

**A Synthesis of the Prevailing Conflict Management Paradigms:  
Toward a Unity of Conflict**

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# **A Synthesis of the Prevailing Conflict Management Paradigms: Toward a Unity of Conflict**

By

James Douglas Smith

## **Abstract**

This synthesis of 5 prominent conflict management paradigms uses power differential as the single most contributing variable to their process and outcome of conflict. Efforts of scholars to integrate or synthesize conflict paradigms have been unsuccessful or clumsy by the scholars' own assessments. The 5 selected paradigms represent an interdisciplinary set of normative and descriptive paradigms from different social contexts and intellectual frameworks. The 5 share the common traits of rival goals, three levels of socially constructed power differential, and outcomes relative to the total value of the rival goal. An inverse relationship between power differential and the total value of conflict outcomes is supported by all 5 paradigms and empirical data. Explanatory metatheory is the methodology used for synthesis.

An increase in power differential results in a decrease in total value of the rival goal. Power differential is constructed using Max Weber's ideal-type method. The power differentials are abstracted from the paradigms themselves. Empirical work from secondary sources and case studies complete the analysis.

Keywords: social conflict, communicative action, organizational conflict, game theory, leadership grid, dual concerns, strategic choice, managerial grid, interest-based bargaining, integration, power differential, Rummel, Northern Ireland, interdisciplinary, typology of conflict, authoritarian, synthesis, ideal type, social change, absolute value, transformation, change management.

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I further acknowledge the Light and Energy of life, the unseen source of human development.

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### When Prevailing Paradigms are Not Enough

*The aim of science is theory. R. J. Rummel 1967*

In the beginning of his rule, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad set up a power-free zone for public dialogue to gain insight on how to better govern the nation (Zisser, 2006). The world dubbed this action the “Damascus Spring”. Al-Assad wanted Syrians to express their opinions, ideas, and vision for the new regime freely. The effort turned out to be a power-free façade (Klein & Huynh, 2004). A little over a year later, al-Assad arrested, jailed, and tortured prominent scholars, leaders, and politicians who expressed opinions threatening to al-Assad’s rule (Blanford, 2002; Zisser). How might any of today’s prevailing paradigms of conflict have warned citizens of this potential outcome?

Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action postulates the value of a power-free zone for public dialogue to promote policy development (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003). In a power-free zone, civil discourse is welcome among all citizens, regardless of perspective. The goal is to reach an understanding with one another to promote a common good. President al-Assad set up and used such a zone. He gathered critical information about the opposition. Then the president hurt them. The zone only appeared to be power free.

Louis Pondy’s (1967) organizational-conflict model is clear that benevolent dictators may not remain benevolent forever. Pondy’s phrase about dictators is not a major part of his paradigm but is a warning. Nothing Pondy says serves to protect the weaker side from defections such as al-Assad’s.

Robert Axelrod's (1984) game theory teaches that defection can happen at any time but is less likely when there is a long future expected together. Axelrod explicitly claims to have no answer to situations where power differential is so large that defection by the powerful leaves the weaker parties with no direct recourse. The future becomes less relevant in such cases, and the weaker side loses at every public turn.

Blake and Mouton's (1964) managerial grid provides little protection against leaders who change their mind mid-stream. Collaboration quickly turns to contention as the true short-term profit motives emerge. A corporation may lose some profit and public favor when they do things that are not popular, but employees may lose income necessary to live. Such is the gambit some managers play.

Fisher, Ury, and Patton's (1991) paradigm of interest-based bargaining encourages parties to share interests. This is exactly what al-Assad's adversaries did. Al-Assad's bluff paid off. The public sharing only benefited al-Assad.

No single prominent paradigm sufficiently frames this conflict or informs those in conflict about how best to proceed in cases of high uncertainty yet of great promise. However, the five major paradigms of conflict management share a set of fundamental principles that, when synthesized, do provide useful information. These principles provide insight for assessing one's position in any conflict based on power differential. It is the goal of this dissertation to identify, isolate, and synthesize these principles. These synthesized principles create a systematic framework to inform those in conflict concerning basic threats and benefits of conflict through the lens of power differential.

Consider another traumatic conflict. It was just a game. In 2006, Richard Dawkins was training a group of executives in conflict management using standard game theory and the prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1984). All the executives worked for the same company. I assume they regularly relied on each other for achieving desired outcomes. On the final move of the prisoner's dilemma game, where one side can defect on the other without the other having a chance to get back at them, that is exactly what happened. One team of executives defected while the other played nice by cooperating. Instead of both teams winning three points, the defectors won five, and the good guys won zero! The defectors planned to be uncooperative to their own advantage. The others cooperated or "played nice" trying to benefit everyone. Those who cooperated suffered an embarrassing loss. They scored zero points. These losers became angry. The total points won between the teams were now less than if they had both cooperated and the nice team was way behind. The game was over. I explain the scoring details in the literature review.

Dawkins reports that the executives who cooperated felt cheated. They experienced psychological trauma so severe that counseling was necessary. What is the measure of value in this conflict? What is the lesson? Axelrod went so far as to say the lesson is not to be a sucker and to cheat the cheaters back. Neither Dawkins nor Axelrod addresses this explicitly. Mediation and negotiation training use this same exercise and experience similar outcomes. Game theory is core curriculum for training in conflict management programs.

What different type of outcome could occur if these same two teams pursued other types of conflict approaches when faced with the payoff matrix of game theory?

Habermas's communicative action does not fit game theory because no dialogue needs to occur. Even with communication, people still mislead, bluff, are insincere, and sometimes untruthful. Pondy's system describes the aftermath of similar conflicts but offers no decision-making criteria. Pondy notes that the company may be worse off after conflicts like this. If the two teams took the roles posited in Blake and Mouton's managerial grid, then those same executives would contend with the others perceived as weaker. In game theory, the both parties are equal in every way. Thus, the managerial grid has little application. Because the individual players do not set the payoffs in Axelrod's game, it is unlike interest-based bargaining. There is no negotiated settlement.


None of the five paradigms frame either the Syrian or the corporate team conflicts well. Neither conflict worked out well for the weaker parties. As will be shown later, the results were suboptimal for the stronger parties too. The reason to look more deeply into each of the five paradigms is to understand the dynamics of conflict they present and identify critical patterns that are helpful in understanding social conflict systematically. We shall return to both of these examples of conflict in the final chapter of this exploration and view how the synthesis puts them in a different light that can bring better outcomes for everyone.

### **E Pluribus Unum: Many Paradigms, One Synthesis**

The five prominent paradigms used to explain social conflict represent different frameworks, different disciplines, and different styles for managing conflict. Each of these paradigms originates from a different discipline or social science. This interdisciplinary and socially cross-cutting arrangement is suggested as an optimal

approach to understanding conflict (Turner, Beeghley, & Powers, 1995). No one lives in just one social context. Each of us experiences conflict in many social contexts. These contexts include personal relationships, political relationships, business and professional relationships, and community relationships, among others. Conflicts occur even between complete strangers. Thus, a synthesis drawn from a socially diverse set of paradigms is useful to identify a common pattern of conflict dynamics.

A map of the five social contexts covered by the five paradigms is found in figure 1. The figure illustrates their wide social range of context and size. Susan Opatow offered a map of nested social relationships similar to this that covers a similar and comprehensive set of relationships (Opatow, 2006). The Human Universal (Brown, 1991) characteristic of conflict is captured as far as social context is concerned.



*Figure 1.* From micro to macro, and covering the interdisciplinary applications.

### **Scholarship and Synthesis**

Several scholars attempted to synthesize these and other conflict paradigms. According to the authors of those attempts and scholarly community, the attempts were not fully successful. They were not successful because no fundamental dynamic pattern emerged. The call in scholarship to continue the search for a pattern remains. I describe these attempts in chapter two. A more complete pattern to present conflict management, distilled from all these paradigms, can address a serious gap in knowledge of this part of human existence. The nature of the synthesis I present in this dissertation has a positive impact even if only the dominant parties understand it. The nature of leadership is visible in the paradigm. Some leaders would share the information openly; others would not. Those that did share would benefit themselves and followers. Leaders who did not share

would do no harm. I believe that that wider distribution of this type of knowledge is a boon to those facing overt conflict, just learning about conflict, and to those seeking improvement in the performance of their group.

My personal bias and the results of this synthesis indicate that creating an even social playing field is an acceptable and compelling goal. The finding supports the concept of transparency within teams and fair play between opposing teams. There is no illusion that conflict is simply semantics and that everyone can get along all the time with the right mediator. For those in higher power positions it yields positive payoffs through positive relationships. The intent and result of this entire effort is to create a clearer conceptual map for understanding conflict. The synthesis will aid all parties involved in social conflict to develop positive relationships and positive payoffs if that is what they want. If parties do not want such positive relationships, the results are often a diminished value of the goal or goals they have in mind. This is what the paradigms, as I will show, have in common.

Social norms that systematically frustrate the aspirations of some people while facilitating the aspirations of others are identified in the synthesis (Hendershott, 2002). Authoritarianism is the system that binds the minds and bodies of groups of people in much of the world including women, children, men, minorities, nonreligious, sexually different from the dominant norm, and even just plain great thinkers. Raw power and unfair laws often facilitate the regimes of authoritarian leaders. The laws are rationally justified without the necessity of valid evidence. Some authoritarian leaders, such as Mubarak of Egypt, receive foreign support because they are the best alternative to even more authoritarian groups. Teaching principles of conflict based on power differential

may protect nations and groups from authoritarianism regardless of foreign intervention or the uncertain results of revolutions.

The goal of this dissertation is not to advocate for or against any political, religious, or cultural group but only to view the dynamics of conflict as indicated by the selected paradigms. Those dynamics compare command-and-control methods for dealing with conflict and less hierarchical and self-organizing methods for dealing with conflict. Different types of power used to engage conflict are the keys to understanding the outcomes of conflict. Questions about the best ways to relate to enemies are part of those dynamics. Both modern conflict scholars and those of the past are engaged.

It is important to distinguish between social and psychological conflict. The paradigms address only social conflict. Psychological and social conflicts are distinct from each other. Psychological conflict is internal to the individual or single person. It requires personal decision-making, or counseling, or some internal resolution before action occurs. There are other cognitive factors involved and usually internal conflict must be resolved in order to engage social conflict. This dissertation will show a connection between the collective behavior patterns of individuals and the concept of power differential embedded in society. A premise that is not contended for here, but assumed, is that individuals are shaped by their environment but not captive to it. This assumption is supported by the paradigms. Social conflict is the front between what a dominant group wants or controls and what a smaller group or single individual desires.

### **Overview of the synthesis.**

An overview of the presentation and synthesis follows. The overview covers the literature review, methodology, the central concept of power differential and observable applications. The dissertation synthesizes the data in the literature review because this is the call from the scholarly community. The generic framework for the synthesis, a case study, and empirical data lend support to the analysis.

The literature review covers the conflict literature beginning in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Germany in order to provide a social context for understanding the five modern paradigms central to this paper. The review covers the definition of conflict, the role of goals, types of power, parties involved, individual outcomes, and the social outcomes of conflict. The five conflict paradigms are reviewed and compared generally. After this, the focus on power differential takes a central role in understanding the paradigm's similarities.

The selected paradigms in this research are contemporary theories in use among scholars and practitioners. These have become so prominent they tend to form a lens or paradigm for understanding conflict in each major social context (Kuhn, 1962). Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1981), Louis Pondy's organizational conflict model (Pondy, 1967), Robert Axelrod's game theory (Axelrod, 1984), Robert Blake and Jean Mouton's managerial grid (Blake & Mouton, 1964), and Roger Fisher, William Fisher, and Bruce Patton's interest-based bargaining (Fisher et al., 1991) are the core paradigms used for synthesis. General references to each of the

paradigms or the respective authors throughout this paper refer specifically to these references.

Calls for a useful synthesis of conflict theory are found in the works of Lewis Coser (1956). Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim (2004) dedicated their book to a synthesis of conflict they found successful. Their synthesis was not of models but a reconstituted managerial grid adapted as strategic choice model. Strategic choice describes only one party that can use one of four strategies to achieve a goal. It is not a synthesis of any other paradigms but does include other concepts in a way that makes them more of an add on than an integral function of conflict.

Marc Howard Ross (2000) pointed to a lack of imagination and integration in attempts to synthesize conflict models into something more concise and useful. Attempts to synthesis conflict paradigms have been made by Jonathan Turner (1990) and by Roy Lewicki, Stephen Weiss, and David Lewin (1992). Morton Deutsch observed that practitioners must synthesize many paradigms to achieve a successful practice (Deutsch, 2006a). After 25 years of experience and reflection, even Louis Pondy (1992) called for new efforts to this end. Synthesis is an unfinished project to which this work adds a piece toward its completion.

The methodology for synthesizing the paradigms into a framework uses an explanatory form of metatheory. Though each paradigm comes from a different theoretical framework, the synthesis uses a systems framework to support the integration. Some of the paradigms are normative, others descriptive, and still others are formal theories. The synthesis framework is descriptive with normative or ethical implications in

the tradition of critical social theory. The methodology in concert with the literature review provides a context that reduces the opportunity to cherry pick only supporting information. It does this by laying a foundation upon which the synthesis must fit.

The scholarly work of following up on each of the major paradigms continues and is included as appropriate. The data are extant in most cases. How to make sense of it all is what scholars are still seeking. This is what the dissertation addresses.

**The central concept is power differential.**

Power differential is hypothesized as the key factor in synthesizing the paradigms. Power differential leads to a clearer understanding of conflict dynamics. Two dynamically related sources of power differential are noted. The first source is social context in which the conflict occurs. Social context refers to the laws, norms, and culture of a group. Dominant groups often create a culture to favor their group over others. The second source of power differential is inherent individual or group differences in ability, passion, priority or other personal factors.

Some parties are more aggressive, assertive, or passive than others and so engage others with more or less intensity. The relationship between these two sources of power can lead to a stable social situation if power differentials remain the same or it can lead to radical social change as power differential grows or narrows. Social changes experienced during the recent 2010-2012 Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria are examples of attempts to change power differential in societies.

The dynamics of these two power sources lead to changes in power differential. A change in power differential transforms the social system. This dynamic results in a

system where individual components impact the whole and the whole impacts the individual components. Living systems theory is a modern approach that describes this type of relationship. Living systems are interactive, self-organizing, and change or transform over time (Bailey, 2006).

Hundreds of experiments have been performed in laboratories and throughout history regarding conflict and power. Scholars have completed in depth statistical reviews of conflict. Case studies abound. One of the ways to use the synthesis is to review some of the work in conflict studies through the lens provided here and consider its usefulness more fully.

Figure 2 provides a visual and generic explanation of the synthetic system's organization and the social changes it can model. It is the same figure as the synthesis of the five paradigms but without their details. The figure represents what the common components of the five paradigms. The origin of this structure is the result of over 10 years working in and with conflict practice and theory. This is a short time compared to the lifetime of effort each of the prominent theorists invested. 10 years is a short time compared to those who provide the contextual and empirical support cited in this paper.

Power differential manifests in three levels: high, medium, and low. The measure of such differentials are difficult to measure or quantify so each level of power differential is described in a later chapter following Max Weber's methodology of ideal-types (Weber, 1993).

The generic model of the synthesis contains just six lines. three of the lines form a pyramid shape. The base of the pyramid represents total power. Power differential can be

tracked along the base line as a percentage of total power available. The other two sides of the pyramid represent two different sides in a conflict.

### The Generic Pattern in the Paradigms




Figure 2. Conflict expression and behavior at each power differential level.

The total power available is always 100%. The power each side has at any given time varies yet the total possessed by both or all sides always adds to 100%. Thus, power differential can be anywhere from 1% versus 99% (high differential), 25% versus 75% (medium differential), or 50% versus 50% (low differential). There is no claim made at this point to any particular points as critical or as having empirical significance. Such claims are important and to be pursued in later research.

The paradigms address this ideal set of three power differentials in different ways. Between the dominant and weak side there is always a *zero sum* game. As one gains some percentage of the total, the other loses the same amount of percentage. Yet, it is possible for total value of the power shared by the two sides to grow or shrink as the relationship between the two sides changes. The line to the left of the triangle tracks changes in total value.

The line on the left runs perpendicular to the base of the triangle. It represents total value. Total value is a measure of the value of the focus or goal of the conflict listed at the apex of the triangle. In much of conflict literature, the goal is referred to as a pie . That is literally, a pastry, baked in an oven. The social context of conflict causes pies to shrink, grow, or remain the same. As will be shown, each paradigm indicates that as the relative power of each side to decide how the pie is cut and who gets which piece becomes more even, the pie grows in size and there is more to share for each party. Of course, a single pie, already baked, will not grow larger or shrink if it is cut one way or another. So, how does the growing or shrinking work dynamically?

Total value and power differential are in an inverse relationship. Imagine two people fighting over a freshly baked pie. One is much stronger than the other. He hits the other, takes the pie, and walks away with it. The other is not completely out so the other reaches out and trips him. The pie falls to the ground and is smashed. Just little pieces remain edible. This use of power results in fewer pies made and generally of less quality. This is a *negative sum* outcome relative to the pie associated with a high power differential situation. This example is admittedly crude. Usually, the strong side in high power differential cases tries to enslave, unilaterally command, or limit choices of the

weaker side in order to control the situation and maintain an advantage. Weaker parties may feel physically constrained or attacked. The outcome for the value of is negative growth or stagnation at a low point in the long term.

Imagine a freshly baked pie shared between two people with some power differential but not an overwhelming difference. The difference is at a medium level. Neither party can physically control the other in any direct manner. The pie comes out of the oven and they both enjoy a piece. They both agree that they will eat the rest the next day. There is a rule in the community that only elder children may leave their room at night alone. In the middle of the night, the more powerful elder gets up and takes all of the remaining pie to a secret place. He leaves just one piece for the other child.

This is an example of what happens in the mid power differential area. Rules are created, used, or broken to benefit just one party. The effect can be negative when next a pie is baked. The one who felt cheated may refuse to work well with the other, sabotage the other's efforts, break the oven, or put soap in the mix somehow to ruin the whole pie. They may just not try too hard anymore. The weaker one may try to change the rules about who can get up at night. Maybe there is recourse to an authority that cares enough to get involved. The results can be positive if improvements to the method of sharing and safeguarding the pie through the night are implemented. Thus, a variable sum outcome is associated with this area. Much of that outcome depends on implementing ideas of fairness.


Finally, imagine two equally powerful people, cooking and baking the best pie they can. Neither would decide to cheat the other because they not only love pies but

each other as well. Although always a little competitive, these two work hard to create amazing pies and have always shared them in a manner each feels is fair. If there is a misstep, it is corrected for the next time. The outcome for these two is hypothesized to be bigger and better pies. Perhaps more pies too. Thus, the low power differential is relative to positive-sum outcomes to the pie as indicated on the perpendicular line.

Two horizontal lines run parallel the base of the triangle and frame three areas of power differential in Figure 2. These lines represent social transformations. High differential is the bottom area where the sides are far apart in terms of power. Middle is directly across the lowest line and under the top line. Low power is above the top-most line that runs just below the apex.

The transformational lines represent fundamental power differential shifts in social relationships between conflict parties. A shift can be a change in norms, laws, and culture that impact relationships within the culture as related to the goal. The shift nearest the apex represents a change toward a positive attitude or orientation between parties. These three are levels are found in each of the prominent conflict paradigms.

There are some immediate similarities in the triangular form with the parabolic form or pattern of conflict suggested by conflict theorists including Yerkes and Dodson (1908), revisited by Broadhurst (1957), and supported further by Karl Weick (2001). There are also significant differences between that parabolic form and this one. I will show how insufficient this parabolic approach is as a teaching tool for conflict management. That parabolic shape shows how stress caused by conflict follows the parabolic arch pattern affecting the performance of only one party (Figure 3).



*Figure 3:* The parabolic structure of conflict and productivity.

The parabolic pattern visually conveys the concept that a medium level of stress in a party's environment results in the highest level of productivity. On the parabola, there is medium stress or eustress, high stress or distress, and low stress or rest. There is no unit of measure for the levels. Highest productivity is in the medium stress level, neither high nor low. The relationship makes intuitive sense but is not helpful to people in actual conflict with others who may want to overwhelm others. It is a reasonable, howbeit simplistic.

Mary Jo Hatch (1997) presented a similar pattern in her textbook on organizational theory. The approach is limited in use and was questioned regarding validity by Lewicki et al. (1992). It is significantly different from the structure in the paradigms. There are not two parties represented, the social environment is not included, and an individual's place

in conflict is missing. There is also no identifiable way to determine what is too much, too little, or just right levels of conflict are except the productivity outcome. When productivity is highest, conflict is optimal and when conflict is optimal, productivity is highest. This is circular reasoning. The message seems to be to adjust the level of conflict until the productivity goals are reached. This is questionable advice.

The relationship suggested by the parabola is that as relative power finds a middle level, not too high and not too low, productivity increases. The approach in this dissertation is different because there is no parabolic relationship in the social conflict realm. The absolute or total change in value of the pie is inversely proportional to the change in the balance of power. It is not a parabolic, diminishing returns, type of relationship, as Figure 3 indicates. The apex of the triangle represents a balance of power and highest productivity in Figure 2. The reason for the difference between the two approaches is that the parabolic relationship deals with an individual party and that same party's educational learning not social conflict.

The logic used to describe the change in total value relative to the balance of power in Figure 2 is that for power to balance, it is usually the weaker side that becomes stronger. The stronger side need not change. The more powerful rarely "give up" power. If the weaker parties become stronger, without the stronger party becoming weaker, then there is more total power available. All power is relative to goal attainment. This increase in total power leads to increased total value of the rival goal because more human energy is focused on it..

Crossing one of the two transformation lines above the base of the triangle represents dramatic social change. Mid-level power differential represents a completely different relationship from the high-power differential relationship. The mid-level is more communal while the relationship at the base of the triangle is coercive. The mid-level follows a rule of law; the other follows the rule of force. I am not saying that is the way it “ought” to be in a normative sense. The arrangement is the way the paradigms say it is. A second social transformation of norms and relationships that is required for low power differential to emerge. Low power differential is characterized by positive and creative relationships as top contenders for the goal reach a balance of power. Generally, such a relationship is cordial, cooperative, and creative.

Just showing how each paradigm indicates that lower power differential is central to positive outcomes may also lower power differential. This happens naturally by making this information readily available to people who want to change their situation for the better but lack certainty (Martin, 1989).

The chapter on power differential presents a typology related to the synthesis. The typology captures a continuum of ways conflict expresses. The typology and synthesis are applied to the case study of Northern Ireland and the common problem of bullying. Northern Ireland shows how the power levels can be used in tracking the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. The conclusion reviews the hypotheses and suggests how the findings might be used in education, practice, and further research.

