noted, it is hopeless to assume that a single conceptual perspective – let alone something as short and reductive as a conventional “definition” – could cover the domain of affectivity exhaustively and find universal acceptance. The best way forward is therefore the detailed development of a specific approach that is capable of providing a focused outlook on a broad enough segment of affective phenomena, combining a solid footing in theory with a flexible heuristic apt for wide-ranging application. Such a conceptual outlook is well advised to begin from a discussion of metaphysical or ontological options, and obviously requires a robust awareness of the relevant segments of intellectual history. Following an influential trajectory of work in cultural affect theory, we begin from a present-day appropriation of the dynamic substance monism of early enlightenment philosopher Benedict de Spinoza, especially its concomitant metaphysical approach to affect (Spinoza, 1667/1985). The first chapter in Part I, entitled “affect” (affect), accordingly undertakes a focused reconstruction of Spinoza’s approach, viewed mostly through the lens of Deleuze’s (1968/1990) interpretation and in line with recent feminist readings of Spinoza’s works (e.g., Gatens, 2009). While many contemporary approaches to affect merely pay lip-service to Spinozism, we aspire to undertake a more thorough reconstruction. This perspective centers on an account of affect as efficacious
relations between evolving entities in formative settings. It can be read as both a basic understanding of power and an encompassing ontogenetic approach, as it focuses on processes of formation and transformation, not on finished products. The transition to contemporary approaches in affect studies becomes clearer by way of a detailed explanation of some of the basic principles and conceptual tendencies in Spinoza’s approach, notably his notion of *potentia* (a kind of micro-power inherent in all entities), and his distinction between the terms *affectio* and *affectus*. In light of this reconstruction, we believe that several contested ideas from recent affect studies literature become more tractable and lose their apparent strangeness. For instance, the contention that affect pertains to bodies or entities of all kinds, not merely to what commonly counts as “sentient creatures,” is a direct result of Spinoza’s dynamic substance monism and his initial definition of *affectus*. Likewise, the emphasis on incessant processuality and transformative dynamics that many proponents of affect studies countenance will seem less excessive on these ontological grounds. Accordingly, the chapter is structured such that it leads from discussions of Spinoza’s core tenets on affect to several current perspectives in affect studies and to the various conceptual and methodological options prevalent in this field.

One effect of this comprehensive elucidation of affect is that both the contrast with and the similarities to a prevailing understanding of “emotion” become accessible. Already, Spinoza’s notion of *affectus* was much closer to vernacular concepts of emotion than many affect theory radicals would like to admit. However, we chose to keep a clear separation between the concepts of affect and emotion in play. The second chapter in this part (→ emotion, emotion concept) offers a broadly constructivist approach to emotions and their socio-culturally specific conceptualization, aligning with major strands of interdisciplinary emotion theory in the 20th century. Concomitantly, the first part of the volume collects chapters on other key classes of affective phenomena, such as feeling, attachment, sentiment, and atmosphere, and it provides a developmental perspective on the “formation of feeling” grounded in a particular research perspective from the Affective Societies project (→ Gefühlsbildung). By charting such a broad spectrum of phenomena and their developmental formation both in childhood and during adult life, chapters in the first part broaden the theoretical and terminological scope of most current work in affect theory. This enlarges the repertoire of methodological and analytical options. To give just one example, the concept of sentiment complements the focus on relatively short-term, situational affective dynamics by emphasizing the sustained, longer-term habituation and regimentation of affective orientations as part of cultural and political programs developed with the aim of ensuring conformity with prevalent modes of governance. A perspective on “sentiment,” moreover, offers powerful analytical tools for the normative branches of social theory as it helps to assess and study in detail the historical formation and transformation of normative orders (→ sentiment).
Part II: elaborating affect

The second part of the volume further elaborates the conceptual register of relational affect. In this part, our authors’ allegiance with prevailing currents of cultural affect theory (e.g., Gregg & Seigworth, 2010) is most evident, yet the chapters give their own constructive and innovative twists to established articulations of affect-related phenomena. They focus on the way relational affect coalesces into local affective arrangements, how it enfolds into comparatively stable affective dispositions, how it gets enacted, further shaped, and reflexively thematized within affective practices, and how its circulation through discourse and media gives rise to affective economies. Exemplary affective practices such as writing affect and affective witnessing are introduced and discussed with regard to their contemporary cultural and political relevance. A comprehensive critical perspective on the affects of racialization rounds out this part of the book. This chapter links work on affect in a descriptive as well as normative key with anthropological work on the ongoing affective ramifications of settler colonialism and current instances of environmental racism, and with recent perspectives from critical race theory.

Considered collectively, the chapters in this part showcase the strengths of and fascination with the turn to affect, while consolidating several theoretical and diagnostic perspectives and pushing the field forward in multiple directions. Some of the chapters consciously break with cherished positions of the early wave of affect-related work in the 1990s by placing emphasis on the close entanglement and mutual dynamic formation of affect and language (writing affect), or by developing a notion of affective disposition that focuses on the relative bodily permanence and differential reenactment of recurring patterns of affective relationality (affective disposition). Again, however, the chapters collected in Part II will not offer a single perspective, but encompass contrasting options, also with regard to implications for research methodology. For instance, the chapter on affective practice comes with a strong mandate to “follow the actors” and pay attention to these actors’ own reflexive understanding of the affective dimension of their practices, including specific terms and concepts employed by actors in situ (affective practice). By contrast, the chapter entitled “Affective arrangement” proposes a somewhat more impersonal approach to the situated settings, material contexts and dynamic frameworks in which relational affect unfolds locally and trans-locally. Actors do remain in the picture, but only as contributing elements in larger dynamic formations of heterogeneous components that often exceed the scope of what human individuals or collectives consciously grasp and reflect upon (affective arrangement). While not entirely incompatible, the respective concepts of affective practice and affective arrangement emphasize contrasting aspects of the situated manifestation of relational affect and thus inspire different analytical perspectives and methodologies. Distinct from both these approaches is the concept of affective
Introduction

economy, as it is centered on the role of mediation and media practices in forming the manifestation of affect and in establishing a global circulation of affective forms, styles, and symbols (→ affective economy). While this chapter comes with a provocative – and surely contestable – ontological thesis on the general economic character of mediatized affect, it also offers an innovative methodology for studying the globally shared symbolic, aesthetic, and imaginative undercurrents of contemporary affective societies.

Part III: resonances and repertoires

The third part of the volume focuses specifically on forms, repertoires, and registries of affect and emotion and on their dynamic stabilization as parts of specific material and nonmaterial contexts. The two preceding parts emphasize the fluidity and volatility of affect and elaborate on domains of social and cultural life in which this fluidity becomes tamed. Affect is thereby elaborated rather than constrained into specific forms that are very loosely coupled to specific and more enduring cultural phenomena. The concepts in Part III take this idea one step further by proposing perspectives on and understandings of affect as more closely intertwined with cultural forms and formations, both material and immaterial. Entries here focus, to varying degrees, on the notions of resonances and repertoires to illustrate this intertwining. Both of these notions can be understood as poles of a continuum along which affect becomes stabilized, channeled, labeled, and governed. Affective resonance, in this sense, is introduced as a type of relational dynamics of affecting and being affected, characterized as a process of the reciprocal modulation between interactants (→ affective resonance). Resonance dynamics are seen as intensive or force-like phenomenal qualities with a strong emphasis on face-to-face interaction in dyads and small groups rather than in larger and more latent social formations. On the other end of the continuum, emotion repertoires refer to the individual and collective agentic powers to adapt felt experiences in socially and culturally appropriate ways (→ emotion repertoires). Emotion repertoires are specific forms of more general cultural repertoires that individuals learn and internalize as skills, resources, knowledge, action, practices, and so forth, to meaningfully respond to a given social situation. They enable individuals and collectives to enact emotions in ways that are broadly deemed compatible with and intelligible to prevailing forms of cultural categorizations, interpretations, imaginations, and evaluations. Emotion repertoires thus exhibit a certain durability and resistance to change, although more in the sense of intransigence rather than fixation or stability.

Both notions aptly illustrate the potential of concepts that travel between disciplines and contexts. The concepts in Part III tackle issues that pertain to the intertwining of affect and cultural forms and practices. The concept of (p)reenactment, for example, draws on more established understandings of artistic practices of reenactment as the repetitions of past events within
literature, media, art, and theater (→ preenactment). It draws attention specifically to the affective qualities of reenactment while at the same time emphasizing their future-oriented dimension. The concept thus promotes an understanding of the affective dynamics that evolve between the poles of memory/history and visions of the future. The notion thereby bridges analytical perspectives on the affects of actual, situated artistic practice and culturally condensed meanings of past events. In a similar vein, the concept Pathosformel, which goes back to art historian Aby Warburg, serves to describe affect as being formalized historically, with reference to primal bodily affects such as ecstasy or pain, in objects of art (→ Pathosformel). The concept thus serves to reflect the idea that affect can be intimately tied to cultural objects, not in purely static and inert ways, but rather as expressions of the changing interference between stored (formalized) affect and its various forms of historically contingent cultural dissemination.

**Part IV: collectives and contestations**

Further extending the importance of cultural forms and practices, Part IV makes explicit the social and political relevance of relational affect. Understanding Affective Societies means coming to terms with how affect is the force or intensity that interrelates the various bodies of the social, from actors in face-to-face interaction to groups with competing interests and the media through which many of these relations are made possible and public. The chapters in Part IV explicate how affect and emotion contribute to the formation, preservation, or disruption of various social formations, such as communities, institutions, or nation states. They also shed light onto how affect and emotion are themselves subjected to and channeled by these formations, as in the case of the affects of citizenship or feelings of communal belonging. The perspectives outlined in these chapters are thus multi-paradigmatic in that they emphasize different facets and conceptions of the social, from physical co-presence and ritual gatherings to networks and institutions and their normative and political dimensions. Previous scholarship in the social sciences, following the tradition of Ferdinand Tönnies’ (1887/2005) distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society), has usually relegated affect and emotion to the domains of families and close-knit communities. This part clearly shows that societies and their central institutions are similarly made up of an affective fabric that is essential to various forms of governance, civic engagement, solidarity, and cooperation. The tight interlocking of affective phenomena and social formations reflects the view that both are co-constitutive: affect and emotion are integral to any form of sociality, and relational affect is social at its very core. For example, “social collectives” is not just an umbrella term for various social formations, but instead refers to a multiplicity of actors who are situationally affected by and affect one another while self-categorizing as part of this multiplicity (→ social collectives).
From this standpoint, the chapters in this part develop both social theoretical concepts pinpointing the contested and collective nature of the social and concepts and theories of mid-range phenomena that are essential to larger societal formations. For example, the social theoretical concept of belonging accounts for actors’ affective and pre-reflexive attachments to places, languages, or material objects, thus sidestepping the notion of cultural identity, which would usually include the idea of a categorical identification with particular values or social collectives (→ belonging). It also emphasizes the sense of being accepted as part of a community, while also avoiding the notion of collective identity, which is often understood as emphasizing sameness. Belonging hence reflects one’s sensing of relational affect as a form of attachment to social and cultural formations. In a related account, the concept of orders of feeling foregrounds those discursive orders that leave marks on individual and collective appraisals of feelings, thus shaping socially, culturally, and politically proscribed feeling and display rules (→ orders of feeling). Orders of feeling are germane to societies, places, social groups, and communities and impinge on subjective experiences vis-à-vis institutionalized social and political hierarchies. Regarding mid-range social phenomena, the concept of affective communities draws attention to processes producing a temporal solidarization between affecting and affected social bodies (→ affective communities). Instead of understanding social formations as outcomes of pre-established rules, norms, and structures, the concept of affective communities stresses the importance of sensual infrastructures of social encounters and of modes of affective exchange that make up the fabric of the formation and transformation of the social. Affective publics is a concept further developed in this part that renders affect central to the understanding of publics as relational, processual, and performative arenas (→ affective publics) in which politically contested issues of social coexistence are debated. The concept also does justice to the various critiques of normative understandings of a single unitary public, accounting for the fragmented and networked character of publics and the diversified modes of public communication they entail.

**Outlook: the politics of Affective Societies**

Since the advent of the turn to affect in the mid-1990s, much was made of the putative political potentials of a notion of pre-categorical dynamic and relational affect. Authors wrote about the event-like intensity of affect as a force capable of tearing apart gridlocked discursive and practical formations. Affect was thus seen as an instigator of cultural and political change, catalyzing processes of becoming; a progressive political force unlike any other (e.g., Connolly, 2002; Massumi, 2002). While critics were quick – and often correct – to point out the one-sided and unwarranted positive assessment of affect in politics that these early articulations invoked (e.g., Hemmings, 2005), a thorough and balanced discussion of the political ramifications of the relational affect perspective has yet
to take place (see Protevi, 2009, for a promising start). In view of recent surges of right-wing political parties and movements in many Western countries that often rely heavily on affective forms of mobilization, and considering their expressed longing for radical disruption and uprising against what is perceived as a globalized, multi-cultural status quo, it can seem that the political “promise of affect” has changed sides from left to (far) right. This makes a sound and detailed understanding of the many dimensions of political affect all the more urgent. Here lies a major challenge for contemporary studies of affect and emotion in the social sciences, cultural studies, and the humanities – and it is here where a research endeavor such as Affective Societies has the potential to make a significant and timely contribution.

Many of the chapters in this volume speak to the political dimensions of affect and emotion in what we hope amounts to a careful probing of the emancipatory potentials vis-à-vis the risks and downsides of affect and emotion in politics. What these chapters jointly bring about, first and foremost, is a much-needed broadening of perspective. Various processes and techniques of governance that involve affect are discussed, both in their productive and their exploitative capacities (→ immersion, immersive power; → sentiment). Multiple forms and dimensions of collectivization come in view – as empowering means to foster solidarity, but also with regard to inherent tendencies toward closure and exclusion (→ social collectives; → affective communities). Moreover, a premium is put on new developments in political communication and recent transformations of the public sphere (→ affective publics), including new subversive practices enabled by new media and interactive technologies (→ affective witnessing; → Midān moments). In a different key, the more subtle aesthetic dimensions of commonality and collective imaginaries are analyzed with precision thanks to refined affect theoretical concepts (→ Pathosformel; → poetics of affect), and likewise the circulation and profound temporal logic of affective formations (→ affective economy; → (p)reenactment). Backed by these perspectives on specific dimensions of the political significance and efficacy of affect and emotion, other contributions are in a good position to tackle contemporary regimes of affective politics, such as the pervasive policing of cultural modes of belonging and national identities (→ affective citizenship; → belonging), or to ask more foundational questions with regard to the theoretical nexus between affect and politics. For instance, it will be asked how an elementary striving for freedom that many associate with the ultimate “point” of the political (e.g., Arendt, 1961) might be construed in a way that is profoundly social – cognizant of the constitutive relationality that links all individuals with one another and to their material and natural surroundings (→ political affect).

In light of these various elaborations on the political dimension of Affective Societies, we are convinced that the present volume will advance this segment of affect theory considerably and steer well clear of earlier one-sided and uncritical perspectives. However, we do not over-estimate this achievement. In view of the recent surges of xenophobia, right- and left-wing populism
and extremism, unabashed outbursts and shameless public displays of group- and identity-focused enmity, resentment or hatred, it is vital for affect and emotion experts to stay on top of these developments. A willingness to engage with surprising, unexpected aspects of this trend is needed, including a readiness to confront – and rigorously analyze – the ugly downsides of political affectivity. The present volume provides the conceptual foundations for work of this kind. The tools are here – it is now time to put them to good use in future work on the exhilarating affective dynamics of contemporary social and political life.

References


Part I

Affect and emotion
Charting the landscape
In this initial chapter of the *Affective Societies: Key Concepts* volume we outline a basic understanding of affect circumscribing a general tendency that we deem fruitful as an analytical perspective. This understanding builds on a notion of affect as *relational dynamics* between evolving bodies in a setting, thus contrasting with approaches to affect as inner states, feelings, or emotions. “Affect” designates specifically those encounters between bodies that involve a change – either enhancement or diminishment – in their respective bodily *capacities* or micro-powers. Thus, affect is inextricable from an approach to power, understood as relations of reciprocal efficaciousness between bodies – human as well as non-human – in a particular domain. This suggests an affect-based perspective on the dynamic formation and subsequent transformation of individual entities – their ontogenesis and individuation – instead of assuming that entities, whether ordinary objects or human actors, are ready-made, stable, and fixed. For human actors, affects are material and ideational relations that, in the short term, increase or diminish their agentive and existential capacities in relation to their surroundings and all other actors and entities present in a situation. In the longer term, affective relations *constitute* human and non-human actors, insofar as affective relations over time both establish and subsequently modulate – make, unmake, remake – individual capacities and dispositions. In other words, relational affect is a central factor in the process of subject formation. Moreover, relational affect is a driving force in the formation and subsequent consolidation of larger aggregates of bodies, that is, in processes of collectivization.

Delineating affect in such general terms is productive for devising research perspectives in a number of different fields and with different goals and methodological orientations. Methodologically and conceptually, we will approach affective phenomena neither as individual mental states, nor as categorically circumscribed episodes within human practices (→ *emotion, emotion concept*). Rather, they constitute forceful encounters between evolving entities within tangles of formative relations (→ *affective arrangements*). Emphasis is placed on developmental processes, variable power relations, change and transformation, on the formative settings that are the backdrop of ontogenesis and subjectification, and
on the spontaneous, intensive association of entities into larger aggregates (→ affective communities). In addition, this perspective helps to bring into view subtle affective dynamics that may otherwise escape the purview of researchers. However, all these phenomena – human actors and their characteristics, mental states, interactive practices, social collectives, established systems of categories and feeling rules – may still be thought of as the transient yet temporarily consolidated results of such affective encounters. This conception of affect – mainly developed from materials found in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza, read through Gilles Deleuze – is generative of further working concepts apt to illuminate the nexus between affect, power, and subjectivity. The purpose of this chapter and of several subsequent chapters in this volume is to flesh out this cluster of ideas and its conceptual background and highlight some of the implications for the contemporary study of affect.

**Foundation: Spinoza’s relational approach to affect**

**Talking affect with Spinoza**

That a key strand of contemporary affect studies is rooted in Spinoza’s philosophy makes it interesting but also vexing. Spinoza offers an all-encompassing metaphysical system – a dynamic form of substance monism – that opposes central lines of Western philosophical thought running from Descartes via Kant to many individualistic and mentalistic approaches in the 20th century (cf. Andermann, 2016; Balibar, 1997; Gatens & Lloyd, 1999; Saar, 2013; Sharp, 2011). This oft-unacknowledged conflict of metaphysical frameworks lies behind some of the controversies surrounding the turn to affect in the past 30 years, and might explain some of the misunderstandings and confusions that beset its proponents and opponents alike (cf. Massumi, 1995; Leys, 2011; see Gatens, 2014, for clarification). In this section, we therefore revisit Spinoza’s understanding of affect in light of his overall ontological approach, so as to bring the basic perspectives and underlying thought of contemporary Spinoza- and Deleuze-inspired affect studies into view. Our account is geared to present-day concerns, and aims to strike a balance between philosophical reconstruction and a systematic perspective on research. In the second half of this chapter we relate this understanding of affect to current approaches within affect studies.

In Spinoza’s main work, *Ethica* (1677/1985), especially when interpreted in a Deleuzian key (e.g., Deleuze 1981/1988a, 1968/1990), affect can be characterized along the lines of three thematic vectors: (1) a relational ontology; (2) a constitutive interplay of affecting and being affected; (3) a dynamic and polycentric understanding of power.

Before we explicate these three conceptual strands, a note on Spinoza’s – and our own – terminology is in order. Spinoza distinguishes between
The term “affection” in current English is misleading in this context, as it refers to particular affectional (i.e., loving) relations, not to affective relations of all kinds as Spinoza’s term affectio was meant to refer to. Thus, we will stick with the Latin term wherever the pronounced understanding of affectio is in play, while “affect” captures Spinoza’s affectus well enough for a start.

Each is closely related to his metaphysical position of substance monism, as they are basic ontological notions that apply at the level of being itself. According to Spinoza, there is only one substance that is truly all-encompassing, constituting a field of immanence to which all being and all reflection on being is inevitably tied. Neither an external observer’s position, nor an encompassing representation of reality is conceivable in Spinoza’s account, only involved articulations from positions within substance. This one substance – not coincidentally also called “nature” or “god” – is dynamically differentiated into an infinite amount of finite modes. These modes – literally, the modifications of substance – are the various discernible entities: all that there is. In its most basic sense, “affection,” in the sense of the Latin affectio, is just another word for “mode”: “By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, I def. 5). Yet at the same time, and given the nature of modes as ongoing dynamic modifications of substance, affects-as-affectio are also the relations between the various modes, the effects and impacts they mutually exert on one another. In other words, then, Spinoza’s affectio refers to the being of entities in a dynamic relational ontology, and also – or thereby – to the impression made, or trace left, on entities by their dynamic encounters with other such modes (cf. Deleuze, 1981/1988a; Andermann, 2016).

While affects-as-affectio are all relations between entities (modes) within the one substance, Spinoza uses “affect” (lat. affectus) to designate those affections that effectively either increase or diminish the powers – agentive capacities or potentia – of the entities in question (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III def. 3). As such significant impacts, affects-as-affectus might be conceived of as durational transitions from one state of being into another. As Deleuze (1981/1988a) suggests, from here it is not far-fetched to assume that, in the case of sentient creatures, some of these significant transitions register as a felt durée, as feelings, in other words (cf. pp. 39ff., 48f., 62f.). Viewed from this angle, affects-as-affectus might be separately individuated and named, thus approaching what in current terminology is referred to as emotion: the categorical types designated as, for example, happiness, sadness, fear, anger, shame, and so on. However, a premature focus on the categorical sorting, individual enactment, and conscious feeling of such consolidated affects can lead us away from acknowledging Spinoza’s principal point, namely that affects-as-affectus are

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2 References to Spinoza’s Ethics follow the common citation scheme using the work’s internal segmentation in parts (I–V), propositions (prop.), scholia (schol.), proofs (dem.), definitions (def.), and others.
relational phenomena unfolding dynamically and effectively in-between enti-
ties, both human and non-human, and within formative environments. They
are not – or not initially – individual human comportments, let alone “mental
states.” For this reason, we postpone the discussion of the relationship
between affect and emotion to the chapter on emotion (→ emotion, emotion
concept).

As a terminological orientation, we use “affect” (affectus/affectio) roughly in
the way Spinoza employs these terms, while we use the non-Spinozist term
“affectivity” generically to cover the whole extended family of affective
phenomena that encompasses, for instance, emotions, feelings, sentiments,
moods, atmospheres, and so on. In contexts where it is important to preserve
the Spinozan nuances, we write affect-as-affectio and affect-as-affectus for
maximal clarity (or just the Latin affectio and affectus in short). Our wager
throughout is that even short of a theoretically pure adoption of Spinoza’s
metaphysical outlook, this approach can help inform – either embellish and
dynamize or productively challenge – other theoretical perspectives on affect-
tive phenomena.

Toward a systematic understanding of affect and affectio

We will now unpack successively some of what is implicit in the general
determination of Spinoza’s understanding of affectio/affectus. Contemporary
affect theory and related work would benefit from adopting, or at least
accounting for, these aspects of Spinoza’s thought.

(1) Relational ontology. Affect/affectio refers to dynamics of mutual effective
impingement in relations, that is, between individual entities. This presents us
with a productive approach to the question of the constitution or formation
of individual entities, or the process of ontogenesis. To Spinoza, an individual
(“finite mode”) is nothing more or less than how it manifests in relations of affect-
ing and being affected. Individuation, on this account, is an open process of rela-
tional modulation not guided by an anticipated result or blueprint. It thus
presents a radically relational and dynamic understanding of individuals and
their affective encounters. The individual on this approach is a transiently sta-
bilized node in an encompassing relational dynamic and thus constitutively
entangled with other individuals and a shared formative milieu. Gilbert
Simondon’s (1989/2005) concept of transindividuality is apt for capturing this
dynamic-relational understanding of individuals. It emphasizes both the
separate and unique character of individuals once constituted, and the essen-
tial sharedness of the formative relational domain, or pre-individual milieu, in
which individuation takes place (Balibar, 1997; see also Sharp, 2011,
pp. 34–42).

Another important takeaway of Spinoza’s ontological approach is the
theorem commonly referred to as ontological “parallelism,” in opposition to
Cartesian dualism. Human affects in Spinoza are inseparably both a bodily
and a mental dynamic, that is, they are, as affectiones, simultaneously relations between bodies and “the ideas of these affections” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, def. 3). Spinoza (1677/1985) states that “the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension” (prop. 2 schol.). Extension and thinking are just two attributes under which the “order and connection of things” as part of the one substance may be explicated, and “hence the order of actions and passions of our body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III, prop. 2 schol.). This parallelism theorem is an important background axiom to an understanding of affect as social micro-dynamics. It gives the reason why the nexus of affective dynamics and concurrent subjectivity must be analyzed in social situations and networks of relations where affect is a register of reciprocity on a bodily and a mental level.

(2) Affecting and being affected. Another key characteristic of Spinoza’s notion of affect/affection is that it is always referring to a correlative interplay of affecting and being affected. An affective relation is not a one-sided or unilateral impact of one individual on another. Rather, active and receptive involvement are inseparable. This entails that the unfolding of an affective dynamic is not reducible to properties of only one of the involved individuals. The way one individual is affecting and being affected in a situation co-depends on all the other participating individuals, both human and non-human alike. Rather than asking who is affecting whom in a given situation, the question how a relational dynamic of affecting and being affected evolves in the immanence of a given situation is rendered salient. This informs a basic directive for research, namely, the requirement to situate a putative affective dynamic within its specific micro-relational milieu, and thus investigate affect as part of complex, polycentric, and spatio-temporally extended affective arrangements (→ affective arrangements).

Understanding affect as an interplay of affecting and being affected does not boil down to a concept which assumes a cascade of “one-directional affections” (individual A affecting B with subsequent “counter affection” of B on A) that sums up to reciprocity merely on an aggregate level. The interplay of affecting and being affected should be understood in a strong sense, even to the point of transforming the implied understanding of causality. The prototypically modern idea of causality as transitive, with billiard balls as the standard model, shifts into thinking of immanent causality between things as parts of a higher context of effectuation, of which the physics of coupled oscillators would be the textbook model (→ affective resonance). Thus the elementary structure of our Spinoza-based concept of affect is that of a joined

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movement—with, of a durational coupling of the individuals’ movements in reciprocal modulations and resonances, so that it is impossible to say A is affecting B without B affecting A. In a Deleuzian terminology, this is to say that affecting and being affected is always forming an open process, a process of *becoming* (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987, ch. 10). Of course, this perspective does not preclude the singling out of affective and agentive contributions of individuals, nor is it blind to acts of singular and one-sided violence. To the contrary, it allows to explicate how the violence of a perpetrator is often enabled by structural constellations of relative inequalities in affective capacities and by overall situational dynamics as their manifestation.

(3) *Power*. The concept of affect in Spinoza is intimately connected with—even identical to—an understanding of power. Spinoza attributes to each individual a *potentia*, which is a kind of “micro power.” This potentia is not something that individuals possess besides their other characteristics. *Potentia* might best be translated as the individual’s capacity to enter into relations of affecting and being affected—or *affective capacity* in short (cf. Spinoza, 1677/1985, III, post. 1 and 2; Deleuze, 1981/1988a, pp. 49–50). In Spinoza’s ontology this amounts to saying that an affective capacity is the individual entity’s ability of being in general: “*Posse existere potentia est*” (“to be able to exist is to have power,” Spinoza, 1677/1985, I, prop. 11 dem.). At the same time, an individual’s affective capacity is also a receptive capacity as affect is always both active and receptive. *Potentia* is thus the individual’s specific susceptibility to affections by others as much as it is its power to affect others through one’s acts or one’s sheer presence. In combination this makes for the fundamental heteronomy in the constitution of the individual in Spinoza, whose being is both an expression of its own potentia and modulated by all the other individuals (and their potentia) around.

In this dynamic notion of individuation, a spatial (or “extensive”) and a temporal dimension can be distinguished. The “extensive” dimension figures prominently in the Deleuzian reading of Spinoza and in some contributions to affect studies. It stresses that an individual is nothing but a composition of smaller individuals in specific “relations of motion and rest” (see Spinoza, 1677/1985, II, axioms and lemmata after prop. 13; Deleuze, 1981/1988a, pp. 91–92, 123). When a mode “encounters another mode, it can happen that this other mode is ‘good’ for it,” so that both enter into composition; “or on the contrary decomposes it and is ‘bad’ for it.” In these cases, the mode’s “power of acting or force of existing increases or diminishes, since the power of the other mode is added to it, or on the contrary is withdrawn from it, immobilizing and restraining it” (Deleuze, 1981/1988a, pp. 49–50). What an individual is at a given point in time is variable, shifting according to the prevalent level of individuation for the explication of a social configuration. Such a configuration may sometimes be comprised of humans, of parts of humans, of couples, teams, families, corporations, or states and so on. This is particularly fruitful for the analysis of structural power phenomena as it
enables understanding the fundamental heteronomy of the individual on different scales of relatedness but without rendering the individual passive or depriving it of an own power.4

Along the temporal dimension of individuation, an individual’s potentia is always also a product of their history of relations of affecting and being affected. The temporal structure of individuation is what makes for a transsituative coherence of one and the same individual passing through a series of situations and contexts of relatedness over time, counterbalancing to some extent the transience and variability of entities on the process ontological account. How an individual can affect and be affected is a result of a kind of bodily and environmental repository for specific patterns of affectivity in past relations. This repository works by means of the sedimentation of past patterns of affect into the potentia, which are thus present as potentials in current relations, co-shaping an individual’s affects, actions, and embodiment (→ affective disposition). This suggests an account of how past patterns of interaction are not identically repeated, but act as tendencies in present affective relations – not entirely unlike what gets expressed by notions such as “habitus” and “performativity” in practice theory (cf. Bourdieu, 1990; Wetherell, 2012) (→ affective practice). Along these lines, the genesis of an individual’s potentia can be extended to an analysis of social structures, such as gendered or racialized modes of interaction inscribed and perpetuated as patterns of affective relatedness, also consolidated within institutions and often blocked from view by being assumed as inevitable givens in the routines of day-to-day practice (cf. Mühlhoff, 2018) (→ affects of racialization).

Contemporary affect: ideas and directions

In this second part of our chapter, we extract central ideas for understanding affect in contemporary affect research, drawing especially on lines of work belonging to what has been termed “cultural affect theory” or the “turn to affect.” While we find it unhelpful to play up the putative contrast between affect and emotion, it is clear that a Spinozan perspective on affect engenders a different analytical gaze, different methodologies, and different research questions than work centered on a predominantly anthropocentric, categorical conception of emotion (→ emotion, emotion concept). With this concept of affect, a dynamic-materialist ontology challenges the reflexive individualism

4 By the same token, what is in common sense referred to as an individual’s “power” is to be explained as a manifestation of their potentia as it is rendered effective in a socially, politically, economically stabilized structural constellation of many individuals. That is, an individual’s power to act, or even to command or to repress, is not a property of that individual alone, but the joint product of larger, relational constellations. Some refer to this crystallized form of power as potestas in distinction to potentia (see Negri, 1991; Hardt & Negri, 2000), while the clear origin of that distinction in Spinoza is under dispute (see Saar, 2013).
long dominant in Western modernity. This classical mode of thought is pre-mised on the separation of intelligibility and materiality – articulated variously as “body” versus “mind,” or “human” versus “non-human” or “reason” versus “nature,” or similar such dichotomies. In light of this, it is unfortunate
that post-1990s affect studies were initially pitched by some as a radical break with discourse- and language-based approaches to cultural articulation. While this was understandable as a strategic reaction against a perceived hegemony of poststructuralism (see for example Massumi, 1995, 2002; Sedgwick & Frank, 1995), Spinoza’s affectio/affectus both cross-cut and dynamize these modernist orderings. That is, they fulfill rather than counter a key poststructuralist aspiration (cf. Terada, 2001). In light of this it is feasible, for instance, to explore an account of language as affect (writing affect), or focus on the affectivity driving discursive practices, or understand affect – as Deleuze (1985/1989) suggests – as part of the vital core of what was long considered its very opposite: thought itself.

We cannot develop all these ideas here. Instead, we will identify three broader strands of affect-oriented work that have been noteworthy in recent years. This selection is not meant to be exhaustive. What these three orientations have in common is that they all approach affect as a modality of power – force, effectiveness, potential – not (directly) wielded by human actors. As such, these lines of work foreground questions pertaining to the often diffuse, distributed operations and formative workings of power in various societal sectors and domains of practice (political affect).

**Bodies-in-relation**

Spinoza’s understanding of affectio/affectus features the body in its full worldly complexity and environmental permeability, as that which stands in constant onto-formative relation with the surroundings and registers – in all sorts of sensuous, vital, material, and dynamic ways – what goes on around it. At this point, there is a significant overlap with (post-)phenomenological approaches in affect studies that emphasize the situated embodiment of affect and the affective sensitivity of situated bodies. For instance, Sara Ahmed (2007) powerfully expounds the ways that racist public discourse, discriminatory social practices, and the operations of paramount institutions – for example those of law enforcement, administrative bureaucracy, or the education sector – invent, enforce, and sustain the “norms of whiteness” (Ahmed, 2007). The effects of these discursive and institutional operations always sooner or later

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5 A convincing and accurately wide-ranging exposition of the various strands and perspectives of the turn to affect is to be found in the Introduction to the seminal Affect Theory Reader (see Gregg & Seigworth, 2010, pp. 6–9). A notable recent account and showcase of the non-human strands of affect studies, including a take on the innovative method of “affect analysis” is Kwek and Seyfert (2018).
land — often violently — on the bodies of those who find themselves subject to these power dynamics, but also — in different registers of affective impingements — on the bodies of privileged subjects who align seamlessly with the norms and routines of institutions created in their own image: “White bodies are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape” (Ahmed, 2007, p. 158). Ahmed’s work is but the most visible among a growing number of interrogations of affect’s involvements in racialization and other violent forms of othering, discrimination, and structural oppression (see for example Ngai, 2005; Chen, 2012; Berg & Ramos-Zayas, 2015; Palmer, 2017; Schuller, 2018) (→ affects of racialization).

These lines of work in part continue an earlier feminist and queer theoretic current in the turn to affect. In the mid-1990s, acclaimed queer theorist Eve Sedgwick had embarked on a quest to turn the study of affects into a key dimension of cultural inquiry, drawing on work by the psychologist Silvan Tomkins. With hindsight, Sedgwick’s engagement with Tomkins appears less as a transfer of psychological theory into the humanities than as a generous reading that pushes beyond the usual demarcations and border policing tendencies in earlier humanities scholarship. Tomkins’ categorical model of nine transculturally universal affect programs did not have much staying power within cultural affect studies. With their queer forays into materialist and scientific domains, Sedgwick, Elizabeth Grosz, and others instead paved the way for productive lines of work in feminist theory — work characterized by a return to questions of materiality and embodiment and by a renewed openness toward cross-disciplinary articulations and remixes de-emphasizing the strictures of poststructuralism and discourse theory. Inspired by Tomkins’ categorical approach, these authors invoked affects — writ small and in the plural — more than Affect in a grandiose singular, as an analytical angle for studying the plurality and heterogeneity of modes of bodily affection in relation to societal arrangements and power structures.  

We recommend emphasizing convergences in various different approaches and lines of work that all focus on the complex interactive relationality of bodies — human as well as non-human — that coalesce locally to form efficacious affective configurations and affective communities (→ affective communities). For instance, there is a long legacy of work on complexly situated, technologically enhanced, extended, or biomediated bodies — Donna Haraway’s Manifesto for Cyborgs (1984; see Haraway, 1991) is an early landmark — that should be conjoined with the more classically phenomenological approaches to affect or affects as bodies-in-relation. We think of work by Marie-Luise Angerer, Lisa Blackman, Rosi Braidotti, Theresa Brennan, Rey

6 Authors who prefer to speak of affects rather than affect also tend to distinguish less sharply between affects and emotions. This pertains, for instance, to the work of Ahmed and also to that of feminist affect theorist Lauren Berlant (2011). An illuminating discussion of different strands of affect- versus affects-centered approaches is provided by Donovan Schaefer (2015).
Chow, Patricia Clough, Richard Grusin, Mark Hansen, and Luciana Parisi, among many others. These approaches are tentatively united by understanding bodies of all kinds as constitutively relational, and as permeable, extendable, and plastic. Likewise, these scholars share a sense for bodies’ capacity to resonate, to swing with ambient forces and processes, or in general of both living and technological bodies’ inherent proneness for energetic transmission, auralic radiance, rhythmic attunement, and also, not least, for more immediately physical imbrications and entanglements (→ affective resonance). The named authors share the conviction that there is no natural sanctity to the unscathed, unenhanced, non-mediated biological body—be it human or animal—or rather: such allegedly pristine natural bodies do not exist, and likely have never existed. In light of this, a Spinoza-based perspective on affect—together with other lines of work of different origins—encourages studies of the specific imbrications of bodies and designed spaces, technologies, media, and other artifactual arrangements of contemporary societies.

**Affective arrangements: individual and milieu**

This brings us to a second segment of affect-centric approaches. A good deal of current work on affect focuses on the effective entanglement of individuals with the arrangements and apparatuses of specific milieus, settings or domains. Lawrence Grossberg (2010), in an interview on the origins and prospects of affect studies, raises this very point: “[W]hat are the machinic apparatuses or regimes of discourse that are constituting the ways in which we live our lives? The possibilities of affect and their articulations to conjunctures and historical ontologies?” (p. 314). Grossberg asks this question in part with critical intent, alleging that some scholars—Brian Massumi among them—directly “leap from a set of ontological concepts to a description of an empirical and affective context” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 314). Grossberg contends that these authors fail to pay enough attention to the various arrangements and set-ups that make affect concretely effective at particular sites of social life.

Over and above the ontological plane, where affect-as-affectus is described in an abstract register of intensive force relations, there is in each case a specific organizational, equipmental, spatial or technological set-up of the domains under study. It is these “machinic arrangements”—a certain elaborated format of affect-as-affectio—that kindle, channel, and sustain tangible relations of affecting and being affected, and that work as operative registers of time- and place-specific affective dynamics, often manifest as an in each

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7 A noteworthy historical study of these lines of thought, with critical emphasis on the problematic biopolitical dimension of notions of impressibility, sentimentality and the body-milieu nexus in the 19th century, is Kyla Schuller’s *The Biopolitics of Feeling* (2018). The appearance of historical scholarship of this type signals a welcome new phase of scholarly rigor and critical awareness in discourses surrounding affect.

This angle on affect calls for approaches that study the relevant processes in situ by way of various empirical methods. This could mean, for example, that researchers chart the material propping of concrete locations, to focus on the orchestrated coordination of individuals present at a given site (for instance in the study of crowd behavior or in audience research); that they check out frequency patterns, intensity contours, and dynamics of communication in, for instance, white-collar workplaces, kindergartens, or school yards; that they investigate the differential affective responsiveness of patients or customers in medical settings, or study the minutiae of how user practices and user activity are modulated or subtly nudged by the design features of social media, and much else. Work of this kind is required to make good on a central aspect of the ontological “promise of affect”: namely that affect is locally manifest as a shape-shifting level of material effectiveness, sedimented into historical formations that, in all sorts of ways, contribute to establishing and sustaining a time-bound, initially inchoate yet characteristic and repeatable structure of feeling (Williams, 1977). What is called for here is the transition from ontology in general to historical ontology, a step mediated by concepts on the meso-scale of cultural articulation – concepts such as Deleuze’s and Guattari’s agencement machinique or Foucault’s dispositif, which have been productively adapted to affect studies, for instance as “affectif” (Seyfert, 2012), as “affective apparatus” (Anderson, 2014) or as what we prefer to call an affective arrangement (Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2017) (affective arrangement).

There is much work in affect studies that heeds Grossberg’s directive. For example, take Melissa Gregg’s (2011) chartings of white-collar workplaces, teamwork and telecommuting work arrangements; Robert Seyfert’s (2018) case study of high-frequency trading; Natasha Dow Schüll’s (2014) forays into machine gambling in Las Vegas, or consider Grossberg’s (1992) own pioneering work on the “rock formation” and popular music more broadly, Michael Richardson’s (2016) work on affective witnessing (affective witnessing), or Ahmed’s (2012) ethnography of the institutional non-performativity of diversity committees.8

**Affect and the “wild beyond”**

And yet – there will be many who won’t be satisfied with this swift turn to the concrete, the material, the organizational. Is there not quite another “promise of

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8 Not fully fitting this second rubric is work on the aesthetic forms pertaining to modes of affecting and being affected. Such poetics of affect play an important role in many artistic genres as well as in contemporary practices and formats of media (economy of affect). Eugenie Brinkema (2014) has provided an excellent study of such “forms of the affects,” intended both as a critical corrective to some strands of work in affect studies and a continuation of earlier approaches especially to cinematic affect.
affect” that springs from the pages of Spinoza, and likewise from the writings of Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, and others? Isn’t it this other spirit of affect that Massumi tries to bring out in his refusal to let affect be captured by hegemonic codes, discourses, or apparatuses? Indeed, this is what goes on when Massumi tries to evoke, express, and hold on to an affective intensity that transpires before the world, subject, experience, solidify into enduring formations. Preconscious, non-human, rife with vital forces (“the virtual”), intensive, at times wild and ecstatic – it is this image of affect that some of the deacons of intellectual high culture instinctively oppose, because they see it go against fixtures of humanist inquiry: against representation, normativity, the subject, intentionality, critique, disciplinary standards of scholarship, and much else.9 To conclude our chapter, we cast a glance over to this other, this wild side of affect.

Long before the recent turn to affect, Raymond Williams brought forth his seminal notion “structure of feeling” in an attempt to re-invoke the living presences beneath and prior the forms, wholes, and constructs that make up the warp and weft of cultural activity. It was meant as a counterpoint to what he called the “habitual past tense” of social analysis: “reduction of the social to fixed forms remains the basic error” (Williams, 1977, p. 129). This notion anticipated the more radical strands of contemporary affect theory. Williams calls for a theoretical sensibility for the energetic immediacy of affective encounters, to the uncurbed forces of relation. This is not far removed from the impersonal vitality that Deleuze invokes when he discusses affect throughout his oeuvre. This more radical end of the affect spectrum remains mostly unacknowledged and unaccounted for within the terms and habits of routine understanding, yet it energizes, it crucially in-forms day-to-day existence. To call what transpires in these fleeting moments pre-subjective, preconscious, pre-discursive, or non-human does not signal a naive break with established scholarly practice. When bouts of unanticipated intensity well up within routine activity, they provide an occasion for change, potentially inspiring fresh articulations of what seemed self-evident before. Affect in this sense is a generative irruption, potentially kindling transitions from established understandings toward new thoughts and new discursive and practical moves. What is at issue is a dynamic reservoir of possibility, spheres of potential – what is formative but not yet formed.

Williams – in his day less concerned with the non-human than with the infrastructures of social experience as lived – used the somewhat pedestrian notion “practical consciousness,” a term too narrow in scope for many of the purposes of current affect studies. Yet still, this concept points to the important idea of dynamic openness of affect and affect-imbued thought:

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9 We think here especially of Ruth Leys’ (2011) sweeping – and rather reductive – critique of the Massumi-inspired turn to affect, and related moves by other acclaimed scholars, such as Emily Martin (2013) in anthropology. Gatens (2014), Hemmings (2005), and Wetherell (2012) offer more balanced yet also predominantly critical assessments of the more radical strands of affect theory.
“a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but each in an embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined” (Williams, 1977, p. 131). Not incidentally, one of the first examples Williams mentions is language. He notes that no generation speaks in quite the same way as the preceding generation – that there will be shifts in style, in tonality, changes to the complexion of existence as enfolded into phrases and idioms and habits of speaking. What Williams hints at is the fluid underground of social and cultural practices, formations, experiences – the virtual sphere that contains the seeds of change, and that is ever only partially and provisionally articulated and conceptualized. It is crucial not to lose sight of this other side of affect, its opening out to a plane of immanence that is at once the “wild beyond” to determinate formations, habits, states, and comportments and their indispensable formative backdrop.10

It is this sense for the openness and non-containability of the virtual that lets one appreciate (not necessarily like) the more unconventional and experimental writing styles within affect studies, for instance by Kathleen Stewart, Ann Cvetkovich, or Erin Manning. And it renders noteworthy the capacious post-Spinozism of Greg Seigworth. Likewise, in this vein, the more metaphysical and more radically posthuman endeavors surrounding a “new materialism” seem sensible (if not always well-executed), for example work by Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Rosi Braidotti among others (cf. Coole & Frost, 2010), as do non-anthropocentric or “heterological” perspectives on non-human agency, animacy, and on affective configurations that exceed the scope of eurocentric humanism (e.g., Chen, 2012; Kwek & Seyfert, 2018).

This third and last segment of affect-oriented thought might also serve as a note of caution at the outset of a volume on the key concepts of Affective Societies. While it is our goal to approach the social and political prevalence of affect with conceptual rigor and terminological clarity, it is evident that no degree of conceptual elaboration will exhaust the phenomena under study. Affect tends to outrun even its most encompassing and nuanced conceptualizations. However – to end with another suggestion from Spinoza and Deleuze – well-made concepts themselves might become affective formations: concise compositions, conveyors of an intellectual intensity, capable of illuminating pockets of reality, even if, at times, more by conjuring a phenomenal poignancy that they cannot quite capture semantically. Thereby – if it goes well – focal concepts may set thought and action on new paths. We hope that some of this will transpire in the affective practice of reading the chapters collected in this volume.

10 “Wild beyond” is a phrase we borrow from Jack Halberstam’s foreword to Stefano Harney’s and Fred Moten’s The Undercommons (2013). Halberstam does not use it as an affect-related notion but as a broader denomination that signals a break with the structured, organized, politically formatted realm of Euro-modernity. The more radical strands of affect studies share this orientation at least in spirit.
References


The term emotion, stemming from the Latin *emovere* (to move out or agitate), broadly refers to those affective upheavals in experience that are directed at events or objects in the world and that often prompt us to act in specific ways vis-à-vis these events or objects. Since antiquity, these episodes have been branded by labels like shame, anger, fear, joy, embarrassment, or disgust, and classed into categories. Historically, Darwin’s (1872) *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* was one of the most influential scholarly works to inform prominent understandings of emotion in many academic disciplines. Across disciplines, there is broad consensus that emotions are discrete in kind; that is, they are characterized by specific configurations of phenomenal experience, bodily changes, expressions, and action tendencies. Emotions are also widely thought to be adaptive, insofar as they are purposeful and meaningful for an individual, and reflect an evaluative engagement with the environment that helps one prepare for specific actions. Related to this capacity, emotions are generally presumed to fulfill communicative purposes, for instance through facial or vocal expressions, which is why they are deemed essential to social interaction.

Following Darwin’s work, two major debates have refined contemporary understandings of emotion. William James (1884) held that emotions are, first and foremost, a specific class of feelings, to be distinguished from related concepts such as moods, sensations, and sentiments. Emotions according to this view are the subjective feelings associated with bodily changes and expressive behaviors. Hence, as James (1884, p. 190) famously put it, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” – and not vice versa. An almost diametrically opposed shift in understanding emotion is linked to a well-known experiment by Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (1962), based on which they proposed that only thoughts and cognitions, specifically the interpretation and labeling of events (including bodily changes), can bring about a specific emotion. More recent scholarship has increasingly sought to integrate key insights of these feeling-based and cognitive accounts, resulting in innovative perspectives that emphasize the embodied and socially constituted nature of emotion, which we outline in
detail in our own approach. Importantly, in this approach, emotions should be considered part of an integrated conceptual field that encompasses affect, emotion, and feeling. Roughly, whereas “affect” stands for pre-categorical relational dynamics and “feeling” for the subjective-experiential dimension of these affective relations, “emotion” signifies consolidated and categorically circumscribed sequences of affective world-relatedness.

**Emotions as realizations and conceptualizations of affect**

Although there still are many different ways of understanding the concept of emotion and much disagreement remains as to its theoretical elaboration, a minimal consensus can be identified across traditions and paradigms. As a starting ground, this consensus has also proven to be exceptionally fruitful for an understanding of societies as affective societies. Emotions thus are conceived of as object- or situation-directed affective comportments that are sorted into culturally established and linguistically labeled categories or prototypes, such as, for instance, fear, anger, happiness, grief, envy, pride, shame, and guilt. These emotion categories mirror specific kinds of evaluative world-relations, for example a relation to imminent danger in the case of fear, to an offense in the case of indignation, or to a severe loss in the case of grief. Needless to say, these evaluations need not be unambiguous, but can be fuzzy, ambivalent, or even contradictory, often resulting in experiences of mixed feelings and emotions (e.g., Heavey et al., 2017). Hence, emotions also reflect concerns of various sorts, from more abstract goals and desires, for example for social status or recognition, to more basic needs such as freedom from harm or bodily integrity. Whatever theoretical differences are prevalent among researchers, we hold that a workable understanding of emotion must accommodate this category-specific directedness to salient classes of events or objects.

Emotions thus are inherently relational categories. They are cognitive and affective processes unfolding along the lines of a categorically circumscribed evaluative relation, linking an actor or a group to specific matters of concern. Thus, for example, the emotion type fear comprises those affective processes and appraisals for which individuals or groups are affected by an imminent danger; anger comprises those thoughts and affective dynamics that relate an individual or a group to a harmful offense or transgression, while grief comprises dynamics that relate an individual or a group to a situation of significant loss (cf. Helm, 2001). Hence, emotion categories cannot be said to denote processes “inside” individuals or capitalize on some social or material “outside.” Rather, they are indicative of situational entanglements and the relational co-constitution of actors, situations, and evaluative orientations. This constitutive embeddedness is also reflected in recent works stressing the enactive nature of emotions (Krueger & Szanto, 2016; Slaby, 2014). The term
“enactive” suggests that emotions do not simply result from the passive representational processing of environmental information, but are an outcome of the dynamic embodied interaction between actors and their respective environments (Colombetti, 2013; Thompson, 2010).

The idea of emotions reflecting specific situational entanglements also suggests that emotions are episodic. In contrast to moods or sentiments (→ sentiments), emotion categories mirror situational – rather than the dispositional – affective world-relations. Importantly, situational here means “from the first-person-perspective” and is not limited to physical space or an ongoing interaction (Goldie, 2002). For example, recurrent depreciation can be seen as an unbearable situation and produce lasting shame about the self. Similarly, an insult in a face-to-face conversation provokes anger at someone else that is soon dampened by an apology.

Understanding emotions as situational and episodic is also in-line with the view that emotions are usually linked to feelings (→ feelings). When we say we are angry, sad, or proud of something, others usually have an immediate idea of what it feels like to be in a state of anger, sadness, or pride. In how far feelings are “at the core” of an emotion or in fact necessary for them is a question that reflects the different positions of James on the one hand, and Schachter and Singer on the other, and is still much discussed (e.g., Prinz, 2005). Instead of arguing that conscious phenomenal experience is a necessary ingredient of an emotion, we suggest a perspective from which emotions are predominantly realizations and conceptualizations of affect (→ affect). Aligning our understanding of affect with the domain of human bodies and phenomenal experience, we can interpret an actor’s situatedness as a specific “mode of being” and an evaluative bodily orientation toward the world. Affect in this view is related to the idea of finding oneself in the world amidst the forces that enable or hinder one’s thriving and one’s capacity to act. As a complex bodily stance, affective comportment is not necessarily focused on a specific object, but rather reflects an agent’s entire world-directedness in the sense of a specific “affective intentionality” (Slaby, 2008). Importantly, as part of an emotion, these bodily feelings may be directed toward objects and events in the world (expressing Goldie’s (2002) idea of “feeling towards”) and eventually become categorized and labeled as an emotion.

Contrary to some prominent proposals from the cultural studies branch of affect theorizing (e.g., Massumi, 2002), affect and emotion in this perspective are not systematically opposed. Instead, the relationship is that of a constructive interplay. Affect is a dynamic building block, potentially transgressing normatively prescribed and learned ways of relating to the world, eliding any “inside” versus “outside” distinction. Affect may bring about and intensify emotion episodes, for instance when grief, disgust, or anger build up to such a degree that little remains of the composure and sense-making capacities of the experiencing subject. Likewise, we assume that the conceptualization
of affect into an emotion category will have consequences for the intensity of the experience and for the bodily specificity of the overall episode.

The proposed perspective on emotion and how it links to affect in some ways tallies with approaches in social psychology. In particular, psychological constructionism and the “conceptual act theory of emotion” (Barrett, 2014) propose that emotions are situated and embodied conceptualizations of changes in the world that are relevant to an actor. Embodied conceptualizations essentially involve construals of affect or “core affect” as physical bodily changes with highly specific phenomenal and evaluative qualities and consequences for action. Also in this view, affect itself is considered to be non-conceptual and non-linguistic, and instead as primarily bodily and beyond volitional control. Psychological constructionism (as well as other psychological theories) also argues that affect can be measured and quantified on a number of experiential dimensions, mostly valence and arousal. Although this perspective is in some respects compatible to our proposed concept of emotion, it does differ in its understanding of affect. Whereas from the perspective of psychological constructionism affect is exclusively a property of the individual human body and its psychological functioning, our understanding is much broader in scope and decidedly not located at the level of an individual human body. Instead, it is conceived of as the relational dynamics between evolving bodies of different sorts and is more of a force, power, and intensity than a property of a biological body. Nevertheless, the repercussions of this sort of affect in the sense of a human body being affected resembles psychological constructionism’s account.

Understanding emotions as realizations and conceptualizations of affect also aligns with the widespread view that – as evaluative and object-directed engagements with the environment – emotions also prepare actors for actions in a given situation (Frijda, 2004; Döring, 2003). Because emotions reflect matters of concern, they also prompt actors into engaging with the things that are of import to them. This motivational impetus is directed at the relation between the self and the object of the emotion. We are often prompted to maintain or alter this relationship as we are frequently pushed towards or pulled away from an object in question. Importantly, emotions are associated with action tendencies rather than with specific actions. They serve to decouple the “stimulus” from the “response” (Scherer, 1994) rather than to initiate some fixed action programs, allowing for flexible ways to engage with what concretely matters.

Furthermore, emotions not only prompt towards action, but are a form of agency in themselves. Situations become emotional situations because emotions co-constitute situations through a range of behaviors, from body postures to facial expressions, vocal intonations, and gestures. In contrast to research that continues Darwin’s line of reasoning that specific sets of behaviors are inextricably linked to specific emotions, we acknowledge the extensive evidence pointing toward notable cross-cultural differences in
emotionally expressive behaviors and their meanings (Elfenbein, 2017). This does not imply that, for example, frowned eyebrows are an entirely meaning-
less communicative signal. But interpreting them as a sign of the emotion category of “anger” requires additional situational cues and culture-specific
knowledge (Röttger-Rössler, 2004). The agency of emotions in conjunction
with their action tendencies – which include speech acts and the verbal com-
munication and social sharing of emotion – therefore are a powerful currency
for social interaction, intersubjectivity, and the emergence of collective emo-

This rough conception of emotion bears several important points. First,
emotions are episodic realizations of affect, sorted into culturally established and
thus historically variable sets of prototypical categories. These categories encom-
pass elements of conceptual knowledge and understanding beyond affective
attunements, bodily processes, feelings, or sensations. Relatedly, emotions both
presuppose and contribute to shaping an intelligible domain of value, including
socially instituted and culturally codified domains of concern and significance at
which the emotions are intentionally directed. This renders emotions relational
phenomena that are co-constitutive of actors and situations. Importantly,
categories such as anger, pride, shame, or disgust also refer to specific action
tendencies and exhibit in themselves agentic powers. Emotions are closely
related to reflective self-relations, providing sources of self-understanding,
anchoring individual narratives of value and import, and providing default ways
of making sense of actions, decisions, and commitments.

The intrinsic connection between emotion categories and valuations, situ-
atational entanglements, feelings, action tendencies, and communicative behaviors
inextricably relates individual traits and experience to cultural repertoires and
patterns of social organization. This relatedness is critical to providing actors
with meaning, intelligibility, and accountability as they constitute social and
communal life. Our proposed understanding of emotion brings to the fore an
inherent tension that is deliberately built into the concept. On the one hand,
emotion categories reflect socially shared (though historically and culturally
diverse) forms of knowledge and experience, for instance through processes of
socialization and acculturation (→ Gefühlsbildung). This also entails notions of
praxis and normative expectations regarding the experience, expression, and
valuation of emotions (→ orders of feeling) as well as the adequate ways to work
on or manage them (e.g., what we find disgusting or praiseworthy, how to
respond to specific dangers, or how to adequately deal with conflict, loss, mis-
chief, and so on) (Scheer, 2012; Thoits, 2004). On the other hand, emotions
also reflect individual predispositions, affections, biographies, and embodied
experiences that do not always fit seamlessly into the socially circumscribed pro-
totypicality of emotion categories (→ affective disposition).

This tension between the individual and the collectively shared aspects of
emotion is reflected in the concept of emotion repertoires (→ emotion reper-
toires). Repertoires are the building blocks that link the emotional lives of
individuals to social structures, forms of social organization, domains of practice, ideology, and spheres of belonging. Emotion repertoires at the same time are collectively shared and individually available. From a socialization perspective, they reflect developmental processes of the appropriation of emotion concepts and their prototypical situational entanglements and valuations as well as of the norms and rules pertaining to, for example, expressive behaviors (e.g., Holmes, 2015). These processes include the learning and habituation of emotions as well as their enactment and performance, all of which comprise elements of novelty, change, and variability. From a cultural and societal perspective, emotions as concept-bound responses to shared concerns are intimately linked to various cultural practices, social institutions, and value spheres, as found in the arts, politics, education, religion, or the judiciary (e.g., Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2015). These realms incorporate and promote specific understandings, representations, articulations, valuations, and practices of emotion, and hence influence subjects’ actual emotional experience. This can happen in implicit and barely noticeable ways when emotions remain mere residuals, or in deliberate attempts at the strategic management, regulation, and manufacture of individual and collective emotions (e.g., George, 2017).

Emotions in this view are subject to constant social change while at the same time being significant agents of change themselves. As shared emotion repertoires change over time, so too, most likely, will actors’ emotional experiences. And as actors’ emotional experiences change, for example through rapid social structural changes or the occurrence of “cultural lags” (Ogburn, 1922), so too may emotion repertoires. This perspective allows for an understanding of emotions beyond the individual human actor. Emotion repertoires can be attributed to collectives and also to social domains or spheres of belonging, such as groups, organizations, or institutional domains, shifting the emphasis from individual enactments to collective or domain-specific performances of emotional behavior. Likewise, this opens up a perspective on how emotions move and undergo transformation independently from the comportment of individual actors. Repertoires with their symbols, formats, and practices circulate globally in mediatized form, enter into other cultures of emotion, and thereby lead to hybridization, change, but also potentially to tension and conflict within established orders of feeling.

**Examples from research**

Given their associations with culturally derived categories, situational entanglements, affect, and emotion repertoires, emotions are at once constitutive of human sociality and contingent upon it. On this account, the concept of “emotion” speaks to at least two different understandings of relationality: those capitalizing on situated relations between human and non-human
bodies, in the sense of a “flat ontology,” and those that emphasize symbolic and structural forms of relationality, as in social stratification and social networks (Crossley, 2011). Emotions thus address long-standing debates in social theory over the “structure/agency divide” and provide novel perspectives to overcome that divide by hinting at how individual-level properties of actors interact with their social structural and cultural embeddedness. We can think of emotions not only from the standpoint of individual experience, but also in terms of emotional deviance, alienation, belonging, cohesion, or social exclusion. Emotions in this sense might be thought of in “full-duplex” fashion, that is, in a way that highlights the mutual contingency of emotion with different social formations such as groups, teams, organizations, social movements, or nation state societies. Two examples from existing research shall serve to illustrate this perspective.

Transnational migration usually involves relocating from one social and cultural space to another, crossing not only language and nation-state borders, but also those borders related to customs, practices, worldviews, and value spheres. In addition, social and cultural perspectives on emotion suggest that transnational migration also means relocating across the borders of “emotion cultures,” or dominant practices, norms, and values associated with emotion categories. Looking at Vietnamese psychiatric-psychotherapeutic patients in the German capital of Berlin, von Poser and colleagues (2017) investigate the emotional consequences of transnational migration using a concept of emotion close to the one we propose. Their interdisciplinary approach – combining insights from social anthropology and transcultural psychiatry – promises an understanding of the migratory process from multiple affect-related perspectives. First, it allows for an investigation of affective tensions arising from potentially conflicting emotional orientations and affordances. Long-nurtured evaluative world-relations and modes of being might cease to provide meaning in novel social and cultural circumstances, instead leading to irritation, tension, and dissonance (→ affective resonance). This might also include distortions and adjustments to the ways affective comportments are sorted into emotion categories when culturally specific emotional prototypes become blurred and ambiguous. This points, second, to affordances resulting from cultural differences in the very meanings of emotion categories and in the emotional repertoires associated with these categories. For instance, situations that might be construed as “shameful” in one cultural context may well elicit shame in another context too, but the social expectations regarding situation and emotion might differ dramatically. Third, these affective and emotional challenges of transnational migration bear consequences at both an individual and societal level, impacting a range of conditions from individual mental and emotional health to the very social fabric of hosting societies and communities, as von Poser and colleagues (von Poser et al., 2017) illustrate.

From a notably different theoretical perspective, a second example highlights the situational entanglement of affect and emotions with their more
inert repertoires. Collective emotions are often conceived as spontaneous and involuntarily processes irrupting in crowds and gatherings without much cognitive involvement. Emotional contagion and facial mimicry are amongst the possible mechanisms responsible for this rapid transfer of emotions across individuals. Taking a slightly different approach, Knoblauch and Herbrik (2014) consider the case of audience emotions (→ audience emotions). In audience emotions, they suggest, collective emotions often stem from the close interplay of pre-existing declarative and tacit forms of knowledge related to specific emotion categories and situational affective comportments. Dedicated spatial arrangements such as the architectural layout of a large stadium, promote certain forms of social interaction, a common focus of attention, entrainment, and bodily affection. At the same time, actors engage in ritual practices that entail specific choreographies and performances such as chanting, singing, or gesturing. These choreographies are explicitly aimed at the generation and expression of discrete emotions, which are labeled, articulated, and socially shared. As such, they are part of an emotion repertoire that is learned and internalized over time through repeated enactment and situational exposure. This perspective on emotion allows researchers to disentangle affective upheavals of experience from their situational and material components, and from the emotion categories into which they are culturally labeled, branded, and enacted. Importantly, this view contributes to our understanding of the formation of different social collectives that share the same social space. Although patterns of bodily affection within a stadium may be shared by most actors present, their linguistic labeling and social sharing will be contingent on emotion repertoires that arise from and contribute to the formation of distinct social collectives, such as different groups of supporters (see also von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).

Conclusion

The understanding of emotion we propose seeks to address a number of shortcomings and oversights in existing social science and cultural studies perspectives. On the one hand, there is an obvious danger to “over-intellectualize” emotions and to treat them as one would treat language, cognition, and conceptual thought. From such a vantage point, emotions are merely another form of discourse, compromising most of what one commonly associates with emotions, such as their immediacy, agency, affective phenomenology, and bodily dynamics. On the other hand, there is a risk of overlooking the importance of culture and sociality by reducing emotions to their affective and bodily qualities. Emotions are much more than sweating palms, racing hearts, or reddening cheeks. They are situation- and culture-specific conceptualizations and classifications of these bodily reactions, evaluatively directed toward specific objects, including the historically contingent norms, values, and social expectations to which they are related. This variety
of ingredients or dimensions of an emotion has important methodological ramifications for empirical social research. It seems almost self-evident that specific research methods, such as in-depth interviews, ethnographic observations, experiments, or standardized surveys will only be able to address particular aspects of an emotion at a certain time. For example, discourse analyses may help uncover the linguistic labeling or textual representation of different emotion categories, but they will fall short of providing insights into emotions’ bodily, affective, and experiential dimensions. Empirical research therefore needs to take great care to avoid construing emotions reductively according to the particular epistemological limitations that every scientific method inevitably yields (cf. Stodulka, 2017).

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In the conceptual field formed by \( \rightarrow \text{affect} \) and \( \rightarrow \text{emotion} \), feeling is the broadest term most notably evading a clear-cut definition. In everyday language, feeling is an umbrella term for all forms of felt experience, including but not limited to the capacity and readiness to feel emotions. In traditional emotion research, two tendencies can be identified. On the one hand, the terms “emotion” and “feeling” are often used interchangeably. On the other hand, when a distinction is introduced, feeling is usually defined as the bodily felt component of an emotional episode. Within the conceptual field opened up by a relational understanding of affect, it is reasonable to understand feeling as the bodily experience dimension of affect, in contrast to emotion, which points to its culturally shaped conceptualization. Whereas it is possible to understand affect and emotion solely with reference to their function and as only rudimentarily involving felt experience, feeling necessarily entails an experiential dimension including an irreducible form of self-awareness or self-involvement – a feeling is always experienced by someone and involves an evaluation of one’s own situation. However, the focus on experience should not lead us to understand feeling as a “mental state” insulated from social interaction and corporeal embeddedness. Rather, the present chapter will outline an understanding of feeling as in itself relational, processual, and interactively embodied – instantiating an affective-intentional orientation in the world, as manifest in \( \rightarrow \text{affective dispositions} \) and \( \rightarrow \text{affective practices} \).

For developing such a working concept of feeling, a Spinoza-inspired notion of affect as relational dynamics between bodies can be combined with certain phenomenological approaches offering an understanding of feeling as embodied, relational, and situated. Such a view holds that feelings are neither just experiences of the body, nor just experiences of the world. Rather, these are two dimensions of feeling that are phenomenologically inextricable. The idea is that all feelings are bodily, but most of the time, the body is not the object of the feeling. Such a notion of feeling builds on a phenomenological understanding of embodiment – mostly inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty – which understands the body as constitutive for our relatedness to the world and to others. Rather than closing us off from our material and social
environment, the body is the scene of embeddedness and connectedness. Although the present chapter mostly relies on phenomenological sources, the notion of feeling outlined here is closely related to the other core concepts in the conceptual field of affective societies. On the one hand, feeling is tightly linked to affect; rather than insulated “mental states,” feelings are interactively instantiated within the dynamics of corporeal affection (→ affective resonance). On the other hand, feeling is tightly linked to emotion; in contrast to sensations, feelings are intentional experiences that pertain to an essentially shareable, culturally modulated, concern-driven engagement with the world. Within the conceptual field formed by affect and emotion, the notion of feeling has the particular role of uniting bodily affection and intentional world-orientation in a way that entails an experiential dimension with self-involvement.

A brief history of the term feeling

The task of elucidating “feeling” is not only troubled by the various uses of the term in different scientific disciplines and traditions, but maybe even more so by the ambiguity of its everyday usage. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) differentiates 30 senses of the noun feeling. The noun is the nominalization of the verb “to feel” for which the OED differentiates 47 senses. This all points to a wild diversity of meanings. Some order can be achieved, however, when noting that the etymologically primary meaning is related to sensation or touch. Feeling first of all means “the capacity to experience the sense of touch or other bodily sensations,” or “a physical sensation or perception (as of touch, heat, cold, pain, motion, etc.) experienced through this capacity.” To feel something first and foremost means to touch it or to be touched by it. This etymology is further supported when considering that the English verb “to feel” is derived from the Germanic verb fühlen. According to the Deutsches Wörterbuch by the Brothers Grimm, fühlen can be traced back to the Old High German falan, which is related to folma, meaning palm, that is the inner surface of the hand (compare the Latin palma and the Greek paláme). This suggests that the oldest sense of fühlen is most likely to touch something with one’s hands or fingers; a sense preserved in the English verb “to palm.” To sum up, the etymology suggests that feeling originally had the sense of being in a bodily relation with external objects, touching them and being touched by them. It is a rather new development, mostly dominant in contemporary analytic philosophy, that the notion of feeling is deprived of any epistemic function and reduced to a bodily sensation that lacks connection to the world and others.

The crucial step toward such a notion of feeling can be displayed with reference to the example of Kant’s practical philosophy. Kant held the view that moral judgments are solely based on understanding (Verstand) or reason (Vernunft). As a consequence, for an individual to fully exercise her autonomy it
does not only require her to follow the moral law, it also requires that she does
so solely based on the formal principle of it being the right thing to do, and not
based on any feeling or desire. Kant claims that moral autonomy can only be
achieved by sharply separating oneself from one’s inclinations (Neigungen). In
this chapter, I cannot discuss the merits of Kant’s practical philosophy. It only
serves as an example for the workings of the dichotomy of feeling (Gefühle) and
understanding (Verstand) and its far-reaching consequences for the conceptuali-
zation of feeling. Most importantly, such a dichotomy prompts a generalization
of all feelings, which tends to encompass the entire domain of felt experiences –
from love to toothache – along the lines of bodily sensations. Such generaliza-
tion has enabled understandings of feeling as deprived of any productive role
within a reasonable engagement with the world, which could grow into crudely
prejudiced but widely spread assumptions like the association of feeling with
femininity (in contrast to male rationality).

In contrast to the Kantian framework, Spinoza (like Leibniz or Descartes)
did not separate feeling from understanding, but rather understood feeling as
integral part of understanding. Max Scheler (1973) saw shortcomings in both
traditions and attempted to find a solution which combines elements from
both. He suggests maintaining the distinction between feeling and under-
standing, while avoiding the reduction of feelings to sensations. Instead, he
conceives of feeling as a unique kind of experience. According to Scheler,
feeling discloses a distinct sphere of objects that is concealed for under-
standing, namely the sphere of value. Thus, in contrast to Kant’s formal
ethics, Scheler’s material value ethics grants feeling a crucial role. Feeling is
the vehicle for the experience of value; far from being a bodily sensation
without epistemic significance or moral relevance, Scheler places feeling at
the core of an evaluative and normative engagement with the world.

For the formulation of his theory, Scheler (1973, 2008) introduces two
conceptual differentiations. First, Scheler follows Husserl in pointing out a
crucial equivocation of the German term Gefühl, which is also present in
many English accounts of feeling. This equivocation confuses “feeling acts”
(Gefühlsakte) with “feeling sensations” (Gefühlempfindungen). The main idea is
that “feeling acts” belong to the domain of “intentional experiences” (inten-
tionale Erlebnisse), while “feeling sensations” belong to the same class of
experiences as sensory perceptions like taste, smell, or touch. This distinction
allows for an understanding of sensations as not themselves intentional states –
they are not directed at objects or events – but rather as possible contents of
intentional states. Let me illuminate this with the example of bodily pain:
Bodily pain does not determine the mode in which it is felt; one can suffer
from pain, endure it, or enjoy it. This shows that feeling sensations are a pos-
sible content of intentional states and that various types of feeling acts can be
directed toward the same feeling sensation (i.e., either suffering from, bravely
enduring or enjoying one and the same feeling sensation of pain). Sensations
are a residuum that can only be experientially detected and causally explained
Feeling acts are intentional experiences that allow for fulfillment or non-fulfillment as well as for intersubjective understanding and sharing, and thus are open to be studied from a variety of cross-disciplinary perspectives. Scheler makes use of the fact that German has two nominalizations of the verb “to feel.” Whereas English only knows the term feeling, German presents a distinction between Fühlen and Gefühl. This enables Scheler to differentiate between (intentional) feeling (Fühlen), the apprehension of an object or event in light of a value, and feelings (Gefühle), which he defines as responses to such feeling of value. This is yet another distinction than the distinction of “feeling acts” (Gefühlsakte) and “feeling sensations” (Gefühlsempfindungen), which was explained in the introduction and which Scheler adopted from Husserl (1975). Let me illuminate this with the help of another example. Consider the case in which I sense that another’s remark is offensive, but remain indifferent rather than responding with an appropriate emotion like anger. In such a case, Scheler’s distinction allows us to say that I indeed felt the value of the other’s remark, although without having the corresponding feeling.

Distinguishing feeling sensations (Gefühlsempfindungen), intentional feeling (Fühlen), and feelings (Gefühle) has a lot of potential for disambiguating the notoriously vague field of feeling-terms (cf. Schloßberger, 2016). Feeling sensation signifies sensory experiences that are localized within the body and have the status of pure states without intentionality of their own. Intentional feeling, on the other hand, signifies forms of sensing or conceiving that are decisive for an evaluative engagement with the world and others (comparable to emotion, emotion concept). Following this distinction, it is reasonable to understand feeling as the combination of feeling sensation and intentional feeling in a bodily felt intentional experience. This would suggest that we should see feeling sensation and intentional feeling as abstractions (obtained by phenomenological analysis) that we normally encounter as elements of feeling. Moreover, it suggests a stratification of feeling depending on whether feeling sensation or intentional feeling is predominant (cf. Vendrell Ferran, 2016). It needs to be noted, however, that Scheler’s ethics did not gain much traction beyond his immediate successors within the early phenomenological movement. Moreover, his distinction between feeling, feeling sensation, and intentional feeling has largely gone unnoticed. The latter is likely due to the fact that it cannot be rendered in English without some linguistic acrobatics that make it sound highly artificial.

Feelings within 20th-century emotion research

Most of 20th-century research on emotions – at least within philosophy and psychology – was driven by cognitivism about emotions. Most philosophers supporting cognitivism about emotions identify emotions with evaluative judgments (cf. Kenny, 1963; Solomon, 1993). According to this view, emotions are intentional states directed toward objects and events in the
world. This view goes hand in hand with the degradation of feelings. The implicit understanding is that feelings are not world-directed at all, but rather experiences of one’s own body. Moreover, some cognitivists claim that feelings are not necessary for emotions, and may or may not accompany them. Such a view leads to a deprivation of emotions from any bodily component, transforming them into cognitive states, such as an evaluative judgment, which might be accompanied by conative states, i.e., a motivation to act.

Appraisal theories are the leading cognitivist approach in psychology (cf. Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). The main idea is that for an emotion to occur, a stimulus is appraised according to a range of cognitive criteria. In contrast to some judgment theorists, appraisal theorists hold that the appraisal is necessarily followed by some bodily process. In particular, the distinction between various components of an emotion by some appraisal theorists can be seen as an attempt at reconciling the world-directedness of emotions with their bodily nature. According to this view, an emotion comprises several elements or components, namely cognition, motor expressions, action tendencies, neurological processes, and bodily feelings (cf. Scherer, 2005). This theory, however, continues to align feelings with mere sensations. While the world-directedness of an emotion is captured in its cognitive component (the appraisal), the feeling remains reduced to an accompanying bodily sensation.

Cognitivist approaches crucially depend on the dualism between experience of the body and experience of the world, accompanied by a dualism between affectivity and cognition. In contrast to these views, the working concept of feeling suggested here is meant to overcome the distinction between bodily affection and cognition by locating the intentionality of an emotion in the bodily experience.

Somatic feedback theories (cf. Damásio, 1994; Prinz, 2004), the other major trend in 20th-century emotion research, fare better in this regard, as they claim that patterns of bodily changes are crucial for the intentionality of emotions. The main idea is that an emotion is a mental state detecting certain bodily changes which, in turn, detect changes in the environment. Thus, an emotion represents changes in the environment mediated through bodily changes. However, intentionality is here understood in purely functionalist terms according to which an apparatus (like a thermostat) can just as well be said to be intentional. Paradoxical as it may seem, somatic feedback theories also eliminate feelings from emotions since they separate intentionality – understood here as the detection of environmental changes – from any felt experience.

1 It can be noted that neither judgment theorists nor appraisal theorists claim that these judgments or appraisals need to be deliberate or that an individual even needs to be consciously aware of them.

2 I follow the terminology of Prinz here. Damásio reverses the meaning of the terms feeling and emotion.
Feeling as bodily affection and meaningful world-orientation

In this section, I will offer a tentative sketch of a working concept of feeling within the conceptual field of relational affect. According to the perspective I am proposing, feeling is immediately bound to bodies as affecting and being affected (→ affect). At the same time, feeling provides a meaningful orientation within the world (→ emotion, emotion concept). Finally, it implies an irreducible experiential dimension which involves a form of self-relation. In short, feeling is the inextricably intertwining of bodily affection, world-directedness, and self-involvement.

Such an understanding of feeling can build on recent trends in the philosophy of emotions. To begin with, Peter Goldie (2000) has advocated a return to a close identification of emotions with feelings. He claims that the separation of emotions from feelings was based on the false premise that feelings are mere bodily states without intentionality. Instead, Goldie argues that certain feelings are also directed toward objects and events in the world. He uses the term “feeling towards” to signify these intentional feelings, distinguishing them from “bodily feeling.” Goldie thereby overcomes the dualisms predominant in cognitivist and appraisal theories of emotions; emotions are not merely cognitive appraisals plus a feeling component. He also overcomes the neglect of experience in somatic feedback theories; feeling towards is at once bodily felt and directed toward objects and events in the world.

Matthew Ratcliffe (2008, 2014) has radicalized this approach, mainly by dismissing the distinction between feeling towards and bodily feeling. He defends the view that all feelings are “both feelings of bodily states and at the same time ways of experiencing things outside of the body. World-experience is not distinct from how one’s body feels; the two are utterly inextricable” (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 1). The main idea is that although all feelings are bodily felt, most feelings are not feelings of the body. In other words, most feelings do not have the body as their object; even though all feelings are bodily felt in a way that is experientially accessible, most feelings are experiences of something other than the body. When experience works, the body drifts into the background and becomes the transparent medium of experience. In those instances, we encounter our body as a feeling body, not as a felt body; our feeling body directs us toward events in the world. Even when we become aware of our feeling body, this awareness does not need to imply a transformation of the body into an object and indeed it seldom does.

Ratcliffe continues to argue that there are certain kinds of feelings – including belonging and estrangement, familiarity and unfamiliarity, embeddedness and disembeddedness – that are not concrete emotional episodes, but rather fundamental ways of finding oneself in the world. He labels these kinds of experiences “existential feelings,” emphasizing that they are at the same time fundamental ways of finding oneself and being oriented in the world. Existential feelings establish both a sense of reality of the world, and a sense of one’s belonging to
Slaby and Stephan adopted Ratcliffe’s suggestion to overcome another fateful dualism, namely one that separates world-experience and self-experience. Their main claim is that all feelings are at once a disclosure of world and self; they are “an evaluative awareness of which goes hand in hand with a registration of one’s existential situation” (Slaby & Stephan, 2008, p. 506). Rather than separating the experience of objects and events in the world from the experience of the self, we need to understand how my evaluation of an event is accompanied by a felt self-evaluation through which I embed myself within a meaningful situation. The term feeling is well-suited to cover this intertwining of world-orientation and self-relation. What we need is an understanding of feeling as at once feeling toward and bodily (self-)feeling. Putting “self” in brackets is meant to indicate that (self-)feeling does not need to transform the body into the object of the feeling; rather, (self-)feeling first and foremost takes the form of a bodily self-awareness constitutive of all felt experiences: all feeling is necessarily experienced as someone’s feeling. This pertains to a theme that has a long-standing history within philosophy, ranging from Selbstgefühl in German Idealism, via Heidegger’s (1927/1996) Gemeinigkeit and Sartre’s (1936/1991, 1944/1966) conscience (de) soi to the Heidelberg School of self-consciousness (cf. Henrich, 1967; Frank, 2002).

Such an understanding of the feeling body is at the core of phenomenological accounts of embodiment. Thomas Fuchs, for example, draws on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2012) notion of intercorporeality to develop an account of inter-affectivity. From a certain perspective, Fuchs comes to a similar conclusion regarding the relationality and reciprocity of affective life as a Spinoza-inspired notion of affect. The claim is that living bodies are connected with each other in such a way that each of them immediately affects others, and is immediately affected by them. Accordingly, affective life cannot be understood separately from its embeddedness within enabling and sustaining social environments.

The mutual bodily resonance in social encounters, mediated by posture, facial, gestural, and vocal expression, engenders our attunement to others and functions as a carrier of basic interpersonal atmospheres such as warmth, ease, familiarity, and belonging, or in the negative case, coldness, tension, unease, or unfamiliarity.

(Fuchs, 2013, p. 222)

This allows Fuchs to strictly oppose an understanding of affectivity in terms of mental states. He states that “affects” (which he uses as an umbrella term for all affective experience) “are not inner states that we experience only individually or that we have to decode in others, but primarily shared states that we experience through mutual intercorporeal affection” (p. 223). However, this discussion of Fuchs also makes manifest the limitations of a phenomenological approach that exclusively conceives of embodiment in terms of the...
intercorporeal relations of human beings. To begin with, Fuchs’ account of inter-affectivity focuses strongly on social relations, while paying less attention to socio-material settings (→ affective arrangement). Moreover, his account of social relations can be charged with blindness regarding the power and normativity inscribed into all such relations. Finally, in terms of the basic ontological premises of the theory, a phenomenological account of embodiment restricts inter-affectivity to the domain of sentient beings. In contrast, affect is claimed to constitute a general ontology pertaining to all entities. While I take power, normativity, and socio-material settings as important issues that a phenomenological notion of inter-affectivity should be able to account for, I consider it plausible to restrict feelings to sentient beings. The hypothesis is that all entities are part of the dynamics of affect, but only sentient beings are capable of experiencing affective dynamics in the form of felt experiences.

**Outlook**

According to a traditional understanding of the term, feelings seem to constitute a challenge for empirical research. The assumption is that while the emotional states of an individual can be inferred from the observation of behavioral and physiological indicators, there appears to be no scientific method to measure bodily experience (cf. Scherer, 2005). The aim of this chapter was to show that this assumption is based on a conflation of feelings with feeling sensations. Whereas it is true that feeling sensations are only accessible to the individual undergoing them (I cannot experience another’s sensations), feelings are best conceived of as essentially shareable affective-intentional experiences within a meaningful understanding of self and world. However, this does not speak against the corporeality of feelings. Rather, the working concept of feeling outlined here suggests that a feeling is at once bodily felt and intentionally directed toward objects or events in the world, and that this double role can be conceived of in terms of the feeling body. Within the conceptual field of affect and emotion, such a notion of feeling emphasizes the experiential dimension involved in dynamics of → affective resonance and in the enactment of → emotion repertoires; an experiential dimension that implies self-involvement. Feeling is at once evaluative world-orientation and situational self-awareness. Feeling constitutively is (self-)feeling, a form of bodily (self-)awareness in all experiencing. Although feeling concerns the experiential dimension of individual bodies, it is important to note that the body is here understood as the scene of embeddedness into the world and of connectedness with others. This suggests that feelings are intersubjectively accessible through their relational embodiment and intentionality, and are thus open to be studied from a variety of cross-disciplinary perspectives.

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The German term “Gefühlsbildung,” translated roughly as “feeling-formation” or “the formation of feeling,” takes the threefold semantics of Bildung (as education, formation, and emergence) and transfers these to the appearance and stabilization of emotion repertoires. Hence, Gefühlsbildung has a broad spectrum of meanings encompassing not only the explicit ways in which feelings and emotions are purposefully taught and influenced but also the more implicit processes by which feelings and emotions take form in everyday social interactions. Both dimensions of the formation of feeling depend on the given socio-political structures as well as the values and norms of a specific social or cultural group. Moreover, the behavioral norms in a society also always include “feeling rules” (Hochschild, 1983) that define who is allowed to feel which feelings, at what intensity, in the presence of whom (vis-à-vis age, gender, status), and in which social situation. Equally important, these norms dictate the form in which these feelings must be expressed or even suppressed (orders of feeling). Studies in social and cultural anthropology confirm the enormous diversity of these social and cultural codes of emotion (e.g., Lutz & White, 1986) that are themselves subject to continuous historical transformations (Frevert, 2013) as well as global influences.

A major part of the social and cultural formation of human emotionality takes place during childhood. Nonetheless, the formation of feeling is a lifelong process that is not restricted to this life phase alone, since changing societal demands imposed on individuals as they age as well as changes in society itself require continuous emotional readjustments. However, the notion of Gefühlsbildung is restricted here to intentional and purposeful forms of emotion modulation taking place in, for example, institutional settings such as kindergartens, schools, psychotherapeutic intervention centers, or self-enhancement programs. In contrast, the socialization of emotions is understood as a more general term encompassing explicit modes of emotional education as well as implicit processes of emotional modulation in everyday social interactions and behavioral routines. Thus, investigating processes of the formation of feeling means focusing primarily on the explicit facets of emotional socialization and analyzing related social practices.
This chapter first addresses some terminological issues in order to describe the concept of the formation of feeling. Then, it examines how feelings are socialized and taught in childhood and adolescence from a comparative social-anthropological perspective. It goes on to focus on how processes of Gefühlsbildung take place in the context of migration – that is, in transnational social fields. Finally, it considers how globally circulating “emotional pedagogies” interact with local conventions of formation of feeling. The outlook addresses the relationship between the explicit and informal forms of Gefühlsbildung and discusses the affective dynamics unfolding within the interplay of these processes.

**Education, socialization, Bildung, and the formation of feeling**

Although the terms “education,” “socialization,” and “Bildung” overlap to some extent, they all emphasize different aspects. Within the social sciences, the term “education” has the clearest definition of the three. It is defined as the planned, socially preconstructed ways in which adults influence children and adolescents with the goal of imparting the norms, values, abilities, and skills of their respective society or social group (Löw & Geier, 2014). Education is only one aspect of human socialization, defined as the complex processes through which individuals interacting with their social and material environments acquire the behavioral requirements and knowledge of their respective social worlds. The term “socialization” is much broader than the term “education”: It also comprises implicit forms of social learning that are understood as a life-long process.

The difficult to translate German term “Bildung” (derived from the Old High German term “bildunga” meaning creation, image, and/or gestalt) emerged in the Middle Ages within the context of the theological concept of imago dei. Here, Bildung is understood as a process by which God forms the human being in His own image. With the changing view of humanity in the 18th century focusing on potentially enlightened beings who act and think in rational categories, the term “Bildung” finally became secularized and applied individually. Representatives of enlightenment pedagogy assumed a fundamental need for every human to be educated and therefore called for universal access to Bildung. Bildung was increasingly understood as a process of individual self-formation encompassing not only knowledge acquisition, meaning the Bildung of the rational intellect, but also the “Bildung des Gemüths [of the mind]” (von Humboldt, 1982) or the “Bildung des Herzens [of the heart]” (Schiller, 1784/1967), considered to be the site of feelings (Frevert & Wulf, 2012).

The different meanings acquired by the term “Bildung” over the course of history still reverberate in its modern iteration, as it still stands not only for the acquisition of formalized knowledge but also the life-long process of
human development. Within this development, humans broaden their intellectual and pragmatic capabilities, and also extend their personal and social competencies to meet the needs of their respective life situations. This latter aspect encompasses the ability to creatively enrich, or even critically question and transform, social conditions. In this regard, the classical concept of Bildung differs from today’s focus on social competencies, prevalent within Western perspectives on human development, which emphasize the ability to cope with and adapt to demanding lifeworlds. The current understanding of social competencies is closely connected to the increasingly significant notion of “emotional competence.”

This concept, introduced by psychologists Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer (1989), was popularized by psychologist and science journalist Daniel Goleman (1996) under the heading “emotional intelligence.” Nowadays, the term is applied in a wide range of fields beyond psychology, such as vocational training and adult education; and is even used in commercial human resources consulting to describe programs for acquiring self-enhancement techniques to control personal emotionality. Emotional competence is described as an individual’s ability to cope with their own emotions and those of others appropriately within a given situation. This means interpreting emotions in specific encounters in the “correct” way, evaluating them, and then responding to them with the appropriate form of behavior (Saarni, 1999). Nonetheless, there is no universal specification of what should be considered to be an appropriate “emotionally competent” behavior in any particular situation. Instead, this depends strongly on the respective social and cultural norms or “feeling rules” as proposed by Arlie R. Hochschild (1983). Individuals learn some of these rules implicitly through daily interactions and behavioral routines during the course of their socialization. However, many of these rules are a product of targeted feeling-formation; that is, of explicit processes of modulation.

These processes of modulation take place within institutional structures such as kindergartens, schools, adult education centers, psychological and psychiatric practices, and social education counseling centers. They are shaped not only by the feeling rules valid in a given institution and the practices applied within it but also by the resulting affective arrangements (affective arrangement). However, the formation of feeling in the sense of an explicit modulation of emotions also takes place outside institutional structures and within informal, social processes of communication – for example, when people verbalize, evaluate, and classify emotional experiences in private contexts or otherwise act these out together. Increasingly, this is a process that is now being conveyed through various media channels. These informal,  

1 Nevertheless, this concept has various precursors. For example, Edward Lee Thorndike coined the term “social intelligence” as early as 1920, describing it as the ability to understand and manage others.
though by no means implicit, conscious modulating processes play a major role in both stabilizing and transforming emotion repertoires (→ emotion repertoires).

Hence, Gefühlsbildung includes all the explicit ways in which emotions are influenced and formed. It takes place within the framework of institutionally structured processes as well as in informal social interactions and practices. Using the German term “Gefühl,” similar to the English term “feeling,” invokes connotations of immediate, sensual feeling and is therefore aimed toward the dimension of subjective, bodily experience (→ feeling). This should indicate that subjective experience is formed into distinct, culturally categorized emotions (→ emotion, emotion concept) by social processes of modulation.

The formation of feeling in childhood and adolescence

Although social and cultural anthropology reveal a long tradition of studying childhood, adolescence, and socialization, they have rarely taken aspects of the formation of feeling into account. It is only in the last few decades that attention has turned to the specific issue of the socialization of emotions. In the context of the “emotional turn,” this has produced several significant studies on different cultural practices of emotional childrearing that investigate how the emotional concepts and feeling rules of their lifeworld are conveyed to children within the context of everyday scenarios and interactions (e.g., Briggs, 1998; LeVine et al., 1994). This raises theoretical questions regarding how far culture-specific childrearing practices in general can shape the formation of emotions – that is, ontogenetic emotional development – without being aimed specifically at shaping children’s emotionality.

Comparative social-anthropological studies, such as the pioneering work of Naomi Quinn (2005), indicate that different cultures vary widely not only in their social, economic, and political structures but also in their behavioral norms, and values. Therefore, childrearing goals utilize what is only a limited set of practices to socialize children in line with their respective societal norms. From the perspective of a theory of emotions, it is particularly interesting to note that all the societies examined in these studies utilize affective or emotionalizing childrearing practices such as evoking fear, creating uncertainty, teasing, shaming, or praising in order to teach children specific lessons (Quinn, 2005, p. 490). It can be assumed that these affective childrearing practices impact the formation of emotions significantly.

This assumption was at the center of an empirical social-anthropological-psychological research project investigating the effects of emotionalizing childrearing practices on the emotional development of children in three different cultural groups (from Madagascar, Taiwan, and Indonesia). Results showed that cultural differences in the use of affective childrearing strategies
The other cultural groups examined in this project (Minangkabau in Indonesia, Tao in Taiwan) utilize what are partially different and partially similar “socializing emotions.” Because these interact with the respective culture-specific value systems and socialization conditions (family constellations, socio-economic structures, etc.), they may lead in each case to extremely different forms of emotional development (Funk et al., 2012; Röttger-Rössler et al., 2013, 2015). When discussing their results, the research team developed the theoretical concept of “socializing emotions.” They use this ambiguous term deliberately to describe the emotions that the deployment of emotionalizing childrearing practices intends to elicit. The aim is to convey specific lessons in a particularly enduring fashion – that is, to use emotions for purposes of socialization. This research showed that the use of “socializing emotions” also leads to the formation or socialization of other emotions. Therefore, it makes sense to differentiate analytically between socializing and socialized emotions. For example, childrearing practices based on fear (of corporal punishment) among the Bara of Madagascar create not only fear among the children but also intensive anger and a high level of potential aggression toward those performing the sanctions. For the Bara, anger and aggressive behavior toward persons in authority is unacceptable. Therefore, it is punished rigorously, and children learn to suppress these emotions out of fear of being sanctioned. However, aggression and anger directed toward nonrelated peers is tolerated. These feelings actually represent a desired form of behavior in this segmentary, competitively oriented society, which is perceived as being categorically different from what is viewed as inappropriate anger toward persons in authority. In short, through the socializing emotion of fear, Bara children also develop a disposition toward anger that can lead to different, linguistically differentiable forms of anger within the course of their further socialization (Funk, Röttger-Rössler, & Scheidecker, 2012, pp. 224–226, 233–235; see Scheidecker, 2017, for a detailed presentation of these complex processes). This research team’s studies show that the development of emotion repertoires is modulated to a similar extent by both the explicit and implicit emotional childrearing that takes place within ongoing processes of socialization in daily interactions. They also show that the implicit and explicit modes of emotional modulation are closely entangled. However, what happens if this entanglement falls apart – for example when conditions of socialization (family- and social structure, economic situation) change as a result of societal transformations or migration, and the conventional modes of feeling-formation within a specific social group cease to fit the current lifeworld? This is the question I shall examine in the next section.

2 The other cultural groups examined in this project (Minangkabau in Indonesia, Tao in Taiwan) utilize what are partially different and partially similar “socializing emotions.” Because these interact with the respective culture-specific value systems and socialization conditions (family constellations, socio-economic structures, etc.), they may lead in each case to extremely different forms of emotional development (Funk et al., 2012; Röttger-Rössler et al., 2013, 2015).
The formation of feeling in transnational social fields

Social-anthropological, sociological, and (social) psychological migration research has frequently examined conflicts between immigrant parents and their children (the so-called second generation) along with the challenges of “immigrant parenting” (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco, 2001). However, it has hardly considered the aspect of the formation of feeling. Our study within the Collaborative Research Center Affective Societies on the formation of feeling and intergenerational relations within the Vietnamese community of Berlin focused specifically on this topic.³ Our previous studies had shown that a large part of the conflict between the parent generation that had migrated from Vietnam and their children growing up in Germany relates to feeling rules that are perceived as incompatible. Parents interact with their children primarily on the basis of an emotion repertoire socialized in Vietnam. The children, in turn, find this hard to accept because it contradicts the feeling rules dominant in the social fields (school, peers) in which they grow up. Two examples can illustrate this. First, Vietnamese parents place a great deal of importance on their children treating them with respect and deference. Obeying parents immediately and without question is considered a sign of respect and unopposed recognition of parental authority. It is often hard for the children to accept this because voicing disagreement and one’s own opinion are not only encouraged and supported in educational settings but are also something they often observe in the parental homes of their German friends. Second, these children have to assist their parents in many everyday situations by, for example, translating for them when dealing with local government, going to the doctor, filing applications, or filling out forms. In these contexts, the family’s fabric of authority becomes destabilized because it is the parents who are dependent on their more competent children. This asymmetry of linguistic competence and knowledge of the German context weakens the cultural model of “filial piety” and changes affective relations between generations (Röttger-Rössler & Lam, 2018).

Members of the second generation process their problems with their parents’ behavior and modes of emotional expression largely on internet platforms and in the form of YouTube clips under the keyword “asian parents.” By employing humorous exaggeration, they use these platforms to debate family interactions and tensions. Such digital platforms provide important spaces for the informal formation of feeling. They can be used to negotiate, express, reflect on, and name affective tensions. Young people use them specifically to address the divergent feeling rules dominating the different parts of their lifeworld. They share their experiences and find ways to express the

³ Besides the author, the project team consists of Gabriel Scheidecker and Anh Thu Anne Lam, to whom I want to express my gratitude here.
feeling of “living in Germany and having Vietnamese parents” (quoted from an interview). In this sense, they form affective communities (→ affective communities). In my view, these internet platforms are significant media outlets for “emotional meaning making” and therefore the formation of feeling. On this basis, the children of these Vietnamese migrants work together in a generation-specific way to create a transcultural emotion repertoire that fuses components of the feeling rules that shape their daily life in Germany with those that their Vietnamese–born parents relate to and try to pass on to them. This emotion repertoire differs considerably from that of both their peers with German parents and their peers who are growing up in Vietnam. In large part, this emotion repertoire forms around affective experiences of dissonance that are specific to this generation – in other words, especially for children of migrants who came to the GDR from North Vietnam in the 1980s as contract workers and who have been the focus of our study so far.

Parents, on the other hand, discuss the challenges of raising children in Germany with other parents – and, like their children, increasingly do this online. They are also trying to modify parts of their emotion repertoire in response to their experiences of dissonance. However, this is often difficult for them because, in contrast to their children who are in the process of developing their emotion repertoire, parents need to reform a repertoire that was already acquired and consolidated many years ago. In this case, the patterns of emotional response and expressions acquired during socialization in Vietnam and habitualized through long-standing behavioral routines prove to be particularly enduring and resistant to change. Many Vietnamese parents have difficulties with direct verbal and gestural signs of affection toward their children. It seems that a limited, restrained form of feeling expression is deeply embedded in the parental generation and hard for them to overcome.

The tensions that often lead to severe conflicts between Vietnamese parents and their children are also frequently the subject matter of explicit feeling-formation measures promoted by institutions engaging in family, youth, and social work. These institutions offer different counseling and intervention programs based primarily on those childrearing ideals and feeling rules that are currently prevalent in Germany. As a result, they focus on conveying these ideals and rules to their clients.

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4 It must be emphasized that feeling rules always have to be analyzed within the historical situation in which they are embedded. Feeling rules shaping the parental generation’s upbringing and socialization in the (postwar) Vietnam of that time have also changed significantly over the years. Moreover, these feeling rules were never homogeneous but varied significantly according to region and social background. Thus, the modes of emotional childrearing practiced by immigrated parents represent very specific forms of “immigrant parenting.”

5 Our previous research focused primarily on the families of former GDR contract workers. Therefore, results do not generalize to other immigrant groups such as those who came from South Vietnam to the BRD as “boat people” in the 1970s or those who are currently migrating to Germany, primarily from central Vietnam.
Emotion pedagogies on the move

Recent years have seen a significant increase in global programs on the formation of feeling in numerous countries such as China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, and the United States as well as in Central and South America. Various globally applied programs have been developed under the generic term “Social Emotional Learning” (SEL). These are designed to train adolescents and adults not only to perceive, name, and regulate their own feelings but also to communicate with others empathically (see, e.g., edutopia.org, wingsforkids.org, or casel.org). In 2003, UNESCO started a global campaign, launched by the globally active NGO Committee for Children, to implement “Second Step,” a SEL component oriented toward both adolescents and adults.6

The social anthropologists James M. Wilce and Janina Fenigsen (2016) have coined the term “emotion pedagogies” (EPs) to describe such formation of feeling programs. They view EPs as a new phenomenon that can be distinguished clearly from traditional ways of influencing and regulating emotions. They define EPs as being characterized by the following features: (1) accepting all emotions, (2) focusing on naming emotions, (3) focusing on so-called “I messages,” (4) understanding emotions as teachable and learnable skills, (5) developing specific curricula, and (6) being oriented toward a neoliberal understanding of the self and the person (Wilce & Fenigsen, 2016, p. 83). Whereas traditional forms of emotion regulation to be found in all cultures focus usually on certain emotions that may either be felt and shown or suppressed depending on the respective feeling rules, EPs firmly insist on allowing all emotions to surface, including those that are deemed “bad” in their respective societies. This is rooted in the belief that suppressing emotions which society categorizes as unwanted and negative is harmful to mental health. A central element in every EP is therefore to uncover, recognize, and name all emotions with the help of emotion word lists. Uncovering and naming all emotions is considered to be the prerequisite for processing them any further. This “taming-by-naming” approach, which presumes a referential relation between word and emotion, is often connected in many EPs with so-called “I messages.” This concept, developed by the US psychologist and popular self-help writer Thomas Gordon, is a communicative practice in family therapy stipulating that messages sent to others have to be sent in an “I” form. According to Wilce and Fenigsen (2016, p. 85), this privatizes emotions and makes them the responsibility of the individual. The single individual is then responsible for what she or he feels and how she or he feels it. Emotions are perceived as competencies that can be learned through

6 See www.cfchildren.org and www.secondstep.org. Eight million students (from lower and middle grades) and two million adults have participated in “Second Step” programs since 2004 (Wilce & Fenigsen, 2016, p. 82).
formalized instructions within the context of set curricula. These new, globally oriented EPs therefore emphasize and disseminate neoliberal forms of the self-concept in line with the “subjective turn of modern culture” (Taylor, 1992, p. 26). They are generating diverse modes and technologies of self-management and self-formation that have resulted in a market for such formation of feeling programs. This makes the study of EPs of great importance for theoretical debates on the nexus of emotion and economics (Illouz, 2007) or the emergence of “emotional economic man” (Andrade, 2013).

Any examination of globally operating EPs leads to the question – at least from a social anthropological perspective – of how far such forms of “cultural globalization” create new diversities that not only influence local forms of Gefühlsbildung, but are themselves also transformed through interactions with these local practices. Sonya E. Pritzker (2014, 2016), for example, is studying “inner child emotions pedagogies,” a version of the SEL approach currently popular in China. This is geared toward uncovering the emotions situated deep within humans – in the so-called “inner child” – and making them accessible to modulation. Pritzker shows how these EPs based on Western psychotherapeutic ideologies are fused with traditional Chinese practices of self-management and lead to a new form of Chinese governmentality that is closely intertwined with the country’s socio-economic transformation. Pritzker shows how the strong emphasis on verbalizing emotions as the key to one’s own inner experience, so dominant in the original Euro-American method, is expanded significantly in Chinese practice by the inclusion of dynamic enactments. Because the verbalized emotions of one person are scenically enacted and acted out by the other participants, the group experiences a direct and shareable intersubjective physicality. These emotions become embodied affective phenomena of resonance that blur the line between the internal and the external, between self and other. These practices link up with traditional Chinese concepts that conceive emotions as affective resonance phenomena (Pritzker, 2014, pp. 8, 40) (→ affective resonance). During the pedagogic enactments of these Chinese “inner child” workshops, different cultural ideologies and models of emotion as well as styles of expression and regulation are fused into a new transcultural emotion repertoire. The globally operating EPs sketched here raise questions regarding the dissemination and implementation of neoliberal concepts of the self, thereby linking up with recent debates in the social sciences on affective economies that grasp the institutionalized techniques of Gefühlsbildung theoretically as kinds of immaterial labor, and as competencies that individuals need to acquire in order to meet the demands of a neoliberal labor market.

7 Pritzker understands these enactments as living translations, as translingual practices through which situated performances become translated into the bodily dimension of experience (Pritzker, 2016, pp. 166–167).
Outlook

In the present context, the concept Gefühlsbildung is restricted deliberately to processes of exerting an explicit influence on emotions, and of the targeted modulation of emotions. It is distinguished from the multilayered, implicit processes of the socialization of emotions. Differentiating analytically between what are de facto two closely intertwined aspects makes it easier not only to grasp their interplay but also to focus specifically on the affective dynamics emerging in the context of diverse forms of Gefühlsbildung. I assume that formations of feeling never proceed without friction but always tend to create affective tensions that relate closely to their respective socio-cultural structures and feeling rules.

The close entanglement of Gefühlsbildung and affective dynamics becomes evident in the three examples given above, each addressing a different facet of this relationship. The first case study about childrearing strategies among the Bara in Madagascar showed that the experiences of affective dissonance provoked in the adolescents as part of the local childrearing practices play a crucial role in this process: They motivate latent aggression and channel it during the course of socialization so that it may develop into distinctive, socially accepted emotions. This example illustrates that affects are of central importance for the creation of emotion repertoires. It suggests that the formation of feeling practices are built upon the triggering of affect; they can be effective only if they succeed in doing so.

The second example concerning parent–child relations in Vietnamese Berlin showed that the different feeling rules and corresponding practices confronting immigrant parents and their children generate affective dissonances that motivate them to deal with disparities in experience, and thereby to engage in Gefühlsbildung (in the sense of consciously performed acts). Arguing about divergences in experience, reflecting on them, and negotiating them both within and between each generation simultaneously leads to the formation of what are, at least in part, new emotion repertoires. A central research question emerging here concerns the limits imposed on the transformation of emotion repertoires by their embodied nature. The case study suggests that the reserved style of emotional expression acquired by the parents during their socialization in Vietnam is engrained so deeply in their corporeality that it is hardly modifiable.

The third example, that of globally circulating emotion pedagogies, addresses a central question in recent research: Which experiences of affective dissonance within local worlds lead people to turn to new global feeling-formation programs? Conversely, one can ask how far affective resistance by the embodied repertoires of participants forces modifications to the global programs – as can be seen in the “inner child pedagogies” popular in China. Here, again, the deep entanglement between the formation of feeling processes and affective dynamics becomes clear. It is
experiences of affective dissonance that both motivate people to turn to new parameters of Gefühlsbildung in order to transform their emotions, as well as cause them to resist.

A better analytical grasp of the processes of the formation of feeling – suggested here both within a single society and in transnational or transcultural contexts – can be gained by distinguishing between explicit forms of modulating emotions and their implicit formation during the course of socialization, even when these modes are closely intertwined in reality. The concept of Gefühlsbildung should be understood as an analytical tool designed not only to cast light on these complex entanglements but also to serve as an impulse for further theoretical analyses of the many-layered processes leading to the formation, stabilization, and transformation of emotion repertoires.

References


Attachment refers to an enduring affectional bond of humans to particular others, whether individual or collective, as well as to non-human actors such as animals, material possessions, places, or spiritual beings. Attachments are distinguished by their tendency to persist over time and across contexts and their profound emotional and affective significance. The concept of attachment allows attending to the diachronic dimension of emotional and affective relationships from the perspective of individual actors. As a fundamental precondition for human existence and the development of all major capacities, attachments are formed from birth onwards. Although early attachments may persist for decades or even a lifetime, individuals usually also lose attachment figures and turn toward new ones over the course of their life. The temporal dimension of attachment transcends particular bonds, since experiences in preceding attachment relationships function as dispositions for future attachments (→ affective disposition). Such dispositions for attachment are theorized as internal, affective-cognitive working models of the self in relation to particular others. They evolve through past relational experiences and guide ongoing interactions in existing attachment relationships as well as engagement in future relationships, which in turn provide new experiences. Thus, the concept of attachment accounts for both continuity and transformation across the course of life.

Attachments are central for affective and emotional processes in several ways. To begin with, attachments themselves can be considered affectional bonds. This becomes apparent, for instance, in the desire for proximity with an attachment figure, the comfort (or discomfort) experienced in their presence, distress upon involuntary separation, or the grief that may be caused by losing them. Moreover, dispositions for attachment can be considered central to the idiosyncratic ways in which individuals tend to emotionally affect and respond to others, and also to the specific patterns of deploying and regulating emotions in relationships and beyond. Such patterns are most fundamentally established through early socialization, as caregivers and other social partners may play a powerful role in amplifying, curbing, or modulating a child’s affective environment and their various affective responses to it.
In cultural studies on affect, the term “attachment” is sometimes used as a counterpoint to highly celebrated notions like movement, circulation, or transformation (e.g., Ahmed, 2004; Berlant, 2011). However, it has not been explicated as a key concept within this field. A more comprehensive conceptualization of attachment is offered by classical attachment theory, which was founded in the 1960s by Bowlby (1969) and Ainsworth et al. (1978) and has since evolved as one of the most influential approaches to child development and parenting advice. While drawing considerably on classical attachment theory, the current contribution proposes to modify and extend several of its major tenets that are too limited and normative in light of ethnographic research beyond the educated classes of the Western world (e.g., Keller, 2013; Morelli et al., 2017). By doing so, this chapter aims to encourage cultural studies and social science research on affect and emotion to both deal with and contribute to attachment theory from a critical distance. Overall, the concept of attachment, as proposed here, calls for attending to the formation and transformation of persisting affectional bonds as fundamental constituents of affective societies.

**Attachment in affect studies**

The term attachment appears frequently in key writings in affect studies. However, it is rarely explained explicitly, but rather used *en passant*. Its uses in some of the more prominent texts may serve as one starting point from which to unfold attachment as a key concept for the study of affective societies. In *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Sara Ahmed (2004) introduces the concept in a matter-of-fact tone: “Of course, emotions are not only about movement, they are also about attachments or about what connects us to this or that” (p. 11). In *Cruel Optimism*, Lauren Berlant (2011) positions a notion of attachment at the heart of her own central concept: “Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object” (p. 24). What appears to be common about the usages in these central passages is the apparent opposition of attachment to movement, circulation, or transformation. The fact that these latter notions are often seen in a very positive light in affect studies imparts a somewhat problematic position to the notion of attachment. As an obstacle to change, attachment seems to slip into the role of representing the downside of affect. In *Cruel Optimism*, for instance, attachment is mainly introduced to account for the inability to detach from an object of desire, even though this object threatens the well-being of the subject. Here it is precisely an attachment that makes optimism cruel. Such a thankless role as an obstacle to desirable transformation is also ascribed to similarly positioned notions like Ahmed’s term stickiness:

Indeed, the question, “What sticks?”, is one that is posed throughout this study. It is a reposing of other, perhaps more familiar, questions: Why is
social transformation so difficult to achieve? Why are relations of power so intractable and enduring, even in the face of collective forms of resistance?

(Ahmed, 2004, pp. 11–12)

Conversely, it must be desirable to detach, as Ahmed (2004) subsequently confirms: “There is hope, of course, as things can get unstuck” (p. 16). Thus, the notion of attachment seems to be viewed somewhat negatively by some central authors within affect studies, mainly as an impediment to the free circulation of affect and the fluidity of social relations, and more generally as a blockade to the transformation of societies (in a desired direction). It is rarely explicated as an analytical concept with particular histories and cross-disciplinary relationalities.

It may be worthwhile to establish “attachment” as a key concept for the study of affect and emotion in the social sciences and cultural studies for several reasons. The concept of attachment may help to cast light on processes of emotional and affective stabilization, continuation, or patterning that tend to be overshadowed by notions of circulation, transformation, fluidity, creativity, or excitement. The latter have so far figured more prominently within affect theory and seem to enjoy rather broad approval. Attachment is far more fundamental to the affective and emotional lives of people than indicated in its understanding as a mere impediment to affective and social dynamics. Furthermore, as attachment is a well-established and highly influential concept in other disciplines, especially developmental psychology, it can be fruitful to tie in with these lines of research and the debates surrounding them. Affect theory may thereby benefit from the conceptual and empirical work that has already been done in these fields. Conversely, affect theory might be enabled to contribute in specific ways to attachment theory, and also to the various fields of its application as well as to the wider public understandings of close relationships.

**Classical attachment theory**

Although most works in affect studies using the term “attachment” do not explicitly refer to classical attachment theory, an indirect influence via its popularization is highly likely. This is because attachment theory, introduced in the 1960s by child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby, has been widely popularized and blended with everyday understandings of social relationships, at least in the educated classes of the Western world. As the leading approach to the formation of interpersonal relationships in developmental psychology, attachment theory guides all kinds of practitioners and institutions

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1 One of few exceptions with an explicit reference to classical attachment theory is Anna Gibbs’ *Disaffected* (2002, p. 337).
Gabriel Scheidecker

2 Compare Lauren Berlant’s (2011) notion of cruel optimism. The notion of attunement in developmental psychology has been taken up by many proponents of affect studies and is relatively widely used as a fancy term (for a critical overview see Papoulias & Callard, 2010, pp. 42–46).

3 whose work relates to childrearing. Conversely, parents and their children may incorporate its tenets from birth on, for example, through post-natal hospital care, when seeking parenting advice, through nursery practices such as the period of familiarization, and in interventions of institutions of family support or in the arrangement of legal custody (cf. Rosabal-Coto et al., 2017). Beyond the realm of parenting, attachment theory has become increasingly influential in various schools of psychotherapy and psychiatry. Due to this unprecedented influence of attachment theory in a range of disciplines, social institutions, and popular understandings of close relationships, it is reasonable to build on this approach explicitly but also critically.

Bowlby and Ainsworth (1965) defined attachment as a profound and enduring emotional bond that connects one individual to another across time and space (cf. Cassidy, 2016). Whereas preceding theoretical models, based on psychoanalytic and social learning theory, explained children’s ties to their caregivers as a secondary drive derived from the more primary hunger drive, Bowlby ascribed such bonds to a biologically predisposed desire for proximity and the corresponding behavioral tendencies already present in newborns. Thus, rather than explaining attachment as a side effect of being fed, attachment theory considers interpersonal affectional bonds as an essential precondition for infant survival, as well as for the development of all major human abilities, such as social interaction, cognitive processes, or emotional regulation. The central positioning of affectional bonds may be a chief reason for the widespread reception and application of attachment theory described above.

While the tendency to become attached is claimed to be biologically rooted – all children are believed to form attachments as long as a caregiver is available, even if she or he is abusive2 – children will develop varying attachment patterns or qualities depending on their experiences with primary caregivers. The way caregivers attend and respond to the affective signals of children, particularly those related to distress, is considered to be crucial for the quality of the attachment they develop. Sensitive responsiveness, that is, prompt and appropriate responses to the child’s emotions, is seen as ideal, fostering a secure attachment, whereas non-sensitive patterns are thought to give rise to several forms of insecure attachments. Caregivers’ sensitivity is manifested in emotionally attuned communication between caregiver and child, which allows the child to develop confidence that the caregiver will be available and responsive if needed and thus form a secure attachment.3

The social experiences of children in the first years of life in relation to its primary caregivers are considered to be particularly crucial for the formation of idiosyncratic attachment patterns, which are decisive for the way individuals
engage in social relationships and regulate emotions throughout their life (cf. Thompson, 2016). Such long-lasting effects of early social experiences are ascribed to the emergence of basic internal working models concerning the self in relation to others. These models influence all future relationships of the person, and are constantly being elaborated and modulated. In line with current findings on memory and embodied simulation, such working models are theorized as guiding ongoing attachment behavior, feelings, and affective dynamics by letting involved partners re-experience and pre-experience relevant scenarios (cf. Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). This may be exemplified by trust, which is considered to be a fundamental affective dimension of attachments. Whether, to what degree, and in regard to which concerns an individual is able to trust in a certain attachment partner, depends on the feelings invoked by recalled and projected scenarios of reliability or rejection.

In addition to relationships, early attachment patterns have been found to influence a wide array of domains, such as emotional regulation and understanding, personality characteristics, concepts of the self, social cognition, and conscience. Moreover, classical attachment theory is increasingly deployed to explore affectional bonds between adults and non-human figures. The variety of attachment figures being considered ranges from sport teams (de Groot & Robinson, 2008), material possessions (Kleine & Baker, 2004) and brands (Thomson, MacInnis, & Whan Park, 2005), to pets such as family dogs (Beck & Madresh, 2008), places such as landscapes and homes (Scannell & Gifford, 2010), and gods or other spiritual beings (Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2018). In general, such research extending the scope of possible attachment figures beyond human actors can be endorsed. It must be noted, however, that this expansion of attachment theory into a wide array of psychological, social, and para-social domains amplifies the reach of some fundamental tenets established in early childhood research. Thus, research on early attachment formation needs to be considered critically.

Reconsidering attachment theory

Recently, classical attachment theory has been criticized from the perspective of cultural anthropology and cross-cultural psychology, calling for a reconsideration of attachment theory that takes into account cultural diversity (Quinn & Mageo, 2013; Otto & Keller, 2014; Keller & Bard, 2017). Such critiques argue that attachment theory, counter to its universalistic claim, largely reflects the specific ideals of relationships and parenting dominant in the Western educated classes. This limitation of current attachment theory is all the more relevant as these theories increasingly inform policies and programs of “parenting improvement” in low- to middle-income countries around the world (cf. Rosabal-Coto et al., 2017; Morelli et al., 2018). Two aspects of attachment theory – its normative dimension and the assumption of monotropy – are particularly problematic from a cross-cultural perspective.
The distinction between secure and various forms of insecure attachment is clearly normative, since only secure attachment is considered beneficial. It is believed to promote the child’s future psychological well-being, cognitive abilities, sociability, and many other characteristics deemed desirable. Consequently, attachment-informed programs and institutions of parenting intervention promote globally sensitive-responsive parenting and associated forms of relating and interacting, such as assigning the child with a (quasi) equal role in interactions, responding to the child’s emotional expressions instead of caring proactively, engaging in turn-taking, face-to-face interaction, smiling, explaining, or other forms of verbal communication. Such parenting patterns may well reflect the standards of the Western educated classes, to which the majority of the researchers as well as research subjects belong (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). However, they clearly depart from parenting models and goals in many societies around the world (see Keller, 2013; Morelli et al., 2017). Thus, such a normative dimension needs to be critically reflected upon when using attachment as a key concept of research.

The second critical point – monotropy – refers to the psychoanalytically derived assumption that a child usually attaches to one principal caregiver (e.g., the mother) whom he or she prefers over all other social partners, particularly in times of need. Although it is theoretically acknowledged that anyone who consistently takes care for the child can become the principal attachment figure, in empirical research as well as in the applied field, the biological mother is mostly considered a priori as the exclusive attachment figure. In stark contrast to this view, ethnographic research has demonstrated that children in many societies around the world grow up from birth on in an extensive network of caring social partners (e.g., Weisner & Gallimore, 1977; Keller & Chaudhary, 2017). Such a large interdependent social network goes well beyond the nuclear family, which often seems to serve as an implicit reference point for attachment researchers and practitioners. Thus, the monotropy assumption with its focus on the mother – or the romantic partner in adults – as primary attachment figure is problematic from a cross-cultural perspective. Instead, this chapter encourages scholars to attend to the whole array of possible attachment figures and also to the specific socio-material settings in which attachments are embedded.

Of course, not all relationships that children or adults engage in are considered to be attachment relationships. Several criteria are commonly used to discern them from other kinds of relationships (see Cassidy, 2016, pp. 12–13): (1) attachment bonds are persistent over time and across contexts; (2) one attachment figure is not easily interchanged with another, e.g., individuals may grieve over the loss of one attachment figure even though another is available; (3) attachment bonds are highly emotionally significant; (4) individuals wish to maintain some proximity to the attachment figure; (5) this is especially true when he or she seeks security and comfort in times of distress; (6) involuntary separation from the attachment figure is experienced as
distressing. Yet it has to be noted that these characteristics hardly draw a clear line between attachment relationships and other close relationships, as is often presumed by attachment researchers. Instead, these characteristics can be understood as representing one tendency among human relationships, which can manifest differently depending on the cultural and social context.

Children growing up in nuclear households in an urban environment and spending considerable amounts of their daytime just with one parent may possibly develop pervasive, hierarchically organized, dyadic attachments with two or three individuals that are clearly delineated from the wider social context. By contrast, in societies in which the task to care for children is widely shared, the cooperating group rather than particular individuals might serve as a secure base and become an object of attachment. Children growing up in an Efe community of hunter-gatherers (Democratic Republic of Congo), for example, are cared for by many adults and older children who alternate with one another frequently depending on who is nearby and available in the moment of need. One-year-old children were cared for on average by 14 different individuals within a span of merely two hours (Morelli, Henry, & Foerster, 2014). The attachment system is further complicated by considering the possibility that an individual develops different modes of attachment with different social partners or groups. This option is systematically ignored if only a principle attachment figure, such as the mother, is examined. To provide an example of such differentiation of attachments and its consequences for emotion, affect, and the self, the next section describes particular ways of relationship formation in a rural community in Madagascar.

**Example: multiple attachments in Madagascar**

This case is based on 15 months of field research on the socialization of emotion in a rural community in southern Madagascar (Scheidecker, 2017). From birth on, children in this community spend most of the day outdoors in a densely populated village and are thus almost constantly surrounded by several social partners within arm’s reach. According to systematic observations of 42 children ranging from three months to three years old, interactions are clearly socially differentiated. Mothers, other adults, and preadolescent babysitters almost exclusively attend to the bodily needs of children, for example through continuous body contact and frequent feeding, aimed at keeping the child in a calm state and fostering rapid physical development. These interactions with caregivers develop into distinctly hierarchical attachment patterns. While caregivers hardly engage children in interactions like face-to-face contact, smiling and laughing, chatting or playing, other children are consistently available for such affectively intensifying communications. As soon as children can walk, they spend most of the day in the company of their peers in search of cheerful and exciting experiences, sometimes
interrupted by intense conflicts. Some of the peers, mostly cousins, become permanent companions that develop into intimate, enduring, reliable social partners, whereas other, unrelated peers turn into passionately resented enemies, connected by a chain of mutual retaliation.

Based on my fieldwork, I argue that these simultaneously evolving, highly disparate forms of hierarchical attachments (with caregivers) and egalitarian relationships (with peers) are connected to different modes of self, affect, and emotion. The self in hierarchical relations within the kin group is characterized by the prioritization of interdependence over autonomy; it is understood as existing only through the constant influx of "life force" from the ancestors. Thus, far from being ascribed to a single act of procreation in the past, the self is believed to persist only by way of perpetual recreation through forebears. A metaphor commonly used to imagine the self in hierarchical relations is the banana tree, whose single sprouts are considered as descendants. They grow from and through a common body and die away if separated from it. As long as individuals stay close to their parents and ancestors, follow their directions, and integrate into the hierarchical structure of their descent group, they are believed to be safe. Correspondingly, hierarchical relations are generally associated with low-intensity affect and feelings of (physical) security and tranquility. Little occasion is given to intense positive or negative emotions within these relations. Even if people feel strongly affected, they are expected to refrain from displaying it, as it would be considered disrespectful and unduly self-expressive. Moreover, hierarchical relations are also shaped by a kind of latent moral fear that only intensifies if norms of one’s group are transgressed and sustenance through parents and ancestors is threatened. Although hierarchical relations are constantly performed and reinforced through a wide array of social practices within facilitating socio-material settings, they are also anchored in the form of working models in individual actors. Generally speaking, these models, which have been reconstructed elsewhere in detail (Scheidecker, 2017), entail felt expectations that parents and ancestors will constantly sustain one’s physical well-being, but also apprehensions that they could withdraw it, with life-threatening consequences, in case of moral transgressions.

Egalitarian relationships depart clearly on many levels from hierarchical relationships. First, in these relationships, autonomy is prioritized over interdependence. They are not inherited but depend largely on personal preferences. Yet, egalitarian relationships, at least between related individuals, are characterized by a high degree of continuity and availability, as the social partners involved usually grow up together, live side by side, and cooperate closely throughout life. Thus, these relationships are hardly covered by the notion of friendship. By contrast to the hierarchical social sphere, which is highly formalized and routinized, the egalitarian social sphere is characterized by intense individual emotions and passions, both positive and negative, that guide actions and interactions to a large extent.
These roughly sketched hierarchical and egalitarian patterns of attachment, which are in fact much more nuanced, are highly persistent across age, gender, and material environments. Individuals switch between these modes mainly as a function of their situational social context, although there may be some material environments more conducive to certain modes over others. A basic condition for the socialization of such highly distinct modes is the neat separation of hierarchical and egalitarian social spheres, with mutually exclusive patterns of interaction, from early childhood onwards. However, these conditions started to change drastically with the introduction of schooling at the end of my field research. As a consequence, children began to spend considerable amounts of time under the surveillance of authority figures (teachers), who played a large role in structuring and regulating peer-interactions.

**Outlook**

Given the enormous influence of attachment theory in research on socio-emotional processes as well as in a wide range of applied fields and amongst the wider public, it is crucial to engage with this theory in an endeavor to understand affective societies. The reasons are twofold: First, to be able to benefit from the extensive conceptual and empirical work that has been done within this paradigm; second, to give critical findings in that domain a chance to become relevant beyond academia, for example in the applied fields of attachment theory.

With regards to the first reason, the current, rather flat notions of attachment in affect studies can be enriched by attachment theory in order to achieve a more multilayered conceptualization of attachment. In the resulting view, attachment is more than just an opponent to circulation or transformation, rather, it integrates stability and transformation, social relationalities and individual dispositions: Particular patterns of socio-emotional interaction lead to the formation of corresponding dispositions of attachment, theorized as internal working models, which in turn affect and are affected by ongoing social relations.

Furthermore, it allows one to account for idiosyncratic patterns of relating and responding affectively and emotionally to others in a given situation, and individual ways of engaging in (or detaching from) long-lasting relationships. It is clear that these individual patterns are derived from social interactions and are always enacted (and possibly transformed) in particular socio-material settings that may be conceptualized as affective arrangements (→ affective arrangements). Even if the primary research focus is the affective and emotional dynamics of particular social settings (and not the relational histories of individuals), the concept of attachment may be useful to account for powerful influences connected to the particular characteristics of present actors (→ affective dispositions). Taken together, the concept of attachment promotes a view according to which
affective relationality is neither reducible to the current affective arrangement, nor to the respective dispositions of the actors involved. Rather, it implies that affective relationalities are permanently co-constructed in a complex interplay of both sides.

As for the second reason, it seems important to contribute perspectives of cultural studies and social sciences to attachment theory, given that it is the most influential approach to socio-emotional development – particularly in light of its global applications in increasingly heterogeneous contexts, which necessitate its pluralization in many ways. The two suggestions in this chapter – to account for the full diversity of patterns of attachment as well as for multiple attachments – are but two aspects of attachment theory that need to be explored in an open fashion. One area in which such explorations are particularly urgent is the field of migration studies. How do the children of migrating families deal with affectional bonds to individuals, objects, or places left behind, and how do the attachment patterns they have acquired subsequently affect processes of building new affectional bonds with people whose ways of relating may be different? How do children whose parents have migrated negotiate their close relationships to family members and to people outside the diaspora (e.g., friends, nurses) if their ways of relating contrast significantly? How do children whose parents have migrated negotiate or maintain ways of relating and interacting with their children in the new context, in which their practices might be heavily challenged? To pursue such questions, it is necessary to both draw on and expand the notion of attachment.

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References


“Atmosphere” refers to a feeling, mood, or Stimmung that fundamentally exceeds an individual body and instead pertains primarily to the overall situation in which bodies are entrenched. The concept of an atmosphere thus challenges a notion of feelings as the private mental states of a cognizant subject and instead construes feelings as collectively embodied, spatially extended, material, and culturally inflected. In this sense “atmosphere” can be considered a mereological concept: While “affect” refers to the ways in which (emerging) bodies relate to each other (→ affect), “atmosphere” describes the ways in which a multiplicity of bodies is part of, and entrenched in, a situation that encompasses it. In this respect, atmospheres tend to be contagious, as they wield authority over the entirety of bodies in a situation. Timothy Morton (2007) conceives of the homogenization characteristic of atmospheres as “rendering”: a mass of elements is rendered in one all-encompassing rhythm or hue. Atmospheres are thus modes in which the world shows up or coalesces into an indivisible and intensive situation or in which a group of bodies comes to exist as a felt collective. In this regard, atmosphere operates as a medium that brings into appearance that which cannot be deduced from or reduced to the bodies present in a situation. Nor can an atmosphere be referred to as a single, specific source. An atmosphere, then, not only simulates a palpable unity where there might otherwise be difference, but can even render potential futures or repressed memories abundantly present, or make otherwise absent or ulterior persons or relationships perceptible. Crucially, these effects of atmosphere are not mental projections “into the world” but have a material presence and pertain to embodied processes of involvement.

German philosopher Hermann Schmitz (1969/2005), who introduced the term atmosphere into phenomenology in the 1960s, considered atmospheres as meaningful situations and as spatially extended non-subjective feelings. Drawing on Schmitz, yet largely dissenting from his so-called new phenomenology, the term “atmosphere” has been variously defined across disciplinary boundaries in recent scholarship. For instance, atmospheres have been characterized as qualities of a space (Böhme, 2017), as mediums of perception (Thibaud, 2003), or as a non-representational social dimension (McCormack,
Despite philosophical and disciplinary heterogeneity, these various notions of atmosphere all grapple with, and aim at subverting, binary distinctions between inner and outer world, medium and content, meaning and matter, individual and collective, body and mind, subject and object. Atmosphere is invoked as that which mediates between two terms, integrates both, or precedes their distinction.

To study the ways in which atmosphere pertains to affective societies, I suggest a move beyond traditional phenomenology of perception or aesthetic theory. These approaches consider the subject as a perceiver of atmospheres, and accordingly construe the latter as aesthetic or perceptual givens. My interest, by contrast, is focused on what an atmosphere does and how it operates. Thus, this chapter foregrounds the mereological structure of atmosphere, as well as its capacity to modulate situations and collectives into coherent wholes. While the manipulation and creation of atmosphere is critical in the arts and architecture, which share a traditional understanding of and concern with human perception, I will outline a concept of atmosphere by means of examples from domains that do not center on the perception of individual subjects. Instead, I propose to conceive of atmosphere in relation to (religious) transformation, (mass) mobilization, and processes of (political) homogenization. Furthermore, due to the close affinity that music and sound have with atmosphere, I approximate atmosphere through music. In what follows, I trace the genealogy of the term atmosphere in German, and point to its grammatical specifics, before elaborating on four of its key characteristics.

A genealogy of atmosphere

The modern Latin term “atmosphaera” that entered English, German, or French derives from the Ancient Greek “ατμόσφαιρα,” a sphere of vapor, steam, or emanation. It is widely assumed in scholarship on atmosphere that the notion of atmosphere as feeling is a metaphorical adaption of a meteorological term. However, closer attention to the term’s genealogy in German in important but so far largely neglected historical texts not only challenges this interpretation, but also significantly broadens the semantic scope of the term.

From the early 18th century onward, “atmosphere,” particularly in German and French, did not simply denote the aerial vapors of celestial bodies but referred to corporeal effluvia, substances that emanated from and enveloped humans and all other sentient and non-sentient bodies, and also referred to the force field of magnets. These “atmospheres” primarily related to the sense of smell and were composed of various transpirations specific to a body, but also comprised humors and passions, all of which radiated into its surroundings. In the case of human atmospheres, feelings as humors could thus literally be smelled and prompted attraction or repulsion. Furthermore, since emanations varied according to gender, occupation, diet, and habitat, atmospheres were social indicators,
suggestive of the character of a person, their social class, and emotional situation. Historian Alain Corbin (1986) thus speaks of these atmospheres as “social emanations.” Crucially, the atmospheres or feelings that bodies emanated were not mere immaterial aesthetic phenomena of perception but consisted of material effluvia and could even transmit contagion such as cholera. It is this non-binary concurrence of material substance and feelings already present in the early semantics of atmosphere that imbues the term with innovative potential and aligns it with affect in a monistic ontology (→ affect).

With advances in scientific knowledge about the human body, the term “atmosphere” became largely obsolete as a medical term by the early 19th century. But connotations of “social effluvia” and the idea of materially emanating feelings remained an important semantic dimension of atmosphere in poetical and philosophical writings until the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, when Georg Simmel (1917), whose seminal footnotes on atmosphere have so far gone unnoticed in scholarship on the topic, spoke of the “atmosphere” of both people and cities, he was not appropriating a meteorological term for the emergent discipline of sociology. Instead, his interest lay with the social implications of corporeal effluvia in processes of Vergesellschaftung (socialization). Like Simmel, psychiatrist Hubertus Tellenbach, writing much later in the 20th century, considered atmospheres in the quasi-medical sense of room-filling phenomena emanating from bodies. In his pioneering work Geschmack und Atmosphäre (Taste and Atmosphere) published in 1968 he extrapolated these personal emanations onto families, social groups, and nationalities where they would operate as media “of a prereflective and pre-verbal elemental contact” (Tellenbach, 1981, p. 229). In Tellenbach’s psychological Daseinsanalyse, being social meant emanating and discerning atmosphere. With the discovery of pheromones, this decidedly materialist notion of atmosphere as corporeal emanation came to resonate with new scientific evidence. Teresa Brennan (2004) thus concludes in her opus magnum that pheromonal odors are critical to how atmosphere is felt and affect is transmitted.

Schmitz, who established “atmosphere” as a central concept of his phenomenology of the felt-body (Leibphänomenologie), bypasses the etymology of the word and considers atmosphere in its semantic confluence with the phenomenological notion of Stimmung (Wellbery, 2003). Schmitz was not the first to do so; William Stern (1935) who, like Schmitz, pursues a philosophical personalism, had already posited atmosphere as Stimmung. Stern argued that a feeling of familiarity, for instance, would be of “completely ‘atmospheric’ nature; it is a total mood [Gesamtstimmung] in which the special affective tonings of people, things, and events are indistinguishably embedded [my translation, F. R.]” (Stern, 1935, p. 784). Instead of drawing on Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological notion of Stimmung, however, Schmitz refers to psychological phenomenology and quotes Theodor Lipps’ (1906) “spatial feelings” (Raumgefühl) or Ludwig Binswanger’s (1933) “tuned spaces” (gestimmte Räume), famously defining feelings as spatially poured out
atmospheres (“ortlos ergossene Atmosphären”; cf. Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 343). He conceives of atmospheres in terms of what he would, in contrast to Gernot Böhme’s (2017) spatiological thinking, later identify as a “situation ontology.” Atmospheres were thus holistically embedding situations permeated by and unfolding in suggestions of movement that modulate the dynamics of the felt-body (Schmitz, 1969/2005). Feelings, consequently, were not internal states of a subject but encountered in the world as quasi-objective external forces that grip the felt-body. In this anti-mentalist and anti-materialist stance, to feel, then, literally means to move and to be moved. In contrast to a Spinozist ontology however, Schmitz’s personalism is committed to a methodological anthropocentrism where a normative human person acts as the benchmark for an analysis of atmosphere: In order for his phenomenological accounts to gain general validity, the perceiver of atmosphere must be of normal human condition (Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 131), of normal sanity (Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. XI) and normal mind (Schmitz, 1969/2005, p. 46). In light of this, Schmitz’s felt-body becomes highly suspicious and complicit in the very humanist project that theories of affect have intended to challenge.

In the 1990s, Böhme translates Schmitz’s idiosyncratic language into a popular aesthetic theory that now focuses on the perception and creation of atmosphere. According to Böhme (2017) atmospheres pertain to “the common reality of the perceiver and the perceived” (p. 20) and are located between subject and object. Böhme (2017) conceives of the term as a metaphoric appropriation from meteorology and, unlike Schmitz, considers atmospheres as emanating and radiating “ecstasies” of things, while apparently remaining unaware of the term’s historical and lexical associations with bodily effluvia. In contrast to the atmospheric emanations of the 18th and 19th centuries, the radiations he speaks of turn out to be virtually immaterial since, as he repeatedly insists, they would be nothing without the perceiving subject (Böhme, 2017, p. 183). Böhme, whose writings are sometimes dismissed by his German peers as philosophically flawed (Wellbery, 2003), has nevertheless become a key reference in scholarship on atmosphere and applied research on ambiance. Critically expanding on Böhme, Jean-Paul Thibaud (2003), who develops a nuanced theory of urban ambiances, states that rather than being objects of perception, atmospheres condition perception. Rainer Kazig (2007) defines atmospheres as media between humans and environment, while Ben Anderson (2009) who, in a much-cited article, coins the phrase “affective atmosphere,” conceives of them as “singular affective qualities that emanate from but exceed the assembling of bodies” (p. 80). Mikkel Bille, Peter Bjerregaard, and Tim Flohr Sørensen (2015) who have critically pointed out the tautological character of the phrase “affective atmosphere,” suggest focusing on the shaping and deliberate staging of atmospheres while Kathleen Stewart (2011) has identified them as “force fields” and Tonino Griffero (2014) has emphasized their “authority.”
The grammar of atmosphere

In German, the word “Atmosphäre” is often used in conjunction with the verb “herrschen” (to rule, to reign, or to govern). Writing about lodging-houses in Manchester, Friedrich Engels (1892/1952) rhetorically contends: “What physical and moral atmosphere reigns in these holes, I need not state” (p. 42). The German collocation that Engels uses here, “an atmosphere reigns” (eine Atmosphäre herrscht), grammatically places both climatic and moral atmosphere in the subject position and imbues it with the agency to govern a sphere. Herein lies a critical structural difference between the semantic capacities of the German word “Atmosphäre” and the English word “atmosphere” since the latter finds it much harder to leave its grammatical status as an object. Moreover, the verb “to reign” underlines the mereological character of “atmosphere”: just as the sovereign reigns over an area by uniting its inhabitants under one law, ideology, or banner, so an “atmosphere” is said to reign over a particular place and wield authority over all bodies present in that place (see also Griffero, 2014). The authority of atmosphere thus pertains to a location or situation as a whole, for instance, an apartment, a concert, a mass uprising, or a religious event. These places or events can all be described as being “governed” by a particular atmosphere. It thus comes as no surprise that creating and mobilizing atmospheres can be considered a technology of power.

But this collocation is not exclusive to the lexeme “Atmosphäre.” Various words, from the phenomenal complex of weather and Stimmung to feelings such as grief, joy, boredom, or silence, are all collocated in German with the verb “herrschen” (to reign) and can consequently be assigned the grammatical subject position. This linguistic co-association of these diverse nouns further adds to their affinity, in particular between weather, feelings, and moral sentiments (→ sentiment). Syntactically speaking then, feelings and atmospheres in German are not necessarily descriptors of subjectivated human existence or qualities of situations and places, but dominant forces that “govern” situations, societies, spheres of action.

Drawing on Morton’s theory of ambient poetics and on the “situation ontology” in terms of which Schmitz frames his notion of atmosphere, I will elaborate upon the following four key characteristics of atmospheres: their mereological fabric, their modal structure, their intensification at affective thresholds, and their affective efficacy through “suggestions of movement.”

From meteorology to mereology

Key to the mereological conception of atmosphere proposed here is the seamless coherence of atmospheric phenomena. Morton (2007) argues that “ambient poetics is a rendering” (p. 35), a process whereby, for instance, all elements of a film are drenched in a technically generated color-scheme. Photo filter applications put this aspect of atmosphere to work and ultimately
commercialize the longing for atmospheric experiences. They do so by filtering a photo into a finely-tuned coherent color-mode that retrospectively charges the image, and thus the memory of the situation in which it was taken, with an intensive atmosphere. Such rendering invokes coherence in two ways: First, processes of rendering pertain to a situation, a place or an artistic creation as a whole, and second, they also constitute its coherence; just as Johann G. Herder (1785/1869, p. 49) had posited that climate affected the entirety of things in a given region while at the same time rendering its inhabitants a cultural collective. In an atmosphere then, the multiplicity of bodies is imbued with a seamless hue, just as a sunset tinges the entire “world” in shades of red. The widely remarked affective “meaningfulness” of atmospheres (Vadén & Torvinen, 2015) is related to this coherence, for an atmospheric whole cannot be further differentiated into numerable elements or separate meanings.

Critically, however, such a hue or climate that pervades a situation as atmosphere does not necessarily affect or involve each individual body in the same way. For this reason, Morton (2007) refers to the absorptive capacities of atmosphere as simulation. Atmospheres transform a situation of diverse elements in such a way that even discordant voices and bodies are fashioned in an all-encompassing style. Using the meteorological term “atmosphere” as a metaphor for the contagion of religion and religious mass mobilization, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1799/1958) argues that once religion has seized a critical mass, even those who are not converted by it shine in its light. In a crowd of believers, religiosity is simulated as strikingly genuine in the atmosphere. Here, atmosphere does not simply invoke coherence but also simulates it, erases inconsistencies, and melts, unifies, and homogenizes by imposing an overarching significance onto elements that might otherwise be unrelated. The 19th-century poet Edward Bulwer-Lytton (1842) names this the “deception” or “phantasmagoria” of atmosphere. Tim Flohr Sorensen (2015) exemplifies this aspect in his study on atmospheres of funeral rites in pre-historical passage graves, where he elaborates how the lack of light and thus visibility collapses the difference between living and dead bodies among whom one’s own presence is no longer confined to a bodily and bounded identity but becomes a “seamless infiltration” (p. 7). Not only is death atmospheric in the penetrating darkness, but darkness undermines the (exceptional) status of the human subject as living being.

As smoothing forces that evoke coherence, atmospheres are also highly political, since they paint even conflicting voices in an all-encompassing homogeneous light. This can be exemplified by the musical “accompaniment” blaring from concentration camp loudspeakers, which served not only to drown out death cries acoustically, but to assimilate them into the musical mood of Wagnerian marches. Or consider the singing or chanting congregation in which participant individuals both simulate and consume religious unity (Riedel, 2015). The monochrome uniforms in which the denizens of a totalitarian
regime or a religious community are attired are also such devices of unification. Similarly, the deliberate assimilation and mimetic strategies of dressing, moving, and shouting that prime a crowd for revolution (Runkel, 2018) or impel a football team and their fans to prevail are technologies of mobilizing atmospheres of power (Edensor, 2014). Since atmosphere presides over situations in their entirety, it not only subverts anthropocentrism, but does away with the idea of a center altogether (see also Morton, 2002). Or, to use Schmitz’s terminology, atmosphere is spatial, but without a location and surface (“ortlos” and “randlos”). Atmosphere, then, does not simply surround a person as a centrifugal expanse, as some have argued, but, rather, following Morton, personhood itself may be conceived of as environmental or in fact atmospheric.

**Modes and modulations**

That music and sound but also light, odor, or weather all have a latent tendency to become ubiquitous and thus to invoke coherence and charge a situation with atmosphere is due to their capacity to operate as modes. A landscape at night might be charged with atmosphere because the moonlight, or absence thereof, renders the entire world in a monochrome mode of shades of black, which may even obliterate the difference between earth and sky, void and matter, human and non-human. The atmosphere of the night here is not a locatable object in the world but a mode in which the heterogeneous objects coalesce in one characteristic color scheme. The same can be said for odors that have no defined location in space but rather modulate a space in its entirety, as in the historical notion of atmosphere-as-effluvia. Likewise, sound does not appear as an object in the world with a defined location and surface, but rather, charges an entire place or situation with sonorous intensity due to what Schmitz terms its *surfacelessness*.

Appropriating the concept of mode from music theory, modes, like atmospheres, are structured mereologically. A mode in the modern sense of scale, for instance, determines the pitch relationships in a musical piece. To shift only one pitch of the scale may transpose the entire musical piece into another mode. Mode thus determines the musical material in which music unfolds and thus always affects a musical piece in its entirety. It is for this reason that musical modes have a strong affinity to moods and to being atmospheric. In its extended sense as fashion, style, manner, or way (*Weise*), musical mode is not to be reduced to pitch relationships. Friedrich Schiller writes in 1797 that rhythm serves as a tool (*Werkzeug*) to provide a dramatic production with an “atmosphere,” because *everything* is subject to the law of rhythm. For Schiller, rhythm is a mode that combines “all characters and all situations [my translation, F. R.]” (von Goethe & Schiller, 1881, p. 329) of a play into one seamless whole.

In modulating mood, atmosphere governs the relationships of its parts just as the scale sets the degrees of its pitches. In turn, the embeddedness of each
body within the encompassing whole predominates the more individual affective vectors in which bodies are related to each other. Even if we approach such atmospherically charged situations from the perspective of individual perception, those who are repelled by it or remain unaffected by it may nevertheless recognize the way in which a situation coheres in a distributed feeling, or sense its grip as a modulating force (for modes of involvement and perception see Griffiero, 2014). But it is also possible to turn this argument around and follow Robert Seyfert’s (2012) notion of the affectif, which he defines as “mode of affective interaction” where only bodies sharing a certain frequency spectrum are drawn into affective resonance (→ affective resonance). Thus, contrary to Schmitz’s normalized and ethnocentric configuration of the felt-body, a focus on the modes in which a situation coheres as atmosphere enables us to consider atmosphere with respect to the abundant cultural, historical, and physical diversity of embodied and even disembodied existences.

**Affective thresholds**

Atmosphere, Leo Spitzer (1942) writes, indicates “something characteristic which distinguishes one place from another” (p. 22). This diacritic function of atmosphere is not accidental, but essential. Social movements and ritual situations play on contrast to mobilize atmospheres. Victor Turner (1995), who in the 1950s proposes to conceive of ritual (and society) as a process “with successive phases of structure and communitas [emphasis added]” (p. 78), highlights the atmosphere of communal singing precisely at the point in the process of a Ndembu pregnancy ritual where moral rules are explicitly inverted and where a highly sexualized language is given voice to in ritual songs that would otherwise be fraught with shame. In the ritual mode, shame is powerfully defused and replaced by a sexualized atmosphere that animates not an individual subject but transforms the entire situation into a “collective feeling” (Schmitz, 1969/2005) (→ affective communities). Climatic situations of transition from one meteorological state to another, such as the first day of spring or the notoriously photographed sunset that marks the dramatic threshold between day and night, are also particularly atmospheric.

Such affective thresholds are critical to musical modes that only make sense and produce meaning in their difference from each other. Put simply, mode is inherently differential. Furthermore, musical mode operates most powerfully as an atmospheric tool when one mode contrasts with another. The juxtaposition of modes is thus a musical technique of invoking atmosphere and affording experiences of immersion (→ immersion, immersive power), as, for instance, in the traditional court-music of Myanmar where musical pieces performed by the Hsaing Waing orchestra are structured in alternating tempos. The musical shift into quicker tempos powerfully generates a musical, and indeed corporeal, momentum that unleashes dancers from the preceding slow meter and pulls them into rapid movements. Music kicks in. The atmospheric tension here
Atmosphere derives not just from the substance of each of the rhythms but from their contrast. For this reason, the affective power of mode is always specific to historically situated musical traditions and cultures of listening, and their repertoires and modal systems. Similar techniques are employed in baroque suites or in classical symphonic works that are composed of a succession of distinctive movements that contrast in various musical parameters, such as a shift in key, meter and rhythm, volume, timbre, tempo, or orchestration.

**Caught up in movement**

The question that studies on atmosphere have usually started with is how an atmosphere is felt, perceived, or experienced. Attending to the material texture of light, temperature, sound, and architecture inside pre-historic passage-graves, Sørensen (2015) argues that bodily movements of entering and – in the case of the living – exiting the tomb, are not simply caused by architecture but are themselves generative of the spatial form and of a shifting sense of presence and self in “evolving kinesfields” (p. 7) and further alter sensorial perception. Movement is thus integral to how atmospheres might have unfolded in situations of interment. Circumventing the clause of subjectivity characteristic of Böhme’s notion of atmosphere, a focus on movement in which bodies are continuous with architecture, sound, or climate, Sørensen suggests, enables a study of atmosphere that decenters the human being.

Schmitz, equally, elevates “movement” as a key term for his phenomenology of perception to evade what he sees as the problematic reduction of perception to the senses. Rather than being seen, heard, or smelled, atmospheres are perceived in and through movement. “Being moved” is not a metaphor for feelings but a corporeal dynamic manifest in the felt-body. Even seemingly static phenomena are related to the felt-body through what he terms “suggestions of movement” (*Bewegungssuggestionen*). Albeit immobile, architecture and landscape may nevertheless suggest movements through lines of flight, height, narrowness, darkness, or expansiveness. Climatic states, too, take effect as felt atmospheres by engulfing the felt-body in suggestions of movement, thus invoking feelings as atmospheres. Like architecture and weather, music assembles an entire array of suggested movements by means of harmonic tension, timbral shifts, rhythmic drive, melodic contour, or volume. In situations of worship and ritual music making, musical “suggestions of movement” may function affectively in the manner of atmospheres as they may lead to spiritual transformations and religious becomings (Riedel, 2015; see also Eisenlohr, 2018; Abels, 2018). Thus, in a worship service of a Pietist congregation, when the last verse of a protestant hymn is transposed into a higher key, a harmonic shift charged with movement suggestions takes place. The singing and seated congregation embodies this shift by standing up to sing the last verse, enraptured in a musical atmosphere saturated with religious feelings (Riedel, 2015).
Conclusion

The ways in which atmospheres unfold and take effect are not limited to the four modalities outlined here. The diversity of culturally and historically specific situations in which atmospheres operate have yielded other key features such as vagueness, spatial extension, processual formation, or meaningfulness. The value of atmosphere as a heuristic concept, as I have sought to suggest here, however, is its mereological fabric that significantly exceeds the realm of (aesthetic) perception.

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References


The way the word “sentiment” is used in everyday English provides a starting point for characterizing it as an analytical term. Sentiment can mean a view or opinion that is held or expressed as in “I agree with your sentiment.” But it can also denote a feeling or emotion as in “an intense sentiment of horror.” Furthermore, sentiment can be used as a mass noun referring to “a general feeling or opinion” as in “the rise of racist sentiment” (cf. Stevenson, 2010). This vernacular use of sentiment already reflects two major premises of sentiment as an analytical term. First, the concept of sentiment connects cognitive processes of forming opinions and judgments with affective and emotional dynamics. Second, sentiments do not only seem to exist on the individual but also on the collective level.

Sentiment describes an evaluative regime of meaning as embedded in and colored by affective and emotional dynamics. The term “regime” signifies that sentiments contain regular patterns, orderly procedures, and rules of how sense is to be made of the world. This process of meaning-making is not limited to rationality and cognition, however, but always includes affect and emotion. In other words: affect and emotion are not merely additions to independent rational processes of cognition and meaning-making, but inextricably permeate them and thereby co-constitute sentiments. Such sentiments can be experienced in different modes: as vague gut feelings, weakly shaped intuitions, clearly formed opinions, and even firm judgments. Thus, all of these can be described as sentiments: an opinion on how to assess the behavior of a person (for instance, the morality of a particular action or a whole lifestyle), a judgment on which system of rules is preferable over another (for example, when it comes to the appropriateness of criminal justice measures over traditionally practiced rituals of reconciliation), a perception of the truth of theoretical premises (as they may be derived from religious doctrine or scientifically produced knowledge), a choice over the legitimacy of a political measure (based on democratic deliberation, authoritarian rule, or something else entirely).

Sentiments are experienced by individuals, but they cannot be reduced to bodily feelings or inner sensations; they structure meaning-making on a collective level, but are not simply abstract structural formations either. Sentiments
are social-relational phenomena and emerge in processes of individual and collective formation and instantiation. Because sentiments are dialectically reproduced, they may change over time, but do so in relation to both individual and collective processes of remembering. As such, sentiments coalesce into relatively stable regimes and tend to change slowly and gradually. As they endure, sentiments can potentially transport structures for meaning-making through time and space – and can sometimes travel with great historical depth.

Sentiments emerge on multiple scales. On the macro-level, they can appear as wide-ranging discursive formations, on the meso-level as institutionalized and materialized arrangements and on the micro-level as both conditions for and the product of individual action. On all of these scales, sentiments have the potential to structure processes of meaning-making for collectives and individuals, govern the formation of subjects, and establish frames of references for communication.