## **Conflict Games: Getting a Feel for the Field**

### **Unwinnable Games in Education**

The idea for this dissertation started with my experience during an educational game played at the Cornell Industrial Labor Relations School called *Star Power*. It is designed by game theorist Garry Shirts (Shirts, 1992). *Star Power* simulates a labor-management negotiation. The game starts with a bag full of multi-colored plastic chips, a large group of participants, and rules provided by the facilitator. No goal is stated. There are four different colors of chips in the bag and each participant randomly selects five chips from the bag. Each color chip has a different value. The participants learn the values of the chips only after selection. After selection, the participants divide into two groups based on the value of their chips. One group was richer. The other was poorer.

The professor announced rules next. The group with the higher chip values unilaterally makes the rules for bargaining. This group is analogous to management. The chips that remain in the bag represent value over which the bargaining takes place. In order to get more chips out of the bag, both sides need to agree with how they will be divided. In this way, creating value by releasing chips was directly tied to distributing the value released (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). The only other rule of the game was that either team could vote any other member out of their group by a simple majority vote. I was on the high-chip-value team.

The stronger side that made the rules set them in a way that advantaged them in the distribution of any chips taken from the bag. The stronger side set the interaction rules as a privilege of their socially bestowed, position and right. The results are predictable. As

the rules the made by the more powerful were perceived as biased and unfair, there was less cooperative communication, less organizational interaction, and less of an overall payoff in cumulative chip value. There was more avoidance, and stalled negotiations. The weaker side refused to bargain.

A critical point is that all the players on both teams were students from similar educational, economic, and social backgrounds unlike actual labor management negotiations where there are economic and status differences. Refusing to play was easy because there were no real physical or lifeworld effects from the decision. In real world situations, Gene Sharp explicitly advises less socially endowed parties to withdraw support from those who have more power in the conflict (Sharp, 2003). This withdrawal can paralyze and capsize those with extreme power because they are actually dependent on the weaker side's labor. This might bring about a power balance that leads to relationships that are more cordial after a major social shift. In labor-management situations, the management can bring in replacement workers, move facilities overseas, or shut down operations.

I understood that the rules our team was making would adversely affect the bargaining results. No team would release chips from the bag to benefit either side. After my failed attempt to temper these rules, I spoke briefly to the other side to encourage them to try to bargain with us by challenging some of our rules. To my surprise, while I was speaking to the other side, my team voted me off! That meant to me that I sat in the back of the class while bargaining commenced and concluded quickly with no agreements reached.

The result of bargaining was that the socially weaker side refused to bargain. No one could win more chips. All the chips remained in the bag. No increase in total value occurred for either team. All the work was thus lost effort representing a negative return.

The power differential between both sides was high. It was established at the beginning when the chips were selected by each team member but empowered by the rules of the game. The rules of the game for our little society in the classroom set the power differential at a higher, metalevel. The game rules that provided the privileges of the power positions in that little society were magnified by the bargaining rules the lead group crafted. In negotiation terms, the bargaining rules determined how all chips were distributed. The total number of chips released from the bag increased the total value available to enrich each team. In conflict and negotiation theory, if distributive rules are fair, total value increases (Bazerman & Neale, 1992).

The facilitator came back and explained how unfair rules lead to refusals to bargain (Compa, 2001; Katz & Kochan, 2000). Additionally, the professor noted that I was taking the role of a mediator. This role often led to rejection, sometimes by both sides.

My response during the concluding classroom statement by the professor was visceral and assertive (Alberti & Emmons, 1970). I stood up in the back of the amphitheater and said in a loud voice, Look at all the chips left in the bag! That response came from two sources. The primary one was that I had experienced more than one major conflict of this nature that negatively affected an entire social change effort in a Hospice. It set the organization back in terms of support and referrals. The other source of my response may have been from the emotion of being voted off.

Today, my response might be to join the weaker side quickly. I would inform them exactly what to expect and together decide how best to pursue our emotional, intellectual, and physical goals. This would help them, give me a positive place in the group, increases the balance of power, and increase the opportunity to increase total value too. We can use all our ways of connecting to our self and each other to gain such connections and strength (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997).

The day after this experience, I met with the dean of the school and the facilitator, another student, and an administrative officer. We discussed the exercise along the lines of academic integrity and usefulness. Such considerations I had yet to come to grips with answering or even how to answer them. The best answer was to continue learning, experiencing, and practicing to find the best ways to understand conflict at every level. It was clearly an individual effort in a corporate experience.

Star Power was the just one of many conflict games, in academia, corporate training, and professional life that led me to look beyond any one approach to understanding conflict theory and application in order to understand what seemed lacking or vague in much of it. To me, this learning experience demonstrated how much more there was to understanding the dynamics underlying conflict theory and practice.

The goal of this dissertation, among other things, is to explore how such rules, social norms, and other factors are understandable in light of the five major paradigms of conflict management and how they may indicate that there are many unclaimed chips of human creativity and development left on the table of society. Such unclaimed chips represent an opportunity to increase total value of a group.

## **Unwinnable Games in Cultural Media**

The Kobayashi Maru is a conflict game made famous in movies by the science fiction movie “Star Trek: The Future Begins” (J. J. Abrams, 2009). For those who have not seen this movie, it is important to know that the character Spock programmed this simulation, or game, to be unwinnable by the trainee. The future Captain Kirk, then a trainee at a facility known as The Academy, was successful on his third try in winning the game. However, in order to win, Kirk hacked into Spock’s computer program and changed the decision rules. As this science-fiction thriller goes, Kirk was the only student ever to win this game. The reward for his winning gambit was academic suspension for cheating. Did he cheat? Did he simply take advantage of a weakness in the authority’s program and thereby win by playing at the metalevel? That is the crux of the conflict.

The formal accusation against Kirk was changing the rules so it was possible for him to win. Kirk justified this by saying that the test itself was a cheat because it was programmed to be unwinnable. Because his goal was to win, the rules of the test required changing.

The Kobayashi Maru included the rival goal of winning. Kirk wanted to win. Spock did not want anyone to win. Spock wanted to teach a lesson how leaders reacted in the face of fear and certain destruction. To achieve this effect of fear, Spock had to control the physical characteristics of the interaction between the game and the players. In this game, like Star Power and other conflict games, the goals of the exercise are not clear.

The idea of winning is left for each person to define, but winning is the goal for each, and no clarification is readily available. Role conflict is evident in this case. A

captain cares less regarding a training exercise than a successful mission. If any training manager, like Spock in this case, sets up a game scenario to interfere with the main motivation of another player, conflict seems completely expected. If at any point one team wants what the other wants alone, or makes it impossible for the other to achieve their main goal for any reason, regardless of the rationale, then the goal or goals are rival. Only through sharing the desire to negotiate cooperatively for a common goal, can they achieve success, divide all the chips acceptably without duress, and increase total value.

Perhaps Kirk could have used a different logic in his defense at the tribunal. He might have pointed out how illogical it was for a Vulcan, a race that prided itself on logic and lack of emotion, to program a test designed to elicit an emotional response of fear. He then may have pointed out how he transcended the emotional factor and used his logic and intelligence to do what a great captain would do to complete the mission successfully. Kirk could have easily argued that his emotional desire to complete his mission drove all his intellectual behavior and social interaction.

These examples of conflict games are not meant to be representative of all conflict. They are examples of regular and frequent ways conflict is viewed. Although it was probably the prisoner's dilemma and star power, that gave energy to me to do further research, the ubiquity of conflict, as found in the Star-Trek movie, helped confirm the need for it.

### **Research Questions**

The research questions target responses to my personal experiences and the calls from scholars for making more sense of the field of conflict management or resolution.

Question 1 responds to the call for a cross-disciplinary approach to conflict management. The hypothesis is that the broadness of the field can be addressed by working from the fields of practice and learning where the five major paradigms were birthed. Paradigms applicable on a large scale are game theory, at the global and local economic levels, and communicative action at the national and lower political levels. These are macro paradigms in application. Pondy's (1967) organizational model is applicable to any bureaucracy of any size but is less widely applicable than the first two. It is a meso level. Negotiation theory of Fisher et al. (1991) and the managerial grid of Blake and Mouton (1964) are personal and micro.

1. Can the broadness of the conflict research material be adequately addressed in any one analysis or set of paradigms?
  - a. Hypothesis: Yes, through identifying domains of social conflict: Macro-Meso-Micro levels and comparing paradigms with interdisciplinary applications.

Identifying shared principles of conflict requires a shared definition and the definitions are hypothesized as embedded in the five paradigms. This will show all salient characteristics of conflict and the dynamics or laws by which they interact. Once the characteristics are abstracted from the paradigms, the laws may be considered tautological in the sense that they are self-referent to the paradigm. The reality of how conflict plays out in the observable world is addressed through the methodology of applying the principles to known conflicts and available empirical data.

2. Do the leading paradigms of conflict share a similar set of principles?

- a. Hypothesis: Yes. They share rival goals, power differential, two or more parties, behaviors, and outcomes that are predictable or narrow.
- b. Power differential is the main predictor of conflict outcome.

The differences in paradigms that may exist are the result of how great a range of power differential they engage. Negotiation rarely involves high power differential, for example, because if the differential is too high, the weaker party will not be successful in engaging the stronger party in the process. Game theory is structured so power differentials are more challenging to identify and categorize. The differences are important but more subtle.

- 3. Do the leading paradigms diverge significantly, making comparison impossible?
  - a. Hypothesis: No. Although perfect overlap does not occur, substantive factors remain the same.

Although a bias toward cooperation exists, given certain social conditions of fairness, the bias may have an empirical basis. Game theory certainly may go well beyond the descriptive flavor of many paradigms that cannot be validated and thus show validation for cooperation. Although cooperation may be a bias in the other paradigms, it is demonstrable in game theory.

- 4. Are similarities or differences of the paradigms a result of underlying assumptions?

Hypothesis: Yes, a bias toward cooperation permeates each paradigm.

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

*The game is worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end. Michael Foucault*

Caring people choose their words carefully, with more consideration for what the listeners might hear than for what they want to say. Researchers live in a similar social world, a scholarly community. Tone is important and critical to acceptance. As such, I look for meaning under the words regardless of the denotations. A Chinese proverb says that a wise man hears two words for each one spoken. What this literature review achieves is listening to the message of the authors, all of whom survived major wars like World War II, The Six-Day War in Israel, the Korean War, and the Vietnam Conflict. They lived in a context of atomic bombs, and head-to-head stand-offs, and strategic revolutions between worldviews in places like Cuba, Armenia, and Burma. Campuses in America were occupied by students. Cities were full of riots. Notable dignitaries and politicians were assassinated in broad daylight. The five paradigms reviewed here, come out of that seedbed.

This literature review explores each of the five prominent conflict management paradigms in the context of other contemporary conflict literature. A relevant history of social conflict scholarship addresses central questions that existed historically and still exist today. These include questions surrounding definitions, goals, and the purpose of conflict. What exactly is social conflict? Does conflict serve a valuable social purpose or should all conflict be resolved so everyone can live in peace? Is individual psychology the cause of social conflict? What is the role of power in conflict and what is power? How is power measured? After review of the five paradigms, there is a comparison with

these questions in sight. Chapter four explicitly addresses power differential and adds to this chapter's material as part of the methodology.

### **One Hundred and Fifty Years of Conflict Sociology**

Lewis Coser (1956) and Ralph Dahrendorf (1958) wrote overviews of the history of conflict sociology covering scholarship up to and through the first half of the 20th century. Randall Collins wrote extensively on the pre-eminence of conflict in all fields of scholarship throughout all history and around the world (Collins, 1998). Certain patterns emerged regarding the nature and value of conflict that are important. For example, conflict sociology still falls into two camps: functional and dysfunctional.

These historical contexts serve as a lead up to the era of today's five prevailing paradigms. four of the five prominent paradigms of today began within a decade after Coser's and Dahrendorf's work. Only Axelrod's game theory came later, approximately 24 years after Dahrendorf and Coser. However, the roots of game theory predate both Coser and Dahrendorf by nearly a decade. The roots of game theory started with John Von Neumann (1944) during the time of the first atomic bomb near the end of World War II.

The questions asked in early sociology about conflict, its ubiquity, the questions of function or dysfunction, and, the desire for the understanding it all remain entrenched and are central to this paper. These questions help clarify why various paradigms have emerged since Coser and much of what they share in common.

How can we know if conflict is good or bad? A synthesis in the field of conflict sociology that addresses the function and dysfunction controversy regarding the efficacy

of conflict would be useful according to Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim (2004). This paper looks at the contemporary paradigms to hint at an answer that both are possible. Positive conflict and negative conflict can co-exist. Georg Simmel noted a paradox that unity and order requires conflict just as the natural forces of attraction and repulsion hold the natural universe together (Simmel, 1971). Is he saying that chaos and order, dysfunction and function, are more than perception but the deep way the system of both the natural and the moral order work?

Jonathan Turner notes that Pareto observed that social trends follow a sine curve pattern of social change (Turner, 1986). At certain historical points conflict is felt to be dysfunctional and there is low desire or sentiment for social or political change (Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1995). At other times social sentiment swings in favor of social and political change and conflict is seen as functional. Does such a mood swing indicate that there is both a functional and dysfunctional aspect of conflict based purely on perception? Is a conflict beneficial based just on a matter of whose side, the strong or weak, one is on and how much stronger one is than another?

This paper suggests that conflict is not simply either functional or dysfunctional. There is a continuum of conflict manifestation along a range of power differential. The place along the continuum where conflict occurs may determine the social value of conflict. Bartos and Wehr conceptualize a similar continuum of power differential (Bartos & Wehr, 2002). Power differential is noted as a relative measure in social conflict situations (D. L. Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007). As authoritarian tendencies increase in the social fabric so does power differential. As power differential grows dysfunctional conflict also grows.

Critical social theory (CST) carries the idea of functional conflict of Marx and Weber from the 19<sup>th</sup> century through the 20<sup>th</sup> and into today's scholarship (Klein & Huynh, 2004). CST has gone through its own evolution of understanding the conflict dynamics of capitalist societies. The school's special focus on authoritarianism has become a central theme (Morrow & Brown, 1994). Authoritarian societies have a high degree of social status and education difference because the essence of authoritarianism relates to policing not only group behavior but also the way people think. Often there is a dual educational system. One system is for the elite and another is for everyone else.

CST is explicitly interested in social change, emancipation of the oppressed, and exposure of authoritarianism (Meyer-Emerick, 2005). CST supports conflict as functional when it leads to social development and change by overcoming unnecessary constraints and the freeing of the mind from domination by those of a higher cultural or social status (Klein & Huynh).

CST differs significantly from the school of Talcott Parsons. Parson's structure and functional approach to society dominated academia in the middle 20<sup>th</sup> century and had little place for the value of conflict that would change social structure (Coser, 1956). CST does not downplay the value of conflict to bring positive social change. CST does not support social structures and institutions simply because they exist or can be pragmatic (Turner, 1986). The remaining questions are concerned with how both a structural and functional approach can be useful, co-exist, and still facilitate growth and development. This dissertation uses a systems approach to blend structure, function, and change.

Turner supports the dialectical model as a positive approach to integrating functional and dysfunctional conflict into a new concept (Turner, 1986). A significant difference between CST and Parsons is that Parsons uses function to describe what people do in a stable social structure. CST uses function for what conflict can do to emancipate people from the oppressive and arbitrary authority of a given social structure. In this way, conflict becomes part of a process by which social change and improvements occur.

The principle presented in this paper's approach to conflict modeling is that it is dysfunctional to use a type of conflict behavior necessary to win freedom or equality once freedom or equality is obtained. It is also inhuman to state that conflict behavior is dysfunctional to those who are oppressed and enslaved when conflict related behavior could secure freedom for them. Conflict is seen as functional when it leads to social transformation, liberation, and emancipation (Meyer-Emerick, 2005).

### **Synthesis as Requested by Scholars**

Some of the most well regarded and deeply connected scholars and practitioners in sociology explicitly state there is a need to integrate this field. Peter Coleman in the "Handbook of Conflict Resolution" states that there is much conflict in the field of conflict (P. T. Coleman & Marcus, 2006). Other fundamental questions exist such as, What is conflict? This and other questions require answers to create a foundation for useful analysis.

The lack of a firm definition is part of the reason why there is yet to be a firm systematic understanding of conflict dynamics. Noted scholars such as Lewicki et al.

(1992) stated the field is fragmented. They do not find a basis for synthesis. Jonathan Turner states it needs laws identified (Turner, 1990). Later, his attempt at identifying such laws is reviewed. Morton Deutsch states that an interdisciplinary understanding is needed (Deutsch & Goldman, 2006).

Another call for the work presented in this dissertation comes from the late Louis Pondy.

This model of a pure conflict system obviously needs to be developed in greater detail. It is not clear whether it is 'testable' in any normal sense, although we have already suggested two testable theorems that follow from the model. It would be a mistake to try to test the model in any direct way. The purpose of the model, like any model or theory, is to draw attention to previously unrecognized phenomena and processes, and to change the very way we think about or look at familiar phenomena. (Pondy, 1992, p. 260).

Above, Pondy described a pure conflict system similar to what this dissertation proposes. According to Pondy, such a model will orchestrate conflict with the right parties, right issues or goals, and right ground rules, in order to make conflict functional for the organization. Note in my model herein that the ground rules are different in each power differential area. The parties are clear in the stronger, weaker, or even sides. The issues are right by focusing on the goals. The organization is served by measuring total value increase or decrease.

Kenneth Bailey went beyond the calls for synthesis of Turner, Coleman, Pondy, and Lewicki et al. Bailey calls for the use of systems theory to bring a structural and functional approach that explains how conflict leads to transformation over time (Bailey, 1994; , 2006). Bailey compares the dynamic systems approach to conflict with a person who refers to a dictionary to write books and articles that change the meanings and rules

contained in the dictionary as the articles are accepted into the culture. Thus, there is a systems view to conflict that he states neither Collins nor Giddens (2000) engage in their conflict theories.

Bailey's approach addresses incremental changes in conflict while radical change is not addressed. The synthesis in this paper fits Bailey's description of conflict in most ways yet captures the radical social change. Both approaches are multi-disciplinary. Both describe self-reproduction and incremental change over time, and can accommodate explanations for larger shifts as they occur. The systems approach describes dynamics of change as similar to a steady heat that melts ice to form water then boils the water to form steam. A small flame may bring incremental temperature shifts but, without a pressurized situation, a small flame will not transfer enough energy for a large transition from liquid to gas, just as small conflicts may not lead to large changes (Deutsch, 2006b). Systematic and holistic analyses connect energy and information within a social system leading to changes in relationship between the individual members.

Previous attempts at integration and synthesis in conflict did not imply that the field was completely bound within their integration. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011) note that mapping the scholarly field (Figure 1) must occur prior to paradigm selection and synthesis. My mapping of the field of conflict is the result of formal studies in and about conflict sociology as well as other disciplines such as economics, politics, and law. It is also informal by discussions with practitioners as well as my own practice.

Many of the conceptual maps of the process of conflict contain large numbers of arrows going in many directions with words and symbols like, *resources*, *rebalancing*,

*pluses, minuses, either, and or signs* surrounding everything. Others are more organized but still noted by their own authors to be awkward (Turner, 1990). Coleman (2006) has over 30 bubbles containing factors, and scores of arrows going in every direction and even bending around others. These may be used for generating a computer program to track conflict, which is part of the Coleman's long-term plan. It is critical to note that discussions around rebalancing rarely discuss total value creation or destruction during the rebalancing action.

The presence of so many arrows and factors is partially due to the idea that sociological events are rarely based on any single factor (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Using power differential as a single factor to describe behavior and predict outcomes in the field of conflict is at odds with the idea as stated by Pruitt and Kim. Still, systems scholars, such as Borch (2005), note power as a primary factor in systems evolution. Power is reformulated in terms of communications between sender, receiver, and message. In system theory, communication is reflexive in nature and parties become one system as they create each other. Communication is information flow. Such flow is critical to social development. The hypothesis of this paper is that a similar dynamic relationship between the parties, goals, and outcomes of conflict is explained by power differential. However, the goal-oriented individual may challenge and champion a change in the status quo of a system. Communication is only reflexive within a range of power differential that changes. Still, power differential is the determinative single factor.

From this systems base, the five paradigms are reviewed from their primary texts. Other research related to each paradigm is included as necessary. Few, if any, conflict paradigms are exclusively prominent in their field and efforts to identify them as

prominent may be held in question. Lewicki, et al. (1992) claim that a paradigm is prominent if it has longevity in scholarship, is used in practice, and there is a deep developmental history. Each of these five paradigms has those characteristics.

After the general review, their similarities are brought out in terms of conflict definition and the factors of conflict. Then the contrasts are reviewed. The synthesis itself is based on the similarities and differences and presented in chapter four.

### **Communicative Action of Jürgen Habermas**

Jürgen Habermas is a leading scholar in the Critical Social Theory School (Klein & Huynh, 2004; Meyer-Emerick, 2005; Morrow & Brown, 1994). His work pinpoints human communication as the center of social action, especially in the public sphere and at national levels. Communication encompasses the effort to objectively control resources, reality, and the subjective experience to come to mutual understanding (Klein & Huynh).

Jürgen Habermas defines conflict in the domain of the public sphere as a higher order process outside of parliament, designed to solve conflict in a rational manner between the majority and minority or individual. Habermas's ideal public sphere is not hindered by coercion or strategic action. Conflicts should be resolved by debate or dialogue in this power-free zone, between everyone as equals (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003). This requires a common way to communicate and to facilitate *linguisticization* of situations and status that are otherwise beyond words. The paradigm is normative. Implementation of dialogue across different economic classes and status is the main challenge to its use.

Habermas seeks to restore linguistification to the phenomenological experience of the individual in social life. This means that society recognizes the individual's personal voice and experience. This supports each person's lifeworld so it is not invaded by the larger society. Linguistification refers to using a more commonly understood language for things that are difficult to communicate. Dialogue requires linguistification to open avenues of understanding that help transform relationships and bring about creative solutions.

*Intersubjectivity* is the term Habermas uses to describe the key component of communicative action that leads to understanding. Inter-subjective communication refers to two or more people discussing their phenomenological, or lifeworld experiences. By lifeworld Habermas means the perspectives of the individual that collectively creates social systems but at the same time is threatened with consumption by that same system (Habermas, 1981).

It is in setting up and engaging others in a power-free zone that individuals meet the entrenched powers of society. Entrenched social powers tend to use strategic and instrumental communication to invade or colonize the minds of individuals (Habermas, 1981). In the power-free zone and with the ability to talk about difficult social forces the two meet with a more equal or balanced voice.