In their relative stability over time, sentiments play a key role in processes of creating, maintaining, and transforming normative orders – a term most broadly understood as any form of law, politics, cosmovision, or morality. Investigating sentiments is therefore central for coming to terms with political, legal, religious, and moral orders and the myriad practices that bring them about, challenge them, transform them, and aim to stabilize and reproduce them. The concept of sentiment provides an important tool to analyze the normative dimension of affective societies.

**Neighboring concepts**

Sentiment can be investigated through the conceptual lenses of both affect and emotion, and therefore cuts across the field of *Affective Societies* (→ affect; → emotion, emotion concept). When affective and emotional dynamics relate to the establishment of relatively stable evaluative regimes of meaning, which govern, structure, and regulate how people make sense of the world and how the world inscribes into people’s sense-making, one can apply the term sentiment.

Sentiments emerge in the relational co-presence of bodies in space, and affective arrangements are sites of their production and re-actualization (→ affective arrangements). Sentiments inscribe themselves into the emotional life of individuals, institutional arrangements, and whole societies and can become deeply encoded into cultural frameworks. As such, they play a role in the production of and form part of emotion repertoires (→ emotion repertoires). Sentiments can be described as affective inasmuch as they are experienced as vague, pre-structured, and atmospheric, and as emotional inasmuch as they take on a concrete, scripted, and localized form.¹ They can be found in the everyday and in the extraordinary.

¹ In this case, sentiments can include “moral emotions” (Haidt, 2003). For an illuminating ethnographic approach see Scheidecker (2017). However, moral emotions describe only one aspect of the broader understanding of sentiment.
At a subjective level, sentiments can be experienced as feelings (\(\rightarrow\) feeling). But although sentiments have a strong normative dimension, they go beyond what is usually described as “feeling rules” (Hochschild, 1983). Feeling rules govern what people feel in a given context. Sentiments govern what people feel about the meaning of a given context.

At a collective level, sentiments can, to a large degree, be described as discursive in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault, 1972a). The concept of discourse, however, is clearly focused and mainly confined to the realm of language, while the concept of sentiment decidedly includes non-linguistic, affective forms of meaning-making. Sentiments can be understood as an element of Foucault’s broader concept of dispositif, which is described as an apparatus containing both discursive and non-discursive components (Foucault, 1972b, p. 195; cf. Mühlhoff, 2018).

Conceptual roots

There are two major conceptual roots of sentiment as an analytical term. The first can be found in certain strands of practical philosophy, the second in social science thinking. We propose to draw from both of these sources to outline sentiment as an analytical device.

At least three philosophical traditions can be mobilized to outline the idea of sentiment: (1) Aristotelian ethics, (2) Scottish moral sense theorists, (3) a more recent theoretical line of thinking leading from Marx over Nietzsche and Freud to Foucault. Recent approaches that use sentiment as an analytical lens have drawn on all three of these traditions, albeit with different emphases (cf. Throop, 2012).

A first conceptual root for imagining sentiment can be seen in the Aristotelian (2009) tradition of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics sees ethical behavior as a question of crafting oneself as a moral subject rather than adhering to rules and duties (deontological ethics) or choosing one’s actions by paying close attention to their consequences (consequentialist ethics). In Aristotelian thought, affect and emotion play an integral role in forming the moral subject and hence deserve a central place in thinking about law and politics (Huppes-Clysenaer & Coelho, 2018). Contemporary practical philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum (2013) draw on the Aristotelian tradition to

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2 There is also a growing field in computing called “sentiment analysis” that analyses natural language use, typically in “big data” settings (e.g., Liu, 2010). It is based on sociolinguistic insights on how opinions are expressed in metaphor, grammar (e.g., syntax), word combinations, ideophones, and so forth.

3 Bourdieu’s (1972) concepts of habitus and hexis fruitfully explore the interconnection between socio-economic structure and subjective experience and theorize the interface of society and body, language and feeling. The potential of Bourdieu’s theory to contribute to more recent debates on the relationship of language and affect, however, is yet to be explored in detail.
think about what kinds of sentiment should be produced and maintained and what kinds have to be challenged and transformed in order to promote virtue.

A second conceptual root can be found in Scottish moral sense theory most prominently associated with the work of David Hume (1751) and Adam Smith (1759). These thinkers explicitly outlined sentiment as “a word which can stand both for judgment and affection” and systematically “conflates opinion and feeling” (Mullan, 1988, p. 8). The “moral sense,” a feeling of sympathy for and with others, is seen as a normative device to orient one’s judgments. While moral philosophers of the 18th century thus relied on affect and emotion to assess the morality of actions, sentimentality increasingly came to be regarded as false, self-indulgent, and artificial from the end of the century onwards, prominently so in the field of arts and aesthetics. This was especially the case after Friedrich Schiller distinguished between “naive” and “sentimental” poets in his influential series of papers Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung (Schiller, 1795/1993). Schiller asserted that naive poets, for instance in Greek antiquity, had directly described nature in an unalienated way. Most contemporaneous sentimental literature, however, was written from the alienated and self-reflective stance of modern culture; it aimed for an ideal state, yet ultimately reproduced its own artificiality.

This conception of being internally divided and alienated from one’s own nature developed into a specifically “modern” concern throughout the 19th century, preparing the ground for a third conceptual root found in the work of Karl Marx (1867), Friedrich Nietzsche (1887), Sigmund Freud (1930), and Michel Foucault (1984). These scholars represent a line of thinking on the internal divisions of the affective and emotional life of the subject and the ambivalence of moral sense. Marx emphasizes that the subject is not simply able to assess right and wrong independent of the socio-economic structure of power it is embedded in. In his concept of commodity fetishism, the affective life of the subject is led astray by the structural conditions of capitalism and develops a false consciousness about the value of commodities that might nevertheless “feel right” (Marx, 1867, ch. 1). This theme of internal division and alienation of the subject is taken up by thinkers from the late 19th and early 20th centuries: the subject must subject itself in order to come to power (Nietzsche), the subject must have desires which can never be fulfilled for it to function (Freud), the subject is embedded into structures of power in such a way that it always both resists and wields power (Foucault). Conceptualizing the subject as internally divided and contradictory – not only because it is embedded in structural relations of power – challenges some of the premises of the two older traditions concerning the concept of sentiment. It questions the divisions between sentiments promoting virtue and those promoting vice, as both are inextricably entangled in the formation of the subject. Affect and
emotion can likewise not easily guide a moral sense, because the affective and emotional life of the subject is internally contradictory.⁴

These traditions point toward the two important components of sentiment as an analytical term, which are, as mentioned before, already embedded in its vernacular meaning. First, they point to the normative dimension of affective and emotional dynamics and to their role in the (re)production of normative orders. Affect and emotion are not in opposition to normative judgments, but essentially contribute to their formation. Second, in this process of emotional and affective meaning-making, the individual and the collective emerge as dialectically interrelated and internally divided. This creates constant ambiguities in the process of their co-instantiation.

The social sciences have also made sentiments a topic of investigation. For instance, sentiment is an integral part of Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1927) functionalist theory of culture and society. He defined sentiment as “a system of organized emotions” (Malinowski, 1927, p. 139). In his elaborations, which are quite in line with contemporary research on affect and emotion, he emphasizes that “our emotional life is definitely co-ordinated with the environment” and explains that

round each person or object the emotions are organized into a definite system – the love or hate or devotion we feel for a parent, a country or a life-pursuit [...] the ties which bind us to the various members of our family, patriotism, ideals of truth, righteousness, devotion to science – all these are sentiments.

(Malinowski, 1927, p. 139)

Since Malinowski, anthropology has continued to investigate sentiment to describe how people make sense of the world and establish normative orders in the context of affective and emotional dynamics (Abu-Lughod, 1986; Lutz, 1988; Throop, 2010). It has analyzed the larger political dynamics engendered by sentiment, such as humanitarianism (Fassin, 2012) or the colonial governance of the intimate (Stoler, 2002, 2007).

Social scientific and specifically anthropological investigations focus directly on the collective and social-relational dimension of sentiment. Sentiments as relatively stable evaluative regimes of meaning and feeling, of beliefs and desires, should be investigated as socio-cultural phenomena and must conceptually include collective actors and their systemic and structural dimensions. This perspective is less explored in the conceptual roots in practical

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⁴ An example of this strain of thinking about “moral sentiments that escape the alternative between good and evil” (Fassin, 2013, p. 249) is the concept of ressentiment as developed from a phenomenological perspective by Max Scheler (1912) in reference to Nietzsche. See also Fassin’s illustrative differentiation between the French term “ressentiment” (which is also used as a loanword in German) and the English term “resentment.”
philosophy mentioned above. Drawing on practical philosophy as well as social science thinking, sentiment appears as a multifaceted concept to think about meaning-making and the formation of normative orders.

**Sentiment at work**

The particular topic of our research, the politics of international criminal justice in Africa, can illustrate how a focus on sentiment sheds light on the affective and emotional dynamics of evaluative meaning-making. We highlight this process below by proposing a terminological shift from the *sense of justice* to the *sentiment of justice*.

**Sentiment and the International Criminal Court in Africa**

The research project on which these observations are based includes ethnographic fieldwork at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague and in several places in Northern Uganda. At the center of the project is an analysis of the affective and emotional dynamics in which the ICC case *The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen* is embedded. In this criminal proceeding, Dominic Ongwen, a former commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel force engaged in a decade-long civil war with the government, is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The proceedings are conducted at a time of growing criticism of the ICC’s engagement in Africa (cf. Clarke, 2019). Many, particularly high-ranking African politicians, criticize the ICC for prosecuting exclusively Africans and accuse the Court of neo-colonial practices. This research project aspires to grasp the role of sentiment in this case on multiple scales.

At the macro-level, sentiments can appear in the form of globalized and mediatized discursive formations. In such debates on transitional justice in Africa, one example is the appearance of colonialism and the Holocaust in global discourses. The critics of the ICC frequently refer to “learning a lesson” from the history of European colonialism in Africa and criticize the Court’s legal interventions as a neo-colonial practice. The proponents of international criminal justice in Africa frequently refer to “learning a lesson” from the history of the Holocaust of European Jews and make a plea for ending the culture of impunity for mass-scale violence. Such claims in political discourses can fruitfully be investigated as sentiments and explored in their embeddedness in affective and emotional dynamics. While both the *topoi* of colonialism and the Holocaust are mobilized to justify normative judgments on the legitimacy of the ICC’s activities in Africa, they also connect to

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5 This research contributes to the broader field of law and emotion research (e.g., Bandes, 2001), particularly to those studies interested in the role of emotions in transitional justice proceedings (e.g., Mihai, 2016; Reynaud, 2017; Clarke, 2019).
affective and emotional dynamics encoded in collective memory. By invo-
killing colonialism in the context of asking audiences to form a judgment on
the legitimacy of the ICC, emotions of pride in African nationalists fighting
for decolonial liberation and indignation about foreign oppression factor into
the normative decision-making process. Invoking the Holocaust in the same
context taps into emotions of horror about the industrial extermination of
human beings and indignation about such deeds going unpunished. Charac-
terizing such macro-debates as a competition between “anti-colonial senti-
ment” and “anti-impunity sentiment” opens up an analytical space in which
affect and emotion and the formation of judgments are taken seriously in their
mutual entanglements.

At the meso-level, sentiments can appear as materialized regimes of regu-
lating feeling and meaning-making in institutional settings. The ICC as an
institutional frame is derived from a normative order, namely international
criminal law, and is engaged in a transitional justice project. In assisting soci-
eties in coming to terms with a violent past and facilitating a transition to a
peaceful and democratic regime, the ICC can be analyzed as an institution
producing specific sentiments. From such a perspective, it becomes clear that
the law is not free of emotions (Bandes, 2001), but instead systematically tries
to produce specific affective and emotional dynamics. While employees of
the ICC frequently emphasize in conversations that an international criminal
proceeding must “take the emotion out” of the process of justice-making,
they often highlight the deterrent function of the ICC and appreciate that
potential or actual perpetrators of mass violence are afraid of the Court. The
ICC’s elaborate infrastructure of victim participation is frequently justified by
the satisfaction of victim’s emotional desires to “have their day in court.” The
ICC applies strict rules of behavior for visitors to court hearings: they must sit
quietly and are not allowed to bring books even for long proceedings.
Security personnel immediately intervene if visitors engage in conversations
or display specific emotions that are seen as inappropriate, such as smiling or
laughing. These and many other examples point to the mobilization of insti-
tutionalized regimes to produce sentiment in the context of transitional
justice. The past is to be judged in a specific way to construct a peaceful and
democratic present.

At the micro-level, sentiments can be observed as materializing in concrete
events, such as court hearings in The Hague and outreach events in Northern
Uganda, but also in narrative interviews with participants justifying their
assessments of the legitimacy of the Dominic Ongwen case. An analysis of the
rhetoric applied in the courtroom reveals how participants (contrary to the
ideal of a purely rational legal proceeding) consequently use affective and
emotional framing for their legal arguments and their statements of fact. Arti-
facts such as images and audio and videotapes are purposefully mobilized in
order to evoke affective and emotional dynamics within different audiences.
Outreach events are set up to create specific affective atmospheres in order to
create popular support for the ICC’s transitional justice projects. All this is directed to influence people’s formations of judgments in the context of the case. One can observe that when people justify their subjective judgments on the legitimacy of these proceedings, they frequently present narratives, whether personal and biographical stories or widely known histories, in which emotional and affective dynamics are encoded: stories of killed relatives, feelings of betrayal by the government or LRA rebels, the unbearable and precarious life in camps of internally displaced people, but also widely used tropes such as the anti-colonial and anti-impunity sentiment also found in globalized or regionalized discourses.

Sentiments that appear on these multiple scales constantly re-instantiate each other. The individual actors of the ICC’s transitional justice performances form their opinions and judgments about the legitimacy of these proceedings in the context of affective and emotional dynamics that unfold on multiple scales. When individual actors utter these judgments, these utterances feed back into the multi-scalar production of sentiment (→ affective witnessing).

**From the sense of justice to the sentiment of justice**

Combining the conceptual roots of practical philosophy and social science thinking within the analytical device of sentiment, it appears fruitful to also approach questions of justice with the concept of sentiment. So far, however, when scholars have addressed justice not only in purely normative terms, but by descriptively including people’s subjective experiences, they have typically done so in the framework of the *sense of justice*.

Legal philosophy has approached this topic in the philosophical traditions outlined above, connecting the sense of justice with the work of the Scottish moral sense theorists (Dubber, 2006; Solomon, 1995), among others. This approach to the sense of justice puts the emotional life of the individual in the center of the investigation and tends not to sufficiently highlight its interdependence with society. More recent anthropological investigations take an explicit social science position and characterize the sense of justice primarily as a social-relational phenomenon (Brunegger & Faulk, 2016). These approaches, however, tend to include all kinds of experiences and perceptions people can have in relation to the law, and seem to lack a specific focus on affect and emotion.

Against this backdrop, we argue that research on perceptions of justice can benefit from expanding our understanding of *the sense of justice* through a more comprehensive lens on *the sentiment of justice* (Bens & Zenker, 2017). Such a perspective allows for a clear focus on affect and emotion without losing sight of the relational embeddedness of people’s experiences. Investigating sentiments of justice means taking seriously the processes through which people assess the legitimacy of normative orders as they unfold in
affective and emotional dynamics. Such an investigation does not conceive sentiments of justice only as internal phenomena in people’s minds or as external structures conditioning the production of subjectivity, but rather as constantly re-produced in the dialectic of the individual and the collective.

Exploring the normative dimension of affective societies

Mobilizing the idea of affective societies means systematically taking affect and emotion into account when analyzing culture and society. Sentiment is a key concept for the analysis of affective societies, because it pays close attention to affective and emotional dynamics in normative processes of meaning-making. Sentiments describes the evaluative regimes of meaning that emerge entangled in and colored by affective and emotional dynamics. As such, sentiments play a central role in processes of ordering, regulating and structuring human interaction through rules.

The concept of sentiment is especially suited to focus on relations of power and inequality in affective societies. Basic categories in the production of inequality and alterity – such as class, race, and gender – are invoked, re-produced, and legitimized by way of sentiments. Capitalism, racism, or patriarchy, for instance, are long-standing formations deeply entangled in sentiments; the same applies to the movements that counter them – be they socialist, anti-racist, or feminist. In this sense, sentiment as an analytical term is politically neutral, but can be used to describe the processes at work when power relations are established and challenged.

Human life is inextricably embedded in affective and emotional dynamics reconstituting both individuals and collectives; the invention and re-invention of normative orders is no exception. In its broadest sense, sentiment thus provides an analytical device to help understand how affective societies are produced, maintained, challenged, and transformed.

References


Part II

Elaborating affect
“Affective arrangement” is a philosophical concept that describes the in each case unique constellation of a particular affect-intensive site of social life. An affective arrangement comprises an array of persons, things, artifacts, spaces, discourses, behaviors, expressions or other materials that coalesce into a coordinated formation of mutual affecting and being-affected. While its composite materials are heterogeneous, an affective arrangement is characteristically social. As such, it usually brings multiple human actors into a conjunction, so that these actors’ reciprocal affecting and being-affected is the central dimension of the arrangement. The concept thus pertains to the mutually formative combination of socio-material settings and local – as well as non-local (i.e., mediatized) – affective relations. As part of an affective arrangement, affective relations are channeled and modulated in recurrent ways that can be charted by researchers.

As a working concept, “affective arrangement” – and the methodological perspective it anchors – can help researchers come to terms with ongoing affective relationality in various settings, in particular where actors with different positions, roles, histories, dispositions, or habits engage and interact. Affective arrangements are regularly found, for instance, in corporate offices, in public arenas of sports or entertainment, at the sites of religious or ceremonial rituals, at the sites of social and political gatherings of various sorts, but also in the private setting of the family home or in the interactive spaces of contemporary media. The concept facilitates micro-analyses of such settings as it furthers both an understanding of the entities that coalesce locally to engender relational affect, and also the overall affective tonality or atmosphere that prevails in these locales.

The concept is inspired by Deleuze’s and Guattari’s influential notion of agencement (Deleuze & Guattari, 1975/1986, 1980/1987; see also Buchanan, 2015; Nail, 2017). Another precursor is Foucault’s concept of a “dispositif of power” (Foucault, 1977/1980), which stresses materiality, historicity, and visibility in the study of power relations but does not place particular emphasis on affect. Deleuze’s and Guattari’s agencement refers to local concatenations of diverse materials that actively run through a characteristic routine. Thus, the
concept invokes a notion of distributed *agency* in the sense of a performative sequence jointly enacted by the contributing elements. Affective arrangements likewise comprise agency – both human and non-human – in inextricable entanglement with relations of affecting and being affected among its various elements.

An affective arrangement is a fragmentary formation – a tangle of pieces, where the pieces in question keep their distinctness and individuality no matter how densely they are enmeshed. Yet there is a characteristic mode of relatedness that holds the elements together, a specific mode of affecting and being affected. In such a dynamic interplay, the elements sustain a local sphere of affective intensity and thereby both initiate and give shape to characteristic affective relations and agentive routines.

In view of their dynamic openness and heterogeneity, affective arrangements resist attempts to sharply demarcate them. Yet often, there will be a sensible difference between inside and outside, marked by thresholds of intensity. Affective arrangements are *performatively open-ended*, capable of expanding into their surroundings by incorporating new elements. From the point of view of individual actors, affective arrangements often exert an active allure, drawing actors in by offering occasions for → *immersion* within a sphere of → *affective resonance*, thereby potentially giving rise to longer lasting → *attachment*, or even, at times, to forms of behavioral addiction (cf. Schüll, 2014).

**Arrangement thinking: key dimensions**

Affective relations unfold as part of a local formation of elements, involving actors, materials, and their environmental contexts and conditions, whose characteristics and potentials enter into and shape the affective relations in question. Thus, where affect is at issue, there is always more going on than merely the affectedness or affective experience of an individual actor or an interacting dyad viewed in isolation. The point of the concept “affective arrangement” is to bring the contributing elements and dimensions into focus in their specificity and with regard to their local mode of composition. Ideally, this enables an understanding of a multiplicity of elements in terms of how they coalesce locally into a concise formation of affecting and being affected (→ Pathosformel).

There is much leeway as to the forms affective arrangements may take, with regard to the elements that might figure in them and as to the types of relatedness holding them together. However, there are recurrent dimensions that have proven useful for elucidating concrete cases. Among these are the aspect of *heterogeneous composition* (i.e., a non-unifying adherence of self-standing elements), the idea of a *polycentric tangle of relations* that nevertheless gives an impression of a *characteristic mode of relatedness*, the idea of *shifting thresholds of intensity* that provisionally demarcate the arrangement from its surroundings, and – slightly less centrally – the sense of an often (but not always)
pleasurable absorption, captivation or immersion that an affective arrangement affords to individuals that are about to get involved with it, with potential for longer-lasting attachment. In terms of dynamics, an affective arrangement is usually beset by two counteracting tendencies: one toward its consolidation into a relatively permanent pattern, the other, opposing the first, toward transformation or even dissolution. Often, phases of relative dominance of either tendency can be observed (i.e., relatively stable arrangements vs. relatively more fleeting ones). As temporally stabilized agglomerations of materials and expressions, affective arrangements function as repositories of the past, which points to their complex, multi-scale historicity (→ affective disposition).

With the concept “affective arrangement” comes a particular style of thought and methodological orientation – arrangement thinking, one might call it – that lets theorists and researchers approach affective relations in a specific way. Over and above a general orientation toward the situatedness of affect, emphasis is placed on local meshworks, apparatuses, and relational configurations, and one reckons with surprising combinations of elements in one’s attempt to situate a given instance of affect within a particular “intensive milieu” of formative relations. The theoretical optic engendered by this concept is one that seeks out fragmentary complexes, and invokes an ecological perspective critical of individualism and mentalism. This style of thought can be glossed as a form of materialism, but it is a vital materialism that foregrounds the dynamics, liveliness, and intrinsic performativity of matter (Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2010; see Ahmed, 2008, for critical remarks on this trend).

Background and related concepts

As the invocation of Deleuze and Guattari as well as Foucault indicates, the idea of an affective arrangement is inspired by influential conceptual lineages in continental thought, with Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as early instigators. What these precursors have in common is a broadly materialist and social-realist allegiance pitted against the idealism of bourgeois culture, and at least Nietzsche and Marx share a tacit focus on performativity and agency as opposed to representation, and a form of subject-thinking that emphasizes formative relations to the environment, to ambient culture, or socio-industrial complexes. Marx’ fragment on machines and his thoughts on commodity fetishism (Marx, 1973), Nietzsche’s naturalistic yet constructivist and affect-oriented construal of the subject (Nietzsche, 1886/2002), and also Freud’s concept of the “complex” as an idiosyncratic psychic constellation all prefigure certain aspects of what will later become, in the works of Deleuze and Guattari, the agencement.

The successive stages of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s collaborative work are the main attractor for the different phases and facets of arrangement thinking. An early seminal articulation is in the Anti-Oedipus, a book that commences with the re-coding of the Freudian complex into the “desiring machine”
This move frees the *agencement* (the French translation of Freud’s “complex”) from both its psychic interiority and its confinement within a stuffy family setting – the Oedipal triangle. Instead, the *agencement* gets relocated within a plurality of socio-material constellations, object relations, and machinic concatenations, fueled by a notion of desire centered on the polyvalence and productivity of attachment. Around the same time, Deleuze and Guattari identify Kafka as the virtuoso of the *agencement machinique* and the modern novel as its aesthetic format of choice, while they also point to literary writing in general as a practice of crafting energetic complexes of affect that might stick and prevail (Deleuze & Guattari, 1975/1986) (∴ *writing affects*).

With its productivity, dynamism, and polyvalence, the *agencement machinique* was supposed to counter the strictures of structuralism while preserving its insights into the formative workings of cultural formations, rituals, sign systems, or other codified practices (cf. Schmidgen, 1997). In its more developed phase in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980/1987), Deleuze’s and Guattari’s approach takes the guise of an encompassing dynamic-materialist ontology reaching from the microscopic to the cosmic scale.

On a parallel track, mid-20th century theorizing in Western Marxism began to champion a notion of “apparatus” as a device of power-inflected, often repressive subject-formation, with Althusser’s *ideological state apparatuses* as a central articulation (Althusser, 1970). In critical distinction to Althusser and his deterministic leanings, Foucault settled on the subtler notion of a “dispositif” or “dispositif of power” (a term that initially got translated into English as “apparatus,” whereby its distinctness was lost). In Foucault’s work, the “dispositif” replaces his earlier notion of a “discursive formation,” emphasizing the role of non-discursive materials and arrangements in the production and maintenance of power relations. The concept anchors both a perspective on power as productive, distributed, and polycentric and an understanding of the subject as in part shaped and molded by socio-material configurations, where Foucault stresses the heterogeneity of these formations as well as their strategic character. Given the productivity of the concept, it is understandable that there are attempts to accommodate the dispositif directly to affect theory with the term “affectif” (Seyfert, 2012). While this proposal overlaps to some degree with the present account, it is preferable to speak of an affective micro-*dispositif* in the context of affective arrangements (Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018; see also Anderson, 2014).

More recently, “apparatus” has resurfaced in the work of feminist philosopher of science Karen Barad, who continues an earlier line of non-dualistic feminist thought on the material-discursive practices of science initiated, among others, by Donna Haraway, whose “apparatus of bodily production” also belongs in the conceptual lineage tracked here (see Haraway, 1988, p. 595). In Barad’s (2007) relational ontology centered on “entanglements” and “intra-action,” with a stress on material agency and post-human
performativity, the apparatus is the main arena of distributed agency. Like the *agencement* before it and the affective arrangement on the present account, Barad’s apparatus is not merely an assortment of stuff at a place, but a lively unit comprised of different elements that operate together dynamically, a site where things unfold in a more or less regular way, without an instance of top-down control. Barad’s quantum-physics-derived notion of “entanglement” signals the non-separability of intra-acting parts within such relational meshworks and allows a focus on variably drawn and re-drawn boundaries among and within phenomena. The term “entanglement” has been employed productively in recent years within cultural analysis, for instance in feminist approaches to the biosciences (Wilson, 2015) and in media theory (e.g., Chow, 2012). Much recent work on networked media and emerging social media practices can be considered as informed by arrangement thinking, as the focus in media theory has shifted from separate devices to dispersed media environments and overlapping practices of mediation, with multiple formats, technologies, and temporalities coalescing into multisensorial complexes and “intensive milieus” (Angerer, 2017).

Other recent articulations in the *agencement* lineage are the varieties of *assemblage theory* in the social sciences. Besides Bruno Latour’s widely received actor-network theory that draws variously on a flattened notion of *assemblage* (Latour, 2005), Manuel DeLanda’s (2006) social ontological approach is noteworthy. In keeping with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s groundwork, DeLanda understands “assemblage” — until recently the standard translation of the French *agencement* — as a non-organic totality whose parts are self-subsistent and autonomous in relation to the whole. Likewise, his topological perspective foregrounds the specificity and historical contingency of an assemblage, opposing essentialism and archetypical thinking. DeLanda’s approach synthesizes Deleuze’s and Guattari’s metaphysics with complexity theory, network science, and innovative strands of organization theory, showcasing the potentials and range of application of assemblage-style thought. On the flip side, his work has been criticized as too rigid in its bottom-up logic, as unclear with regard to key notions (such as “scale”) and as not receptive enough to the heterogeneity, non-linearity and “crankiness” of real-life assemblages (cf. Buchanan, 2015).

In order to enable it to function as a focal concept for the study of affect, and especially as a notion capable of bringing out the specificity of situated affective relations, it is important to construe “affective arrangement” in a sufficiently open-textured manner. Accordingly, we advise against adherence to

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1 Limits of space prevent an exploration of the resonances between the conceptual lineage charted here and approaches in microsociology. Erving Goffman’s work on interaction rituals and their settings, situations, and frames is highly instructive, in part also because Goffman often speaks of “arrangements” himself (see, e.g., Goffman, 1983); a key articulation of microsociological emotion theory is Collins (2004).
one particular school of thought to the exclusion of other approaches, and suggest a more free-floating usage.

**Examples from research**

To heed this directive, this section presents examples from recent work on affect in which the concept and the thought style of arrangement thinking have found application. The cases are such that a particular domain of study has inspired further conceptual development at the ground level of research. Each example will emphasize a dimension of affective arrangements, but it is not assumed that all of its dimensions will ever appear together in a single case.

An intuitive example is contemporary work environments such as open-floor corporate offices with their communication and interaction routines among co-workers in a spatial set-up, wired-up by networked media and interactive workflow technologies (cf. Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2017). Crucial in modern office workplaces is both the creation of a working atmosphere – an affective style of moment-to-moment interaction and engagement among the co-workers – and the longer-term habituation and cultivation of affective dispositions and agentive routines. The affective arrangement is a dynamic formation that modulates individual dispositions and harnesses energies and potentialities to the benefit of the overall set-up (i.e., that of the company or organization). There is an element of self-organization as local interaction patterns and intra-active routines emerge in part spontaneously, but also a dimension of design and deliberate affect engineering that draws its techniques from the legacies of group dynamics research, organizational psychology, ergonomics, or human factors research (among much else). Conceptual elaboration in these settings might suggest further notions capable of characterizing the dense mutual modulation of affectivity, behavior, and habit in close-knit workplace interaction, for instance concepts such as “affective resonance” or “immersive power” (cf. Mühlhoff & Schütz, 2017; Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018).

Significant political events and movements might be approached through the lens of the affective arrangement. Recent ethnographic work on the street protests during the revolutionary uprisings in Egypt in 2011 make use of the concept to bring the particular affective atmosphere, texture, and temporality – and their various enabling conditions – of the movement into focus. The protests at issue are those on the Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo on 18 memorable days of the square’s occupation in 2011 (cf. Ayata & Harders, 2018). In interviews, activists speak of a palpable intensity and energy unfolding during the protests, and many consider their time on the square as life-changing. Approaching the dynamics on the square as a complex of interlocking arrangements – rather than a matter of collective emotions such as anger, fear, or enthusiasm – provides a fruitful angle on the heterogeneity of contributing factors (material, architectural, practical, discursive, medial, etc.), on the
uniqueness of certain transformative moments, but also on the tensions and differences among participants and participant factions. Arrangement thinking lets researchers look at Tahrir Square as a material-discursive site imbued with the traces of previous struggles, movements, epochs, and balances of power that weigh into the particular affective texture of the 2011 uprisings. As a conceptual guide for qualitative research, the optic of arrangement thinking is capable of combining – not merging – individual perspectives, gleaned from narrative interviews with activists, with fine-grained descriptions of the affective dynamics on the square. A socio-political event on the world-historical scale is thereby dissected into a confluence of enabling and contributing factors without imposing a reductive explanation. It is noteworthy that the political event itself can become the focus of arrangement thinking, as epitomized in the concept “Midān moment,” coined to bring to attention the exceptional temporality of an ongoing situation of protest, including its manifest transformative force (Ayata & Harders, 2018) (→ Midān moments).

The ethnographic study of rituals is another domain where the concept of an affective arrangement has proven useful. In his work on religious performances at saints’ shrines in Sehwan, Pakistan, the anthropologist Omar Kasmani brings to bear an arrangement optic to focus on the multilayered temporality of practices of devotion at holy sites, with emphasis on the complex soundscapes, on the “sonic mise-en-scène of affect” (Kasmani, 2017). By foregrounding the local arrangement of sound, the thick sensuality and complex historicity of the audible comes into view as a powerful conveyor of affect. Practices of devotion are seen as multiply layered soundscapes in which a panoply of tendencies, temporal dimensions, participant orientations, tensions, and contestations coalesce at a historically charged site into a unique sonic formation:

[T]he ordinary tinkering of tea-sellers, the guttural roar of motor-cycle rickshaws, the five calls to prayer, the daily bustle of surrounding markets as well as the occasional fights, brawls and conflicts on site are as much part of an emergent yet already drifting sonic-scene as are dissonances triggered by ritual performances themselves.

(Kasmani, 2017)

Arrangement thinking here entails a sensibility for the time- and site-specific complexities and ambivalences that inhere practices of worship at tension-riddled sites. This prevents a monothematic approach that would foreground a focus on transcendence and view participants mainly in their role as devotees with few other stakes in their practice. Countering such readings, Kasmani emphasizes the political dimension audible at Pakistani shrines, lending an ear to other vital concerns besides religious ones, and discerning stirrings of political agency on part of those engaged in the rituals: “in publicly sounding allegiance to Shia figures, events and temporalities, pilgrims
long for other histories, they insist on other futures. They voice a historical-emotional consciousness that critiques, interrupts, and refuses a for-granted continuity of the present” (Kasmani, 2017).

**Conclusion: two methodological orientations**

Implicit in the preceding exposition of the concept “affective arrangement” are two distinct methodological orientations. Taken in its full complexity, “affective arrangement” is a philosophical concept that aims at elucidating the *unique* constellation of a particular affect-intensive site of social life. It drives toward disclosing the operative essentials of a social site in terms of a unique local patterning of relational affect, giving shape to a potentially idiosyncratic affective texture or formation inherent in a specific place at a time. The methodology associated with this employment of the concept is qualitative, interpretive, and constructivist, as a given site or domain will be described from a unique and potentially personal angle. Such descriptions are crafted with the help of various aesthetic and stylistic means, as deemed appropriate to the case at hand. It will be hard – if not impossible – to separate this sort of work with the concept from an educated perspective and capacity for judgment of an individual scholar, stemming from an individual learning history and experiential trajectory. This is more than the global orientation of arrangement thinking, which is a perspective comprising relatively clear-cut principles (as described above). What is required, over and above this general orientation, is a unique “take” or imprint on part of the individual scholar or researcher. Moreover, their trained power of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) will not only be applied as such, but has to effectively coalesce with whatever is currently under study, forming an affective arrangement in its own right between scholarly orientation and domain of inquiry. A central role then inevitably accrues to skilled academic writing, as the unique affective *Gestalt* of a given arrangement requires the right words in a nuanced textual arrangement adequate to the scene under study. At issue is an involved, potentially immersive style of approaching and then writing about one’s subject matter.

On the other hand, much in the foregoing has pointed also to aspects of potential empirical research methodologies. For instance, social scientists, ethnographers, or researchers of media who approach a social domain might use “affective arrangement” as an explorative concept that guides their charting of the material layout and functional design of social spaces, domains, or media platforms, focusing on those elements and their structured interplay that are presumably instrumental to the reliable production and/or continued circulation of affect. Here, the concept works as a generative template inspiring hypotheses, research questions, and initial domain descriptions. For example, the ethnographic study of ritual might map out elements of the material propping and staging instrumental to the unfolding of affect during the ritualistic performances – up to the minute drawing of empirically grounded heat maps and
interaction diagrams. In the sociology of organizations, the design of offices and workplaces might be approached with an eye to those factors and local set-ups which likely play a role in realizing the predominant forms of affective interactions or affective atmospheres in these settings.

What these predominantly empirical endeavors have in common is that they do not have to assume the full qualitative notion of the affective arrangement, but can restrict their scope to selected dimensions, or focus on different elements of an arrangement sequentially during the research process. Reckoning with an affective arrangement within empirical research can take the form of an orientating blueprint which might be coarse-grained and selective, with details being filled in as new data emerges. The research process takes the form of moving back and forth between arrangement sketches and their correction and elaboration in the light of new material.

The best-case scenario for the interdisciplinary study of affect is that these two methodological tracks stay closely aligned. Conceptual elucidations of affective arrangements will be more potent when informed by empirical research about the constellations in question and about their various components and modes of composition. Empirical work, in turn, will be less prone to reductionism or simplification when it keeps reckoning with complex and oftentimes unique constellations that may exceed what can, at present, be established by empirical methods – and sometimes also that which “makes sense” in conventional ways. With “affective arrangement” we have a rich conceptual template that has a foot each within the qualitative and the quantitative, without being split-up artificially. This is a key characteristic of what, in the present volume, is glossed as work on the concept as a methodology for the study of affect and emotion: the crafting of concepts that provide dual service, that is, they work as heuristics suited for wide-ranging application, but also as generative templates for articulation and explication within ongoing research and academic writing.

References


An affective disposition is an individual’s repository of affective traces of past relations, events, and encounters, acting in the present as potentials to affect and be affected. In philosophy, the term disposition, or dispositional property, denotes the capacity of a thing to act or be acted upon in a specific way. A disposition is a latent property that manifests only in specific encounters. This chapter introduces the concept of affective dispositions in an affect theoretical framework that understands affecting and being affected as a relational and constitutive register of being, such as in Spinozan ontology (→ affect). The concept “affective disposition” is coined specifically to describe couplings of active and receptive inclinations of a body as part of its striving for self-preservation (conatus) and is thus very close, but not identical, to what is called potentia in Spinozism.

With the phenomenal scope of social theory in mind, an individual’s affective disposition is a product of their biographical past. It is shaped, for instance, by infant–caregiver inter-affectivity, by significant personal relations, bodily abilities, traumatic experiences, and sedimented patterns of relational affect. As a repository of such traces, an affective disposition is inseparably a bodily and a mental entity (see Spinoza’s parallelism theorem, → affect). It manifests in forms of embodiment and in the relational dynamics of being a social body among social bodies. By way of an affective disposition, influences of the past are virtually present in an individual’s future relations. This means that affective traces from the past co-shape future affective dynamics, not in a deterministic way, but through differential actualization in interplay with the affective dispositions of all other bodies in a particular context. This way an individual’s affective disposition manifests in a particular relation thus always depends on outside factors that both partially augment and inhibit the individual’s capacity to affect and be affected. It is, accordingly, a process of reciprocal modulation.

The English term “disposition” has a double meaning that reflects this conceptual entanglement between the diachronic co-presentation of the past and synchronic modulation in the present. It can mean a prevailing tendency or inclination of an individual toward something (“disposition” in the sense of
temperamental, psychological, or personal inclinations), and it can mean a power of disposing an individual to something ("disposition" in the sense of the environment’s power of disposing the individual to certain affective modes of interaction). In analogy to this meaningful duality, an individual’s affective disposition can manifest either as a set of tendencies toward affecting others and reacting to affect engendered by others in a specific way. Or it can manifest as a specific susceptibility to be at the disposition of the present field of affective relations due to the way the person’s specific affective disposition is captured, harnessed, and thereby modulated in a certain relational context. This duality of contributing to the situation and at the same time being shaped by it is at the heart of the concept of an affective disposition.

At a systematic level, the concept of an affective disposition serves as a theoretical hinge to connect individuality and social structures in the register of inter-affectivity. Affective dispositions explain the emergence of inter-affective patterns. These bear the signatures of the persons involved and perpetuate social structures and large-scale regularities that pertain to a higher entity or social whole. Beyond the dichotomy of structural determinism versus bodily essences of the individual, the concept of an affective disposition helps to explain how social and cultural regularities in affective interactions, such as gendered and authoritarian patterns or the subtleties of a specific social or cultural vibe, are virtually sedimented in each individual’s capacities to affect and be affected as a product of biographical influence.

**Example**

Consider the case of a high school reunion ten years after graduation. The students have gone in different directions; they have developed, matured, and transformed. Some still know each other, others are completely alienated from the group because they moved far away and have not been seen since high school. And yet, over the course of the night, you might find yourself and many others falling into the same old patterns regarding, for instance, who cracks the jokes, who speaks most, how people laugh together, who clings to whom, who seeks whose attention, who is having subtle tensions and frictions, who is being bullied, what kind of gendered behavior re-emerges, and so forth. It is worthwhile to look at this example particularly from a perspective of the constitution of interactive patterns in processes of affecting and being affected. What is interesting is that a sudden re-emergence of long forgotten but latent inter-affective patterns might occur even if, after school, you went to a completely different environment where you established completely different ways of relating and forming attachments to others.

Since a high school class is a micro-social whole, this example operates on a mid-range scale. Its interactive patterns instantiate larger social structures, such as gendered or racialized interactions, and yet, as a group dynamic, are
so much more than that. While these interactive patterns are highly
dependent on the personal characteristics of particular members, this does not
mean that the way in which individuals perform “themselves” is similar to
how they perform in other group contexts. Speaking in the vocabulary of
affective dispositions, an inter-affective “role” that grows out of the group
dynamics of a school class over years gets sedimented, in the form of a poten-
tial pattern of affecting and being affected, in one’s affective disposition. In
the same way, affective roles in families, in relationships, in intensive work
environments and many other micro-social constellations might sediment as
potentials to affect and be affected in future constellations. While the indi-
vidual is the carrier of their affective disposition, it takes a certain interactive-
situational context of the affective dispositions of others for the former to
manifest again. Therefore, in the class reunion, you might find yourself re-
engaging in long forgotten inter-affective patterns based on both the situ-
atonal framing and by your internally sedimented affective capacities.

Related concepts across disciplines

There has been no systematic use of the term “affective disposition” in affect
studies so far. Hence this chapter aims to introduce the concept as a refined
understanding of the more general notion of an “affective capacity” that
highlights the inherent ambiguity of being-disposed-to and being-at-the-
disposition-of that is connected to one’s affective capacity. There are, however,
concepts at work (mostly in empirical disciplines) that share some of the
defining properties of affective dispositions. Three of them shall be briefly
discussed in this section.

The term “disposition” has been discussed in analytical philosophy (for a
historical overview, see Malzkorn, 2001). It must be noted that this debate
seems to have little in common with the present account of “affective dispo-
sitions.” This is for two reasons. First, the analytic debate is dominated by an
approach that seeks to formalize dispositional properties of objects through
conditional statements in a logical calculus. The abstracting “if-then”-structure that is inherent in this style of thought contradicts the fundamental
idea of a reciprocal and dynamic unfolding of affective dispositions in open
and generative processes within situated assemblages (→ affect; → affective
resonance; see also Mühlhoff, 2015). Second, the point of affective dispositions
is that they do not rely on a fixed “list” of possible actions or affects a body
might engage in based on its disposition, but refer to a set of potentials that
manifest differentially in varying relational contexts. At the heart of the pro-
posed understanding of affective dispositions is Spinoza’s famous line: nobody
“know[s] what the body can do, or what can be deduced from the considera-
tion of its nature alone” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III prop. 2 schol.; cf. Deleuze,
1968/1990). In the analytic debate, “disposition” seems to refer to a static list
of how a pre-constituted thing can act or react to the impact of other things
in various circumstances. “Affective disposition,” in contrast, is to be understood ontologically and dynamically, that is, as an ontogenetic notion: Only through constant actualization of its affective disposition is a thing what it is, but this actualization depends on a changing relational context and is therefore somewhat variable.

**Psychology**

In personality and social psychology the term “disposition” is used in the sense of personality traits. Much of personality research is concerned with the methodology of how to empirically measure a person’s personality dispositions by their manifest behavior or reactions, and of how to predict or explain behavior using the known dispositions of a person. From this empirical perspective, personality dispositions are not immediate observables, but “latent, hypothetical characteristics that can only be inferred from external, observable cues” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 2). There is also a vivid debate on the underlying theoretical models, the most prominent of which is perhaps the “five-factor” or “OCEAN model.” Since its widespread adoption in the 1980s, there is an emerging consensus among empiricists that there are five key dimensions of personality traits (“openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism”) that are deemed sufficient as a system of coordinates with which to map the diversity of individual characters (see Norman, 1963; McCrae & Costa, 1996).

Some authors in social psychology distinguish between two major kinds of personality dispositions, personality traits, and attitudes. An attitude, unlike a trait, is an “evaluative disposition” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 20) toward something, such as “toward politicians and political parties” or “toward ethnic groups and nationalities,” etc. (p. 1). That is, an attitude is a disposition that manifests in judgments “respond[ing] favorably or unfavorably to an object, person, institution, or event” (Ajzen, 2005, p. 3), while personality traits are dispositions that manifest as subtle modalities of personally engaging in or with outer affairs. For instance, personality traits could manifest as “dominance, sociability [...] emotional stability, ambitiousness,” etc. (Ajzen, 2005, p. 1). The empirical concept of personality dispositions is thus based on the assumption that there is some kind of inner (psychic or emotional) structure to an individual that causes enduring behavioral tendencies. Insofar as these tendencies are statistically “probable” reaction patterns, they are similar to the concept of an affective disposition in that they are non-deterministic in nature.

Another related field in psychology is the field of attachment theory, particularly in developmental psychology. An attachment is typically defined as an enduring “affectional bond” between a human and someone or something else that persists over time and across contexts (→ attachment). Attachment theories emphasize that early infant attachments inform the way individuals engage in future relationships and social relations. If
attachment is analyzed specifically with respect to its dynamic affective qualities, such as attunement behavior (cf. Stern, 1985/2010), it is immediately apparent how one’s attachment history can be theorized as a significant source for what I call affective dispositions. However, it should be noted that the concept of an affective disposition makes a slightly more general claim than just a “disposition for future attachments.” An affective disposition does not necessarily manifest in an enduring episode in which emotional ties develop. Affective dispositions can also unfold in very situated and short-lived dynamics, in explosions, controversies, repulsions, or temporary alliances. They can appear in in black-outs or social behavioral patterns like taking space or being shy, speaking up or backing out. They can be unleashed in all kinds of affective spaces, including, for instance, spaces of politics or media. At a theoretical level, the proposed theorization of an affective disposition seeks to escape a cognitivist vocabulary even more than attachment theory does. While attachment patterns are sometimes theorized as forming an internal working model of the self (→ attachment), affective dispositions do not generally manifest in such cognitive or reflexive instances. Instead, they are theorized as purely relational potentials, that is, as manifesting only in a concrete affective arrangement. These locally embedded manifestations repeatedly constitute the body as a situated social body. Consequently, there is not one body engaging, based on its history, in evolving and transforming forms of attachments. Rather the body gets re-constituted anew in each situation by means of differential manifestations of its affective dispositions.

**Sociology**

In sociological theory, the term “disposition” is used in the context of habitus theories as an approach to explain participant behavior in relation to a social whole (see Bourdieu, 1980/1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Roughly, so-called “dispositional approaches” may be distinguished from positional approaches to the relation of participant and social whole, such as those theories focusing on social roles and role expectations (e.g., Parsons, 1951; see Mouzelis, 1995). Dispositional theories follow a praxeological approach, stressing the role of what they call habitus. The habitus is a system of perceptive, reactive, and behavioral schemata or tendencies that is acquired in the course of an individual’s socialization in various social “fields” (Bourdieu, 1980/1990). This concept serves to account for the influence of social stratifications and backgrounds such as class, religion, education, profession, nationality, ethnicity on an individual’s behavior in a certain social context. Social “fields” are organized in hierarchical relations. These relations are given by differentials of power and various forms of capital. A habitus is the signature of one’s specific social background and history of socialization as an aspect of social capital.
The proposed theory of affective dispositions and the theory of *habitus* both stress that past influences have a latent impact in present interactions. Yet, the crucial difference is that the concepts of “social field” and *habitus* in Bourdieu – where *habitus* is acquired within a social field – seem to be explicitly limited to “objective relations.” These relations are seen from an external, almost “scientific” vantage point, thus abstracting from personal idiosyncrasies, first-person affective experience and situatedness. According to Bourdieu, a “general property of fields is that they are systems of relations that are independent of the populations which these relations define” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 106). As a methodological consequence:

The notion of field reminds us that the true object of social science is not the individual […]. It is the field that is primary […]. This does not imply that individuals are mere “illusions”, that they do not exist: they exist as *agents* – and not as biological individuals, actors, or subjects – who are socially constituted as active and acting in the field under consideration by the fact that they possess the necessary properties to be effective, to produce effects, in this field.

(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 107)

The concept of “disposition” in Bourdieu’s *habitus* theory therefore relies on a rather broad angle from which the world appears to be segregated in distinct, impermeable strata. Large-scale structures seem to have an almost mechanistic impact on the individuals by means of socialization, making the individual an abstract agent in a web of “objective” relations. In contrast, the understanding of dispositions presented in this chapter is focused more on *situated* unfolding and on a subjective-experiential register of evaluation. It is also better suited to accommodate the fluidity of boundaries between “fields.” This can be seen in the example of the high school reunion. The way one falls back into old inter-affective, experiential, and behavioral patterns in the class reunion can hardly be explained solely in terms of class/race/field habitualization, for what makes the patterns re-emerge is the arrangement of individuals, the particular mix of personalities as carriers of potentials to affect and be affected (of which class, race, and gender might be a non-reducible part). In the register of affecting and being-affected, dynamic patterns and qualities emerge that do not simply reflect only societal stratifications and social roles. A theory of affective dispositions widens the scope of social theory beyond the abstract set of “objective relations” that subtracts from each social situation its concrete “population.” In fact, the particular mix of micro-social relations in the reunion might produce similar but not identical inter-affective dynamics as ten years ago despite the fact that its participants have, in the meantime, been socialized in vastly different social fields, educational paths, economic milieus, and social strata.
Apart from a *habitus*, there is also a set of affective traces reactivated in the class reunion. These affective traces act as individual matrices in which sensitivity (the power to be affected) and active potential (the power to affect others) are entangled. The concept of an affective disposition therefore systematically directs attention toward the emergence of inter-affective dynamics. This does not mean that social structuration (class, race, gender, etc.) is blended out of the picture; rather, in a structure of superimposition, every affective disposition will always inseparably encode both structural aspects and individual particularities.

**The authoritarian personality**

Another precursor to the notion of affective dispositions comes even closer to the understanding proposed in this chapter. It can be found in the studies on the *Authoritarian Personality* by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950), a piece of empirical work that is located somewhere between social psychology, psychoanalysis, and sociology. The latter starts from the assumption that there is a “psychological” or “emotional disposition” (pp. xi, 16) of individuals that is distributed to a certain extent in the population and on which susceptibility to fascist ideology is based. In a broad empirical investigation that also aimed at quantitative evaluation, the famous “F scale” was invented as an approach to bring together in a scale items which, by hypothesis and by clinical experience, could be regarded as “giveaways” of trends which lay relatively deep within the personality, and which constituted a *disposition* to express spontaneously (on a suitable occasion), or to be influenced by, fascist ideas.

(Adorno et al., 1950, p. 15, italics in original)

While authoritarianism is a much more specific topic than the general idea of an affective disposition, the concept of an “emotional” or “psychological disposition” that is at work in the *Authoritarian Personality* is an important precursor to the concept of affective dispositions. In particular, the authors stress that a psychological disposition involves both receptivity toward certain influences as well as a tendency toward certain active attitudes. For instance, it is due to their specific psychological dispositions that some individuals “gravitate toward [political] groups” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 195) or that some are “more receptive to one pattern [of political engagement], others to another” (p. 178). Even an individual’s “choice of ideology” in general “appears to be [...] in large parts an expression of important emotional dispositions” (pp. 206–207). Thus, Adorno et al. do not assume a clear-cut distinction of traits and attitudes. Rather, receptive manifestations of an authoritarian disposition blend into active and attitudinal manifestations.
These considerations are a role model for the conception of affective dispositions as they highlight both the non-deterministic character of dispositions and a deep layer of social structure. Adorno and his collaborators, in line with similar analyses by Erich Fromm and Wilhelm Reich, apply a psychoanalytic model in which “[t]hese dispositions can be understood, in part at least, as expressions of ego weakness” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 236). Regardless of what “ego weakness” really means and whether this theoretical view is still deemed adequate today, what is relevant is that the authoritarian disposition is understood as biographically and inter-affectively acquired, and as such is a product of micro-social structures. In addition, the manifestation of a psychological disposition in actual acts is seen as co-dependent on structural conditions in the present. “Psychological dispositions do not actually cause Fascism; rather, Fascism defines a psychological area which can be successfully exploited by the forces which promote it for entirely non-psychological reasons of self-interest” (Adorno, 1951/1982, p. 135). This makes the concept of an authoritarian psychological disposition a mediator, or a hinge, between social structures, operating in realms like education, infant–caretaker inter-affectivity, and political formations on a larger societal scale. The concept of an affective disposition will copy this functionality at the general level of subject constitution, without limiting its focus to authoritarianism.

Systematic elaboration

In Spinozan ontology, the individual manifests in each situation and relation as a carrier of a power, called potentia, which is simultaneously a capacity to affect and be affected by others (see Spinoza, 1677/1985; Deleuze, 1981/1988, 1968/1990) (→ affect). At the same time, a truly relational and non-individualistic reading of Spinoza’s ontology implies that the individual is itself only constituted in internal and external “relations of motion and rest” – or, in short, affective relations. An individual, with all its particularities and personal traits, is thus the effect of the power to affect and be affected, of which it is itself also the carrier. There is a way to resolve this seeming circularity that remains within the non-individualistic paradigm of a relational ontology of affect and yet still allows for the attribution of individual specificities: Such specificities should not be thought of as rooted in a static bodily constitution, but in a dynamic realm of inter-bodily forces and potentials. That is, the conception of individual specificities of potentia may be transposed from the ontological register of actuality and substantial essences (such as of the brain, the body, or the psyche) to an ontological register of dynamic, relational potentials.

In this perspective, the traces of a body’s past affective encounters, along with their concurrent mental imaginations and psychic traces, constitute a virtual part of ones potentia as long as they stay latent and do not manifest in the here and now. We may refer to this virtual component of potentia as
“affective disposition.” The term “virtual” is taken from Deleuze (1966/1991, 1968/1994; see also Massumi, 2002), who uses it to describe an ontological register of pure potentiality, in distinction from the register of currently “actual” or manifest forms. Following Simondon (2009), it is important to note that this virtuality, and thus also the affective disposition, is a transindividual entity.¹ That is, it unfolds in the field of affective forces and dynamics of a relational context; it does not pertain to the independent individual alone but to an individual-in-a-situation. Its possible actualization, or becoming-manifest in an affective dynamic, is co-dependent on all the other individuals and their affective dispositions within a situation. In the process of actualization of an affective disposition, an individual is therefore both “at the mercy” of a wider context as much as they are disposed by their own biographical past. An affective disposition is both a set of latent personal inclinations and a specific susceptibility to the environment’s power of disposing a subject to certain affective dynamics. This ambiguity is also why the process of actualization of affective dispositions is always a differential manifestation: it cannot identically repeat forms, as it depends on a possibly altered relational context.

Consequently, falling back into old affective patterns, as in the high school reunion, is not an act of mere remembering where past affects are represented and then stored somewhere (in the brain) only to be retrieved and reproduced later. Virtual affective traces act as potentials in the present, that is, as the readiness to act anew on one another that will unfold only in relations. If they unfold in an interactive dynamic, these potentials would differentially repeat old patterns. The concept of a virtuality does not include the actual shapes it will bring about in its unfolding, only the tendency toward acting on one another in a way that connects to a past. This is why the presence of latent affective dispositions often escapes conscious awareness or easy reflection until there is a relational encounter in which they suddenly unfold. Virtual entities generally evade “clear and distinct” mental representations and yet might suddenly be unleashed as relational forces of unexpected power.²

Although each person’s affective disposition is highly particular and idiosyncratic, affective dispositions also tend to perpetuate social structures. In order for a certain regularity to appear in an encounter, for example, a gendered pattern of inter-affectivity, it is often sufficient for a certain fraction of a group of people to have a more or less similar affective disposition as a result of previous influences. This is because patterns such as gendered or racialized interactions tend to be mutually stabilizing modes of interaction, which is how they gain so much power. Moreover, such patterns are easily superimposed as general overtones onto what feels like a highly particular and specific affective relationship such as a friendship, a romantic relationship, etc. Often, these superimposed structures

¹ Balibar (1997) prominently made this point with respect to the individual in Spinoza.
are affectively stabilized by the implicit fact that many other individuals in a certain environment share these latent meta-structures in their affective capacities as they were exposed to them in their biographic past. This might be the case even if the individuals are not conscious of the impact of meta-structures as the dynamic appears to them as highly individualized, such that their hidden complicity with power structures evades direct attention.

**Outlook and applications**

The phenomenon of an authoritarian disposition mentioned before points toward an important application of the general concept of an affective disposition. This is deemed of new importance in light of the current political situation of emerging right-wing populist mass movements in many Western societies (Gordon, 2017), which provides a politically acute and theoretically puzzling example. Further research should discuss whether, and which, latent affective dispositions might be a factor contributing to populist mobilization. To this end one could, for instance, start by clarifying whether the notion of an authoritarian character syndrome as found in Adorno et al. (1950) or Reich (1933/1970) can be reformulated as a special case of an affective disposition, thus yielding a theory of an *authoritarian affective disposition* that is less dependent on psychoanalytic theory. The Spinoza-based affect theoretical framework facilitates a perspective on ontogeny in which affective relations and the genesis of mental ideas and understanding come together in building a body’s specific capacity to affect and be affected. This could be applied to the psychoanalytic account by Else Frenkel-Brunswik (Adorno et al., 1950, pp. 337–389), who suggests that an authoritarian disposition consists of affective traces of hierarchical affective relations in early infancy, where the mind was exposed to these relations not in a mode of understanding but of arbitrariness and subordination: “Was the issue in question explained to the child and was he included in the discussion of it, or did it appear to the child as unintelligible, arbitrary, and overwhelming?” (p. 371).

An authoritarian affective disposition could be latent for a long time, only to manifest after decades in response to certain political, social, or economic circumstances. It is therefore a pressing question what role such affective dispositions play in the current emergence of right-wing populist movements, and how these dispositions are distributed within a certain population. If populism, as Ernesto Laclau puts it, is not primarily a certain “political or ideological content” but a “mode of articulation” of that content (Laclau, 2005, p. 34), this approach will allow one to investigate whether there are specific affective dispositions that make subjects more likely to resonate with a populist mode of articulation. This would supplement the positional or propositional analysis of political engagement with what Massumi describes as a politics of “dispositional trigger mechanism[s]”: “Addressing bodies from the dispositional angle of their affectivity, instead of addressing subjects from the positional angle of their...
Affective disposition, shunts government function away from the mediations of adherence or belief and toward direct activation” (Massumi, 2005, p. 34). In this way, individual predispositions of neo-authoritarian forms of political engagement could be unearthed, and yet, the potentially long latency of such dispositions can show how relational, social, and political co-factors are responsible for their sudden activation.

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“Affective practice” is a concept based on Margaret Wetherell’s (2012) linkage of affect theory with practice theory. It can be understood in two ways: First, in a narrow sense, the term may refer to the treatment of specific practices as belonging to a subcategory of “affective practices,” for example, when the affective dimension of an activity becomes the main focus of attention and is reflexively attended to. Here, affect is produced in a practice and reflected upon as part of that practice. Second, the concept of an affective practice highlights the affective dimension of practices in general. Importantly, the first perspective on the concept informs the second one and is essential for developing a more comprehensive understanding of affectivity. Likewise, current developments in affect studies convincingly argue that affectivity plays an important role in social practice far beyond specifically demarcated affective episodes. For this reason, it is the second and broader understanding of affective practice that will be the focus of this chapter.

The concept “affective practice” addresses how affectivity is collaboratively produced. This production can encompass specific affective phenomena, as well as more general bodily processes of affecting and being affected. Crucially, the praxeological perspective on affect involves the ways in which participants in a practice refer to and interpret a particular phenomenon, and how this interpretation, which is always unfinished and open to revision, is accomplished as part of the practice itself. For example, bumping into somebody on the sidewalk could be interpreted as accidental as well as provocative, while an outburst of laughter may be seen as an authentic expression of amusement or as inappropriate behavior. From a praxeological point of view, these interpretations do not necessarily require discursive explication. Rather, they make up an implicit or tacit dimension of the performances in question. In light of this, it is worthwhile to investigate the practical nature of affective categories, including the range of related concepts examined in this volume. For instance, researchers might ask how particular emotional episodes are recognizably performed and distinguished as general cases of “emotion” (emotion, emotion concept). The same goes for publicly distinguishing feelings as feelings, performing atmospheres as atmospheres, and collaboratively producing affect as affect.
A praxeological approach to affect operates under three basic assumptions: (1) Practices are bodily activities. They are thus always already affecting their participants in some way. (2) Practices are inherently public affairs, and their affective dimension is no exception. Therefore, participants make their own continuous affective engagement recognizable and thus meaningful to others, whether participants or bystanders. (3) Practices unfold in a processual manner. To allow for cohesion between their past, present, and future activities, participants need to be able to refer to past meanings of their practice as well as to anticipate future stages of their practice. In the context of meaningful affective performances, participants are continually remaking both given and potential meanings over time. Bringing these three assumptions together leads to a heuristic stance that takes affect as ongoing practical accomplishment. Elaborating on this, the present chapter will first outline a general perspective on theories of practice, highlighting their intersection with theories of affect. These entanglements will then be discussed from two perspectives: one that illuminates the affective dimension of practices in general, and one that treats affective phenomena as practically constituted. Abstracting from the latter, the chapter argues that affectivity itself is a dimension that does not “preexist” within practices, but rather exists as a practical accomplishment in its own right.

An outline of praxeology

Practice theories are a heterogeneous field of study. Attempts at unifying different theoretical approaches have to reconcile different understandings of “practice” as well as deal with “family resemblances,” or theories that are not sorted into the “practice” category, such as actor-network theory or post-structuralist approaches to performativity. For the purpose of this chapter, I will offer the following working definition: Practice theories, just like any other social theory, are interested in the study of social phenomena. In this case, “the social” is taken to be fundamentally “made up” of practices rather than individuals or structures. Practices are understood as embodied, meaningful, and processual performances, which can most concisely be described as “[nexuses] of doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 2012, p. 15). These performances are public in a twofold sense (cf. Schmidt & Volbers, 2011): First, they remain open to involvement, scrutiny, and modification, even from actors not currently involved in the practice. Second, they do not “belong” to a particular entity, such as an actor executing a preformulated plan, but always already involve an assemblage of multiple participants. This assemblage in turn is taken to be organized by relying on specialized infrastructural practices or as part of a practice’s own enactment. The same goes for the recruitment and training of new participants. While this can involve specialized practices of education, more often than not, participants are instructed in the skillful enactment of a practice as it runs its course, making the instruction into a

Practice theories therefore distance themselves from theories of action that presuppose the existence of actors who are supposed to formulate and execute plans according to internal motives. Simultaneously, they reject theories of structure according to which everyday occurrences are more or less “blind” enactments of supposedly underlying and inescapable norms and values. For instance, from a praxeological point of view, the practice of reading is not taken to be the expression of a “reading intent” nor as representative of the structural enforcement of a “reading norm.” Instead, it is to be investigated at face value, as continually and recognizably constituting itself as reading to participants and bystanders as well as in reading by procedurally generating its participants as participants. At a minimum, this would include both the “reader-of-the-text” and the “text-that-is-read.”

This example already indicates how different practices may link together. In the case of “reading a book,” the practice of reading is linked to practices of writing, paper-making, lumbering, publishing, shipping, and so on. Taking the example one step further allows highlighting how practices involve both humans and non-humans and how this involvement may potentially invert common-sense subject–object distinctions. A non-human text may demand submission from a human reader – for example, as the suspension of disbelief – and the writer–text relation may involve significant resistances during text production, also known as “writer’s block” (writing affect). Practice theory is decidedly materialist in that regard. Rules, motives, structural constraints, and other factors normally seen as behind, outside, or invisible to the current situation are only taken into account if and when they can be shown to be part of overt performances or resistance within practices. For instance, practice theory acknowledges grammatical rules only insofar as they are episodically and explicitly invoked, or when they can be reconstructed from observed regularities in practices like reading, writing, and reviewing.

This does not mean that praxeology is naively situational or overly fixated on the present. More often than not, practices involve different participants at varying times and sites who may very well be ignorant of one another (Schatzki, 2002, p. 80). Further, practices are taken to inscribe themselves into their human and non-human participants: the former via absorption into their habitus, the latter via acquiring their status as meaningful sites and artifacts. This allows for the reenactment and routinization of practices as well as for relatively stable trans-situational linkages between different practices. However, this may also lead to ever-changing practical environments that require continuous re-adjustments, or even to the death of a practice altogether.

Praxeological research therefore needs to follow the numerous threads of activities when attempting to sketch a picture of the practices under investigation “in the wild.” This picture includes participants’ own interpretations
of their activity. These interpretations can frequently reveal what seem like paradoxes, discrepancies, and self-contradictions. In cases where active denial of discrepancies is fundamental to the ongoing success of practices and their institutions, such as in judicial decision-making (cf. Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 104–115), this can lead to precarious situations. However, the aim here is neither to dismiss participants’ interpretations as, for example, naive or dull, nor to offer alternative explanations for what is really going on. Instead, they are taken to be integral to participants’ sense-making and therefore part of the investigated activity itself. The core aim of such research is thus to investigate how these interpretations are, quite literally, put into practice.¹

Given that practices are taken to be, among other things, embodied and processual, theories of practice have in a sense always already and necessarily included affectivity in some way or another. But this is not to say that praxeology at large has actually paid much explicit attention to the affective side of sociality proper. Otherwise, there would be no need to reconstruct the implicit affect theories of canonical authors, Pierre Bourdieu in particular (cf. Matthäus, 2017; Scheer, 2017). Within contemporary practice theory, there are two approaches that may shed light on this affectual blank spot: one explores the affective dimension of practices, another conceptualizes affect itself praxeologically. What both approaches have in common is that affect is seen as a public affair. Any supposedly subjective experience of affect is here taken to be far less interesting, if not epiphenomenal, compared to the public performance of affect. The two approaches differ, however, in their conceptualization of affect: as a dimension of practices in general, or as a practice in its own right.

**The affective dimension of practice**

Exploring the affective dimension of practice means highlighting how practices incorporate affectivity, delineating the role of affect in practices. This approach can largely be seen as theoretical. It requires defining affect beforehand, and locating it within theory-specific conceptions of “practice.” For instance, affect can be taken to be part of a teleoaffective structuring of practices. This idea was developed by Theodore Schatzki (1996, pp. 98–102) and outlines one of the ways in which practices may acquire an organizational structure and continuity over time and space. Through an overarching, albeit open-ended and adjustable telos, practices become projective and

¹ This idea is also termed “second order observation,” an observation that observes observances. This idea becomes highly relevant for the social sciences as soon as one assumes that people continuously interpret (observe) their surroundings, and that social scientists therefore ought to investigate (observe) these observations. This stands in opposition to the project of proposing alternative interpretations (observations) in parallel, that would then need to be justified (observed) as somehow “better” (e.g., “more sciency”) than those of their objects of research, that is, people. This latter approach gives rise to further complications since social scientists are people themselves.
“project-like,” delineating a range of possibilities and outcomes. An example would be building a chair when doing carpentry. Affective phenomena serve as qualifiers that are symbolically linked to this telos, continually expressing and confirming the adequacy or appropriateness of current activity. According to Schatzki (1996, p. 101), the extent to which affect is weighted within a practice’s teleaffective structure varies widely. For instance, “building a chair” may be open to such a large variety of affective expression, from the joys of accomplishment to various kinds of frustration, that it becomes impossible to precisely characterize its affective dimension. The same can most likely not be said for “holding a funeral” or “telling a joke.”

Schatzki’s approach of delegating affect largely to matters of style has been pointed out as limited in light of the rich theorizing of affect in recent scholarship. Andreas Reckwitz (2016, p. 165), for example, proposes a deeper intertwining of affect and practice. He does so by invoking an anthropological constant in the form of a one-dimensional bipolar drive structure (Triebstruktur). In his words, humans have a “basic capacity for reactions of desire and aversion, pleasure and displeasure” (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 121). Consequently, Reckwitz understands affects as “states of physical arousal, of pleasure or displeasure, directed at some definite person, object or idea” (Reckwitz, 2017, pp. 118f.). These are taken to be fundamentally built in to practices, thus making any praxeological research that does not take affectivity into account phenomenally inadequate (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 116). From Reckwitz’s point of view, this conceptualization helps further our understanding of how practices create, recruit, and maintain their participants through mechanisms of motivational structure and immediate focusing of attention (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 120).

Still, apart from the debatable idea of a fundamental affective bipolarity, there is not too great a difference between Schatzki’s and Reckwitz’s perspectives on affect. Both authors propose that affect plays an important role in keeping practices and their participants together. Reckwitz (2017) further highlights an important methodical strategy for how to observe the affectivity of practice “in the wild,” which consists of identifying and studying practices that make their

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2 The idea of a unidimensional bipolar organization of affect is proving to be quite resilient in general (for a prominent example within sociology see Collins, 2004) – classical (Freud, 1922) and contemporary (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998) suggestions for more complex models notwithstanding. Given the contested status and definition of affective bipolarity, making it a theoretical prerequisite (as opposed to an empirical phenomenon of affective discourse or discursive practices thematizing affect) seems at the very least questionable.

3 In my opinion, the overt limitations of Schatzki’s teleaffective structure largely stem from a difference in vocabulary. Where Reckwitz speaks of affect, Schatzki (2012) speaks of the ordering of bodily doings and sayings via basic practical understanding, such as “moving one[’s] hands hither and thither” (p. 16) during sorting activity. By undergirding this process with psychological categories of “pleasure/displeasure” and “desire/aversion,” Reckwitz may be specifying things from the outset in a somewhat too determinate fashion.
own affective component reflexively accessible, and therefore, more easily observable. This method can be employed, for example, in studying the architectural production of atmospheres by professional designers or architects (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 124). But it is also here where the line between affect as *dimension* of practices and affect as *accomplished in* practices begins to blur. If affect is, at least in principle, practically accessible, we might assume that the necessary condition of affectivity is always already “practical.” This would allow us to treat affective phenomena as practical accomplishments in themselves.

**Affective phenomena in practice**

Interpreting affectivity as decidedly practical in this sense has two implications. First, viewed broadly, it embeds affect within the contingencies of history and culture. This replaces the debate over any potentially constant properties of affect with the possibility of empirical investigation, and of comparing milieu-specific treatments of affect. As such, it brings the research close to ideas already raised in 1939 by Norbert Elias in his *Civilizing Process* (2000). This makes affect interesting to (post-)structuralist praxeologists who might, for instance, draw on a Bourdieuan vocabulary for quasi-structural phenomena (such as “field” and “habitus”) that arise from practices over time (for an example, cf. Scheer, 2012). However, as Bourdieu (2000) consistently emphasized, these structural abstractions ought to be taken as secondary compared to the primacy of practices. When operating within an emerging field such as the study of affect, it is especially important that a praxeological stance does not skip the detailed scrutiny of affectual activities, as this scrutiny is required to attain a clearer picture of what its research matter may originally entail in the first place. Therefore, I will now focus on the second implication of treating affect as practical: affect as accomplished within situational social activity.

This ethnomethodologically informed perspective has already proven to be fruitful in existing research on emotion. Studies on shame and anger, for example, show how distinct emotional episodes are cooperatively performed and include elaborate interaction sequences that demand full participation from the bodies involved (cf. Katz, 1999) (→ emotion, emotion concept). The view of emotions as practical situational accomplishments has been employed successfully, even when the emotional episodes in question are exceptionally brief and embedded within other activities (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2001). Less salient affective phenomena, such as atmospheres, can also be understood

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4 Ethnomethodology can be regarded as a subset of praxeology, its distinguishing feature being the emphasis on extremely detailed “how-questions” (as in “how does x work *exactly*”). This is already implied by the name itself if read backwards: “Ethno-methodo-logy” as dealing with the *investigation* of the *ways* by which a *collective* produces itself (and *as* itself). An alternative reading should also be mentioned: The investigation of these methods by a collective (ethno-methodology).
Later on, she moves from situated affect toward its “broader, ‘argumentative textures’” in the sense of the societal dimension of affect (Wetherell, 2012, p. 100). This is something Wetherell argues is not well represented in ethnomethodological research in particular. I would counter that attempts for substantial societal representation might even run against “natural” physical copresence and instead handle reciprocal affecting in a different way, foregrounding it in the process (cf. Knorr Cetina, 2009; Wiesse, 2018). At this point it can be hypothesized that this handling of affect is not limited to selected practices but is much more prevalent than it initially appears. Past research has shown how supposedly natural and ubiquitously relevant components of social interaction require participants’ efforts in order to maintain their “naturalness.” Examples include the bodily category of gender (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 116–185, 285–288; see also Butler, 1990) and basic mutual trust in one another’s interactional competencies (Garfinkel, 1963; Rawls & David, 2006). It is not too much of a stretch, then, to view any basic, natural, or self-evident component of social interaction, including the “capacity of bodies to affect and be affected” (Cromby & Willis, 2016, p. 481), as similarly practice-based.

### The accountability of affect

Margaret Wetherell (2012) has proposed an approach to affect that is thoroughly praxeological in that it treats affect in its entirety — not just some aspect or dimension of it — as a practical accomplishment. Discussing affectivity in social situations, she proposes an economical definition of affect as “embodied meaning-making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 4). This opens up an exceptionally wide range of potential praxeological research questions, given that “all social practice is affective because all human practice is embodied and comes attached with some valence” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 96). However, Wetherell leaves the specifics as to what exactly should be regarded as affective to practices and their participants themselves (Wetherell, 2012, p. 98). Here, Wetherell markedly differs from

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5 Later on, she moves from situated affect toward its “broader, ‘argumentative textures’” in the sense of the societal dimension of affect (Wetherell, 2012, p. 100). This is something Wetherell argues is not well represented in ethnomethodological research in particular. I would counter that attempts for substantial societal representation might even run against ethnomethodological and other praxeological research programs themselves or at least require such attempts to be put in the backseat. Assuming the primacy of practice gravitates toward an emphasis on tentative continuity of form, or “constitutive order,” over continuity of meaning, or “aggregate order” (cf. Rawls, 2009; Korbut, 2014). The latter is taken as produced in participants’ ongoing meaning-making, while the ways in which this meaning-making works is the topic of the former.
the theory-rich strategies of Schatzki and Reckwitz. With her approach, social research on affect reflexively acknowledges that it obeys the logic of practice (Lynch, 2001) and thus submits both to its own disciplinary conventions as well as to the conventions of the field being researched (cf. Winch, 2008). In sum, the theoretical definition of affect then involves an empirical question regarding the public definition of affect as affect.

For researchers, this means asking first and foremost how affect is made reflexively accountable by participants in a practice, in other words, how it is made “visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii). What is of interest here is what participants need to be doing that allows a potential “inside observer” to label these activities as affective. This means that the criteria for judging the “affectiveness” of activities are ideally to be taken from participants directly. Where they stem from an outside source (such as researchers), they should either be kept in check by the field being studied or turned into research items themselves. Reckwitz’s (2017, p. 124) suggestion that researchers may identify practices where affect is attended to reflexively makes a first orientation in this endeavor fairly straightforward. Fields as diverse as psychotherapy, political rhetoric, and marketing categorize and reflect upon their own activities as affective. They do so by drawing on their own definitions of affect or modifying definitions from other fields. The critical acknowledgment and continuous empirically based revision of one’s existing research vocabulary for “embodied meaning-making” then serves to go beyond strict participant classifications in specific fields. This, in turn, allows one to uncover the “seen but unnoticed” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36) practicalities of affectivity in everyday life.

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Chapter 12

Affective economy

Hauke Lehmann, Hans Roth, and Kerstin Schankweiler

How do feelings shape our sense of who we – and others – are? What is the role of media in the production and modulation of such feelings? How do these feelings contribute to the emergence and perpetuation of social and political collectives thought of as affective societies? How are affects mobilized to transform and reinvent the imaginaries on which societies draw? These are the kinds of questions that we seek to address through the concept of affective economy. We set out to do so by developing an economic perspective on processes of affecting and being affected. Whereas the term “economy” refers to the totality of production, distribution, and consumption in a society, the concept of affective economy focuses more narrowly on the exchange and circulation of affects through media. In concentrating on the sphere of distribution, this concept builds on an understanding of affect as relational: the starting point for our investigation is not an individual, autonomous subject, but rather the relational forces and entanglements from which subject-positions emerge in the first place. Here, we understand distribution to involve a certain level of collectivity. The term “affective economy” has recently attracted interest in affect studies, especially following the writings of Sara Ahmed. For Ahmed (2004), affective economies are an analytical tool to describe the creation of collective identities. In our understanding, however, such an analysis has to take into account the role of media in order to describe precisely how bodies and ideas become aligned with each other. The following remarks aim at addressing this desideratum.