Perhaps Habermas is saying that each individual experiences life in society differently. Putting this into words that can convey both the individual experience and feelings requires effort and articulation. This is linguistification. When parties from different groups begin to understand the lifeworld of those in other groups and

individuals, the experience becomes intersubjective. Dialogue and communication has occurred and this is the basis for discussing deeper social relationships meaningfully and productively.

The essence of conflict addressed by Habermas in communicative action is subtle in nature but clear in expression. The subtle nature of the conflict is that the options open to the individual to express personal feelings and unique observations that might lead to change are limited by the power of the dominant culture's use of language, agenda, and media. The culture has people who are representatives or superstars that speak for the culture. These are people of high status. Superstars can be cultural icons or government leaders. The cultural icons are so dominant in the public sphere that minority voices have difficulty being heard. This power is the clear expression of the conflict. It is the strong side making all the noise and the dissonant voice of an individual or group is the weak side that has difficulty finding room for expression. Only a power-free public sphere, where dialogue can occur, is able to balance the voices of the individual groups of the culture regardless of other social factors.

The public sphere is where many manifestations of conflict occur including peace movements, antinuclear movements, women's movements, minorities, psycho-scenes, and religious fundamentalism, to name just a few (Habermas, 1981). Today, social media serve a powerful purpose in the public sphere. The ongoing tension between established and emerging status groups and resultant transformations of society based on competing messages, or lack thereof, is the conflict Habermas addresses.

Habermas theorizes that dialogue that flows from the lifeworld of individuals and interest groups is quieted, overrun, or otherwise colonized by the reification of language in the social norms of market-based status hierarchies and governmental power-mandates. Instead of many voices being heard, the voices of those of lower status are otherwise shut out of the mainstream. Communicative action bases validation on how well laws support the integration of society and are representative of all members. Leaders of social institutions and those who craft laws often fragment society by utilizing strategic rationality and instrumental commands rather than ongoing communication that deepens social connections for everyone (Salter, 1997). This rationality and instrumentality is a source of social power used to dominate and achieve rival goals through established social means.

How does this occur? Leaders from higher status groups influence those of lower status to change their desires by manipulating external situational factors or by changing the internal desires of the other party (Habermas, 1981). Once status groups begin to saturate the social media, they have control over the messages presented. This control supports the interpretation that favors one group's interpretation of history, events, and related desires over minorities. The dominant stories are often repeated and institutionalized. This limits the conversation to that which the status hierarchy, the cultural agents, or the dominant culture machine advocate.

Habermas understands that human communication is hampered or replaced by money and power. This is the transactional component. Money transactions lead to the creation of a social status hierarchy based on physical power and control of resources. Leaders at the top of the money and wealth chain emerge as cultural leaders. The

accumulation of money, status, and power leads to this same group gaining additional social power through government. As this occurs, government tends to reduce and dominate dialogue in the public sphere because laws and mandates replace deeper dialogue that might lead to changes in that same status hierarchy. These leaders make policy decisions. The leaders are created and supported by the status hierarchy. Public comment becomes a perfunctory process. Markets become seed beds of deception (Klein & Huynh, 2004). Grassroots movements are suspect because they come from outside the leadership of the status hierarchy (Hendershott, 2002).

Centralization of power can grow until there is little or no dialogue or inter-subjective communication. The status hierarchy disabled the process of linguistification. People from the weaker and stronger sides stop talking to each other. Communities become gated for the strong side and jails and laborious jobs consume the weaker side when polarization is most high. Cost becomes a barrier to entry to social events and a sign of belonging to those who attend by virtue of their economic success. Thus, economic and political success leads to control of the conversation, which leads to more success. The individual life is, in Habermasian terms, invaded.

This in group-out group structure of success supports a conflict in social relations by supporting domination and authoritarianism (W. Wood, 2000). It reduces communication between people and replaces it with media and policed communications. This control leads to suppression of minority sources that could create any social conflict. Empathy is minimized, and a fundamental attribution error justifies it all. Through the classic use of fundamental attribution error, low status members are categorized as having a personality problem while those in higher status groups are categorized as

having excellent personalities and are worthy of their better situations. Such domination keeps those of low status looking inward for solutions to problems that likely do not exist inside them. It keeps those of higher status looking for solutions and rewards that give them even more advantage because they believe that they merit more. This is a reflexive process with both sides going deeper and deeper into the socially constructed role.

The rival goal that communicative action keeps as central is the battle for the emancipation of the consciousness and individual choice of action to create a better lifeworld (Klein & Huynh, 2004). Individual and interest groups are on one side and an authoritarian social structure is on the other.

Habermas believes the conflicts in modern culture relate more to the quality of life and human rights than the distribution of goods. Conflicts are related to the discussion or negotiation between the individual or group and the social system. He sees a social shift in conflict that is new because modernity is not simply a matter of resource dependence but social influence is a highly sought power. It is about quality of life for everyone. Language and discourse have humanizing and dehumanizing effect in this context (De Matos, 2006).

At this level of conflict, the goal is for individual and sub-group consciousness to be freely expressed and understood. The strong side is society and the weaker side is the individual or sub-group. The goal of communicative action is to facilitate the competition of ideas between the dominant culture and the individual or minority group. The theory is that the lifeworld of the individual and the dominant culture can be decoupled. The cultural system needs to be open to dissonant voices. Communicative

action creates a space for incrementally adjusting or totally revamping the system before it chokes the autonomy out of the lifeworlds that created it.

This theory sets up the conflict with a rival goal of the genuine dialogue leading to human understanding of the other. This other is the weaker side or individual. Habermas's theory transcends socially constructed barriers to communication by setting the ground rules for dialog that allow all voices to be heard. The theory of communicative action presents the public sphere as the forum where outcomes are seen as more optimally made. The dialogue moves away from command-and-control instrumental style and strategic, norm-based, highly rational reasoning. It moves toward the personal communication of minorities and individuals.

The goal is to improve dialogue and, thus, increase mutual understanding. This process creates the possibility for a positive social environment and improvement of the whole. This is similar to Krauss and Morsella's (2006) concept of transcending the individuality of communication and experiencing communication as a collective event. Linguistification supports conversation and discussions between parties more than uncovering facts (Roderick, 1986, p. 10). It is similar to Follett's idea that sociality is not just duty to the other but to the whole of society. We create norms of right as well as follow those same norms (Follett, 1995).

Habermas asserts that part of life and communication are not purpose-driven or means-end orientated. Instead, life and communications are ends in themselves (Habermas, 1988). Groups like America Speaks have reached for this level of communication and been helpful in facilitating a power-free zone through the use of

Audience Response Systems, and a sophisticated demographic tool that brings proportionate representation together for public discussion (Parasie, 2003). The America Speaks process and Audience Response Systems have demonstrated significant changes in opinions after discussions between members of the community who are from different status groups. This dialogue translates into improved outcomes socially and politically. It provides some evidence of the strength of communicative action.

Habermas addresses the possibility that historical progression is not linear. As societies develop toward less authoritarian control centers there are large shifts along the way. Societies cannot be made better from the outside but better societies must be created from the inside (Klein & Huynh, 2004). This represents an implicit goal to lower centralized and authoritarian mechanisms that inversely tend to strengthen the individual lifeworld. The two lines running parallel to the base of the triangle (Figure 2) represent the transitions. A low power differential is possible between the weaker individual or minority group lifeworld and the dominant or mainstream culture. Habermas and the synthesis in Chapter four, agree that a lower power differential is beneficial.

This is central to Habermas's normative ideology. As the conflict moves from old politic to new politic (Habermas, 1981, p. 392) there is often a discontinuation of any line of cumulative conflict because what he calls a silent revolution takes place. It is as if a new world began. The new world was built on conquering the old economic domination. From this new world emerged a more open and inclusive social world with a stronger society. Some societies fail to make the transition successfully and face ruin. Non-linear or dramatic social change occurs according to social transition theory (Avelino &

Rotmans, 2009). Dramatic changes occur as niche or less powerful groups become as powerful as or more powerful than present regime. This is a change in power differential.

The outcome Habermas seeks is an ideal society created through a common understanding shared in a welcoming and meaningful way by all status groups. Often, it is a simple understanding of multiple perspectives that leads to creative option generation and social change.

When I come back to communicative action in the chapter on power differential, the different types of communication represent different power differentials. To command others and have them obey requires high power over them. To communicate strategically in a way that influences others to move without physical force is a powerful technique as well. Influence occurs for many reasons I discuss later. Dialogue creates an awareness and respect that brings all people into the active franchise of a group or nation. No external power needs to be exerted but, instead, the power flows out of the relationship.

### **Organizational Conflict of Louis Pondy**

Lewis Pondy's organizational Conflict Model was described as prevailing by Lewicki et al. (1992). Little has risen to replace it. ProQuest database notes 99 times the article was cited by scholars. Pondy himself (1992) still refers it as classic but, upon 25 years of reflection, found it flawed. It was not flawed in how it described the process of conflict. I was flawed in the way it framed conflict as a problem to be resolved instead of a process to be managed.

In the 1992 article, Pondy described organizations not as cooperative in essence but as conflicted in essence. He experiences relationships that are more in conflict than cooperative. The main piece he thought he was missing in the original article was raw power (p. 257) or the use of coercive force. Pondy considered his first article for 13 years prior to writing it. He furthered considered these views for another 25 years before publishing his reconsideration in 1992. I have considered and lived the ideas herein formally for 16 years but much longer than that personally and professionally.

Pondy came to this new awareness through his experience of running an academic organization for over 20 years. He stated that conflict is not only functional for the organization, it is essential to its very existence (Pondy, 1992, p. 260). Pondy did not propose that his first insights were wrong; they still stand. His vision is more of conflict as an evidence of life and vitality of the organization. Cooperation is little more than a gambit in pursuit of a goal usually employed by those who least want change.

Pondy defines conflict in formal organizations as a dynamic process between two or more individuals in an organization which can be analyzed as a series of episodes (Pondy, 1967, p. 299). This descriptive and process oriented paradigm is focused on helping students and practitioners of conflict management understand what is going on rather than what outcomes or adjustments might be useful for the growth of the organization or parties involved.

Pondy describes conflict in organizations as following a path with five parts that he calls episodes. The same five episodes occur in each of the three organizational structures he identifies. Those structures are bargaining, systems, and bureaucratic

(Pondy, 1967, p. 296). The relationship in each organizational structure determines what behaviors manifest throughout the five stages. The episodes remain the same but the structures and behaviors differ.

Pondy's five stages of conflict—latent, perceived, felt, manifest, and aftermath—are connected. The aftermath of one conflict affects the feelings that form latent stage of the next conflict. Latent conflicts become more intense if the last conflict was not satisfactorily resolved in aftermath (Pondy, 1967, p. 305). These episodes of conflict do not relate to organizational change as much as to organizational stability. Conflict may or may not lead to organizational change.

The three structures each structure processes conflicts differently because the power relationships are different. Bureaucratic structures relate to the superior-subordinate relationship. The focus is on controlling behavior often leading to withdrawal by subordinates. The systems model relates to peers who are positioned laterally and in a functional relationship. Peers analyze problems and distribute limited resources with one another within the organization. Increased or fairer payoffs are sought. The bargaining structure creatively resolves problems while safeguarding the relationship between leaders. Leaders of groups, such as labor and management are involved. The systems approach is distinct from the bargaining approach. There is less information available in the systems structure. Systems tend to sub-optimize rather than create and distribute as happens in bargaining.

Pondy's components of conflict are included in the definition of each of the episodes or the five stages. The context component is captured in the latency stage.

Perception and meaning of the conflict are in the perceived stage. Emotional impact is described in the felt stage that considers functional tensions between members of the organization that may or may not, lead to hostile feelings. According to Pondy, conflict is a dynamic interaction that follows a predictable pattern and emerges from conflict potentials. What exactly are these potentials?

Goal divergence is a major potential factor in the latent stage, especially in the systems model (Barton, 1981). Management can set incentives to bring the entire system into a single goal orientation, thus reducing negative effects of a conflict. Goals related to resource scarcity exist at the bargaining level (Pondy, 1967). Authorities attempting to control subordinates who resist them defines conflict at the bureaucratic level (p. 314). Problems of coordination lead to conflict over control and resources exist at the systems level (p. 317).

Role conflict consists of both real and perceived conflicts. Real conflict means the goals are rival and there is no way to defuse perceived conflict by understanding semantic differences (Pondy, 1967, p. 301). Semantic differences are misperceptions and resolved through interpersonal communications. If any party perceives an action or inaction to be a conflict, it is for that party (p. 303). Conflict can be part of an executive plan to control an organization leading to a need for the executive to resolve contrived conflicts or to create team cohesion through a common enemy strategy (p. 310).

Conflict behavior follows one of three choices. Comply or withdrawal from the relationship in the bureaucracy model. Secure needed payoffs for engaging the conflict or compromise somehow in the systems model. Resolve the conflict while keeping the

relationship intact in bargaining (p. 309). Later, these behaviors are linked to outcomes relate to the increase or decrease of the total value the goal of the conflict parties.

In Pondy's schemata, power differential runs on a continuum from highest to lowest in this order: bureaucratic, systems, and bargaining. The bureaucratic model typically represents vertical relationships of authority. The bureaucratic model relies on rules and policy to define the vertical relationships. The systems model is in a context of mixed powers and competitive negotiation over scarce resources. This is especially true in the budgeting process. Goal clarification is central to productive outcomes. System conflict is much like a competitive and impersonal marketplace in that the parties are using all means, short of physical altercation, to achieve desired ends. Therefore outcomes are expected to vary based on the perceived interdependence and friendliness of the parties (Pondy, 1966). Outcomes would not necessarily be positive or negative. The bargaining model uses the face-to-face of horizontal relationships of a strategic or competitive nature. The bargaining model has power at a relatively equal level and has little variance from other bargaining theory (Kochan, Huber, & Cummings, 1975).

### **Game Theory of Robert Axelrod**

Game theory and Robert Axelrod were cited in scholarly literature over 350 times in 2006 (Axelrod, p. xv). The trend of citations in scholarly literature since the first publication in 1984 has steadily increased. This lifts Axelrod's game theory to a level of predominance. The wide range of practitioner use in fields of economics, warfare, governance (Gupta, 2001), sociology (Pinker, 2002), ethics (Wilson, 1999), and psychology (Axelrod, 1984) attests to this paradigm's influence.

Axelrod defines conflict as a problem of cooperation. He asks and answers, Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? For Axelrod, conflict is moderated by a set of external social conditions or payoffs. These cultural dynamics promote cooperation or non-cooperation. Non-cooperation is also called defection. In some ways game theory leverages reward and punishment similar to behavioral psychology because there is only reward and punishment and no way for programs to learn (Skinner, 1953).

Axelrod's search for cooperation applies to individuals, groups, and especially nations because nations exist in a state of anarchy relative to each other (Axelrod, 1984; Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Axelrod is seeking answers to how each person or group pursuing only their own welfare as egoists, might find mutual-cooperation beneficial. The game he uses in his version of game theory is the iterated prisoner's dilemma.

A payoff grid or matrix determines scoring. It is described below (Table 1). Only two players play together at any one time and they play up to 200 rounds or iterations together. The game is simple. There are only two choices for each player: cooperation and defection. Each informs the other of their choice simultaneously. If both cooperate, each party scores three points. This is mutual cooperation. If both defect, each party scores one point. This is mutual defection. If one cooperates and the other defects, the uncooperative party wins, five points and the cooperative party wins zero points. This is called the sucker's payoff and temptation, respectively because the cooperative sucker wins nothing and the temptation-taking defector wins five points (Axelrod, 1984, p. 10). Mutual cooperation leads to good scores for both although cooperation in the sucker's

payoff yields nothing. Defection provides either a minimal one point or an outstanding five points.

In the end, Axelrod identifies two direct control variables and one moderating variable leading to cooperation in society. The controls are the number of future interactions between the parties involved and the payoff matrices. If the value of defection when others cooperate is too high, cooperation cannot be sustained. A moderating variable of payoffs in society is akin to freedom of association whereby each player can eventually choose the most cooperative programs to engage. By engaging cooperative programs, each does better. Programs that defected often could win the most points by limiting interactions of more cooperative programs with each other, thus reducing the cooperative programs score to zero more often than not.

Table 1: *Payoffs in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma*

<b>Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix</b>		
My Payoffs If :	I Cooperate	I Defect
and You Cooperate	3	5
and You Defect	0	1

A restatement of the problem of cooperation, in the context of game theory, is, How is possible to get people to work together cooperatively instead of sometimes cheating or continually trying to get the best of others through constant cheating? Similar to the Star Power game, Axelrod asks how sides can successfully create and claim the most value possible. The challenge is that the most is perceived as more than others. Claiming all the chips, or each scoring highly, requires cooperating often. Game theory exposes how individual entities with shared resources interact unilaterally based on payoffs and probabilities and how the interactions affect individual outcomes within the social system.

Game theory may mimic social life. It also parallels social populations over many generations when many tournaments are played by the same parties. The differences between the game and life are that the game is transparent in every way. Social life is not. The game has fairly enforced rules agreed upon by all participants. Social life often does not. The goal to score as highly as possible is clear. There are no teams allowed which is significantly different from much of the world. Each side is a team of one. Axelrod posits that individuals can begin to act cooperatively within teams when teams form. All his motivation is extrinsic based on the payoffs. There is no empathy, feeling, or long-term commitment.

Another difference between game theory and human social life was that none of the player-programs could change its programming mid-stream. The programs could not grow, learn, or develop. The programs do not experience identification based trust with other players but only the calculated based trust of a machine (Lewicki, 2006).

This is the crux of the dilemma is the decision to cooperate when there is risk and uncertainty about what the other player will do that makes a significant difference to the player. Players that find others who are mutually cooperative win the highest totals after many rounds. Axelrod's game used computer programs that were meant to be analogous to people. The programs each cooperated or defected in different circumstances, depending on the actions of the other computer program. Those that cooperated all the time did poorly. Those that defected a great deal also did poorly. Programs that favored cooperation but were not taken advantage of did best.

Some programs defected only after the other program defected. Some defected first, to test the others. Once a defection happened, it often led to mutual uncooperativeness from that point onward. This was a downward spiral that led to poor outcomes for both players overall during their round. Each scored just one point. Therefore, winning the five points by being uncooperative led to the other program defecting on the next moves. Then a string of mutual defections occurred yielding just one point each. Over six turns the defecting program wins this string of points:  $5+1+1+1+1+1+1$ . This is a 10 point score. However, the other program wins only  $0+1+1+1+1+1$  or 5 points. Mutual cooperation yields  $3+3+3+3+3+3$  for a total of 18 points. The choices are to defect first and get the chance for at least 10 points while your opponent gets 5 or cooperate first and get the chance for either 5 or 18 points. The best choice to make depends on the other players and finding cooperators rather than defectors. Other scenarios are possible as Dawkins discovered.

For example, to get bragging rights a program might cooperate for the first five interactions and defect on the last. Consider the six move score of  $3+3+3+3+3+5=20$ .

The executives referenced at the beginning of this paper did exactly this type of sequence. They defected, or gave into temptation, on the last move in the game.

Defection on a last move is known as the problem of the last move. When any two people may never meet again, such as a mechanic in a town far from the driver's town whose car she is fixing, there is a temptation to take advantage of the situation by both parties. A bad check may be passed by the driver. Bad parts may be put in by the mechanic. Both behaviors are forms of last move defection.

The result for the executives was angry uncooperative feelings by the suckers who earned only 16 points. This decision could have led to a downward spiral of uncooperativeness for years to come in the organization. Perhaps it did. We do not know the outcome or effectiveness of the counseling that Dawkins reports was provided to the suckers. Regardless, this type of action is the seedbed of feuds and revolutions. Retribution awaits defectors.

The difference between earning six, 10, 16, 20, or any other number of points is the risk of playing nice with new programs. The value of 18 points is the reward for playing nice with new programs or friends when they play nice too by cooperating. Programs that started cooperatively or nice and changed when the other side defected did best in total scores after playing with many other programs. Cooperative programs suffered as little loss as possible and found many more cooperative opportunities that yielded scores of three points each.

Some programs defected on the first move. They tried to make up for defecting first if the other program defected in retaliation or just as a matter of course. Making up

means that defecting programs began to cooperate when the other program did not cooperate anymore. After all, the cooperative side had just been played for a sucker. It had its own point loss to recover. Some programs went right back to cooperating when the program that first defected cooperated on subsequent moves. Mutual cooperation began again. Other programs never cooperated again after a defection occurred. How does this create a cooperative environment among egoists?

A program named Tit-for-Tat did the very best of all and provided some answers to explain cooperative environments. Tit-for-Tat is a simple program that starts out cooperating and then does whatever the other program does on the previous move. It traded defection for defection and cooperation for cooperation. Tit-for-Tat won five of the six simulated tournaments without ever beating another program one on one. Since it never defected first, Tit-for-Tat could never get an advantage in points on another program. It never used the temptation to defect when the other programs cooperated. Its individual scores were always equal or less than its partners, but Tit-for-Tat's total score was higher than all others.

In the evolutionary simulations, the programs played the entire tournament repeatedly with each new tournament representing a new generation. After each tournament, a proportional representation of each program was entered in the new round based on past success. This process determined how many of each program survived into the next evolution or round of the tournament. A program that scored an average of 300 points would have half the number of its own kind in the population compared with programs that scored 600 points. Eventually, the more cooperative and forgiving

programs were more dominant. Aggressive programs that depended on suckers for success did well until there were no suckers left.

The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a highly competitive game and those who cooperate all the time regardless of what others do, have poorer outcomes compared with those who cooperate only when others do and defect when others defect. The highest scores are obtained, on average, with cooperating, or being nice. The worst scores overall come with defecting or being mean. The rule is, do not let others take advantage of your playing nice.

Though game theory is a rational choice model of conflict, Axelrod points out those choices do not have to be deliberate; the players need not be rational, or even conscious. Instead players may be simply acting out various norms, standard procedures (p. 18), or biological imperatives. Even bacteria, with no formal brains, react in a way of cooperation or and defection by releasing toxins that destroy other bacteria. This is simply conditioned response to the chemical environment. Bacteria move toward, away from, or adapt.

The differences between real social life and the simulation of game theory are not sufficient to make it unrealistic. The mathematically contrived payoffs simulate genuine conflicts of interest. Payoffs in real world situations are rarely so stable or closely framed. Still, game theory enhances the usefulness for understanding a population based on deviations from this ideal situation. All the uncertainty seems to make cooperation less likely.

Perhaps the best example of a measurement parallel to the sucker's payoff is the Corruption Index (Covey & Link, 2012, p. 32). This index measures the perception of corruption because corruption is usually hidden except for the artifacts that remain, like sudden extreme wealth (Mueller, 2003). When the index indicates high corruption, there is a withdrawal of support that leads to poor economic outcomes. The assumption is that people, like these computer programs, find their own way to slow things down and get back at *meanies* by defecting or withdrawal. This is the mutual defection downward spiral.

The challenge with Axelrod is not the integrity of the program or data underlying his analysis. The social challenge is the payoff matrices being set to support cooperation. Rarely are parties in high power differential situations facing the same payoffs in relative terms to weaker parties. Wealthier parties are inconvenienced although poorer sides may lose life sustaining resources (Sorkin, 2010). As a stark contrast, consider the difference in payoffs for those with nuclear arms compared to refugees (Ben-Dak, 1976). One side may give up a rocket but the other side will give up food. Overall, game theory is only loosely related to what is considered real life according to Robert Aumann (Aumann, 1997). Aumann notes in dozens of ways how game theory's value is more what it does than what it is.

Pure mathematics of the payoffs tends to assure the outcomes sought. It was not obvious when Axelrod designed the tournament. Even after a full review and publication of the results of the tournament, others re-entered but were again unsuccessful in defeating Tit-for-Tat. Pure cooperative moves average three points per move. The payoffs for defectors averaged only two  $((5+1+0)/3=2)$ . Thus, eliciting and sustaining

cooperation as often as possible yields higher average results. Changes in the payoff matrix will change the players' results and this will change behavioral programming. When the temptation payoff is raised higher and others payoffs remain the same, defection rather than cooperation becomes the winning strategy.

The lesson learned through Axelrod's work is that if the payoffs for cooperation and defection are set to reward mutual cooperation and the number of future interactions between players is sufficiently high, then cooperation and forgiveness can become norms of life in society. The only other factor necessary is that all the programs interact with every other program in the same way. In addition, too many uncooperative programs means that they will be able to take advantage of any cooperative program. It is possible to have a stable society of non-cooperative players, each scoring low but higher than those which show any cooperation.

How does cooperation develop between egoists? Axelrod's lesson is to punish defection reciprocal uncooperativeness until defection turns to cooperativeness. This works only if the rule of society, that is the payoff matrices, can be adjusted to support cooperative behavior. These adjustments include lowering the payoff for defection when others cooperate and increasing the number of future interactions between parties. The ability for cooperative programs to find each other is critical. If there are few cooperative players surrounded by players that start by defecting, the cooperative players will suffer large point losses while the mean players win regularly.

## **Management Grid of Blake and Mouton**

The managerial grid is used in over 1200 organizations in 40 nations. The authors are referred to as grandmasters (Blake, Carlson, McKee, Sorensen, & Yaeger, 2000, p. 59) in the field of organizational change. Lewicki et al. (1992) call the managerial grid classic. The authors also credit the grid with stopping flavor of the day approaches to conflict management and leadership training (Blake et al., 2000). Lewicki, et al. (1992) note it as prominent.

The underlying theory of the managerial is that there are five different approaches to others engaged by managers. The grid theory has received the attention of empirical researchers. That approach is a blend of the manager's concern for production and concern for others. The five approaches are collaboration, accommodation, competition, contending, and avoiding. It is an assumption that collaborators are the best managers for nearly all organizations in all situations. This assumption has not received empirical support one way or the other.

The managerial grid defines conflict as a managerial choice between two competing goals (Blake & Mouton, 1964). One goal is productivity. The other goal is the desires of others or workers. This goal or purpose of an organization is a universal characteristic in all organizations (p. 5). The resultant choice is labeled as the manager's conflict handling style. The list of the five handling styles is below. Those who are bosses and those who are bossed are also assumed to be universal characters of organizations (p. 7).


The goal of the manager is output and productivity. This may not be the goal of the others. The goal of the others can be at cross purposes with the company (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 6). The rival goal to production is that of positive relationships. Specifically, positive relationships include accommodation and collaboration. Of all the paradigms synthesized, the managerial grid is the most psychological and least social in its conceptual format. The manager is explicitly an individual with his or her own management style. The other with goals is a social generalized other with no clear personal characteristics but an implied subordinate relationship with the manager.

The tests validating the existence of the five conflict handling modes are psychometric in nature. The tests validate the psychological rather than social bases of conflict. Those tests include the Rahim Organizational Conflict Index or ROCI (Rahim, 1983) , the Two Dimensional Model (Cosier & Ruble, 1981), Measurement of Difference Exercise MODE (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974), and the Dutch test for conflict handling as reviewed by De Dreu (De Dreu, Eevers, Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001). 37 years passed (1964-2001) before scholars developed a valid instrument to measure, and confirm the existence of all five dimensions as placed on the managerial grid (Figure 4).

Even with a relatively clear measure of these styles, there is not strong empirical evidence that collaboration is the most productive style of the five. There are several reasons that collaboration is hard to validate empirically. It is hard to measure how conflict is handled over any given period. Productivity is easier to measure but there are many variables that could explain variations in productivity. A manager's default conflict handling mode also tends to vary under pressure (Barton, 1981). Without direct

validation, collaboration is still the preferred conflict handling style of organizational development professionals as evidenced by the use of the managerial grid training.

The role of the other in this paradigm is dependent solely upon the attitude of the manager. The manager can view the relationship to others as negatively dependent, mutually dependent, or positively dependent (Pruitt & Kim). See also Figure 4. These three relationships define how the power of the manager's unilateral choice is applied in the managerial grid.



*Figure 4:* Three levels of power use in the managerial grid base on relationship.

The conflict handling style of the manager is visible in the choice of the manager as described using two axes that are both numbered from one to nine (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 10) (Figure 4). 1 on the y-axis represents low concern for the other person and

nine represents a high concern for the other. 1 on the x-axis represents a low concern for productivity and nine represents a high concern for productivity. 1,1 is avoiding or a low concern for both 9,9 represents collaborating or a high concern for both factors. 5,5 is a moderate concern for both factors also called compromise. 9,1 is accommodating or a high concern for others and low concern for productivity. 1,9 is contending or a high concern for productivity but a low concern for others.

These five styles represent the manager's unilateral choice. The model assumes that there is a default position of each manager based on personality. It is further assumed that in normal situations the manager's preferred style is consistent and the manager's preferred style may change as the intensity of the situation changes.

If the manager cares more for the goal of the other than the goal of productivity, it seems an unsustainable situation because managers are agents of executives and owners who demand productivity. This is why the results of the managerial grid testing are compared with measures of industrial managerial successes such as advancement. The controversy of the validity of this model, even though prominent, remains due to the dual goal framework and its struggle to provide a clear line of sight between collaboration and declared business outcomes. A significant scholarly statement of a further challenge is, "Aside from the problems trying to determine what the underlying dimensions are, there has also been questions concerning whether or not a two dimensional model is appropriate" (Carlin, 1991, p. 60). The goal of the dissertation is not to delve into a clear break between the desired results of Blake and Mouton and the empirical research. The paradigm has great prominence, deep theoretical history, and much continued testing. Thus, it is respected and included with appropriate comment.

Structuring of a group of others with goals so possibly at odds with its leader is challenging as a concept. This is what the two dimensional model captures and this may be a manager's dilemma. There are always varying degrees of interest in doing other things or doing things in other ways among the most tight knit teams. The central approach to power use in the managerial grid as presented above is described in the chapter on power differential. This includes definitions of the five positions and the implications for synthesis.

### **Interest-Based Bargaining of Fisher and Ury**

The paradigm for interest-based bargaining is a close race between Walton and McKersie's four sub-processes and Fisher et al. (1991) interest-based bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965). The main concepts of interest-based bargaining were established by Walton and McKersie and are further traceable to Mary Parker Follett negotiation (1918) who championed these same principles of shared power, community building, and negotiation.

Walton and McKersie's work is based on four sub-processes of negotiation that lead to successful bargaining. The four processes in bargaining deal with how the *pie* is distributed, how the pie is enlarged, how to structure the attitudes of the parties, and how to build a sense of positive relationship. The fourth process, building a positive relationship, is especially useful for relationships within organizations. Fisher and Ury adopted and transformed these to be more transactional than relational.

Fisher and Ury are chosen as the paradigm leader due to the Harvard Project On Negotiation center that highlights the scholarship of the program, the many attorneys and

practitioners (Menkel-Meadow, 1983) who use their principled negotiation, its popularity in general culture through the book *Getting to Yes*, and the relative ease of understanding this approach for general application. Interest-based bargaining is the term heard frequently in the world of conflict, mediators, third party negotiators, and labor relations and for the sake of this synthesis, the approaches are so similar that the results would not be affected with either program.

Fisher et al. (1991) define conflict as the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fears, not positions. In other words, conflict is a matter of goals, resources and uncertainties that are central to the negotiation. Stated positions often represent the needs of under-lying goals but are not the goals themselves. Positions are means whereas goals are ends. Goals have meanings that have implications. For example, Israel is more concerned with security of its nation than Iran's nuclear capability. However, they see the two as connected and indivisible. Israel's goal is security. Iran's goal may simply be more electrical power not generated from oil. Security may not be the only concern for Israel and but it is a major risk area. Electricity may not be Iran's only goal but it is also central.

Goals can be the actual goal or just a perceived goal that represents something related but different. Positions, as Fisher et al. discuss, are a means that one side or the other clings to in order to achieve a different, but often related, end. Because there may be many ways to achieve a goal, Fisher et al. distinguish between the desired end of a negotiation and the means to those ends embedded in the positions.

Positions are demands or requirements each side has that they perceive will get them what they really want although not being what they really want. Interests are the desires underlying all other expressions but often hide the interests or are even counter-productive to the achievement of the interests. Interest based bargaining is a process model and part of the process is to sort out real and perceived goals so the options for achieving those goals become clearer. The goal of interest-based bargaining is for each party to obtain the best possible outcome.

The four processes of interest-based bargaining are: separating the people from the problem, focus on interests, invent options, and use objective criteria (Fisher et al., 1991, p. 17). Develop positive relations because they are important to interest-based bargaining but not central. A sense of good faith is a crucial aspect of positive relations. Increasing the size of the pie is part of inventing options but the distribution of increase is left for other settlement criteria related to the objectivity requirement.

No coercive power is present in this model. If there is a large power difference between parties then people simply will not bargain unless they must. It is impossible to gain a place at the bargaining table given if a high a power differential exists. Principled negotiation's four steps put the focus of the conflict behavior on the problem rather than people; it searches for deeper human interests, opens the door for creative problem solving, and uses objective criteria.

Win-win solutions are the best possible outcome. This is similar to what game theory would look like if both sides knew for sure that both sides would cooperate. However, as in game theory, the other side may be bluffing or not cooperative. If this is

discovered, the negotiation is not going to end with a win-win situation or any agreed upon solution at all. If a win-win solution cannot be obtained the authors suggest the parties seek the best alternatives available known as the BATNA or best alternative to a negotiated settlement. This means that each party has viable options when win-win is not possible.

The concepts of equal power, transformed relationships, international peace making, and even the end of war are part of the use of interest-based bargaining's use and related work at the Harvard Project on Negotiation. Positive open dialogue in Habermas, bargaining in Pondy's schemata, mutual cooperation in game theory, and collaboration in the managerial grid are closely related to the ideas promoted by interest-based bargaining. More of the similarities of the paradigm's power-difference implications are discussed in chapter four.

### **Defining social conflict.**

No single definition of conflict is universally accepted (Bartos & Wehr, 2002). Students often find defining conflict bewildering (PeaceStudentsOnline, 2008). Jonathan Turner provides a narrow definition in his textbook (Turner, 1986) which states that conflict is an effort by one person or group to attempt to thwart the objectives of others in pursuit of a rival goal.

The broad definition of conflict extends to the feelings and thoughts of one group toward another, even if such feelings do not result in outward or social action but remain simply as an experience (P. Coleman, 2003). Recently, researchers Pruitt and Kim stated,

“In short, the term conflict has become so broadly applied that it is in danger of losing its status as a singular concept” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, p. 7).

Coleman’s background in psychology and Turner’s sociology background could explain the differences in perspective and choice between using a sociological or psychological definition. A broad social-psychological definition is not suitable for this paper because each paradigm deals with social actors in social situations. Certainly, the psychological experience may lead to social conflict but that is not captured to any great extent in the paradigms except Pondy. Pondy clearly supports the narrow definition of conflict used here in this later paper critiquing his now famous paradigm (Pondy, 1992).

Though conflict may be latent or manifest, each paradigm exists to deal with how conflict manifests surrounding a goal in a specific social context. Is collaboration conflict? Is competition or coercion conflict? How is process different from outcome in defining conflict? Each paradigm deals with observable social interaction. By limiting the definition to social action, we keep true to the dyadic social conflict and delimit it to the five paradigms.

The narrow definition of conflict is used in the paradigms and can be stated as, “Direct and overt interaction between parties in which the actions of each party are directed at inhibiting their adversary’s attainment of *only* its goals” (Pondy, 1967, p. 299; Turner, 1986, p. 179). I added the word *only* to mean that only one side attains the goal but it would be acceptable if both parties created a greater goal to share. The word *only* allows collaboration to be included in conflict as all parties seek a fair outcome for all. If

only were not added, win-win and collaborative outcomes may be defined out of the paradigms that support them.

The requirements for social conflict are then three: rival goals, outward action, and parties. This is the core and context of each paradigm. Goals relate to tangible or intangible resources. Actions are demonstrations of power. These goals, actions, and people exist in a social context. There are outcomes from each conflict. Structuring these five factors is the purpose of the synthetic model. Power differential is the independent variable. Outcomes are a dependent variable.

### **Goals of conflict.**

Rival goals include resources, things, people, places, intellectual property, life-partners, market share, commodities, jobs, careers, leadership, and anything else that cannot be divided or shared in some way. Resources is a term often used as a in conflict literature to denote things that give one party an advantage or improvement in quality of life not readily accessible by the have nots. Locke and Latham note that the desire to obtain goals and resources is central to the human condition (Locke & Latham, 1990). Albert Bandura's work demonstrates that goals are central to human existence (Bandura, 2001).

Each paradigm includes rival goals. For Habermas, the rival goal is having an influential voice in the community versus invasion by the status hierarchy. The dominating voice drowns out individual and out-group sources of consciousness. Pondy is clear that there are rival goals beyond mere semantic differences or goal conflict. One example he gives is the organizational budget. Game theory shows rival goals in the

context of scoring as highly as possible. Since the context of game theory is the egoist or individual and the payoff matrix allows for the possibility of extreme individual payoffs compared to the mutual cooperation, the rival goal fits with Axelrod's theoretical research. The managerial grid positions rival goals inside the manager's attitude that are perceived as between corporate production goals and others' goals. Fisher and Ury use the term interests instead of goals. The semantic difference helps negotiators remember to look below positions to the outcomes or goals those on the other side of the bargaining table really want. Their process is to cut through semantic differences of positional bargaining and see if there is a settlement zone where goals are compatible.

Pondy and Fisher et al. (1991) both address the need to look deeper into any conflict to assess if stated goals are actually incompatible. Habermas addresses the process for understanding the lifeworld needs of others and helping individuals understand their own needs by transcending the prevailing social structure.

Pondy states that even the simple effort to acknowledge rival goals has a cost. It often exacerbates conflict. The benefit is that goals are often found not to be rival after the communication process. Goals perceived as rival require clarification for parties seeking positive conflict management relationships (Rouhana & Fiske, 1995).

A fair process, as well as outcome, is an important goal. Process is a description of the way power is used, channeled, and moderated in a society relative to the outcome of fairness. Mediators, governments, rules, social norms, and other efforts are usually established by history, dominant parties, or third parties. Third parties include oversight boards, to lessen the tension of conflicts and smooth the processes for managing conflict.

However, these same entities can cause conflict, support a status quo of oppression, or simply be unwelcome in conflicts that are not perceived as ripe for engagement (Lukes, 1974). The process of managing conflict is present in the conflict synthesis through the three social contexts marked by the two horizontal lines that divide the triangle and represent social transition (Figure 2).

How often are goals themselves in conflict? Humans want many things that are rival at once. For example, consumers have to decide between price and elegance (Lanran & Janiszewski, 2009). Goal conflict is often part of social conflict. It is clear in the managerial grid and dealt with in that context as the productivity goal v. others goals. If goals are in conflict, then the goal priority may become the super-ordinate goal.

### **Parties in Conflict.**

Is personality a factor that is more important than power differential in determining the outcome of conflict? Due to the psychological rather than sociological nature of much conflict thought, and the fact that parties exist in each paradigm, we now turn to this subject. None of the major paradigms saw fit to make distinctions regarding differences in the psychology of parties. I propose that psychology is a factor equally present on both sides of conflict and is therefore insignificant to overall outcomes. Goal attainment is a central focus of conflict and goal attainment researchers Edwin Locke and Gary Latham present the observation that goals and self-efficacy mediate goal attainment more than personality traits (Ediwin A. Locke & Latham, 2006). Self-perception and self-efficacy is considered further through the lens of the movie “Run Lola Run” (Foss, Waters, & Armanda, 2007) .

Lola generated a continuum of power differential in her conflict. The social system does remain the same but the power she generated through her different roles and self-efficacy runs along a power continuum from high power differential to low power differential. Foss et al. (Foss et al. Foss, Waters, & Armanda, 2007) use the movie “Run Lola Run” as an example to demonstrate that playing a victim role, a “supplicant” role, or a dominate role personality with respect to an unchanging society changes outcomes. The result is that although personality does not make a large difference, self-assertion does even more.

In the film, the heroine, Lola, played the same scene three times. Each time the action, the social structure, and the outcomes changed. She acted differently depending on her view of herself and experience different outcomes in her lifeworld. As she became more dominant or assertive, the world changed and her goal-related outcomes improved.

It is reasonable to consider personality as a factor that is part of power in general rather than a special category. Agentic and assertive people will use more power to achieve a goal over others. That is a tautology. Communal personalities will be more collaborative and balance power for mutual gain. Personalities also change from communal to agentic as wealth, and the options and challenges it brings, increases (Fischer & Torgler, 2006). Each person has some characteristics of both. It is my assumption that personality and goals are so widely different that they do not have a direct impact on conflict in general. The paradigms tend to support this by lack of specific mention.

These studies indicate, but do not prove, that power is related to social setting as well as to individual orientations. Power is part of the social structure, and personality functions as a role taken within that structure. This also hints of contingency theory that power differential may have other effects, such as motivating one person or group more than others.

### **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY**

Psyche's journey to immortality went through pain of rejection from her native, natural, daily living experience. Somehow, she did not fit, even with her family. Cast out of the daily grind of pain, her family left her on a mountain to die. From there, the god Eros took her further up to his abode and as events unfolded, she needed to make a journey. She sorted seeds of all kinds according to their type. She gathered gold from the fire breathing rams of the pasture little by little. The reader sees her journey to get the refreshing water from the river that runs to the depths of being, the river Styx. Finally, psyche obtains the ointment of immortality and dies under its transcendent power. Her former life is over and the god's decide what was to become of her (Bridges, 1991). Her journey is analogous to human development.

In that sense, psyche, myths, and all such patterns create metatheory. They form a bigger picture of steps all people tend to take as they move toward a similar goal. In the next two chapters, I present a similar big-picture pattern to understand the progressions and patterns in the five paradigms. The process of synthesis offers an approach that at once embraces and patterns conflict.

## **Metatheory, Frameworks, Maps**

Explanatory metatheory provides an analysis of the social and hierarchical structure of decision rules used for creation of each model as evidenced by their internal authoritarian structure (Morrow & Brown, 1994, pp. 10 - 30). This process identifies the dynamics of conflict between the parties and the effects of the social structure. An explanatory approach to metatheory draws “attention to the relations of power that shape social reality” (Morrow & Brown, 1994, p. 59).

The hypothesis questions regarding power differential are compatible with the characteristics of explanatory metatheory. I have not focused on a theory of goals, process, communication, negotiation, politics, or leadership. Those areas are not significantly different or logically distinctive among the prominent conflict paradigms. Power differential is hypothesized as distinct, central, logical, and explanatory to the process and outcomes of the prominent paradigms. The explanatory approach is power-centric. The literature regarding power claims is detailed in the chapter following this one. In a logical sense, the chapter on power is an extension of this methodology chapter.

As a meta-theoretical construct, the synthesis attempts to capture principles that are explanatory and embedded in each of the underlying theories. The synthesis is not *new* theory. It is not meant to replace the theories it examines. Instead, it is meant to provide a more overarching approach to explaining and understanding each theory and to inform the design of conflict management systems. Thus, the resulting synthesis becomes a starting point for parties viewing conflicts and the original theory for that area can also be used in a more effective manner.

This work does not seek a mega-process or multiple ways to emancipate or increase the power of oppressed people. It does not delve into the factors that make conflicts intractable. The goal is to synthesize the dynamics of the paradigms in a way that provides a suitable map for understanding conflict. This delimits the metatheoretical approach in a way that is manageable and focused on power differential alone. This delimitation is practical because it allows a concise review. It is sufficient because of its logical and explanatory power.

According to management researchers Rousseau, Manning, and Denyer (2008), explanatory synthesis and management research is characterized by a goal to discern patterns in published research, create new or better theory, and deliver a pragmatic result from diverse methodological fields. The synthesis is used to make each theory more effective when applied individually by providing a starting point that views power relations and desired outcomes within power relationships.

### **Theory and Frames**

Peter Coleman's (2004) work in metaframeworks describes the theoretical domains from which conflict management paradigms emerge. The frameworks represent ways that scholars make sense of and organize their cognitive world. The five frameworks Coleman identifies (p. 202) are used here to show how each of the paradigms and the synthesis fit (Table 2).

Game theory fits the frame of realism by its claim to be concerned with the objective world (Corriveau, 2012). The human relations framework understands interdependence and induces cooperation in the same way the managerial grid promotes

collaboration and Fisher et al. promote positive relations. Pondy's organizational theory is descriptive of a process and has a systematic component. That component is the way the aftermath of a conflict fits with the latent stage of the next conflict. It is more descriptive than systematic. The postmodern framework supports the ideas of social construction and transforming collective identities toward a consciousness decoupled from the business machine (Callero, 2003). Construction and transformation are both addressed by Habermas in the theory of communicative action.

It is challenging to describe Habermas as postmodern. He comments on and analyzes postmodern ideology explicitly to continue the project of modernity and rationality. Following the conflict framework descriptions laid out by Peter Coleman, (P. Coleman, 2003), Habermas fits the postmodern framework because this deals specifically with "communication, knowledge construction, and consciousness" (P. Coleman, 2003, p. 217).