The central theoretical foundation of our concept of affective economy rests on a distinction between abstraction and bodily experience. The former relates to the abstract sphere of exchange, that is collective affective references (fantasies, scenarios, ideas, imageries, etc.). These are “abstract” insofar as the circulation of affects through media involves an act of abstraction from the subjective qualities of feeling (→ affect). This is not to say that affects here are less concrete or real. What becomes abstracted in this form of comparison and exchange is the individual perspective of a feeling subject. The latter relates to discrete processes of affecting and being affected with regard to bodily experience. These can neither be separated from nor reduced to one another in any
way. Rather, they operate in a dynamic relation of permanent feedback. Affects circulate through multiple media as intensities whose modality is not necessarily fixed. They can be differentiated by levels of energy as well as by characteristics such as a temporal contour or a sense of space. Circulating affects repeatedly become translated and appropriated individually as sensory qualities (→ feeling). These qualities vary on a spectrum of consonance and dissonance. Appropriation in this context refers to the act of making sense of affective experience – of intensity – in the form of a feeling. Only in these appropriations do affects find individual expression, which can then refuel the processes of affecting and being affected. Feelings, as understood here, are not exclusively private, inner states, but are capable of becoming collective through their affinity to and interaction with affective dynamics. This potential collectivity is what accounts for the political dimension of affective economies. By sharing ways of affecting and being affected, a collective can come to view itself as a community. Even when appearing as rather solidified, such a community constantly re-negotiates the terms based on which affective qualities are communicated and exchanged against one another (→ affective communities).

**Affective economies: a political media theory of affectivity**

Our objective is to conceptualize affective processes of collectivization as a question of media and mediation. Herein, we build on certain theories of media economy, which use the concept of economy to focus on the constitutive force (strukturbildende Kraft) of acts of communication and networks of perception (Winkler, 2004). This perspective is not limited to the level of technical devices and processes, but rather supposes that “all contact means exchange, and all exchange is governed by the law of reciprocity, is commercial, whether it be exchange of thought with fact, or of cotton with shoes” (Dewey, 1969, p. 152). We argue that this reciprocal mediation is best understood through an analysis of its inherent affective dynamics. Following this, media organize processes of exchanging and sharing affects; they can also link embodied, individual perspectives to collective ideas, fantasies, and discourses. In this regard, understanding the function of media is indispensable for developing insights into the establishment and perpetuation of power relations. The inclusion of a media dimension also encompasses a historical perspective. Mediated in multiple ways, affects can involve diverse forms that mobilize and modulate feelings, and as such, can refer to their historical context without being fully determined by it (→ Pathosformel). This historical perspective must consider the potential reflexivity and transformation inherent in media. Furthermore, focusing on media opens up an analytical perspective that can be used for the study of diverse media in the narrower sense (e.g., TV, film, internet).
The concept of affective economy emphasizes that processes of affective exchange and mediation are decisive for the ways in which a political community negotiates its terms of agreement and its conventions. It is no exaggeration to state that in recent times these processes have intensified, accelerated, and multiplied through (among other things) globalization, digitalization, and interactions between the internet and traditional mass media. Speaking of affective economies in this sense stresses the close connection between spheres of exchange, politics, and history. Our concept refers to certain theories of political economy that also emphasize this connection, such as Aristotle’s understanding of exchange or Marx’s theory of the value form. Our goal in referring to these theories is not to find the most adequate model for contemporary capitalism. Rather, we are interested in identifying links between economic theory on the one hand and the interplay of media and affectivity on the other. Finding such links will help us to analyze and define the political function of this interplay.

**Historical background and state of research**

Addressing the distribution of sensual intensities as affective economies assumes that affective relations and economic processes have a structural affinity. This affinity is highlighted by a specific interpretation of Western modernity that considers the social revolutions of the 18th century as a radical re-foundation of the circulation of social energy (Koschorke, 1999). In a similar vein, even the implementation and legitimation of modern capitalism and colonialism can be analyzed as a *theory and practice of affect*, since during that period man’s moral sentiments, passions, and desires became associated with questions of public wealth, exploitation, social exchange, and economic calculus in a completely new manner (Vogl, 2004). Situating the concept of affective economy within these simultaneous transformations in cultures of communication, political power relations, economic systems, and physiological sentimentalism does not limit the analytical scope of the concept to social formations of Western modernity, but rather emphasizes the historicity of affective economies. Following this, the rise of the bourgeoisie as the dominant social class in Europe and the formation of the aesthetic paradigm can be understood as deeply entangled parts of the same hegemonic project (Eagleton, 1990).

This dimension of historicity aligns with the conceptual history of affective economies in the work of Sigmund Freud. He addresses relations between concrete experiences and abstract fantasies as a quasi-economic displacement and transmission of affects. For Freud (2001), psychoanalysis is (also) based on what he terms the “economic point of view” that would analyze mental processes as the circulation of energy. In contemporary affect studies, the usage of Freudian concepts is rather uncommon. Freud’s overemphasis on oedipal relations and neuroticism was influentially
criticized by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. However, their criticism does not invalidate an economic model for understanding affect. In their two-volume project on Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, 2004b), they do not question Freud’s economic point of view, but rather seek to radicalize it. For Deleuze and Guattari, the unbound flow of commodities becomes central to the production of desire – both literally and conceptually. Their approach has strongly influenced the development of the concept of affective economies.

Since the turn of the millennium, affectivity and economic principles have been increasingly linked to each other (Ahmed, 2004; Hardt, 1999). We can distinguish between two strands of research, differentiated by their respective use of the term “affective economies.” One approach (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Hochschild, 1983; Massumi, 2015) is concerned with the role that emotions and affects play in contemporary neoliberal forms of working and living. This account claims that postindustrial economies have intensified the uses of bodily potentials, especially affects, in a biopolitical fashion, placing increased emphasis on knowledge, information, and attention. The central epistemological interest of this research is directed toward certain current economic regimes. The second approach describes economic principles in processes of affective exchange. Its main concern is therefore directed toward emerging regularities in affective processes that can be described as principles of economic exchange and circulation. One of the earliest systematic approaches to affective economies in this vein is found in Lawrence Grossberg’s work. As with Freud and Deleuze and Guattari, Grossberg (1997) is interested in the ways “psychic energy” is organized within and by, for example, the aesthetics of television or the affective apparatus of Rock ’n’ Roll concerts. Building on the work of Stuart Hall and cultural studies, he focuses on the potential of affective intensities to empower and thus have political implications. His concept of affective economies therefore enables a differentiated perspective on mass culture and diverse media that does not equalize asymmetries in power, consumer activities, and individual desires.

Ahmed (2004) has, like Grossberg, analyzed the political dimension of affective economies, in particular, the workings of a “politics of fear.” As she demonstrates in her study of right-wing discourses, the circulation of affects and emotions plays a decisive role in performatively defining and demarcating individual as well as collective bodies. The (re-)production of these borders and divisions between individual and collective bodies appears to be a crucial element of affective economies. Building on Frantz Fanon and Judith Butler, Ahmed focuses strongly on the individual processes of embodiment and internalization of such economies of fear and hate. Regarding their collective dimension, however, she follows the assumption that right-wing discourses are driven by a massive accumulation of affects analogous to Karl Marx’s general formula of capital flow (M–C–M').
Reconceptualizing affective economies

The concept of affective economies as understood in this chapter draws inspiration from these research perspectives but develops them further. It does not aim for an analysis of economic phenomena in the literal sense. Instead, its task is to determine how principles of economic exchange and circulation can be constructively applied in the analysis of affective processes. In this context, an understanding of economies as always implying community or polis is especially relevant. This perspective allows one to describe processes of dividing and distributing in “households” (Greek: oikoi) of different sizes and specializations – processes which can also be attributed to the circulation and dissemination of affects. For instance, this happens when one considers the modes of affectivity that structure the genre system of Hollywood cinema, or the communicative dynamics of moral feelings such as outrage or solidarity that characterize the diverse and fragmented publics of social media. Thus, the concept of affective economies works as a powerful core heuristic in researching affective societies.

The term “economy” (Greek: oikonomia, housekeeping) refers to the relation between the individual and her/his oikos – the environment or community to which the individual relates. Addressing phenomena as economic presupposes a minimal degree of socialization or collectivization and stresses the non-chaotic, collectively mediated character of processes of affecting and being affected. Of the realms of production, distribution, and consumption in an economy, it is distribution that emphatically and unequivocally refers to a level of collectivity: although production and consumption are collective processes of coordination and interaction, one could possibly imagine them as individual acts, whereas distribution cannot be construed in this way. Affectivity is similar in this regard: one might trace back the “production” and “consumption” of affects to the sensorium of an individual (even though relational theories of affect have long since deconstructed this naturalization), while the coordination and differentiation of sensations and affects is, by definition, relational and social. The strength of an economic approach toward affect lies in helping us come to terms with this relational and collective dimension of affectivity. Therefore, the task is to determine the forms of exchange in which processes of affecting and being affected take place. How exactly are affects related to each other, how are they mobilized, and what are the social forms that enable this mobilization? What are the functions of bodies, signs, and media in this context? How is it possible for discrete qualities of feeling to become comparable and exchangeable? These questions illustrate the importance of the concept of affective economies, insofar as it places exchange and circulation center stage.

In this context, the distribution or “exchange” of affects is used here in the sense of the Aristotelian economy, in which exchange represents a fundamental category of the social as such. According to Aristotle (2012), the
exchange of goods always implies a form of unity or community, in fact, the exchange itself serves to establish such relations. This is because the comparison between different goods presupposes a common measure, which Aristotle (2012) locates in each exchange partner’s “demand” (V, 8). In this regard, the act of exchange (or the sphere of exchange) is defined by a reciprocal determination of such demands by acts of political negotiation. It is through such reflexive acts that a society can come to regard itself as a political community. Therefore, at least in this context, Aristotle seems to regard exchange and the creation of community as almost the same.

The concept of affective economy, as presented in this chapter, systematically centers this question of political self-reflection through exchange and mediation in the analysis of media. It transposes Aristotle’s idea from the domain of trade, narrowly conceived, onto the mediated and collective forms of commerce that structure the circulation of affects. This conceptualization of the distribution of affectivity as an open and dynamic process is not associated with specific value judgments – the mediation and negotiation of affectivity is neither problematic nor desirable in and of itself. The twofold concept of exchange in Aristotle’s *Nikomachean Ethics* (2012) helps us to avoid these biases; since the exchange of goods results in equality in relation to the demands, we do not need to think of these demands as being fixed. In addition, as only unequal goods can be exchanged in a meaningful way, it is always possible for asymmetries, hierarchies, or antagonisms to emerge. An economic approach to affect takes such processes of affective dissonance into account.

As Ahmed has shown, Marx’s analysis of the value-form at the beginning of *Capital* (Marx, 2004) is particularly useful for this purpose. But whereas Ahmed’s reference to Marx remains more or less metaphorical, we take his theory of the value-form as a dynamic model for the forms by which collective affectivity is mediated. For instance, it remains highly unclear whether the “accumulation of affects” in Ahmed’s conceptualization of affective economies is something specific for right-wing discourses or if it describes the general logic of affectivity. While Ahmed does not have to answer that question in her case study, such an answer becomes possible if we consider the role of media in more detail. Here, a more nuanced reading of Marx provides fruitful insights: The differentiation between the abstract sphere of exchange and discrete processes of affecting and being affected elaborated above rests on Marx’s distinction between “exchange-value” and “use-value” of a commodity, without assuming a strict equivalence between affect and commodity.

Marx’s comments on the forms of commodity exchange can carefully be reformulated as the basis for a theorization of media and affect. First, “exchange-value” addresses the commodity not as singular, but as comparable and therefore interchangeable (*Tauschabstraktion*). By analogy, we assume that abstract affective qualities circulate while retaining the potential to relate to
the sensory experience of individuals. Second, it is interchangeability that constitutes the commodity as commodity in the first place. Therefore, as Spinoza and Deleuze have stressed, affects are always relational.

Marx’s notion of use-value does not imply that things have essential characteristics, but rather refers to the dimension of individual appropriation being performed ever anew under changing conditions. Here, the reference to Marx invites us to understand the act of feeling as a productive activity, as the bringing forth of something (poiesis), although (or precisely because) “feeling” always already refers to a level of collectivity. This abstracts individual qualities of feeling, mediates them and makes them exchangeable. Exchange-value and use-value refer to two dialectically interwoven quantities, which can only be understood in their relation to each other. Again, this parallels the forms of affectivity mentioned above. In a structural analogy to Marx’s analysis of the value-form as an expression of abstract human labor, the concept of affective economy focuses on the forms in which the mediation of affects appears in a social context. This is where it becomes necessary to closely link affect theory to theoretical considerations of media. In Grundrisse, Marx (1973) writes that the abstraction taking place in exchange is necessarily mediated, that is, a value-form depends on a specific medium. The exchange-value is realized as and in the mediation of commodities:

Every moment, in calculating, accounting etc., that we transform commodities into value symbols, we fix them as mere exchange values, making abstraction from the matter they are composed of and all their natural qualities. On paper, in the head, this metamorphosis proceeds by means of mere abstraction; but in the real exchange process a real mediation is required, a means to accomplish this abstraction.

(Marx, 1973, p. 142)

But whereas for Marx money takes the position of the solitary and “general form of value” (allgemeine Wertform), the idea of affective economies that we propose here presupposes a plurality of forms that mediate affects. In line with standard positions in media theory (Luhmann, 1994; McLuhan, 1964), where money is regarded as one medium among others, the “real mediation” of affects is always related to a diversity of generic forms, pathos formulae (Warburg, 1906), and means of expression (→ Pathosformel). As a means of exchange, these forms embody and coordinate social relations, because they “make sense” for a certain collective and emerge from processes of political negotiation. Following Marx, one could call these forms “equivalent forms” (Äquivalentform). The term refers to an ephemeral interim stage in the analysis of the value-form and therefore emphasizes that these forms are always modifiable and somehow incomplete, just like their affective equivalents.
The affective economy of audiovisual images

This theoretical groundwork enables a precise understanding of affective forms of circulation and exchange: affects can take on forms that are abstracted from the feeling self, and can thus circulate in a wider sphere. In processes of political self-reflection these plural forms become structured in different and competing ways of making sense of affective experiences.

For example, the spontaneous connection between an image of ocean and sun (cf. Figure 12.1) and a feeling of relaxation or even freedom cannot be explained through a mechanism of stimulus and response, but has to be situated within interwoven and non-linear genealogies of cinematic images, advertisement, postcards, private holiday photography, songs, stories, personal experiences, and so forth. Such genealogies provide potentially collective forms of exchange in the encounter between image and spectator. Within an aesthetic experience, the affective intensities of color (blue) and light (bright sunlight) may, depending on the audience, become appropriated as a specific feeling of “being-on-holiday,” producing a common way of making sense of this experience. This feeling also corresponds to a specific concept of holiday that is culturally generated and determined.

This, in a nutshell, is an affective economy. On the one hand, there are the abstracted but yet concrete qualities of color and light that are able to

Figure 12.1 Philip Scheffner, *Havarie*, 2016, 1 h 33 m. Courtesy: Philip Scheffner and pong film GmbH.
circulate in a collective sphere of imagination; on the other hand, there is the
discrete event of an encounter between image and beholder where the affective
intensities open up a specific space of experience that is historically and
culturally situated. Within this encounter, a generic form (the image of a
holiday) shapes (but does not fix) the translation of affective intensities into
subjective feelings. This generic form must be understood as an equivalent
form (Marx, 2004) insofar as it structures the modality of feeling (relaxation)
and is the basis for forming an aesthetic judgment of the image.

The schema outlined here lays the groundwork for analyzing transforma-
tions of affective modalities. For instance, the very same image of the ocean
can also be associated with states of uncertainty, existential threat, and radical
isolation. It becomes obvious that such a change is dependent on other
generic forms coming into play. If we take the example of news footage con-
cerning Mediterranean migration, the re-evaluation of the image is entangled
with political developments and the discourse on migration that become sens-
ible as a hybridization of generic contexts and repertoires (→ emotion reper-
toires). In such a complex affective economy of conflicting references, the
process of “real mediation” – between images of the ocean, their sensory
experience, and the collective identities these images are connected to – is
destabilized.

This tension between different ways of making sense is at the core of the
film Havarie (2016) by Philip Scheffner. For this experimental documentary,
Scheffner expanded a short YouTube clip of 3:36 minutes to a feature-length
film of 93 minutes. A tourist on the cruise ship Adventure of the Seas recorded
the video clip with a mobile phone camera. The ship reported 13 refugees in
a small boat in distress at the Mediterranean to the Spanish sea rescue on
September 14, 2012. The camera in the tourist’s hand targets the rolling
inflatable dinghy that appears in the distance as a dark and blurry spot on the
screen-filling sea, moving back and forth with the waves. When the camera
pans toward the ship, it suddenly reveals the standpoint of the videographer.
While the extremely slow motion of the video clip in Scheffner’s film unfolds
frame by frame, we hear a sound collage of radio messages between the
Adventure of the Seas and the Spanish sea rescue, parts of interviews with nar-
rations of personal experiences, and telephone calls. Visually, the film accen-
tuates painterly and graphic effects of pixilation and the play of light on the
surface of the water. In the soundtrack, the dialogue and narration often func-
tion as a kind of meta-commentary on the activity of viewing, for example,
when a seaman talks about poor visibility conditions in the dark fog (while
the image is still filled with bright daylight). His comment “I see that I don’t
see anything anymore” is inevitably related to the image of the ocean where
the refugee boat is only a tiny dot. The soundtrack thus mirrors the audi-
ence’s concentration on the image.

The affective economy of the YouTube clip itself can be described as an
encounter between a play of extreme visual perspectives (sudden changes in
focus, zooming in and out, flattening of the image-space, camera pans, light reflexes on the surface of the ocean) and the perspective of the spectator, understood as an ethical problem (→ affective witnessing). The clip aims to configure the relation between dinghy and cruise ship as a spatial one. It shapes the affective intensities of this encounter on the ocean as a feeling of precariousness and of suspension in space.

In appropriating the clip, Havarie translates this problem of perspective into the dispositif of the cinema, that is, into another regime of audiovisuality, marked by an emphasis on the textural qualities of the image and on the interplay between image and soundtrack. By doing so, the film also resists the affective potential of documentary images of threatened refugees. Rather, it extracts the generic qualities and potentials of the clip’s individual frames by means of extreme slow motion. This opens up a historical space of reflection in the act of watching the film: on the one hand, the picturesque qualities of single frames come to the fore; on the other hand, their graphic, abstracted (i.e., two-dimensional) character is highlighted, for example, in moments when the dinghy disappears from the frame and we see nothing but the nearly motionless surface of the water. This sensual transformation can be analyzed with respect to a genealogy of sea pieces – let’s say William Turner’s light-flooded painting Slave Ship (1840) or Gerhard Richter’s series of photorealistic Seascapes (1960s and 1970s) – or experimental cinematography like Derek Jarman’s film Blue (1993) whose soundtrack similarly unfolds against the backdrop of screen-filling monochrome blue. This is not to say that Scheffner is intentionally quoting these examples or even generic forms. But his film inscribes itself into an affective sphere already embodied by these examples. The slowing down of images in Havarie leads to an accumulation of references the viewer could relate to affectively. However, these references are not equivalent to his/her sensory experience. Therefore, he or she is literally thrown back to his or her role as a spectator – a role that is incommensurable with the plight of the refugees on the small boat.

Conclusion

This short example is meant to demonstrate the productivity of understanding audiovisual images and other works of art as interventions into the political economies of affective societies. The manipulations of temporality and the point of view enacted by Scheffner’s film become recognizable as more than stylistic trappings: they aim at reconfiguring (or at least re-describing) the coordinates of a sensorial and affective regime that governs the way power relations are made meaningful and sensible. As shown in this chapter, our concept of affective economies provides a critical perspective on such powerful affective equivalences and allows for an analysis of artistic interventions in collective imaginaries. Building on Marx’s theory of the value-form, we understand the circulation and coordination of affects as inherently
political. Collective processes of affecting and being-affected tend to sediment historically in generic forms and formulas, which in turn can be appropriated and cross-faded in order to produce various articulations of dissent, commonality or belonging. In an open process of self-reflection, affective economies both reproduce and modify the stereotypes, invisibilities and other asymmetries of power they are built on. Emphasizing this double-bind also leads to a precise, post-romantic understanding of the political potential of art and aesthetics: Where the bourgeois ideal of aesthetic autonomy would complain of a fetishization and industrialization of affects, our economic point of view on affect recognizes that works of art are by no means unrelated to the collective scenarios and fantasies produced by media. Thus, Scheffner’s *Havarie* is an excellent example of an immanent critique of affective economies: The film does not shut itself off from popular culture, insisting on its artistic immunity from the realm of exchange-value. On the contrary: it appropriates and transforms circulating patterns of expression in order to carve out a position from where dissent can potentially be uttered. This position emerges in the affective encounter between audiovisual image and spectator. This encounter is where the imagination of community (Anderson, 1983) and the modulation of subjectivity become realized as a process of affecting and being affected.

While philosophers like Jacques Rancière (2004) have formulated theories about the politics of aesthetics, there is, at present, no comprehensive approach outlining how spheres of politics and aesthetics actually interpenetrate and influence one another – especially with regard to the question of affectivity. Unfolding the concept of affective economy that has been presented in this chapter would constitute a major step toward such a model.

References


“Race” has repeatedly been debunked as an unscientific social construct, yet the virulent persistence—and current resurgence—of racist social phenomena makes it imperative to renew analytic tools for understanding how racialization operates. This chapter proposes “affects of racialization” as a useful conceptual frame for analyzing the various affective processes that racialization entails. Racialization—defined here as the naturalization of social differences along “racial” lines—is a phenomenon deeply embedded in affective logics, practices, and histories. Affects are central to understanding such diverse phenomena as the historical and ongoing colonial politics of dispossession, the ways global environmental upheavals disproportionately target the lands, lives, and bodies of racialized populations, and the current escalation of white supremacist xenophobia at the borders of Europe and North America. While standard approaches to affect theory have not made race a central focus of inquiry, the conceptual frame presented here builds on recent definitions of affect as a relation of power (→ affect) and on Frantz Fanon’s (2008) affect theory, to suggest that racialization is a paradigmatically affective process.

Taking racialization as an exemplary rather than a marginal instantiation of affect highlights certain features of affective processes more broadly. As power relations (Spinoza, 1677/1985, III def. 3), all affects are historically contingent, and reproducible through structural, embodied, and material mechanisms in ways that racializing processes bring into sharp relief. At the same time, like all affective processes, racialization typically comprises a strongly visceral, pre-reflexive, non-conscious component. This can make its operations difficult to detect on the surface, even if its logics are also wrought through overt discourses, practices, and policies as well as cognitive rationales and technologies (e.g., race science, race law, prison-industrial complex). Perhaps most notably, racialization powerfully illustrates the relationality at the heart of affective dynamics. Racialization is never just an isolated emotional state or feeling lodged within an individual human subject or body, but is necessarily a relational dynamic of affecting and being affected that is spatially, geopolitically, and environmentally situated.
As a conceptual term, “affects of racialization” foregrounds this relationality. The term refers simultaneously to the implicitly or explicitly racializing character of the affective relations that predicate or constitute racialized processes, and to the racialized affects that such processes generate, particularly (though not exclusively) in individuals and populations naturalized as inferior or superior along historically embedded hierarchies of ascribed difference. It is thus as much a tool for understanding the structural mechanisms of white supremacist affect as it is for understanding the affective impact of racialization on populations marginalized within white supremacist societies. Thus, “affects of racialization” can be adapted as a framework for analyzing cognate modes of distinction, othering, or exclusion that constitute naturalized regimes of hierarchical inequality along the lines of gender, sexuality, class, indigeneity, ethnicity, or national origin.

This chapter analyzes affects of racialization through the perspectives of history, theory, and environment, respectively. I first historicize affects of racialization as an invention of colonial politics, trace some of its shifts, and consider the ways affect theories themselves have historically been vectors of racialized biopolitics. I then delineate the theoretical contours of the concept by drawing on Fanon’s foundational affect theory, and make a case for treating racialization as a paradigmatically affective phenomenon. Finally, I draw on ethnographic case studies of environmental racism in the Americas, highlighting how racialized affects of belonging legitimate environmental forms of colonial dispossession in the deforestation frontiers of South America, but also how dispossession was upended through decolonial affects of “refusal” in the #NoDAPL movement in North America. I conclude with future perspectives on affects of white supremacy and climate change.

**History**

All affects are historically situated, and affects of racialization are no exception. In this section, I suggest that affective analysis is critical to a historiography of race and racialization and, in particular, to understanding the historical biopolitics of domination and dispossession that continue to generate affects of racialization today. However, I also stress the ways affect theories have themselves been vectors of racialization – a factor that has arguably dissuaded scholars of race and racism from engaging closely with the so-called affective turn (Berg & Ramos-Zayas, 2015).

The concept of race and its affective dimensions merit historicization in their own right. As a European classificatory concept, “race” has been deployed since at least the 19th century to hierarchize human life according to physiological characteristics, imbuing these with emotive, moral, cultural, cognitive, and semiotic significance. Though there is discord as to when the concept arose, most agree that race was invented as a tool of colonial domination. Some have argued that modern understandings of “race”
originates with Spanish colonization in the Americas in the 15th and 16th centuries. The Spanish Crown – borrowing from older religiously defined biopolitical concepts of “purity of blood” – developed an organizing taxonomy to hierarchize the human life it sought to dominate and exploit, and invented classifications, including emotive ones, to distinguish these ranks from each other (Quijano, 2000; Todorov, 1999). Others locate the rise of “race” to the end of the Enlightenment, and to the post-Enlightenment shift from mercantilism to an industrial economy, when the discourses of the “rights of man” emerged alongside scientific studies of human biological difference (as in studies of craniology) giving rise to pseudo-sciences of human distinction and improvability (Wolfe, 2016) and to the consolidation of blood quanta laws (Kauanui, 2008). Either way, it is through colonial politics that race emerged as the organizing grammar through which subjugated peoples came to be classified and dominated, and affective classifications were always a part of this lexicon. It is instructive to consider Hannah Arendt’s (1944) definition of racism or “race-thinking,” which, from an affect studies perspective, already includes what we might call race-feeling. As she defined it, racism is not an exaggerated form of xenophobic nationalism, as many in her day – and in ours – might be tempted to suppose, but rather “the primary ideological weapon of imperialistic politics” (Arendt, 1944, p. 41).

Throughout its history, the concept of “race” has been laden with naturalized affective valuations that have serviced regimes of colonialism, slavery, and genocide. In turn, affective dynamics have been critical to the racialized tools of colonial domination. Yet traditional historiographies have often overlooked affective sites of racialized governance in their work, while the archives of racial violence and resistance are themselves often charged with the affective weight of their own “silenced pasts” (Trouillot, 1995). These silences are best understood in tandem. Ann L. Stoler’s (1995, 2002) work has shown that imperial politics in the European mainlands were thoroughly embedded in the private, domestic, sexual, gendered, and emotional negotiations of everyday life in the colonies. By omitting these archives of colonial affect from their narratives, standard histories of colonial statecraft have obscured how deeply European nation-building in the mainland was dependent on racialized power relations in the colonies. Such historical silencings reproduce affects of racialization today by reinforcing an archive of disavowal. In turn, archival silences produce their own affective scars that continue to inform the way racialization is negotiated by historians of chattel slavery and colonialism. For instance, Saidiya Hartman (2007) captures the painful affective burden of an archival absence that confronted her in Ghana on a faltering historiographical quest to “reclaim the dead” of the Atlantic slave trade that had dispossessed her ancestors of any recorded trace. For Hartman, the affects of archival dispossession – the erasure of life stories, memories, origins – are emblematic of the everyday racial calculus of dispossession that continues to impoverish, incarcerate, and imperil black life.
Affects of racialization are genealogically rooted in long-standing affective imaginaries about racialized populations, many of which were produced by the academy itself. This includes gendered colonial fantasies about the purported desire of the colonized or enslaved populations to be subjugated by their “civilized” perpetrators, as in the Orientalist representations described by Edward Said (1978). It also includes the commonplace stereotypes about racialized populations that, following Enlightenment distinctions, portray subjugated classes as inherently more emotional, corporeal, sexualized, childlike, and instinctual than their more “rational” and adult dominators. These affective stereotypes have had concrete impacts on the everyday lives and political possibilities of racialized populations, and were routinely enacted in policies of imperial nation-state formation and in the legal frameworks of legitimacy and belonging such as citizenship rights, suffrage, property, and claims to land-title.

Academic approaches to affect have also serviced regimes of racialized biopower, or regimes that cultivate the vitality of some while abandoning others to social or biological death. As Kyla Schuller (2018) notes, US race science consolidated a sentimental mode of surveillance in the 19th century that sought to regulate the circulation of feeling throughout the population, and to delineate differential relational capacities of human and non-human matter along a racial hierarchy. Whiteness was ascribed a full capacity for feeling (both sensate and emotional) while the racialized – and especially black populations – were regarded as affectively deficient, a kind of vital matter stuck outside time in the unreflexive immediacy of instinct, and incapable of eugenic improvement.

Affects of racialization reflect the distinct historical modes through which racialization was used as tool to dominate or dispossess particular populations for distinct aims. A comparison between Native American and African American racialization illustrates this point: Whereas black lives were made the fungible property of a system that accumulated wealth from their labor, Native American lives were racially targeted to disappear from their land, whether through genocide or other means. Race law reflected these distinct aims in diverging blood quanta laws. Minuscule Sub-Saharan bloodlines were sufficient to make one black through the “one drop rule,” reflecting the drive to maximize white plantation wealth, while maximal blood quanta were required for one to be considered Native, thus minimizing those eligible to pose a counter-claim to white settler territoriality (Wolfe, 2016). Affects of racialization mirror these histories, resulting in what Tyrone S. Palmer has described as differing epistemological contingencies of how affective “capacities” are inscribed onto different bodies (Palmer, 2017, p. 38). While the black body is ontologically marked by histories of “absolute fungibility,” Native bodies are ontologically marked by regimes that still inscribe them as vanished.

Ulla Berg and Ana Ramos-Zayas (2015) have observed that scholars of racism are understandably reluctant to embrace a conceptual frame that has
itself been used as a tool of racial domination, and that appears at face value ill-equipped to illuminate the material and structural conditions of racialized inequality within white supremacist contexts. This disconnect is so entrenched that it was addressed by the Black Lives Matter campaigns that arose in 2015 after police brutality extinguished 61 black lives in the space of one summer. Though not geared toward academia per se, the Black Lives Matter meme that “Black lives > white feelings” captures widespread frustration with a system that structurally privileges the concerns of white affect over the conditions of black life and death.1 As a working concept and heuristic toolkit that makes “power” a central rather than a marginal focus of inquiry, “affects of racialization” must be able reckon analytically and historically with the silent white privilege that oversights to this discrepancy authorize within affect studies itself.

**Theory**

While it might appear that race studies and affect studies have mutually eschewed a focus on the affects of racialization, I shall propose in this section that Franz Fanon’s (2008) canonical philosophical and psychoanalytic treatise on racialization, *Black Skin White Masks*, is also a foundational treatise in affect theory. Although scholars in critical race theory and related fields – such as Sylvia Wynter (2001) – have written prolifically about the emotional, psychic, and affective stakes of Fanon’s treatise, affect studies as a subfield has not recognized Fanon’s intervention as a foundational and generalizable model for the study of affective phenomena more broadly.2

Fanon’s theorization of racialized experience is paradigmatically affective in several important respects, including its articulation of affective relationality, its reading of affective embodiment as intercorporeal, its understanding of racism’s structural, pre-reflexive, and visceral transmissions, and its historically embedded understanding of these dynamics as a reproduction of colonial power relations. Of particular significance for my purposes is his relational reading of the “affective disorders” (Fanon, 2008, pp. xii, xiv) that are generated by colonial racism and sustained by white normativity. Citing the Négritude poet Aimé Cesaire in his introduction, Fanon (2008) addresses the affects that colonizing and enslaving societies have heaped on the lives of “millions

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1 See the introduction to Schuller (2018) for further reading about the meme’s significance.
2 An exception among commonly cited affect studies scholars is Ahmed’s (2007) reading of Fanon in her phenomenological analysis of whiteness as a bodily “orientation” in space, as I mention below. Meanwhile, it is important to note Palmer’s (2017) persuasive argument that blackness cannot be subsumed under a generalizable analytic of affective racialization due to the historical and ontological condition of absolute fungibility that marks the black body differently than other racialized bodies. While recognizing this specificity, I nevertheless maintain that Fanon’s intervention offers an exemplary model and framework for understanding affective relations.
of men [whom] they have knowingly injected with fear and a complex of inferiority, whom they have infused with despair and trained to tremble like flunkeys” (Cesaire, quoted in Fanon, 2008, p. xi). As he develops his analysis, Fanon (2008) challenges an essentializing interpretation of these predicaments as inherent to black experience, in favor of a relational and structural understanding of conditions he calls “affective erethism” (pp. 41, 130), “affective tetanization” (p. 92), and “the affective ankylosis of the white man” (p. 101), to which I shall return. These are not inward psychic states contained within an individual body or subject, suspended in time and space. Rather, they are activated dialogically by white society, and in particular, by the oppressive normativity of the “white gaze.”

The “white gaze” alludes to much more than the socially and historically constructed status of “race.” It invites the reader into an affective predicament of existential, phenomenological, and political magnitude, pushing beyond Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s raceless phenomenology of the “body schema” to expose the racialized affective power relations inherent to phenomenological experience. This is most powerfully evoked in Fanon’s (2008) well-known anecdote of encountering a white child on the train who beholds the author’s blackness with terror: “Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!” (p. 91). Fanon’s body is hijacked, shattered, and returned back to him in the eyes of the white Other as an affective object of horror. White fear unleashes an intersubjective affect of racialization. His experience as a black colonized body in white French space entirely alters and disrupts the phenomenology of his “body schema,” reducing it to its “historic racial schema” and reconstituting it as an “epidermal racial schema” (Fanon, 2008, p. 92). The affects of racialization then take on a dual nature: not only are they the socio-economic, historical, and structural traces of colonial racism, but they are also affectively embodied in the black person as an alienating “internalization or rather epidermalization” (Fanon, 2008, p. xv) of white terror.

The incident with the child also captures the ways affects of racialization merge visceral, pre-reflexive instincts with consciously reasoned, structural, and historical legacies of colonial racism. This is best highlighted alongside Audre Lorde’s (1984) similarly wrenching encounter with white “horror” as a young girl on the subway, in her essay “Eye to eye: Black women, hatred, and anger.” Without quite understanding why, the very young Lorde slowly comes to grasp that the disgusted gaze of the woman seated next to her must not be directed at a roach or some other vermin crawling between their bodies in the subway – since there is none there – but rather at some ungraspable dimension of her own person (Lorde, 1984, pp. 147–148). By drawing on childhood encounters, these incidents capture two symbiotic sides of racialization’s visceral transmission: one in which a white child reflects French society’s deeply habitual, pre-reflexive colonial racism against the sight of Fanon (his apparaître), and the other in which Lorde’s pre-reflexive experience of her movement in the world as a raceless body, is shattered under the
disgusted and horrified gaze of a white adult. Both cases illuminate the way affects of racialization rely on the internalized immediacy of a visceral and instinctive mode of transmission or reception — or otherwise put, of affecting and being affected.

Commenting on Fanon, Ahmed (2007, p. 153) has noted that such interruptions of his bodily schema by the white gaze also disrupt Fanon’s capacity to orient his body in space, since neutral space itself, he discovers, is white. Such instincts, habits, and phenomenologies of whiteness are collectively and structurally reproduced through recalcitrant power relations that are themselves affectively transmitted. Fanon (2008) captures this recalcitrance in his invocation of the “affective ankylosis of the white man” (p. 101). “Ankylosis” is a medical term for the hardening of joints that have fused into bones. The philosopher Alia Al-Saji (2014) argues that ankylosis gestures to the “stuck affectivity” of racialized imperial formations that hide their workings, and to the unequally distributed impact of the colonial past on the racialized present.

Environment

One of the most provocative and under-explored implications of affect theory for analyses of racialization lies in its potential to illuminate modes of environmental racism, including its repercussions for relational rapport among distinct species and materials. Environmental destruction disproportionately impacts the lives, lands, and bodies of vulnerable populations who have historically been subject to European imperial expansionism and its racialized tools of domination — populations that Mel Y. Chen (2011) has aptly termed “industrialization’s canaries” (p. 276). Impacts are seen in inner city rates of urban toxicity, carcinogenic pesticide contamination among Global South farm workers, climate-induced human displacement (not just South–North, but also South–South) and attendant risk of conflict. As the following discussion elaborates, these impacts are also seen in the ongoing territorial dispossession of indigenous people in the soy frontiers of South America, and at the hands of fossil fuel pipeline construction in North Dakota.

Affects of racialization act as powerful vectors of colonial dispossession in the South American Gran Chaco, where I conducted fieldwork from 2010 to 2014. The Gran Chaco region is currently one of the world’s deforestation hotspots, as agribusiness incursions rapidly swallow dry forests, replacing them with massive foreign-owned soyfields and ranches. Largely driven by wealthy foreign-owned agribusinesses and cattle-raising developments, this vast and rapid deforestation has left an alarming carbon footprint that may be exacerbating local drought and flooding patterns in the region, while contributing to global warming (Baumann et al., 2017). The consequences are shared by diverse local actors in this Global South setting — whether colonized indigenous people, mestizo peasants, or white settler farmers. For instance, soyfield incursions and more extreme weather patterns have contributed to
the collapse of small-scale cotton and farming industries run by settlers. Meanwhile, the disappearance of bushlands and waterways limits indigenous access to these already colonized spaces and resources in particularly profound ways, causing displacements. Yet while all groups are impacted, my fieldwork revealed that local historically embedded racialization schemas influence which local populations are at most at risk.3

An analysis of racialized affects reveals some of the ways deforestation’s impact is unevenly distributed in the wake of a shared destruction. In a post-industrial context, previous racial hierarchies of settler colonial labor and land relations are reproduced through affective rituals of belonging. For example, in one case I observed, descendants of white colonizers who had lost their small cotton industries, successfully petitioned the local government (comprised largely of settler-descendants) to restore a house built by their grandparents whom they call the “first inhabitants” of the land. Relationships to the ancestors were performed through European dances, music and family stories of sacrifice. Inaugural government speeches mimicked this collective sentiment and embodied memory, thus congealing a narrative of this edifice and its surrounding landscape as the affective stronghold of settler founding, despite historic and ongoing settler colonization. By consecrating affects of founding while omitting the colonized, this narrative enacted an ideological reversal of the kind that Ojibwe scholar Jean E. O’Brien (2010) has called settler “firsting” (see also Rifkin, 2011).

Racialized hierarchies also privilege settler ontologies of belonging over indigenous ones, thus reinforcing a structural colonial politics of property and place. An affect-oriented perspective on human–non-human relations sheds light on how this racialization occurs. For instance, my settler informants described the affective pull that this plantation house had over them in animate terms, as a site that drew them toward it, and made them not just remember, but “feel” the presence of their grandparents, physically and emotionally. Some described the charge of this site as different and more powerful than being in a church. The site also evoked feelings in my interlocutors of an inherited connection to the land forged through their grandparents’ and parents’ planting. These narratives recurred in media representations and in government pamphlets, fueling affects of national territorial belonging among settlers in the wake of industrial and plantation loss.

3 The Gran Chaco region was ruled by militarily autonomous indigenous nations throughout the Spanish imperial era, until that control was wrested from them by the emerging nation-states of Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia from the 19th to the early 20th centuries. In the Argentine Chaco, where I conducted most of my research, indigenous people were violently displaced through the early 20th century by state-sponsored settler colonization schemes that granted farmland to white European immigrants, whom they charged with cultivating the uncivilized “deserts” through industry. A racialized labor hierarchy was established in which white small farmers relied on labor reserves of colonized indigenous people, as well as on peonage of mestizo landless peasants and internal migrants.
Meanwhile, this same affective regime discounted indigenous affective ontologies of belonging grounded in bushland relations with deceased human ancestors as well as non-human or more-than-human kin, such as waterways and plant and animal species – all of which are under direct threat due to deforestation (Kwek & Seyfert, 2018). Although these affective ontological bonds have always also been political and territorial ones, local state and non-state actors unsurprisingly do not regard them this way, preferring to consider them – at best – as cultural heritage (de la Cadena, 2010). Indigenous interlocutors in my site were well aware of this double standard, often questioning why their own interspecies relations were dismissed while those in the missionary’s Bible were upheld as doctrine. This discrepancy between politically legitimate ontologies (of the colonizers) and depoliticized ontologies (of the colonized) is grounded in racialized evolutionist creeds that regard Western religious animacies and mythologies as more rational, legible, organized, enlightened, and evolved than those of the colonized, deemed childlike, emotional, instinctual, superstition, and magical.

However, as my second case study shows, the affective politics of environmental racism and dispossession can also be “refused” and retooled to decolonial ends (Simpson, 2014). This was evident in #NoDAPL, the 2016 indigenous-led political movement against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), a $3.78 billion, 1,886 km pipeline transporting over 500,000 barrels of hydraulically fractured (fracked) crude oil per day through the treaty territory of the Lakota Sioux Nation (or Oceti Sakowin). Due to the risk of toxic leaks, the pipeline was rerouted from the mostly white town of Bismarck to the treaty lands and waterways of the Lakota, reflecting widespread incidents of environmental racism against Native, black and Latino water and food supplies in North America (Montoya, 2016). In addition to imperiling the only water supply of the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, the pipeline construction disturbed sacred sites and burial grounds.

#NoDAPL “refused” environmental racism by designing a grassroots social movement in their own affective, political, and ontological terms, and in particular, by articulating their relationship to water and belonging in a manner that elides settler affects of possession and dispossession. “Refusal” as conceived of by Kahnawà:ke Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson

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4 I draw here on Kwek and Seyfert (2018), who usefully outline the ways affect theory can illuminate and expand approaches to the ontological turn in indigenous contexts of animacy, which they term “heterological.” However, rather than focusing on indigenous difference, my own approach to affect here stresses racialized political hierarchies imposed on ontological diversities, which necessarily include the ontologies of the colonizers.

5 I observed and participated in this movement from New York as a non-Native ally, demonstrator, and member of the NYC Stands with Standing Rock Collective (2016), a group of Native and non-Native scholars, teachers, and organizers who planned various Native-led educational actions, and collectively authored the #StandingRockSyllabus.
(2014) is not a form of resistance so much as a mode of abstaining from colonial paradigms and institutions of recognition that are contingent on a denial of Native sovereignty. #NoDAPL chose to frame their cause not only as a protest against a policy that threatens their legal right to safe drinking water within a US constitutional framework, but also as a movement to protect the water from harm, both as kin and as a vital living resource (TallBear, 2016).

Whereas settler state jurisdictions separate treaty rights from broader Native political, philosophical, and relational understandings of waterways as life, #NoDAPL refused that distinction, linking “the protection of Indigenous peoples and treaty rights” with “the protection of the earth and our other-than-human relatives” (TallBear, 2016, para. 1). Thus activists called themselves “water protectors,” described the pipeline as the Black Snake in their protest signs and symbols – a reference to apocalyptic Sioux prophesies that a black snake would one day poison the water before destroying the earth – and the movement’s main rallying cry, adopted in transnational campaigns, was “Mni Wiconi” (Lakota for “water is life”). In response to police militarization of the protest camp, water protectors held affectively and politically enmeshed tribal ceremonies and other rituals of belonging. Their slogans, ceremonies, and tactics pushed beyond an Agambenian “bare life” paradigm of water as a material resource for survival, and toward one of water as both life-sustaining and coterminous with life itself. Such a platform refuses the separation of politics and ontologies that settler governance demands in exchange for rights – even in the context of environmentalist and development programs.

Although the #NoDAPL movement’s aims were ultimately upended by the Trump administration, it was extremely successful at mobilizing a vast Native youth-led campaign that drew celebrity and Veteran endorsements, reached millions online (through Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube), and fueled a cross-sectional coalition of regional and global supporters, several thousands of whom protested on site. It also led to worldwide protests against companies and banks in Europe and elsewhere that were invested in DAPL, some of which divested as a result. It accomplished all this by disrupting the way racialized affects of territorial belonging are framed within the colonial state, insisting instead, on the authority to reconfigure the logic of environmental protection in ways that reclaim the right to a politically, affectively and ontologically textured relationship with their occupied lands. As Kim TallBear (2016) noted, an attempt to “eliminate our relations with these lands” is also an attempt to “eliminate Indigenous peoples from these lands” (para. 4).

6 Divestors included the Norwegian bank DNB, the Norwegian mutual fund Odin Fund Management, and the city of Seattle which divested its contract with Wells Fargo, a DAPL lender (Wong, 2017).
Outlook

There are numerous future perspectives that merit attention from scholars of affect and racialization, however I will highlight only two here. First, the vigorous flourishing of white supremacy and white nationalist forms of populism in Europe and North America at the time of this publication, makes it imperative for scholars to develop new tools for examining the affective mechanisms of racialization in general, and of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim forms of white supremacy in particular. White supremacy is understood here not only as an overt ideological or political allegiance to the notion that white people are racially superior and must dominate over non-whites, but also to the more covert, structural, and systemic manifestations of supremacy that permeate European and Euro-settler societies. Western nationalism – including its populist variants – are embedded in the same racialized histories of imperial domination as the affects of racialized abjection discussed in my reading of Fanon above. Nevertheless, affects of racialization have not been a central focus of research on the emotionally charged and highly mediatized resurgence of racial xenophobia today.

This may be due to the status of “race” as a questionable sociological category of analysis, particularly in European social sciences. There is a tendency to frame white supremacy as a subset of populist extremism arising in the wake of neoliberal deregulation, shifts in the global economy, weakened welfare states, post-Fordism, and other socio-economic factors. However, without taking affect and emotion into account, such socio-economic explanations risk oversimplifying at best – or discounting at worst – the staunchly racialized character of both new and resurgent forms of right-wing populism. Scholars of affect can contribute an important set of tools for understanding these conjunctures by placing racialization and white supremacist affect at the center of their analysis. In particular, new methodological designs and theoretical frames must be developed that account for the relational, phenomenological, and historically situated character of these trends. One recent example of an innovative methodological approach is Nitzan Shoshan’s (2016) ethnographic study of right-wing extremism among German youth, which found that liberal governance fostered publicly mediated affects of hate that minimized the effectiveness of anti-extremist educational strategies.

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7 As W. E. B. Du Bois (1903) famously noted over a century ago, it is not blackness that accounts for racialized experience, but rather the “color line” and the thriving institutions of white supremacy that sustain it.

8 A number of scholars have written about related topics that are helpful for developing such an approach. For example, Ghassan Hage (1998) has explored national fantasies of white supremacy in Australia, Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) has studied the emotional life of right wing voters in middle America, and Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve (2017) examine the emotional dimensions of right-wing populism in Europe. None of these approaches specifically examines the role of affect in racialization processes.
Second, as I have argued in the case studies above, affect studies scholars can contribute to understanding the material and embodied consequences of environmental racism, as well as the racialized affects generated by climate change. As noted above, many of the global environmental concerns of our day disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, who are often those who already historically paid the price for industrialization’s advances with their lands, bodies, and lives. Fossil fuel extraction, deforestation,inner-city rates of lead poisoning, contaminated water supplies, and carcinogenic pesticides among Global South farmworkers are but a few examples. There is a growing need for scholarship that considers the embodied affective worlds that these modes of environmental destruction and dispossession yield among historically racialized and colonized populations. A current example of such a perspective is developed by Vanessa Agard-Jones (2014) who considers the affective and sexual body politics of France’s pesticide dumping in its former-colony and current French territory of Martinique, where EU-prohibited crop-dusting practices were for a time authorized through waivers that were not granted on the French mainland. Affective perspectives are also needed for a fuller understanding of the racialized impacts of climate change on such phenomena as drought, flooding, and wildfire, changing interspecies relations, weakened economic and political infrastructure, heightened risk of war and social conflict, as well as the various kinds of displacements and disposessions these engender.

Finally, affective analyses of racialization can challenge us to develop a more intersectional understanding of how the phenomena above are intertwined. The climate and migration “crises” in the news are enmeshed in affective histories, afterlives, and silencings of racialized colonial domination. Such affects have been illuminated but also obfuscated or reproduced through academic theories. And they may be overturned, inflamed, or retooled in unexpected ways by social movements across the spectrum. As climate-influenced conflict and displacements reach the barricaded shores of increasingly populist wealthy nations, we cannot afford to ignore the racialized webs of affect and power that have steered these tides.

References


Witnessing an event is an intensity of experience that is not only linked to proximity but insists on the relationality of the witness and the witnessed. To bear witness means not only giving an account of this experience and making the incident accessible to others, but also entails affecting and being affected (→ affect). To bear witness is to be brought within the intersection of the political and the ethical and in doing so to be affectively entangled in a complex web of relations. Yet this affectivity is often elided or relegated to the background in political philosophy and critical theory. Affective witnessing, then, provides a new paradigm for understanding all witnessing as inherently relational and bodily. At the same time, affective witnessing also describes a particular mode of witnessing in which what is witnessed is affect itself. New forms and practices of media witnessing in the era of social media have brought this specific mode to new prominence. As a result, the proliferation of new media technologies has made it increasingly important to understand witnessing in this way. Not only does each of us hold the potential to bear witness, but pervasive smartphones enable others to become co-witnesses, obliging us to capture events to be witnessed in other times and places. There seems to be an increasing willingness to connect with others through sharing testimonies, for example through social media and into wider media networks. Yet media in general and social media in particular has the capacity to produce, transmit, and regulate affect, such that acts of witnessing rendered into testimony circulate with varying speed and intensity. As the temporality of witnessing blurs – the time of the event, the time of viewing, the times of circulation – so too do its affective dynamics. All this has consequences for what witnessing does, for the production of veracity and for the formation of witnessing communities.

To illustrate how affective witnessing works in the analysis of events and images, we put three bodies of images in relation to one another. First, the infamous images from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where US soldiers tortured and abused detainees, reveals how images entangle viewers in a relation of witnessing. From there, we show how affective witnessing in the wake of Abu Ghraib produces different ethico-political responses in two resonant
Affective witnessing yet unrelated instances from 2016: the abuse of juvenile detainees at Don Dale Youth Detention Centre in northern Australia and “selfie protest” images originating in response to the suffocating conditions for prisoners in post-revolutionary Egypt. Separately and together these instances of witnessing torture, prisoner abuse, and political protest show how affective witnessing provides crucial depth and nuance for understanding testimony. Tracing the affective dynamics of acts of witnessing mediated through digital imaging technologies, this chapter develops a robust conception of affective witnessing suited to the networked terrain of contemporary culture and politics. In doing so, we make clear that affective witnessing is a crucial cultural practice within affective societies.

Witnessing theory

Witnessing and testimony are entangled concepts: witnessing designates the act of bearing witness and of experiencing an event, while testimony is a product of witnessing, a directed, motivated, and necessarily subjective account of the event. Thus, not every act of witnessing leads to testimony, but every testimony relies on witnessing. Nevertheless, the boundaries between witnessing and testifying easily blur and both terms are often used interchangeably or in tandem. Witnessing today is often understood as a practice that already and inevitably positions and produces the witness as a moral and political subject. Since the 1980s, theories of witnessing and testimony and the processes of subjectification they entail – have been largely developed in response to the Holocaust (e.g., Felman & Laub, 1992; LaCapra, 2001). As Annette Wieviorka (2006) points out, the Holocaust as an historical event has led to the largest number of testimonies in the 20th century, proliferating across media forms to form a still-incomplete “movement” against oblivion (p. xi). Indeed, as witnessing theorist Michal Givoni (2011) points out, the Holocaust survivor-witness played a central role in canonizing testimony “as the subversive idiom of oppressed and subaltern groups and as the primary medium of moral sensibility towards victims of atrocities” (p. 147). More recent scholarship has centered on the role of media and mediatization, pointing out that globalized media technologies make witnessing an almost commonplace mode of relating to the world (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009; Peters, 2001; Vivian, 2017).

Despite this apparent ubiquity of witnessing, the figure of the witness is neither homogeneous nor uncontested. Didier Fassin (2008) has differentiated between the allegedly neutral “third party” witness of the court (testis), the survivor-witness (superstes) and the blood witness (martyr) who testifies through death. Lilie Chouliaraki (2006), Luc Boltanski (1999), Wendy Kozol (2014), and others have questioned the distinction between witness and spectator, particular in the context of mediatized encounters with suffering that drastically limit the capacity for action. Sibylle Schmidt (2017) and Verena
Straub (2019) have examined the specific and often overlooked case of perpetrator-witnesses, which further complicates the moral and ethical issues of both the act of witnessing and figure of the witness in general. For the most part, affect and emotion play implicit roles in these writings. For example, in Fassin’s taxonomy the *superstes* is affected by what they have experienced and therefore subjective, while the objectivity of the *testis* is founded on their lack of emotional investment. Our conception of affective witnessing makes this implicit role explicit and in doing so brings affect and emotion to center stage.

**The concept of affective witnessing**

Affective witnessing updates this corpus of theory to account for both the centrality of affect and emotion to witnesses and witnessing *and* their inherent relationality. It stresses the body in its dynamic relationship to other bodies (human or non–human) as central to witnessing. In other words, the focus on affect acknowledges witnessing as both social and embodied. Conceptually, affective witnessing meets the challenge of understanding and analyzing contemporary testimony by recognizing and insisting upon the intensive relationality of the witness, the witnessed and their co-witnesses. Witnesses, after all, always bear witness to *something*; they testify to *somebody*. To witness an event means becoming responsible to it (Peters, 2001). This is an affecting experience, even if the intensity and register changes based on the specific contours, textures, and positions of any given encounter. On one level, then, witnessing is an encounter like any other, one in which bodies, environments, and happenings are affectively entangled in webs of relations, materialities, and matterings (Gregg & Seigworth, 2010). But as testimony theory has shown, witnessing is also necessarily bound up with questions of obligation, morality, and action (Oliver, 2001). Indeed, this inherent and constitutive affectivity of witnessing entails recognizing that witnessing is always on the brink of becoming political, of shifting from the moment of the event to its proliferation through the body politic (Massumi, 2015). Affect is at work in multiple ways: not only in the affectivity of the experience of witnessing, but in the witnessing of affect itself – of intensities and forces and encounters – and in the circulation, reception, and response to witnessing that becomes testimony.

Witnessing always entails media and mediation (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009, p. 1). At the most basic level, the human body of the witness as the central agent of witnessing can be thought of as a medium in the broadest sense. More substantively, the question of mediation becomes central when considering the relationality of witness and co-witnesses, even more so if we take the whole set of media testimonies into account that have gained omnipresence in contemporary networked and mediatized societies. Now we live in “an era of becoming a witness” (Givoni, 2011, p. 165), one in which the
modes, forms, capacities, and potentials of bearing witness are rapidly changing (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2014). New devices, cameras, and sensors make possible the transmission and circulation of witnessing in the event of its occurrence, bringing the body of the witness in the face of the event into mediated spaces of accessibility that enable proliferating relations of witnessing to flourish. Technologies such as these have also rendered witnessing increasingly visual, such that today witnessing often produces image testimonies (Schankweiler, Straub, & Wendl, 2019). Police body cameras, smartphones, live streaming platforms, social media’s pluralization of voices and lethal drone strike footage uploaded to YouTube: these and countless other new sites and techniques of witnessing feed into the mediatized activism of the protest movements in the Arab-speaking world, Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movement, simply to name some of the more well-known examples.

Consequently, media witnessing can not only dominate the event itself, the very logics of events can be shaped by their immediate mediation through eyewitnesses, such that mediation becomes an inherent quality – or even purpose – of the event. Mediation acts to capture, coalesce, and modulate the intensities of witnessing. Its affectivity is the currency of its passage, the charge that sets images, videos, and stories circulating in the digital and enables older forms of witnessing to also remain vibrant and find new avenues for expression and transmission. Now more than ever, corporeal and technological practices, tools, and techniques of witnessing are increasingly co-composed: entangling, converging, and diverging in unexpected ways (Grusin, 2010; Chow, 2012; Kember & Zylinska, 2012; Allan, 2013; Murphie, 2018).

To encounter the witnessing text – the testimonio, the image testimony, the event of witnessing captured in media – is to be opened onto the capacity to be affected, to becoming co-witness. Yet this capacity of media to generate and circulate affect (Gibbs, 2001; Papacharissi, 2014) (→ affective economy) means that the economies of meaning within which witnessing takes place are also increasingly affective, transitory, and contested. The practices, processes, and forms of mediation that enable the vitality, intensity, fluidity, and accessibility of witnessing today are also exactly the forces that can place witnessing under duress. If we are indeed in the era of becoming a witness, we are also in the era of contestation over the very grounds of truth, which can itself play out in the struggle between competing witnesses. Witnessing can even constitute modes of relating to events that did not happen with the force of responsibility (Richardson, 2018).

Because of the inherent relationality of (affective) witnessing, bearing witness never concerns only a single body. There is always a potential collective involved (→ social collectives). Processes of collectivization take place on several levels. First, on a very basic level, a witness always needs a (co-)witness; the martyr for example needs someone who bears witness to his or her death. However, bearing witness in general is a specific way of addressing others. “The
encounter with an other is central to any conception of bearing witness,” write Guerin and Hallas (2007). “For a witness to perform an act of bearing witness, she must address an other, a listener who consequently functions as a witness to the original witness” (Guerin & Hallas, 2007, p. 10). Second, and connected to this, a witness most often testifies out of a responsibility he or she feels, and this responsibility is generally directed toward others (Givoni, 2011, p. 148). Thus, testimony points to an (assumed) community and its identity, an identity that can be enacted by the witness’s expression of belonging to one group or another in the act of giving testimony. If we understand bearing witness as sharing ways of affecting and being affected, witnessing and testimony constitute a “we” that transforms a collective into a community, often against another community of “them” (for instance victims against perpetrators). Third, testimony seldom arrives alone or stays that way for long. Testimonies provoke further testimonies, whether accompanying or countering. Collected and archived, such as at Yale’s Fortunoff Archive for Holocaust Testimonies (established in 1979), testimonies can constitute a movement of accumulating witness statements, preserved to account – however incompletely – for what happened. Or, in more recent protest campaigns like Black Lives Matter (since 2013) against racially motivated police violence in the United States or #MeToo (since 2017) against sexual assault and harassment, testimonies circulate so swiftly and widely that they become the locus for further testimony, producing co-witnesses who might become activists, affected so intensely that they become responsible to events beyond and before their immediate world.

Affective witnessing calls attention to the complex temporalities of witnessing. When an event is witnessed, the act of witnessing immediately transcends the event. As Derrida (2000) writes, “the singular must be universalizable; this is the testimonial condition” (p. 41). Thus, bearing witness means that a singular and unique moment in space and time will become repeatable in other spaces and times. For Frosh and Pinchevski (2009), this “repeatable singularity” is exemplified by the mediatized spectacle of 9/11, which spread through the media sphere in an unstable corpus of images, footage, firsthand accounts, and political statements (pp. 7ff.). Thus, witnessing and testimony bring about a “spatial and temporal extension” (Frosh & Pinchevski, 2009, p. 8). Testimonies can circulate detached from witnesses across time and space, opening up new affective dynamics and appropriations. Hence, while the mediatized testimony might be repeatable, the unique experience is not – whether of the event itself or the encounter with testimony. To encounter again and again the event through media – whether in print or social media or simply in the voice of the witness – is to re-encounter it, with its intensity damped, amplified, or changed depending on the specifics of body and context (→ affective arrangement). In the most fundamental sense, affect itself is inextricable from time: it can never be static or reified, but always occurs in encounter. Attending to the affective, embodied, and relational dimensions of witnessing means bringing this temporality to the
fore. It means attending to the unstable, changeable, and transformative qualities of bearing witness and the way in which an event moves our bodies can vary far more than the semantic content of any given testimony might suggest.

**Affective witnessing as analytical framework**

The value of affective witnessing as a conceptual framework can be illustrated through the analysis of images of political violence. We put three bodies of images in relation to one another in order to trace the dynamics of affective witnessing as they emerge, change, and exchange intensities across these differing contexts. In doing so, we demonstrate the complex, and at times blurred, positions occupied by witnesses, co-witnesses, perpetrators, victims, and bystanders, as well as the role of mediation in the circulation and transmission of acts of witnessing and image testimonies alike. Here, too, the significance of related concepts such as affective economy and affective resonance becomes clear.

To begin, consider the infamous photographs from Abu Ghraib: naked prisoners stacked in pyramids as guards posed with upturned thumbs, or leashed like dogs, or forced to masturbate, or dead in a body bag with a smiling woman’s face above them (see Figure 14.1). Witnessing plays out on multiple levels: the victim who functions as the witnessing figure of the

![Figure 14.1 Abu Ghraib’s Hooded Man, digital photograph by Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick, 2003. PA Photos / AP, 24 October 2003.](image)
martyr, the perpetrators who are also eyewitnesses, and the co-witnesses who see the images after the fact. These are images in which affect is an essential element of what is witnessed, but also images that trouble the status of the witness and make clear the affectivity at the heart of witnessing’s injunction to act. Separately and together, the Abu Ghraib images bear witness to affective relations between bodies – physical contact, relations of power, expressions of distress, and so on – but also radically varied capacities to act. It is not simply the content of the images in a symbolic or representational sense that gives them their force, but rather the way in which they capture affective dynamics in their arrangement of faces, bodies, and environments. While the photographs were taken as souvenirs or mementos rather than to document what happened, they nonetheless position the perpetrators as witnesses as well as abusers (Richardson, 2016, p. 79). The images place us, the viewers, in the uncomfortable position of seeing through the eye of the perpetrator’s camera and thus caught in an affective economy of witnessing that begins with the images being passed around the prison on CDs until they found their way to investigators and the press, who iteratively mediated them: broadcast on 60 Minutes, printed in newspapers and magazines, circulated online.

To see these images is deeply affecting – an act of witnessing that provokes bodily sensations of uncomfortable proximity to the violence itself. As Anna Gibbs (2007) writes, “we have felt the horror of the Hooded Man image before we have time to make sense of what we have seen, never mind analyze it as an iconographic artifact” (p. 130). These images are entangling in ways that are not incidental but rather are fundamental to their capacity to bear witness. This “visual archive circulated – and continues to circulate – in complex, increasingly untraceable movements,” leaving their affective remnants settled in the skin of their co-witnesses, lurking in the background of contemporary networked culture (Richardson, 2016, p. 80). While the intensity with which these images function draws on a long history of images of violence and abuse, the global distribution, digital dissemination, and enduring influence of the Abu Ghraib images shows that affective witnessing connects in important ways to the more generalized concept of affective economy (→ affective economy).

A similar troubling of the position of the witness is evident in the footage and images of abuse by correctional officers at Don Dale Youth Detention Centre in Australia’s Northern Territory from 2010 to 2015 (see Figure 14.2). Smartphone and CCTV video obtained by the Australian current affairs program 4 Corners reveals how Indigenous and other youth had been tear-gassed, stripped, beaten, and shackled, hooded and shirtless, to a chair (Meldrum-Hanna, 2016). The functioning of Abu Ghraib as a repertoire for affective resonance is clear: the use of hooded masks, the postures, even the grainy texture of the images are resonant with the ethico-political intensity that demanded response. A shock to conscience on their own, the photographs of Don Dale obtain an amplified, focused intensity in their testimonial
force through the mediated circulation of that affective resonance (→ affective resonance). Like Abu Ghraib, the Don Dale imagery bears witness with an affective forcefulness that remains potent despite the events themselves occurring at least a year prior to their release. Unlike Abu Ghraib, these are moving images: smartphone video and CCTV footage that captures the processes of shackling, tear-gassing, beating, and so on in time and motion. The handheld footage is rich in affect in different ways: the rapid movements of bodies, excited voices, the camera at times tilting unsteadily away from the action to focus on walls and floors. In these aesthetics, what one witnesses is the intensity of excitement with which the eyewitness is affected. While this footage refigures the perpetrator as witness, much of the video is CCTV footage with the high, static point of view that lends such recordings a non-human dimension (Richardson, 2019). This surveillant quality of the image testimonies channels the affectivity of how they bear witness: their forcefulness in enabling viewers to become witnesses is bound up with the affects of impartiality and veracity that accumulate around the apparent objectivity of the CCTV camera as the mediating technology of the event.

In our third illustration (Figure 14.3), affective witnessing enables the analysis of the formation of communities of witnessing. The selfie protest that circulated on social media under the hashtags #IWantToBreathe and #SuffocatingPrisoners started during a heatwave in Egypt in mid-May 2016 (Schankweiler, 2016). People posted selfies with a plastic bag pulled over their head, as a symbol of the inhumane conditions in the country’s prisons that have no air conditioning.
This staging immediately recalls torture and the images of the torture scandal in Abu Ghraib. At the same time, this body–related protest symbol is a means of increasing the images’ affective dynamics. They stimulate discomfort that appears to be bodily transmitted when viewed. Yet, the affective dynamics at play cannot solely be explained by this, it is in part their relation to the Abu Ghraib images and genealogies of other torture images that accounts for and shapes their affectivity. As a practice and politics of affecting, selfie protests are a very specific form of testimony in social networks. The persons taking part in such campaigns are not necessarily eyewitnesses of the injustices they are revolting against. They are defending the rights of others (and their own) by presenting their bodies as a kind of testimony. These image testimonies are then shared to connect with others and produce feelings of communality and solidarity. Yet people might take part for very different reasons, out of various contexts, attitudes, and political convictions. Thus, the selfie protests above all bear witness to the participants being affected. It is affect that constitutes belonging to a community of protest as an affective community (→ affective community). Witnessing, especially when unfolding on social media, needs to be defined as a collective and relational practice with the effect of forming these communities on the basis of affecting and being affected.

**Future directions**

Affective witnessing constitutes a significant revisioning of witnessing theory and, as such, opens up a number of important lines of inquiry. What might be revealed in the comparative analysis of different modes, forms, and arrangements of affect that emerge, change, and recede in witnessing? What relationship might there be between political action and witnessing communities? To what extent is it possible to bear witness to events that never took place yet are affectively experienced? And what, in turn, might affective
witnessing tell us about the affect studies and affect theory more generally? While this short account offers little space to pursue these and other questions, some gestures toward key lines of inquiry are possible.

As has been argued, image practices and politics in social media have significantly intensified the affective dynamics of image testimonies that are circulated in “real time” on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and the like. The role of these new “mediators” of witnessing is not yet explored. Likewise, the specific aesthetic qualities of image testimonies that most matter for experiencing and for processes of affecting are another field of potential investigation (Schankweiler, 2019). New technologies and possibilities of circulating testimonies also seems to topple one of the foundations of witnessing and of establishing credibility and trust: the identifiable human witness who presents her/himself to others. On social media, many testimonies are anonymous, and the ones bearing witness are not even visible, they are behind the camera, not in front. It is not yet understood what this means for witnessing.

In addition, affective witnessing also offers the potential for nuanced examination of the relationship between material objects and witnessing. At issue here is whether non-human objects bear witness or if objects can only ever have the status of evidence. If, as much testimony theory insists, witnessing is confined to the human and merely mediated by various technologies, then autonomous and semi-autonomous technologies (drones, remote sensors, artificial intelligence software) are simply vehicles – mediators – of events and not themselves witnesses. Yet if what constitutes the body – any body – is the capacity to affect and be affected, to be webbed in relation to other bodies and to experience the world as it changes, then perhaps non-human objects can become bodies that bear witness.

Finally, affective witnessing contributes a deeper understanding of the political dimensions of affect to the wider field of affect studies. In revising witnessing theory to account for the relational and affective, it brings the question of affect itself into some of the essential questions of political theory regarding issues of responsibility, ethics, action, and truth. In doing so, it demonstrates that the politics of affect are neither marginal nor absent from affect itself. Rather, affect is in fact intrinsic to the political and to figures, practices, and processes out of which political theories, orders, and institutions are formed.

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To think of “writing” as a key concept of affective societies means to think of writing as an affective practice that unfolds between writer and written text. From this perspective, affect is embedded within writing as a dynamic and relational process between actors and a highly complex framework of linguistic norms and rules, different types of texts, and their readership. This process is reciprocal, and involves the activity of speaking and writing as well as the bodily dimension of both writing and language. The affectivity of written language forms the body and vice versa. In this sense, “writing affect” always has to be understood as “affective writing.” This conceptualization of affect counters the strong notion of representation in literary studies; affect is not simply a result of writing, but rather, part of the writing process itself.

Writing – and particularly literary writing – has historically been both a bodily activity and a concept. Writing is a material form of “doing” embedded in certain social and cultural patterns, a formative process of subjectivation, and sometimes even a way of life (Sigmund, 2014). Within enlightenment discourse, it is a concept that emphasizes the primacy of the written text and the modern author. Writing is thus a “doing” that is informed by historical discourses (Schatzki, 2017).

The concept of writing is affectively charged for several reasons, not least because of its importance within literary history and the processes of canonization and standardization. In particular, it is strongly inflected by gender bias; beginning with the emergence of modern authorship since the 18th century, writing has been shaped by notions of male originality and uniqueness (Koschorke, 2003; Kittler, 2003). Additionally, it contributes to the notion of a pure and standardized written language and the emergence of the monolingual paradigm around 1800, itself a gendered discourse (Yildiz, 2012). Since this period, literary writing has relied on the idea of possessing one true language, the so-called mother tongue that is supposed to express and represent affect and emotions authentically.

Although this chapter cannot elaborate on the history of writing in more detail, it is important to note that analyzing “writing” as a key concept of affective societies requires an awareness of its entanglement in a number of
fields, ranging from education, schooling, bodily techniques, and conceptions of spoken and written language, to the invention of monolingualism (Gramling, 2016) and other processes of standardization. All these institutions, techniques, and processes provide the groundwork for modern literature, the rise of the public sphere, and the modern nation state, and form a key part of the historical, social, and normative framework in which writing as an affective practice is situated.

**State of research and related concepts**

While there is extensive research on the history and techniques of writing in literary and cultural studies (Campe, 1991; Stingelin, 2004; Zanetti, 2012), only a few studies have addressed writing within the field of affect studies. Writing in the making is difficult to analyze, and literary critics tend to deal with a written text without interrogating its bodily dimensions. In German literary studies in particular, there is almost no research on affect studies. However, the last two decades have seen an evolving debate on the “affect of language” (Riley, 2005) and the relationship between affect and language driven by feminist and queer theoretical approaches to performativity (Sedgwick, 2003; Berlant, 2011). These works have substantially influenced scholarship that seeks to integrate affect and language (Fleig & Lüthjohann, in press) as well as affect and narrativity (Breger, 2017), even as the search for affect in literary studies has so far mostly drawn attention to textual representation. Such approaches in literary studies operate within the broader framework of New Historicism thinking of affect in terms of discourse, wherein literature is a particular kind of discourse. This interpretive approach to affect reproduces the simplistic divide between textual representation and reality while dismissing affect in spoken and written language. But, as Heather Love (2013) has provocatively stated, New Historicism has “run its course” (p. 402), and thus there is new room to think of the relationship between affect, language, and writing in touch with the “real.” This may entail, for instance, studying these relations in their social and cultural contexts and with regard to the historical conditions of their production, and analyzing literary writing and literary texts as affective and social practices. Further research on “writing affect” could thus profit from two different theoretical approaches. The first relates to affect theory, the second to practice theory. Both allow for processual thinking. However, neither provides a profound conceptualization of language beyond discourse.

Affect is the dynamic relationship between bodies, including the interweaving of bodily memories, words, and worlds. In writing, affect unfolds between the writer’s body and the written text. In the Spinozan/Deleuzian branch of affect theory, this movement is dual: it is formative of and transformative for the writer, as well as the process itself (Slaby & Röttger-Rössler, 2018). If affect is always about “affecting and being affected,”
writing affect is about writing and being written. Literary writing in particular therefore demands “an involvement that may go so far as to challenge the fixity of our own bodily limits” (Gibbs, 2006, p. 159). Affect not only forms part of the process of writing, but might even change and transgress it in moments of flow in which body and word as well as corresponding words find each other.

Thinking of writing in terms of change and transformation raises the controversial question of how affect and language are related to each other. While language occurs in speaking and writing, writing transforms different genres of speech into texts. Because of the bodily dimension of both speaking and writing, and their dialogic relationship in what literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1981b) calls a “speech situation,” this process of transformation is reciprocal. According to Bakhtin, language is a social phenomenon that has no “author.” Rather, it unfolds in a dialogic manner between the writer’s body and the written text, which speaks in different genres and voices, and in which the writer’s voice is one amongst many. Words and sentences are thus not only conventional, but also individual in their specific context. With regard to affect, this holds true for the concrete material as well as the discursive level of writing. Still, as Theodore Schatzki (2017) has recently pointed out, we must attend to how relationships and transmissions between practices and discourse are organized (p. 129).

Given the dearth of research on the relations between and within affect and language, it does not come as a surprise that scholarship on the topic initially emerged from a field between theory and creative writing (Gibbs, 2006) as well as from writing as a concrete strategy for affect analysis (Knudsen & Stage, 2015). In this context, Anna Gibbs highlights writing as a relational and dialogic process. According to Gibbs (2015), affective writing as a method in academia refers “to the process of making sense of the research” (p. 222). Crucially, “making” – or “doing” in terms of practice theory – transforms a situation and operates directly on the body (Gibbs, 2006). This means that writing is not only a way of representation after the research is done, but is a central part of the research process itself (Gibbs, 2015, p. 222).

Gibbs’ concept of writing allows us to think beyond performativity to interactivity (cf. Gibbs, 2006). It emphasizes the active act of listening to the voices of others, and interrogates the preconceptions of the researcher and her theory (Gibbs, 2015, p. 223). As Gibbs is exploring writing as a method of research, much of her approach could be transferred to literary writing, too. Two aspects are crucial to this approach: First, the underlying concept of relationality, and second, the notion of forming the result through the very act of writing. Writing has to be understood as a process which is “implicitly dialogical, in conversation with the world, other writing, and reflexively, with itself” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 224). Writing therefore highlights resonances between text and world and between text and “rhythmic orality as traces of bodies in texts” (Knudsen & Stage, 2015, p. 18), but should not be reduced
to the primacy and representation of the human voice. Rather, it has to be conceptualized as a performative engagement that echoes listening and reading in moving between spoken and written registers. Writing is “a process in which subjectivity continually risks itself, finds itself, loses itself, and makes itself in its dialogic relations with the world to which it attunes” (Gibbs, 2015, p. 227).

Following Gibbs, and re-reading approaches of affect theory, Michael Richardson (2016) argues that writing is an affective process “in which words resonate with the writing body” (p. 21); it “entails the experience of affect as well as its expression” (p. 21). Expression must thus be understood as a movement and exposure of the writing body, not solely as a form of representation. Citing Brian Massumi, Richardson (2013) argues for a concept of semblance, rather than representation, that enables literature to speak beyond words (pp. 156, 165).

At this point, however, it is important to recognize that Richardson’s work belongs to the field of trauma studies that is complexly related to problems of representation. Trauma is an important concern within affect studies and vis-à-vis writing. This includes the problem of dealing with an experience so horrific that words are inadequate to describe it (Gibbs, 2013, p. 133). Writing trauma as a gesture of testimony (Richardson, 2016) simultaneously reaffirms and rejects the limits of language. Richardson’s approach runs the risk of positing language as the “other” of that to which it only can refer, thus reproducing the divide of representation and real experience, since trauma signals the impossibility of narration (Assmann, 1999, p. 264). For this reason, writing trauma provides a limited perspective on writing affect. For instance, the affectivity of ruptures as bodily gestures plays an important role in writing trauma. While these gestures interrupt processes of narration, they underscore an idea of representation emerging from a body’s “inner voice,” while neglecting the performativity of language and writing themselves. Instead, we must think of writing affect in circulation, condensation, repetition, rhythm, or the emergence of sound in writing as a process that covers both the materiality of language in writing as well as its textual representation.

From this perspective, language in writing could be conceptualized as a dynamic practice, which is always entangled with other social interactions. This shift in attention can be located within the framework of integrative practice theory. The turn toward writing as a practice neither privileges the agency of the autonomous authorial subject, as in much of traditional philology, nor the structuring forces of discursive orders or the literary field, as in many structuralist and New Historicism approaches. Instead, it provides a dual focus that emphasizes both the embodiment and materiality of all forms of “doings” that organize and modulate affectivity in certain ways (Reckwitz, 2017). In this respect, practice theory helps to foreground the aesthetic, bodily, and performative qualities of writing and literary texts and put them at the center of philological inquiry. As an approach that is
deliberately “thin” and does not include a grand theory of society, practice theory shares an empirical openness with affect studies, as well as the assumption that social structures cannot exhaustively explain the specific forms of writing and literary texts. However, thinking relational affect always implies an inquiry into concrete practices that are situated in historical frameworks of norms and rules.

The notion of practice clearly stresses the historical relationality of affect, and counters the tendency to think of it as something pre-social or ahistorical. This social entanglement of writing, however, is not to be understood in abstract terms, for instance, in terms of a “symbolic order,” but, as initially noted, in terms of a network of discursive and non-discursive practices such as language acquisition, education, schooling, publishing, and so forth. Here, power relations like the hierarchy of gender and the monolingual paradigm saturate the practice of writing, but do not determine it in a mono-causal way. Thinking of writing as an affective practice allows us to analyze it as a dynamic and relational process of transformation that is not only entangled in the dynamics of the lifeworld, but forms an active part of it. Furthermore, its dialogic and interactive character constitutes a “feedback process” (Gibbs, 2006, p. 162) that is closely related to the material dimension of language, sound and rhythm, and circulation and repetition.

Examples from research and future perspectives

Research on writing affect, especially in literary studies, is still in its infancy. Examining the inseparable relations between affect, language, and writing as dynamic and dialogic remains a substantial challenge. Against the notion of a full “autonomy of affect” (Massumi, 1995), language is by no means only a system of normalization, regulation, or standardization. Language and affect are not mutually exclusive, but should be conceived of in their entanglements such that the constitutive role of embodiment, materiality, and performativity can be taken into account. The same holds true for the relationship between affect and literary form, or rather, the “form of the affects” (Brinkema, 2014). Further research in literary studies should therefore embrace a dual agenda. It should elaborate on the development of affect and practice theory with regard to language and writing to move beyond discourse. Simultaneously, it should continue performing analyses of literary texts with regard to form, genre, themes and motives, figures of speech, narrative perspectives, and concepts of authorship. This perspective might open up a rather new combination of “thin” and “thick” approaches to language, in which writing and form coalesce into affective practices over time, particularly within literary history.

Highlighting the pragmatic and performative dimensions of language (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) and following the literary theory of Bakhtin (1981b, 1986), written texts are therefore neither to be understood as arbitrary systems of signification nor as cultural discourse. In the literary works of
Heinrich von Kleist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, Robert Musil, J. M. Coetzee, Elfriede Jelinek, Emine Sevgi Özdamar, or Yoko Tawada – to name just a few – we can find exciting and often agonistic forces of encounter within language and between language and writing. They take shape in grammar and syntax, in rhythm and rhyme, in the intensity of bodily gestures, as in the writings of Kleist (Gumbrecht & Knüpling, 2014), or in moving and translating between languages, tropes, and metaphors, as in Özdamar’s writing (Martyn, 2005). With regard to writing affect, we must therefore not only ask the performative question “How to do things with words?” but also “How to do words with affect?” Writing can thus be seen as a dialogical mode of doing things with words and as a process that unfolds in an assemblage of affective speech genres (Fleig & Lüthjohann, in press).

Thinking of writing in terms of performativity questions not only the affect vs. language opposition, but also the narratological divide of author and text. According to Bakhtin, writing must be understood as a dynamic process between language as phenomenon of everyday life on the one hand, and individual utterances on the other. Further research on writing affect must therefore develop non-sovereign concepts of authorship as well as dissolve the dichotomy between narratology and performativity (Breger, 2012). Emphasizing writing means analyzing and reading words and texts in individual works, even if there is no “author” of language and not only one language. Bakhtin conceptualizes this type of relationality as a dialogic one: an utterance follows another word and is thus always entangled in a speech situation. In this mode of communication, words and sentences as well as whole utterances affect each other and form a process of articulation which cannot be reduced to the level of “purely” semantic signification (Acker, Fleig, & Lüthjohann, in press). Rather, this process could be described in terms of affective relationality that connects written text and world.

Further research on writing as an affective practice might keep in mind what Bakhtin calls “heteroglossia”: “The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance” (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 272). Bakhtin not only relates every utterance to its concrete environment, but also stresses dialogism as a structuring affective force. Therefore, the concept of heteroglossia is an excellent starting point to think of several differences, for instance, the difference between spoken and more standardized written language, or between accent and the lack thereof as exemplified in the writings of Tawada, where accent is “the face of spoken language” (in the German original: “das Gesicht der gesprochenen Sprache”; Tawada, 2016, p. 22). Tawada’s text reflects the difference between writing’s own “accentlessness” and the pronunciation and articulation of speech, thus questioning the norm of monolingualism in both the productive and political sense of affective dissonance (Acker, Fleig, & Lüthjohann, in press). Inseparably linked to this critical view are differences...
of gender and genre in writing and challenges to the relations between mono-
and translingualism as explored by different women writers (Hausbacher &
Gürtler, 2012) dating back to the emergence of modern authorship in the 18th
century.

According to Bakhtin’s concept of the *chronotope* (Bakhtin, 1981a), the
affective structures of time and space in different genres also open up further
perspectives for research. The specific relationship between time and space
structures different dimensions of literary texts. It produces a literary setting,
but it also shapes bodies, affects, feelings, memories, and words, as well as
their circulation in their respective social and cultural contexts (Fleig, in
press). In addition, this relationship also encompasses the relationship between
writer and written text, as well as that of both to the readership of the text.
Finally, the affectivity of rhythm and repetition in literary texts clearly corre-
ponds with the technique of writing itself. Writing is learned and repeated
through training on the one hand, and sedimentations of time and space in
the dialogism of language on the other. This is reflected, for instance, in the
literary works of Musil and Jelinek. Both provide an affective structure that
lays the foundation for the dynamic processes of writing affect and effective
writing.

Bringing affect into literary studies and including historicity as well as the
continual dynamism of language and writing opens up new paths for both lit-
erary analysis and theoretical perspectives. Combining affect and practice
theory emphasizes processual thinking and the bodily dimensions of literature
that take shape in interactive dialogue within every single utterance. This
theoretical approach to affect might help future literary studies come alive.

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Part III

Resonances and repertoires
Affective resonance is a type of relational dynamics of affecting and being affected, characterized as a process of reciprocal modulation between interactants. Resonance is a relational and processual phenomenon. It is neither a singular affective “state” nor a one-sided transmission of affect, such as in contagion, but arises through a complex interplay between the affective dispositions (→ affective disposition) of multiple individuals and contextual factors within an affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement). Here, active and receptive affects are in a permanent coupling that cannot be explained as a chain of unilateral actions (A affects B, then B affects A and so on). Resonance thus differs from echoing and mirroring because it creates its own affective quality in a “non-linear” interplay of the affective dispositions of all individuals involved.

Phenomenologically, and from the first-person perspective, resonance is primarily intensive or force-like (“gripping,” “carrying away,” “explosive,” and so forth). Affective resonance is a subtle and ephemeral phenomenon that pervades most face-to-face social interaction. The concept is geared primarily toward explaining dyadic and small group interactions rather than masses and large-scale affective dynamics, although mass affects can also be seen as an example of resonance. Elementary cases are the mutual modulation of facial expressions and gestures, or of melody, intonation, and accent during a conversation or in a persistent relationship. By conceptualizing these examples as cases of affective resonance, one can see that the affective coupling mutually transforms partners in an interaction, making resonance more than mere contagion or the synchronization of affective states. Since resonance is a dynamic coupling at the causal level of affecting and being affected, the affects in which a dynamic of resonance manifests “on the surface” for different individuals do not necessarily resemble each other, though they are jointly co-created and shaped by relational interplay.

Resonance is thus characterized by a fundamental reciprocity at the level of the causality of affect. However, this does not imply that this dynamic is symmetrical when it comes to resulting affects. This has important systematic consequences, as resonance can then also manifest as asymmetric or
complementary affective entrainment between individuals, such as the dynamic constitution of different “affective roles” in group dynamics or asymmetric but dynamically stabilized patterns in couples. From a social theory perspective, affective resonance can therefore be used to explain the dynamic emergence of micro-social patterns and differentiated affective roles, as well as subtle, non-repressive but modulating forms of power relations in small groups, such as families or work teams. This, generally, makes resonance an ambivalent phenomenon, such that striving for resonance per se is neither a political maxim nor an ethical ideal.

**Example: “affect attunement”**

Paradigmatic examples of affective resonance can be found in empirical studies of the infant-caregiver dyad. In particular, the concepts of “vitality affects” and “affect attunement” coined by the American developmental psychologist Daniel Stern (1985/2000) are precursors of the philosophical concept of affective resonance proposed here.\(^1\) Stern starts from the hypothesis that infants in their first weeks cannot distinguish different things, such as objects, persons, colors, or shapes. They are also unable to read affective expressions such as joy, fear, sadness, disgust, and so forth, but rather experience temporal contours, rhythmic patterns, and gradients of intensity that can underlie all sorts of actions, gestures, mimicry, or tactile sensations. Distinguishing them from “categorical affects,” Stern terms these dynamical qualities “vitality affects.” As contours of intensity, they are best described in “terms such as ‘surging,’ ‘fading away,’ ‘fleeting,’ ‘explosive,’ ‘crescendo,’ ‘decrescendo,’ ‘bursting;’ ‘drawn out,’ and so on” (Stern, 1985/2000, p. 54).

Based on this, Stern also shows that there are reciprocal processes of affecting and being affected that take place solely in the register of vitality affects. Stern observes such dynamics between infants at the age of nine months and their caregivers and calls these “affect attunement” (Stern, 1985/2000, pp. 138–161). As a form of “intersubjective sharing of affect” (Stern, 1985/2000, p. 141), affect attunement operates as a matching of temporal patterns and contours of intensity, but is different from mere imitation, as it does not show perfect symmetry or “mirroring.” Affect attunement is not just about copying the child’s vitality affects, but about integrating one’s own affects into a dynamic of mutual attunement which then creates a new, shared affective experience.

It is this idea of a dynamically and inter-affectively co-constituted quality of being-in-relation that makes affect attunement an example of affective resonance. Stern’s affect attunement (1) is a truly bi-directional coupling, (2) it constitutes an experiential quality of its own, and (3) is experienced immediately

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\(^1\) Stern was directly received in affect studies and philosophy, see Gibbs (2010), Guattari (1992/1995), and Wetherell (2012).
as force-like dynamics, not as categorical affects; hence it shares all structural properties of resonance. Moreover, according to Stern, the specific capacity of affect attunement is acquired around the age of nine months and is never lost again. It is active even in adult life, though not always consciously, so that affect attunement underlies all kinds of daily interactions between adults. In fact, the disposition to engage in affect attunement constitutes a fundamental domain of social relatedness. This ultimately provides a central insight into the relevance of affective resonance for the genesis of subjectivity (see Guattari, 1992/1995; Mühlhoff, 2018).

Origin of resonance in classical physics

The concept of resonance has its origins in the physics of mechanical and acoustic vibrations, where it describes a particular phenomenon in the interplay of multiple oscillating systems. A detailed look at some of these physical phenomena will reveal three features of the concept of resonance, which also apply in the realm of affectivity. Resonance in classical mechanics refers to the fundamental observation that the degree to which an oscillatory system can be induced to oscillate by coupling to another oscillating system is highly sensitive to the frequency of that other system (Tipler, 1999; Morse, 1948). For example, the extent to which a child on a playground swing can be made to swing depends on the frequency of the periodic pushes exerted by another person or by the child’s own legs. Simple systems usually have one specific frequency, called resonance frequency, at which it can much easier be induced to oscillate than at other frequencies. In resonance, the coupled system hits precisely that frequency. Resonance is thus a very specific and selective case of interaction in which the least effort has the greatest effect in terms of induced vibration.

The most interesting cases of resonance occur when multiple oscillating systems are coupled to form, as a whole, a new dynamic system. Such composite systems can enter a state of (internal) resonance, which mutually modulates the oscillations of each subsystem. This is the case, for example, with the three Jupiter moons Ganymede, Europa, and Io, which, in terms of their rotation around the planet, are in a state of “orbit-orbit resonance,” as it is called in celestial mechanics (Murray & Dermott, 1999, p. 9; see also Mühlhoff, 2015, 2018). Empirical observation shows that Io turns exactly four times, Europa two times faster than Ganymede. These exact integer ratios deviate from what is obtained when the individual rotation frequency of each moon is calculated using Newton’s law of gravitation. In reality, moons do not rotate individually around the planet, but influence each other through their reciprocal gravitational forces. They are in relations of mutual affecting and being affected by one another that are perfectly simultaneous with respect to activity and passivity. This entanglement of moving and being-moved in relation causes the moons to mutually modulate each other.
in their rotational frequencies. This is a phenomenon of resonance, and interestingly, it is a case where resonance does not result in identical motions because the frequencies of the moons remain different.

As it turns out, the solar system is full of such rotational resonance couplings, and that makes it dynamically stable. Through orbital resonance, the various rotational objects jointly establish a dynamic in which each of them behaves somewhat differently than in the case without interaction (“individualistic case”). But in turn, this dynamic being-in-relation, as a whole, is mutually stabilizing in the sense that it can withstand minor a-periodic perturbations, such as asteroids and comets passing by. This example shows how resonance in classical physics describes a joint dynamic of elastically coupled sub-components that is only apparent as a whole. In resonance, these sub-components are held together in an interplay of moving and being-moved, that is, of dynamically constituted mutual forces that unite the individual objects or systems in a joint motion, thereby constituting a new quality of relational stability. This suggests that resonance is more than a mere correlation or synchrony of temporal patterns that can be observed from an external perspective. The core of resonance is that it is a dynamic of inherent forces that can only be directly experienced in the immanence of its interplay. In resonance, each of the moons is, as it were, slightly in the grip of the other moons.

In putting the concept of resonance to use in affect theory, I do not mean to describe dynamics of affect as physical phenomena. Rather, the philosophical and affect theoretical concept of resonance can be obtained by transposing the physical concept into the domain of an affect theoretical ontology. This is to say that affective resonance and physical resonance share some key structural properties. These structural properties are: (1) Resonance is based on a simultaneity of affecting and being affected, which prevents the decomposition of the process into chains of unilateral impacts. (2) Resonance is an inherent dynamic of forces and causal couplings, as opposed to an external observation of correlations. (3) Resonance constitutes a dynamic quality that is more than the sum of individual contributions and thus pertains to the whole (cf. Mühlhoff, 2015, 2018).

**Systematic elaboration: thinking resonance in a Spinozan ontology**

The concept of affective resonance can be developed in the framework of a Spinozan ontology of affect (see Spinoza, 1677/1985), of which two aspects are particularly relevant. First, affect for Spinoza is an ontological principle;
every individual (modus) is constituted only through affective relations (→ affect). Second, affect implies an entanglement of affecting and being affected in which active and receptive roles cannot be separated. Under the name of potentia, Spinoza moreover attributes a specific capacity to affect and be affected to each individual. This potentia is a product of past relations of affecting and being affected and acts in the present context as a set of potentials, which is why I refer to the potentia as the affective disposition (→ affective disposition) of an individual.

In this setup, the concept of resonance can be formalized by looking into the question of what kind of dynamic unfolding could arise when two or more individuals with their specific affective dispositions are co-present in a given situation. To this end, I will use a specifically dynamic reading of the Spinozan ontology obtained in connection with ideas from Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson. “Dynamic” means that a concept of forces is introduced that is ontologically primary to states and statically individuated forms. Discussing affective dynamics instead of just processes of affecting and being affected emphasizes that these processes are essentially an unfolding of relational forces and not just sequences of transitional states.\(^3\) Resonance is a dynamic concept as in the perspective of the individual, it is experienced immediately as a force-like entanglement of moving other(s) and being moved by other(s); it is a movement-in-relation which is only partly under my control. In the unfolding of resonance, I contribute to a group dynamic, and at the same time, I am gripped by it. The dynamic acts on me, it makes me move – not in an externally determined way, but in my own way – and thereby it gets enacted and carried further by me. Although the affects of each individual may be different, the affective quality of being-in-resonance is not a composite of individual affective states, but something that happens between individuals.

To account for this, an ontology of differential forces can be imported into the Spinozan ontology of affect. For this purpose, the concepts of “virtuality” and “actualization” known from Bergson and Deleuze are particularly useful (cf. Deleuze 1966/1991, 1968/1994). For Deleuze, the virtual is an ontological register of pure forces or “differential elements.” These forces are ontologically preceding the actual forms they could bring about in processes of their unfolding (see Deleuze, 1966/1991, pp. 94–103; Deleuze, 1968/1994, pp. 208–214). The conceptual opposite of the virtual is the “possible,” because both concepts are connected to different notions of processuality. A possibility undergoes the process of a “realization,” which

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3 This refers to the fundamental distinction of dynamics and kinematics in classical physics. Kinematic descriptions of motion do not use a concept of forces but only the geometric ideas of straight lines and reflections, thus of singular transactions, such as collisions of billiard balls or bouncing off a wall. The situation of Jupiter’s moons could not be described in kinematic terms.
Deleuze characterizes as a “brute eruption” or a “leap” from non-existence to existence (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 211). It is thus a process that limits that which arises to a resemblance to what is logically pre-conceivable as a possibility. The virtual, on the other hand, undergoes a process of “actualization” reminiscent of how a force performs work in physics. Instead of instantiating resemblance to a possibility, actualization is an open process that creates its own path of action and is productive in its unfolding (Deleuze, 1966/1991, p. 97). Unlike a possibility, a virtuality does not come with a preconceived directedness to a target point of its process of actualization. Thus, considering the dynamic forces of resonance as virtual allows us to locate them in an ontological register that is independent of the manifest affective qualities through which they appear “on the surface.”

As already mentioned, the forces that drive resonance result from the affective dispositions of individuals, that is, from their capacities to affect and be affected in the immanence of a given affective arrangement (→ affective disposition). It is crucial that Spinoza’s concept of potentia, on which the concept of affective disposition is based, refers to relational embedding. That is, an individual’s capacity to affect and be affected depends not only on past relations, but also on present relational configurations. Hence, this capacity must be conceived of as a virtuality, as it does not contain the actual affective contours in which it unfolds. In light of these theoretical considerations, resonance is (1) a dynamic of relational forces, and as such is rooted in a virtual register of being-in-relation; (2) these forces result from the affective dispositions of the individuals involved; and (3) the actual affective qualities in which this dynamic of forces results are not pre-conceivable from the mere sum of individual traits, but result from a non-linear interplay of forces in an open process. Resonance is thus a process of actualization in a relational field of potentials to affect and be affected that is jointly constituted based on the affective dispositions of individuals in an affective arrangement (see Mühlhoff, 2018).

Resonance and dissonance

As we have seen, in a process of resonance, the affective power (potentia) or disposition of an individual manifests in a specific way. The term “specific” is intended to indicate that it depends on the constellation of resonance and thus on all other individuals and the surrounding affective arrangement; how exactly the potentia of a particular individual can unfold in it. Therefore, resonance is a process of modulation that transforms everyone and everything to some extent, by amplifying some aspects of their disposition and weakening

4 Gilbert Simondon (2009), too, has a concept of (internal) resonance that has strong similarities to the one developed here. However, there is some dispute over how compatible Simondon’s thinking is with the immanent philosophy of Spinoza, see Del Lucchese (2009, p. 182) and Mühlhoff (2018, pp. 134–150).
others, thereby creating something new. Building on this idea, we can now introduce further differentiation by taking into account that in Spinozism affects are always evaluated according to whether an individual’s power to act is “increased or diminished, aided or restrained” (Spinoza, 1677/1985, part III, def. 3). A dynamic of resonance that modulates the individual will always partially increase and partially weaken one’s potentia. Nevertheless, one can identify the special case of an overall restraining and weakening dynamic of resonance. This case can be referred to as dissonance: Dissonance is the sub-case of resonance in which the virtual force field is experienced as aversive, divisive, destabilizing, or even explosive and destructive. Moreover, one could now juxtapose this concept of dissonance to a more narrowly conceived concept of amplifying resonance, which would refer to a case in which the reciprocal amplification of the potentia of all individuals clearly predominates.

Related concepts in affect studies

A variety of concepts have been used in affect studies and other disciplines to describe the relational dynamics of affect. In the following, I will touch on some of them to briefly point out similarities and dissimilarities to the proposed concept of affective resonance.

A first group concerns concepts of affect transmission, including emotional/affective contagion and suggestion (see Le Bon, 1895; Gibbs, 2010; Tarde, 1890; and for a historical analysis, Blackman, 2012) as well as the transmission of affects by means of “chemical and nervous entrainment” (Brennan, 2004, p. 49). These concepts tend to evoke the idea of one-way transmissions. “Contagion” comes with a strong connotation of a split between active and passive roles, where the passive individual is haunted, hit, or infiltrated from outside by an active affective influence. The semantics of contagion and transmission suggests that the result of this process is a synchronizing “copy” of the affective state of the “sender” in the “receiver.” In addition, the concept of circulation of affect, which has been used by a number of scholars (Ahmed, 2004a, 2004b; Clough, 2007; cf. Blackman, 2012; Wetherell, 2012), similarly connotes a one-directional mechanism underlying the circular movement of affects. In particular, this is the case when affect is conceived as a state into which an individual can or cannot enter. If what causes such states is transmission of affects, then circulation is only a more elaborate form of transmission. As Margaret Wetherell puts it, “‘circulation’ suffers from similar problems if it implies that affect is an ethereal, floating entity, simply ‘landing’ on people” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 141). The concept of resonance, in contrast, aims to focus on the reciprocity of causal processes, such that the resulting qualities of affect are bi-directionally co-constituted, while potentially manifesting in complementary and a-synchronous forms.
A second group of related concepts is comprised of various notions of emotional and affective atmospheres (see Anderson, 2014; Böhme, 1993; Brennan, 2004; Latour, 2003; Schmitz, 2014; for an overview: Seyfert, 2011). While the exact conceptions vary in detail across disciplinary and cultural boundaries, “atmosphere” tends to refer to a form of temporary organization of a field of heterogeneous elements and forces. In Anglophone discourse, the term is often used “vaguely and interchangeably with mood, feeling, ambience, tone and other ways of naming collective affects” (Anderson, 2014, p. 137). The German tradition deriving from phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz often understands atmospheres more starkly as ethereal, non-localized entities that float through everyone and may even “wield authority over the entirety of bodies in a situation” (atmosphere). In this particular strand of thought, atmospheres are imbued with authority or dominance (“eine Atmosphäre herrscht”). Resonance also refers to a form of collective affect and thus shares its phenomenal scope with the more general understanding of atmospheres as mood or ambience. More specifically than that, however, affective resonance names a dynamic of multi-directional causal interaction from which this collective affect results and which is not necessarily present in all examples of affective atmospheres. Moreover, affective resonance, like the concept of atmosphere in the German phenomenological tradition, can potentially be used to analyze structures of power and influence (Mühlhoff, 2018; Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018). However, the structure of this form of influence is different, since one cannot say that resonance reigns over or dominates a situation (“es herrscht Resonanz”). Instead, resonance arises “bottom-up” and in an immanent interplay of a multitude of individuals. While atmosphere often comes with a connotation of embeddedness-in or exposition-to, resonance emerges as an inherent quality from a web of horizontal relations in a potentially open milieu.

A third group of related concepts is formed by the notions of imitation and mimesis, which are often used in affect studies and other areas (Blackman, 2012; Bösel, 2014; Brennan, 2004; Gibbs, 2010; Seyfert, 2012; Thrift, 2008). In particular, those contributions that derive their concepts of imitation or mimesis from the work of Deleuze provide an elaborate understanding of mimesis as an intensive and constitutive process of joint becoming. Imitation is then not just a superficial simulation of identical shapes and contents, but deeply modulates and transforms the individual without making it identical to the imitated thing. If mimesis can be understood as process of mutual (that is, multi-directional) imitation, it resembles the concept of resonance in terms of causal reciprocity. At the level of forms, however, it differs from the concept of resonance, because mimesis and imitation are generally convergent or synchronizing processes. Unlike resonance, imitation and mimesis do not cover cases of asymmetrical attunement of affective contours. Consequently, imitation and mimesis could be considered as the synchronizing special case of affective resonance. Or, in other words, affective resonance could inform a
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causal and affect theoretical approach to how mimesis operates. However, there are asynchronic, disruptive, and chaotic cases of resonance that are clearly beyond the phenomenal scope of mimesis and imitation.

Applications and outlook

Affective resonance as treated here takes place primarily in the bodily co-presence of individuals. Further investigations may clarify how resonance can be understood in the context of media techniques. Of course, affective resonance also occurs in situations in which the individuals are not physically present but affect each other, for instance through a social medium. A crucial point here, however, would be to understand the medium not just as an amplifier and transmitter of affect which merely increases the range of local dynamics to a global scale. Rather, it must be assumed that the media have a specifically formative and constitutive role in the affects and affective resonances made possible therein. Media create resonance spaces that can have their own technically and socially conditioned properties to enable resonances, which could lead to completely new dynamics (the tradition in media theory that builds on Simondon seems particularly promising in this respect, cf. Hansen, 2001; Angerer, Bösel, & Ott, 2014). A related question is whether a variant of the concept of resonance can also be used for the situation of non-real-time media, for example, in the context of the reception of films or novels, where one cannot assert that affects are bilateral in the same way.

The term resonance is often used metaphorically or even with a romantic connotation, for example, in the sense of a kind of longing, or an ethical ideal of striving for responsiveness and meaningful engagement with the world (see, for example, Rosa, 2016). In contrast, the concept of affective resonance proposed here is politically and ethically rather ambivalent. Affective resonance is a micro-modality of power in social relations and affective arrangements because it is a dynamic of mutual modulation and influence. This means that in resonance, the power (potentia) of an individual is increased, diminished, aided, or restrained in a certain way.

The form of power that manifests itself in resonance, however, is weaker than a one-sided, instrumental, or hierarchical conception of power, such as in the tradition of Max Weber. It shares similarities with relational and productive understandings of power in, for example, the works of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. The concept of resonance can help broaden the understanding of the emergence of subjectivities, investigated as discursive subjection in the poststructuralist tradition, so that it encompasses the domain of affective relationality and affective subjection (Mühlhoff, 2018). Dynamics of resonance produce affective patterns and forms of relating that can sediment, as virtuality, in the affective disposition of individuals, thus becoming co-present in future relations of resonance. In this way, the role of affect attunement for the constitution of subjectivity, hitherto spoken of in
the context of developmental psychology (Stern, 1985/2000), can be extended to a social philosophy of affective subject constitution based on affective resonance, as Guattari (1992/1995) has suggested.

The relevance of a particular mode of subjectivation – itself based on resonances within affective arrangements – for an analysis of power is evident, for example, in modern techniques of Human Resource Management (HRM). Certain working environments in the trend of the “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999/2007) use deliberately stimulated affective resonances to modulate their employees in a non-repressive way to “more productive” forms of mutual interaction (Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018). While these new forms of collaboration – such as in startup culture and team-work formations – are often subjectively rated as positive and empowering, the technologies of stimulating appropriate affective bonds between co-workers can easily be analyzed as subtle forms of coercion (Gregg, 2011) and governance.

On the other hand, resonance can also contribute to the gradual and tacit emergence of empowering new forms of attachment and of intimate relatedness, for instance in queer spaces and other subcultural movements. Often, spaces that are somewhat shielded from dominant affective patterns in a society allow for the emergence of such resonances which then, in turn, produce new social realities and life forms. This suggests that processes of empowerment and social transformation are not just based on deliberation and negotiation around external antagonisms and conflicts, but also on internal processes that often start from affective resonances in small groups and safe spaces. This spectrum of possible examples shows that affective resonance is not itself good or bad, desirable or harmful. The term neither articulates a political maxim nor an ethical ideal; rather, it is a concept that facilitates the analysis of the micro-social power of mutually affective modulation.

References


In a narrow sense, reenactments can be understood as repetitions of past events within literature, media, art, and theater. The term derives from the field of historical didactics (Collingwood, 1946/1993), and refers to performances that aim to faithfully reproduce historical events and promise an authentic re-experience. Recent scholarly endeavors, however, outline the fact that iterability always implies a shift toward the original event (Fischer-Lichte, 2012; Schneider, 2011), which allows for new perspectives on these events to emerge and highlights their relevance for the present. Forms of reenactment operate through a specific (re)structuring of time: Drawing on knowledge of the past, they set up performances in the present to (re)construct and (re)live events in the face of a future to come. As indicated by the brackets, reenactments, in contrast to other forms of repetition, do not solely historicize or actualize their topics, but generate temporal, spatial, and affective tension between the horizons of past and present. They can be described as performances of non-simultaneous simultaneity (Otto, 2015). Under preconditions of dynamic transformation, a reenactment can reevaluate its (historic) subject and produce varying meanings for the present as well as the future.

Although reenactment has attracted substantial attention over the past years (Heeg et al., 2014; Roselt & Otto, 2012), it is only recently that scholars (Czirak et al., 2019; Kaiser, 2014; Marchart, 2014) and artists (e.g., Hofmann & Lindholm, Interrobang, or Friendly Fire) have begun to address the future-oriented dimension inherent in forms of reenactment. Many performances no longer deal with the revision or replication of a historic event but orient themselves toward an imagined future and set out to experiment with fictitious time(s) and space(s). For example, in Interrobang’s experimental game *Preenacting Europe* (2011), the audience is encouraged to vote for new forms of European government. Taking as its starting point the current phenomena of social and political crisis across Europe, it ponders more sustainable and pleasant forms of government, such as the “Lottocratic Republic of Europe” based on raffle and luck. Such hypothetical scenarios of the future are staged and anticipated as actual realities, as dystopias or utopias, in which the “now” – for example the present-day situation in Europe – already appears as part of...
the past. As this artistic production contains both directions of temporal movement, the terms “re-” and “pre-enactment” do not designate clearly distinguishable performative genres. Rather, they have to be considered as different accentuations of temporal relations in performance art, accompanied by different affective dynamics.

Whereas the term “preenactment” has occasionally been used to indicate this shift in the temporal structure of reenactments, we propose adopting the specific notation of (p)reenactment to emphasize the fundamental interconnectedness and interdependence of pro- and retrospection as well as the instability of each temporal perspective. At an experiential level these temporal crossings are accompanied by a multilayered assemblage of affective dynamics that may even lead to a haptic sensation bridging times (Schneider, 2011). Such an entanglement of temporal layers forms an affectively charged situation that opens up a realm of possibilities in which the unexpected seems likely to happen and the unfamiliar or unknown might appear. It is precisely this entanglement that makes (p)reenactment interesting for affect’s temporal dimensions. We thereby encourage a new perspective on pre- as well as reenactment practices in which reoccurrence, repetition, or duration no longer form the center of attention; instead, we conceptualize (p)reenactment as an affective means of reorientation, transition, and transmission. As a key concept for understanding Affective Societies, (p)reenactment might then best be described as a heuristic tool to analyze inquiries into questions of affectivity and temporal order in the context of performance.

**Toward an affective understanding of (p)reenactment**

The entanglement of past, present, and future in (p)reenactments accounts for a “dys-position” (Didi-Huberman, 2011) of its materiality and thereby fosters tensions in affectivity. With the term “dys-position,” Didi-Huberman refers to a conflicting disorganization of things that he encounters, for example, in montage practices in the arts during the 1920s. Rather than disposing of and ordering things and thus only underlining prevailing structures, continuities, and regularities, montage techniques of dys-positioning produce collisions of heterogenous elements that subvert or counter each other. Understanding (p)reenactments as forms of dys-positioning thus requires a specific focus on temporal and spatial ruptures and contradictions as well as on affective ambiguities generated in a performance.

In (p)reenactments, the capacity to affect and be affected takes place between the poles of memory/history and visions of the future. Comprehending (p)reenactments as events whose affective potentiality in the present is orientated toward the past and the future allows us to focus on aspects currently overlooked in literature on reenactment and preenactment. Drawing from research within the field of affect and media studies, we might think of
affect as a central vector that links the past and the future to the present. By
taking up concrete objects, events or actions from the past, (partly) detaching
them from their historical context of origin, and transferring them to a histor-
ically and semantically different context, reenactment potentiates dynamic
interpretations, contextual relations, and experiences. As part of a collective
or cultural memory, events in the past or imagined future always carry an
emotional value, or appear as affectively charged.

(P)reenactments’ multiple transpositions thus also concern the affective
dynamics in place that relate to the contexts of origin and those of the actual
performance. These trans-positions may be captured and further analyzed
using concepts from affect theory such as *agencement* (Deleuze & Guattari,
1987) or affective arrangement (→ *affective arrangement*) whereby the concept
of (p)reenactment highlights the temporal and experiential dimensions inher-
ent in these notions. (P)reenactments thus not only provide a narrative frame-
work for a retrospective or prospective investigation in a highly codified
setting, but also set their scenes in material surroundings shaped by social ges-
tures and corporeal behaviors. Accordingly, one might conceive of
(p)reenactments as the installation of complex scenarios (Taylor, 2003) that
frame and produce shifting affective experiences not only of temporality, but
also of spatiality and sociality. In contrast to ritual practices of repetition, in
performance art or neighboring contexts, these shifts may be intentionally
staged in order to convey certain messages, evoke specific interpretations or
provoke predestined affective responses. This is exemplified in cases of poli-
tical theater performing *alternative* or *utopian realities* in order to create an af-
ective drive toward political change, for instance, the tribunal performances
staged by Swiss producer Milo Rau in Moscow (2013), Zurich (2013), or
Bukavu (2015) (Walter-Jochum, 2019). In these cases, the affective impact of
(p)reenactments is often shaped by changes in historical contexts and
topographical settings. However, the actual reception of these affective poten-
tials can never be fully determined or predicted and is thus beyond the control
of the performers. In our view, this aspect of contingency in reactions to
(p)reenactments is central to their specificity.

Uncovering (p)reenactment’s potential to affect is also important in under-
standing processes of collectivization. Understanding affect as a formative
force that establishes relations between bodies (Slaby, 2016) (→ *affect*),
(p)reenactments can also be a useful tool with which to examine the emerg-
ing dynamics between individual actors and social collectives as well as non-
human actors (→ *social collectives*), including questions of belonging and partic-
ipation that arise in relation to different historical or topographical settings
and experiential spaces. (P)reenactment can take an affirmative stance here in
that it repeats or reinforces already existing social relations, but given its
potential of iterative dys-positioning, it also contains the subversive power to
expose or question the historical contingency of power relations or relations
between human and non-human actors. Furthermore, (p)reenactment enables
“role playing” in the sense of adopting the perspectives of others and experiencing how these depend on historically and culturally specific relationships.

**Embodiment and bodily memory**

As embodied performances, (p)reenactments can address the somatization and bodily registers of cultural memory, which is often predominantly thought of in terms of its semantic and cognitive aspects (Taylor, 2003). In doing so, (p)reenactments may figure as a corrective toward a cultural memory centered on written records: by acting in the realm of (p)reenactment, bodies are embedded into historical and iterative contexts and thereby emphasize that agency and identity are always influenced by historical and cultural frameworks. The aesthetic and political expressivity of bodily figurations in (p)reenactment draws on the ambiguity of their points of reference, as these figurations oscillate between different layers of time, subjectivities, and affective arrangements, making it impossible to contextualize their actions definitively. In some cases, the (p)reenacted event is itself mediated and transgresses the physical presence of the body. As such, it has to be understood in terms of recursivity, absence, or withdrawal. Here, forms of bodily memory and their historical variability play a vital role, so that (p)reenactments even open up dimensions of analysis concerning facial expression, gesture, posture, and speech. Questioning the privileging of texts and narratives over embodied performances, (p)reenactments can also be read as scenarios that rework cultural memories and have the potential to make marginalized positions visible and recognizable (Taylor, 2003).

**Situatedness and space**

To rework and re-imagine past events, (p)reenactments literally take place. In The Battle of Orgreave, for example, the artist Jeremy Deller (2001) occupies the original location of the iconic 1984 strike of English miners in a Yorkshire coking plant to reenact the violent confrontation between police and strikers with 800 historical reenactors and 200 former miners. Re-staging this strike in situ, Deller used the place’s historical value and aura to generate an immersive effect (→ immersion, immersive power), which proved successful: Despite the artistic framing of the performance, the inclusion of props such as plastic truncheons, fake blood, rocks made of foam, and years of preparation, the reenactment was perceived almost as a flashback of the events of 1984. The aim of this long-term project was to re-configure, re-evaluate, and re-politicize the events of the past – an approach closely linked to place by Deller (2001): “I’ve always described it as digging up a corpse and giving it a proper post-mortem.”

Whereas Deller seeks the “original” scene for his reenactment, performances such as Preenacting Europe profit from the spatial distance between

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theater and everyday life. Rather than conjuring up the affective sediments of historical places, *Preenacting Europe* conceives of the stage as a laboratory for future forms of government and addresses the heterotopian qualities of theatrical space. Deller’s and Interrobang’s different orientations toward places reveal a spectrum of spatial delineation through (p)reenactments. While their levels of affectivity differ significantly in this regard, both examples show that localized experiences and emplaced practices always generate spaces of (p)revision and (p)reimagining (de Certeau, 1984). Consequently, analyses of (p)reenactments have to consider scenic arrangements as deeply entangled with temporal dimensions and vice versa (Massey, 1994). Jeremy Deller’s work makes obvious that such crossings of time and space (“practiced place”) occur at the interstices of live performances and mediatization. The Battle of Orgreave relied heavily on media coverage of the literally iconic 1984 strike to re-stage the events; it was also documented by film director Mike Figgis and broadcast as a 60-minute documentary in 2002 on the UK’s Channel 4. Thus, shifting the focus to media-based forms of (p)reenactment contributes to a deeper understanding of the (real, imagined, and symbolized) interruptions of time and space in (p)reenactment.

**Mediatized (p)reenactments**

While current scholarship largely employs the notion of (p)reenactment to analyze embodied performances in live situations, we aim at widenings its scope to mediatized phenomena as well. Contemporary artistic practices, social phenomena such as role play and gaming, and political (p)reenactments can be highly mediatized. Some (p)reenactments are staged explicitly for a camera, others are “enacted” in the mediated realm itself, for example, within digital games. In his video installation *Serious Games* (2009–2010), German filmmaker and artist Harun Farocki demonstrates how virtual reality scenarios are used as re- and preenactment strategies in contemporary warfare. In *Serious Games I. Watson is Down*, Farocki shows a training unit at a Marine Corps base in California, in which young Marines rehearse future combat scenarios with the help of computer simulations to train rational and strategic decision-making and reduce disturbing affective impulses. A similar technique is used in *Immersion*, part III of the series; in this case not for training purposes, but rather as a means of therapy. The video displays a workshop for psychologists working with war-veterans and introduces them to new virtual reality software that can be used to reenact and relive traumatizing situations. The alleged veteran in this software demonstration is in fact an actor who imagines the potential reactions of a future patient; in this example, the entanglement between different temporal layers becomes even more intricate. Virtual reality thus seems to function as a prism that enables both projections into the future as well as reflections of the past.
Thinking with the concept of (p)reenactment in interactive realms such as digital simulations or computer games in which the actor operates as a virtual avatar makes clear that performance theory’s notion of reenactment as an embodied repetition of a past event needs to be expanded. Including the possibility of mediatized forms of (p)reenactment should disassociate the concept from the paradigm of “liveness” (Phelan, 1993) which continues to inflect recent developments in theater and performance studies (see, e.g., Auslander, 1999). What becomes crucial and obvious in mediatized (p)reenactment practices is that their occurrence in the “here and now” can dissolve into a multiplicity of situations of “enactment”: Mediatized (p)reenactments are not bound to the temporal or spatial co-presence of the actors involved, which is why they can no longer be regarded as singular events but as events that continually circulate in the media (→ affective economies). Thus they can be performed, actualized, and experienced at different times and places, which reaffirms (p)reenactment’s potential to rearrange temporal and spatial layers. Whereas live performances take place in a rather closed situational arrangement, mediatized (p)reenactments have a much bigger range and rate of reception, and are thus able to affect societies on a much broader scale. In some respects, our understanding of mediatized (p)reenactment resonates with Richard Grusin’s (2004) concept of premediation which highlights the fact that all possible scenarios of the future have always already been remediated, meaning they have been anticipated through the media before they even occurred. The main aim of premediations, according to Grusin, is to establish a low level of anxiety as a form of affective prophylaxis. This is exactly the case with the soldiers in Farocki’s Serious Games, whose future war experiences are anticipated by the affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement) of the computer simulation. Even though it seems problematic to reduce the affective potential of premediation to “negative” affects such as traumatizing experiences, “affect” can be seen as one crucial vector that relates the future to the present and the past. Similar to premediation, the (p)reenactment of future events not only shapes present affectivities, but also has the potential to transform, lower, or heighten their intensities in the future – be it as a “prophylactic” or, more positively, as a form of training, preparation, or pleasant anticipation.

(P)reenactment as a pattern central to social forms of action

Given affect’s relational potential of building collectivities (→ affective communities), we think of (p)reenactment not only in relation to artistic performances, but also as an essential part of everyday life. Everyday acts of playing, presenting, and performing (Goffman, 1956) need to be constantly actualized or reenacted. They are also linked to future forms of actions, even if their ongoing accomplishments are contingent (Garfinkel, 1967/2015). Established
theories such as social phenomenology and social constructivism can help to underline the relevance of (p)reenactment in everyday life. As discussed in the works of Husserl (1985), Schutz (1974), or Berger and Luckmann (1966), the structuring of time is a determining part of social action. Alfred Schutz (1971) conceives past, present, and future as analytical categories that are always connected to each other and form an essential part of human concepts of action. The routines and dynamics of everyday lifeworlds are always based on modes of repetition, actualizations, and concepts of action developed in the past. This enables people to see things through the eyes of others in performances of everyday life (Schutz, 1974; Goffman, 1956). In line with this, we would argue, (p)reenactments as specific performances in the field of art seem to rely on the repetitive character of (p)reenactments in everyday life in a more general sense. In both cases, then, (p)reenactments can thus be conceived of as mutually influential processes, in this iteration, performance appears as “restored” or “twice-behaved behavior” (Schechner, 2002).

Accordingly, every human action, be it in the context of art, ritual, or everyday life, depends on actions that have been trained, rehearsed, or performed before. In this capacity, however, all performances also actualize and alter these ways of behavior. Despite the dialectical relationship between art and everyday life, we should note that we must still distinguish between (p)reenactments as a form of art and as a form of everyday life. While most forms of re- and preenactments in everyday life routines can be characterized as being performed in a “typical” way, even though another “reality” (Schutz, 1971) is always possible, artistic (p)reenactments are often based on the intentions of and reflexive decisions by producers, and thus emphasize their authorial agency (Warstat, 2012). Thus, (p)reenactments can serve as a useful tool to reflect on the patterns of everyday lifeworlds, and can make obvious their political potential.

**(P)reenactment and the political**

Conceiving of a performative event as a form of (p)reenactment entails a combination of acting in the present, drawing from the past, and establishing future perspectives. Thus, many performances question stable temporal modes and thereby establish various modes of (political) inquiry. (P)reenactments may, for instance, enable a critical stance toward a linear understanding of history and emphasize the construction of time. By closely bundling different temporal orientations, practices of (p)reenactment also expose current acting and experiencing as culturally and historically imprinted, albeit never fully determined and open to change. Insofar as all patterns of human actions depend on the logic of iteration (Derrida, 1972/1988; Butler, 1993), thinking in terms of “origins,” “beginnings,” or “endings” seems problematic, if not obsolete. In line with this, the concept of (p)reenactment allows us to rethink different temporal aspects as indeed mediated and mutually dependent on
each other, but at the same time sets up a tension between the possibilities of past, actual, and future scopes of action.

Subsequently, (p)reenactments may draw on written as well as on bodily transmitted knowledge to address and enact realms of a possible future or to render visible and attainable constellations that have been precluded from collective memory thus far. In doing so, they also interrogate how to conceive of a possible future informed by the losses, misrecognitions, and unrealized potentialities of the past. (P)reenactment performances can explore how future-oriented actions, for instance, the rhetoric and practices of change such as revolution, creation, or the foundation of something new, can be modeled. As Oliver Marchart (2014, 2019) has argued with reference to the interventionist work of the Israeli collective Public Movement, pre-enactments operate as anticipations of desired political changes and thereby already generate transformative experiences. An especially powerful example of the constitutive and active dimension of (p)reenactments are the on-camera performances of would-be suicide bombers who claim their status as “living martyrs” before the actual suicide attack. On the one hand, the individuals reenact preceding video testimonies from the past by relating to the aesthetic, rhetoric, and performative qualities of the genre and by explicitly referring to their predecessors. On the other hand, the performances are as much directed toward the future and can be viewed as bodily preenactments of their imagined persona as “martyrs,” and thereby set the stage for what is about to happen (Straub, 2018). Some of these videos were further appropriated and reenacted by artists (e.g., Rabih Mroué, Sharif Waked) who added additional (and critical) dimensions to the complexity of these (p)reenactments. In sum, the concept of (p)reenactment is deeply entangled with political practices, and raises further questions about the relationship between artistic, social, and political realms.

**Outlook**

While studies on reenactment can build on a growing body of literature, the field of research on (p)reenactment demands further elaboration. Future work on (p)reenactment must emphasize its affective dynamics. Informed by affect studies, such scholarship should center its analysis on bodily perspectives, bodily memory, and the dynamization of affective arrangements, and should inquire into differences arising from embodied and mediatized performances. The latter effort seems especially promising given the peculiarities of globalized and connected communities, as the scope of (p)reenactments and their potential audiences increases rapidly through the use of networked media (→ affective publics). Comparative studies of forms of (p)reenactment in bodily co-presence and mediatized forms of (p)reenactment remain an important endeavor and have the potential to contribute to a better understanding of affective modes prevalent in mediated and live situations.
Furthermore, work on (p)reenactment should accept the challenge of grasping the full range of the concept, from concrete artistical performances to measures of political protest and proceedings in everyday life. In considering the iterative nature of social interactions, the concept of (p)reenactment can be used to underline the interconnectedness of the realms of art, politics, and the social world. (P)reenactment can highlight the stability of traditions, rituals, and social norms, but can also open up new perspectives on the possibilities of social and political change and their affective circumstances.

References


The term “poetics of affect” originates in the Aristotelian theory of tragedy, understood as a founding document of poetical thinking. It describes the manner in which a given work of art – in this chapter, we shall be concerned with cinematic images – structures the affective involvement of its audience. Aristotle’s concept of *catharsis* (1953) informs perhaps the most prominent model of modulating affects by means of media. It differs from other artistic means of emotionalizing in that it implies a specific dynamics of affect. According to Aristotle, tragedy aims at successively heightening the arousal of “tragic feelings” (fear and pity) through the dramaturgical arrangement of scenes. Here, it is the rhetoric intention that dictates the nature, intensity, and gradation of affects. Affects are aroused in order to be purposefully released, purified, or discharged.

This concept of “poetics of affect” can be applied not only to drama but to all forms of audiovisual movement-images. It encompasses the dimension of dramaturgy, which entails laying out a succession of scenic complexes with the intention of shaping a distinct course of feeling. This course of feeling is based on spectators’ perceptions of a given representation. It also comprises the dimension of rhetoric, meaning the employment of expressive modalities of the cinematic image to elicit a particular desired emotional effect. Finally, poetics of affect also encompasses the economic function of media practices, defined by Aristotle as *catharsis*:

Tragedy, then, is an imitation [mímesis] of an action [práxis] of high importance, complete and of some amplitude; in language [lógos] enhanced by distinct and varying beauties; acted not narrated; by means of pity [éleos] and fear [phóbos] effectuating its purgation [kátharsis] of these emotions.

(Aristotle, 1953, p. 24)

It is important to note that the much-discussed notion of purgation or purification in Aristotle’s definition does not refer to the psychic states of individual spectators, but rather to the affective economy (→ affective economy) of a political community, that is, to the intersection between individual feelings
and collective imagination. Thus, it is not possible to simply apply a modern psychological understanding of emotions to a poetics of affect, as is the tendency, for example, in cognitivist film theory (cf. Grodal, 2009; Plantinga, 2009). Contrary to what those approaches imply, the “purification of these emotions” cannot be reduced to a model based on a linear scheme of stimulus and response, but rather points to an argument about the political function of aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic judgment. On the other hand, historically, poetics of affect have always been conceptualized and deployed with explicit intentions of achieving specific effects. In what follows, we will elaborate on this tension, first by laying out its theoretical groundwork, then by focusing on the example of the classical Hollywood war film. The specific pathos of this genre cannot be dissociated from media techniques that seek to aesthetically modulate the feelings of spectators.

**Theoretical orientation**

On some level, the question of what constitutes a poetics of affect does not seem to be difficult at all: one simply has to refer to those affective phenomena which form the basis of all genre-poetical reflection in the Western tradition: laughing and crying. Both forms of expressive behavior have historically been linked to essential cultural practices and cultivated, in tragedy and comedy, into two paradigmatic subjects of poetical theory.

While under present-day conditions one might not simply follow Helmuth Plessner (1970) in positing laughing and crying as a decisive criterion to differentiate humans from animals, we still consider both reliable indicators of affective belonging (→ belonging) and solidarity in social communities. We may simply be unable to recognize laughing and crying outside our own species because “we” do not belong there. In this context, laughing is intuitively accessible as an expression of conviviality and sociability: particularly in cases where it happens at someone else’s expense, it equally expresses and motivates processes of community building. In contrast, crying often is a plea of the lone individual, experiencing her- or himself as excluded, isolated, and disparaged by such communities.

Since Aristotle, the theory of poetics can be understood as a poetics of affect – based on the concept of *catharsis*. Most approaches concerned with the relation between media (especially film) and emotions presuppose a psychological definition of the latter (e.g., Carroll, 2008; Grodal, 2009; Plantinga & Smith, 1999). They usually ascribe these emotions to more or less clearly identifiable personal actors who express them before they become modulated or coded by “the media” (meaning cultural practices that become identifiable through specific media technologies). In these approaches, emotions generally denominate affective judgments of the object world. They are understood as physiologically grounded processes based in subjects that remain consistent.
Proceeding instead from a concept of relational affectivity (→ *affect*), we will focus on those media practices in which we can observe affects as effects of specific media formats and forms of mediated communication. From this perspective, affective dynamics are not attributed to individual emotions – on the contrary: they themselves refer back to processes of subjectivization. The “I” in the phrase “I feel” is always a mediated effect of being affected that has found its symbolic form of expression (→ *feeling*). This form of expression is itself grounded in discursively produced epistemic regimes and media practices. These practices can be motivated artistically (the generation of aesthetic pleasure), socially (for the purposes of education, for example), or religiously (ritual purposes). They can aim at entertainment, the formation of a certain habitus, or the production of belonging. Such practices determine the positions that make it possible to experience and formulate something like “I feel” in the first place. This “I feel,” in our conceptualization, is always an effect of subjectivization referring back to historical discourses, cultural practices, and techniques of power and control, which are all structured by various media.

From Aristotelian tragedy to Hollywood cinema and entertainment TV, the problem of affect is situated in the contested territory between processes of political collectivization, media practices, and human actors. The forms of representation as well as the contents and techniques of media use are themselves parts of operations in which processes of affecting and being affected are being cultivated into shared “feeling-worlds” (→ *orders of feeling*). “Feeling” in this context aims at the sensation of experiencing oneself as affectively connected to the world in a variety of manners. This implies both long-term affective stances – the phenomenological “being-in-the-world” (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2002; Slaby, in press) – and the dimension of “belonging” in collective feelings (cf. Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2012; Röttger-Rössler, 2016) (→ *feeling*). It also refers to passing moods and atmospheres in given situations (social constellations, landscapes, entertainment, play), which can activate or modulate the former. These processes of embedment are always structured by symbolic and media practices.

**Aesthetic experience and reflexivity**

Conceptualizing feeling in this way positions the concept as an intermediary between psychologically grounded theories of emotion and the notion of a constitutive inter-affectivity (in the Deleuzian interpretation of Spinoza, cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) (→ *affect*). Feelings can thus be understood as processes in which a given dynamic of affectively evaluating the surrounding world is being correlated with the basic affective embedments of an individual (their feeling for a world shared with others). This involves the ongoing reflexive monitoring of affective changes in dynamic situations as well as feedback to the symbolic forms of these embedments. Poetics of affect intervene in and make use of the entanglement between these different
dimensions – that is, between momentary shifts in intensity on the one hand and symbolic operations on the other.

This notion of feeling follows John Dewey’s (2005) concept of aesthetic experience. If we want to understand how a poetics of affect can realize itself in concrete, socio-culturally located situations, it makes sense to integrate his concept into our approach. For Dewey, the specific character of an experience is formed in an act of perception that integrates its individual elements as a complex entanglement into a coherent temporal unity. Feeling means grasping and seizing the unity of a temporal form, which consists of elements entwined with each other. Feeling is the form in which an experience emerges from the stream of everyday life as a holistic temporal *Gestalt*. In this respect, experience for Dewey is aesthetic in and of itself: the quality of the aesthetic is the quality to “round [...] out an experience into completeness and unity as emotional” (Dewey, 2005, p. 43). Dewey clarifies his use of the term emotion: “In fact emotions are qualities, when they are significant, of a complex experience that moves and changes [...] All emotions are qualifications of a drama and they change as the drama develops” (Dewey, 2005, p. 43). From this perspective, an understanding of emotions as categorically defined becomes secondary: “Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it” (Dewey, 2005, p. 43). Instead, emotionality serves to delineate the gradual difference between everyday and aesthetic perception. Perception is given in its full sense only when it becomes experience, that is, when it becomes aesthetic:

There is, therefore, no such thing in perception as seeing or hearing *plus* emotion. The perceived object or scene is emotionally pervaded throughout. When an aroused emotion does not permeate the material that is perceived or thought of, it is either preliminary or pathological.

(Dewey, 2005, p. 55, emphasis in original)

The activity of the artist, like the perceptual activity of the spectator, belongs to a realm of cultural practices that intentionally disengage operations like perceiving, thinking, and making from their everyday context to become an object for aesthetic pleasure. In this process, the sensitivities of the spectator are intensely linked to the object of perception. The pleasure of experience consists in perceiving oneself as being affected and closely connected to an object. A state of being affected is transformed into a reflexive state of being-in-the-world; experience in its full sense denotes an affective relation of exchange, in which the perceiving subject is linked to the world they experience while possessing a reflexive insight into this linkage.
The spectator feeling

In examining the feeling of film viewing, we first and foremost inquire about the temporal form of this reflexive act of perception. Neither the actors in their performance, nor the characters in their actions, neither the social spaces in which the characters are located, nor the relations between them are given as representations in cinematic images. Rather, they are produced by the acts of perceiving, feeling, and thinking by spectators as they view films. The connective tie between the image on the screen and the spectators in the audience can be found neither in the plot, nor in the narrative, but in the capacity to affect other bodies and be affected by them. To understand the inter-affective structure in which the technical and the human, the artificial and the organic body are entangled, we need to understand the matter in which both are grounded. This matter – for all cinematic forms of audiovisual images, at least – is movement itself.

According to Vivian Sobchack (1992), movement unfolds outside of the physical material of film, in front of the screen. The movement that is generated in the medium of cinematic images gains another, physical reality in the perceiving body of the spectator: as the lived-body’s sensation of being affected. The movement of the cinematic image becomes materialized and embodied in the sensations of the spectators – their perception and cinematic expressivity are immediately connected to each other.

The movement of the cinematic image is thus comprised of discrete but symbiotic dynamics taking place at completely different levels. First, there is the movement of bodies in space – the movement of represented bodies and objects in a space which spectators presuppose as the homogeneous space of our everyday world. Second, there is the movement of the audiovisual image – the conjunction of different dynamics of montage, framing, camera movement, sound, music, and so forth – that creates an image-space for the audience. And, last but not least, there is the affective involvement of the perceiving body – a fluid dynamics of sensuous impressions, unfolding feelings, and mental operations in which this image-space is transformed into a mode of perceiving the world. This mode is embodied by spectators but constitutes a subjectivity that is not identical to those of the spectators. The cinematic image encompasses both the movement of bodies in space and the spectators’ embodied process of perception in the movement of an image-space that unfolds and transforms over the course of the duration of the film.

In this sense, we can understand the cinematic image as a mediated form of experience that, by relying on its embodiment by spectators, penetrates the realm of affects and absorbs it. Thus, it gives rise to a form of movement that can no longer be objectified but realizes the connection between screen and audience during the act of viewing a film. Sergei Eisenstein (1988) called this movement the “fourth dimension in cinema”; in typically laconic fashion, he notes that this is time itself. This temporality of the cinematic image becomes
manifest on all levels of staging (acting, music, montage, etc.). Each level contributes to the dissociation of the exterior movement of bodies from the homogeneous space of everyday perception and thus connects it to the affective dynamics of film-viewing. The cinematic image itself becomes the “fourth dimension” of a perception-space in which all three dimensions of movement listed above (movement in space, movement of the image, and the process of affecting the audience) can relate to each other and can be generative of each other. To put it differently: The staging of the image refers both to the movement represented on the screen and to the bodies of spectators who are being affected by what they perceive. Because of this, the cinematic image emerges as the fourth dimension of a space in which the cuts, divisions, and junctures between different dimensions of movement can be experienced as shaped time and as a temporal form.

The compositional form of movement-images thus marks the interface between movement on the screen and the processes of embodiment in the sensations of spectators. In this theoretical model, the episodic unfolding of a complex montage of movements can be described as the compositional modulation or stylization of the affective experience of spectators. It is precisely in this dimension of movement that Sobchack locates the intersubjective dimension of the cinema: Spectators realize the cinematic image as a specific mode of perceiving the world (Sobchack, 1992, pp. 8–9). They realize it as a specific way of being-in-the-world, which is unfolded in the process of staging. The temporal form of this unfolding provides the basis for the spectator feeling. This is what Dewey aims at when he writes that “emotions qualify the experience as a unity”, and that this unity is the unity of its temporal unfolding: “The experience is of material fraught with suspense and moving towards its own consummation through a connected series of varied incidents” (Dewey, 2005, p. 44, emphasis in original). In the remainder of this chapter, we will show how a particular, historically specific poetics of affect – that of the Hollywood war film – can intervene into and modulate the basic inter-affective structure of the cinematic image in order to make sense of the world culturally, historically, and politically.

**A particular pathos: the shell-shocked face**

At the center of the Hollywood war film, we do not find heroes or heroic deeds, but rather the melodramatic image of the suffering individual soldier. The “shell-shocked face” constitutes the signature of this genre. It recurs in images of faces that bear witness to an excess both affective and inherently mediated: the insisting amazement of Willard in *Apocalypse Now* (Coppola, 1979) or the cold, restrained cruelty of Colonel Kurtz in the same film, the paralyzed face of Tom Hanks in *Saving Private Ryan* (Spielberg, 1998), the madness of the humiliated Marine in *Full Metal Jacket* (Kubrick, 1986), or the crystallizations of sacrifice in *Platoon* (Stone, 1986).
Throughout these and other films, the shell-shocked face can be read as a deeply ambivalent image. On the one hand, it is the *imago* of sacrifice, in which the horror of war and the agony of the soldier have transformed him into an overdetermined icon of suffering. On the other hand, it is a cinematic image seeking to testify to this suffering as precisely that: naked, physical suffering (→ *affective witnessing*). It is testimony to the utterly senseless destruction of human life. This face thus becomes an emblem of the mythology of a community, which sees itself and its values confirmed in the sacrifice of the individual. At the same time, it refers to the practically immeasurable number of photographic and cinematic images documenting the victims of the violent wars and genocides of the last century.

Simultaneously a mythical icon of community and document of crime, the ambivalent image of the suffering soldier articulates a contradiction that directly confronts the foundations of political culture in the United States. The destruction of individual life violates the core value constituting the purpose of the political community itself. Today, over 70 years after World War II (during which the war film genre emerged), this conflict concerns Western culture as a whole – although perhaps in less explicitly political terms.

In all its variations, the shell-shocked face articulates a deep moral dilemma in affective terms: it combines moral outrage with devout reminiscence, accusation with the solemn commemoration of those who gave their life to preserve the political community. In this sense, we can understand the shell-shocked face as the “pathos formula” (→ *Pathosformel*) that has generated and structured the war film genre as a genre in the first place. However, if we speak of pathos formula, we do not mean iconographic subjects or motifs that can be traced as serial unities across the manifestations of visual culture. Rather, we are referring to the circulation of affects, namely, passions (i.e., pathos) that are transferred onto a community, whether an audience, a cultic, or a political community. For Aby Warburg (2010), who coined the term “Pathosformel,” certain primal affects (fear, pain, and so forth) function as generic factors that find their expression in innumerable figurations of dynamic movement across the history of visual culture. Even if we do not share this anthropological explanation, the concept enables us to link aesthetic systems of reference, like genres, with the affective economy of political communities.

In the recurrent restagings of the pathos formula, an affective collision is worked through repeatedly, which appears to us in the double meaning of the shell-shocked face. If the image of sacrifice links the war film to archaic rituals of community building, the image as evidence of crime refers to the violation of the articulated goals of such a political community. In this second meaning, the image aims at the pathos of moral outrage, at a wrath that turns against any attempts of bestowing significance to suffering. The iconography, plots, and narrative patterns of the genre develop along the lines of this
affective collision. In this manner, the variations of the pathos formula of the shell-shocked face structure the history and poetics of the Hollywood war film genre (cf. Kappelhoff, 2018).

**An affect theory of genres**

Without prematurely comparing the practice of film viewing to cultic activities and rituals, it seems apt to highlight one ritual aspect of this practice that helps us understand the generic function of the pathos formula and its lineage in the war film genre. That is, we can link the Hollywood war film genre to a form of collectivity that can be understood as the affective *substratum* of the political, as *sensus communis* or a feeling for that which is common: a sense of commonality. Analyzing the poetics of affect of the war film genre is necessary to understand and conceptually identify this sense of commonality in relation to the sphere of politics. Affect theory is naturally predisposed to the study of relations: between the individual and the collective, between bodies and media, and between politics and aesthetics.

Defining the generic function of the pathos formula can help us to develop an affective theoretical understanding of the poetics of genre, instead of understanding genres taxonomically and deriving this taxonomy from historical description, as is usually the case. The Hollywood war film genre provides a good example to implement this approach: Here, it is possible to observe how, within a clearly defined period (1940 to 1945), in a relatively homogeneous technological environment (cinema before 1950) and in a fully developed genre system (Hollywood), a new genre emerges, drawing from propaganda and publicly funded educational films as well as from popular entertainment. One can thus closely study the dynamics of the transformations through which the Hollywood genre system reacted to the symptoms of crisis appearing in a democracy at war. Insofar as the war film can be defined by a particular pathos, this pathos is closely tied to a crisis in the affective economy of the political system in the United States.

The pathos formula of the shell-shocked face corresponds to a crisis of political forms of community – a crisis whose manifestations are more than obvious after the excesses of state power in the wars and genocides of the 20th century. The crass contradiction between a meaningful sacrifice “for” and the senseless death of individuals “through” the political community is a conflict charged with affective tension. This conflict is unsolvable for any society invoking no higher authority in its political actions than the ordinary lives of many individuals. Consequentially, the Hollywood war film unfolds not as a heroic, but a melodramatic genre. This distinction appeals to a variant of aesthetic pleasure that initially does not appear particularly dignified in terms of political judgment. But the question of the relation between a sense of commonality and the political is intricately linked with the question of
how different modalities of aesthetic pleasure function in constituting such a feeling for what is common.

The war film genre makes an excellent case for the argument that the media practices and symbolic forms through which a society assures itself of its political cohesion are shaped by those modalities of experience that are usually located in the genres of art and entertainment. In any case, the staging strategies and poetic concepts of the Hollywood war film always refer to the affective tissue of a culture, advocating an emphatic idea of community. This is true whether individual films seek to affirm, mobilize, criticize, refuse, or renew these affective collectivizations in their pathos. Since this never takes place in the form of mere intellectual reflection, but is always mediated through the pleasure of being affected, we can speak of the Hollywood war film in terms of a poetics of affect. This perspective makes it possible to conceptualize the ritual dimension as an exemplary poetics of cinema understood as a media praxis through which a society understands itself as a political community.

References


**Filmography**

*Apocalypse Now*, 1979, Francis Ford Coppola.


*Platoon*, 1986, Oliver Stone.

*Saving Private Ryan*, 1998, Steven Spielberg.
The work of German art and cultural historian Aby Warburg can be described as a fragmented theory of affect that can address issues of formalization of affect, its circulation and dissemination (→ affective economy) as well as its temporality and historicity. In particular, Warburg’s notion of “Pathosformel” or “pathos formula” could become a key concept for an affect theory that seeks to address the affective in conjunction with the formal qualities of an object. Warburg introduced the term “Pathosformel” to describe expressive gestures of heightened affective intensity. For Warburg, pathos formulas are closely linked to primal bodily affects such as intoxication, ecstasy, pain, and the like, in their superlative form, such as highest arousal or deepest contemplation. The structural extension of the concept to all affective phenomena that we suggest in this chapter has emerged only through its reception by other scholars. Warburg saw these affects as being formalized, historically in objects of art. Understanding this non-trivial idea of formalization is key to a precise understanding of the notion of a pathos formula and to its affect theoretical potential. For Warburg, the formalization in question is primarily a matter of movement: certain aspects of artworks function such that they effectively “freeze” a movement into a dynamogram and thereby make it accessible and transferable (Gombrich, 1970, p. 248). Warburg’s idiom suggests that he thought of formalization along the lines of aesthetic or philosophical forms but also with respect to mathematical formulas. In science, a formula is a concise, symbolic expression of a certain relationship between given variables. This allows one to extract information about this relationship irrespective of quantity, and insert it into different calculations alongside other elements. In conjunction with the aesthetic notion of form, the concept of a formalized affect means that a certain relation or distribution of affective intensities can be given an aesthetic form, as in a classical painting. This form, for example, a gesture of ecstasy, can in turn serve as a formulaic manifestation of this relation of affective intensities. As such, it can be reused again by artists in different contexts. Thus, pathos formulas are an expression of the changing interference between stored or formalized affective energy and its forms of cultural dissemination. They not only reveal a long history of being handed
down by tradition, but also shape this history dynamically as they are shaped by it. As a formalization in this complex sense, a pathos formula enables affectivity to circulate: what has been an individual event becomes formulaic and can thus be copied and shared.

Only by formalization can affective events become simultaneously analytically accessible and affectively repeatable (→ (p)reenactment). This connects to yet another Warburgian term: “Nachleben” (afterlife). Probably taken from British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor (1871), “Nachleben” refers to the afterlife of images, motifs, and affects, and links the work of the art historian to that of the anthropologist. It is here that Warburg’s theory develops its most speculative idea of some sort of “mnemonic” triggering through which the pathos formula can animate its observer to reenact or relive stored affective intensity (Warburg, 1929/2010, p. 631). It is not just the observer who assimilates the images; the images themselves show a form of agency as they affect the observer actively. By offering an interpretation of Warburg that foregrounds this part of his theory, we focus on the relation of form and intensity in affective processes. With Warburg, we believe that there is no “pure” affect independent of its formalization and that affect, in turn, can be stored and released only by way of formalization. Warburg himself did not use the word “affect,” and his fragmented work, spread over many articles, notes, letters, and diary entries, demands more elaboration and requires a hermeneutical effort to excavate a Warburgian theory of affect. However, within the scope of this chapter we open up a line of interpretation that makes Warburg’s ideas productive for affect theory.

**Historical orientation and neighboring concepts**

The historical sources, inspirations, and precursors for Warburg’s concept are diverse and do not necessarily form a coherent whole (Böhme, 1997). Darwin’s view of the continuity of expression in human beings and animals is among them, as is Nietzsche’s theory on the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In addition, his work is influenced by linguistic, medical, and anthropological theories of his time. Briefly, we touch on a small selection of the disciplines and theories drawn on by Warburg.

Perhaps least surprising given his own profession, Warburg was influenced by historians such as Jacob Burckhardt and Karl Lamprecht, who expanded the reach of historical scholarship to include art and culture and, in the case of the latter, offered new sociological and psychological methods. In particular, Burckhardt’s “rediscovery” of the Renaissance as the cradle of modernity resonated with Warburg’s own interests. However, while indebted to these innovators, Warburg felt dissatisfied by their self-restrictive compartmentalization of history and the subsequent synthesis of its segments (Warburg, 1902/1980, p. 67). Instead, he sought out new ways to emphasize the heterogeneity of this particular epoch by looking at the many forms and
traces of an afterlife of antiquity within the Renaissance. He claimed to have found these traces in pathos formulas that survived from antiquity through the Middle Ages, re-emerging suddenly in Renaissance art.

The concept of an afterlife of pathos formulas came to Warburg from Tylor by way of Warburg’s colleague and friend, art historian Julius von Schlosser. Like von Schlosser, Warburg sometimes used the English “survival,” found in Tylor’s cultural anthropology, synonymously with “Nachleben” (Didi-Huberman, 2003). Survivals are cultural phenomena that persist even after the demise of the conditions that brought them about. Therefore, when Warburg uses the term afterlife in relation to pathos formulas, he assumes the survival of certain affective intensities via their artistic formalization. The enduring presence of the past makes any linear and monolithic historiography questionable.

Warburg’s general outlook, although not synthesized in a theory, influenced his contemporaries and disciplines outside the realm of art history. It laid the groundwork for an iconological method of art history, later known as the Hamburg School. Warburg’s personal library in Hamburg played an important role here. In the preface to the second volume of his Symbolic Forms, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer specifically mentions the library’s set-up. It appeared to be organized not according to disciplinary conventions, but arranged around a “central problem” (Cassirer, 1955, p. xviii), which concerned the expression and symbolization of a pre-rational, affective understanding of the world, clearly prefigured in Warburg’s idea of pathos formulas.

Lastly, this central idea of a cultural anthropology of affect and its formalizations can also be traced in an alternate genealogy, leading from Erwin Panofsky’s idea of the habitus of an epoch to Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological theories. This broad reception is very telling about the nature of Warburg’s ideas, and scholars like Giorgio Agamben and Georges Didi-Huberman have branded any disciplinary reduction of Warburg’s undertaking as contrary to its very essence (Agamben, 1999; Didi-Huberman, 2002/2017).

**Aby Warburg’s Pathosformel**

Definitions of what a Pathosformel is or does vary heavily in the literature or remain entirely absent, mostly because Warburg himself never further elaborated on the notion himself. At its most basic level, the word “Pathosformel” describes the depiction of expressive gestures; and, with regard to

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1 Tylor’s theories on “Primitive Culture” (1871) might also be the source for Warburg’s own primitivist views (e.g., Schlangenritual). On Warburg’s primitivism see also Maupeu (2016).
2 We write this chapter from the point of view of visual culture studies and art history. The reception of Aby Warburg is of course not limited to these fields. We cannot account for the diversity and interdisciplinary literature on Warburg in the scope of this chapter.
Warburg’s writings, more specifically those found in works of (Renaissance) art echoing antique portrayals of almost archetypal affect or pathos. Warburg uses the paradigmatic examples of dancing female figures like nymphs, gestures of death and the dying as seen in the figure of Orpheus, or scenes of erotic pursuits, such as the Zephyrus chasing Flora on Botticelli’s *Primavera*. However, pathos formulas are not studies of facial emotion expression. His interest lies not in the individual actualization of a general or basic emotion – like fear, anger, or desire – but in the generic reproduction of an expressive, affective formula that can, in fact, serve many different purposes. Warburg was neither looking for universal pathos formulas that would occur in all cultures, nor did he claim that every pathos would necessarily become a formula (Krois, 2002, pp. 300–302). Rather, he wanted to describe a transformation: something that is individual and refers to a specific event, in this case pathos, becomes generic and permanent, that is, formulaic. It is this formulaic character that enables circulation and reiteration, in contrast to bodily expressions that are situational and ephemeral (Krois, 2002, p. 295).

Under the impression of Charles Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Men and Animals* (1872), Warburg understood pathos as inseparable from but neither identical with nor causally related to its expression. Therefore, he did not follow the path of physiognomy, which conceptualized expression as mere effect of underlying (mechanical) goings-on in the soul. With Darwin, he understood expression as one of three behavioral phenomena: (1) as the result of the conflicting forces of *affect intensity*, in the sense of a will- and habit-independent, biologically necessary “direct action” of a nervous system that is being affected; (2) as a product of the faculty of *association*, which could trigger the same expressive reaction even without biological necessity and could bridge the gap between natural reaction and willful communication by the force of habit; (3) according to the *principle of antithesis*, by which forms of expressions are invented not by biological necessity, but by an inversion of already established movements; that is, the creation of forms of expression which stay immanent to communication, for example, shoulder shrugging as inversion of aggressive behavior without any biological necessity (Didi-Huberman, 2002/2017, ch. 3).

The word “*Pathosformel*” appears for the first time in a talk about Dürer and the Italian Antiquity, where Warburg uses it to refer to the defensive gesture of Orpheus, who is about to be slain (see Figure 19.1; Warburg, 1905/1998, p. 447).