Table 2. *Types, Disciplines, Frameworks, of Paradigms and Synthesis*

Paradigms by Type, Discipline, Framework, and Scale						
Paradigms	Habermas' Communicative Action	Pondy's Organizational conflict	Axelrod's Game Theory	Blake and Mouton's Managerial Grid	Ury and Fisher's Interest Based Bargaining	Synthesis
Qualities						
Type	Normative	Descriptive	Realism	Normative	Normative	Descriptive with Normative implications
Discipline	Politics	Organizational	Economics	Leadership	Negotiation	Sociology
Framework	Post-Modern	Systems	Realism	Human Relations	Human Relations	Systems
Social Scale	Larger	Medium	Larger or small	Individual	Small or Medium	All

The systems framework is the best descriptor for the synthesis presented in the next chapter. Systems frameworks deal with the many initiatives and drivers, analytic understandings, and serve to manage complex adaptive systems. The Pathology framework is not present in any of the paradigms. Pathology targets malignant social processes and hidden agendas. The focus on power in the synthesis has an implied theme that is embedded in Habermas and game theory. These two, to a lesser degree than their primary frame, show conflict as invasion of the lifeworld, and compared to biological entities that devour others, respectively. Thus, they are only partially pathological. Conflict can be destructive or constructive depending on the level of power differential. The malignancy or life-giving system perspective also links back to the functional-dysfunctional view of social conflict itself and is part of living systems theory (Schwab, Gray-Ice, & Prentice, 2000).

## **Theory Types and Disciplines**

Descriptive, normative, and realist types of theory are integrated in the synthesis. The normative theories are communicative action, the managerial grid, and interest-based bargaining. Normative models promote conflict by stating the authors' belief of how conflict should be. Pondy's organizational theory is descriptive because it describes conflict as episodes and claims that conflict happens this way. Game theory is a realist type of theory. Game theory measures observations and interactions that build into theory. In that sense, it is also descriptive of the process and reality of conflict. The combination of these three types of theory provides the synthesis with wider explanatory power.

The synthesis itself is descriptive with normative implications. As will be described in the next chapter, conflict can be described in terms of parties attempting to obtain a goal that both cannot have at the same time. Since the total value of the pie is affected, normative statements follow in that a state of lower power differential is right, ethical, and healthy because in both process and outcome life is enhanced.

The synthesis integrates five disciplines. Politics relates to communicative action. Organizational science relates to Pondy. Economics is from game theory. Leadership is the focus of the managerial grid. Interest-based bargaining is pure negotiation theory. These social theories integrate from the conflict aspect.

This set of theories covers social organizations from the largest size of nation, organizations within and among nations, leaders of organizations and subordinates, and

interactions of negotiation between leaders and between any person able to enter and negotiate an agreement (Figure 1). Game theory claims universal application.

This arrangement of frameworks, disciplines, types, and scale provides a wide coverage of social structures from national, intra-group, agency based, inter-personal, and international. There is no claim of complete coverage of all society but the arrangement is representative of the paradigms central to the hypothesis. This wide scope of social structures, relative size, disciplines, and types of theory suggests robust results.

### **Maps and Legends**

After framing the synthesis as systematic, descriptive with normative overtones, and sociological in nature, how it functions as a map is now discussed. The five predominant theories act as individual maps of conflict in limited domains. Each covers a different facet of social conflict. The effort to synthesize these in the next chapter is to allow a quick assessment of conflict situations regardless of which paradigm is eventually engaged to deal with detail. The benefit sought by the synthesis is that the limitations of any one paradigm, as outlined in the introductory chapter, can be avoided by an assessment of power differential.

Abrams and Hogg (D. Abrams & Hogg, 2004) refer to theory and metatheory as a travel guide. The synthesis may function like a legend on these five theoretical maps or a stand-alone general framework. As a legend, it attempts to decode some of the otherwise difficult to understand dynamics. It is not easy to say why scholars feel the need for integration of conflict theory or seek universal principles except for the idea that the major conflict maps, or theories, seem to defy integration and interpretation on some

level. I pursued this integration intuitively and to achieve of a sense of completeness in both research methodology and practice. There was no legend on any of the conceptual conflict maps. Other scholars, already mentioned, attempted to construct one to serve the purpose of interpretation.

The goals of conflict are like cities or destinations on each of the paradigm's map. This indicates where the parties are trying to get to with clarity. The parties heading toward the goal can be included on such a map. This provides insight into affected parties and party relationships like troop movements on a military map. Power differential may be displayed as a map displays proportional distances to each goal or city. This addresses the question of who is advantaged in achieving or maintaining their position relative to the goal. Individual parties can place themselves on the map to determine how advantaged to disadvantaged a position is relative to goal attainment. The total value of the goal can be estimated to understand if the goal, or destination on such a map, is becoming more beautiful and attractive or less as both sides behave their ways relative to it. Is the pie shrinking, staying the same, or enlarging?

A legend can also identify social factors that help reach the goal more quickly or slowly. Details regarding this are in the next chapter on power differential. Insufficient physical power and vital resources in the high power differential zone makes reaching goals difficult. Insufficient knowledge or disinformation in the medium power differential zone makes goal attainment a challenge. A poor emotional connection in the low power differential zone can create challenges in the last miles of the journey toward the goal. Social structures are analogous to typography on a map and the synthesis captures it with power differential. However, there is a clear type of zone effect. The

further from the goal, the greater the power differential, and the rougher the terrain. With this type of legend, a party in conflict can understand the forces at play. The complete set of criteria, abstracted and compared between paradigms, is found in Table 3.

Table 3. *Paradigms Compared.*

Paradigm/ Framework- Type	Differences			Similarities	
	Scale/ Domain	Parties/ Rules	Rival Goals	Power- Differential	Actions-----Outcomes
Communicative Action/ Post Modern Normative	Macro/ National	Group/ Individual using group norms. Individual leaders	Social Inclusion Lifeworld vs. status hierarchy	1. Low 2. Medium 3. High	1. Dialogue-----Positive 2. Strategic----- Varied 3. Instrumental-----Negative
Pondy/ Human Relations Descriptive	Meso/ Organizational	Group/ Corporate Policy Individual leaders	Resources Respect Varied	1. Low 2. Medium 3. High	1. Bargaining -----Positive 2. Systems-----Varied 3. Bureaucratic-----Negative
Game Theory/ Economics Realism	Universal/ Economic	Individual/ Payoffs Matrix and # of iterations	Highest possible value to individual	1. Low 2. Medium 3. High	1. Both cooperate-----Positive 2. One side defects-----Varied 3. Both sides defect---Negative
Managerial Grid/ Human Relations Normative	Meso/ Leadership	Individual/ Unilateral Choice of Manager	Production Goal vs. "other goal"	1. Low 2. Medium 3. High	1. Collaboration-----Positive 2. Compromise-----Varied 3. Content-----Negative
Interest-based Bargaining/ Human Relations Normative	Micro/ Negotiation	All parties/ Mutual Satisfaction or "sufficient consensus"	Maximum Payoff	1. Low 2. Medium 3. High	1. Win-win-----Positive 2. Bluff----- Varied 3. BATNA-----No Negative

The text-based table above serves as the basis for the graphical legend on how to read each map of conflict. The maps are the individual theories. A map is never the same as the area it describes (Aguayo, 2004). Yet, a clear legend on the map adds value. Only by actually involvement in a specific conflict or a practice of conflict management, does the usefulness of the synthetic model fully appear. The legend provided here is not from the perspective or experience of a specific conflict. The synthesis is an answer to the challenges the scholars in the field itself who identified the need and struggled with

marginal success to address that need. It is meant to add a lens for experiencing or perceiving conflicts effectively regardless of their social context.

When these theories, or maps, are super-imposed on one another and viewed as one the pattern emerges. Table 2 shows how all the conflicts have goals but nearly all goals are different. There is no pattern in the goals. All the conflicts have more than one party but those parties can be of any characteristic on both the strong and weak side. There is no pattern in the parties. All the conflicts have power differentials. Power differential does, with modest abstraction, follow a clear pattern in each paradigm. Outcomes related to power differential are present.

E. O. Wilson (1999) commented that maps were desperately needed to address problems found in different social domains. Conflict sociology has many maps but the legends are missing or are all different. Understanding theoretical maps and having a legend for interpretation supports active and productive engagement. Each conflict is unique in terms of parties, goals, and social context. Understanding power differential as a common element is an improvement.

### **Social Laws**

Theory sometimes rises to the level of a law. Laws are disprovable while theory is useful for explanation and may not be disprovable. Once laws are identified, as Turner (1990) and Durkheim (van Poppel & Day, 1996) claimed to do, they form a specific point of reference used for prediction of outcomes. Laws in social sciences are social facts. Social facts are causal factors coming from group dynamics that lead to individual

behaviors. The two authors above claim to explain and predict individual choice because of social structure related to power.

Turner identified three laws of power use (Turner, 1990, p. 51). These manifest in social conflict in environments of inequality. Inequality is the same as power differential. If any human wants a resource, only extreme power deprivation will bring extreme disparity. Medium power differential leads to medium deprivation and low power differential leads to low disparity.

Turner's laws state that the level of power used to maintain social advantage is positively related to the potential of social violence. Overt conflict occurs as the disruption of the weaker or subordinate's living standard increases. Violence in conflict positively and exponentially relates to the use of power by the stronger side.

Turner's idea of power use is different from the concept of power differential. Turner is tautological because the concept of power use is linked to violence potential even though violence is power use. Power use is conflict because it stops others from reaching goals and that is the definition of power use in conflict. Power differential has the ability to suggest not only violent negative outcomes but also value-creating or positive outcomes. Turner does not suggest the effect on resources that rebalancing brings. For example, if a rebalance happens under a high power use, does or does it not affect the total value of the resource, or pie? Turner, Marx, Blau and Homans, and Weber all use rebalancing as if it were a simple re-distribution of a fixed amount of assets. The five prevailing paradigms suggest that there is more than power used to secure a fixed or

limited amount of resources and less used to secure a growing amount of assets. There are increases and decreases in the assets themselves to consider.

The five prominent paradigms show movement in two directions across a continuum of power differential and outcomes although Turner shows just one. Turner also uses only a macro view of conflict because his synthesis used Marx, Weber, and Homans's and Blau's theories as subjects. These are exclusively macro theories.

This conflict in the paradigms is supported in a fundamental way by Hegelian dialectics (Hegel, 1929). Hegel's dialectic embraces conflict and does not require resolution or redistribution of a fixed amount. Hegel points to synthesis as a resolution between two sides, anti-thesis and thesis, as strong and weak, respectively. Hegel's synthesis is a creative understanding of a forward moving dynamic of thesis and anti-thesis moving toward synthesis. Hegel works with the idea of conflict in context of a dominant existing understanding or truth. According to Hegel's concept, as long as learning exists a synthesis of new knowledge will exist. Piaget calls this process accommodation or assimilation as new information comes into conflict with existing information. New information is the weaker side of the structure introduced in the first chapter of this paper. Conflict, as a form or pattern of learning and assimilation continues in this way as Hegel's dialectic is a learning theory and a social theory. Hegel's dialectic does not sufficiently address, What type of power differential does a new idea need to overcome to reach synthesis?

Marx focused on a power differential of all or nothing (Marx, 1992). The sides Marx delineated were labor and capital and the relationship was eternal class warfare

with no synthesis. Marx formally attempted to separate his ideas from Hegel by, simply stated, applying the dialectic to the material rather than spiritual world. Hegel based his concepts on religious terms and concepts. For Marx, the material organization of economics created a dialectic between the capitalist order of status hierarchy and an ultimate power differential of the highest level between ownership and labor. Marx claimed capitalism forever alienated humanity from itself, from its spiritual roots of value, and from meaning in work or other economic forms of expression. Just a short time after Marx, Max Weber began to publish and he re-framed conflicts into struggles for power beyond simply ownership and labor. Weber noted gradations of power, coercive, legitimate, and charismatic.

Hegel's dialectic is a deductive-inductive tension where the dominant parties establish themselves as the deductive law or major premise. All inductive insights not aligned with the major premise form the thesis. The triangle portion of Figure 2, a generic pattern of the synthesis of the paradigms, is similar to Hegel's anti-thesis-thesis concept. The major premise, or anti-thesis, is the strong side. The unaligned thesis is the weak side. The goal is legitimacy in scholarship.

Terms like dominant, paradigm, rules and laws are each on the side of absolute truth of Hegel's pattern. This is the strong right side on this dissertation's model. Such dominance naturally opposes terms like, idea, creative, integrative, and open dialogue which represents a non-absolute nature that is open to new information. As Valerie Bentz and Jeremy Shapiro (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998) observe, scholarship includes both learning on the weak side and protecting on the dominant side.

This tension is understandable as both the prevailing paradigm and newer and challenging ideas can be wholly or partially wrong or incomplete (Kuhn, 1962). This tension forms a constant motion and social interaction between these two. Dominant and weaker parties in conflict are both more easily engaged when we remember that all observations are partial interpretations of events (D. M. Rousseau, Manning, & Denyer, 2008). In such cases, the value of conflict appears to act as a driver in the process of learning.

The value of a metatheory approach is that the process itself is explained in detail. Metatheory provides a social explanation of what drives the conflict and how the two sides interact over time. Dominant and weaker powers are rival powers that can lead to a productive synthesis that is developmentally sound depending on how the two engage in conflict. The metatheory will show how higher power differentials tend to make the process less effective and lower power differentials tend to improve outcomes of the process. Nowhere is it suggested that low power differential, once achieved, will remain low after productive gains. Conflict can escalate and power differentials can occur again for many reasons.

One reason for not supporting the concept of a perpetual peace is disruptive technology. The typewriter was once a balance between the older brands of Brother and Remington. Suddenly, the idea of a word process overthrows both of these. The social equilibrium between these two manufacturers and marketers was created by market acceptance and use. It seemed to be a perpetual peace. Then, the word processor disturbed it. The entire concept of writing text was transformed. This represents a new conflict on a higher level. Such possibilities are ever before us. A social state where

everything is stable may not exist on the level of everyday experience. I suggest accepting conflict and managing it well.

The key concept to the development of this synthesis is power differential. A thorough understanding of how this concept is developed for application to the paradigms and structuring the framework for their integration is essential. The usefulness of the preceding chapter on methodology requires a methodology for measuring power in order to actualize the comparison and structure for theoretical purposes. I turn to this task now.

#### **CHAPTER FOUR: POWER DIFFERENTIAL**

The core concept to developing a synthetic framework is power differential. The types of power differential that exist in this methodology are common to human experience. Romeo and Juliet loved each other dearly yet family conflicts required them devise ways to meet that sometimes strained their positive relationship. They collaborated closely and positively with a low power differential to overcome conflicts around and between them. The couple ran from the physical and economic threats of warring noble families. These threats were uses of high power differential. The plots of the guards and the leaders to stop these youths from loving each other were extensive. The ruling prince decrees death to members of the families if more fighting continues. Romeo and Juliet secretly and tie the personal bond of marriage. Next, there is the physical fighting between two Juliet's cousin and Romeo's friend. Romeo attempts to intervene but his friend is killed. Romeo then kills Juliet's cousin. The Prince of the kingdom declares Romeo banished permanently. Juliet and a friar hatch the ill-fated plan to reunite Romeo

and Juliet by faking Juliet's death. This is strategic use of social norms and is an example of medium power differential.

In this iconic play, there is physical coercion, social power exerted by parents, and intense collaboration of Romeo and Juliet. It is typical of thrillers and romance movies to have three clearly identifiable types of conflicts: coercive, strategic, and deeply interpersonal. Each of these is present in the play. The parties shuffle but the goal remains the same.

In this chapter, essential literature on the subject of social power provides context. Next, I identify the social power references in the paradigms and organize them using a method of ideal-types as conceptualized by Max Weber. The method for doing this is abstraction. The first step is to identify specific social powers in each paradigm. The next step is to place the identified social powers into the hierarchy of ideal-types. This abstraction of power differentials allows for a meaningful comparison and grouping of the powers. Jürgen Habermas's paradigm provides an example. His social power of dialogue in a power-free zone is a low power differential ideal-type. Romeo and Juliet used dialogue to engage each other. Habermas's instrumental communication, or command power, is placed in the high power differential ideal-type. The parents used this type of power as well as the family member who was killed. Commands assume a higher power of one over another than dialogue. Habermas's strategic communication uses social norms to reach a goal. Romeo and Juliet's marriage was just this strategy.

The three ideal-types of power differential, high, medium, and low, form an ordinal scale. High power differential is physically coercive. It exists when one party has the

unilateral access to guns and armaments and uses them at will on parties in conflict with them who are denied both voice and access to similar weapons. Those with coercive power are said to be on the stronger side. High power differential includes constructive coercion. Shutting off vital resources such as food, water, air, heat, or other necessities in order to control a situation is a high power differential as well.

Medium power differential is the most challenging area to engage. In this area, both sides agree, more or less, to a process of social engagement. This brings some level of legitimacy. The power differential is one of information, expertise, cultural access, social status, and all things mental, including mathematics, statistics, logic, and technology for processing these. Medium power differential exists when one side has a significant advantage to access to information, expertise, professionals, media, influence makers, rule makers, rule enforcers, and the financial resources that accumulate with such connections.

An example of medium ideal-type power is bluffing in interest-based bargaining. Only the bluffing side knows the full extent of its assets and liabilities. The bluffing is strategic to support the goals of just the bluffing party. The other side may never know a bluff has occurred and thus relies on false and biased information. Consider how useful a bluff may be when made by a multi-national company negotiating with a fledgling technology company with limited experience or financial depth.

It is in the midlevel of power differential where many social justice determinations come to bear. Most familiar to social justice is the concept of social contract. A contractual agreement solidifies society with a sense of security. That security can be in

person, in property, in economics, and due process. In the modern world or the paradigms and conflict theory, issues of equality are central. The owner of a business is usually considered legally superior to others involved in the business. Economic disparities tend to grow exponentially over time for successful families who become like royalty. Royalty status allows for privileged education and undue positive attribution that in turn leads to even greater wealth accumulation. Other unfair rules might impede social equality. These could include: the in-ability the opportunity to marry whom one chooses regardless of gender or race, the in-ability to pursue an education so de-skilling of jobs has less long-term impact, laws to expose smaller entities to predatory legislative efforts of larger entities, laws with disparate social impact, and decreasing transparency of social information to all but a few.

An ideal-type low power differential exists when both sides have relatively equal physical and informational support, fair rules that are fairly enforced and a positive emotional attitude among sides. Ideal-type lower power is present during successful and usually high level negotiations.

Using ideal-types of power differential make integration of the five paradigms possible. Empirical research that parallels these ideal-types is presented in this chapter to provide support for the synthesis. A typology of conflict based on the three ideal-types is also presented in this chapter. The purpose of the typology is to identify conflict escalation in terms of power differential and the segment of society involved.

## **Social Power**

Power as a social concept has a long history in literature. The Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict ("Power, social and political theories of", 2008) provides an overview of social power. Including Marx and Weber, there are also themes on power manifestations in the works of Talcott Parsons, C. W. Mills, Steven Lukes, Robert Dahl, Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault, and Michael Mann. French and Raven and Mary Parker Follett are well-regarded scholars in this area.

Social power is not a physical object or energy like electricity. Instead, it is an influence on emotions, decisions, and aspirations of individuals. This influence can be conscious or unconsciously weighted. It can influence individuals to move ahead or stay where they are, or retreat relative to a goal.

The sources of social power are rules, norms, language, symbolic interaction, and interaction rituals are four major sources. These sources create the context of social life and govern the way people interact. Enforcement of rules is one way that power manifests and influences individual behavior. Sometimes it changes individual behavior 'en masse'. Social power is any non-naturally existing power that exerts influence on the ability of any individual or group to achieve a goal. The influence may be constraining or motivating. Rhetoric, argument, persuasion, and media are attempts to influence norms and rules through a process of internalization. Symbolic interaction is a method of reinforcement that strengthens the effect of norms in an individual member of any group. Sheldon Stryker (2008) calls the institutionalization of symbolic interaction "structural symbolic interaction".

Symbolic interaction forms a powerful framework upon people that is difficult to transcend. Not all groups share the same symbolic framework and this creates identity differences between classes, status, and party. Culture and symbolic interaction are related.

Randal Collins explains a type of symbolic interaction known as an interaction ritual (Collins, 1998). The interaction ritual involves four simple and highly influential steps. First, a group of people look at an object or hear an idea. Secondly, each person feels a similar and strong feeling to that idea or thing. Thirdly, each person is aware that the others are feeling the same thing. Fourthly, this bonds people in a way that is passionate and powerful. Collins notes that ritual participants will sacrifice themselves for each other due to bonds formed by the ritual. This is an example of the way social interaction exerts power on individuals. Individuals become bound to each other and against those who are against the feelings the group shares.

The culture of a society is enforced, or reinforced, on the individuals through physical coercion, the influence of norms, or a combination of these two. Those totally identified with the culture have positive regard for one another. Physical coercion often starts with spanking little children, though I am totally opposed to this, corporal punishment, jails, denial of job opportunities based on past crimes, border guards, and military actions.

In the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mary Parker Follett (1995) wrote about power as power over and power with. She states that people exercise power with other people when they influence others toward outcomes using normative relations. Follett states that

power over is the ability to force others to act in a way they do not want to act. It is coercive by definition. Both power over and power with are usually present in some measure. In voluntary associations, power-with is dominant. Between groups, there is power-over that is often dominant. Power over and power with are central to high and medium power differential, respectively.

French and Raven (1960) note five types of power that flow along a continuum ranging from power over to power with. Coercive and reward power are at the high power over end of their continuum. Legitimate and expert powers are sources of power that although not coercive, are a source of widely recognized power. This is a middle level comparatively. The social norms add extra ability to get others to do things they may not want to do otherwise. Referent power is a power with others based predominantly on personal respect. French and Raven's continuum can be measured by the amount of deep personal respect the parties have for each other. Coercive is low respect. Referent is high personal respect. Moderate levels of respect entail respecting people as objects or things in a system and relating to each other that way.

Coleman (P. Coleman, 2006) points out that a component of power is environmental. Environmental power is power bestowed, formally or informally, by social structures, institutions, norms, and language. How social structure can influence the way goals are pursued has been partially addressed. However, the term *authority* refers to any of the environmental social forces that are externally applied. Experts have authority because by designation as experts. Police and military have authority over others because they are empowered by the existing government to use force to insure compliance with all laws. According to Robin Stryker (2007) the effects of law in non-

dictatorial societies can be positive, negative, or neither. Legal efforts to insure both equal standing in law have and continue to be central in an on-going battle between parties in the process and pursuit of rival goals.