Warburg claims an expressive or *gestural* genealogy connecting Dürer’s depiction of the *Death of Orpheus* to similar representations, and, through Angelo Polizianos play *Fabula di Orphee* and the writings of Ovid directly to the expressive repertoire or *formal vocabulary* (*Formensprache*) of antique art. Warburg is not interested in an evolution of styles, but in the formal iteration of expressions of pathos that constitute a memetic series, which he calls
“afterlife” (Nachleben). For instance, some affective intensity belonging to the Death of Orpheus, or the War against the Amazons of the Amazon Frieze from the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus has survived changes in time, lying latent during medieval times in its varying forms of expression. Equally, it survived
geographic changes from antique Rome, to Renaissance Florence, to Dürer’s Nuremberg, as well as changes in its cultural context, in this case from paganism to Christianity. Afterlife is not a theory of the evolution of emotional expression, where an original image is simply copied and slowly changed over time until it reaches its current form, as in the case of the development of pictograms to letters. Instead of an evolutionary model, it follows a psychoanalytical model of a symbolic relation between singular or collective experiences and symptomatic reiterations (Didi-Huberman, 2003), wherein the image of Orpheus’ death, for example, could be a formula for all affects concerning death, murder, loss, mourning, and so forth. To view the Death of Orpheus as formulaic reiteration of the “same but different” pathos of experiencing violence and death throughout history is to regard the representational nature of the image as second to its affective genealogy. Obviously, this is not the only possible way to look at it, nor does it contradict a merely representational reading.

To make this clearer, Warburg draws an analogy between his ideas and Hermann Osthoff’s linguistic theory of intensification (see Gombrich, 1970, p. 178). In this theory, the Latin word “bonus” (good) changes to suppletive forms: bonus, melior, optimus. The same happens to some infinitives when conjugated: to be – am – is – are. However, the sense of what is expressed by these words survives the semantic changes, remaining the same in essence, but changing form. Accordingly, what is “stored” or encoded in pathos formulas is not a particular emotion but its intensity in a particular formation (Warburg, 1929/2010, p. 631). The intensive peaks of pathos generate “extremes of physiognomic expression in the moment of highest excitement” (Warburg 1903–1906, as cited in Gombrich, 1970, p. 179), which no longer belong to one fixed emotional regime, like fear, agony, or lust, but mark the point of their possible transition.

This allows Warburg to trace pathos formulas independently of their emotional contexts. He goes as far as claiming that the emotional, cultural, or religious context attributed to a pathos formula may not only change slightly over the course of history but can be completely inverted to its opposite, for example, from the desire of pursuit to the fear felt in escape, or from the agony of death to the ecstasy of lust. He calls this shift “energetic inversion” (energetische Inversion) to express the dynamic and ambivalence of tension-filled movement (Gombrich, 1970, p. 338). Evil demoness or avenger angel, fighter or dancer – both are developed with the help of the same pathos formula. Hence, what Warburg is interested in is not individual expressions of emotion, but the generic or formulaic capturing of affective intensity. These formulas of intensity are not semantically fixed. Although they might have been connected to relatively stable semantic content over long periods of time and in many artworks, pathos formulas can also be recoded. Thus, they first and foremost function as a sign of affective intensity and energy.
Pathos formulas as intensifiers

For Warburg, the most basic formula for any intensity is motion or movement. In his dissertation on Sandro Botticelli, he pays special attention to the external and ornamental movement of things like drapes or hair in the wind (Warburg, 1893/2010). They add little to the narrative content of the image, but intensify the image. According to Warburg, these ornamental motions, which he calls “dynamograms” (Dynamogramme), fascinate and affect us, because they create the illusion of movement and liveliness in something that stands still, just like the term pathos formula itself binds together the event of affecting and being affected (→ affect) and the timeless, motionless idea of a formula. We miss the point of the dancing nymph, an allegory of Spring, who welcomes Venus on the shores, if we take her dancing (only) as dancing, while it actually works as an intensifier of the whole scene (see Figure 19.2). Warburg locates the affective intensity, or pathos, not on the faces of the goddess or any of the other three depicted figures, but rather sees it in the wave of Venus’ hair, in the joyful tumbling of the flower petals in the wind, as allegorized by the two figures on the left, and in the dance movements of the welcoming nymph to the right. These moving elements – fluttering garments, flying hair, drapes, and so forth – act like accessories. Warburg calls them “bewegtes Beiwerk” (moving accessories; Warburg, 1893/2010, p. 4) and traces them through time and artistic genres alike. Thus, Warburg posits, if artists wanted to add affective intensity to an image, they could accessorize them with formulaic props that reach back to antiquity; this would work independently from the facial expression of emotions.

Figure 19.2 Sandro Botticelli, *The Birth of Venus*, c. 1480, Tempera on panel. © Photographic Department of the Uffizi Galleries, Florence.
Storage and release of affect

As we have seen, the semantic framing of a pathos formula within an image is not essential to its affective intensity. The content or sujet of the image and its affective intensity might drift apart. This can create oscillating effects, between, for instance, pain and lust, or serene calmness and chilling lifelessness. When analyzing affects via the description of an image, attention must be paid to the internal resonances and possible dissonances between the context of the picture and the intensity of its affective qualities. A pathos formula does not have a fixed meaning of its own, but helps to generate meaning by arranging the affective dynamics within an image. In other words, a pathos formula does not illustrate a specific content, but almost literally moves or arranges the elements of an image, and thereby also moves and arranges the affective relation between the image and the viewer. Building on Warburg, we understand these two conjoined processes, affectively arranging the elements of an image and, consequently, arranging the relationship between image and viewer, as “storing” and releasing or reenacting affective intensity in a certain dynamic form. It is precisely this mutual affective relationship to which the art historical description of artifacts and images testifies, and no analysis of an image can step outside this affective relation. Hence, Warburg’s idea of a pathos formula is not only of value for art historians, but also for every researcher of affectivity who finds herself affectively entangled with the very objects she studies (Schankweiler & Wüschner, 2019).

This leads to the most speculative element of Warburg’s concept, which is the idea that affectivity is not only stored within pathos formulas but can also be released or reenacted by the beholder. According to Philipp Ekardt (2011), there is mimesis between objects and objects – for instance, different renderings of the same expression – constituting the afterlife of pathos formulas, and there is a mimetic relationship between object and subject, constituting the afterlife of the affective intensity within the beholder. This mimesis, therefore, is not only bodily but also psychological. Against the backdrop of Robert Vischer’s “Einfühlungsästhetik,” Ekardt claims, Warburg sees a mimetic element in the act of perception itself (Ekardt, 2011, p. 105). This mimetic assimilation within perception itself is possible only, because art, as Ekardt puts it, does not imitate or represent nature as such, nor even nature as experienced in perception, but “mimes the effects [emphasis added] of perception itself, understood as affects” (Ekardt, 2011, p. 105). Therefore, whenever they create or describe pathos formulas, artists and beholders alike refer to the same experience of being affected, which is stored in antique forms. This is a process that Vischer, too, calls “Nachleben,” thus adding to the possible sources for Warburg’s concept (Ekardt, 2011, p. 111). Thus, once perception and mimesis are fused together in affect, no “decoding” has to precede the reenactment of said affect. Strictly speaking, not even a transmission of affect is necessary, for affect itself is this transmission.
However, as intriguing as this theory might be, its empirical and theoretical foundations remain opaque or sometimes doubtful. At times, Warburg even seems to have followed a “biological-behavioral stimulus-response theory” and appears to argue for the dissemination of affective repertoires via genetic retransmission (Knape, 2008, p. 126). This is but one of several instances where Warburg leaves the reader with a feeling of uneasiness. It serves as a reminder that despite being a visionary thinker and practitioner, who is rightly considered a pioneer of visual culture studies today, Warburg needs to be understood in the context of the scientific landscape of the early 20th century. He followed in this tradition rather eclectically, while only turning his critical astuteness against his own discipline. Nevertheless, Warburg’s concept of the pathos formula entails an affect theory in its own right that we believe is not necessarily compromised by the rather problematic parts of his thinking.

Toward a theory of affective formulas and their iteration

It cannot be denied that Warburg developed his idea of pathos formula with reference to the human body. He was predominantly looking at figurative art and was especially interested in the depiction of human bodies, and of human affectivity that certainly affects the beholder in a particular and very direct manner. However, we deem it important to stress that pathos formulas are not conceptually bound to the human figure, just as being affected by an image cannot be reduced to feeling empathy toward who or what is represented. In Warburg’s efforts to address accessories in motion, we can already see a trajectory that leads beyond the human body, despite the fact that he identifies elements that are bound to the human body and its excited motion, like the aforementioned flying hair or draping. We would suggest expanding the scope of Warburg’s idea toward moving accessories that are detached from the human body. A painting or photograph of a dark sky, shrouded in clouds, above a turbulent sea, for example, could also be described as a formulaic movement generating affect, even as pathos. Moreover, even art or images that are not figurative at all could possibly be read along these lines – abstract painting like the scribbled, calligraphic elements in Cy Twombly’s work or Jackson Pollock’s abstract expressionism come to mind. The literal meaning of pathos in pathos formula might be strained by such examples, but we still would suggest a conceptual continuity between pathos formulas in the narrow sense and these formulaic arrangements of things and non-representational elements, a continuity, which for us is expressed best in Warburg’s own words as dynamograms.

Given the importance of movement, another point seems worthwhile to address: Warburg developed his ideas in relation to still images, such as paintings, prints, photographs, and did not include film – even though the emerging culture of cinema in the 1920s would have given him ample opportunity. In
view of the fact that Warburg also found pathos formulas in literary works (e.g., in Ovid), it must come as a surprise to us today that he himself did not include the kinaesthetic experience of the moving image that might even intensify affective dynamics. Although he did not rule out the application of the concept of pathos formula to moving images and thinking of formulas that unfold in time, Warburg focused on still images for a reason. For it is precisely the tension between movement, in the double sense of motion of bodies (and things) as well as being moved emotionally, and stillness that makes a pathos formula work (Krüger, 2013). Its formulaic character makes it easy to grasp, and easier to repeat, and to travel across time and space. Although videos are increasingly used in everyday communication, we tend to remember still images. As Julian Stallabrass (2017) writes: “Even in an age of instantly available video, iconic images – those that are reproduced insistently in the media and dwell most saliently in collective memory – are more likely to be still photographs” (p. 29). Since Warburg’s idea of pathos formula is connected inextricably to memory and mimesis and to the question of how affectivity can be stored and “survive” over time, it seems less surprising that he ignored moving images. The issue of memory gained center stage in Warburg’s unfinished project of Mnemosyne Atlas. At the end of his life it consisted of 63 boards covered in heavy black cloth with (mainly) photographs of pieces of art, illustrations from books or albums, newspaper clippings and other media pinned onto them. The atlas, named after the goddess of memory in Greek mythology, offers insights into formalized affectivity and its historical transmission. It is Warburg’s attempt at a cartography of pathos formulas as they are actualized in an iterating series of images. As such, the atlas emphasizes the dynamic historicity of both imagery and affectivity.

To summarize, our reading of Warburg’s ideas, especially that of his key notion of pathos formula, contributes to the field of affect studies with regard to three main aspects: First, the concept of pathos formula enables us to address affective intensity as a formal quality. Second, the idea of dynamic formalization stresses that affect can indeed be stored in objects of art and in images in general, and can be transmitted across time and space. Third, and connected to the latter, the idea of formalized affective intensity enables us to theorize the issue of the historicity of affect. As a particular formation, affectivity can have an afterlife that can be traced back, and at the same time dynamically shapes future affectivity connected to images.

References


Immersion is a specific quality that emerges through dynamics of affecting and being affected, and is characterized by a dense involvement of the subject in an interactive and inter-affective context that entangles thinking, feeling, and acting. Immersion is based on the subject’s affective disposition, selected aspects of which are activated in an immersive situation (→ affective disposition). Thus while the individual brings a certain potential to be immersed, it is the specific framing of an inter-affective and relational context that unleashes and harnesses this potential in a particular manner. While this happens, any possibility of distancing on the part of the subject is temporarily blocked. The immersed subject is “at the mercy of” the inter-affective context, but also simultaneously contributes to and participates in that context. From the perspective of the immersed subject, the affective quality of immersion is characteristically accompanied by experiences such as absorption or uneasiness with/in the micro-social dynamics of the respective situation.

Examples from two specific domains are paradigmatic for studying the phenomenon of immersion in the context of affect theory. The first domain is part of a current trend called “immersive arts.” This umbrella term gathers a range of artistic formats that “immerse” their recipients into the performance event in different ways: by mobilizing the spectator, through the use of Virtual Reality (VR) or Augmented Reality (AR) tools, or through participatory techniques that involve the audience members in a situation, narration, or instruction. Here, we focus on performance installations that create fictional worlds actualized in large-scale site-specific environments. The audience is invited to roam freely and explore the fiction through various modes of interaction with performers, props, and other audience members. Specifically, works of the Danish-Austrian performance collective SIGNA are exemplary in provoking situations in which “spect-actors” are involved in inter-affective and interactive micro-situations in which they cannot but act and affect according to their personal dispositions.1 Immersion in these

1 The term “spect-actors” refers to spectators that are strategically activated to engage in a certain role or function within a performance.
performance installations is, for the subject, a specific mode of situational (re)enacting of emotions, states, or evaluations. Immersion unfolds as a result of finding oneself embedded in an affective arrangement (affective arrangement), which can activate the full range of someone’s affective and psychological dispositions. These might include traumata, shame, inferiority complexes, and other sensitivities.

The second domain we discuss is modern Human Resource Management (HRM) in post-industrial work cultures. Current corporate governance techniques increasingly tend to create lifestyle environments at work. In these settings, employees engage in a full spectrum of social, affective, psychological, and cognitive registers. In intensive and holistic environments, workers are simultaneously stimulated and harnessed at the level of their intrinsic motivational dispositions. As these dispositions are social and affective in nature, their activation during work tends to blur the boundaries between work and leisure. This facilitates a form of micro-governance that modulates people’s behavior for the company’s benefit by stimulating affective dynamics that strategically prevent moments of distancing and critique.

In this chapter we pursue the claim that these phenomena of immersion reveal a significant structural aspect of contemporary societies at large. Immersion is less a particular phenomenon in art and corporate governance than an increasingly poignant theme in a general cultural diagnosis. A willingness, readiness, or even a manifest desire of subjects to become immersed and to immerse themselves is evident in a range of domains; at the same time, new techniques of post-disciplinary micro-governance and power are based on immersion. Since public debate tends to limit immersion to VR technology, in this chapter we will counter such techno-centricity by presenting an affect-theoretical approach geared toward understanding immersion as a lived form of intersubjectivity and affectivity in a spectrum of lifeworld settings (Mühlhoff & Schütz, 2017).

**Different phenomena of immersion**

The English term “immersion” derives from the Latin verb immergere and offers a constellation of at least three slightly different meanings. First, it can refer to the act of immersing, and second, to the state of being immersed in a surrounding medium, for instance a person in water. In both cases, immersion is used transitively: somebody or something is immersed into another substance, in the sense of submersion or “diving in.” Notably, both the immersed object and the medium remain distinct in this connotation of the word. A third meaning of immersion refers to the extensive exposure of a person, for instance, to a foreign culture or language environment for the purpose of learning. In this case, immersion addresses a way of deep bodily and mental involvement up to the point of absorption and amalgamation aimed at transforming the individual. This third facet of meaning derives from
the verb “to merge,” which is connected to “immersion” through the Latin verb *immergere*. Immersion in the sense of merging suggests the amalgamation, fusion, or coalescence of an immersed individual within something else. Our affect theoretical conceptualization of immersion selects and highlights this third meaning because it provides a way of overcoming a static subject–object divide. Relationality among different individuals and within specific environments is key to the understanding of immersion. The examples we take up below suggest that an immersed individual and the social group or environment into which they are immersed are no longer the same objects. Immersion is therefore not to be understood as a one-directional absorption or submersion of someone into something, in which each entity remains discrete and fixed, but rather as a mutual transformation of both.

Because of its spectrum of connotations, the term immersion has been adopted by a broad range of scientific and cultural discourses. For instance, in film, literature, and game studies the term is used to describe a mode of reception. The reader of a piece of literature is considered to be immersed if they are mentally or imaginatively traveling into the represented world. Analogously, this effect of absorption in a mediated world may describe the experience of watching a movie or a realistic play in a theater. Immersion is also a trending keyword in the lively field of gaming, where it refers to a mode of being-in that is not merely a quality of reception but a visual and tactile strategy facilitated by special technological media devices. Research in game studies describes immersion as a special moment of presence, as an impression of sensory and motor involvement in a represented and mediated world. The development of VR and AR technologies and their interfaces aims to increase this effect of presence by systematically connecting the human perceptual apparatus with hardware devices producing an *as-if* effect based on physical stimulation, algorithms, and digital data.

In response to this somewhat vague and often metaphorical use of the term immersion in art, media, and game studies, Gordon Calleja (2011, pp. 26–27) calls for a differentiation between immersion as absorption and immersion as transportation in the context of reception theory. Immersion as transportation addresses the reception of the mediated “possible world,” its environment, the characters, the storyline, and so forth (see also Ryan, 2001, pp. 99–105). Immersion as absorption, however, focuses more on the quality of the medium, that is, on its capabilities of undisturbed mediation. Beside the often vague and heterogeneous usage of the term immersion in art and media studies, the discourse also tends to remain entrenched in a binary mode of thinking, frequently evoking a range of dichotomies such as active versus passive, absorption versus reflection, proximity versus distance, or manipulation versus agency. This binary thinking finds parallels with the rather simplistic way of evaluating the phenomena of immersion in a dichotomous scheme of either optimistic and affirmative or pessimistic and dismissive critiques.
While no systematic history of the concept of immersion exists, Oliver Grau (2003) argues that the history of immersion as a mode of reception is as old as the history of illusionist art. With each new medium of illusion, the relationship between the power of the image (or, the power of the medium mediating the image) and the recipient’s strategies to distance themselves from perceptual or imaginary immersion had to be renegotiated. Raising the question of the subject’s self-positioning toward ongoing perceptual, sensual, or affective manipulations in immersive contexts is therefore key to the debate on immersion. This holds not only in the field of art but also within the widespread aesthetic use of immersive techniques in everyday life. The phantasmatic _topos_ of “total immersion” combines both the desire for immersing oneself in a pleasurable mode of manipulation and the fear of being immersed without recognizing it. This is why current research in film and theater studies analyzes the moment of experienced immersion as a permanent oscillation between diving in and resurfacing (Schweinitz, 2006, p. 147).

In contemporary neoliberal capitalism, immersive techniques have become increasingly ubiquitous phenomena (Curtis, 2008, p. 79). Several strategies of binding subjects (in)to a specific and intense surrounding in consumer capitalism, experience industry and affective computing could also be described as techniques of immersion. Retail and trade corporations in different fields increasingly rely on elements of scenography and scent design in order to transform their stores into exceptional “places to be.” Their idea is to create an environment with a pleasant atmosphere in order to capture the multisensorial attention of the consumer. Architecture and city marketing, which increasingly utilize immersive techniques or so-called “scripted spaces” (Klein, 2004), like small model versions of Venice, are another example of an attempt to immerse consumers into constructed everyday worlds. Dark restaurants and immersive fitness centers are only a stone’s throw from entertainment sector events like “secret cinema” venues, transgressive nightclub formats, “escape room games,” or popular “immersive theater” performances. All of these forms work with the marketing promise of an extraordinary experience and a unique, unforgettable event. In addition to normalizing escapism in a way, these sectors work on temporally and spatially embedding the subject in a designed but real space. In this context, processes of gamification can also be analyzed as governance techniques producing a subject’s motivation and desire to take part in these forms and events.

At this point, it becomes clear that immersion is used as a metaphor to describe vastly diverse phenomena. In contrast, the examples we use below facilitate an analysis of the (affective) impact of social–relational arrangements that embed subjects in a specifically affective way. It is therefore important to distinguish between two different senses of immersion. First, as a broader understanding of processes that emphasize a subject’s embeddedness in the world, that is, the state of being immersed in a language, an environment, or within culturally and socially constructed feeling rules (→ feeling rules) or...
behavioral patterns. Second, it is a mode of experiencing situations as immersive due to a specific affective intensity or impact.

Returning to our first example, the work of SIGNA offers a striking case study to elaborate our affect theoretical conception of immersion. Unlike in the case of film, VR, or AR, the specific mediality and materiality of theater in SIGNA’s performance installations do not use technological devices to stimulate or facilitate the spectators’ “plunge” into fiction. Rather, the spect-actors’ state of immersion is the result of direct face-to-face involvement and inter-affective relations with the performers within the performance space. The artistically designed environments in SIGNA’s performance installations work as hyper-realistic simulations of closed milieus. For instance, spect-actors are invited to experience themselves as patients in a psychiatric hospital (Ventestedet/Waiting Room, Copenhagen 2014), as employees in a tightly hierarchically structured corporation (Söhne und Söhne/Sons and Sons, Hamburg 2015), or as potential members of a mysterious sect (Das Heuvolk/Peoples of Hay, Mannheim 2017). Although audience members are mostly aware of being spectators within a theatrical scenario, the installation consistently creates situations that lead them to neglect this frame by crystallizing the bare immediacy of acting and reacting in an intense affective dynamic. Characteristic of SIGNA’s installations is a rigid power structure of the represented (fictional) world that involuntarily implicates and binds audience members. At the immediate level of embodied interaction, the often dystopian narrative of SIGNA’s fictions is supplemented by transgressions such as exposing spect-actors to performers’ intense gazes or to instructions given in a commanding tone. The multisensory perception of the closed space often involves purposefully instigated disgust (for instance, through exposure to vomit or bodily fluids) and unease (for instance, through being questioned on intimate topics or being approached in a sexually explicit manner). This turns SIGNA’s installations into a very specific affective arrangement (affective arrangement) in which each individual enters into an immersive interplay of affecting and being affected in situ, which produces a degree of immediacy beyond fictionality and technical mediation.

Another remarkable aspect of SIGNA’s dramaturgy is the staging of scenes of violence. Spect-actors see performers become victims of physical or psychological violence in their immediate proximity. Such acts are part of the fiction but enacted in a real, material scenario of face-to-face interaction. This exposure forces spect-actors to react and take a possibly moral or political stance toward what they see. In these situations, individuals might find themselves immersed into a dense affective struggle based on their own ethical and political values and normative rules of behavior and feeling. SIGNA’s dramaturgy catalyzes such struggles and the potential re-actions and interventions by audience members by purposefully stimulated group dynamics and politics of gazes between the audience members.
An affect theoretical approach to immersion

In our approach based on an affect theoretical framework (→ affect; → affective disposition), immersion names a certain mode of emotional and affective involvement in a situated or mediated dynamic of affecting and being affected. This mode of involvement is characterized by the inherent entanglement of the individual contributing to and participating in this dynamic. Simultaneously, the overarching context is subtly modulating the individual’s feeling, thinking, and acting. This is what constitutes the mutually transformative aspect of immersion, overcoming a static subject–object divide in which the immersed subject and the medium remain distinct. From a subjective perspective, the affective tonality of an immersive mode of involvement may best be described as absorption or coalescence within the local affective arrangement (→ affective arrangement) that frames the situation. Importantly, this absorption or coalescence is not solely externally induced, but rather builds on the individual’s specific affective disposition (→ affective disposition) that shapes their potential to contribute actively to an affective dynamic. For an affect theoretical understanding of immersion, we propose the following explication in three steps:

1. First, immersive involvements are characterized by the relationality of affect. That is, immersion is based on reciprocal dynamics of affecting and being affected, of activity and passivity, movement and sensation, action and experience. Immersion does not solely render passive, overwhelm, or overpower the immersed subject. In an entanglement of active and passive involvement, how the subject is affected depends irreducibly on how it affects others within the same dynamic.

2. Reciprocity of affect is a necessary but not sufficient criterion of immersion. The specific and distinguishing criterion of immersion is a reciprocal dynamic of affect accompanied by the experience of absorption by the subject being immersed. By this, we mean constellations in which the relational dynamic seems to cast a spell on the subject, capturing them completely in a specific local frame that functions as a social, affective, discursive, symbolic, and institutional force field. Absorption is the moment where one’s own (affective, cognitive, bodily) potential is harnessed in such a way that it turns into an integral part of the ensemble at hand. It is accompanied by emotional involvement that shapes the spectrum of possibilities for the subject to think and act in that situation. In immersion, these possibilities diverge from those the subject has at their disposal outside the immersive framing and with respect to their whole biography. Depending on the situation, this may mean a limitation of the spectrum, so that only part of one’s affective disposition is in play. Or, it could have a productive and constitutive effect: the specific experience of immersion might open up surprising new forms of feeling, acting, and embodiment that could be transformative for subjectivity.
From the perspective of affect theory, it is important that immersion is neither a property only of a certain situated arrangement or ensemble, nor of the immersed subject alone, but rather of the interplay of both. The subject is immersed into an affective dynamic by means of specific aspects of their affective disposition (→ affective disposition). In immersion, the reciprocity of affecting and being affected stabilizes into a certain pattern by means of feedback processes between the individual’s disposition and the environment’s affective stimuli. In such a feedback loop, the subject is already susceptible to this particular mode of being absorbed – it is part of their affective disposition. At the same time, this mode of being absorbed is selectively intensified and possibly deliberately stabilized in the local framing. As a result, changing one’s mode of involvement to different patterns of affecting and being affected – for instance, by means of deliberate interventions, volatile behavioral strategies, or reflexive distancing – is possible in principle, but made difficult by the specific design of immersive contexts. This is why immersion typically limits a subject’s scope of attention, sensitivity, and action to the present context. The immersed subject is thus in a state of absorption in the situation in either a pleasurable or displeasing way. One could get carried away by an immersive dynamic or get framed in a disturbing way; in both cases, one’s powers of thinking, feeling, and acting would be modulated by that specific mode of involvement. Because of this mechanism of relational co-constitution, immersion does not overwhelm or overpower the individual from without, nor does it make it passive. Here, our conception moves beyond those approaches that describe immersion as a mode of illusionist reception related to technological or artistic frames that imply mental, imaginary, or virtual traveling into a fictional world (Ryan, 2001; Griffiths, 2008; Wolf, Bernhart, & Mahler, 2013), whether in games (Jennett et al., 2008), films (Rose, 2011), multisensory immersive theater environments (Machon, 2013), or everyday settings (Bieger, 2007). Our understanding of immersion, in contrast, focuses on affective dynamics in which deeply rooted psychological and affective dispositions of specific individuals enter into a feedback loop with environmental stimuli. In this approach, immersion is not primarily based on being separated or shielded from an outside world. Rather, it starts from inherent and intensive forces of involvement so that closure of the interactive sphere of an immersive situation is not a cause, but an effect of immersion. This understanding facilitates critical analyses in which immersion may be seen as a mechanism of immanent rather than repressive power.

**Immersive power**

As a broader cultural diagnosis, the adaptation of immersive techniques in marketing and consumer spheres can be deciphered as indicating a prevalent
readiness or even longing to be immersed. This observation leads to the social theoretical observation that the cultural disposition toward immersion does not only correlate with certain forms of entertainment or modes of aesthetic reception. It is also being discovered and (sometimes furtively) adopted by modern techniques of micro-governance and subjectivation. This is particularly evident in contemporary Human Resource Management, our second exemplary domain: a field in which applied psychology, digitization, and micro-economics all interact with each other. For instance, in the current trend of “start-up culture” copied from Silicon Valley companies into many classical branches of knowledge work industries, science, research, and even public administration, companies seek to attract employees with the promise of holistic work environments and intense social dynamics in a closed sphere of “amazing” co-workers. These work environments powerfully integrate elements of work and leisure in the workspace, functional and aesthetic considerations in the design of offices and interactions as “lifeworlds,” and work relations with implicitly orchestrated forms of social and affective attachment. All this fits with the “post–industrial” paradigm of production (cf. Liu, 2004) and the subjectivity of the “entrepreneurial self” (Bröckling, 2016). The lines between work and life, duties and pleasures, and company goals and personal goals are thereby increasingly blurred (Mühlhoff & Slaby, 2018).

Melissa Gregg (2011) shows in her workplace ethnographic study that workers’ immersion in modern HRM formations is not only a face-to-face interaction in the presence of co-workers. Due to the proliferation of networked media, work is, in fact, no longer spatially contained. Yet paradoxically, increasing spatial dissolution due to digital connectivity does not mean work is less immersive. In fact, the demand for availability on electronic communication platforms, from real time emailing to chat programs or video telephony, penetrates into the most intimate spheres of life such as bedrooms and evening hours, activating even the most remote portions of a worker’s time and mental capacity as a resource for company benefit. An immersive work environment is thus a complex heterogeneous ensemble of persons, architectural designs, company visions and discourses, and technological infrastructure. These elements interplay to form a dense web of involvement.

The trend of immersive governance at work, which is evident in the design of office spaces as holistic environments and in the ubiquitous connectivity of networked media, is part of a wider dispositif of the psychologization of micro-management in the New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999/2007). Resulting from intellectual precursors such as cybernetics and group dynamic research in the second half of the 20th century, techniques such as “team work,” “soft skill trainings,” “bonding exercises,” and regular “performance reviews” that also cover personal and social competences build today’s standard repertoire of corporate socialization measures. Seen from a critical point of view, such measures exist to produce suitable affective dispositions in co-workers, which allows for a form of corporate governance that
operates almost exclusively by “positive” forces. The older techniques of discipline, internalization of role expectations, and functional assignments are thus replaced by an immersive style of governance that strategically addresses co-workers’ social and interpersonal motivations and needs; in short, their affective attachment patterns.

While work in such environments often feels free and self-organized, which is in fact one of its promises and a result of its specific subjectivation, discourses and modes of reflexivity in such environments are strategically set up in such a way that conscious distancing, critiques of this form of involvement, or temporal withdrawal often come at high psychological and emotional costs. In a sphere where work relations are meant to blend with social relations, duty with pleasure, and company goals with subjective goals, an effort to distance oneself or have upfront conversations on critical points is easily a paradoxical and self-destructive endeavor that goes against one’s own social bonds and motivations (cf. Gregg, 2011). This is why we consider HRM an example of immersion – of the strategic production of absorption and amalgamation based on one’s own affective disposition – on a subtle and everyday scale. The case shows that the design of immersive environments is used as a modern technique of affective governmentality. In this way, our affect theoretical approach to immersion sheds new light on the diagnosis of “societies of control” (Deleuze, 1992), and shows how control is implemented by the implicit stimulation of affective mechanisms. Immersion, then, appears as a certain modality of subjectivation and power that operates in the register of affective relations more than in discourse. A critical analysis of governmentality based on “immersive power” (Mühlhoff, 2018) provides an important contribution towards the as of yet insufficiently developed theory of power and subjectivity in control societies.

References


Emotion repertoires are specific configurations of cultural repertoires (Swidler, 2001) that guide human action and meaning in durable, practicable, and relationally intelligible ways. Emotion repertoires endow individuals and collectives with the agency and security to display, negotiate, and thus regulate felt experiences in socially and culturally appropriate ways. These repertoires take shape during processes of socialization but remain flexible due to a life-long formation of feeling as well as due to ongoing affective experiences and societal transformations. Based on such a dynamic and agentive understanding, we argue that individuals and collectives variously draw on emotion repertoires to create relational spheres of affective resonance. Within these spheres, individuals and collectives either build and enact, or unbind, attachments and affectional bonds and can thus both facilitate and hinder feelings of belonging. In other words, emotion repertoires are the “glue” that connects individuals within different affective communities as part of Affective Societies.

Our theoretical foundation of the concept of emotion repertoires builds on and brings together ideas from a variety of related disciplines such as cultural sociology and cultural anthropology (Coe, 2013; Swidler, 1986, 2001), theater and performance studies (Davis, 2009), psychological anthropology and its subfield of cognitive anthropology (Lowe, 2018; Röttger-Rössler, 2004), and the philosophy and history of emotion (e.g., Reddy, 2001; Slaby, Mühlhoff, & Wüschner, 2016). Based on our interdisciplinary anthropological-psychiatric research in heterogeneous Vietnamese lifeworlds in Berlin (Heyken et al., forthcoming; von Poser, Lanca, & Heyken, 2017; Ta, Hahn, Nguyen, & Spennemann, 2017), we use the framework of “repertoires” in order to present and discuss three distinct, yet constantly interlinked analytic dimensions, which we consider as paramount to and constitutive of emotion repertoires. The first dimension addresses the durability and intransigence of emotion repertoires, whereas the second and third dimensions relate to the practicability as well as to the relationality of emotion repertoires. We build on recent theories of affect and emotion in the social and cultural sciences (von Scheve, 2017; Slaby & Röttger-Rössler, 2018) to explore the
affective efforts that individuals and collectives undertake in processes of readjusting internalized emotion repertoires within contexts of migration. The aforementioned dimensions, as well as the interlinkages between them, have the potential to become the subject of inquiry in several disciplines. They have yet to be thoroughly addressed within transdisciplinary emotion and affect research and in the context of research on *Affective Societies*. Moreover, emotion repertoires relate to other salient emotional and affective phenomena studied in various disciplines. Therefore, the conceptual value of emotion repertoires transcends disciplinary boundaries.

**Conceptualizing emotion repertoires**

Our concept of emotion repertoires might be thought of as an expansion of what cultural sociologist Ann Swidler (1986, 2001) defines as a “cultural repertoire,” which is a prominent theoretical framework relating back to the work of social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1969). Recently, the concept has been taken up by a number of scholars (e.g., Coe, 2013; Lowe, 2018) to refine investigations at the interface of culture, agency, and social and emotional navigation. According to Swidler (2001), a cultural repertoire is a kind of toolkit that “allows people to move among situations, finding terms in which to orient action within each situation” (p. 30). In framing culture as a set of repertoires, analogous to those of an actor, a musician, or a dancer, Swidler argues that individuals have learned to rely on an available array of cultured skills, resources, arguments, or strategies in responding to a given social situation. Swidler, moreover, grounds culture and the concept of a repertoire in action, experience, and practice. Thereby, she deploys a praxeological, highly dynamic, and agentive notion of repertoire, which she explains as follows:

> We can ask not only what pieces are in the repertoire but why some are performed at one time, some at another. [...] Just as a musician may have easier, more assured mastery over some parts of her repertoire than others, so our mastery of culture varies. Some cultural orientations are so ingrained that they require neither effort nor self-consciousness. Others require laborious concentration. And still other parts of a repertoire are insecurely learned, so that one may act out a cultural attitude without being very good at it. (Swidler, 2001, pp. 24–25)

Scholars interested in repertoire theory and emotion theory have indeed drawn on performance theory (e.g., Coe, 2013; Röttger-Rössler, 2016; Sarbin, 1986). Anthropologist Cati Coe, whose research on the social navigations of Ghanaian migrant families is theoretically informed by work in performance studies (e.g., Tailor, 2003), argues that:
a person only enacts some of his or her repertoire in the world. A repertoire can contain other possibilities for action that are declined, for whatever reason, including personal history, or as people reflect on their actions and situations. [...] People may know more than they enact or be aware of greater possibilities of action than they believe is right to do.

(Coe, 2013, p. 19)

Following this tradition, we take theater and performance theorist Tracy D. Davis’ (2009) definition as a productive point of departure to explicate the durability and resistiveness to change of emotion repertoires. However, this relative intransigence does not mean that they are fixed, stable, or rigid. Rather, they are characterized by possibility, adaptability, and creativity. Davis (2009) states that repertoires are “multiple circulating recombinative discourses of intelligibility” (p. 7; italics in original) that provide audiences with the ability to comprehend and interpret different performative tropes as well as incorporate new ones by means of creative improvisation. Based on a “phenomenology of experiencing” (Davis, 2009, p. 7), collectives are thus explicitly able to draw on the possibilities produced by performances of interacting bodies in reiterative and recombinative ways.

Emotion repertoires, as part of cultural repertoires, enable individuals and collectives to communicate durable meanings out of a number of possibilities and perform actions in intelligible ways on various levels at which emotions evolve (Svašek, 2010). At the level of “discourse,” emotions evolve in relation to social and cultural categorizations, associations, imaginations, interpretations, and evaluations. At the level of “embodiment,” emotions evolve in relation to bodily and sensory perceptions, reactions, and expressions (Wetherell, 2012). At the level of “practice,” emotions shape and are shaped by behavioral patterns, habits, and modes of action and interaction (→ emotion, emotion concept; → affective practice). When acquiring cultural repertoires, individuals and collectives thus also learn to encode felt experiences as discrete emotions, how and when to display and respond to feelings in certain ways, and which positive or negative sanctions to anticipate in view of their own and others’ affective and emotional enactments (Röttger-Rössler, 2004; Röttger-Rössler & Markowitsch, 2009).

Emotion repertoires are significantly shaped during implicit as well as explicit processes of socialization. A comparative study of childrearing practices in two different societies in Taiwan and Madagascar found that the “enactment of culture-specific socializing emotions leads to different trajectories of emotional development and thus to different emotion repertoires” (Röttger-Rössler et al., 2015, pp. 191–192, italics in original). It is within processes of socialization that emotion repertoires gain a quality of durability as children imitate and habituate these repertoires, often in deeply embodied ways, and simultaneously test their practicability in the relational affective settings of different social and spatial fields. In her research on emotions in an
Indonesian society, Röttger-Rössler (2004, pp. 70–79) draws on approaches from cognitive anthropology to argue for how deeply “cultural models of emotion” become ingrained. According to her view, human emotionality develops in relation to cultural schemas (as information-processing mechanisms) and cultural models (as the more complex interconnections of different schemas) that individuals acquire and that are collectively recognized, available, and shared (see also Lowe, 2018). In terms of durability, individuals constantly rely on schemas in their structural/categorical and hierarchical organization of subjective and shared experiences. In terms of practicability, individuals repeatedly draw upon and process these schemas whenever they face similar experiences. Finally, in terms of relationality, schemas unfold in dynamic ways during interactions with one’s environment. A child seeing his/her parents warmly hugging one another in situations of happiness, for instance, is likely to apply this embodied schema of hugging someone he/she likes in a similar situation in a similar fashion. Importantly, as Röttger-Rössler (2004, pp. 97–98) highlights, the schemas that are imbued with feelings in interaction become most salient and ingrained in the social and emotional makeup of individuals and collectives.

While much is set during earlier phases of socialization, which ideally provide individuals and collectives with a noticeable sense of emotional security and competence, emotion repertoires nevertheless remain malleable over the course of people’s personal “affective lives” (von Poser, 2018) and in accordance with the life-long formation of feeling (→ Gefühlsbildung). In these ongoing processes, a “repertoire is creative, flexible, and adaptable, because it has to be applied to a situation that is not exactly similar to the situations that have come before” (Coe, 2013, p. 20). Due to their social, spatial, and temporal situatedness and due to changing experiential horizons in the lives of both individuals and collectives, emotion repertoires thus remain flexible and are therefore not always or equally binding for all individuals and collectives. Accordingly, some cultural schemas within broader repertoires may prove impractical in new situations whereas others might become vital in organizing experiences.

Our conceptual proposal to introduce the notion of “repertoire” to affect and emotion research foregrounds an actor-centered approach (see also Wetherell, 2012) as pursued within the framework of our anthropological-psychiatric research. In line with philosophers of emotion (Roberts, 2003; Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009) and historians of emotion (Reddy, 2001; Scheer, 2012), we systematically incorporate a “situated perspective on emotions” (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009) into our concept of emotion repertoires. Recognizing that situatedness matters greatly, scholars from the fields of cultural anthropology (Coe, 2013), social psychology (Wetherell, 2012), and the philosophy of emotion (Slaby et al., 2016) have variously preferred the term “repertoire” over Pierre Bourdieu’s famous notion of “habitus.” We agree with Coe, who argues that the emphasis of “habitus” on embodied and unconscious
dispositions “slights the moments when such dispositions become visible and discussed” (Coe, 2013, p. 16). Although Coe does not systematically link “repertoire” with emotion theory, her argument that “the historical moments when something commonsensical becomes the subject of commentary […] are important, because they signal change” (Coe, 2013, p. 16) is in line with our understanding of the dynamic and processual nature of emotion repertoires. Social psychologist Margaret Wetherell (2012), too, takes a critical stance toward “habitus.” She criticizes the relative fixity of the correspondence between individual embodied schemas and the normative patterns of a social field in Bourdieu's account. Instead, she proposes a more flexible, domain- and practice-specific repository of affective and emotional enactments.

We think that the answer to Swidler’s question of why some parts of a repertoire are performed at different times and with varying levels of mastery, must come from an in-depth analysis of the dynamic interplay between the duratomicity, practicability, and relationality of any repertoire in a given situation. Our empirical example focuses on the imbalance between the durability, practicability, and relationality of emotion repertoires as a possible reason for the heterogeneous and fraught affective complexities that migration caused in the lives of our interlocutors. Indeed, in today’s increasingly pluralized and complex societies, encounters with different emotion repertoires become much more frequent, as do encounters between persons with highly different worldviews, normative orientations, and values. Under these circumstances, the practicability of internalized emotion repertoires might be hampered and the “act of transposing one’s repertoire to a new resistant situation causes repertoires to shift slightly or abruptly, whether consciously or not” (Coe, 2013, p. 22). Such shifts in prevailing emotion repertoires, we believe, may occur with increased affective intensity when individuals and collectives socialized with different emotion repertoires become suddenly and forcefully entangled with one another. Depending on the quality of affective resonance that these entanglements instigate between individuals, collectives, surroundings, materialities, and objects, emotion repertoires are shared or solidified in different spheres of belonging, or are contested and transformed and thus attuned to ever-changing environments (→ belonging; → affective communities; → affective resonance).

**Illuminating emotion repertoires**

Our empirical insights stem from observations and conversations in clinical and everyday encounters with first-generation Vietnamese migrants within the framework of psychiatric anthropology (Heyken et al., forthcoming). Our interlocutors were born and raised in different parts of Vietnam. They left their country of birth either as contract workers or refugees. Years after their arrival, they are now participants of an innovative group therapy setting offered at a specialized psychiatric outpatient clinic in Berlin (Ta et al., 2017). In illuminating the concept of emotion repertoires, we concentrate on affective
dissonances as felt frictions that manifest as clashing emotion repertoires. We also highlight the possibilities of overcoming these frictions using therapeutic intervention.

In long-term ethnographic encounters with one of the authors (Heyken), Mr. N, for instance, repeatedly referred to his difficulty in addressing situations of unease in a direct manner. These were situations in which he felt he was treated unfairly or felt disempowered through the actions of others. Instead of immediately voicing his complaints, he remained silent, which, in turn, led to a felt affective dissonance that he described as “inner turmoil” or “pressure.” These affective tensions then negatively reverberated in him upon remembering such situations. To contextualize this affective dissonance, Mr. N recalled a situation in which his German colleagues argued with each other but still remained friends. Mr. N said that this would be impossible among elderly Vietnamese men, instead symbolizing a loss of face and the termination of friendship, and eventually culminating in emotions of anger, frustration, and rage. According to the emotion repertoire he and his generation had acquired during socialization in Vietnam, one needs to follow a relational approach in communicating complaints. Thus, Mr. N explained that one is supposed to deploy an indirect approach, which avoids phrasing one’s argument openly and which often requires appropriate acquaintances to negotiate the problem and figure out solutions with the opposing party. Apart from verbal modes of expression, the acquaintances would also need to deploy nonverbal modes such as taking respectful and reserved body postures or avoiding direct eye contact. Mr. N further reported that, when directly confronted by a German colleague, he became petrified, as he was not able to spontaneously react to this confrontation. Upon Mr. N’s reaction, his colleague mocked him. In narrating his experiences, Mr. N said that he had observed his colleagues’ bodily and verbal reactions in situations of stress – such as clapping on one’s thigh or briefly shouting out – and that he had tried to perform similar actions but failed because these expressed repertoires were so diametrically opposed to his own deeply internalized modes of dealing with stress. In interactions with Vietnamese friends and acquaintances in Berlin, his emotion repertoire still proved practicable, whereas it caused dissonance in the relational context of his German-dominated environment.

Within the therapeutic context of the specialized outpatient clinic, Mr. N voiced his affliction to the psychiatrist for the first time. Later, he agreed to join an innovative, interdisciplinarily conceived group therapy focusing on emotional and affective experiences, which helped him to understand that other Vietnamese patients suffered from similar conflicts and related feelings of insecurity. All patients placed experiences of affect either within frames of sympathy, coherence, and belonging, or of estrangement, disempowerment, and non-belonging. Learning to flexibly adjust one’s repertoire takes center stage in the innovative group therapy. During an exercise, the psychiatrist conducting the group therapy asked the patients – three women and four men – to take a seat
Before addressing the sensitive topic of implicit dispositions and affective dissonances therapeutically, it was paramount to create a safe environment and invest in sustainable mutual trust to encourage patients to leave behind old and, speaking in psychiatric terms, dysfunctional patterns in situations of increased distress.

In two matching rows, face each other in pairs and make direct eye contact for at least one minute, and then move on to the next chair and make eye contact with another partner. The psychologist, along with the three anthropologists of our interdisciplinary research team (see Heyken et al., forthcoming) participated in the exercise while the psychiatrist, a native Vietnamese herself, directed the formation. In several therapy sessions before, we had observed how the patients, when uncomfortably affected, relied on durable nonverbal repertoires of interaction: they averted their gazes, lowered their voices, or took reversed body postures. Given that seeking direct eye contact may be fraught with cultural difficulties within Vietnamese codes of conduct, the exercise was especially challenging. It exposed the patients to a stressful situation and “deprived them” of their habituated emotional responses. The therapist explained that she intended to trigger affective responses from the patients and thereby draw their attention to the connections between embodied emotions and affects, and to related cultural notions and practices.

Shortly before the exercise began, we could sense palpable tension: some patients sat down rather reluctantly, apparently weighing up who would take the opposite seat, while others either looked serious or giggled. During the exercise, we observed that, in terms of gendered embodiment, most of the patients were able to maintain eye contact with a same-sex counterpart, whereas, with an opposite-sex counterpart they clearly employed a strategy of avoidance. One patient, a man of comparably younger age, also responded with avoidance vis-à-vis other men. We observed that the male patients either stared up or pursed their lips to restrain laughter in front of an opposite-sex counterpart, whereas the female patients tipped their heads down and closed their eyes. After the exercise, the male patients spontaneously stated that, “from Vietnamese perspectives,” looking into one another’s eyes, as they had just done, would be considered an act of social transgression of the norms and rules tied to principles of hierarchy, seniority, and status, as well as an act of aggression and provocation. The female patients affirmatively nodded; compared with the male patients, however, they were reluctant to openly voice their opinions. As the psychiatrist asked the patients to jointly relate the affective intensity felt during the exercise to bodily and sensory perceptions (embodiment), to modes of interaction and behavioral patterns (practice), and, finally, to cultural categorizations, associations, and interpretations (discourse), she created space for the patients to reflect on the durability, practicability, and relationality of emotion repertoires.

A few days later, in a conversation outside of this setting (Heyken, forthcoming), Mrs. D, one of the female patients, offered a further and more

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detailed explanation of the affective intensity she experienced, which was
gendered and anchored in early memories. During her childhood and youth
in Vietnam, she had experienced the cultivation of a social and physical sepa-
ration between girls and boys as part of her socialization and institutional
education in school, which included gendered behaviors of shame expressed
by the avoidance of eye contact and close body contact. As Röttger-Rößler
et al. (2015) have argued, the socialization of emotion repertoires involves
explicit and implicit practices of cultural transmission that confirm their prac-
ticability and durability. Mrs. D remembered that girls and boys were not
allowed to sit next to each other in school and that there were hardly any
occasions for girls and boys to meet outside the school casually. This mode of
interaction still persisted in her generation, Mrs. D emphasized. Seeking eye
contact was a sign of intimacy between lovers or spouses and thus clearly
confined to those relationships. Later, in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam
and the subsequent political and societal changes in the South, she further
internalized that directly looking into others’ faces is a sign of disrespect and
may cause aggression.

While the therapy exercise was only a short and “staged” moment, the
reactions and explanations that followed made clear that a coherent and
shared sense of the predictability and intelligibility of emotions and affects,
acquired during the socialization of emotion repertoires at younger age in
Vietnam, was prevalent in this arrangement of individuals. All patients discurs-
ively linked direct eye contact with feelings of aggression and provocation or
shame. They all showed practiced forms of avoidant behavior, which varied
according to gender and embodiment (and according to age in the case of
one younger male patient). The exercise thus elucidated facets of a relation-
ally constituted emotion repertoire.

Our observations in the clinic and beyond, in fact, show that the intensity
of affects as “felt differences” (Röttger-Rößler, 2016, p. 6) depends on who
or what exactly “the other” is and what is at stake within a given relational
encounter. Moments of disempowerment felt by patients were interpreted as
a loss of face according to their habituated understanding. This is because
conversations about one’s personal or medical issues, according to Vietnamese
conventions, are to be held relationally within the family. Our observations
indicate that the patients were more likely to develop an understanding of the
complexity of conflicting emotion repertoires when therapeutic explanations
were based on experiences made during affect-eliciting exercises like the
“contest” of eye contact.2 By connecting these new experiences to the

2 Eckert, Biermann-Ratjen, and Höger (2012) define emotion-focused therapy by placing the
emotional processes of the patient in the center of the therapeutic work. Arguing with
Greenberg (2004), the authors contend that emotions are principally adaptive and serve the
organism to process complex and situated information to perform actions thereby supporting
and protecting it (Eckert et al., 2012, p. 316).
broader context of relationally attuned and flexibly performed emotion repertoires, patients regained a stronger sense of agency.

The above case thus reveals the significance of an analysis that addresses the durability, practicability, and relationality of emotion repertoires.

**Conclusion**

Our concept of emotion repertoires creates a new avenue of thought for researchers analyzing the dynamics of societal and affective coexistence in today's globalized and profoundly entangled worlds. We adopted the term “repertoire,” as discussed in cultural sociology and theater and performance studies, to convey the idea that individuals and collectives use recombinative, communicable, and mutually intelligible enactments to organize felt experiences in socially and culturally appropriate ways. Moreover, we have combined these ideas with insights from cognitive anthropology and recent research on affect and emotion. We find that the enactment of emotion repertoires inevitably unfolds within distinct spheres of affective resonance. Such spheres of resonance modulate the processuality, malleability, and transformability of emotion repertoires. Nevertheless, emotion repertoires tend to resist change even in the face of ongoing transformations of societal coexistence in mobile worlds. The difficulties that the first-generation migrants of our study faced when they had to adjust emotion repertoires acquired at a young age prove that emotion repertoires can be somewhat intransigent. Our examples have made clear that the relevance and impact of conflicting emotion repertoires needs to be addressed in studies of migration. Such a perspective reveals the underlying dimensions of affective dissonance and consonance, which are tied to implicit and more unconscious modes of interaction, to bodily and sensory perceptions, and to socially and culturally saturated interpretations.

In paying particular attention to the interplay of the durability, practicability, and relationality of emotion repertoires, we hope to have paved the way for thinking about this concept as truly relational, agentive, and creative. Beyond the ethnographic and psychotherapeutic settings of our interdisciplinary research frame, the concept could be applied as well in other and broader societal and political terms (→ sentiment; → political affect). The relational concept of emotion repertoires holds theoretical and transdisciplinary value, and could be applied in various spatial and temporal contexts beyond the particularities of migration-related experiences. The following questions provide fertile ground for further inquiry: How intensive or fleeting are affects as “felt differences” in the contexts of ageing, im-/mobility, and shorter or longer educational, work, or internal migrations? What role do new forms of mediatizing affects and emotions play for different generations of individuals and collectives? How and why do individuals as well as collectives feel empowered to readjust and master emotion repertoires to avoid losing their efficacy as a communicable and performable means of affective relationality and as sources of creative expression?
References


Audience emotions are not yet established as a theoretical concept, neither in audience research nor in emotion and affect studies. This chapter outlines an understanding of audience emotions based on research and theory in the social sciences (sociology) and the humanities (theater and performance studies). The concept is developed from our research on physically present audiences in live events and goes beyond comprehending emotion as an individual psychological or physiological process. It stresses forms of expression, display, and feeling that emerge from the affective relations between a potentially heterogeneous social collective and a performance, an artifact, or any other act or object that forms part of a common focus of attention. While audiences have mostly been studied with respect to mass media and, more recently, digital media, the concept of audience emotions underlines the relevance of immediate audiences, that is of audiences that are bodily co-present at an attended event. We are thus concentrating on audiences that interact jointly with and are corporeally directed toward a common focus of attention. Audience emotions are not a mere aggregation of the emotions of spatially assembled individuals. While it is still the individual member of an audience who feels, experiences, and displays emotions, the concept of audience emotions highlights those aspects of emotions which emerge in the context of a gathering of individuals. Some striking examples of audience emotions are the enthusiasm in performing the “Mexican wave” in a soccer stadium, the mesmerized silence of a theater audience watching a gripping scene, or the excited applause at the end of a rhetorically brilliant speech.

Audience emotions are both material and cultural manifestations; they merge social and individual dimensions and they often linger on the blurred boundaries between affective dynamics and discrete emotions. We suggest an understanding of audience emotions as bearing the following key characteristics: (1) **Collectivity**: Audience emotions are a form of collective emotion. They are essentially bound to a collective, a bodily co-present gathering of several individuals or even large crowds. (2) **Activity**: Audience emotions, like most other emotions, do not represent an “inner” state of being, but are an action, a dynamic activity. Audience emotions are thus an important element of the
Audience emotions connect an audience or part of an audience with a specific situation and the entire event. At the same time, they constitute specific relational dynamics within members of the audience themselves. Audiences not only act as a heterogeneous ensemble of individuals, but as individuals relating to an audience of which they are part as audience in a way that bestows them with agency and power. This is why audience emotions have been associated with political potentiality as well as with threats to social order since antiquity. (4) Temporality and spatiality: Audience emotions are characterized by a certain spatio-temporal immediacy depending on the fundamental co-presence of bodies, on spatial-material settings, institutions, discourses and interpretative frames that structure an event. But they can also exceed the temporal frame of the present by influencing and affecting subsequent events, or by evoking a strong and/or long lasting impression on memory, prompting people to seek out similar intensive collective experiences again. (5) Shared contingency: Although audience emotions are shaped and formed by a multifactorial set of elements pertaining to a performance, an artwork, or object in focus, this array of elements is not the only powerful influence on audience emotions. They enact an experience of shared situative contingency, which is why their emergence is, to some extent, unpredictable and also uncontrollable. This moment of social contingency is often experienced as an intense and empowering experience, crossing the boundaries between the individual and the collective as well as between the audience, the event, and their broader context.

In the following, we will briefly sketch major trends in audience research and outline crucial factors that have resulted in the neglect of audience emotions. We will then develop our understanding of audience emotions by elaborating on the five key characteristics mentioned above and by discussing the potential of the concept for understanding societies as Affective Societies.

**Audience studies, performance, and the focus**

Audiences have been the subject of extensive theoretical reflection in the social and cultural sciences (for an overview see Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998). Although their association with masses and collectives (Blumer, 1954) has stirred heated theoretical debate, there is surprisingly little systematic empirical research on bodily co-present audiences across various socio-cultural fields such as theater, music, or dance. One most notable exception is media audiences. A large part of audience studies is devoted to audiences of mass media and, more recently, digital media, and some ethnographic studies have addressed interactions between audience members and forms of interactivity mediated by digital technologies (Sullivan, 2013; Webster & Phalen, 1997; Papacharissi, 2015). However, the interactive dimension of bodily co-present audiences and the interdependence and connectedness of audience
and event (“autopoetic feedback loop,” Fischer-Lichte, 2008) cannot be adequately understood solely with established concepts of reception and theoretical models developed in fields such as media studies. This is because the bodily co-presence of audience and performers allows for real-time, face-to-face interactions between audience and performers and their reciprocal influences that differ categorically from mediatized forms of interaction.

The distinction between audiences and mass media was established by propaganda studies in the 1930s, a field that also stressed the role of emotionality (Brooker & Jermyn, 2003). In subsequent studies on mass communication, the role of emotion has been addressed, for example, by Critical Theory (Adorno, 1991) as well as in an increasing number of psychological, physiological, and, recently, neurological studies on the effects of media on emotions. Many audience studies in the social sciences have capitalized on statistical analyses of audiences, for example pertaining to class, gender, age, or lifestyle. Since these studies mostly deal with structural social aspects, there is only limited knowledge of the qualitative features of audience activities, their emotions and affects (Clevenger, 1966; Das & Ytre-Arne, 2017).

In the humanities, the rise of semiotics, reader response theory, studies on spectatorship and poststructuralist theories since the 1960s highlighted the agency of readers, spectators, and/or the audience in (co-)creating a text or work of art and completing it through interpretation. In these perspectives, the audience is placed at the center of a performative event. The desire to reconfigure the relationship between audience and event has also been a recurring topic in the arts since the avant-garde movements of the early 20th century and the neo-avantgarde since the 1960s. However, in contrast to the relevance of the audience as a theoretical concept, studies focusing exclusively on audiences and their activities in live events have remained scarce. Dennis Kennedy (2009) identified the paradox that despite persistent claims about the audience’s impact and influence, the term audience often remains a theoretical construct, “a pale hypothetical inference of the commentator’s imagination” (p. 13). Extant scholarship has investigated audiences as interpretative communities (Bennett, 1997) and looked into the individual responses of spectators to consider the cognitive, corporeal, and affective activities of audiences (Tulloch, 2005; McConachie, 2008). Historical studies have explored what audiences did during performances, how they acted and experienced the event they attended, and how the historical contingency of audience behavior aligned with social, cultural, and political questions and with various processes of inclusion and exclusion (Fisher, 2003; Müller, 2012; Beushausen, 2018).

While classical models of communication adhered to the transmitter-receiver model and considered audiences as the “other side” of a performance enacted for them, recent societal and technological developments have given rise to the observation that performances have been widely extended in scope and reach. Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) propose a new “performance paradigm” according to which audiences are becoming “diffused” (ch. 2),
such that “being a member of an audience becomes a mundane event” (p. 37) and “everyone becomes an audience all the time” (p. 68). In addition to this extension of the audience, we can witness a complementary extension of the performance: it is no longer restricted to what is happening on a stage. Rather, every action tends to become a social performance. Of course, there were and still are cases in which the distinction between performance and audience is often marked temporally and spatially, and where it is highlighted by architectural markers, visual effects, conventions of genre and repertoires of emotion (→ emotion repertoires), as in classical theater or music halls. Yet, in an increasing number of contexts in our networked and mediatized world, these distinctions are hardly recognizable or even lacking entirely, for example, as in current forms of performance art and participatory theater where the audience is often an active part of the performance.

In terms of the study of audiences, this also implies that the activities of audience members themselves should be examined, observed, and analyzed as performances. Moreover, to the degree that audience members act differently, we cannot maintain the idea of one homogeneous audience, but must concede that there are split, highly heterogeneous or even disparate audiences. Consequently, there are crucial ramifications for an understanding of audience emotions:

> So, although it is possible to speak of “an audience”, it is important to remember that there may be several distinct, co-existing audiences to be found among the people gathered together to watch a show and that each individual within this group may choose to adopt a range of viewing positions.

(Freshwater, 2009, pp. 9–10)

Audiences are not only given but are constituted “by virtue of being addressed” (Warner, 2002, p. 50) and by a shared focus, such as a sports event, a theater performance, or a music concert. A complex process of co-constitution binds audience and focus together. Obviously, the audience of a soccer game behaves differently than the audience of a classical string quartet. In addition, the course of the soccer game might be influenced by the supportive cheering, shouting, and singing of fans, just as the inattentive atmosphere of a distracted audience might cause an inaccurate execution on the part of the string quartet. Audiences are thus co-constituted by the very event they are focusing on and which they are themselves actively co-constituting.

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1 This dominant role of performance in everyday life, observed by many authors over the last decades, has already been established by Goffman (1959), who argued that rituals increasingly revolve around the individual in modern society so that every action becomes a performance. Even those actions performed in the absence of others are oriented to them so as to constitute “public actions” (Goffman, 1963).
From this backdrop, audience emotions can be understood as collective emotions directed toward the object of audience attention and, at the same time, directed to the audience itself, within the frame of a specific event. This dual perspective allows us to ask how audience members relate to (1) what is constituted as the focus of attention, (2) to one another, and (3) to other aspects of an event (such as objects or the spatial setting). Thus, the acts of observing, hearing, or perceiving and of being observed, being heard, and being perceived are fundamental aspects of audience emotions. As audiences are affected by their focus as well as by themselves and their surroundings, audience emotions are not only a “reaction” to what is happening, they also *perform and reflect* specific situational entanglements and communicate an embodied evaluation of them, whether by way of laughing, crying, and clapping or by other forms of collective bodily expression and display.2 Last but not least, audience emotions are often experienced as ecstatic and intensive moments of communitization and as a social relationship based on the subjective feeling of (parts of) the audience in that they – even if only temporarily – share an emotional experience of the world (→ affective communities).

**Shortcomings of audience research**

So far, audience research has mostly neglected the diversity and the artistic as well as social and political potentials of audience emotions. There are several barriers to a better understanding of audiences and, in particular, audience emotions: a historical suspicion toward the emergence of collective emotions among a gathering of people and, more recently, a skepticism based on an understanding of modern societies as predominantly rational and enlightened formations (see Borch, 2012, for an overview). Specifically, the taming and suppression of affective dynamics and emotions are a conventionally established paradigm in the tradition of the analysis of societies (e.g., by Max Weber, Norbert Elias, Jürgen Habermas, Talcott Parsons). A better understanding of audience emotions is also obstructed by a tendency to confuse or merge individual and collective responses. Further, it is impeded by the fact that one specific formation of an audience – a disciplined, corporeally immobilized group of people concentrating to make sense of an event – is implicitly assumed to represent the analytical paradigm for audiences per se. Historical research, however, has shown that those audiences whose expressive conduct is strongly regulated are a recent and modern invention, starting from the 1850s to the end of the 20th century. Audience activities in the 21st century, with their uses of social media, interactive feedback loops, and other forms of participation (Burland & Pitts, 2014) seem to confirm that the model of the mostly immobile,

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2 Therefore, affect theory leads to the “prioritization of communication” in audience research (Gibbs, 2011, p. 252).
silent, and concentrated audience is a historical exception and a theoretical construct rather than a historic reality (Kattwinkel, 2003).

Against this background of the (allegedly reduced) repertoire of emotional expressions, most existing studies on the emotions of audiences consider emotions to be internal and individual psychological phenomena (Schoenmakers, 1992; Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998, ch. 3). Therefore, their methodologies typically address individual audience members, for instance, in the form of questionnaires offering different scales for “engagement” or “attention” and relating them to physiological measures of arousal of a relatively small number of selected individuals (Stevens et al., 2014). In order to understand our perspective on audience emotions, it is important to recognize how these methodologies one-sidedly focus on audiences that have been subject to a history of self-discipline and their related dispositifs, such as concert halls for classical music or play houses for middle-class theater. In particular, the rise of bourgeois culture has led to a massive disciplining of affects. This disciplining encompassed both the repression of undesired emotions and the generation of desired emotions (Kolesch, 2006). Before the 19th century, strong affective displays like shouting, crying, or spitting had been common at music, theater, or rhetorical events (Campbell, 1987). From the 19th century onward, audiences increasingly tended to be sanctioned for “expressive behavior” and for all activities which might undermine full concentration on the performance at hand, such that even “noise made by unwrapping chocolates” was offensive to theater actors in the 1950s (Kershaw, 2001, p. 142). Except for framing activities at very specific, highly conventionalized points, like applause before and after the marked end of the performance, audiences had to reduce their activities to the operation of specific sensual modalities only, such as listening in concert halls, seeing in museums and galleries, seeing and listening in the theater, etc. Audiences were thus transformed into mere perceptual apparatuses. What once was active participation became “passive” experience which could then be addressed as a psychological phenomenon: “Spectators are thus trained to be passive in their demonstrated behaviour during a theatrical performance, but to be active in their decoding of the sign systems available” (Bennett, 2014, p. 54).

**Key features of audience emotions**

To overcome the shortcomings of audience research mentioned above, we stress the following five key features of audience emotions: collectivity, activity, reflexivity, spatiality and temporality, and contingency.

**Collectivity**

While most existing studies on audience emotions often confuse individual and collective reactions, we understand audience emotions as forms of collective
emotions (von Scheve & Salmela, 2014; Sullivan, 2015). It is crucial for the specificity of audience emotions and their societal relevance to note that immediate audiences are a temporal gathering of (mostly) strangers coming together at a certain place and sharing a short span of time together to watch a performance or see a work of art. Audience emotions are thus intricately linked to the specific modality of being a member of an audience. They display how collectives are affected by and affect performances and how these dynamics affect audiences themselves (→ social collectives). The common tendency to think of an audience as a single entity cannot do justice to the heterogeneity assembled in an audience or to the variety of audience emotions. Audience emotions are the collective experience of a momentary corporeal synchronization and of a sensuous transmission. They reflect the emergence of intercorporeal resonances among a group of assembled people – a process often referred to as one collective body transgressing the individual bodies of the assembled audience members. Most audience emotions empirically depend on a “law of large numbers” in terms of forms of communication that presuppose coordinated collective action, such as the unison of sound produced by large numbers of voices, thundering applause, or standing ovations.

This collective dimension can also be actualized ex negativo when a single audience member experiences himself as being out of sync with the majority. Not being amused at what the rest of the audience is enthusiastically laughing at or being moved to tears by something that seems to leave others unmoved are audience emotions which are only possible in relation to and in contrast to fellow audience members.

**Activity**

The collectivity of audience emotions does not mean that audience emotions are just “passive” responses to an object or performance in attention. Although often referred to as “spontaneous,” audience emotions are a crucial part of the communicative, evaluative and energetic activity of audiences. This activity often is coordinated and prepared.

Audience emotions can be coordinated situationally with respect to certain formats. Thus, rhetorical formats, such as contrast pairs, may allow the audience to clap collectively at exactly the same time (Atkinson, 1984). Similar situational ways of affecting audience emotions can be found in the case of religious sermons, but also, in a less verbal manner, with respect to certain moves in football games (Knoblauch, Wetzel, & Haken, 2019). Audiences may be instructed explicitly to perform certain “choreographies” either bottom up, by fans or social movements, or top down, by event managers and organizers. The “capo” orchestrating the collective emotions of football fans, the cheerleaders in a basketball arena, or the “claque” of a political speaker initiating applause are paradigmatic cases. In some contexts, audience emotions can be highly ritualized and become part of the “script” of these
performances, such as cheering in pop-music concerts or at comedy shows. Furthermore, with the use of social media, activities such as posting, liking, or tweeting become important catalysts as well as expressions of audience emotions. The agentive and collective dimension of audience emotions is also a crucial economic as well as a political factor, with corporations and companies using them to create and/or reinforce a special bond between brands and their consumers and with social movements or political parties trying to enact forms of participation, empowerment, or voter commitment.

Even the presumed “inactivity” of an audience may be ritualized, such as the short hush after the final move of a symphony where no one wants to spoil the moment by applauding, or the silence during the transubstantiation at a Catholic mass. These collective forms of silence can be considered as performances of specific emotions, such as awe (in terms of “aesthetics” or “religion”).

Audience emotions are not only coordinated, they are often also prepared in advance. Knowledge relevant for audience emotions may be transmitted beforehand, that is by fanzines, social or other media. As the coordination of audience emotions depends on the knowledge of different conventionalized forms and collective repertoires of emotions (→ emotion repertoires), they also vary according to the venue, its cultural sphere and corresponding affective arrangements (→ affective arrangement). Audience members can also prepare themselves (through dressing, makeup, equipment with flags or other emblems, ritualized behaviors, etc.) before the event in order to facilitate the generation of audience emotions.

**Reflexivity**

To enable audiences to act as collectives, audience members need to direct themselves not only to the focus of the audience’s attention, but also to the audience as audience. Thus, audience emotions are reflexive in a very specific manner. Members of an audience are not only perceiving, acting, or performing, but are being seen by other audience members as undertaking these actions. This reflexivity is essential for audience emotions: Instead of being instances of imitation, as mass-psychological theories maintain (Brooker & Jermyn, 2003, pp. 1–2), collective displays like clapping, cheering, or singing depend on audiences orienting themselves toward the conduct of others and on collective forms of communication. The diverse ways in which audience members relate (or do not relate) to each other, how they act and interact with one another and with objects, technologies, spatial settings, and the specific temporal order of an event, distinguish audience emotions from other kinds of emotions.

This relationality of audiences is twofold: First, audiences are affected by the shared focus that co-constitutes them as an audience. Second, there are also intra-audience relations. If these relations are homogenous and intensive, they may be compared to what Durkheim (1912/1965, pp. 250ff.) calls “effervescence.” In most empirical cases, they are highly variegated, thus
evidencing the heterogeneity of audiences. In immersive theater, for example, there may only be one audience member interacting individually with a performer, while in a sports stadium, thousands of fans may be coordinating their activities in order to sing or gesture collectively. While individualized audience members may act in a multitude of ways, the affective relations between audiences – as collectives – and the focus of their attention can take typical communicative forms – like applause, booing, stage diving, and so forth – displayed and performed in the collective corporeality of an audience.

**Spatiality and temporality**

The situational entanglements audience emotions perform and reflect are characterized by certain forms of *spatiality* and *temporality*. Audience emotions are affected by material settings and architecture, by objects, atmospheres, and media technologies (Quirk, 2011). These spatial alignments can be materialized (e.g., in the architectural construction of theater buildings or sports stadiums), but they may also be situative, as in the case of the physical formation of a street musician’s audience forming a circle. Audience emotions can be experienced as an intensive, transitory moment of synchronized immediateness and commonality; they can also unfold sequentially and spatially – sequentially, such as in the metachronal rhythm of the “Mexican wave,” performing enthusiasm and elation; spatially, such as by walking from stage to stage at a music festival (Heath, vom Lehn, & Knoblauch, 2001). As markers of intensity and transpersonal collectivity, audience emotions exceed the temporal frame of a live event by affecting future behavior, by prompting people to engage with future situations in specific ways, and by leaving a strong and/or long-lasting impression (→ *Midān moments*).

**Shared contingency**

Highly metaphorical language is often used to describe audience emotions and their enactive, transmissive potential (“contagion,” “emotional infection,” “electricity,” etc.). These metaphors indicate that audience emotions are not determined by material settings, genre conventions, cultural practices, etc., but that they always are processes and experiences of *shared social contingency*. The generation of a sensual sphere of shared movements and actions and the emergence of a mutual, albeit temporary, feeling of belonging is as unpredictable as it is uncontrollable. The potential to act as a collective body paradoxically results from a highly contingent occurrence, thus bestowing audience emotions with the transgressive power to transcend the self-conscious identity of individual audience members and generate a momentary feeling of community and belonging in a gathering of mostly strangers. This contingency has provoked a long tradition of suspicion toward audience emotions and various efforts to enclose and contain them.
Relevance of audience emotions

Audience emotions are episodic realizations of affective relations between audience, performance, and the surroundings. Based on routines and patterns of behavior shaped by collective knowledge, cultural practices, and repertoires of emotion, but also influenced by material and situative settings, genre conventions, social structural aspects like class, age, or gender, and regimes of power, audience emotions perform the collective engagement with others attending the same live event, feeling and sensing others’ actions and reactions. Audience emotions thus constitute temporary moments of social cohesion and belonging. The temporal community formed by audience emotions lies on the border between “emotional communities” (Rosenwein, 2006) and affective communities (→ affective communities). While emotional communities share certain values, ideas, and social structural elements like class, status, or age, as in the highly homogeneous audience of a classical music concert, affective communities constitute intermediary realms of affective exchange and collective immediacy which transgress socially defined categories and culturally valorized positions. Understanding the specificity of audience emotions and their potential to instigate processes of communitization thus has important ramifications for future research on collectives and collective agency. This is because audience emotions indicate the relevance of shared emotions for experiences of social cohesion, whereas personal or collective interests, values, and shared ideas appear to be secondary for the experience of communality.

Until recently, audiences have been and are still considered as a kind of public. Some highly disciplined, individualized, and standardized audience formations were even considered as an idealized model of the public, without regard for the uncontrollability or even the destructive potential of audience emotions. In contrast, theater audiences have been constructed as a homogeneous public sphere of bourgeois society. Today the conceptualization and better understanding of audience emotions is a key factor in researching the impact of audience activities in various fields of civil societies and their relevance for the comprehension of contemporary neoliberal systems at large, where being a member of an audience becomes a ubiquitous and everyday experience. Audience emotions emerge not only as an outcome of certain venues, but also as a driving force for social gatherings and for attending public events. Conducting research on audience emotions is thus an essential aspect of grasping the functions and current modifications of public spheres. Accordingly, the study of audience emotions may contribute significantly to a contemporary understanding of the public and its transformations in various global communities.

References


Part IV

Collectives and contestations
Social collectives are assemblages of actors that affect and are affected by others or by a specific object or situation, and eventually share a common situation-specific understanding of the self as part of a collective. Contrary to widespread uses of the word “collective” as an umbrella term for various social formations, such as groups, communities, organizations, crowds, audiences, or gatherings, the concept developed here conceives of collectives as specific though fragile and transient episodes of dynamic stabilization in the reciprocal affections and relational self-understandings of actors involved in these formations. Because of the situational nature of affect, social collectives are therefore more expediently conceptualized and analyzed as constantly “in the making” rather than as “substantial social formations.” Most social formations are well theorized in view of their distinct structures and organizing principles. Social groups, for example, are primarily characterized by social interactions amongst all group members; organizations are described by formal membership, common goals, and hierarchies; communities are defined by enduring emotional bonds and a collective identity which tie community members to each other; and concepts of crowds and gatherings emphasize the spatial proximity of participating actors as a defining element. None of the existing principles of social organization, however, account for the specific ways in which human and non-human actors mutually affect – and are affected by – one another. These formations prefigure and enable these effects and relational self-understandings, much in the sense of specific affective arrangements (→ affective arrangements).

Groups, organizations, crowds, communities, and other formations may thus transiently become social collectives under certain circumstances and for a certain time: Some social formations, such as organizations and communities, involve specific self-understandings, for instance through formal membership or kinship ties, whereas others, such as masses and gatherings, do not necessarily require a well-developed collective self-concept. Likewise, some social formations can more easily be understood as affective arrangements than others, making it more likely for actors to affect and be affected by one another or a situation in certain ways. Contingent on the culture and
Historicity of a social formation, mutual affection is also more or less likely to become categorized and labeled using pertinent emotion words (→ emotion; emotion concept). Indeed, many of the exemplary social formations mentioned above often develop dedicated instrumental strategies and cultural practices to shift their ontology – at least momentarily – toward that of a social collective, that is, a formation in which actors mutually affect one another and conceive of themselves as parts of a collective. In line with ritual and conflict theory (e.g., Durkheim, 1912/1995; Collins, 2004), these strategies often aim at achieving an “embodied grounding” of the social formation in question. Discursive episodes of intense national pride, collective feelings of religious offense, or effervescence during rituals are obvious examples. This also points toward the important consequences social collectives bear for individuals and social formations. Existing research suggests that collective emotions – to which social collectives are highly conducive – promote collective action, social cohesion, solidarity, collective identity, and belonging (→ belonging), while at the same time constituting or promoting boundaries, exclusion, and the derogation of others. The proposed concept thus entertains the possibility that social collectives become precursors to other, more stable social formations in that they instigate and motivate processes such as ritualization, symbolization, and institutionalization.

Requirements of social collectives

The conceptual sketch outlined above begs the question of what it is that contributes to the transient becoming of a social collective. The understanding proposed here assumes that social collectives require two essential conditions to be fulfilled: first, the existence of relational self-understandings, and second, the existence of infrastructures that promote the dissemination and exchange of ideas, symbols, practices, or beliefs and allow for actors to affect and be affected by one another. Both are somewhat related to Georg Simmel’s (1959) distinction between content and form, and, regarding the relevance of affect, to ideas in new materialism and relational ontology, albeit without compromising the importance of language, thought, and cognition for social coexistence.

Relational self-understanding

The first criterion for the emergence of social collectives is the existence of some kind of relational self-understanding (Mead, 1934), of which self-categorization is amongst the most basic forms (Turner et al., 1987). Self-categorization refers to the social psychological processes by which actors conceive of themselves as being part of a specific social formation and – potentially – act according to this form of self-construal. This criterion clearly distinguishes social collectives from related concepts, such as swarms or
aggregates of individuals exhibiting similar behavior, for instance, in mass panic. A social collective hence comes into existence if and only if multiple individuals situationally self-categorize as being part of a larger number of individuals who likewise self-categorize in similar ways. Analytically, this requires insights into two different epistemological domains.

The first domain is concerned with a specific first-person or “phenomenological” perspective on the world, that is, with actors interpreting events, objects, and the self as being a part of a larger collection of individuals. This can be highly rudimentary and unspecific, as in “us against them,” where the “us” may remain entirely unspecified. Or it may be very specific and involve some form of collective identity, such as “us fans of Michael Jackson” or “us counter-protesters” against a rally of a despised political party. Importantly, this sort of relational self-understanding does not necessarily mirror a (formally) existing social formation. For example, political parties as formal organizations with clear membership rules and hierarchies of power rely on unambiguous self-categorizations and a collective identity. But different social collectives may well emerge within such an organization, for instance, when groups of dissenters are affected by a certain policy decision and momentarily self-categorize as “the dissenters” rather than as members of the party.

The second domain involves an analytical third-person perspective which is necessary to actually circumscribe a collective – the “multitude” of actors – which is, at least in principle, capable of collective behavior or collective action. A solitary individual might simply imagine that he or she is part of some social formation and see the world accordingly. An example might be a historical group or community that ceased to exist long ago. Unless there is an actual multitude of individuals self-categorizing in this way in a specific situation, there can be no mutual affecting one another, no collectively shared emotion, and no collective action or behavior. Of course, both criteria will usually co-occur empirically. In other words, people know or believe that they are part of some larger social formation and see the world accordingly. An example might be a historical group or community that ceased to exist long ago. Unless there is an actual multitude of individuals self-categorizing in this way in a specific situation, there can be no mutual affecting one another, no collectively shared emotion, and no collective action or behavior. Of course, both criteria will usually co-occur empirically. In other words, people know or believe that they are part of some larger social formation and see the world accordingly. An example might be a historical group or community that ceased to exist long ago. Unless there is an actual multitude of individuals self-categorizing in this way in a similar way. But how do individuals become aware of the existence of a social formation in the first place and how do they generate beliefs about a significant number of others who are part of this formation? And how do beliefs regarding the existence of a specific social formation emerge within or spread across larger numbers of individuals? And how can a multitude of actors mutually affect one another in a specific situation which is potentially not bound to the same physical space?

**Infrastructures**

The second condition for the becoming of social collectives addresses these questions and pertains to the necessity of some sort of *infrastructure* which is required for any of the social formations in question (cf. for a related
Infrastructures can be as immediate as a shared physical space where face-to-face interaction is possible amongst some—though usually not all—actors occupying that space. Crowds and gatherings are usually situated in a specific material space. This space is often transformed into a socially meaningful place that can be conducive to actors’ mutually affecting one another, for example, through nonverbal bodily cues (e.g., Brennan, 2004). Tahrir Square in Cairo during the Arab Spring uprisings as well as large sports stadiums may serve as good examples here (→ Midān moments). Infrastructures can also consist of media and communications technologies and mechanisms of “connectivity,” through which ideas and imaginations about the collective are transmitted in a peer-to-peer or centralized fashion and through which actors can directly interact with and affect each other (e.g., Thacker, 2004). Classical understandings of the public in a Habermasian sense (like “communicative infrastructures,” cf. Habermas, 1989, p. 327) as well as online social networks would be examples (→ affective publics). Mass media communications with centralized promulgators also belong to this category, although they may transmit ideas and imaginations that do not require any form of interaction, such as in authoritarian regimes where a genuine public in Habermas’ sense does not exist. Infrastructures can also consist of symbol systems which hardly involve any social interaction, but in which affect—in the sense of affecting and being affected—works through exposure to and reception of cultural artifacts, such as monuments, architecture, sites, novels, poetry, lyrics, and other artworks. Nation states are a paradigmatic example given how various mnemonic practices and invented traditions fuel the symbolic realm of the “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) as well as a range of structures and institutions that themselves affect and preconfigure being affected in specific ways (→ affective citizenship).

Of course, these distinctions are purely analytical and ideal-typical and one would expect to find amalgamations of these in social reality. It is also worth mentioning that both self-categorizations and infrastructures are highly contested and conflictual since they essentially involve elements of social inclusion as well as exclusion. The physical space at a political rally is contested between protesters and police, the space in a stadium between supporters of opposing teams. Communications in social networks struggle for attention and persuasion, and the symbolic universe of a nation state is, by definition, a matter of constant contestation.

Social collectives are therefore not void of any social presuppositions, as scholars of spontaneous crowds and gatherings often suggest. Instead, situation-specific self-categorizations and infrastructures are prerequisites for actors to mutually affect and be affected by each other and for the eventual categorization of these affections into culturally established and linguistically labeled prototypes of emotion and collective action or behavior. The existing literature, briefly reviewed in what follows, has pointed at these two requirements as defining
features of various social formations, for which, however, the term “collective” is almost exclusively used as an umbrella term.

**Background and related concepts**

The history of the concept of collectives in different disciplines has been highly politicized and can be read as a story of social order and unrest rather than one of thorough social theorizing, which is probably why the term has not gained a strong foothold in social theory. Very broadly, two contrasting perspectives on social collectives can be distinguished. First, substantialist accounts emphasizing the enduring and orderly features of collectives, rooted in what people have in common, in particular “mental” properties such as beliefs, attitudes, and values that gradually consolidate into the capacity for collective action. Second, “interactive” accounts highlight the ephemeral and situational nature of collectives and their respective forms of collective behavior, in particular in crowds and gatherings, widely considered to be disruptive to social order.

**Substantialist accounts**

Substantialist accounts strive to develop taxonomies and classifications of different kinds of social formations, for instance associations, bodies, or organizations (Jonsson, 2013, pp. 70ff.). This strand of research aims at distinguishing more “abstract collectives” from localized collectives sharing the same physical space, in particular crowds and gatherings. Abstract collectives are supposed to be more enduring (and stable) social formations characterized by a certain degree of shared beliefs, values, and goals (so-called “Dauerwerte,” cf. von Wiese, 1956) that motivate coordinated forms of social action rather than the allegedly irrational behaviors of crowds. Past research has suggested different pathways that connect shared psychological properties to collective action. Ferdinand Tönnies (1931/2012) argued that actors are simultaneously embedded in a multitude of social relations; collectives could be distinguished according to the degree of actors’ willful commitment to these relations and their potential to pursue common goals. Most social relations would involve mutual dependency regarding the satisfaction of basic needs, such as kinship, cooperation, or exchange. Although these relations entail the sharing of resources or values, they are usually not intentionally conceptualized as relations by the parties who constitute them. Instead, Tönnies (1931/2012, pp. 249ff.) used the term “Samtschaften” to denote arrays of social relations which are deliberately and consciously intended by constituent actors bearing a number of commonalities like preferences, desires, customs, language, feelings, and

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1 See, for example, the concept of neo-tribalism (Maffesoli, 1996) for social formations that are abstract and localized at the same time.
thoughts. Social collectivities in this understanding include social classes, nations, or certain religious communities. These collectivities, however, are incapable of proper collective action since they cannot form a “common will” on which those actions might be based. Tönnies (1931/2012, pp. 251ff.) used the term “social corporations” (Körperschaften) to denote collectives bearing an institutional structure through which members could form and articulate a common will that precedes collective action. Clans, local communities, or unions are examples of these social corporations that are referred to as “collective actors” in the contemporary social sciences. The idea of a lasting orientation toward values and of the trans-individual character of social formations is also mirrored in Durkheim’s (1901/1982) holistic conception of “social facts” as collective realities that are “external” to individuals. He used the term “collective consciousness” to broadly refer to thoughts, representations, and emotions that are shared across a community and hence have their own laws (Durkheim, 1901/1982, p. 40).

These taxonomies already foreshadow more contemporary distinctions between formal and informal collectives prominent in organizational behavior and social movements research. In informal collectives, actors do share beliefs, norms, and goals. However, membership is usually not governed by formal rules (as in formal collectives) but rather through similar social practices (e.g., Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Taken together, substantialist perspectives on social formations as collectives by and large revolve around the sharing of certain stances, attitudes worldviews, and phenomenological aspects in which intentions and self-categorizations refer to a collective, and which entail the capacity to engage in some sort of coordinated and intentional action.

Interactive accounts

In contrast to the focus on shared ideas and worldviews and collective agency, a second strand of work has considered social collectives as situational and ephemeral patterns of interaction processes. This perspective capitalizes on non-organized and localized collections of individuals in specific social situations. These collectives have traditionally been investigated in terms of their “collective behavior,” meaning “unconventional” and, for the most part, spontaneous, non-institutionalized behavior in public places.

Crowds and gatherings are probably the most exemplary forms of this sort of social collective. A classical definition by Gustave Le Bon (1895) conceives of a crowd as a collection of individuals assembled in the same physical space, sharing a common focus of attention. Immersed in crowds, people show patterns of behavior that render all individual attitudes and characteristics irrelevant in favor of the emergence of a “collective mind” or “mental unity” (Le Bon, 1895, p. 57) (→ immersion, immersive power). Le Bon not only emphasized the importance of the crowd for instigating collective behavior, but also pointed at the essential role of emotions in characterizing collective
behavior as “irrational” and “exaggerated.” Essential for crowds is the process of contagion through which attitudes, emotions, and behaviors involuntarily and rapidly spread across individuals. Tarde (1962) proposed a similar perspective on crowds, although he argued that rather than contagion, imitation (which, in contrast, is essentially based on beliefs and desires (see King, 2016)), is the key process driving the convergence of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Durkheim (1912/1995) criticized both concepts for being overly individualistic and for disregarding the importance of extra-individual social facts, in particular shared values and beliefs. However, he too suggested that individuals in crowds are often carried away by emotions, for which he coined the term “effervescence.”

These views are more or less mirrored in later works, such as Robert Park’s and Ernest Burgess’ (1921) account, according to which a crowd is characterized by the dominance of a common drive amongst its members that results from the suppression of all individual impulses. This is achieved through “circular reactions,” which Herbert Blumer (1946) later defined as a form of “interstimulation wherein the response of one individual reproduces the stimulus that has come from another individual and in being reflected back to this individual reinforces the stimulation” (p. 170). Teresa Brennan (2004) has elaborated how these concepts of circular reaction and interstimulation can be understood as processes through which actors mutually affect one another.

Blumer furthermore developed a typology of crowds that reflects gradual shifts in their degree of institutionalization. In “casual crowds,” members only briefly turn their attention to some source of stimulation, such as a row in the streets (Blumer, 1946, pp. 178ff.). “Conventionalized crowds” share some similarities with rituals when they come together on a more or less regular basis, for instance when watching a football match. “Expressive crowds” gather for the purpose of exaltation, excited feelings, and bodily movements, as in dancing. In contrast, “acting crowds” are captivated by a common object and the pursuit of an external goal related to this object (see Dolata & Schrape, 2014; Borch, 2012, pp. 147ff.).

Quite some effort has been put into identifying criteria that distinguish localized, actually assembled crowds from the “substantive” kinds of collectives discussed above and into delineating the ways in which both types might interact. Durkheim (1912/1995) proposed a well-established account of how, in rituals, shared beliefs and values as well as processes of affecting and being affected coalesce. Taking a different perspective, Wilhelm Vleugels (1930) coined the distinction between “latent” and “active” crowds. Latent crowds (or “separated crowds” in Tönnies’ terms) are first and foremost “communities of feeling” (Gefühlgemeinschaften), meaning those parts of a population that share a certain way of evaluating or assessing events or states of affairs (often with respect to their rights and duties), and thus develop a latent feeling of being connected in solidarity (cf. Menzel, 1931). Members of
latent crowds do not directly interact with each other, but develop similar beliefs, ideas, and, eventually, emotions, by being exposed to mass media, in particular newspapers and political propaganda. Active crowds (or “assembled crowds” in Tönnies’ terms), on the other hand, are physically assembled crowds as described by Le Bon and others. They can be outcomes or transformations of latent crowds, but may also emerge from mere gatherings of otherwise entirely unrelated individuals (Vleugels, 1930). Active crowds are characterized by “affects, aroused passions, and instincts” to which participants irrationally succumb (von Wiese, 1956, p. 32).

These ideas have been taken up by the Chicago School, which further elaborated typologies of crowds and masses. Whereas crowds are characterized by the dominance of a common drive that results from the neglect and suppression of all individual impulses, a public retains all of these individual impulses. A public is not characterized by a common drive, but aims at deliberation and the rational exchange of arguments regarding a specific issue. It can therefore even be understood as a platform that promotes the emergence of individual impulses in the first place (cf. Borch, 2012, p. 143). Although crowds and publics are distinct forms of social formations, they are both distinguished from social groups in that they share an ahistorical character. Crowds and publics may precede other kinds of social groups, and it is only through interactions and communications that they gradually develop shared goals and values. Crowds are, in a sense, an innovative force that propels actors out of old ties into new ones.

A further relevant distinction is that between crowds and masses. Blumer (1935) introduced the mass as a type of social collective that is unique to modern societies because it requires modern media, such as motion pictures and newspapers. Masses are considered “a homogeneous aggregate of individuals who in their extra-mass activities are highly heterogeneous. In the mass they are essentially alike, are individually indistinguishable, and can be treated as similar units” (Blumer, 1935, p. 118). Importantly, however, individuals in masses do not interact with each other and masses do promote collective behavioral dispositions. Blumer (1935) mentions “war hysteria, the spread of fashion, migratory movements, ‘gold rushes’ and land booms, social unrest, popular excitement over the kidnapping of a baby, the rise of interest in golf” (p. 115) as examples.

**Examples from research**

Given this extraordinarily broad array of concepts traditionally filed under the label “social collective,” it is not intuitively clear how a social collective can be meaningfully conceptualized as ontologically distinct from other social formations such as communities, organizations, movements, or crowds. The understanding of social collectives proposed here assumes that they are specific and distinct social phenomena – not merely an umbrella term for
various social formations. In a nutshell, substantialist accounts would argue that collectives are trans-situational social formations in which actors share beliefs, values, feelings, and eventually a common will, whereas interactive accounts emphasize that collectives are those social formations that manifest situation-specific collective behavior. Both provide, by way of different infrastructures, critical potentialities through which actors mutually affect each other and eventually come to share a common emotion. Substantialist understandings hint at existing commonalities that promote – as the smallest common denominator – similar self-categorizations. Interactive accounts emphasize the necessary material, symbolic, and technological infrastructures that enable (latent or active) sharing and reciprocal awareness of this sharing, allowing for actors to mutually affect and be affected by each other.

The proposed understanding of social collectives subscribes to the interactive view that they are transient and situation-specific “aggregate states” or “dynamic stabilizations” of other social formations, rather than an enduring and substantive social entity. Such situations are, however, not bound to Goffmanian “encounters” (Goffman, 1961) in a shared physical space, but also encompass spatially dispersed actors. Nevertheless, collectives require an infrastructure that facilitates mutual affectivity and being affected, which may even be a media space or symbolic universe. Borrowing from the substantialist perspective, the proposed understanding also holds that actors need to have an (episodic) self-understanding as part of a group of actors that self-categorizes and is affected in similar ways. The proposed sharing of beliefs, goals, and values in the substantialist account is, in a very rudimentary sense, a precondition for these transiently converging self-categorizations, and would likewise require a corresponding infrastructure.

Existing research has emphasized the utility of this notion of social collectives in many ways. For example, a study of the embodiment of belonging through religious practices amongst members of a Pentecostal church and a Sufi order in Berlin conceives of collectives as constantly “in the making” (Dilger, Kasmani, & Mattes, 2018). Focusing on notions of space and place, the study demonstrates how social collectives are actively generated, performed, and experienced through the physical co-presence of several actors. These spaces (and their mediatized analogues) provide the infrastructure for the embodied ways in which actors mutually affect each other. The religious backdrop of Pentecostalism and Sufism respectively provides the basis not only for congregating in ritual practices but also for shared self-categorizations. The study thus helps to make sense of how collectivity is articulated and stabilized beyond gathering in a shared physical space. It conceives of religious communities and gatherings as social formations that constitute specific affective arrangements, which in turn promote certain modes through which actors affect and are affected by each other.
A second study has looked at social collectives in the context of film and cinema. Subscribing to philosophical notions of community, Hauke Lehmann (2017) conceives of social collectives as emerging in between individual and idiosyncratic self-understandings, and historicized and cultural forms and patterns of the (collective) self. This in-betweenness carries a specific affectivity and is conceptualized in its potential to create shared sensibilities and modes of world-relatedness. This shared sensibility, although highly transient and ephemeral, may culminate in perceptions and concepts of “we-ness.” In this context, film and cinema assume a critical role in that they project individual and corporeal forms of feeling and being affected toward collective forms of affectivity and self-understanding. In other words, they simultaneously provide the infrastructures for shared self-categorizations and the capacity to affect and be affected, and are a privileged means for re-instantiating transient social collectives.

**Conclusion**

Social collectives, as proposed here, are distinct types of social formations that come into being at the borderlines of transient social situations and certain forms of relational self-understanding. These relational self-understandings are not without presuppositions, but instead draw upon existing views of the self in social contexts and material as well as medial infrastructures that can enable actors to affect and be affected by others. Social collectives by no means render other sorts and theories of social formations obsolete. On the contrary, theories of social groups, organizations, communities, crowds, or nation states provide the necessary insights into social processes that enable or promote self-categorizations and infrastructures. Their hierarchies, histories, political strategies, institutions, networks, etc. all inform the different ways through which common self-categorizations and reciprocal affect can be achieved, either intentionally or as unintended consequences. Given that actors categorize themselves as part of a larger collection of individuals and given that infrastructures allowing for relational affect between actors and for similar self-categorizations are in place, social collectives can situationally emerge for certain episodes. These episodes can be conceived of as specific transient “states” or modes of being of other (already existing) social formations or may contribute to the generation of these (often more enduring) social formations. This collective becoming thus provides an “embodied grounding” of various (also more abstract or latent) social formations and contributes to collective actions, behaviors, and emotions.

**References**


Chapter 24

Midân moments

Bilgin Ayata and Cilja Harders

Emotions and protest has been a growing field within social movement studies over the past two decades. Focusing on the political practice of occupying public squares, we develop the concept of “Midân moments” to analyze the emotional and affective dynamics of such mass protests. The term “Midân moment” emerges from our research on the 2011 occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, and the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, Turkey. “Midân” refers to the Arabic word meaning “square” or “battlefield” that highlights the spatial and antagonistic dimension of the concept, while “moment” refers to its temporal component. Midân moments are episodes within a delineated space that are characterized by intense affective relationalities engendered through the bodily co-presence of protesters as well as practices relating to these spaces. We define Midân moments as moments of rupture in which pre-existing emotional repertoires of fear, hate, repression, or respect for the political order are destabilized. They can potentiate new ways of being and relating to each other, but can also raise new conflicts and tensions. Midân moments are imbued with a sense of possibility for social change as well as ambivalence, as they may already contain – and make vivid – the limits of these possibilities. Looking at Tahrir Square, Gezi Park, and other sustained occupations through an affective lens complicates both the narrative of a utopian square and the narrative of a “failed revolution or uprising.” Moving beyond a simple assessment of failure or success, a focus on the affective dynamics of extraordinary episodes of collective protest reveals as much about a society’s past tensions as its future ones. Furthermore, Midân moments are not fixed to a particular space and event, but can travel in time and space, extending to distant localities. When Midân moments travel, they can evoke new political practices that often escape the level of research and media coverage afforded to sustained mass protests. These new forms of local political practices, in which actors may engage in formal or informal, local or national, violent or peaceful types of participation, may feed into political pluralization and lead to the intense politicization of substantial parts of participating protestors. At the same time, such participation may contribute to processes of polarization and political and sectarian violence instigated from
above, but felt and practiced “from below” as well. Thus, the concept of the Midān moments allows for an analysis of political transformations during and after mass protests that can account for the non-linear, multidirectional, and at times contradictory developments in the aftermath of such struggles. In contrast to much of the scholarly work in Social Movement Studies (SMS), the concept we propose combines agency, time, and space in relation to emotions, which enables one to account for the more inchoate and incoherent dimensions of political emotions.

**Historical orientation and state of the research**

While passions have had a productive and important place in the early conceptions of politics, such as in ancient Greece, the modern social sciences treated people’s emotions and affects as dangerous and in need of control. This was because they could be stimulated (and abused) by able despots and politicians and could develop disruptive powers. Sociologists from Gustave Le Bon to Max Weber were wary of crowds and their allegedly uncontrollable, dangerous, and even pathological emotions. Liberal and deliberative political thought in particular advocates the idea that participation in the political sphere is performed by rational actors, who are moved by identifiable interests and engaged in tempered public deliberation about the collective good (Greco & Stenner, 2008). Postwar US-American and continental political science, both underpinned by rationalist foundations and normative interest in democracy and good governance, followed this line of reasoning. Broadly speaking, affect and emotion were neglected, feared, and/or analytically relegated to lower-class “dangerous masses,” non-democratic forces, women, or colonial subjects (Bargetz & Sauer, 2010; Staiger, Cvetkovich, & Reynolds, 2010). In the same vein, political participation was largely thought of in legalistic, institutional, and conventional ways, and understood narrowly in terms of rational citizens making informed electoral choices according to their interests.

Yet with the emergence of the field of SMS after various mass mobilizations in the 1960s, the picture changed. With anti-colonial movements flourishing in the former colonies and emergent civil rights, peace, students’, and women’s movements in many countries of the world, protest, participation, and the complexities of mobilization attracted more scholarly attention. The new field of SMS dedicated itself to the analysis of movements, their repertoires of protest, and street politics as important aspects of the democratic process rather than disruptive political contestation (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Early proponents of SMS stuck with rationalist paradigms, analyzing the mechanisms of mobilization, resources, and political opportunity structures which enabled contentious politics. They did so in an effort to shield both movements and the emerging scholarly field from allegations of irrationality and irrelevance (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001). Yet after the
“cultural turn” in SMS over the past two decades, these rationalist and functionalist approaches were increasingly questioned, and emotions were pushed to the forefront of the study of movements, protest, and participation (→ emotions, emotion concept). In a number of seminal publications, social movement scholars emphasized that in contrast to political psychology, which is interested in individual emotional states, the social and political dimension of emotions are critical for a complex comprehension of collective action and protest (Della Porta, 2016; Flam & King, 2005; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001, 2004; Gould, 2009; Jasper, 2011).

Emotions are highly relevant when analyzing repertoires of contention, framing strategies, the recruitment of movement members, the mobilization of protest, and the sustainability of movements; they are crucial to understanding how movement identities as well as a sense of belonging are forged (→ emotion repertoires). Typological distinctions have been proposed between short-term and long-term or reciprocal versus shared emotions (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001) and between “affective loyalties” as attachments or aversions and “moral emotions” as feelings of approval or disapproval (Jasper, 2011, p. 287). In her study of the Arab Uprisings, Wendy Pearlman (2013) shows how participation-constraining emotions such as fear, grief, and shame turn into anger, joy, and pride, which lead to mass mobilization even in the face of violent repression. Similarly, Helena Flam (2005) distinguishes “cementing emotions” and “subversive emotions” in an effort to understand the dynamics of “emotional liberation,” a process in which actors disrupt old feelings of loyalty and construct new (oppositional) emotional bonds (p. 31). Cognitive and emotional liberation, she holds, need to be conceptualized as mutually reinforcing processes. Mass protests and occupations can set such processes into motion due to the intense emotional and affective dynamics in the squares, allowing for new feelings and the disruption of an established emotional habitus. Such new feelings can be very disquieting and thus protests do not only need material and immaterial resources, resonant frames, ideological orientation, moral shocks and engaged actors, but also require an understanding of these as emotional processes (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001, 2004; Flam & King, 2005; Hogget & Thompson, 2012) in order to be sustained. Movements engage in “emotion work”; protesters need ways to “read” anger or frustration in order to translate feelings into activism and even create specific, emotionally attuned repertoires or “emotional habitus” (Gould, 2009).

Given that collective mobilization tends to be much less “tidy” than the typologies of SMS suggest, emotion work is even more important. Research on mass protests and occupations show that, more often than not, protesters experience mixed feelings, ambivalence, and ambiguity (Ayata & Harders, 2018). Their assessments can change from one moment to another, just like the situation in an occupied square might change from boredom and anxiety to the sudden intensity of an expected attack by security forces or counter-movements. The nonlinearity and complexity of emotions was emphasized in
Deborah Gould’s (2009) study of the ACT UP movement in the United States. Her approach to the role of affect and emotions in protest refuted categorizations of emotions as “positive” or “negative” for protest, which still inflect SMS scholarship on emotions. For instance, in her reading, despair can lead to mobilization, but also to immobilization. Her approach to human motivation derives from an understanding of affect as “non-conscious, non-linguistic, noncoherent, nonrational, and unpredicted” (Gould, 2009, p. 23) (→ affect). Approaching human motivation in this way enables scholars to make sense of what drives people to cast a vote or join a demonstration, or why people become members of a party or stay in a group even though the meetings are boring and the agenda is not very promising. Mobilization is driven as much by cognition as by affect and emotion. Gould emphasizes that perceptions of rational interest, of rights, of dignity, and of being included or excluded are shaped, informed, and structured by affects and emotions because they are formed through our embodied practices in the social world. Following these important insights, the concept of Midān moments offers a shift of perspective. Rather than asking why people protest, which is still one of the core questions in SMS literature, we ask what protest does to people. How does experiencing the highly intense affective dynamics of protesting together affect participants? What do the collective experiences of inchoate, nonlinear, and immediate feelings that become registered as bodily intensities and connectivity do in the aftermath of protest? What does protest do to an individual’s relationship to the collective, to the self, to the political community, and to political transformation? These are the questions we seek to explore with our analysis of Midān moments.

Systematic explication of the concept Midān moments

Following the series of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East after December 2010 that led to massive changes in the region, the occupation of public squares once again became a popular form of protest around the globe. Our concept of the Midān moment emerges from the in-depth study of two occupations of public squares, namely the occupations of Tahrir Square (Cairo 2011) and Taksim Square/Gezi Park (Istanbul 2013). However, our analysis of the intricate dynamics of affect, emotion and politics also offers important insights for other forms of protests that take place over a sustained period of time. Midān moments refer to episodes in a specific space that are characterized by intense affective relationalities through the bodily co-presence of protesters and the practices experienced in these spaces. Some of these practices relate to political deliberation, decision-making, and basic forms of political protest. Crucially, the very act of occupying and maintaining a space requires daily maintenance and service provision.
These intense bodily experiences are embedded in new political practices of hitherto unlikely personal and political encounters across existing social and political cleavages and can evoke different affective attachments. The sustained practices of protest and occupation by the collective in the public square are embedded in a complex web of affective arrangements marked by capacity and potentiality (→ affective arrangements). Midān moments are a “time out of time” (Sabea, 2013) during which new ways of being, both at the individual as well as collective level, are experimented with. They are moments of rupture that destabilize previous emotional and political constellations, for instance, the fear of repression or respect for the current political order (→ emotion repertoires). Participants can experience “emotional liberation” (Flam, 2005) which enables new alliances, new political practices, and new ways of relating to each other. Hardt and Negri (2012) have called the occupation of squares “factories” that are producing political affect, which in their reading necessarily leads to emancipation and new political subjectivities. However, our study of the Tahrir and Taksim protests show that the experiences in the square are too manifold, messy, and at times contradictory to be categorized in such a linear manner. Even though romanticized notions of protest movements are rather common in analyses of recent protests, it is important to account for the ambivalences, ambiguities, and limitations that emerge from spatially inflected affective dynamics (Soudias, 2018). Fear and hope, excitement and boredom, love and hate, affective community building and alienation, and a range of other personal and collective experiences are felt in parallel during the protests. All contribute to the highly intense affective relationality on the square. While at times they enable new alliances and new encounters across intersectional hierarchies based on race, gender, class, religion, they can also intensify and consolidate existing hierarchies, conflicts and antagonisms. Therefore, we argue that Midān moments are imbued with a sense of possibility and ambivalence as they may already contain – and make clear – the limits of these possibilities.

Our choice of the term Midān moment captures this Janus-faced dimension. The Arabic word midān refers primarily to a field, place, or square, but it also means a battlefield (Viré, 2012). Etymologically, the word midān refers to the field on which princes and noble youth were trained in martial arts in Persian antiquity, lending weight to the notion of the midān as a locus of physical battle and contestation (Knauth, 1976). Just like the English “field” or the German “Feld,” it also hints figuratively at intellectual or political “battlefields.” A midān is a well-defined place, a locus of everyday practices that in turn create and structure urban fabric. The midān is embedded in a city as a multi-scalar site, which is – in a Lefebvrian sense – a socially produced space, and thus as much a product of power structures as a site of resistance (Brenner, 1999; Lefebvre, 1991). The square is thus a socio-political space in which power struggles unfold.

To emphasize the directness and instantaneousness of relational affect, we use the term “moments” as a temporal register of momentum, rather than
situations, events, hours, or days. A Midān moment consists of many different encounters in a distinct temporality. It combines two temporal registers: the immediacy of, for instance, an affective atmosphere, which imposes itself in a matter of seconds and can lead to an immediate rupture of the well-known; and the emergence of new ways of feeling, which can last longer. In this sense, a Midān moment is a “transformational event.” Transformational events “come to be interpreted as significantly disrupting, altering, or violating the taken-for-granted assumptions governing routine political and social relations” (McAdam & Sewell, 2001, p. 110). At the same time, moments can be repeated, remembered, and lived again, due to the affective attachments they carry. As such, they gain momentum over time, a process which is important to explore for a better understanding of the more mid- to long-term effects of such events.

To illustrate the Midān moment from our case study of the occupation of Tahrir Square, we can point to at least two important overlapping affective arrangements structuring the affective and emotional dynamics in the square: one is related to the midān as battlefield; and the other is geared toward the political practices that created and sustained Tahrir as a utopian space – as the “independent republic of Tahrir” (Keraitim & Mehrez, 2012; Sabea, 2014; Telmissany, 2014). The midān is configured here both as a utopian place and a socio-political battlefield in which class, gender, and religious and political difference were momentarily less relevant, or open for renegotiation. At the same time, these differences and latent conflicts were still present, reappearing both visibly and subtly, sometimes openly violent, sometimes less so, thus creating important constraints to the desire to begin anew in a utopic moment (Ayata & Harders, 2018). For instance, it was possible to experience becoming a collective when shouting and protesting in concert, loudly demanding “bread, freedom, dignity, and social justice.” This resulted in moments of deep affective resonance between men and women, old and young, Christian and Muslim, secular and religious, leftist and conservative, and rich and poor Egyptians. Yet on the other hand, moments of dissonance, embedded in multiple layers of conflicting emotions and differing affective arrangements, were also experienced on the ground. Counter to what social movement research usually suggests, participants often do not recount the dominance of one specific mobilizing emotion. Different affective arrangements, which might be dissonant and resonant at the same time due to the various possibilities of affective attunement, interweave complexly to shape individual experiences in the square.

Even though the term Midān moment highlights the locality and time of the event itself, it is important to underline that the affective dynamics of the square can travel in time and space (Schielke, 2015). The protests themselves involve varying levels of participation. For instance, certain activists sleep and live in the square during the occupation, while others join only at certain times, thus connecting the occupied square with their homes, districts and far
Beyond spaces. The in- and outflow already carries the Midān moment to distant localities during the protests. But Midān moments also travel over time, in the aftermath of protests in which personal and collective memory creates an affective archive that can be reinvigorated at different times and different places. For instance, memories of victory, violence, and loss are important reference points for local mobilization long after the initial protests. As Midān moments travel in time and space, they feed into new political practices. Political participation in such practices may be formal or informal, local or national, and violent or peaceful. Instead of merely looking at mass uprisings as events that are too often hastily described as successes or failures, it is this capacity of the Midān moment to travel in time and space that allows us to understand and analyze political transformation below the level of regime change. This is true of Turkey and Egypt, which on the one hand have become much more authoritarian, repressive, and polarized after the mass uprisings, but on the other hand, have seen resilient and sustained local political practices from below as a result of the protests (Harders & Wahba, 2017), which feed into larger protests or resistances that challenge the regimes from time to time. Thus, tracing the trajectory of the Midān moment enables us to analyze the medium- and long-term processes of transformation that continue to take place long after cameras and people have left occupied squares.

In order to empirically capture how Midān moments travel, we propose to approach them as participation rather than protest because the latter is a specific and comparatively rare type of participation. Conventionally, participation has meant public, collective, voluntary, and non-professional activities directed toward the government or politics. In the last decades, this notion has continuously expanded to include the ever-growing diversity of forms taken by citizen agency, such as contemporary modes of “creative, personalized and individualized” action from street parties to consumption boycotts (van Deth, 2016, p. 1). Lately, these debates have been informed by approaches that stress the affective dimension of such agency (→ affective citizenship).

Even with these new re-conceptualizations, research in the field has mainly focused on democratic politics and has thus missed out on more refined debates about informal and less visible types of agency in anthropology and critical area studies. For example, Asef Bayat (2009) hinted at the public impact of individual agency in the “quiet encroachment” of massive, though individualistic, informal “non-movements” in Egypt and Iran. Diane Singerman (1995) alluded to the importance of neighborhood networks to the practices of ordinary citizens in Egypt, and James C. Scott (1985) famously analyzed the “weapons of the weak.” Similarly, our broader conceptualization of participation includes informal, individual, hidden, illegal, and “non-political” actions and networks, as well as organized public collective action within and beyond institutionalized frameworks. In more abstract terms, it
includes all practices geared towards “involvement in the social, political, and economic processes of formal and informal resource-allocation in a society” (Harders, 2013, p. 116). Such involvement is always informed by intersectional categories of social inequality, such as class, race, religion, ethnicity, and gender. Thus, when Midān moments travel in time and space, they might turn into less visible, informal ways of keeping the utopian or dystopian quality of the moment alive as they inform political practices.

**Outlook: from protest to participation**

Sustained mass protest is not the rule but rather the exception, both in democratic and authoritarian polities. Thus, in order to grasp the emotional and affective dynamics of mobilization beyond highly visible mass events, we suggest the concept of the Midān moment that enables us to study both the potential and limitations of such highly intense forms of collectivization and mobilization. Highlighting the temporal and spatial components of mass protests, we conceptualized Midān moments as being highly charged affectively and emotionally. They are transformative moments, which inform and feed into manifold symbolic, discursive and praxeological references in their aftermath and in various locations. Once the moment gains momentum, it develops its own affective economy that feeds into a diverse array of practices and discourses, which we conceptualize as participation (→ affective economy). At the same time, the affective and emotional charge of such extraordinary events is fundamentally open and contingent. Egypt and Turkey underwent extraordinary mobilization and polarization. For some, feelings of enthusiasm and solidarity turned into hate and violence. High hopes led to deep exasperation and disillusion. Such polarization was also carefully orchestrated “from above,” when state-controlled media and security apparatuses deliberately targeted those groups which challenged the status quo, such as the urban poor, leftists, women, LGBTQ, or religious or ethnic minorities. Both states intensified their so-called “war on terror,” unleashing state violence and permitting popular violence. At the same time, both the Erdogan and the Sisi governments were alluding to the “Gezi-” or “Tahrir-experience” when organizing mass rallies, tapping into the affective archive of the Midān moment with the intention of replicating it for their own purposes. In addition, as Midān moments travel in time and space, they erupt and show their potentiality during conventional political events such as elections and referendums. Such conventional opportunities for participation then are used by activists to refresh the memory of the Midān moment and increase electoral mobilization. These are the more visible and tangible layers of deeper socio-political transformations. They are fundamentally contingent in the sense that a struggle for “bread, freedom, and dignity” can at least in the short and medium term lead to more authoritarianism, but leaves its mark on a citizenry which can then tap into the experience and memory of Midān moments.
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Affective communities do not only evolve from processes of collectivization, but are themselves a mode of relating individuals toward each other. Mutual affectability serves as a prerequisite for the construction of communal relationships. In this respect, affects function as implicit translators between social bodies that sensuously converse and create a dynamic sphere of sensual experiences. Transgressing the plurality of socially defined and culturally valorized positions, by means of affectivity, people consolidate intermediary realms of affective exchange and situationally generate a sense of affinity and collective immediacy. The notion of affective communities draws attention to processes of producing a temporal solidarization between affected and the affecting social bodies. The creation of ephemeral milieus of communality is characterized by an intense and immersive form of social integration.

Instead of understanding social forms as the product of pre-established rules, hegemonic norms, and imposed structures, the concept of affective communities focuses on sensual infrastructures of social encounters and on modes of affective exchange that make up the fabric of the formation and transformation of the social. The idea of an affective communality, at first sight, seems to counter the notion of systemic integration maintained by the administrative-economic complex of societal order. The concept of affective communities, thus, conjures a prevalent social imaginary that reflects the structure of contemporary social reality; a social imaginary driven by the withering of belief in the idea of an “iron cage” (Weber, 2005, p. 123). By understanding social constructs as the ever-changing product of timely, affective social connections, the social is imagined to assume a rather vital form. The notion of affective communities, hence, envisions the social as a net of pulsating spheres of sociability instead of depicting society as a self-contained corpus composed of organized elements (Giesen, Zink, & Le Maitre, 2016).

In this respect, affective communities are social collectives inasmuch as they are transient aggregations of individuals (→ social collectives). Nonetheless, the concept of affective communities depicts a specific form of collectivity that can be characterized by a shared sensuality eliciting an implicit sense of commonality and immediateness. This understanding of affective communities
Veronika Zink has a conceptual affinity with the notion of emotional communities (cf. Rosenwein, 2006; Weber, 1978). Emotional communities are thought of as evolving from affectively intense social encounters of fellow feeling that (re)produce the belief in an indissoluble community of shared values and like-mindedness. In comparison to the compulsory bonds that define emotional communities, affective communities describe the mutual constitution of social associations. Affective communities are momentary connections of social immediacy that are driven by “the impulse of sociability” (Simmel, 1971, p. 254), that is, of a playful form of practicing convivial connectivity. Accordingly, the concept of affective communities is to be located between the idea of society (Gesellschaft) in terms of a rational association modulating the personal interests of distinct individuals, and the notion of community (Gemeinschaft) in terms of an affirmative subjugation to an emotionalized, transpersonal collectivity.

Assembling social bodies: sensory infrastructures of social cohesion

Describing an American football match, Brian Massumi (2002) illustrates the “political economy of belonging and the logic of relation” (p. 68) at work in the collective realm of the match. Independent of the antagonism of the teams, the players, the ball, and the field that is polarized by the two goals turn into a “unity of movement” (Massumi, 2002, p. 75) driven by dynamic relations of force. What is at work between the moving and the moved bodies are the reciprocal affections that continuously process communality and a mode of belonging that Massumi (2002) defines as the “incorporeality of the event” (p. 64). This sensual and sensory interpositioning of the bodies opens up an intermediary space of mutual dependence between the ball, the player, and the goals. For the duration of the match these bodies belong to each other, since they affectively and expressively reflect one another and thus condition each other’s “actionability” (Massumi, 2002, p. 74):

The player’s body is a node of expression: not a subject of the play but a material channel for the catalysis of an event affecting the global state of the game. Whereas the ball is the catalyzer, and the goal are inducers, the node of expression is a transducer: a channel for the transformation of a local physical movement into another energetic mode, that of potential energy.

(Massumi, 2002, p. 74)

This affective realm of mutual sensual impressions and bodily expressions not only groups the formerly separated bodies into “a state of intensive readiness for reflex response” (Massumi, 2002, p. 74), but literally puts the bodies into play: The affective movement implies a temporal suspension of the socially
Ascribed identity of what is an object and what is a subject. Not only is the ball “the subject of the play” (Massumi, 2002, p. 74), but the players need, as Massumi suggests, to transcend their position as self-conscious and selfinterested agents and arrive at a sensory state open to the ever-changing dynamics of movement.

For Massumi, transcending one’s individual identity for the sake of constituting an affective community requires that the players enter a state of pre-reflexivity and pre-consciousness. From a sociological perspective, this idea is arguable. Georg Simmel (1971) points to the fact that within the realm of sociability there is no room for individual personalities, interests, and feelings. Self-confident subjects, according to Simmel, emphasize their distinctness and, thus, oppose the social form of a convivial association. The belief in the equivalence of elements is a central principle of sociable associations allowing mutuality between potentially heterogenous bodies. Affective communities are thought of as impersonal spheres consisting of beings that leave aside both objective differences and the personal intensity of life. Nonetheless, the concept of affective communities discounts a naturalistic vision of the social, since the impersonal sphere of affective communality is a superficially constructed sphere. The more heterogeneous the bodies are, the more important it becomes to create the imaginary of a pre-personal and pre-reflexive realm of interaction “among equals” (Simmel, 1971, p. 133). Accordingly, being sensitive to the dynamics of a social movement and temporarily voiding one’s identity should not be confused with the image of a pre-socialized and unformed body. Mutual affectability presupposes the capability of resonance (Seyfert, 2012) and an educated social sensibility (→ affective resonance). Being sensible to the resonances of a movement and reflecting its dynamics requires a specialized training of the body (Bourdieu, 1996) and, thus, hyperconscious agents that are acutely aware of affective movements. The example of sport in particular makes clear that the socialization of the body and the incorporation of a field-specific, sensual knowledge is necessary to intuitively react and to enter the flow of an “affectual nebula” (Maffesoli, 1996, pp. 72–78) that is itself very sensitive to change (cf. Seyfert, 2012).

The development of the concept: images of the social and mechanisms of association

Due to their capacity to relate and repel social bodies, affects play a vital role in the moving of the social, in the collectivization and singularization of bodies (→ affect). By focusing on sensuously perceptible mechanisms of social cohesion, the concept of affective communities not only stresses the social power of sensuality, but concentrates on a specific form of the social: the community. Within modern social theories, the idea of community is opposed to the notion of society. Reflecting a modern imaginary of the social, society is formed by the functionally rational, socially contracted, and
formally impersonal organization of social coexistence. The vision of a technocratic, ordered society is perceived to be the civilizing product of bureaucratically organized industrial modernity, in which the market economy, the nation state, and legal justice become the central institutions of life (Weber, 1978). In contrast to this mechanic imaginary of the social, the notion of community reflects an organic teaching and is grounded in the belief in socially close, personal relations and in an emotionally grounded solidarity. This said, the idea of a community reveals a fundamentally different perspective on integration. While associative relationships (society, *Vergesellschaftung*) rest on, as Max Weber (1978) defines, “a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement” (pp. 40–41), communitization (*Vergemeinschaftung*), at least in its pure form, describes a social relationship “based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together” (p. 40).

This very notion of community has often been characterized as a socially mobilizing form with political potential. Against the backdrop of the modern industrial age, the idea of a personalized, emotionally indissoluble community augurs the image of a warming “fireplace” (Bauman, 2000, p. 1) and promises relief from the alienating “iron cage” of modern society. Modern social theorists, indeed, conceptually distinguished these two modes of social formation. However, they frequently pointed to the fact that community and society are not two separate entities, but that modern social life must be understood as a permanent recombination of associative and communal relations. In this line of thought, Weber (1978) famously conceived the modern nation state as being driven by the reenacted belief in an imagined community of sentiment (p. 925) (→ affective citizenship). Siegfried Kracauer (1998) enunciated the dialectics of the modern organization of the salaried masses that is characterized by the systemic integration into the functionally rational order of the modern firm but also enlivened by the ecstatic experience of the community orchestrated through operationally organized sport events. And, as a result of his analysis of the totemic cultures of Australian tribal societies, Émile Durkheim (2001) assumed that the collective, affective arousals and the libidinal virtue of assembled bodies fulfill a socially cohesive function revitalizing the social corpus, especially within functionally differentiated, modern societies.

Modern theories of communitization certainly inform current conceptions of affective communities. Most notably, one is reminded of Durkheim’s description of the *corroboree* feasts. The collective realm of a ritual assembly is a highly resonant sphere produced by sensual transmissions, mutually affective stimulations and “emotional infections” (Denzin, 2009, p. 149). As a result, the diverse elements of this cultic encounter (the totem, the clan members, the music, etc.) coalesce into a movement of perpetual affections:

Once the individuals are assembled, their proximity generates a kind of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of
exaltation. Every emotion expressed is retained without resistance in all those minds so open to external impressions; each one echoing the others. The initial impulse thus becomes amplified and reverberates, like an avalanche gathering force as it goes.

(Durkheim, 2001, pp. 162–163)

Using highly metaphorical language, Durkheim aims to signify the social potency of this reciprocal mode of sensual affections that unresistingly and transversally moves through bodies and becomes intensified and amplified by them. Similar to Massumi’s football scene, the conducted electricity and the contagious echo-like effect transfigure a mediating social force that, by means of affects, constructs a sensual space of mutual belonging and shared movements (→ belonging).

Apart from Durkheim’s pictorial description of affective communities, studies in social psychology, most prominently that of Gustave Le Bon, have continuously tried to understand the mechanism at play. For Le Bon (2001) the crowd is a “provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements” (p. 15). Due to the “suggestibility” (Le Bon, 2001, p. 23) or impressionability of its elements, the temporarily released affective community is a highly contagious social realm. Certainly, Le Bon’s portrayal of the members of the crowd as suggestible puppets in the hand of the all-infusing will of the collective has often been criticized for neglecting the role of its members in transducing the affective community. Nonetheless, the idea of affective contagion makes the basal effects of intercorporeal resonance, of sensual transmission and of sensorial synchronization clear. More recent approaches offer a nuanced view on socio-psychological mechanisms carrying affective contagion. These studies focus on seemingly automatic, unintentional, and prereflexive modes of synchronizing and coordinating facial, bodily, mimicked, or vocal expressions. Elaine Hatfield (1998), for example, describes the motoric mimicry of agents unconsciously tending to imitate the expressions of their fellow participants: “By attending to this stream of tiny moment-to-moment reactions, people can and do ‘feel themselves into’ the emotional landscapes inhabited by their partners” (p. 73). While these studies are mainly interested in the social dynamics that undergird a shared emotionality and engender intersubjectivity among human agents, social political theorists like Teresa Brennan (2004) emphasize the diversity of affectively transmitting bodies. Here, affective contagion is understood as a multi-sensorial mode of relationality between multiple bodies at a hormonal, olfactory, visual, or vocal level. Affective contagion serves as the prerequisite for communal relationships that instantaneously form shared “affective atmospheres” (Anderson, 2009) and immerse the multiple bodies that generate it (→ affective atmosphere). In this regard, affective communities depend on an experiential proximity. Spatial closeness of bodies propels affective transmissions, but is not a precondition. Experiential proximity rather rests upon
a communicative infrastructure of sensory transfer that connects sensuously trained bodies and enables affective exchange.

Focusing on processes of affective communitization means analyzing situationally prevailing logics and sensory modes of transmission that constitute the infrastructure of social life. This perspective suggests understanding the sensual texture of sociality as a generic structure. Portraying affects as the pulse of social formation reminds one of Henri Lefebvre’s (2004) materialist study of rhythms forming and being formed by the social. Rhythm, for Lefebvre, is the most immanent and concrete mode of sociability producing manifestations of the social. But, in their very presence and precisely because they are social movements, social rhythms are “fleeting objects” (Lefebvre, 2004, p. 28) that present themselves through their sensible imprints on the body. Just like Lefebvre’s idea of rhythm, affective communities are to be understood as the ever-changing products of material relations of force unfolding between bodies that are “perpetually forming and deforming” social reality (Anderson, 2009, p. 79).

In classical social theories the community is thought of as a solid collective entity temporarily enlivened by means of affectively arousing rituals that authenticate the belief in the shared values of the collective (Durkheim, 2001). In contrast to the image of a persisting social body, affective communities are spontaneous communities that generate collectivization (Turner, 1969). Comparable to Simmel’s reading of sociability, the ideal type of an affective community gives weight to the form of associating, while content only serves a secondary purpose, namely, “sociation” (Simmel 1971, p. 24). For Simmel, emphasizing content – be it personal interests or transpersonal values – disturbs rhythmic interactions, since content monopolizes the autonomous process of social formation: “For ‘good form’ is mutual self-definition, interaction of the elements, through which a unity is made […] in sociability the concrete motives bound up with life-goals fall away” enabling “the pure form, the free-playing, interacting interdependence of individuals” (Simmel, 1971, p. 129). The form of sociability constitutes the realm of affective communities. Accentuating the formal aspect as well as the instantaneous nature of communitization should not be confused with a lack of commonality. On the contrary, affective communities are characterized by an intense affinity between bodies that share interest in the affective production of commonality as well as the mutual “feeling of the worth of association” (Simmel, 1971, p. 129). The concept of affective communities focuses on affective dynamics of processing communality. Affective communities are transient social formations. But, in parallel with Randall Collins’ (2005) notion of emotional energy, the sensual affinity produced during the time of communitization imprints on affected bodies, be they human bodies, artificial objects (like a ball), or collective symbols (like a totem). Even though affective communities dissolve the moment experiential proximity disperses, affective impressions of communality generate an affective memory that can be reactivated, enabling the transition into a durable emotional community.
Franco Mazzucchelli’s (1971) film *Alfa Romeo* documenting an artistic intervention serves as an illustrative example of an instantaneous affective community. The film documents the mutual affectivity between workers of the Alfa Romeo factory in Milan interacting with the moving materiality of inflatable objects placed by Mazzucchelli in an urban public space. Jumping on the objects, hitting others, and penetrating traffic with them, the workers are affected by these inflatable bodies and in turn affect the objects’ movements. Concurrently, the laborers create a highly contagious and affectively dynamic atmosphere of instantaneous commonality. The film depicts the unfolding of an effervescent social event carried by mutual sensuality and emotionality, by reciprocal movements consonant with the material characteristics of the objects, and by a collectively produced unbounded exuberance. The filmic example can be understood as a prototype of an affective community driven by the play-form of association. The affective community appears to be content-less only driven by the shared interest in sociation and in producing affective interdependence. The potency of this transient form of solidarization rests upon the common creation of unity through movement. Certainly, the affective community will abort the moment experiential proximity among the bodies in the square dissipates. However, it is not clear which social form the affective community will take: the community might just disaggregate, the enactment might also activate the belief in a shared, more solid class consciousness, or the components – the workers and the objects – might translate the emotional energy generated during the event into economic productivity.

**Affective communities: beyond societal order and communal solidity**

Whether in Durkheim’s depiction of the feast or in Massumi’s representation of a football game, affects are passing transmitters of communal relations. They enable the transcendence of one’s socially determined, enclosed individuality by breaking with one’s ordinary identity as well as by creating space for intense affective impressions and the effervescence of sociality:

> It is not difficult to imagine that a man in such a state […] no longer knows himself. Feeling possessed and led by some external power that makes him think and act differently […] he naturally feels he is no longer himself. He seems to have become a new being […] it is as though he really were transported into […] a setting populated by exceptionally intense forces that invade and transform him.

(Durkheim, 2001, pp. 163–164)

The concept of affective communities does not initially appear as a new concept as such. Thinking of Durkheim’s (2001) notion of effervescence,
Veronika Zink Weber’s (1978) ideal type of emotional communities, Le Bon’s (2001) depiction of the libidinal masses, Turner’s (1969) analysis of the spontaneous communitas, or Lefebvre’s (2004) Rythmanalysis, social theorists have frequently described affective processes of communitization by pointing to the political potentialities as well as the societal dangers of this affectively mobilized social form. Classical as well as contemporary social theories on affective communities describe the mechanisms that engender communality in a comparable manner. They refer to the idea of an intermediating affectivity, they depict the socially transgressive potential ascribed to this form of collectivization, and highlight the communal production of a sensory rhythm of the social as well as the notion of a punctual dissolution of the socially and symbolically ascribed status of its elements. Nevertheless, despite the mechanisms depicted, the social theoretical perspective on affectively construed communities has changed.

In classical social theories, the affective mode of producing communality appeared as a precarious social phenomenon. Due to the affective responsiveness of its members, it was considered to be highly susceptible to ideological instrumentalization and to authorities monopolizing and controlling the diversifying affects. At the same time, the socially vital and mobilizing potency of the sensual was depicted as an anti-structural and, thus, potentially anomic state that, without solidifying into a representable collective form, would dissolve the moment affective energies were exhausted. To use a Durkheimian metaphor, it would be an effervescent social moment that would liquidate like a spume and thus lack any sense of political and socially transformative direction. However, translating an affective community into a solid, emotional community in turn bears the risk of monopolizing affectivity for the sake of a substantial unity. Transforming the process of affective communitization into a substantial social form involves the belief in a hegemonic center of values that subjugates the communality of the individual bodies to the emotionally solidified will of the collective and defines the socially exclusive limits of affinity. The transient character of the affective community likewise denotes the threshold of communality. In both ways, the vitality of the affective community was thought to dry up; it would either dissolve or congeal. For modern sociologists, the affective production of communality thus functioned as an instantaneous infusion of the social. This enabled the belief in an imagined, emotionally indissoluble community that occasionally enchants the abstract corpus of modern, rationally ordered societies.

In the aftermath of poststructural thought and buoyed by new materialist approaches within contemporary theory, the fragile and diversifying rhythm of affect conceptually turns into a social category in its own right that underscores the creative logics of sensory relations. Herein, the social is not thought of as a substantial form that consists of agents and is ordered by social structures, but as a continuously transforming organism. Understanding the social as a process in the making, contemporary theorists invoke belief in the
Affective communities

To distinguish between two forms of power, Maffesoli (1996) uses the term *puissance* in order to describe the horizontally affective potential and the vital force of affectual communality. Here, *puissance* is used as a counter-concept to *pouvoir* reflecting the hegemonic, vertically structuring power apparatus ordering the individualized modern societies.

The works of Leela Gandhi (2005), David Featherstone (2012), and Michel Maffesoli (1996) in particular reflect this vital notion of the social, as well as the political potentiality of this all-encompassing mode of connection. Building on Derrida’s notion of friendship, postcolonial theorist Gandhi traces the imprints of 19th-century, cross-cultural affective communities that evolve on the basis of global, imperial structures facilitating these connections, but simultaneously enable an affective global politics of friendship aiming to subvert the imperative nature of colonial structures. Similarly, studying historical geographies of solidarity, Featherstone theoretically reframes the notion of solidarity. Instead of understanding solidarity in terms of an unquestionable loyalty to a pre-established collectivity, he points to the vitality of transnational alliances and transversal modes of relating. And sociologist Maffesoli (1996) suggests understanding the fragmented structure of networked society as the configuring infrastructure for the emergence of volatile and transient “affectual tribes” (p. 6) or “affectual networks” (p. 113) characterized by a vitalism that enchants technocratic structures.

In terms of an instantaneously intense and immersive form of practicing sociability, affective communities are the modus operandi of contemporary affective societies. The global network economy of modern societies characterized by amplifying ties of connection requires sociable bodies that, despite their individual differences, are capable of processing affective associations that transiently congeal and dissolve (Elias, 2000). Against this backdrop the renewed interest in affective communities reflects the belief in the decentralized infrastructuring of society characterized by the ontology of the network. Simultaneously, the concept of affective communities conjures a notion of sociality that aims to subvert technocratic visions and instead accentuates the social potency or *puissance* of convivialist forms of being-together and of sensual modes of temporal solidarization. The idea of a sociality formed, transmitted, and propelled by affections echoes this very imaginary as well as the hope in the “sensed potential” (Massumi, 2002, p. 75) of collective movements. The social value ascribed to affective communities is informed by the belief in a seemingly enlivened and, hence, basic form of collectivity that is in direct contrast to modern visions of a functionally organized, alienating society governed by instrumental reason. While at first sight the emphasis on sensual social bonds might appear as a mere repetition of the classical dichotomy between community and society, contemporary notions of affective communal relationships, on the contrary, aim to dissolve this sociological distinction. Though the classical model of community underlines the precarious openness of affective communities.

The idea of a sociality formed, transmitted, and propelled by affections echoes this very imaginary as well as the hope in the “sensed potential” (Massumi, 2002, p. 75) of collective movements. The social value ascribed to affective communities is informed by the belief in a seemingly enlivened and, hence, basic form of collectivity that is in direct contrast to modern visions of a functionally organized, alienating society governed by instrumental reason. While at first sight the emphasis on sensual social bonds might appear as a mere repetition of the classical dichotomy between community and society, contemporary notions of affective communal relationships, on the contrary, aim to dissolve this sociological distinction. Though the classical model of community underlines the

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emotionally grounded solidity binding its members together, within contemporary theory the concept of affective communities gives weight to the continuous process of associating and dissociating and, thus, serves as a paradigmatic expression of a pulsating sociality. The recurrent idea of affective communities appears as a promising concept since it is formulated in opposition to the notion of a functionally ordered society and concurrently liquidates the belief in an indissoluble community. Accordingly, the proposed notion of affective communitization puts forth the idea of a vital conviviality occasionally enlivening the globally operating, instrumentally rational infrastructures of the network society. The transient construction of sociability infuses the network with the belief in re-enchanted, imagined affective communities that form and deform, and that temporarily congeal and dissolve again.

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The concept of belonging bears significant analytic potential for the exploration of a wide range of phenomena related to globalization, collectivity, mobility, and migration. Within the social sciences, belonging has been delineated in emotional, social, and local terms evoking ideas of commonality and mutuality, modalities of allegiance, and attachments, whether spatial, sensorial, material, or immaterial (Anthias, 2006, 2016; Lähdesmäki et al., 2016; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2012; Röttger-Rössler, 2016). It has been defined as “an emotionally charged, ever dynamic social location – that is: a position in social structure, experienced through identification, embeddedness, connectedness and attachments” (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2013, p. 7). The notion’s potential thus stems from its ability to address widely heterogenous social experiences that encompass not only interactions between humans but also between humans and the non-human world. This brings into view the multiplicity of affective relations that become relevant in processes of displacement, replacement, inclusion and exclusion in migratory and other contexts.

Notwithstanding these considerations, it is often claimed that the concept of belonging evades rigid definition (e.g., Antonsich, 2010), not least because it glides freely between everyday and scientific registers, making it “at once slippery and axiomatic, flexible and self-evident” (Wright, 2015, p. 391). The seemingly paradoxical notion that its ability to form collectives and transform lives can result from its violence and failures equally speaks to its complex character (cf. Ahmed, 1999). It is not surprising, then, that Sarah Wright (2015) turns to the term “puzzling” as a way to underpin the myriad uses and theorizations of belonging. How might we work with the notion of belonging conceptually while cherishing its contradictions and inconsistencies? How might we use it if we do not wish to shut down its drive for multiplicity (Wright, 2015)? Such questions are particularly salient if we are to attend to the emotional registers, affective arrangements (→ affective arrangement), and the more-than-human processes that co-constitute belonging in particularly relational ways. These involve people and other agents: animals, plants, spirits, places, things, institutions, memories, and discourses, to name just a few.
One possibility is to follow Floya Anthias’ (2013) suggestion to use the notion of belonging in heuristic terms, recognizing that its analytic worth comes to be attributed to its aims. In the same vein, the study of belonging calls for and benefits from a multidisciplinary context where a wide range of materials and methods can be brought into conversation with one another. Taking this stance, in what follows, we first discuss some key dimensions of belonging, which, though distinctly elaborated here, are always already entangled. Subsequently, we present two examples from different disciplinary perspectives alongside one another. These include an ethnographic study of a Vietnamese migrant community in Berlin and a literary studies analysis of writings of the contemporary German-language author Herta Müller.

**Key dimensions**

A basic concern of “belonging” has to do with its relation to neighboring concepts such as “identity” and “affiliation.” “Belonging,” one may argue, better accommodates people’s affective, partially pre-reflexive attachments to places, landscapes, languages and material objects than the notion of cultural identity. The latter, even if understood as multiple and fragmented (cf. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Hall, 1994; Krönert & Hepp, 2015), usually refers to conscious processes of categorical identification with particular cultural values and social collectives, as well as the discursive and political malleability of such processes. At the same time, belonging is to experience a sense of being accepted as part of a community. Yet it cannot be reduced to collective identity, since it does not place equal emphasis on the idea of homogeneity and sameness within a social collective to which one feels a sense of belonging (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2011). More than that, the notion of “belonging” distictively accounts for the practice and performance of commonality, reciprocity, and mutuality. It is thus understood to better address and represent the relationality involved in affective processes of collectivization than the categorical notion of identity (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2011).

“Belonging” also demands a conceptual distinction from “affiliation,” which generally describes a form of often formalized membership and the accompanying interaction between actors and institutions in what may be called affiliation spaces (the family, peer groups, schools, clubs, occupational fields, the nation state, etc.). Each of these spheres has their own rules, defines particular rights and duties, and determines claims and entitlements that come with affiliation.

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1 This chapter has benefited from discussions and feedback of participants in a multidisciplinary working group entitled “Belonging” (2015–2017). For further information on the group, see www.sfb-affective-societies.de/forschung/themengruppen/2016/belonging/index.html.

2 For a more detailed discussion of the conceptual distinctions (and overlaps) between belonging and identity, see Anthias (2013, 2016) and Pfaff-Czarnecka (2012, pp. 23–28).
When concerned with similar issues, “belonging,” however, with its affective measure, offers a richer perspective that includes its emotional, social, and moral registers. This refers to what Yuval-Davis (2006) has called the politics of belonging, that is, a distinct sphere that corresponds with questions of citizenship, refers to entitlement to belonging, involves privileges and allegiances, and relates to civil and political rights. It also takes into account questions of socio-spatial exclusion, such as territoriality and assimilation, as well as those of access involving groups that are vulnerable and discriminated against. This notion of politics is inflected by factors like age, gender, class, race, ethnicity, disability, and sexuality, which points to the fact that belonging, whether at the level of the collective or the individual, is never free of dynamics of power.

A further essential aspect in theorizing “belonging” as both process and outcome of affective interrelations is spatiality. Much of contemporary theory on mobility, transnationalism, and globalization conceives “the migrant” as the embodiment of “borderless belonging”: fluid, transitory, un-rooted, and un-mappable. However, people’s longing for and practices of creating a “home” in a new place amidst experiences of displacement stand in stark contrast to such conceptions. In the context of “belonging,” migrants’ practices of place-making and their narratives and imaginaries of “home” speak for a profoundly relational notion of place (Ingold, 2000; Malpas, 1999; Massey, 2005). References to left-behind places thus play an important role, whether in the form of people’s practical engagement in local diasporic communities or particular (institutionalized) forms of remembering and memorializing their places of origin. Such mobility may contribute toward feelings of in-betweenness or multi-sited forms of belonging. In other instances, it may also lead to people’s longing for less transnational ways of being.

A related feature of “making a home” is the aspect of “building,” which both in a literal and metaphorical sense is an essential performance of belonging by entering into a productive relationship with place and time. This also refers to one’s emotional attachment and engagement with places, for example, feeling at home, experiences of familiarity, or feeling safe, legally secure, and economically rooted in place: social and affective dimensions captured in the idea of place-belongingness (Antonsich, 2010). Sara Ahmed offers a more complex understanding of ideas of home and puts it in conversation with temporal questions of estrangement such that categorical distinctions between being home and being away come to be radically questioned. It destabilizes ideas of security, familiarity, and fixity and situates possibilities of strangeness, movement and dislocation within the home. Ahmed does so to explain how the question of being home is a matter of affect: “how one feels or how one might fail to feel!” (Ahmed, 1999, p. 342). Sensing and making sense of one’s place in both spatial and temporal terms also include feelings of estrangement, discomfort, an
impossibility to extend or return, and discontinuities of past and present; queer conditions, so to speak, that foster forms of belonging and enable the emergence of communities. Elizabeth Freeman (2007) argues that belonging is just as much a question of who is connected to whom as it is of one’s extendability into the future. This is particularly relevant to her discussion of queer bodies, for whom belonging goes beyond the mere longing to be or be connected. Queer belonging is the name she gives to a longing to “be long,” by which she means “to endure over time, beyond procreation” or “to be bigger not only spatially, but also temporally” (Freeman, 2007, p. 299).

Also worth mentioning is the role of memory and its failures in dynamics of belonging. Texts, artifacts, buildings, anniversaries, icons, feasts, symbols, stories, rituals, rites, images, bodies, food, and landscapes become materials and mediums through which belonging is actively realized, sensorially perceived, and mnemonically lived. Questions of sensuous perception become particularly relevant in situations of unfamiliar and successively or suddenly transforming spatial and material environments. These, as Amanda Wise (2010) notes, can lead to incongruence between people’s day-to-day sensuous experiences (e.g., with regard to smell, sight, and proprioception) and their embodied place-memory, a dynamic she identifies as dis-synchronization. This includes feelings of discomfort, estrangement, disorientation, and “unbelonging,” which can be read as affective dissonance (→ affective resonance). Sara Ahmed (1999) also points to the crucial interplay between place, memory, and belonging (cf. also Assmann, 1995; Palmberger & Tošić, 2016; May, 2017). She lays an equally rigorous emphasis on remembering in processes of community formation, which she describes as collective acts of remembering in the absence of a shared knowledge or a familiar terrain. She also points to the act of forgetting, which may also be generative of belonging, as holding on to memory allows a subject to identify with a history, not in the sense of a shared past, but in the very loss of it.

Here, we present two case studies that originate from research projects of the Collaborative Research Center Affective Societies (Freie Universität Berlin). The ethnographic example drawn from Edda Heyken’s research (Heyken et al., 2019; von Poser et al., 2017) expresses the fragile efforts of belonging: how people moving across places, cultural settings, and social milieus, strive to manage in the face of radical transformations, but also fail to develop new bodily ways of being and belonging. In comparison, the literary example drawn from Marion Acker’s work (Acker & Fleig, forthcoming) also addresses feelings of rupture and alienation, but does not exclusively tie it to experiences of migration and mobility. Instead, it situates unbelonging in the very context of Heimat. While both examples illustrate prominent concerns of belonging as outlined above, they also highlight aspects that have hitherto remained under-addressed.
Affective drivers of (be-)longing: remembrance and place-making among Vietnamese refugees in Berlin

Shared experiences of discontinuity and disruption serve as affective drivers for individuals in movement, through which they are able to deal with feelings of longing and estrangement (cf. Röttger-Rössler, 2016). This case study from research among elderly Vietnamese refugees in Berlin illustrates place-making strategies that evoke, in the words of one interlocutor, the desire to “transport a piece of Vietnam to Germany” (March 2016). This relates to larger anthropological-psychiatric research that studies the affective efforts of migration in “Vietnamese Berlin” (von Poser, Lanca, & Heyken, 2017), a heterogeneous field resulting from different “regimes of mobility” (Glick-Schiller & Salazar, 2013). Among other questions, the project inquires when and how experiences of mobility, rupture, and alienation turn into affective crises leading to the utilization of psychiatric-psychotherapeutic help. This is explored in an emotion- and affect-focused group therapy. The project also focuses on the lifeworlds of individuals beyond the clinical setting and aims to understand their experiences of belonging in the context of biographic ruptures, mobility, and migration.

Data from our research in psychotherapeutic group sessions show that many refugees had already experienced feelings of unbelonging even before fleeing Vietnam, as the socialist North took over the former authoritarian-anticommunist South. In its aftermath, new political, economic and social boundaries were drawn that interfered with individual life courses altering people’s prospects for societal participation (Su & Sanko, 2017). This led to a continuous movement of people out of the country, many of whom ended up in former West Germany. Even though such refugees were granted the right to stay in Berlin – the legal means to affiliate with the state as a political entity – a sense of unbelonging persisted: language barriers, adjustment to the requirements of everyday life, cold weather, and alien customs engendered feelings of disorientation, isolation, and estrangement. The conjunctive social experience of displacement and the affective dissonances between Vietnamese and German emotion repertoires can be said to have jointly shaped processes of un-/belonging (emotion repertoires): The following passage aims to illustrate the temporal and spatial dimension of practices and performances in the context of diasporic belonging, where bonds and boundaries of identification, affiliation, and “feeling at home” are continuously attuned over time. After

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3 The end of the war in 1975 and the subsequent reunification of Vietnam mark a transition of living conditions toward socialist ideals. Since 1978, approximately 38,000 people have been accepted as “humanitarian” refugees to West Germany (Su & Sanko, 2017).

4 Predominantly South Vietnamese refugees arrived in former West Germany after 1978 whereas mainly North Vietnamese contract workers migrated to former East Germany during the 1980s (von Poser et al., 2017).
Belonging

arriving in Germany, Vietnamese refugees from all ages and heterogeneous backgrounds came together in various non-governmental support programs. By talking in Vietnamese and sharing a meal in such contexts they were able to nurture feelings of mutuality, familiarity, and relatedness. As one interlocutor put it, “every black-haired person was regarded as one of us, with the same story” (January 2017).

Among Vietnamese refugees with a Buddhist background, one can observe a similar sense of longing that manifests in their desires to continue religious practices and remember left-behind places. This is illustrated in their efforts to build a place of ritual congregation (see Svašek, 2005). When a pastor allowed them to perform Buddhist rites in his church, a statue of Buddha was placed next to the cross, fostering the community’s emotional attachment to the place. Their official registration as an association eventually allowed the growing Buddhist community to rent an apartment and secure a sustainable place of gathering. Finally, a bigger place was purchased, and distinct architectural features were added to the existing structure. This included erecting an elaborate and widely visible Pagoda, a protruding staircase, and an ancient bell. The place’s unambiguous visual authority in the landscape arguably contributed to the community’s material-spatial sense of belonging. In addition, monks, nuns, and volunteers filled the garden with scenes and statues of Buddha and planted Asian vegetables and herbs. Inside the prayer hall, incense sticks, the sound of singing bowls, and the smell of orchids continue to stimulate the senses, forming an affective arrangement whose familiar sensations offer ways of embodied belonging. And finally, the Buddhist section of a graveyard in the same area points to people’s concern of being buried next to each other and contributes to an enduring attachment to Berlin.

Home-making strategies like the ones discussed above can also serve as an empowering resource in the clinical setting, where their tactical utilization helps arrive at belonging psychotherapeutically. Enabling situational affective attachments and negotiating experiences of belonging assists patients in dealing with feelings of rupture and alienation while establishing a productive relationship with self, others, and their environment.

Continuities of rupture: ambivalences of (un-)belonging in Herta Müller’s work

In one of her lectures Herta Müller, born in the German-speaking Banat-Swabian part of totalitarian Romania in 1953, describes belonging as a feeling, “in das man sich, während man es abstreift, nur tiefer verstrickt” [in which

5 This example forms part of the CRC research project “Mixed Feelings – Shared Feelings” that analyses dynamics of heteroglossia and narratives of multiple belonging in contemporary German-language literature. For further information, see: www.sfb-affective-societies.de/en/teilprojekte/A/A03/index.html.
one gets further trapped the more one tries to strip it off; own trans.] (Müller, 2004, p. 143). It is exactly this ambivalent dynamic between belonging and unbelonging that is explored again and again throughout Müller’s entire work.\(^6\) Feelings of (un-)belonging are explicitly expressed and articulated, critically reflected upon and re-created in her various texts of different genres. Moving beyond the mere representation of (un-)belonging, these texts reveal a performative memory that involves the persistent repetition and variation of specific, autobiographically based constellations of (un-)belonging. These often evoke the environment of Müller’s childhood as a heterogeneously constituted relational setting. By talking about her loneliness as a child tending the cows in the river valley, Müller draws attention to the materiality of (un-)belonging and the active role non-human agents play in this context:

\begin{quote}
I ate leaves and flowers so I would belong to them, because they knew how to live life and I didn’t. I spoke to them by name: milk thistle was supposed to mean the prickly plant with milk in its stalk. But the plant didn’t listen to the name milk thistle. So I tried inventing names with neither milk nor thistle: THORNRIB, NEEDLENECK. These made-up names uncovered a gap between the plant and me, and the gap opened up into an abyss.
\end{quote}

(Müller, 2009)

“Gap” and “abyss” – these are key words of a poetics that programmatically refuses the somewhat romantic idea of a primordial sense of belonging. Rather, feelings of un-belonging prove to be the affective source and driving force of Müller’s writing. These feelings are not caused by migration but are experienced from early childhood on. The “gap” creates a desire for relatedness that is already inscribed within the notion of be-longing itself and is “increasingly performed in the knowledge of the impossibility of ever really and truly belonging” (Probyn, 1996, p. 8).

Müller’s repetitive practice exceeds the borders of single texts, thereby calling into question conventional hierarchies of genre. It further illustrates that (un-)belonging is not an entity one possesses but rather a process of becoming, something that is always “continually (re-)made and (re-)constituted” (Wright, 2015, p. 400). Consequently, Müller’s work not only rejects nostalgia or the lament for an idealized past, but equally opposes the normative optimism that underlies teleological narratives of belonging. In contrast to the linearity characteristic of traditional storytelling, she offers an anti-teleological view on belonging that resists closure. The incessant dynamics of (non-)belonging can be interpreted as a continuous attempt to relate to the world, but they may also be considered a “vicious circle” (Müller, 2009), to cite the title of Müller’s lecture at the Nobel prize ceremony. Repetition produces and stabilizes patterns of

\(^6\) For further discussion of this double movement, see Acker and Fleig (forthcoming).
affective relatedness. At the same time, repetition, with its inherent potential for transformation, opens up the opportunity to detach from these aporetic dynamics. It offers a chance to question and reconfigure these patterns, and provides the possibility to create liberating lines of flight that escape from oppressive “regimes of belonging” (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2011).

Müller’s work is characterized by a strong “antagonism towards any normative notion of belonging” (Cooper, 2009, p. 488). In her first book, for example, a collection of stories entitled Niederungen (1982/1984),7 she satirically analyses the ritual practices of her native village that promote conformism and seek to eliminate individuality. The book unmasks the village community’s exclusionary politics of belonging and its totalitarian-like mechanisms of control. In so doing, Müller rejects the notion of “Heimat,” stressing instead the multiplicity of belonging as well as the potential for resistance that non-belonging holds in store. Since Müller’s texts lead us to question the understanding of belonging as “a positive phenomenon” (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016, p. 242), they offer possibilities to re-imagine the concept itself.

**Encounters of belonging: open questions**

Our discussion of the literature is in no way exhaustive of the scholarship on belonging. The material we have presented in our case studies follows but also complicates some of its dominant narratives.

Despite their particularities in terms of material, method, and discipline, both examples point to belonging as a performatively lived, long-drawn and ongoing process. They highlight the constitutive role of temporality and (dis-)continuity in affective experience, thereby questioning the understanding of affect as a brief and ephemeral event. In addition, they offer a cross-scalar view that helps tie micro interactions and macro processes.