Socially constructed power figures prominently as the power source used by parties in conflict. Socially constructed power is the deep structure that runs beneath visible actions. It is like a motor that powers a vehicle. That deep structure is rarely absent. It is less present in situations of anarchy, as game theory demonstrates, and ever present in situations of dictatorship. Dictators are the opposite of anarchy. Anarchy is sometimes recognized as the political relationship status of nations today (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). The leaders of nations decide to associate cooperatively or uncooperatively for many reasons related to payoffs. Eventually norms are created and established that tend to guide these relationships. A change in the norms means a change in the relationship and possible change in power differential. Change occurs through conflict behavior.

**Extreme effects of social power differential: False consciousness.**

The concept of false consciousness relates to frustrating the goals of weaker parties by leveraging a high power differential advantage in order to overwhelm and break down a weaker party so they have no will to challenge for any rival goal. This breaking down can cause people to seek asylum in denial also known a state of false consciousness. False consciousness is a state denial towards objective and valid evidence that contradicts the views that a person holds and the stories they tell themselves about why they are content or feel secure about a situation. Usually those situations clearly dehumanize them (Meyer-Emerick, 2005).

Boris Kabanoff (1991) provides a clear example of how those in control of physical and vital resources justify inequity of distribution by controlling the attributes and meanings related to how the resource and value is created. It is also true, but beyond the scope of this paper, to show that those who are the controlling parties may also experience a false consciousness of a different nature. The controlling party's false consciousness internalizes the beliefs and values with rationalizations that support domination. Both the dominated and dominator are in denial of a negative human situation.

When the goals of a weaker party are routinely frustrated through coercion, it is likely that this weaker party will become hopeless. Giving up on goal achievement and giving in to the desires of dominators often happens (Seligman, 1990). Hopelessness is a negative outcome. This is the negative dynamic of the use of coercive power.

The three power levels in the ideal type power differential are physical and resource, rational, informational and legitimate, and mutual benefit and creative are often at work simultaneously. Powerful leaders, using a high level of coercive physical and resource power, influence weaker parties who convince themselves that what the leader says is true. Weaker parties may feel whatever agreement is reached is for their benefit too even though the agreement is tremendously one sided. Others, in the same group, may decide to work together without that leader. These begin to compete with the leader as an opposing party or team. Still others might break away and do something completely different, perhaps more assertive, than all others and serve as an alternate group. A more assertive weaker party could bring some kind of new approach altogether.

In the high power differential zone, this is known as class warfare according to Marxian theory. According to Weber, it is a struggle for power. Weber is more in the middle range of power differential. In the low power differential area, it is a struggle for bargaining advantage. Only the Marxian concept truly applies in terms of false consciousness.

three power levels exist in each paradigm. These range between higher and lower uses of power. Each paradigm addresses a higher coercive power differential, a middle range of power differential that is highly calculated, and a lower range of power used to connect parties more positively.

Control over another requires power over the other. If one person controls another, the two have a high power differential. When there is no power over, with, or between others, there is anarchy. There is a wide range of social power levels between these two. Max Weber addressed this with his ideal-types of social power.

### **Ideal-types of Social Power in the Paradigms**

Social power has proven difficult for conflict scholars to measure yet power is proclaimed as central to conflict (P. T. Coleman, 2006; Pruitt & Kim, 2004). The use of ideal-type to define and identify power differential levels effectively addresses the measurement problem at the conceptual level. Ideal-types were introduced by Max Weber (1993). Weber's ideal-type approach has been used in conflict literature to identify "analytically separable forms" (Angstrom, 2001, pp. 103-104) of conflict behavior. The ideal-type has been used to differentiate between normative powers of a

state and the civilian power with the three ideal-types similar to those used here (De Zutter, 2010).

The combination of the power differentials in the paradigms and the idea-types is in the table below (Table 4). Abstracted from the paradigms, the following ideal-types share similar power differentials dynamics:

1. High power differential is exercising power over others. This includes instrumental power to command others, bureaucratically superior-subordinate relationships, defection leading to downward spirals in reciprocation, contending with and avoiding of others, and refusal to bargain.
2. Medium power differential is exercising power with others. This includes strategic playing of social norms, systematically calculated interaction, defecting on others when you can get away with it, competing with subordinates, and bluffing during open discussions.
3. Low power differential activities are exercising power with another and actions of creating outcomes. These include understanding dialogue, bargaining, mutual cooperation, collaborating with and accommodating subordinates, and creating win-win outcomes.

Table 4. *Power Manifestation Ranked by Ideal-Type Power Differential.*

## A Brief Overview of Power Manifestations in the Paradigms

Paradigms	Power Manifestation		
	Low differential	Medium differential	High differential
Habermas: Communicative Action	Dialogue for Understanding	Strategic Communication	Instrumental Communication
Louis Pondy: Organizational	Bargaining choices	System transactions	Bureaucratic Mandates
Robert Axelrod: Game Theory	Mutual Cooperation	Temptation / Sucker's Payoff	Mutual Defection
Blake & Mouton: Managerial Grid	Collaborate & Accommodate	Compromise	Contention & Avoidance
Ury and Fisher: Interest bargaining	Win-Win	Bluff & negotiation technique	Break off negotiation BATNA

Ideal-types differentiate between the types of power used in social conflicts.

Weber's ideal-types emphasized certain aspects of social conditions and ignored others to define a type as ideal. In social settings there are rarely, if ever, pure types. Usually, there are many types of power involved in any social action. Emphasizing just one aspect of power to create an ideal-type is a conceptual technique that allows for targeted analysis. Ideal-type power is therefore a sanitized, or idealized, form of power. Just as gold must be separated from other minerals to be pure and useful, so social powers must be separated from others with which they are usually found to be understood in a social context.

Conflict power manifests in behaviors that follow from three qualitatively different sources. Weber used ideal-types to describe power in social terms of class, status, and party. Power is used in this analysis to describe interactions between any class, status group, or party in an effort to achieve a goal directly or to gain power to achieve a goal.

Marx focused on class, capital owner class or labor class, as the source of all social conflict. For Marx, there was perpetual war between two relatively inflexible classes. Weber viewed social conflict as a struggle for power. Those powers were legitimate domination, control of physical resources, and charismatic and status based powers. The concept of this power designation is to present power as an identifiable, thus observable phenomenon. The ideal-type allows a more refined comparison of power than just between labor and capital as Marx used.

Each paradigm notes three levels or types of power and presents a pattern of power that flows from directive, to highly calculated, to relational. Physical power, information and cognitive power, and emotional power are the three observable actions used as ideal-types for describing social power in the paradigms.

The paradigms each contain the same three power-levels but abstraction is needed to make the power differentials sufficiently generic of synthesis. For example, Habermas's instrumental communication is not necessarily and explicitly connected with dictators, authoritarian control, or coercion. However, compared to the other three powers, it fit the same hierarchical pattern of the other paradigms. Habermas's strategic communication is not necessarily associated with a competitive environment ruled by legitimate rules but it is a clear fit in context of his two other modes of communication.

Dialogue is not just a clear and close relationship in an egalitarian environment. Dialogue occurs in a power-free zone as Habermas indicates. A power-free zone inhabited by equals with no unilateral authority over others in that zone. This same relative level of abstraction fits with the other paradigms under consideration (Table 4).

The “Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict” has three levels noted as physical coercion, economic influence, and political support (“Power, social and political theories of”, 2008). The ideal-types defined for this dissertation are not significantly different from those but are taken directly from the paradigms in the sense that all five paradigms have three levels of differential with parallel outcomes.

Power is available in the areas of access to physical and vital resources, access to valid and useful information, and ability to engage in emotionally related relationships. The hierarchy of engagement socially, from higher to midlevel, to lower power differential, follows physical coercive power, mentally agreed upon legitimate power, and emotionally positive interactions, respectively. Avelino and Rotmans (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009) use a similar hierarchy and note that all the powers are present at most all times but in differing amounts. Not all the powers may be as obvious to an outside observer but may still be the central power.

Other scholars and practitioners note three power levels that parallel the high, medium, and low differential, respectively. Blaine Lee (1998) notes coercive power based on fear, utility power based on fairness, and principled centered power based on honor. James and Marguerite Craig (1979/1973) address domination power, manipulation

and persuasion, and working with others to accomplish things they cannot do alone. The Craigs' hierarchy matches the ideal-types found in the paradigms.

Social power is a function of the passion and determination of an individual or group as moderated by the social norms. High status is bestowed upon those who succeed in a sector of a social environment. There is wide variability when it comes to individual passion and ability. This was covered in the description of the parties involved in conflict. The individual is held as a constant in this ideal-power type analysis. Holding that individuals are often equally passionate about achieving the goal, it is the socially determined rules that often make the rest of the difference in how much focus on rival goals exists and the value added to the goal in pursuit of that goal or pie.

Social rules and their fair enforcement affect individuals and outcomes. A weaker party may or may not have agreed to rules initiated by the most powerful or even a majority of the population. Often, the more powerful can manipulate physical resources and information for their advantage through strategic action and playing the system. An example of this is the US penal system rules that tend to disproportionately incarcerate the poorest citizens of minority backgrounds (Western, 2006). Those with felony convictions are ruled out of the running for high-level management positions. The weaker party's education may be less empowering due to rules that tend to reward success and perpetuate socially created status hierarchies. Inner-city schools in the USA are examples of educational disparities based solely on social rules. Those rules include tax rules that support elite public schools in gated-communities. The dissertation does not address changing specific rules. The focus here is on knowing that in the middle level of power-difference rules exist, and that these rules must be understood if improvements are to be

made. Attributions of media and cultural norms create additional obstacles to gaining more power for weaker group in hegemonic societies even in societies that are moderately free and open. This context forms the dynamic of many social conflicts.

**Sport: A unique and ideal form of social conflict.**

Sporting games are a unique and ideal-type of social interaction. I know of nowhere else that such relationships exist except in sports. The rules of the game are clear and agreed upon by all players. The goals of all players are well defined. Generally, the rules are fairly enforced. Everyone knows who is on which team. Teams are equally passionate and capable. Surprising victories happen. There are winners and losers but today's losers often become tomorrow's winners. This social environment creates a powerful outcome. That outcome is improvement in the sport on nearly every level. Records are broken. Players are safer. Technology improves. Physical conditioning improves. Still, there are individual differences in the top players and teams.

Some differences are between players in terms of physical conditioning. Some teams and owners have much more money with which to work. Other power differentiators are emotional engagement in the form of what, in the west, is called heart or spirit. Superstars appear at random and in unpredictable patterns. The rules and their fair enforcement is the control variable. The outcome of the goal or, in this case sport as a whole, is the dependent variable that improves as the game or event is engaged over time.

Most, if not all cultures, genders, ages, orientations, religions, and personalities love sports. The Olympics appears to be supported by all genders, cultures, and ages.

Sports is being used and refined as a tool for social change around the world at this time (Lyras & Welty Peachey, 2011).

What is important related to ideal-types of power is that sports are mostly a mid-level ideal-type of power differential but there is little playing the system because the rules and their enforcement are transparent to both players and observers. Competitive sport has a high level of emotional connection based upon respect between teams but it does not directly reach a win-win ideal-type of low power differential. It comes close. It is not possible for both teams to win at the same time. Societies are rarely constructed so fairly, regardless of the goal. Such construction could be in the future.

The ideal example of sports can be marred in the same way that social environments can be marred. Abuses of power ruin the experience for players, fans, and the sport itself. If unchecked, abuses of the rules may have as negative an impact on a culture as it does in sports.

An example of improper use of physical power use that would ruin a sport, if left unchecked, was the attack on Nancy Kerrigan by a family member of her competitor in the Olympic skating competition. Nancy's leg so severely she could not skate to compete (Courtney, 2011). Some social environments threaten competitive groups with similar types of physical abuse. It was a common conception that judges in skating competitions from certain nations displayed a bias against skaters from competitive nations by ranking these skaters lower than if they judged them without bias.

This type of bias is a problem for the sport. If there was no way to change the bias, interest in doing the best possible could be reduced.

The use of steroids and other performance enhancing drugs in secret gave was a strategic effort that provided an unfair advantage to the athletes that used steroids. It also threatened the quality of sports from a systematic perspective. As I propose in the following ideal-types, Kerrigan's attack was a use of high power differential and if acceptable socially would ruin the quality of skating as a sport. The use of performance enhancing drugs is a threat to the sport not from high power differential but, if tolerated, would be a medium power differential because it would be systematically unfair to those who did not realize or did not have access to such drugs.

**Ideal-type and high power differential: Rights.**

The ideal-type high power differential is physically based and coercive. The central focus of such conflict is human rights. Human rights violations require the use of force to subdue people who would otherwise powerfully resist (Bartoli & Psimopoulos, 2006). This level is represented in scholarly literature by Follett's power over (Follett, 1995) and French and Raven's coercive power (French & Raven, 1960). French and Raven's reward power can be coercive when such rewards are necessary or vital for life such as rewarding a slave or laborer with water if the slave works well but withholding all water if the master deems the slave's work unsatisfactory. Nearly all, if not all, human rights violations systematically occur only with the support of ideal-type of high power differential.

This high power differential ideal-type is identifiable by the presence of overwhelming physically dominating, and resource manipulation sufficient to paralyze or kill others who might actively seek a rival goal of the more dominant side. This physical

power, used to control the others by the dominant side, is one sided to an extreme, otherwise there would be outright war. The weaker side could fire back but in such cases, the weaker side is usually denied weapons that could balance power.

Instead, the weaker side often avoids and withdraws until their strength increases relative to those in control. Such withdrawal of active participation in these relationships is the essence of non-violent action. Withdrawal and forming mutually supportive groups to gain social strength for self-liberation from tyranny is suggested by Gene Sharp (Sharp, 2003). As the empirical evidence presented at the end of this chapter indicates, high power differential situations have negative impacts on the culture.

There are many practical examples of this type of ideal-type of high power differential. Armies, police, and security forces exercise this power over those within their control area. A tactic used by dominant colonial powers is to put a minority group in charge over a majority group with full military and economic backing by the colonial power. Rwanda is an example. Belgium put the minority Tutsi tribe over the Hutu Tribe, paid Tutsis' salaries, allowed no Hutus into leadership, and extracted labor from the majority Hutus (Eller, 1999). It was not an agreed upon solution by all three parties. It was a unilateral command. It favored a group needing the support of the colonialists to dominate the Hutu majority. This is an example of manipulation of one group to take advantage of others (Lawler, 1983). Though the Tutsi were a monarchy prior to Belgium's and Germany's colonial presence, after that presence the divide in favor of the Tutsi was extreme and conflict more entrenched (Colletta & Cullen, 2000).

The indigenous minority group becomes dependent upon the colonialist power to rule over a majority indigenous group in order to extract labor and raw materials. This same minority group eventually tends to dominate the entire power structure of the nation (Heacock & Conte, 2011). It is both coercive and controlling. There is little chance for the dominated majority group to complain until the colonial power leaves or stops supporting the ruling minority. When the colonialists left Rwanda the pent up complaints of the majority led to horrendous death, long-term extreme poverty, and intractable conflict. The creators of this power structure were gone when the massacre occurred in 1994 (Lyon, 2005).

Physical spousal and child abuse is another example that fits this ideal-type of high power differential. The same high level of power differential is present in most totalitarian states. It is also present in some organizations where management becomes the minority rulers over workers. It is an assumption that violations of human rights require an exertion of physical power. Without a high power differential, people would organize collectively and live in the medium ideal-type of power differential.

***Expressions of high power differential in the paradigms.***

Habermas expresses high power differentials through instrumental, or demand-based, communications. This type of communication is one sided. The strong side commands others. Authority does not allow questioning. There is no public sphere dialogue. There is a legitimate use of commands in crisis or dangerous situations but that is not the case in social conflict, except where crisis creates a need for command as part of the dominant leader's plan.

Pondy's bureaucratic level of organizational conflict is characterized by rigid commands and mandates that are handed down in memos and policy booklets without significant input from subordinates. It is hierarchical, superior-subordinate, interaction. Not all bureaucracies operate this way but it is often the situation. Pondy, as already noted, omitted raw power from his original conception but would add it if able to today.

In game theory the downward spiral of mutual defection occurs whenever one side feels the other side was not fair and they have no way to even the score. Players have many reasons why they might not play cooperatively together but some of these, not present at the other levels, are the same factors that lead to physical expressions of violence noted in the other paradigms. A bully in game theory expects cooperation at all times, even after the bully is uncooperative.

In practice, Axelrod shows how bullies act in game theory and actual social life. A high power person will defect on lower level persons from time to time and expect cooperation. If the lower positioned person ever defects, even if the bully defects, the bully will never cooperate again. This is one way of extracting from a weaker economic class by the more powerful. This leads to mutual defection.

The managerial grid expresses high power differential by the manager's unilateral choice to contend with or avoid those under the manager's control. Contending is defined by Blake and Mouton's statement, "Efficiency in operations results from arranging conditions of work in such a way that human elements interfere to a minimum degree". Avoiding is defined as, "Exertion of minimum effort to get required work done and as appropriate to sustain organization membership" (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 10).

Minimums can be not at all and removing the human elements reduces people to machines.

In a labor situation, the manager functionally controls the physical environment and work rules. If not direct coercion, constructive coercion by the manager over subordinates includes threats of dismissal, demotion, or withholding of benefits.

Interest-based bargaining has no place for the use of physical force. If coercion was apparent, the weaker side could leave the bargaining process to seek better alternatives. Large power differential preclude interest-based bargaining. When considering high power differentials, Fisher et al. (1991) state that you can't grow "cactus in a swamp" (Fisher et al., 1991, p. 99). There is no bargaining in high-power differential situations.

High power relationships are necessary to maintain Human Rights violations. High power differential without obvious coercion is present when the idea of choice has been purged from a person's awareness (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or when the legitimacy of the powers leading society overwhelm human empathy and dignity as demonstrated in the now classic Milgram study on power (Blass, 2000).

#### **Ideal-type and medium power differential: Rules.**

Ideal-type medium power differential is identified by a lack of overt coercive power. Constructive coercion is unacceptable as well. The conflict behavior between parties is mostly informational. The central focus of conflict is on the rules of the conflict. Conflict becomes a game of rules, regulations, hiding, bluffing, and even secret classified intelligence and relationships. The asymmetric information societies are most

pronounced by dual tracks of education whereby one side is educated to lead and the others barely educated at all (Gillborn, Rollock, Vincent, & Ball, 2012) .

Rules for the use of physical power are legitimized only through mutual agreement by all parties in the middle level of power differential. The legitimate use of force belongs to the government but the extent of the use of force is granted by a legitimate and inclusive process (Weber, 1947). These rules for the process of use of force may be changed by some other agreed upon process. A significant difference between high and low power is the way the rules are changed. In high power differential, rules are changed by unilateral proclamation. In the medium power differential ideal-type, rules are changed by an inclusive process.

The rules are not necessarily fair to both sides but the mechanism for change on both the social and the personal level are negotiable. No side can be forced outside of the rules. Though the rules may not be fair, the fairness of the rules is negotiable through group decision-making processes.

The dialectic of this level is that as more autonomy is available to parties in general, the less monitoring that can occur. Without strict monitoring of every move on the social playing field, some social players can and will take advantage of the lack of monitoring. The rules may or may not be fairly enforced by those who judge, enforce, or interpret the conflicts. The critical component of this level is that force is minimized and genuine agreement is necessary to guide social conflict and related development (Rugina, 2000). There is no guarantee of an advantage for either the stronger or the weaker parties.

An example of mid-level power differential is active in the United States at this time. A conflict with the goal of gay males and lesbians to be legally married is occurring. A few states allow gay and lesbian marriages. The dominant heterosexual community proffered one main prohibitive piece of legislation: the Defense of Marriage Act. The goal of the strong side is to keep marriage defined legally as between a man and woman. This is the status quo. This is the dominant culture. If the weaker side rises to equality, there will be a cultural shift even though positive relationships may not immediately be established. The entire conflict occurs in the middle level of ideal-type. Ultimately, the battle hinges on both the idea of legal recognition for gay male and lesbian marriages and on the physical resources that will accrue to those who obtain the legally recognized status of marriage. The weaker side has made steady advances over several decades. These physical resources include health insurance, tax status deductions, and many other benefits. I understand the lasting effect of the gay marriage conflict stands on three things: the love the individuals have for each other that makes marriage work, the social support provided in things like the tax code and other laws, and the benefits to society these marriages bring. Overall, according to the paradigms, the institution of marriage will be strengthened.

In the mid-level, competition is strong and social norms are both central and manipulated to achieve desired outcomes. Sometimes one party wins and the next time, the same party may lose. It is a type of cooperative competition as noted by Linder (2006). As in a debate, where one party wins and another loses, the points that are made by either side inform both sides and move the level of debate higher. Legitimacy explicitly deals with what is right and fair. It is very much the same as people on different

teams deciding what rules of engagement are fair and then playing by those rules. Information, expertise, truth, and thought leadership are highly competitive areas in business, scholarship, and politics. Dominant parties can emerge. If the rules are accepted with or without controversy, then parties in conflict have agreed to cooperate in this type of a competition.

The competitive nature of this level is captured in the Native American Indians who played lacrosse when social tensions became too high and physical violence threatened to break out. The game was both a release and symbol of an agreement to cooperate by sometimes competing.

At mid-level power differential human rights are better established. The parties in conflict engage in a courts of law, open markets, debates, sport games, or running for CEO of a company. Critical social scientists refer to such manipulative influences as a culture machine. The key identifier is information control. The battle to control the internet by central powers of government is an example of this ideal level's existence. The power of social media to move politics and business is evidence of information's importance to transparent leadership and market-based conflict.

***Expressions of medium power differential in the paradigms.***

Habermas's strategic communication fits this level of power differential. He notes that there is a status hierarchy but not a class struggle. It is not a class struggle because there are not just two polarized groups but many levels between the top and bottom. Those with the most status gain the power to control and achieve goals. Higher status citizens tend to strategically increase their power through the cognitive and social realm.

Each vies for power in society in a dramaturgical style using established norms, rights, and fairness. This form of ongoing debate helps clarify what is right and who is right. Fairness means a chance for weaker sides to catch up or at least be secure socially and physically.

Pondy's systems level deals with laterally positioned parties as the mid-level power differential. This level is a functional relationship. The parties are similarly positioned in the organization but each is unique and vying for scarce resources. Their efforts to coordinate may collide with the other's goal. Their positions and responsibilities provide a valid base for strategic efforts to achieve their goals.

Parties often expect conflict. This expectation tends to cause more perceived conflict when none actually exists. Although it is extremely unlikely that violence or aggressive behavior will occur at this level, the challenge is sub-optimization of resources. One group cannot get its work done while the other group does what it has to do to get its work done. Coordination is the big challenge and the result of conflicts can be mixed for the organization.