Building on the sources we have discussed, the two cases point to hitherto under-addressed aspects of belonging. They highlight the simultaneously cohesive and disruptive forces at play in relational processes of belonging and bring into view the heterogeneously constituted settings where such processes unfold. Finally, despite the importance of migration, they effectively disturb the causal logic that belonging necessarily stems from conditions of mobility.

In light of our reflections and examples, we propose that belonging be explored further along the following lines: What shapes can belonging take when not imagined as linear, teleological, and success-oriented? In what ways can the discussion on “multiple belonging” be enriched by our understanding of how this multiplicity is relationally experienced in light of its inherent frictions and contradictions? What opportunities are to be found in belonging’s queer forms? And finally, to what extent can belonging inspire us to keep asking how societies thrive affectively?

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7 For English translation of this work, see Müller (1999).
References


Belonging


“Orders of feeling” are conceived in relation to the concepts of symbolic and normative orders. They refer to discursive orders that leave their marks on individual and collective appraisals of feelings, and they shape socially, culturally, and politically proscribed feeling and display rules. Orders of feeling relate to societies, places, social groups, and communities, and impact subjective experiences vis-à-vis institutionalized social or political hierarchies. They influence whether, how, with whom, where, and when affects, feelings, and emotions can be verbally articulated or visibly performed through gestures, mimicry, bodily postures, and positioning. Moreover, orders of feeling nurture belonging and exclusion. They ensure that persons and collectives “fall in line” through more or less subtle societal, economic, legal, political, cultural, and affective arrangements (Röttger-Rössler & Stodulka, 2014; von Scheve, 2017) (→ affective arrangements). Orders of feeling act on the subjective and collective experiences of social structures and hierarchies and reproduce them. Yet, underscoring the relational dimension of affects, feelings, and emotions vis-à-vis social orders and norms, they are susceptible to transformations and contestations that transpire within social and political movements (Britt & Heise, 2000), the implementation of new laws, societal and cultural changes, or formations of resistance (Stodulka, 2014, 2017a, 2017b).

As an analytical concept, “orders of feeling” enquires into subtle discursive arrangements (how is subjective experience and its verbal and embodied communication structured along social and political hierarchies?), explicit authoritative commands of governing and disciplining (how do institutions address individuals and whole collectives and make them comply?), and related forms of endurance, resistance and subversion (how do people respond to and influence these?). This focus on the discursive formation, institutionalized governance, and emergence of affective orders of feeling opens up interesting methodological pathways. When compared to rules, structures, norms, and values, the understanding of order as a relationship between them allows for the methodological and epistemological integration of the researcher’s positionalities and emotions within the orders they study (Davies & Stodulka, 2019).
The following section describes established concepts in the study of subjective feeling and social structures. Subsequently, the chapter carves out an integrated perspective within the framework of an ethnographic case study. It concludes with a brief summary of main arguments and an outlook on future research and relational and affectively aware methodologies.

**Feeling rules, structures of feeling, and emotion norms**

The concept of “feeling rules” is a classic sociological concept that has been employed over the past three decades to explore how feelings and emotions shape and are shaped by social and cultural norms. Arlie Russell Hochschild (1979, p. 554) explains feeling rules as a form of social control that is less explicit than other normative orders. Following Peter and Carol Stearns (1985), who distinguish between collective emotional standards and actual individual experiences (pp. 813–814), feeling rules link the individual with the group or the collective in structural terms. Feeling rules are inherent in etiquette, tact, and ethics as well as in moral and cultural values (Sakti, 2018). They require cognitive bodily *emotion work* by altering, masking, reinterpreting, or physically releasing what our social environment deems to be (in–) appropriate feelings (Hochschild, 1979, p. 560). Christian von Scheve (2012) writes, “in addition to valued feelings – they play a crucial role in shaping the ‘emotional culture’ of a society” (p. 5), that, according to Peggy Thoits (2004), is comprised of “beliefs about the nature, causes, distributions, value, and dynamics of emotions in general as well as of specific feelings” (p. 362; see also Illouz, 1997; Reddy, 2001).

From a Marxist perspective, feeling rules can lead to a person’s affective exploitation and alienation from one’s self, personality, and feelings (Hochschild, 1983). Ferdiansyah Thajib (2017) relates such affective ambivalences within and between individuals and emotional collectives to cultural theorist Raymond Williams’ (1977) “structures of feeling”, a concept that focuses on the asymmetries of power that shape how members of marginalized groups experience their feelings. While “socially deviant” persons and collectives at the margins of societies may share emotional climates (Barbalet, 1998; de Rivera, 1992), their identification with and feelings of belonging to a vulnerable community raises the question of whether discursive structures translate social vulnerabilities into differences in status and privilege. Anthropological and sociological research on the relationship between social structures, asymmetries of power, affects, emotions, and feelings has highlighted the role of emotions in both resisting and responding to normative orders, cultural, and moral values (Scheff, 2000; Stodulka, 2017b). For example, emotions like shame may serve to alienate and discipline marginalized communities, whereas emotions like pride might promote integration. Foucauldian and poststructuralist approaches
have highlighted the affective power and resonance of public discourses as subtle dispositifs disciplining and controlling the “deviant” (Gould, 2009; Ahmed, 2004).

As an integrative concept, “orders of feeling” focuses on discursive and structural arrangements, the emergence or collapse of feeling rules, and structures of feeling within and between different social groups. It encompasses institutionalized political and legal imperatives of authorities as expressed through social, cultural, and emotion norms. In its empirical application, the concept can be operationalized as an analytical lens to study affective practices that construct and shape local orders of feeling and individual and collective responses of “falling in line,” as well as the forms and practices of resisting and subverting these orders. The concept dismantles the dominance of cognitivist structural-functionalist approaches in social scientific emotion research that ignore their political dimension, and grounds cultural studies perspectives that would otherwise extend the “affective turn” into thought experiments in which everything and nothing becomes affect (White, 2017).

**Cultural values and emerging orders of feeling**

To make these claims tangible in the context of empirical research, I will illustrate how a focus on “orders of feelings” contributes to the study of newly emerging moral values and subaltern strategies of contesting and resisting normative orders. The following exemplary case study relates to my long-term research in Indonesia. It analyzes how the political instrumentalization of feeling rules, emotion norms, and social, cultural, and moral values plays out in urban public spaces and curtails the visibility, movement, and mere existence of communities marked as “deviant.”

In 2014, the government of the autonomous Special Region Yogyakarta, Java, Indonesia, adopted a by-law that is promoted in terms of improving social welfare and ensuring public order. The law prohibits citizens to look or behave like a “homeless person” who has no identification card, no fixed abode, no steady income, and “no future plans either for themselves or for their children.”¹ It also bans the figure of the beggar, defined as person

a. whose income generation depends on the sympathy and compassion of others, and exerts pressure or induces anxiety and fear in others, b. who wears dirty and disheveled clothes, c. who loiter in busy or strategic places, and d. who applies the abovementioned and similar practices in order to induce sympathy and compassion in others.²

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1 Quoted from the opening paragraph of the by-law *Peraturan Daerah Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Nomor 1, Tahun 2014, Tentang Penagnanan Gelandangan dan Pengemis*; translated by the author.

2 See footnote 1.
The increased regulation of public spaces promoted as “social welfare” and “public order” coincides with other national developments of subject formation and public disciplining related to sexual, religious, and other minority identities. What is striking here is that a law directly targets local orders of feeling and the affective practices of a whole society. According to the law it is prohibited to work as a “beggar” or a “homeless person” in public spaces if wearing inappropriate clothes, and to try to evoke sympathy or compassion in passers-by. Offenders are arrested and brought into camps, where they are sorted into the main categories of “homeless,” “psychotic (psikotik) homeless,” “beggars,” or “unproductive women” with regard to their behavior, local origin, social provenience, age, and gender. Motorists are reminded by warning signs at the road junctions not to give money, but to transfer donations to the government’s social welfare department instead. Other street banners and signs are less subtle and directly refer to the fines and charges established in the law. Article 24 targets and regulates how passers by may (not) be affected by now no longer only “deviant” and “immoral,” but “illegal” emotive practices that aim to evoke sympathy and compassion:

Any person (including NGOs and legal entities), who violates the regulation not to give money and/or other goods to the “vagrants” publicly […] is sentenced with up to ten days of prison and/or a maximum fine of 1,000,000 Indonesian Rupiah [70 euro].

Sympathizing is now “illegal,” and giving a few coins, bills, or small gifts to homeless persons or “beggars” is now a criminal act. The local government has curtailed street-related community participation in the city and publicly regulated sympathy and support. The new law controls citizens’ feelings and behavior in public spaces, and alters prevalent cultural ethics (etika Jawa) and local practices of compassion and care (the Javanese budi pekerti). Ignoring busking homeless persons and beggars is not an individual’s moral dilemma any longer. It is a legally prescribed “good practice” of civil obedience and a new order of feeling directed against vulnerable “deviant” social groups. Although religiously, culturally, and ethically contradictory (Retsikas, 2016), the existence and emotive income-generating practices of vulnerable communities, as well as sympathy and action on the part of citizens in public are illegalized. Citizens are ordered to structure their subjective feelings in accordance with national policies of “development and progress.”

This comes as surprise in the city of Yogyakarta, whose residents stress that their city is the cradle of “Javanese culture” (budaya Jawa), which promotes refined, respectful, and harmonious social interactions and relationships. In order to deal with the complexities of community life, persons are expected to know their position within social hierarchies and behave accordingly.

3 See footnote 1.
Acting as if one does not know one’s place within Javanese social order is perceived as “ignorant,” “wild,” “not-yet Javanese,” and even “not-yet-human.” Being aware of one’s social position in social encounters, persons are expected to behave deferentially toward those with higher status, never loud or lacking in self-awareness, and particularly generous but never “arrogant,” “ignorant,” or too “proud” toward those of lower status. Complying with what has been dubbed Javanese “virtue,” “courtesy,” “character,” or “ethics” is key to avoiding unrest, agitation, and conflict in personal and community life.

The new law sustainably changes local Javanese ethics and practice and hijacks them discursively: non-normative subjects and collectives are excluded from society and public spaces through re-ordered language and dispositifs of care and social welfare. If we understand the new law not only as modified normative order, but as politically restructured orders of feeling, the affective and emotional experiences and practices of individuals and communities can be studied systematically. In the context of Yogyakarta, we can take into account how historically, socially, and culturally emerged forms of sympathizing and generosity have been re-structured by the state.

In contrast to feeling rules or emotion norms, “orders of feeling” take into account the relationality between subjective and structural dimensions of affects, feelings, and emotions and are particularly focused on newly emerging practices of dominance, compliance, negotiation, and resistance. With regards to the case study, the analytical focus of the concept elaborates both on the political implementation of new laws targeting the transformation of local emotion norms, feeling rules, and cultural values, and brings into focus its social and affective consequences, as well as the related practices of those affected. In the context of these newly illegalized vulnerable communities, previous strategies of transforming scarce resources, marginality, and stigmatization into affective bonds and vital socio-economic cooperation in public spaces have been disciplined, curtailed, and pushed into oblivion. Formerly effective emotional economies (Stodulka, 2017b) of “beggars” and “the homeless” in terms of relating to, bonding with, and emotively orchestrating feelings of compassion, sympathy, and care in passers-by and motorists, which had socially and economically manifested in cultural practices of alms-giving, were restructured by national laws and policies. Local cultural values of mutual respect, support, and sympathy with vulnerable communities were politically re-aligned, and now framed as discourses of modernization and progress that impinged on individual and social bodies, and their feelings and practices of relating to each other.

Despite being discursively glossed as “assistance,” “welfare,” and “care,” these newly emerging orders of feeling invest in the criminalization, marginalization, stigmatization, and exclusion of non-normative individuals and collectives. The government has curtailed the discursive spaces and local places of subalterns’ opportunities for income-generation without providing
good alternatives. In addition, as a concept, “orders of feelings” allows us to broaden our scope beyond “structures of feelings” and to attend to spatial and affective arrangements of the social fabric. Over the last decade, public spaces and empty land lots in Yogyakarta have been privatized and transformed into shopping malls, hotels, restaurants, or theme parks. In the administration’s aspiration to promote the city as a Southeast Asian hub of cultural tourism, it has issued dozens of new laws and licenses for hotels and leisure parks. From what I describe as an “integrated” perspective, we can unearth the rigorous application of the new law as a historicized and long-term political project that feeds into the city’s restructuring of desires in terms of modernity and progress at the cost of those previously constructed as socially deviant or non-normative, who are now illegalized. Coupled with the emotive power of politico-religious narratives that circulate on- and offline, new laws and orders contribute to public shaming, stigmatization, and (affective) violence toward vulnerable collectives (Mills, 2007). Local media practices that support politico-religious hardliners for the sake of “public harmony” and “social welfare” suggest that the city’s once renowned liberal atmosphere transformed into new orders of feeling. These give rise to new nationalisms and affective arrangements that build on and feed into newly emerging emotional and affective economies (Ahmed, 2004). In response, vulnerable street-related communities have become almost invisible to the public eye. They have been pushed into urban niches and newly established “educational camps” run by the local government. Ongoing studies suggest that spatial and social niches of street-related communities’ agency have narrowed dramatically over the years. A systematic focus on emerging orders of feeling promises to not only analyze how spaces, places, and citizens “fall in line,” but reveal how vulnerable communities create new forms of resistance, “blend in” to the margins of the city, and reclaim their belonging.

Conclusion

Anthropology, sociology, and critical cultural studies have produced robust concepts that attend to the analysis of experience and structure, domination and resistance, cultural and moral hierarchies of feeling and emotion, or affect and politics. As a concept, “orders of feeling” expands on the scholarship of “feeling rules,” “emotion work,” “structures of feeling,” “emotion norms,” or “cultural values” that are often unnecessarily construed as mutually exclusive. It calls for an integrated perspective when analyzing the affective practices of individuals and collectives vis-à-vis structural, organizational, or institutional power relations. Orders of feeling put persons and collectives in place, and promote social and political hierarchies in terms of gender, age, social position, or status, and so forth. Orders of feelings structure societies and communities and impinge on body and language in social interactions between persons of similar or different social status. Yet, considering affect,
feeling, and emotion as relational phenomena, orders of feelings are susceptible to change, challenge, and contestation. As an analytical lens, the term lends itself to the study of human experience, social and cultural practice, and social structures in various localized and transcultural contexts. As the case study above illustrates, when researching processes of social or spatial marginalization (Yang, 2014), it analyzes orders as commands, hierarchical arrangements, and structured experiences: how did orders emerge that prescribe who is allowed or expected to express certain feelings toward whom and in which spaces and contexts?

Other domains of inquiry are studies of suffering and affliction, or systems of care and therapy. The concept lends itself to the critical analysis of taken-for-granted orders of medicalization and “patient” disciplining (Davies, 2013; Yoshimizu, 2014). It may be asked what emotions are to be regulated in the realm of diagnosed mental illness, and for what purpose, or what diagnostic manuals are at play. Who constructed these and for what purpose, and who benefits from them? Do patients respond to these in treatment, do they attend therapies that follow other orders of feeling, or do they form self-help groups that collectively carve out their own? In the study of economies and labor markets, orders of feeling are at stake in economic trajectories or gift exchange (Lindquist, 2008): why are certain decisions taken and not others? How does economic cooperation between different parties come into existence, and how can it be sustained or refuted? What emotional economies do persons engage in by using and manipulating dominant orders of feeling in order to achieve their goals? “Orders of feelings” is also particularly relevant in the analysis of ritual structure, practice, and experience (Röttger-Rössler, 2012) in their focus on speech patterns and their affective tones and spatial arrangements. What is conveyed in plenaries or ritual spaces and what is communicated online? For what purpose? Furthermore, analyses and postcolonial critiques of globally circulating norms of human rights, democracy, international law, sovereignty, secularism, justice, and development might profit from a systematic focus on the affective dimensions of transnationally implemented post-Enlightenment “modernities” (Dhawan et al., 2016) by inquiring into why some political ideas resonate better with some local worlds than others.

The application of the concept is manifold because of the semantic diversity of “order.” When compared to rules, orders take their origins and ontologies into account: who or what constructs the rules? And how can this process be historicized? In relation to structures, orders are less static and imply hierarchies of scale that mutually constitute each other in particular, shifting, and dynamic contexts: to what extent do structures affect individuals and collectives, when and in what contexts? And how do the latter position themselves and express their feelings on various scales both on- and offline? With regard to norms, orders are always already contested and in flux, hence continuously constructed: who directs orders at whom and for what purpose, and how do those affected respond and “shape back”? 
Orders of feeling

Similar to other concepts that attend to the scientific analyses of affects, feelings, and emotions, the empirical study of “orders of feeling” invites systematic self-reflexive and relational methodologies. Affect studies and emotion research that take seriously the embodied and experiential dimensions of normatively regimented feelings profit from an increased methodological attention to whether, how, and to what extent studied orders of feeling affect researchers, who are also socially and affectively positioned subjects within the orders they study (Stodulka, Dinkelaker, & Thajib, 2019; Stodulka, Selim, & Mattes, 2018). How else, one might conclude provocatively, could we possibly research and write about the dynamic entanglements of orders, arrangements, or dispositions in relation to their affective dimensions structured as feelings or emotions?

References


The concept of the public is a notion long associated with rational argument, discourse, and deliberation, following Jürgen Habermas’ (1962/1991) formulation of “the public sphere.” “The public,” understood in the singular as one coherent entity, thus encompasses normative assumptions about public discourse as a primarily deliberative structure that legitimizes democratic forms of governance. Numerous critiques have been leveled at the concept of the public for its normative character and its dichotomy of the public and the private (Fraser, 1992; Benhabib, 1992). These critiques have shown the need for a new understanding of publicness to account for the increasingly convergent, networked, and mobile character of media technologies, and of the diversified modes of public communication they entail. This chapter proposes that affect is central to the constitution of publics – in the plural – and that an understanding of publics through affect focuses on their relational, processual, and performative character, thus being able to account for the complex mobile media environment constituting new networks of communication. Affective publics is a term introduced by Zizi Papacharissi in 2015 to describe the small, fragile, and fluid quality of these publics. In the analysis of political communication, the notion of affective publics emphasizes their “turbulent” and thus unstable character, which causes severe concerns as established structures, such as legacy media institutions, and actors, such as professional journalists, are losing relevance and influence (Margetts et al., 2016). A traditional understanding of current publics is based on clear distinctions between audiences and publics and between consumers and producers (→ audience emotions). However, the ubiquitous availability of digitally networked communication technologies in the everyday suggest that those traditional distinctions have failed to capture current processes of public communication. Terms like “networked public” (boyd, 2011) or “hybrid public spaces” (van Dijck & Poell, 2015) offer new understandings...
of the complex and dynamic constellations of public articulation. Yet these concepts mostly focus on the technology-based, but socially adapted structures of participation. The concept of affective publics thus adds a missing, specifically affective understanding of publics. Affect here, and elsewhere in this volume, is understood not as an antagonist to discourse, but rather as a part of it. Affect in this sense becomes a key term to capture the fluid dynamics between digital technologies and human behavior. Affective dynamics can help illuminate the temporal logics by which new publics emerge, for example, in moments of crisis and conflict or in search for solidarity or joint action. As an alternative to normative understandings, the performative character of publics (Warner, 2002) becomes obvious in the dynamic emergence of online as well as offline publics. Understanding publics as performative emphasizes that they are temporally and situationally sustained in the mediated and/or localized co-presence of actors (Lünenborg & Raetzsch, 2018). Recent research on protest communication of social movements suggests an understanding of publics as affective due to the highly dynamic character of news distributed instantaneously, usually through social media, during an ongoing event. In this context, publics take part affectively in waves of solidarity within online and offline communities (Papacharissi, 2015). At the same time, mobilization strategies of right-wing extremists can rely on comparable dynamics, producing disgust and outrage. Thus, the ambivalent character and conflictive potential of affective publics becomes apparent.

**From public sphere to fragile publics**

The idea of “the bourgeois public sphere,” initially conceptualized by Habermas (1962/1991) as a historical analysis of the upcoming nation states in Europe, has since been applied to societies far beyond this particular historical period. In its Anglo-American reception, the conceptual legacy of this normatively grounded framework has been understood as a fundamental precondition of modern democracy. The very foundation for a joint public sphere in this understanding is deliberation, based on the mode of ongoing exchange of rational arguments that arose, for instance, in salon debates and literary

1 The concept of articulation follows Stuart Hall’s understanding outlined in an interview with Lawrence Grossberg (1986, p. 53):

> Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects.

> “Articulation” here is understood as the contingent form of speaking out in the variety of media texts within given unequal power constellations.
pamphlets in its beginnings. Habermas did already describe the professionalization and commercialization of journalism and the media as fundamental shifts enabling social engineering and as diminishing the quality of public discourse. Nevertheless, the ongoing success of his conceptual work praised the quality of the rational exchange of ideas as a public good.

The concept of the public sphere thus encompasses normative assumptions about public discourse as a primarily deliberative structure that legitimizes democratic norms of governance. Two elements of the public sphere are seen as essential within this normative perspective. The first element is the virtual and physical spheres, which are regarded as an institutional setting of communication among strangers. The second element is the public sphere’s facilitation of reasoned public choice. This dualism of the idea of the public sphere has proven to be exceptionally popular and problematic at the same time. Almost coinciding with the publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in English (Habermas, 1962/1991), a critical discourse about the alleged universalism of the public sphere took shape against the background of the end of the Cold War (Calhoun, 1992). Scholars pointed out that the public sphere is both a mechanism for debate and choice, and a space for solidarity and for building a sense of belonging. In particular, Nancy Fraser (1992) and Seyla Benhabib objected to the “unexamined normative dualisms” (Benhabib, 1992, p. 95) that had informed Habermas’ conception of the public sphere. Fraser and others pointed out that a lack of attention to gendered categories, such as the distinction between an intimate private sphere and a political public, legitimized structures of inclusion and exclusion. Some scholars argued that the public sphere as a notion left unexamined the gendered divisions between men as public and women as private, and that this distinction is a crucial argument against the universality of the idea of the public sphere (Klaus, 2001). Criticizing the nation-based and thus unifying view of the public sphere, scholars have also highlighted that counter-publics and deliberately oppositional social formations need to be taken into account (Castells, 2007). Opposing the idea of a shared understanding by deliberation, scholars like Chantal Mouffe (2005) have argued for an “agonistic public” intensely relying on passion as a driving force, where conflicting positions are maintained rather than resolved. Another stream of critique has come from scholars in Islamic studies and postcolonial studies. Scholars in this line identified the idealization of rational discourse and deliberation as a core concept of a secularized, Western notion of the public sphere. They thus argue for a focus on the corporeal, ethical, and religious dimensions and practices in the constitution of publics outside the European-American context (e.g., Mahmood, 2012). With such a variety of critiques, it has become obvious that the normative assumption of a public sphere – though proclaiming openness and accessibility as its precondition – heavily relies on power structures, hierarchies, and mechanisms of exclusion.

These critiques of “the public sphere” have inspired alternative concepts, like Michael Warner’s (2002) “counter publics” or Mouffe’s (2005) “agonistic
public.” Additionally, some have suggested the pressing need for a systematic inclusion of emotions and modes of emotional communication in the constitution of publics. Chris Peters (2011) criticizes an “undertheorized” approach to emotion in journalism studies, suggesting an understanding of emotion as a constitutive part in journalism’s history. Peters (2011) moreover notes that in recent years “the diversity of emotional styles […] and attempts to involve the audience have become more explicit” (p. 297). Likewise, Barry Richards (2010) has called for “placing emotion at the heart of our understanding of politics” (p. 304). He argues for establishing “a healthier emotional sphere” (Richards, 2010, p. 309) by taking into account the emotional patterns of news making and the strategies of emotionalization that are used in public communication to reach a broader audience. However, my argument for “affective publics” goes beyond such an addition. Instead, I regard affect as a dynamic, processual, and fluid capacity arising in the relational interaction between actors and artifacts in any kind of social practice, and embedded in a variety of temporal and spatial contexts (→ affect).

These contexts are not fixed. They have changed radically with the ubiquitous rise of accessible digital networked communication technologies. This shift calls for a new understanding of the emergence and establishment of public articulations. Traditional distinctions between audiences and publics, and between consumers and producers of media, are increasingly inadequate to capture processes of public communication that emerge through circulation rather than distribution and broadcasting, at a time when media technologies are increasingly networked, convergent, and mobile (Livingstone, 2005).

Any adequate understanding of publics needs to take into account its fluid, unstable, fragile, and dynamic character. This is especially so at a time when publics can forge transnational avenues of protest via networked communication constituted via hashtags (e.g., #MeToo, #TimesUp, #BlackLivesMatter) and through the coordination of online and offline activities, for example as flashmobs or as forms of “connective action” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). The ongoing pluralization of media formats and technologies challenges the established hierarchy of communicative actors. The normative concept of deliberation relies on a regulated system of privileged actors, in which journalism is an institution that delivers information of prioritized social relevance. However, today’s dynamic and often chaotic constellation of speakers and observers does not rely on such a given hierarchical structure. In hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2013), the coexistence of traditional media institutions with personalized, networked media establishes conflicting settings of articulation where the tone, modality, volume, and dominance of speakers in a given public is part of an ongoing struggle. The concept of affective publics proposed here does not argue for a technology driven understanding of new communication settings. Rather, it provides an analytic approach to describe and understand
ongoing turbulences and new opportunities in public articulations. Affect theory seeks to capture these seminal shifts based on dynamic forms of interaction between (media) technology and human actors. It does so by providing a theoretical framework for researchers to re-conceptualize the relation between individual actors and institutions, as well as between technology and (human) agency. Based on a relational understanding of affect (Slaby & Röttger-Rössler, 2018), I consider publics as performative, processual, and thus affective. We will show how such an understanding goes beyond the inclusion of emotional aspects of public communication.

Understanding publics and counter-publics: the performative character of publics

Decentering the association of publics with deliberation urges us to acknowledge that a public is not an institution. Publics cannot be reduced to particular organizations such as the media, or to particular “spheres.” Publics come into existence through modalities of communication between very different kinds of actors, networks, and groups in societies. Warner (2002) regards publics as performative as they emerge through a “dependence on the co-presence of strangers” who pay attention to individual articulations (p. 76). His argument about the necessary co-presence of articulation and attention becomes even more salient in today’s context of social media and its public articulations. Individual articulations can originate from a personal context, but are simultaneously accessible to others. Articulation and attention are necessary components of publics, or in Warner’s words, “publics are only realized through active uptake” (Warner, 2002, p. 87). Such a performative understanding emphasizes the “doing” of publics instead of its normative character addressed by deliberation. “Doing publics” can be understood as part of a social analysis based on practice theory interested in an “open set of practices relating to, or oriented around, media” (Couldry, 2004, p. 117). By analyzing routinized and iterative practices with media, patterns of emerging performative publics can be identified. Understanding publics as performative emphasizes that they are temporally and situationally sustained in the mediated and localized co-presence of actors. This emphasis on the spatiality and temporality of publics nowadays becomes even more relevant as aggregation, searchability, and live feeds create their own temporalities and networks of followers. Co-presence can be physically localized or might become mediated and thus translocal, though quite often both modes coexist and mutually reinforce each other. Thus, co-presence implies an evolving and changeable social relation between actors and spectators, wherein differing levels of agency, social hierarchies, and gendered speaker positions become apparent and can be challenged. Like the performativity of gender, the performativity of publics is based on a “stylized repetition of acts” that constitute “social temporality […] through sustained social performances” (Butler, 1990,
In the iteration of gendered communicative acts, the concept of performativity allows for the analysis of negotiations over the terms that regulate social hierarchies. Performativity here describes “that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler, 1993, p. 2). Thus, a public must be brought into being through practices and actions.

Conceiving of publics as performative, I highlight that the co-constitution of actors and spectators creates alternating positions, rather than exclusive ones. This reflexivity of speaker and audience positions captures the particular modalities of public articulation that are embedded in quotidian practices of digital networked communication. Online communication is then inherently performative, because it demands of actors to negotiate predefined features of media platforms within their specific social environments.

Based on such a performative understanding, the temporal dynamics through which publics arise or vanish are of specific relevance, and should be considered in detail. Current networked communication has generated new temporalities and spatialities for public participation. These are beginning to alter the constitution of publics, as users of social networks switch between personal and public modes of communication, and contribute to the spontaneous emergence (and often quick dissolution) of publics (Sheller, 2004). Digital modes of mediated communication, such as mobile telephones and social networking sites, have been incorporated into quotidian user practices. Thus, mediated publicness is becoming a default mode of online communication that further complicates the empirical basis of identifying publics. A multitude of communicative actors are now connected as “networked publics” with high frequency, dynamism, and intensity (boyd, 2011). This context requires analytic approaches that account for the mutual influence of each actor on the other. These “networked publics” describe “a space constructed through networked technologies” and “the imagined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice” (boyd, 2011, p. 39). It is important to stress that networked publics are spaces and communities at the same time. These forms of connecting, gathering and constructing sociality are established in their own temporal dynamics, becoming visible as “shit storms” as well as waves of solidarity, and forging intensities and dynamics that can best be described as “affective flows” (→ social collectives). In such a way, temporality becomes constitutive of publics themselves. The agency inherent in these kinds of publics is no longer located in individual actors or in technology itself, but lies beyond human capacity in the interactive relation between media technology and a network of actors. This is exactly where affect comes into play.

Affective publics: dynamics of protest and outrage

In social movement research, the role of social media is critically addressed with regard to different tasks such as mobilization of followers, organization
of actions, and the articulation of joint demands. Examples like *Occupy Wallstreet* (#ows) have also shown that a multiplicity of roles and functions become available as actors perceive each other as joining around a common interest (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Social movement research has begun to investigate how political subjectivity is negotiated in digital media environments, and under what conditions unstable associations of actors come to establish structures of contestation. Yet, the focus remains indebted to the political nature of participation. Forms of protest have changed due to social networked media and institutional preconditions have lost their relevance. In such a context, individual articulations – which cannot always sharply be distinguished as either private or public – can become starting points of joint action. Particular sites (understood both as physical locations and as communication platforms) serve as catalysts of communality and contestation. Personal networks of individuals here are crucial for mobilization and the organization of protest. There is a marked shift from researching institutionalized movement structures to researching individualized media practices of ordinary citizens. This shift in research objectives acknowledges a certain de-institutionalization of political activism while investigating new modalities of public articulation and contestation that emerge from networks of actors, quotidian practices of communication, and the circulation of common symbolic repertoires (Cammaerts, Mattoni, & McCurdy, 2013). W. Lance Bennett’s and Alexandra Segerberg’s (2012) notion of a shift from “collective action” to “connective action” captures this point.

In addition to this established work on social movements, recent research on hashtag activism has shown how public protest becomes effective with almost no institutional structures and backing, even if many such protests rely on pre-digital social networks as well. So-called “ad hoc publics” do not rely on formal prerequisites, but mostly on those digital devices that are part of everyday life. Online activism against everyday forms of sexual harassment, for example, is increasingly becoming a focus of research. Even before the ongoing and global attention to #MeToo, diverse forms of digital feminist activism like *Hollaback!, #BeenRapedNeverReported*, or *#aufschrei* (German for “outcry”) relied on translocal publics that emerged and grew dynamically in a limited period of time mostly without any formal hierarchical structure. The performative character of such activism is indicated by its affective flows. As I have argued, affective flows characterize the temporal dynamics that are central to this form of digital mobilization (cf. Lünenborg & Raetzsch, 2018, pp. 26–28, including further examples).

These different types of protest show how mediatized modes of articulation and participation form publics, however small, fragile, or short-lived such publics turn out to be. Grounded in routinized daily practices with digital media, public forms of articulation and participation continue to diversify and increase. Such affective practices include producing and circulating a meme, posting a message, liking and sharing, as well as commenting on
others’ posts. Embedded in networked technologies, these affective practices enable users to shift gradually from personal to public communication and become part of affective publics. The affective character of such publics becomes apparent in the blurring of established dichotomies that were previously understood to characterize the public sphere. Indeed, participants in communication processes navigate a continuum between personal and public communication, combine formal and informal modes of speaking, and switch constantly between producing and consuming information. Crisscrossing historically distinct spheres, roles, and modes of articulation, these digital communicative arrangements allow for a more diverse participation of speakers and users who may simultaneously be involved as individuals, citizens, activists, parents, professionals, or politically engaged actors. As these media practices rise, affective dynamics move to the forefront while established forms of regulation and self-regulation – in terms of access, modes of speaking, and the forms of addressing – have lost their assertiveness. Twentieth-century journalism was convincingly described as the “most important signifying system of modernity” (Hartley, 1996, p. 36). As a form of organized gate-keeping, journalism offered a professional procedure of selecting, priming, and framing information. Nowadays, however, digital networked and convergent communication works without any gate. As a multiplicity of speakers with diverse forms of articulation become publicly visible and audible, they give rise to a number of unprecedented and contingent dynamics that can be described as affective formations. These affective formations are not opposed to discursive structures. Instead, they entail an ongoing interrelation between arguments and emotions and between technological affordances and social appropriation.

A focus on the affective formation of publics enables a new understanding of actors mostly perceived as citizens and thus widens the common understanding of citizenship (→ affective citizenship). Most of the research in this field is driven by the normative idea that more inclusive publics offer diverse citizens the opportunity to articulate their interests and thus feed their perspectives into ongoing discourse, especially in moments of political change. In this vein, Papacharissi (2015) established the notion of affective publics in her analysis of the Egyptian uprising in 2011. Studying the Twitter feed, she points out: “The affective rhythms of news storytelling on #egypt reproduced and reinforced feelings of community for an existing public of indignant citizens who had had enough” (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 62). Her reference to rhythms draws our attention to the temporal structure of affective publics, in which a single articulation becomes part of a flow produced by retweets and mentions. The intensity of such repetitions, modifications, and re-articulations does not serve the interest of information, but rather contributes to an affective stage of togetherness, solidarity, and belonging. Such an “affective flow” produces its own intensity and temporality, sometimes referred to as “contagious” (Papacharissi, 2015, pp. 18–21). However, such a recourse to
biological terminology, which draws on an ontological understanding of affect following Brian Massumi (2002), has its risks. The risk is to place affect outside of agency. Unlike that approach, we have argued here for an understanding of agency that emerges in the interaction between human actors and (digital) technology itself.

Of course, affective publics are by no means solely devoted to the production of solidarity and empathy. A comparable type of intensity can be observed in “networks of outrage” (Puschmann et al., 2016). Within such networks, for instance, Islamophobic groups on Twitter perform a close network of sources that produce mutual affective attunement. Claudia Alvares and Peter Dahlgren (2016, p. 54) raise their concern as well when they discuss right-wing populism and its relation to media. Opposing traditional normative perceptions, “publics can espouse anti-democratic values while nevertheless remaining ‘publics’. Such publics constitute a risk for democracy due to the possibility of mobilization and ‘self-education’ through violent actions.”

**Final remarks**

Critical considerations of publics in contexts of right-wing populism remind us that a number of normative implications are still relevant for a proper understanding of publics. The concept of affective publics elaborated here acknowledges and builds on its ambivalent character. Publics are diverse, agonistic, and fragile, and they continually emerge and disappear. The affective character of such publics highlights the dynamic and processual mode of public articulation itself. We must acknowledge that affect is constituted relationally, through the interaction between humans and non-human artifacts like media technology and public space. Further research about how publics are constituted should consider the affordances and capacities that go beyond human intentionality. This conceptual proposition mostly sheds light on affective publics in political discourse. However, the concept also opens paths for a more inclusive understanding of publics and their contemporary relevance in digital media environments. By overcoming dichotomies between public and private and between the political and the personal, an analysis of affective publics enables us to describe affective articulations from an individual standpoint. Affective articulations thus come to encompass personal participation in domains where cultural forms of inclusion and exclusion are performed, such as viewers commenting on media coverage on social TV and debates surrounding topics of public interest that need not be explicitly political. Such articulations might manifest in diverse ways, from forms of hate speech to expressions of collective empathy.

I have argued here for an affective understanding of publics that goes beyond the mere insertion of emotions into public discourse. Nevertheless, future research should be directed toward furthering our understanding of the specific implications and relevance of emotions in the constitution of publics.
Communication studies offers one promising avenue for doing so. In particular, the field can help analyze rising rates of emotional communication in the context of increasingly personalized politics, as well as the strategic uses of emotions in communication about crisis and risk, and in contexts relating to terrorism and insecurity. Indeed, these are concerns that straddle traditional mass media as well as digital communication. In sum, further analysis is needed about the interrelation between emotions and affective dynamics in the constitution of publics.

References


The concept of affective citizenship advances a new understanding of citizenship whose affective components have largely been neglected in the social sciences. Citizenship is conventionally understood as a rights-based political membership that forms the key institutional tie between the state and the individual. Even though in very early conceptualizations, such as by Plato, affects and emotions play a critical role in discussions of what constitutes a good citizen, it is only in the past two decades that scholars have increasingly attended to the affective dimensions of citizenship. Building on feminist, queer, and postcolonial critiques, the concept of affective citizenship departs from rationalist paradigms that undergird most scholarly approaches to the state, bureaucracy, and citizenship. Focusing on the affective and emotional dimension of citizenship, the concept enables us to decipher and problematize how states “govern through affect” (Fortier, 2010), how citizenship policies endorse particular feelings as legitimate while discrediting others, how desire configures state–subject relations, or, to put it more broadly, how affects and emotions are employed within mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. While a plethora of scholarship has pointed to the various forms of inclusion and exclusion enacted through citizenship policies and practices, focusing on the affective dimensions of citizenship allows us to analyze those hierarchies and differentiations that exceed the level of formal access or legal equality. Since crude legal discrimination based on race, gender, and class have become more complex to sustain in light of contemporary international human rights laws, political boundary-making has shifted more pronouncedly to affect and emotions to reinforce difference and differential treatment. For instance, while two individuals may be equal citizens from a legal point of view, their perceived difference in terms of religion, race, sex, gender, or class may result in identifying one individual as the proper, true citizen who is naturally entitled to the privileges and status of citizenship, whereas the other may be identified as a “quasi” or “technical” citizen, whose belonging to the political community remains in question despite holding citizenship. In this case, additional affective and emotional efforts must be performed to confirm rightful political belonging. Thus, it no longer only matters where “one is
really from,” but also “how one really feels” (toward the nation, state, or political community) (Fortier, 2008). With the declaration of the Global War on Terror by the United States and its allies, as well as with the problematization of migration, difference, and plurality as potential threats to social cohesion and national security, such boundary-making and governing through affect has increasingly attracted scholarly attention, and rightly so. The concept of affective citizenship allows us to critically analyze differential regimes of inclusion and exclusion by attending to the role of affect and emotions in state–subject relations, both from the perspective of states as well as that of individuals and communities (→ affective communities).

**Historical background and context**

Citizenship is one of the most elementary concepts in political life that refers to rights, status, belonging, identity, and participation (→ belonging). Broadly speaking, citizenship distributes rights, confers status upon its members, ascribes identity and belonging to the political community, and facilitates modes of participation. It is both a socio-cultural and legal concept as well as a political institution that sets the boundaries of national and political membership. Hence, citizenship is a powerful mechanism of both inclusion and exclusion. In the long historical journey from the *polis* to the nation state, citizenship has consolidated itself as the foundational principle that orders the relationship between states and subjects. States can employ citizenship both as a rewarding as well as a punitive measure through the legal act of naturalization or denaturalization.

Contemporary citizenship rests on the principle of equality and provides protection from arbitrary treatment; it builds on the fundamental idea that humans are right-bearing subjects. This is a result of many struggles and historical developments that have shaped the tenets of citizenship over centuries. At its inception, citizenship was directly linked to the protection of property and exclusively granted to a few male property owners, but over the past two centuries, many struggles by excluded subjects such as the colonized, the enslaved, women, and migrants have led to an expansion of citizenship rights. Today, there is hardly any country in the world that has not invented, amended, or radically transformed its existing laws and regulations of citizenship. In the classic account of sociologist Thomas Marshall (1950/1992), first published in 1950, the consolidation of nation states around the globe as well as the expansion of capitalism as an economic order that perpetuates inequality has broadened the scope and content of citizenship. Accordingly, in the 18th century, citizenship related to civic rights, in the 19th century, its scope extended to political rights, and in the 20th century, social rights were added with the expansion of welfare states (Marshall, 1950/1992). While his analysis captures the larger trajectory of citizenship, his linear and limited perspective has been criticized both by feminists and postcolonial scholars, as Marshall’s analysis rests firmly on the history of white
European men. Moreover, scholars have pointed out that welfare states had indeed first strengthened social citizenship as a means of redistribution but then retracted exactly those rights under neoliberalism (Brown, 2015). Hence, it would be misleading to think of citizenship as continuously expanding in a linear, progressive way. For instance, the pressures of globalization, neoliberalism, and migration have resulted in flexible citizenship (Ong, 1998). To illustrate this with an example: you can purchase citizenship in the EU member state Malta for 1.15 million euro through investments in the country, and for much less in six other countries in the world (Tanasoca, 2016). Yet at the same time, thousands of migrants are dying each year at the shores of Europe when crossing the Mediterranean (Ayata, 2017).

To account for the multitude of developments that change or shape citizenship, myriad theories and alternative conceptualizations have amassed in the past decades. The literature on citizenship is flourishing. Scholars have explored how migration (Balibar, 2004; Bauböck, 1994; Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1998; Soysal, 1994), globalization (Falk, 2010; Urry, 1999), neoliberalism (Fraser, 1997; Somers, 2008), gender and sexuality (Lister, 2003; Plummer, 2003; Richardson, 1998; Siim, 2000), multiculturalism (Modood, 2011; Taylor, 1994), technology (Barns, 2005), media and culture (Klaus & Lünenborg, 2004) or political participation (Isin, 2009) have transformed the practice and theory of citizenship. While citizenship has attracted interest across the social sciences and humanities, the bulk of research on this topic has focused on the territorial, economic, legal, historical, political, and cultural aspects. The affective and emotional dimensions of citizenship, however, have been rather neglected, even though the importance of affects and emotions for political life is increasingly acknowledged (Connolly, 2002; Nussbaum, 2013; Protevi, 2009) (→ political affect). This neglect is highly problematic, given that affect and emotions have always formed critical components of citizenship. For instance, in Plato’s dialogues on *The Laws*, the emphasis on the emotional commitment of the citizen to the laws of the state already points to the affective dimension of citizenship, as Cohen De Lara convincingly demonstrates (2017). Later, during colonization, affects and emotions figure as critical components in legitimizing the withholding of rights and citizenship from colonized subjects by juxtaposing European rationality and reason against the allegedly affective states in the colonies (Fanon, 1963, 1991; Grovogui, 2006; Stoler, 2007). The historic exclusion of women from and the contemporary restriction of citizenship rights for LGBTI communities also reveal how intimately citizenship, affects, and emotions are linked (Berlant, 1997). A growing body of research has recently been emerging under the rubric of “affective citizenship.” This work analyzes the affective and emotional dimensions of citizenship from various perspectives. New insights are provided into the seemingly rational apparatus of the state, administrative processes, and wider state–subject relations in the context of increasing societal and political pluralization.
Systematic explication of the concept

The concept of affective citizenship contributes in crucial ways to a better understanding of societies. It seeks to “destabilize citizenship as a purely rational and administrative exercise of state authority by attending to the role of affect in production of regimes of inclusion and exclusion” (Di Gregorio & Merolli, 2016, p. 934). Importantly, it highlights the relational dynamics of political boundary making in affective societies that are marked by plurality and heterogeneity. While at the horizontal level a further increase of formal equality is to be expected through naturalization processes, citizenship as a differential regime will continue to contribute to internal hierarchization among designated “true,” “proper” citizens and those who are viewed only “technically” as citizens, a prominent trope in ongoing European and US debates on Islam and migration (Volpp, 2002). The concept of affective citizenship helps us to understand what else is required for a rightful belonging to the community that the legal obtaining of citizenship does not confer, such as an affective disposition toward the right feelings for the state, nation, or political community (∃ affective disposition). Take the example of debates on Islam and migration in Europe. After terrorist attacks in London in 2005, Paris in 2015, and Berlin in 2016, the political belonging of ordinary Muslim citizens was put under heightened scrutiny, questioning their emotional alliance with the victims or the “injured nation.” This phenomenon was similar to the governance of public feelings after 9/11 in the United States (Anker, 2014). Relatedly, the latest modification of naturalization laws in the UK explicitly highlights the importance of feeling British (∃ attachment). While it was previously possible to apply for citizenship by mail, now numerous requirements and ceremonies are included into the naturalization process to ensure that citizenship is emotionally desired by the applicants (Fortier, 2013). Thus, it is not sufficient to ideologically identify with the principles, laws, and values of the state whose citizenship one seeks to obtain, but also to “feel the right way.” What one grieves about, fears, enjoys, cheers for, or cherishes becomes part of proper citizen conduct. The lines of demarcation between insider and outsider are thus affectively (re)drawn. The concept of affective citizenship allows us to study the creation of “internal outsiders” even when they formally belong to the political community (∃ affective communities). It enables us to decipher the affective contract between allegedly entitled members of the community and state institutions that permeates discourse, policy, and practices through the production of citizenship. Studies on nationalism and patriotism have long addressed the affective and emotional components of political belonging, yet the relegation and confinement of emotional affairs to nation and nationalism has helped to maintain the misconception that the apparatus of the state is free of affects and emotions. As recent ethnographies on affective state bureaucracy by Didier Fassin and his colleagues (2015) have shown, this is hardly the case. In this vein, the concept
of affective citizenship contributes to dissolving the juxtaposition of the emotional nation versus the rational state, and instead pushes for an understanding of states as affective entrepreneurs, or as “affective states” (Stoler, 2007).

As a conceptual lens, affective citizenship explores practices of governance relating to people’s feelings toward those they identify as “alike” and those they identify as “different” (Ahmed, 2000, 2014), and how feelings of comfort, unease, anger, empathy, (mis)trust, (dis)respect, love, and hate toward an imagined “us” and “others” are regulated and reproduced in official policies, discourses, and practices. Fortier (2010) has described this regulation of feelings as “governing through affect” (p. 22). This has consequences both for the relationship between states and subjects, but also for the relationship among subjects and different communities. Therefore, the concept of affective citizenship cannot simply be reduced to the practices of the state. Equally important is how citizens and non-citizen subjects negotiate, contribute to, or contest the state’s efforts to govern through affect. For a comprehensive understanding of how citizenship in its broadest and multiple senses is produced by governance through affect, the analysis of affective citizenship must take place at the level of the state, the community, and the individual. This includes questions such as how citizens themselves respond to, engage in, or practice affective citizenship and what forms of resistance, contestation, compliance, or adaptation are expressed in acts of affective citizenship.

**Affective citizenship in research**

Multicultural, plural societies in which migration or the naturalization of former migrants are still publicly problematized as challenges for the social and political cohesion of the national community are the main context for discussions within literature on affective citizenship. By researching the affective dimensions of integration policies (Fortier, 2010; Merolli, 2016), naturalization (Fortier, 2013, 2017), community cohesion (De Wilde & Duyvendak, 2016; Johnson, 2010) or cultural difference (Mookherjee, 2005), scholars of affective citizenship have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of how citizenship as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion is affectively employed by encouraging certain feelings that create desirable states and citizens. For instance, by analyzing integration documents in the UK, Fortier (2010) traces community cohesion policies as an attempt to manage the unease of white Britons regarding cultural and religious difference. Recognizing the social character of feelings such as unease, discomfort, and suspicion is critical to understanding how citizens are affectively produced in the course of integration policies or naturalization policies. Hence, one of the key questions to ask when analyzing affective citizenship is how states construe themselves and citizens as “desirable” and how the “fantasy of state power and desirability” is produced (Fortier, 2013, p. 700).
While Fortier and other authors employ the concept of affective citizenship as a theoretical and analytical lens that allows us to explore neglected aspects of the production of citizenship, some scholars have proposed to think of affective citizenship as an alternative and more inclusive political model of belonging, and have pointed to the transformative potential of affective citizenship (e.g., Hung, 2010). In her discussion on the ban of the Muslim veil in France, Mookherjee (2005) seeks to reconcile both postcolonial and feminist discussions on female subjectivity and the autonomous subject by offering affective citizenship as an alternative model of recognition. Accordingly, this model can integrate different understandings of identity and autonomy in multicultural societies. Mookherjee takes up the dispute over headscarves, in which feminist philosophers argued that by wearing the veil women would deny their autonomy, while postcolonial critics pointed to the universalizing language in which the feminists’ critique was articulated. They criticized feminists for taking the Western liberal idea of a self-constituting autonomous citizen for granted. Seeking a productive resolution of these two positions, Mookherjee argues that the autonomy of citizens is embedded in multiple affective bonds to families, intersecting communities, and so forth, that need to be equally accounted for. Support for the rejection of the veil, then, disregards these affective bonds in multicultural societies. Thus, she develops a model of affective citizenship from a postcolonial feminist perspective that responds to the need to be transformative with respect to acknowledging cultural differences and to be critical with regard to social inequality. In this model of affective citizenship, the recognition of multiple affiliations and affective belonging then unsettles the “majority and minority’s perceived distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘difference’, and between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’” (Mookherjee, 2005, p. 37). Mookherjee places hybridity, group representation, and the recognition of minority values at the center of her concept. Affective citizenship, in her reading, is an inclusive concept that provides equal space for minority values and recognizes hybrid modes of female subjectivity (Mookherjee, 2005, p. 47). She suggests a concept that facilitates democratic communication and reciprocal transformations in postcolonial, hybrid societies without abandoning universal critiques of social inequality and oppression.

While Mookherjee develops her concept of affective citizenship based on ongoing debates on identity and value in Europe regarding Islam and migration, Ruyu Hung’s (2010) concept of affective citizenship stems from an engagement with pragmatist and phenomenological philosophers within the field of citizenship education. He proposes affective citizenship as a more inclusive, caring, sensitive model of citizenship that can contribute to a more open public sphere. What is important to highlight is that both Mookherjee and Hung employ affective citizenship as a normative concept which carries an inclusive potential that could better account for diversity and plurality in contemporary societies than conventional notions of citizenship. Thus, in the
current research on affective citizenship, the concept is employed both analytically and normatively in a manner that points to its productive quality. Future research can further develop the concept at both levels, yet the strongest potential of affective citizenship arguably lies in its ability to analyze rather than formulate policies.

**Outlook**

In his awarding winning book *Between the World and Me*, US-American author Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015) writes a lyrical letter to his teenage son that offers a powerful account of what it feels like to be a black citizen in the United States. He narrates how fear, disembodiment, and affective control are daily components of black survival in a country in which formal equal citizenship does not offer equal belonging for members of visible minorities. Instead, Coates highlights the physical vulnerability of black bodies to institutional racism that informs and permeates intimate family relations, school education, neighborhood relations, and all other critical spheres of life. What it feels like to be a black citizen in the United States is a state of fear, insecurity, and vulnerability. It is a life that is not protected by the state but rather has to protect itself from the state. Written roughly 50 years after the Civil Rights Movement, the book uncompromisingly shows that achieving full citizenship rights has not protected the non-white population in the United States from racial injustice, which also relies on the governance of affect and emotions. One example of such governance of affects and emotions in this case is the normalization of the perception of young black males as threatening, violent, and irrational. This has led, through various court verdicts, to the justification of their murders by police as acts of “self-defense.” In a similar vein, the construction of Muslim citizens in the United States after 2001 as threatening and dangerous also operates at comparable affective registers that delineate two categories of citizens: those who are naturally entitled and those whose citizenship is conditional, ambiguous, or relegated to a formality if they do not feel, behave, or act in desired ways. This phenomenon is of course not restricted to the United States but can be found in many countries around the world to varying degrees and in varying forms. For instance, with the ongoing polarization and problematization of migration, identity, and belonging in contemporary debates in Europe, the importance of the affective dimensions of citizenship are reinforced for dual citizens and former migrants. For decades, it was European countries themselves that encouraged countries such as Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco to set up religious and educational institutions in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and so forth from the 1970s until the 2000s. The aim of this policy was to ensure that Muslim migrants would explicitly maintain their affective bonds with their countries of origin and thus eventually return. Yet now, with increasing naturalization and the realization that former migrants and their children will stay in Europe for
good, any undesired display of affective bonds with their countries of origin can lead to questioning their rightful belonging to Europe. In light of the global intensification of struggles over entitlement, national belonging, and collective identity, our understanding of citizenship can no longer afford to exclude the realm of feelings, emotions, and affect. Affective citizenship is a promising concept with which to explore the affective ties between states and citizens from their respective vantage points. It allows us to decipher the multiple experiences, power relations, and policies that emanate from the politics of exclusion and inclusion in contemporary and future constellations of affective societies.

References


All political practices are affective. Political action and its institutional and organizational architectures are embedded in and productive of affective dynamics. At the same time, political practices and institutions are dependent on specific forms of affectivity, which may crystallize into prevailing sentiments and emotional orientations. These, in turn, are either conducive to modes of governance or foundational in efforts to resist such demands. The longing for radical change, the wish for soothing security, the commitment to a set of communal values, the denouncement of certain deeds as morally wrong – acts and orientations deeply embedded in all kinds of political processes – cannot be conceived without taking affect into account.

The theme of political affect encompasses a broad spectrum of phenomena and issues, as evidenced by the massive amount and diverse orientation of recent work on political affectivity (e.g., Connolly, 2002; Protevi, 2009; Massumi, 2015; Lordon, 2016; Bargetz & Sauer, 2015) and on political emotions (e.g., Clarke, Hoggett, & Thompson 2006; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Nussbaum, 2013; Marcus, 2002; Mihai, 2016, Mohrmann, 2015). For the purpose of this chapter, we propose a relatively broad conceptual outlook that is systematically divided into two segments, corresponding to the two main parts of the chapter. These segments reflect a basic distinction in recent political thought – the one between “politics” and “the political” (Marchart, 2007).

The first segment – affect and the political – is predominantly philosophical in nature and asks about the general relation between the political and affectivity. In this regard, the concept of political affect functions in part as a reflective notion, engendering considerations on the ultimate “point” of politics. To substantiate this perspective, we revisit the thought of the early modern philosopher Spinoza, whose work contains crucial aspects of a sophisticated understanding of the relation of affect and the political that we deem exemplary for contemporary approaches. Central is a social conception of freedom that aligns Spinoza’s perspective with more recent associative approaches to the political (e.g., Arendt, 1961). Political affects, in this regard, are chiefly affects of allegiance. By contrast, a dissociative understanding of the political, defended by proponents of radical democracy (e.g., Mouffe, 2000),
emphasizes difference and intergroup conflict. Here, political affects are primarily adversarial – affects of antagonism.

The second segment – affects in politics – deals with politics as a regulated sphere of collective action and inquires into the role that affect and emotion play as part of the routines and practices of this sphere. Accordingly, in the second part of this chapter, we provide various exemplary considerations that fit the rubric of “affective governance, affective resistance,” starting from a broadly Foucault-inspired perspective. Affect and emotion come into view as means and targets of governance, but also as fueling resistance to being governed. This includes a policing of styles of belonging and displays of partisanship – in effect, politically implemented orders of feeling that inflect the practice of government since at least the advent of the European nation state (Fortier, 2010). Moreover, the second part of our chapter also covers broader cultural programs of constructing and regulating historically specific political formations. Powerful discursive and practical regimes centered on feeling and sentiment were involved not only in the historical construction of race and gender but also more specifically in the construction of certain subpopulations as politically problematic, marking them as targets of biopolitical intervention. This development has been aptly labeled “sentimental biopower” (Schuller, 2018; see also Strick, 2015). Such techniques of affective governance provoke passionate resistance and attempts at destabilization. Analyzing affective struggles in a dialectic of governance and resistance within the realm of politics opens up empirically grounded perspectives on the affective dimension of the political itself.

Affect and the political: power, collectivity, and freedom

Spinoza is among the central philosophical sources informing important strands of affect theory, including the conceptual perspective on relational affect developed in this volume (e.g., → affect; → affective disposition; → affective resonance). This pertains not only to his ontological understanding of affect as a constitutive relationality between all bodies, entities, and realities (what Spinoza calls “finite modes”), but also to his political thought. Given the centrality of affective relations as the basic form of constitutive efficaciousness between all that exists – formative power, capacity, or potentia – it is not surprising that Spinoza’s views on affect and his political philosophy are closely entwined.1 In this first part of the chapter, we sketch considerations on the connections between affect and the political that we deem eminently relevant to contemporary concerns of political theory.

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1 Our reading of Spinoza is indebted to the interpretive tradition initiated by Deleuze (1981/1988, 1968/1990), and relatedly by the political readings provided by Balibar (1997, 1998) and Negri (1991). More recent inspiration comes from feminist elaborations of Spinozian themes (e.g., Gatens, 2009a; Gatens & Lloyd, 1999; Armstrong, 2009; Sharp, 2005, 2011); from a study by Martin Saar (2013) and an article by Dorothy Kwek (2015).
Right at the outset of his *Tractatus Politicus*, Spinoza (1677/1951) gives pride of place to “the passions”:

Philosophers conceive of the passions which harass us as vices into which men fall by their own fault, and therefore, generally deride, bewail, or blame them, or excrete them, if they wish to seem unusually pious. [...] For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be. Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics, they have generally written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics, which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in Utopia.

(p. 287)

This is a striking plea for realism in political thought, and realism with regard to the affective constitution of human beings in particular. Spinoza consequently theorizes politics not based on the ideas of political philosophers, who tend to take a detached stance of idealized normativity, but rather with regard to political practitioners – Machiavelli notably among them – who derive their insights from their own practical experience (cf. Walther, 1990, pp. 247f.). The particular practical reality that thereby appears is to a fair extent that of affective relations. One can generally say that, for Spinoza, social and political life consists of myriad configurations and arrangements of affective relations and their ongoing dynamics, which, on his perspective, are relations of power. Both individuation and collectivization are affective through and through; by implication, the same is true of the development, modes of existence, and eventual transformation of operative political entities, from the various institutions of government to the state or commonwealth as a whole. The “art” of politics, then, amounts to the beneficial arranging and harnessing of the affective energies that circulate within a given social formation, while finding the means to contain or productively re-channel destructive affects.

Four ideas render Spinoza’s approach to the affect–politics nexus particularly relevant for a contemporary understanding of political affect: (1) constitutive relationality; (2) the thesis that power equals right; (3) the notion of the multitude; (4) freedom as the “point” of politics.

(1) The first and most basic idea is that of an encompassing onto-formative relationality of affecting and being affected among all that finitely exists (→ affect; → affective resonance). This means that every constituted body or entity – including human individual and collective bodies – is effectively embedded within a historically specific “ecosocial matrix of other bodies, affecting them and being affected by them” (Protevi, 2009, p. 50). This “dynamic sociability grounded in the powers of bodies” (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, p. 54) leads to a perspective on the inevitable interdependence and
mutual constitutive relevance of all entities. It gives rise to a dynamic “politics of relation,” which has seen various elaborations in the more recent history of political thought (cf., e.g., Balibar, 1997; Butler, 2009; Sharp, 2005, 2011).

(2) The second idea results from the combination of this relational ontology with Spinoza’s denial of any transcendent source of legitimation. Within the immanence of the one substance or nature, there is no other source of right than the relationally constituted *potentia* of each finitely existing thing: “the right of each thing extends so far as its determined power extends” (Spinoza, 1670/2007, p. 195).² Combined with Spinoza’s understanding of power as the essential *capacity* of each entity – which is identical to a thing’s dynamic essence – this postulate implies that no individual can ever completely cede all of their power to a political body, on pain of self-annihilation. This makes for a natural limit to the power of a commonwealth, as those governed will continue to possess power of their own and thus remain capable of resistance, and even, under certain conditions, have the capacity to topple their rulers so as to regain control of their political constituency. In particular, no commonwealth or monarch can ever possess more power than the combined power of all individuals governed – the power of the “multitude” (*potentia multitudinis*).³

(3) As the aggregate of all individual *potentias*, the multitude is the founding source and enabling ground of political power and legitimacy. The point of this concept is that it does not unify its constitutive elements (human individuals as carriers of *potentia*) into a single substantive body (such as “a people” or “das Volk”), but that it is a non-homogenizing aggregate of individual forces, a multiplicity of distinct yet dynamically – that is: affectively – interrelated actors that, under certain conditions, acquire the capacity to act in concert (cf. Saar, 2013, pp. 350–368). The multitude is the principal subject of politics in Spinoza’s account, a dynamic accretion of agentive potentials capable of both founding and dismantling a polity. Understandably, this notion of a multitude as the radically egalitarian, albeit highly unruly and unpredictable founding instance of political constituencies, has for a long time fired up the imagination of proponents of radical democracy – including the early Marx and those inspired by him (e.g., Hardt & Negri, 2004; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Virno, 2004). The politically ambivalent character of the multitude has likewise been stressed, not least by Spinoza (1677/1985) himself: “The mob is terrifying, if unafraid” (*Ethics*, IV P54S). The multitude is that which carries the original potential for democracy – democracy’s vital substance – but may also be destructive.

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² Not surprisingly, this is an issue of much debate among Spinoza scholars. We tentatively side with Moira Gatens’ (2009b) assessment; see also Saar (2013, pp. 57–63).

³ See Kwek (2015) on the complicated theme of the power of the multitude, its role in the composition of the commonwealth, and the vexed issue of the unity of the multitude.
of democracy, as masses are prone to delusions and destructive impulses, and may be seduced by manipulative leaders into hatred and violence (cf. Saar, 2013, pp. 395f.). This ambivalence is closely tied to the affective character of the multitude and accordingly should never be lost sight of in considerations of political affect (cf. Kwek, 2015).

(4) The forth notable idea presents the ultimate “point” of politics for Spinoza: “the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom” (Spinoza, 1670/2007, p. 252). Among much else, this emphatic orientation towards freedom ties Spinoza’s political thought back to his understanding of affect, in particular, his distinction between passive affects – the classical “passions,” which for Spinoza often constitute instances of bondage as opposed to expressions of freedom – and active affects, which amount to the realization of an individual’s or a collective’s capacity to act out of rational insight: “Like the Stoics, Spinoza sees the free and virtuous life as a transition from passivity to activity – in his terms, from ‘bondage’ of passion to the free activity of reason” (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, p. 48).

Accordingly, the decisive criteria for assessing the viability and legitimacy of a polity is whether it enables its constituents to realize and live their potentials – whether it provides conditions conducive to the enjoyment of active affects and thus enables action in line with rational self-understanding (cf. Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, pp. 117–120). At the collective level, the key measure for a polity is accordingly the “free multitude” (multitudo libera) – a collective that is constrained in its actions only by those laws that are compatible with the essential characteristics of its constituent members (cf. Saar, 2013, pp. 361–368), and that is on the whole “guided more by hope than by fear.”

Spinoza’s understanding of freedom is complex and runs counter to the main currents of modern thought, especially as freedom is, to him, not a matter of the will, but a matter of knowledge and understanding: insight into necessity (cf. Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, pp. 41–57). Crucially, one must not misconstrue this orientation toward freedom in an individualistic manner, for instance, as an expression of the liberalist conception of individual thriving. This would violate the basic tenet of the relational constitution and thus the foundational interdependence – “transindividuality” – of all finite realities (Balibar, 1997). Spinozan freedom is a social affair, inextricable from collective self-realization and “acting in concert,” as especially feminist interpreters of his writings have convincingly argued (Armstrong, 2009; Sharp, 2011). Again, affect is key here: The identity of an individual is the product of a history of constitutive relations of affecting and being affected, and thus inextricable from formative connections and affective alliances in an enabling milieu. Freedom, then, informed by adequate insight into these formative affective connections, comes with an expanded sphere of selfhood. Its actualization consists in joint action based on these insights – joyful active affects enacted collectively. As Aurelia Armstrong (2009) puts it, freedom or
autonomy for Spinoza is “a social process, that is, an effort to build and maintain mutual, reciprocal relationships with others that support and foster this striving for all concerned” (p. 61).

These four points inform a nuanced understanding of emphatically political affect. When things go well, political affects are active affects of allegiance: joyful collective engagements grounded in rational insight into the determining factors of individual and collective existence – freedom realized. It is not too far fetched to see a connection between Spinoza’s views and Arendt’s programmatic claim that the “raison d’être of politics is freedom” (Arendt, 1961, p. 146). However, things rarely go well, particularly for “finite modes” such as human beings, as Spinoza would be the first to remind us (cf. Kwek, 2015). In such a context, “political affect” designates affective reactions to prevailing conditions of unfreedom, to bondage, oppression, and tyranny. One might presume that these affects would be found in the vicinity of resistance, expressions of a longing for freedom, cracks in the fabric of dominance, or energies that fuel fights for liberation. Here, notable affiliations lie less with Arendt and other centrist political thinkers but rather with the likes of Frantz Fanon, Assata Shakur, Audre Lorde, and others engaged in an uncompromising struggle against oppression.

Affects in politics: affective governance – affective resistance

As we have seen, Spinoza suggests that even if political action is ultimately aimed at and might even depend on some kind of freedom, it can rarely, if at all, be realized. Investigating this dilemma of freedom in unfreedom is a major task of politics. It is one of Foucault’s (1982) central theoretical insights that political subjects are always-already governed, and resistance and governance are inextricably linked. Thus, an orientation toward freedom is inextricably linked to dialectical relations of power. In Foucault’s (esp. 1984) work, the cultivation of affect plays a major role in governance and resistance. With his convincing co-reading of the two authors, Rainer Mühlhoff (2018) has shown how the production and governing of subjectivity as described by Foucault are largely compatible with a Spinozan notion of affect.

The creation of political subjects, be they individual or collective, is not conceivable without processes of affective attachment, whether to a system of governance, a political cause, a group, or to individual peers or comrades (attachment). To maintain organizational political arrangements, affective dynamics are crucial, both to mobilize members and to enforce compliance with rules. At base, such processes are comparable when it comes to the state itself governing its citizens or to a group of dissidents resisting the state. The wielding of power, either in order to govern or to resist, is fundamentally an affective process. Insofar as politics is about the creation, maintenance and use of power, political actors understand the relevance of the creation of relatively
stable affective dynamics to further political projects, both as a target for destabilization when it comes to their political opponents, as well as a goal to achieve for themselves.

It is therefore not surprising that much work on affective dynamics and the political has dealt with the production of emotion and sentiment (→ emotion, emotion concept; → sentiment). Emotions such as love for god or country, hatred for the enemy in war or class struggle, anxiety of foreigners or social disenfranchisement, enthusiasm for economic advancement or legal equality are powerful and culturally scripted devices for “doing politics.” Beyond the evocation, production, and maintenance of political emotions (cf. Nussbaum, 2013), politics also aim at creating sentiments – relatively stable regimes of meaning embedded into affective and emotional dynamics. Being for or against something, assessing an action as right or wrong, finding an outcome just or unjust – these are all processes that play out in the context of the creation, mobilization, and transformation of sentiments. Seemingly different, even contradictory notions such as racism, social equality, gender stereotypes, class struggle, warmongering, peacemaking, law and order, liberal values, or conservatism come to the fore not as abstract rational concepts, but as sentiments. Being able to skillfully navigate, govern, or transform sentiments is accordingly a powerful political capacity.

In the study of affect and the political, authors have tended – sometimes based on a Massumian notion of an all-too strict differentiation between affect and emotion (cf. Massumi, 1995) – to emphasize the role of affect in processes of resistance and transformation, while taking emotion and sentiment to be prevalent in processes of governing and stabilization. We are wary of such distinctions and make a plea for systematically investigating the role of affect, emotion, and sentiment in all kinds of political processes, including governance and resistance, stabilization and destabilization, revolution and reaction. Kyla Schuller (2018) has given an impressive account of 19th-century biopolitics and the decisive – and highly problematic – role of feeling and sentiment as means of governance, bringing forth the notion of “sentimental biopower.” She uses this concept to highlight the extent to which affectivity was – and still is – a discursive device for establishing and cementing hierarchies of race and gender. With regard to affective resistance, on the other hand, Hardt and Negri (2004) see affective dynamics as the birthplace of a new form of political subject, the global multitude, which can be the agent of fundamental and radical change against the capitalist world economy. Based on a similar notion, Mouffe (2000) highlights the role of the mobilization of passions for bringing the political, in the form of agonistic struggle, to the fore and forming the basis for leftist resistance against neoliberal policies.

4 Bargetz and Sauer (2015) argue that this has led to a trend of overestimating the positive effects of affect while downplaying its negative outcomes. On this matter, we basically agree with them and would also stress the political ambivalence of affect.
One field of inquiry in which the role of affect, emotion and sentiment has been especially highlighted is the workings of colonial governance. In such works, many refer to Fanon (1952/2008) as a scholar of colonial affectivity (e.g., Ahmed, 2007). Fanon shows how racist colonial governance is affectively inscribed into the self of the colonized (→ affects of racialization). At the same time, he indicates that anti-colonial resistance must also aim at the modulation of feeling and sentiment to free the governed from colonial power. Ann Stoler’s work (e.g., 2007), largely based on Foucault and on feminist readings of his texts, has skillfully demonstrated how colonial governance aimed at the cultivation of specific sentiments and the crafting of emotional dispositions. In her work on Dutch colonial policies of education and childrearing in the Dutch Indies (today’s Indonesia) in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Stoler (2002) carves out a practice of governance she calls “sentimental education” (pp. 112–139). From the thorough investigation of colonial records, Stoler (2002) maps out “the moral landscape of a racializing and reformist colonial regime for whom child rearing and affective attachments were defining features and affairs of state” and describes what was at issue, namely the “learning of place and race” (p. 112). It was by learning certain sentiments and sensibilities that young citizens in the colonies were granted the right to be treated as European; a right that was denied to others. Stoler shows how the concern with nurturing specific affects and sentiments was not limited to the colonial peripheries, but also began to dominate the European motherland. Her work demonstrates that the colonial state’s concerns for feelings of belonging and affective attachments were not metaphors for something else, but key conduits of power themselves. As such, the harnessing of sentiment and the making of communities of sentiment was a crucial site of political contest. Stoler (2009, pp. 73–102) also describes a protest from 1848 in Batavia, the Javanese capital of the Dutch East Indies, which was likewise directed at educational policy – namely the rule that only those youths schooled in the Netherlands would be eligible for the colony’s most coveted civil service posts. This education in the “motherland” should culturally cultivate bureaucratic selves governed by “self-denial, diligence, temperance and self-control” (Stoler, 2009, p. 65). The protesters were contesting the strain this policy laid on their affective attachments to their sons, when they had to ship them off to The Hague for years. For the governing colonialists such “parental sentiments and the sorrow of a father’s heart now looked more like ‘political’ issues and concerns of state” (Stoler, 2009, p. 83).

Along similar lines of thinking, a number of entries in this volume have highlighted the role of feeling, affect, emotion, and sentiment for political processes of governance and resistance. One crucial technique of governance is immersive power, a term which describes the multifarious techniques of immersing people in affective arrangements to form them as subjects and selves, harness their energies and potentials for the purposes of a larger apparatus such as a party, a movement, or a company, and to evoke thoroughgoing
compliance (→ immersion, immersive power). One form of affective governance is the production of a racialized regime of othering and inequality, described by the concept of racialized affect (→ affects of racialization). In line with the idea of affective subjectivation is the claim that affect plays a key role in the formation of collective subjects and communities (→ affective communities). The citizenry is a specific community of political subjects brought about by the state whose inner workings can be fruitfully investigated through the lens of affect; citizenship is far from a formal, criteria-based mode of allegiance but a thoroughly affective affair (→ affective citizenship). Practices of resistance, such as dissident practices of image-making and image-distribution in political protests are likewise rendered meaningful by way of affective dynamics (→ affective witnessing). Political protest can open up affective possibilities and create potentialities to imagine and even produce new political futures (→ Midān moments).

Outlook

We have proposed using “political affect” as an analytic notion that helps to render visible the multifaceted involvement of affect in efforts of governance and in the manifold reactions and resistances these efforts encounter. Cultivating affect is a force to create new potentialities and possibilities, but the crafting of specific affective dynamics is also a successful technique of governance and creating compliance. Investigating affect in the myriad of practices that unfold in this constant dynamic of governing and resisting significantly broadens investigations of politics beyond reductionist characterizations, such as those that see politics as a game of negotiating purportedly rational political interests, with the occasional application of physical violence. Political affect is an analytical perspective that lets us look more closely into the fine-grained intricacies of political interaction that all too often shift out of focus: the intimate, the everyday, that which is only possible, yet not realized, and how these are entangled with the public, the extraordinary, and the real. Political affect asks most broadly and curiously “what matters?” (Lutz, 2017) – and does not know the answer in advance.

Besides this practical and analytical orientation toward concrete politics, we have taken the political thought of Spinoza as an exemplary articulation of a deeper theoretical involvement of affect with “the political.” While thoroughly realistic and empirically oriented, Spinoza’s reflections on the dynamic constitution of political bodies do more than analyze the affective workings of extant political formations. Over and above such forays into the Realpolitik of his day, Spinoza inspires foundational reflections on the philosophical connection between affect and the political as such. In particular, his thoughts on the ultimate “point” of politics, namely, a social form of freedom as joyously enacted collective action, suggests an elaboration of the concept of the political as deeply involving affect. Spinoza – at least on the feminist reading of his
works we espouse – outlines an orientation toward a radically democratic polity in which individuals realize their potential through the forming of affective alliances, thereby creating a collective life grounded in understanding and solidarity. While this is an exemplary vision of the political that not everyone will share, it orients us toward inquiring into the upshot or the “point” of the political as such. Other answers are conceivable here. Some, for instance, will reckon with a much more antagonistic political landscape, where the road to human freedom leads through a thoroughly contested territory and via the conflicting orientations and demands of multiple groups and collectives – a Schmittian vision of politics as struggle, in which the paramount political affects would have to be sought in the vicinity of conflict, war, or general antagonism (Laclau & Mouffé, 1985). Again, others will take a stance against such an ultimately “bellicose” orientation and instead posit the necessity of tying a notion of the political to an ethical perspective, which likewise invites articulation in affective terms. Authors drawing on the work of Levinas and Derrida have associated the political with an “infinite” ethical demand issued by the Other. Butler (2004) and Critchley (2008), for example, straightforwardly tie such a line of thought to considerations of constitutive affective relations to alterity. On these grounds, Critchley (2008) explicitly invokes an “ethical politics” (p. 205) – a notion that is near inconceivable to proponents of an antagonistic understanding of the political.

The more general message we take from these conflicting accounts is that “political affect” in all these proposals works as a philosophical notion that inspires assessments and problematizations of the political as such. Understood in this way, the concept of political affect does not invoke a definitive articulation of the meaning of politics, but rather works as a means for reflection on the nature of the political (Reflexionsbegriff). It points in a certain direction – for instance, to collectivity, antagonism, justice, or freedom – but without delineating a direct path to a single, unambiguous answer. This entails an orientation within a given political situation that transcends the merely factual and moves toward a sense of possibility. The political is the sphere where human individuals and collectives determine – either jointly or adversely – what their finite earthly existence will ultimately look like: the how of their living together and relating to one another. A truly political affect in this sense will be one that begins from an awareness (or mere hunch) that, within human affairs, change is possible at any time.

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