Game theory has a middle power differential area that expresses both temptation to cheat others and suckers who naively allow cheating. Each is guessing what the other might do. Each is still in the game and neither a negative downward spiral nor a positive mutual cooperation is established. In this level, Tit-for-Tat is the strategy that worked best.

Social cheating and social loafing are the big fears of cooperative parties. One party may say one thing and do another to its own advantage. This level is about calculated

switching back and forth between cooperation and defection in order to achieve a win overall for ego purposes. No meanie is able to extort points from a needy opponent as can happen in a high power differential social environment. It is simply up to the players to decide whether to cooperate or not. If not, both will score few points. If either party can find cooperative partners, both will score the highest possible. The main point for Axelrod is to help parties learn that the rules or payoff matrices can be changed to assure better outcomes for everyone.

The managerial grid manifests the medium power differential through compromise (Figure 4). Compromising fits the middle power differential through balancing a systematically recognized relationship. The relationship is functional and team-based between other and the manager. For those in conflict the rules provide guides for what is socially acceptable.

A medium power differential is expressed through the managerial decision to care somewhat about the other. Blake and Mouton define compromise as, “Adequate organization performance is possible, through balancing the necessity to get out work with maintaining morale of people at a satisfactory level” (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 10). This level of caring is between not at all and a high level of care. The connection that the manager sees with the other is purely systematic control. The manager is attempting to meet everyone’s goal in a satisfactory manner. In compromise, there are neither winners nor losers. It is a type of adjustment of accommodation so both parties get something (Blake & Mouton, 1964). This style recognizes the legitimacy and mutual dependence of both parties. This is a point of mutual dependence (Blake & Mouton, 1964). The manager

systematically looks for a quid pro quo but just enough to get the job done. The result is sometimes called satisficing.

Interest-based bargainers express the mid-level power differential through bluffs and more easily leaving the bargaining process. Either side may have superior access to information regarding situation under negotiation. At this level of power differential, both parties have the ability to begin discussions but one side is often more informed and has more resources and other connections.

There is no overt social structure giving one side more power in interest-based bargaining. Fisher and Ury, in the updated version, note that power is not the central concern as much as the skill and ability to negotiate. Fisher and Ury see negotiation skill as a power itself. Negotiation is a strategic use of power because strategy is all about understanding a social field without controlling it and without the necessarily of understanding the other party.

Bluffing is a negotiation skill that leverages an information advantage. The one bluffing knows more than the one who is bluffed. Bluffing occurs in many ways. Bluffing might include stating that you have other options to settlement or the ability to prolong negotiation. Bluffing parties might pretend they have no need to settle when the situation is critical that they do. This strengthens the position of the bluffing party so the other party knows they do not know how vulnerable the bluffing party may be.

Positioning is taking a firm stance on a particular outcome without revealing the deeper motive or desire for that outcome. Positioning is different from bluffing, yet it is sometimes effective to reach a goal. A statement that indicates the highest price you

might pay will not be over \$100 is a position. Both bluffing and positioning are strategic tactics. Bluffing and positioning are designed to use information to in a way that supports a desired outcome by providing only information that supports goal attainment.

Positioning can amount to a take-it-or-leave-it offer if the other side cannot meet it.

Bluffing leaves the other side not knowing there may be material information of which they have no idea.

### **Ideal-type and low power differential.**

Ideal low power differential is a closely balanced relationship. Both sides are equal and positively engaged. All sides maintain explicit inter-dependence related to the goal and to creating value regarding the goal. Each party has earned its place at the bargaining table through powerful uses of resources and social strength. Asymmetries of power are minor but still important when they exist. Though Follett might still refer to this area as power with, it goes beyond that. New creative solutions emerge from concerted and creative efforts of the parties. Creative efforts lead to outcomes that create new value for all involved. I refer to this as a power between. This is the mystery of synergy. It is creative in nature and enlarges the pie in a way neither party could if it were purely a systematic relationship in the medium range power differential. Scott Isaksen's research shows that low power differential cultures are more conducive to creativity especially when the low power differential is both environmental and with manager-employee groups (Isaksen & Akkermans, 2011).

Consider power between as accessing a creative power that is beyond power with and qualitatively different from power over or power with. The difference between power

with and power between is the difference between influencing another to marry you and creating a happy home with children. The happy home and children are the result of a creative power between. Neither party had the power to do that alone or in a task-oriented manner.

Emotional composure is key to interaction at this level. Scholars call the ability to interpret and respond effectively to the emotions of others emotional intelligence (Kotz & Venter, 2011; Stough, Saklofske, & Parker, 2009). This is a level where friendly relationships are most central and the premise of a great relationship is reaching an adequate outcome based on a mutual understanding, respect, and trust. Low power differential is a relationship level. At this level, physical and socially constructed differences are not evident as evident. The two sides construct their own outcomes. The informational differences are not vast as far as public and industrial knowledge are concerned.

*Expressions of low power differential in the paradigms.*

For Habermas dialogue in a power-free public sphere is means no party can exercise control or power regarding the agenda of discussion, content of the dialogue, or manipulate the interchange. No one is telling others what to do with instrumental commands, or arguing about what is right in order to strategically get their way. Habermas's approach is considered a rational approach. Much of rationality is based on socially constructed rules and norms. This leads to the consideration that it is irrational to require a high level of rationality of rationality in a power-free zone. If things not understood are to be understood, openness to just being together, without the requirement

of rationality or immediate understanding, is reasonable. Openness to the possibility that each party can actively engage and learn from each other regardless of any other considerations helps create a power-free base. Power-free is a focus on opening and structuring the attitude of the listener to be understanding rather than responding.

Power-free zone means engaging in discussions that are open to people of all classes, statuses, and parties for engaging each other respectfully. The goal is to understand. This facilitates social change through socially transformed norms based on an internalized set of values. The power-free zone is a place for the gentle expression and sharing of ideas and perspectives. Communicative action in the form of dialogue or deliberative discourse is communication that has an end of each party understanding the others and the lifeworld in which they form their perceptions and desires. Habermas designates dialogue as power-free and believes this communication empowers society.

Dialogue is offered as a way leading to stronger and more sustainable relationships and processes of social change. It appears to support collaborative outcomes and improved decisions but empirical evidence is needed. Dialogue is neither forcing nor influencing directly but simply creating an understanding and space for others. The nature of instrumental and strategic communications, in contrast with dialogue toward only understanding, represents is a clear distinction.

Through dialogue, existing ideas and social hierarchies that tend to colonize the lifeworlds of individuals and minorities are balanced with emergent developments, ideas, and goals. Follett calls such balances co-management and joint-control and the future of both business and society (Follett, 1995).

The lower power differential in Pondy's model occurs in the bargaining structure. There are total resources and total demands. Conflict occurs when demands are greater than resources. In Pondy's bargaining structure, conflict takes the form of integrative and/or distributive bargaining. Bargaining might be between labor and management or between executives at the executive level. The goals may be wage levels or budget allocations. Pondy uses the terms strategic and cloak all decisions to describe the privacy of the process and outcome. This bargaining appears quite fierce and can be part of chronic organizational conflict.

Pondy's bargaining structure is related to the interest groups negotiating over scarce resources especially in budgeting and labor-management concerns. The outcome sought is to increase available resources or reduce the needs of the sides involved (Pondy, 1967, p. 313). The strategic use of bargaining sessions rarely escalates or manifests. Thus, bargaining is simply attempting to increase the value of the pie and divide it acceptably.

Game theory has a similar mutually cooperative level. Both parties experience and perceive the benefit in cooperating. Given full information, both players decide to cooperate and simply continue earning the most points possible consistently. It does not become an us versus them or ego driven relationship. When applied in social settings, it means that each player recognizes the other as a good guy and one who can add value through mutual-cooperation.

Low-differential is at the top range of the y-axis in the managerial grid. The manager has lifted the concern for the other to the level of the manager's own or higher.

Accommodation is a higher level of concern than for the manager's productivity. Accommodation is defined as, "Thoughtful attention to needs of people for satisfying relationships leads to a comfortable friendly organization atmosphere and work tempo" (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 10). Collaboration is where the two concerns are balanced at an equal and high point, "Work accomplishment is from committed people; interdependence through a common stake in organization purpose leads to relationships of trust and respect" (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 10).

Win-win in interest-based bargaining is an outcome that describes an even power relationship. Each party has the equal access to needed information and feels satisfied. Negotiators who collaborate or maintain and convey sustainable and powerful emotional connections create the highest-level results and agreements.

### **Synthesis with Power Differential**

At this point, power differential can provide the basis for synthesis of the paradigms. The work of Gary Furlong captures the material presented regarding power differential and outcomes. Furlong's (2009) conflict resolution book presents Fisher and Ury's model as a set of power differentials. Furlong notes that using raw power is a lose-lose scenario. Strategically asserting rights creates a lose-win scenario. The positive-relations and interest-based approach is win-win. Furlong captures this spirit. The synthetic model is displayed below (Figure 5).




Figure 5: The power differential of each paradigm and the ideal-types.

This synthesis categorizes conflict by the dominant type of power exercised by in the conflict at a given point in time. The synthesis has an action orientation expressed in the type of power in use. The underlying theories are cognitive in expressions of the theory itself. Conflict is a total experience of cognition, emotion, body, society, desires, and creative vision and is best captured in a way that synthesizes all of these. This synthesis attempts to do that.

Power differential is the relationship between the two sides as they share 100% of available power. If one side increases its percentage of power, the other side loses the same percentage of power. A party can make efforts in many ways to increase power over others and thus change their position.

There is an inverse between power differential and total value of the goal. As power differential decreases, the total value of the goal increases. What is total value of the goal?

Total value of the goal refers to rival goal's qualities of desirability, purity, usability, or overall beauty. In a conflict over land as the goal, land becomes more fertile. Other goals and their increase could be results like water that is more pure after a water-related conflict. Spouses could be more compatible after marriage conflicts. Ideas could more fruitful and plentiful after a scholarly argument. Machines do become more efficient in the area of market-based competition. The goal becomes more valuable as the means by which it is sought takes place in the context of a balance of power. It becomes less valuable as it is sought in contexts of high power differential. Can this be verified?

The way to verify that power differential is inversely related to the total value of the rival goal, a straightforward method seems reasonable. Name the rival goal. Determine the level of behaviors in play to achieve, maintain, or obtain this goal. Measure or determine the value of the goal prior to conflict and after conflict. If the conflict occurred in a high power differential context the value of the goal is predicted to decrease. If the conflict occurred in the low power differential context, the value of the

goal is predicted to increase. In the mid power differential level of conflict, the value of the goal could increase or decrease but is more likely to increase.

### **Transformation of conflict and peace by changing power differential.**

This dissertation is not primarily concerned with how cultures move from one set of norms of power differential to another. Peace and transformation are part of the synthesis because something happens when power differentials change. These movements represent transformation and support peace. The model assumes that two changes occur and these changes account for three levels of power differential.

In the context of this dissertation, a transformation is a change in the relationship of the parties due to a change in the social structure surrounding the conflict (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009). Changes in relationship can be changes in relative power, or satisfaction with the outcome of the conflict sufficient to render the conflict resolved.

Movements from one set of norms and values to another is indicated by the two lines that run parallel to the base of the triangle. I call these two lines “transition lines”. A Movement across these lines represents a significant change in power differential. It may be possible to change social values without significant change of power differential. In that case, the lines are not traversed but power differential still changes moderately. The concept is that cultures move both toward more and toward less power differential during their existence. Along the way, the transition lines are traversed. It could be in either direction. Revolutions are for many reasons and outcomes vary.

The large shifts, represented by these lines, bring changes in the way parties interact and value each other. This is by definition, per the paradigms. Instead of viewing

one another through a fixed lens of personality type or as good or bad persons, we may see each other as able to change and become more equal (Dweck & Ehrlinger, 2006). Changes in the social structure related to the conflict can include the introduction of new laws, norms, or cultural standards that reflect newfound or newly gained respect and value. Changes in the individual parties or the social structure surrounding the conflict can play a part in conflict development or resolution.

It is the weaker side that generally initiates efforts when it sees the possibility to change the status quo yet it is different for the stronger side who are maintaining the status quo (Korpi, 1974). The long-term social benefit of conflict outcome depends on the level of power differential achieved by the conflict aftermath and not necessarily the conflict itself. A coup d'état seeks to increase power differential. A popular uprising seeks to lower it. Both transform the status quo. The long-term benefit, according to the synthesis, is what new level of power differential is established between all parties.

The Arab Spring was an effort to go from high to midlevel of power differential. The colonization of South Africa, was an effort to move to a high power differential in favor of the United Kingdom colonists. These two transitions are public displays of power and informational rhetoric. A move from mid power differential to equal power differential and a working together puts the interaction in a much more private, personal zone, and generally positive relations. An example of moving to a low power differential is the effort to create the United Nations. For the first time all nations can engage with a more equal voice.

What happens to change the power differential? Relative power measures can be tracked in social science using a model similar to Kurt Lewin's Force Field analysis (Cummings & Worley, 2001). Lewin's analysis is a balance or equilibrium approach to the goal of the change. Lewin lists driving forces that support a certain change and restraining forces that resist that same change. Transformation occurs when the driving forces become sufficiently stronger than the restraining forces but Lewin seems to omit specifics except for freezing and refreezing. Transformative culture changes occur as cultures move from one ideal-type of power differential to another regardless of direction (Bartos & Wehr, 2002).

After a transformative event or change in society, there is a period of adjustment to the new status quo. Major power shifts usually necessitate the development of new leaders who become the attractors in the new system. Much of the direction of this new system will be a function of how well these new leaders are able to modulate information and articulate the process of legitimizing rules and rule-making procedure. When groups establish a set of positive relationships and an acceptable level of transparency then conflicts that occur within this power differential will be little more threatening than a butterfly coming out of its cocoon.

### **Empirical support for the synthetic model.**

Rudy Rummel's analysis of national and international conflicts and outcomes is a secondary source of empirical work that follows the same pattern as the synthetic model and reaches similar conclusions (Rummel, 1967, 2005). Rudy Rummel measured how power differential within nations affected national development. He measured some of

the goals normally associated with nations and humans. These included economic prosperity, human development, poverty reduction, and level of freedom. Rummel's statistical research identified patterns, structures, and levels of conflict and associated them with the goals and desired outcomes listed above.

Rummel's work has been controversial for several reasons that have little to do with methodology but are worthy of mention. He, like his critics, has strong ideological stances. Rummel supports libertarianism, which means minimal government intervention in social affairs. His ideas of the Democratic Peace support democracy as a preferred form of government that, he insists, rarely if ever initiates war (Rummel, 1984). He sees democracy as a step toward utopia (Fukuyama, 1997; Wilbur, 1998). Even though some of his numbers and estimates can and have been challenged by scholars such as Dulic, the general tenor and substance of his findings remain intact (Dulic, 2004).

Similar and parallel to the power differential levels, Rummel measures the freedom levels of nations. Rummel relied heavily on Freedom House, a United States group, for assessing these levels (Puddington, 2011). Some 240 nations are ranked and included in Rummel's work. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988) has criticized Freedom House's reporting of events for bias toward United States' policy. Freedom House was not accused of using a flawed scale for freedom rankings. Instead, Chomsky pointed to specific cases where reports were inaccurate and harsh. Chomsky believed this was due to these same nations' decision to pursue actions that were not politically aligned with U.S. interests.

Rummel ranks nations on one of three levels of freedom. Freedom is defined in terms similar to power differential. High power differential is not free. Not free includes only highly authoritative and dictatorial nations. Medium power differential is the same as Rummel's partially free state. Partially free means a nation has an established rule of law but the law is not equally applied to all groups. A monarchy is typically considered partially free because the royal family and close relatives and friends enjoy a much less restrictive set of laws and process. Free means there is rule of law equally applied to all. Free equals a low power differential.

Rummel's unit of analysis is the national level. The study is from 1998. His outcome of conflict measures are the Human Development Index, Purchasing Price Parity, and the Human Poverty Index (Rummel, 2005, p. 82). These measures target factors significant to quality of life (Table 5). The results are also graphically presented to show the linear discontinuity (Figures six-eight). Jon Turner said, "The social world is nonlinear" (Turner, 2006, p. 460).

## Correlation of Outcomes with Power differentials


Table 5. *Rummel's Measures of Goal-related Values for Each Level of Power*

*Differential*


	Human Quality	Average Freedom Index (Higher is better)	Purchasing Price Parity (Higher is better)	Human Development Index (Higher is better)	Human Poverty Index (Lower is better)
Free: Low Power differential		13	11,918	.8	14
Part Free Medium Power differential		8	4,285	.63	26
Not Free High Power differential		3	3,733	.58	34



Figure 6: Nonlinear Change in Purchasing Price Parity (PPP).



*Figure 7: Nonlinear Change in Human Development.*



*Figure 8: Nonlinear Change in Poverty Index.*

Rummel's systematic unfairness parallels the social rules surrounding all conflicts.

The conflict is based on the presence of authoritarian policies of oppression and

systematic unfairness. Morton Deutsch recognizes six types of injustices including distributive, procedural, a general sense, retribution, exclusion, and cultural imperialism (Deutsch, 2006b, p. 44). Rummel's process is to observe social power structures that surround conflict and then analyze the relationship between social power structures and quality of life at a national level.

The analysis addresses relevant outcomes that individuals strive to obtain. These are rival goals. The overt rival goal is to exercise influence over the national policy and leadership. The synthetic model indicates that in conditions of high power differential, the value of the nation the winner will exercise control over will be less than the value of the nation the winner exercises control over if there is a low power differential.

Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a measure that shows income across nations in a way that equalizes the measure. Through PPP, one dollar in Chile is the same as one dollar in Australia. Free nations, on average, are wealthier than partly free or not free nations. The same pattern holds for Human Development.

Human Poverty Increases as power differential grows. Human Poverty Index measures chance of dying before 40 years of age, rate of illiteracy, lack of clean drinking water, and the number of underweight babies. The Human Development index measures nearly the opposite of the Human Poverty Index. As power differential grows poverty grows also.

This is empirical support for the synthesis of the paradigms and, perhaps, the paradigms themselves. The rule taken from Rummel's work is that as power differential

is reduced, total value of the goal is increased. Thus, as power is shared there is more power to share.

Rummel (2005) explains how violent behaviors increase as power disparity increases because when authoritarian regimes work against others using force, that behavior tends to become dominant and polarizes the group. This may imply that the reason for power disparity in any group is solely to coerce one side. This hints that there are external effects of power differential that may vary in the same way and with the same quality as the goal of the conflict.

Psychologically the idea that power-disparity is negatively associated with productive outcomes is supported by concepts of hopelessness and helplessness. In situations where there is pervasive punishment of many people who cannot escape a large percentage of people just give up trying to achieve any goal (Seligman, Park, & Peterson, 2005). These no longer are able to contribute or actively pursue the goal. This could reasonably explain the results of Rummel.

A shortcoming of Rummel's grid is that the work is a measure at one point in time only. It is a snapshot of conflict. It does not follow a conflict and related results over time. It only measures the outcomes at one point in each conflict. There is some room for error in not following the same conflict and outcomes over time. There is no reason to suspect that following conflicts over time would yield a significantly different result but that is a possibility.

### **Typology of Conflict**

Three manifestations of conflict are linked to fit conflicts in a typology designed for the synthesis. This results in a three by three grid that results in a typology of nine types of conflict (Table 6). The three conflict types are private conflicts, focusing event conflicts, and public conflict.

This typological grid makes it is possible to name various types of conflict and fit them into a category of one through nine. Examples of each the conflict types are in the grid space. Some conflicts can overlap into more than one cell. The fit makes the grid clear as a conflict map. Conflicts escalate as they move vertically and become more violent. Conflicts expand socially as they move horizontally to include more people. This means private conflict using collaboration is in Zone 1 and large-scale violent social conflict is in Zone 9.

## Typology for Conflict Management

Table 6. Three Power Differential Zones and Three Social Impact Zones.

Social Agenda	Personal	Targeted Conflict to bring wider social change	Broad Social Change Effort
	(Private Event)	(Focusing Events)	(Public Event)
Low Power- differential (Free)	1. Party to party negotiation. Examples: Agreement, contract, verbal/handshake, business deals, marriage.	2. Critical experiments, panel discussion, public displays. Examples: Intellectual conflict, conscientious objectors America Speaks.	3. Lobbying efforts, educational efforts, elections, media, editorials. Examples: global warming, gay marriage, political party action, tax reform.
	4. Competition where "best party" wins. Examples: Lectures, sports, blackmail, mafia activity, strikes, discrimination, divorce, ADR, litigation, debate.	5. Demonstrations highlighting values, boycotts, ideological, or technological differences Examples: Class action suits, environmental activism, boycotts.	6. Public demonstrations, marches, media blitzes. Examples: Marches, civil disobedience, general strike, work slowdown. Great salt march.
Medium Power- differential (Nominally Free)	7. Avoidance of stronger party. Examples: Bully, terrorism, duel, blackmail, slave escape. Gang action.	8. Passive resistance, work slowdowns, sabotage, guerilla warfare. Examples: terrorism, bombings, sabotage.	9. Riots, public marches, coups, hunger strikes, bombings, terror, civil war. Examples: Rwanda, terrorism, war, ethnic cleansing, Arab Spring, prison riot. Northern Ireland.
High Power- differential (not Free)			

Using the typology is a matter of identifying the level of power differential and the number of parties except in the middle column containing Zones 2, 5, and 8. Those zones are the focusing event zones where private parties leverage events, both natural and staged, to gain wider support.

There is more information below on each row, column, and zone. The example of Northern Ireland, in the next chapter, shows a conflict that evolves over time, manifests at different levels of power differential, and drives social evolution as social evolution drives the conflict.

***Private party conflict.***

Private party conflicts are conflicts isolated to the extent that they do not at all engage or shape a larger social structure (Coser, 1956). Simple agreements, highly competitive relationships, and spousal abuse fit in this column. They fit in Zones 1, 4, and 7, respectfully. The decision on marriage, where the family will vacation this year, blackmail, divorce, and bullying are types of private conflict. Many family conflicts (Conley, 2004), business conflicts (Weber, 1998), and small private conflicts are private conflicts.

When certain types of these private conflicts, such as bullying (Farrington, 1993), spousal abuse, child abuse (Bentz, 1989), or harassment become numerous enough to draw public attention, they may grow into the type of conflict that has broader social impact. Hate crimes fall into this category. These conflicts are perceived as private conflicts may easily escalate in scale and threaten social order and stability. At the point between private and public, others may become advocates for the weaker party, create focusing events as described next, and fight for social change.

***Focusing events: Conflict between parties leading to social change.***

People use focusing events as leverage to create large-scale social change (R. S. Wood, 2006). Mohammed Yunus (1997) focused on poor entrepreneurs in Bangladesh in order to enhance their ability to access to money. Yunus brought their private plight to public awareness through his fight to change their life. His efforts and success became a focus that brought change to the social structures related to micro-lending and banking.

Yunnus's effort was not to change all the law and social structure at first, but only that which hindered access to capital by able people. He did not lobby the government or march in the streets. He simply became their advocate, one group at a time. In the typology, Yunnus' work fits in the middle column of the table and Zone 5. His work started as a private effort. It was leveraged by others to create large-scale social change.

Focusing events are not always so gentle. The Rosa Park's case is an example of a not so gentle focusing event. Rosa Parks, refusing to give up her seat on the Montgomery, Alabama bus, was a focusing event but it did not start out that way. Certainly, she knew that her arrest might lead to something of a wider social nature (Margaret, 2006). Many other Black persons had refused to give up their seats years prior to Rosa Parks. Arrests similar to Rosa's were common but there was no leveraging of the event for social change. In Rosa's case, as well as many other cases of civil disobedience, interest groups used local individual conflicts to leverage large-scale social change that changed the balance of power. These interest groups focus attention on specific incidents to point to larger needed change.

***Direct conflict for social change.***

In 2011 the phenomenon known as the Arab Spring occurred (Zelikow, 2011). Egypt and Tunisia, among others, both experienced regime change. Military revolutionary force was required to bring it about. The weaker side fought against the entrenched powers. This is conflict found in Column 3 and Zone 12. Zone 9 includes conflicts that are less physically violent but appeal to public empathy through marches,

sit-ins, and demonstrations. Zone 3 is where fair elections, public debates, and discussions take place to lead social change and address conflict.

Though beyond the scope of this paper, it appears that nearly all conflicts that involve violations of human rights require physical coercion to sustain the violations. Conflicts that do not involve physical coercion or the use of force generally improve the human condition and relationships (Bartos & Wehr, 2002).

***Tracking conflicts using the typology.***

Conflicts that grow to include more people move from right to left on the grid. There is no change in power differential or power-use of a qualitative nature. Conflicts that move up and down on the typology do change in power differential and power-use. Conflicts can and do move diagonally. Rarely do they move from corner to corner.

If conflict for freedom starts in area three of the typology and grid (direct effort at social change in a free social structure) and is successful in gathering a social win, that may be the simple end. Women's suffrage was such a conflict. There may be no escalation. If a conflict starts in area nine (direct effort for social change in a not free social structure) there may significant change as the conflict progresses. Arab Spring is an attempt to move from nine to six, from high-power differential to middle power differential through revolts. Successful de-escalation of the Arab Spring conflict would be establishing a rule of law in a way a sufficient amount of the nations involved agreed upon so it would be legitimate. Legitimacy would mean both the process and outcome for public rule was established.

Sometimes changes can be discontinuous. Social structures between rows are significantly different. Changes from a level not free to free or more free are usually drastic. There is often at least a partial loss of historical continuity during such transitions.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: APPLICATION OF THE SYNTHESIS**

### **Northern Ireland: Bloody Sunday to the Good Friday Agreement**

Northern Ireland was considered an intractable conflict until it was brought under control in the 1998 peace negotiations led by Senator George Mitchell (Mitchell, 2001) of the United States. The parties negotiated at the mediation table in Belfast, Ireland. The mediation process, using what have come to be known as the Mitchell Principles was successful in helping parties craft a respectful relationship that recognized the human rights of each and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Act of 1998 (Kavanagh, 2004). It is interesting that the Mitchell Principles require that the use of physical force be suspended during negotiations. This de-escalates the conflict from the bottom row of the typology to the middle row in the right column of table 6.

However, the ability to create a space for this negotiating table mediated by Mitchell took years of sometimes extremely violent and antagonistic conflict. I first became aware of the Northern Ireland conflict while watching the Charlie Rose Show interview with Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein (Rose, 1994). The interview immediately enthralled me by the manner in which Adams met each normative statement of Rose's having to do with the rightful use of power of the United Kingdom and Royal Ulster Constabulary with a balanced statement of the IRA's right to use power to secure human

rights. In some ways, the Charlie Rose interview was almost a power-free zone, but it definitely influenced my view of the Northern Ireland Conflict powerfully.

Further research showed how challenging living is for Protestants (Knox, 1973) when they are exposed to a Catholic majority in Ireland. The conflict is difficult. Few, if any, semantics solutions, separating the people from the problem, or creating win-win solutions existed.

This tracking of the Northern Ireland conflict starts with the event known as Bloody Sunday that occurred in 1972 and goes through the Good Friday Peace Agreement talks commencing 1996. the effective end of outright hostilities (Jeffery & Arthur 1996). It is the story of conflict initiated by and for the Catholic Irish citizens of Northern Ireland in their fight for human rights and full equality including housing, employment, and even voting. Their armed force was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the political arm is Sinn Fein. The progression of this conflict is not significantly different from other oppressed groups struggling with every means available to achieve human rights. The conflict transforms as power differential changes and brings with it escalation or de-escalation. A brief comparison of this conflict through the lens of each of the paradigms that form the basis for the synthesis concludes the analysis.

### **Structure of the Conflict**

The goal was equal rights in housing, jobs, and quality of life for the Catholics of Northern Ireland. The sides were primarily the Catholic population versus the Protestant population. The Protestant population was the stronger side. Their superior strength was due mainly to support from England's Army, which often resorted to violent action when

the Catholic side asserted itself through conflict behavior of any kind. The rest of the world supported the status quo. The conflict had reached a downward spiral of mutual defection, avoidance and contention, mandates and disobedience, manifest conflict, and total withdrawal from serious negotiation.

The structure of the conflict follows the conflict definition of two or more parties with a desire to achieve a non-divisible goal. The goal in this case was equality for Catholics in the Northern six counties of Ireland geographically and politically, Ulster is an Irish province that fully contains Northern Ireland's six counties. Belfast is the capital of Northern Ireland. Belfast is located in two counties of Northern Ireland, partly in Antrim County and partly in Down County.

All of Northern Ireland was ruled by Britain. Belfast had four seats in the British Parliament. Northern Ireland had a total of 18 seats in the Parliament. Eight seats were held by Sinn Fein but they refused to take them physically. This was a political protest, or conflict behavior. This silent political protest was in addition to all the other forms of protest they exhibited.

Catholics made up 44% of the Northern Irish population as of 2001. These are the base supporters of Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). They were 48% men and tended to be a bit younger demographically than Protestants who aligned with British rule and, largely, with the Anglican Church. The Anglican Church is the British Protestant Church that broke away from Rome in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century. Protestants, also identified with the color Orange or Orangemen, made up 53% of the population, and 3% designate themselves as other. Protestants supported the Royal Ulster Constabulary

forces and side with British soldiers. 13 political districts were predominantly Protestant and 11 political districts were predominantly Catholic.

These numbers show the two populations were relatively even in number and evenly disbursed. Based on this, the power of the Protestants to persecute Catholics was provided mostly by their relationship to the political rulers in Britain and no other clear factor (Cradden, 1993). Prior to the resolution of this rather intractable conflict in 1998, the Protestant Irish and British created and dominated the social structure by force of arms (Campbell & Connolly, 2003).

Reviewing the timeline of events from 1972 to 1996, (Table 7) that relate to conflict in Northern Ireland shows how the typology applies. Events fit in one of the nine levels for conflict. Immediate outcomes for escalation and de-escalation apply are evident from history. They are more difficult to assess in the long-run.

This series of interactions are by no means a complete blow by blow. Much more happened but these were most of the major events in that period. In terms of game theory, there is a pattern that follows the Tit-for-Tat mode of reciprocation. There were moves that stopped a downward spiral that Tit-for-Tat reciprocation cannot stop itself.

In 1972, the IRA group went on a peaceful march (Zone 6) and were 14 of them were killed (Zone 9) by the Unionist Group. This was a negative payoff for the IRA. It is escalation from a negative yet peaceful state to war. The IRA's retaliation was a punitive response. The IRA killed 13 wounded over 100 people (Zone 9). Britain then declared martial law. This established the Zone 9 behavior as the new norm. The Unionist's continued the downward spiral through internment of IRA members without trial. This

was a typical downward spiral headed to all out civil war. The move from a Zone 6 to a Zone 9 conflict would likely stay there unless one side or the other tried to make peace.

A good question is Why is this considered high power differential when both sides use guns and force? I answer this by saying that Britain felt in a superior position militarily by the sheer magnitude of its military. It apparently did not figure the passion and surprise that made the IRA much more effective than suspected.

Since this is a conflict over rights of the parties involved, rights are the goal and not peace itself. Often, in cases of where war is prevalent, peace is an end one side obtains when it subdues the other. The 1981 hunger strikes are focusing events (Zone 8) aimed at securing public sentiment in favor of and leading to the release of interned IRA members. Recent internments began in 1971 with arresting and incarcerating IRA members without trial and for an indefinite period. The IRA was successful in gaining greater global support and Britain cannot so easily maintain coercive force.

Table 7. Tracking Conflict Behaviors Using a Typology of Conflict for the Synthetic Model.

Date	Weaker- (Catholic, IRA, Sinn Fein) Action or Response	Stronger-(Protestant, UK, Unionist) Action or Response	Conflict Action/ Typology Start Level	Response Action/ Typology End Level
1/1972	Action: Catholics Peace March for equal rights	Reaction: British shoot and kill 14, several wounded	High differential Declared 6	Direct rule from Britain over N. Ireland 9
7/1972	Action: IRA bombs buildings, 13 killed, over 100 wounded	Response: Send British Battalions occupy N. Ireland	High differential Affirmed 9	Martial Law 9
11/1974	Action: More IRA bombings	Response: British Pass legislation for internment	High differential Affirmed 9	IRA members jailed with no trial (downward spiral) 9
1981	Action: Hunger Strikes leading to death	Response: Let Bobby Sands and 9 others die of hunger in prison	High differential Affirmed 9	Gains much support or sympathy for IRA plight 5
11/1985	Response: IRA Opposed the Agreement as did the Unionists. Dublin liked it and signed	Action: Britain signs 1985: Anglo Irish agreement for Dublin to begin consulting in governing N. Ireland	Mid differential Done by decree 6	Agreement signed (None of the Irish accept) 6
11/1985	Response: Agreement is rejected	Action: Ian Gow, MP, resigns, Protestants protest agreement	Medium differential Attempted 6	Agreement never implemented 6
1990	Action: IRA kills Ian Gow who resigned over 1985 agreement and set N. Ireland policy	Response: None immediately noted	High differential IRA escalates 9	IRA could "hit" the Prime Minister next downward spiral 9

Table 7. Continued from Previous Page.

Date	Weaker- (Catholic, IRA, Sinn Fein) Action or Response	Stronger-(Protestant, UK, Unionist) Action or Response	Conflict Action/ Typology Start Level	Response Action/ Typology End Level
12/1993	Response: IRA declares cease fire but will not take its seats in Parliament	Action: Downing Street Declaration giving Northern Ireland self governance.	Low differential UK de-escalates	Leads to more sustainable peace 3
1996	Response: Good Friday Talks begin as mediation	Response: Good Friday talks begin as 3 <sup>rd</sup> party mediation	Low differential Affirmed	Sustainable relationship built on "power-sharing". 3

In 1985, Britain tried to resolve or de-escalate its conflict in Northern Ireland by transferring Irish rule to Dublin, the capital of all of Ireland through a Parliamentary action (Zone 3). Suddenly, it was the Irish Protestants, not Catholic IRA, who will not accept the British law. They marched in the streets of Belfast to protest (Zone 6). The Protestants were against Irish self-rule because they are a minority in the scheme of all of Ireland but a majority in Northern Ireland. This new arrangement put the Protestants in jeopardy of losing their freedom to Catholic domination in elections (Hogan, 1987). This is a mini-conflict related to but separate from the larger conflict under analysis here.

In 1990, the IRA assassinated Ian Gow, Member of Parliament, who set much of the policy regarding Northern Ireland (Zone 9). It is a painful downward spiral of mutual uncooperativeness.

In order to stop the violence, Britain attempts to institute another self-rule policy for Ireland. There is a with a cease-fire agreement in 1993 (Zone 6). The peace held.

This was a structural change proposition from where no physical coercion was used. Time to get used to less violence also passed. With the addition of the dialogue that began in 1996 (Zone 3) and culminated in the 1998, the Good Friday Peace Accord, brought relative peace. It has prevailed in Northern Ireland though there have been isolated outbreaks of violence since.

Peace happens quite often after protracted conflicts such as Northern Ireland, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. The earth is rife with such conflicts. That is why Axelrod asked his question on how to create cooperation among egoists. Conflicts can lead to mutual respect. The process of power sharing that was created by the Good Friday Agreement represents this type of power sharing.

The attainment of human rights, even if none of them are ever violated again, does not end all conflict. There will be conflicts of ideas, conflicts of business interests, conflicts of divorce, and conflicts regarding competitive positioning in markets. Human rights simply give a voice for people to engage the social system and work together. It does not guarantee social standing or status. Human rights are just concerned with fairness, belonging, and access to redress in a respectful manner. Based on the empirical information in Table 5, when conflicts occur in a free social environment, they are more productive than any other level. Ireland was deeply complicated due to the religious differences and a functional national minority put in charge by Britain.

## **Northern Ireland through individual paradigms.**

### ***Habermas.***

In Habermas's paradigm of communicative action, the progression and regression of the conflict fits the use of communicative means. In high power differential situations, instrumental communication was the barrel of guns. In the second level of power differential is strategic communication. Hunger strikes are strategically using the norms of society through emotional engagement of pain, suffering, and dedication to a cause to death. It worked. The mediation discussions in Belfast showed a deep dialogue to build understanding and respect. A strategic use of the term terrorist disallowed the broadcast of interviews with Gerry Adams. A major news outlet effectively censored his voice in a power-saturated public sphere. Only the British voice aired on the public stations in the United States. Finally, this changed. Charlie Rose was part of that change.

Full consensus was not required to reach a decision during the dialogue in Belfast under Senator Mitchell. Only a sufficient consensus was required. This helped dialogue and allowed for dissent although not requiring a false agreement just to reach consensus.

### ***Pondy.***

Pondy's organizational model can assess Northern Ireland from 1972 through 1993 and the Downing Street Declaration as highly bureaucratic system with much latent conflict manifesting. Aftermaths of each significant encounter showed up in the next encounter. Exerting power, as the IRA did, instrumentally and strategically, lead to the aftermath (Pondy, 1967, p. 300) that few, especially Britain and the Unionists wanted.

This led to a desire or need to bargain because no system or bureaucratic way of doing things achieved stability.

### ***Game Theory.***

Tit-for-Tat seems to describe the game that the IRA was playing with Britain. The IRA was eventually successful because it never gave up and was able to cooperate with those who supported it sufficiently to remain strong and destabilize those it viewed as bullies who consistently tried to hurt them. Over the years, downward spirals occurred creating what appeared to be intractable conflict. The goals were rival. Britain wanted control and would continue to use the minority Protestants by supporting Protestants as leaders, while all the time knowing Protestants relied on the British for safety and power. They served as foils for British control. The IRA did not want to be supportive of the Protestants because that meant supporting British rule. The Unionists and IRA always cooperated with each other and always defected with Britain and the Protestants. This forced more cordial relationships. Later, positive relationships of cooperation emerged.

### ***Managerial Grid.***

Those put in power by authorities that deny basic human rights and respect to the governed are at extreme risk of life and limb. In this case, the Unionists were managers, Britain was the owner they serve, and the IRA is the other. The leadership grid suggests collaboration as a preferred style of leadership. In this case, given the history on both the Catholic and Protestant sides for manipulating the social environment (The Catholics passed Catholic laws when in power in all of Ireland), the balance of power and use of all means necessary to secure a happy and faithful life justify the conflict on both sides.

In the immediate view, the role taken by the Unionist managers of the land was not collaborative but demanded accommodation. They were low on a relationship with others and high on production. This was not sustainable.

***Interest-based bargaining.***

The IRA earned a place at a bargaining table with George Mitchell that they did not have with Britain. Their seats in Parliament, fairly won in open elections, were never taken because the IRA wanted Parliament out of Ireland and Ireland out of Parliament. Sinn Fein means ourselves alone. Parliament in London was an unacceptable venue but the bargaining table in Belfast was not. It was home.

The idea of interest-based bargaining is inherent in mediation because mediation is simply facilitated negotiation. Britain could not be neutral. Therefore, the US was a better choice to mediate a settlement. Each of the six or seven parties at the Belfast bargaining table knew how to negotiate but the emotions had become so strong a neutral was required to balance those emotions in a way that lead toward discussions and the neutral zone it created for understanding.

**Bullying: A More Individual Conflict**

For demonstration purposes of how these paradigms compare and how the synthesis might add perspective, I have chosen a bully as a generic type of conflict to serve for comparative purposes. Bullying does not include many other types of conflicts, such as values conflicts, or role conflicts though any of these factors might be involved.

Bullying contains each of the main factors of conflict identified in the analysis of the prevailing paradigms used for this dissertation. Farrington (1993) defines bullying as repeated physical or psychological oppression by a more powerful person over a less powerful one. The goal of bullying is control of another person and it manifests in many individual conflicts. It fits into the synthetic model. Bullying is based on power, perceived or real, and deals with rival goals. The institutional or social context for bullying is a factor in power relations. If we keep these factors in view, we can study bullying can through the lens of each paradigm.

### **Bullying and communicative action.**

Habermas notes three levels of communication as instrumental, strategic, and communicative (Held, 1980). Bullying would take place mostly in the instrumental and the strategic types of action. Using instrumental communication the bully tells another what to do under threat of physical pain. Usually, strategic action is more subtle because it is less physical and uses simply harassment and intimidation. Bullying is based mostly on physical power because if physical power differential were removed, the power of the bully would be ineffectual to a great degree.

In the United States, the president is said to use the bully pulpit in order to achieve his or her desired outcomes which usually relate to promoting public policy. Since the president is so powerful, remarks made by the president carry more weight than other people's remarks. The bully- pulpit is the opposite of the power-free zone.

### **Bullying and Pondy's organizational conflict model.**

A bully in an organization is a latent conflict. The effect of bullies is defused by encouraging collaboration (Carlin, 1991). Pondy could easily follow the bullying manager through each succeeding stage of conflict beyond perceived to felt, manifest, and its aftermath. Autocrats in a bureaucracy that lose alignment with units under their control can easily begin to control the unit for priorities that favor the autocrat rather than the entire organization.

The deeper sources of organizational concern relate to how the institutional power is balanced to offset or indentify bullying activities. How does a company identify bullies who manage in a manner that alienates the good will and, and energetic or optimal performance of all stakeholders (Sisodia, Sheth, & Wolfe, 2007)? The goals in such situations include status, recognition, pay, by belonging to a team that plays fairly with each other. Everything happens with respect to goal, interpersonal power, and institutional dynamics that support power in relationship to goals. Pondy has little to offer in his paradigm to directly deal with autocrats or bullies.

### **Bullying and game theory.**

Axelrod specifically addresses bullying (Axelrod, 1984) as an institutional or personal relationship between subordinates and super-ordinates where the more powerful systematically cheats the weaker party. In this bullying, the stronger side defects on a regular basis never tolerating defection from the weaker party. If the weaker party defects, meaning they do not do as expected by the social or institutional norms, the stronger party refuses to work with them ever again. The weaker side can act in such a

way as to tolerate one defection from the stronger side but waits for the second defection before they refuse to work further with the other party. There are few laws or sets of recourse for the weaker side in this situation. The essence of the arrangement is that the payoffs are such that it pays the stronger side to defect, then cooperate, then defect, then cooperate. Each defection gives a better payoff to the stronger side and each cooperation sets the weaker side up for another defection.

Examples of this in practice lead social scientists to study wealth, power, and how the richer and the less rich grow wealth at significantly different rates. Marx was concerned with this in a class struggle context. Ownership of capital gives a clear advantage to owners over laborers. The goal is fairness but with one side being able to defect and thus obtain higher levels of benefit and status based on that benefit, it is not fair in the sense of fair play. The wealthy feel that the weaker poor are numerous, have little option to leave, and will choose to suffer some rather than leave the relationship. The more powerful also make sure they punish weaker parties who do not accept some level of defection from them as a warning to the rest of the masses.

In game theory, power and goal are the two essences of conflict. The third party is imbedded in the payoff matrices. The total scores of all interactions hints at the total value given a society where bullying is not supported when the payoff for defection is not too high.

### **Bullying and the managerial grid.**

The managerial grid is set up as two parties with unequal power. There is no clear bullying description but what fits best is the powerful manager making unilateral

decisions that serve only the manager's personal career aspirations and production requirements. Career and production are closely linked by leaders who measure factors that show instant results. Human relationship values have longer-term consequences that often appear only after the career decisions made by owners concerning the manager are long past. Barton (1981) makes this clear in the description of multiple objectives in organizations by showing how relations and equipment maintenance are sacrificed by the unilateral decision of a manager to achieve career advancement through immediately measurable criteria of production. This hurts long-term performance and supports a bully as they defect and only cooperate when essential.

Goal and power are in the hands of the corporate owners and agents. The managers and laborers are the two parties in direct conflict, even if they decide to collaborate at a given moment. The owners' institution, policy, and practice are the third party who support or deny bullying based on their posture and actions. Often, bullying is thought of as bias and discrimination. It is this as well but is much more pervasive too.

### **Bullying and interest-based bargaining.**

No paradigm of conflict comes from a stronger base that assumes equal power between parties than interest-based bargaining. This is because each side may choose to end negotiations at any time and seek a best alternative (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991) to a negotiated settlement. Much of the power in negotiation is based on perception and overconfidence as described by Bazerman and Neale (1992) indicate how overconfidence alienates others at the negotiating table and leads to unexpectedly poor results. A bully is outwardly overconfident and uses the perception of power (Hofstede, 1983) to sway

negotiations into their desired position rather than considering others as equal. Bazerman and Neale noted how negotiators estimate that their own offers will be win 68% of the time when competing other single offers. In these cases the statistical reality is that any offer will win just 50% of the time (Bazerman & Neale, 1992).

In interest-based bargaining third parties are less apparent. Third parties are the institutions or groups the bargainers may represent. A good example of bullying behavior is a labor and management negotiation when management has more staying power than labor. Management has fewer economic constraints. In this case, a bully will look to get their way something. Instead of optimizing all the parties for the best outcome, a bully will try to frame negotiations so just the goals important to the bully are valued. This leads to poorer outcomes overall (Bazerman & Neale, 1992) compared with a flexible and inclusive approach.

### ***Bullying and Synthesis.***

The synthesis has room for bullying in the high power differential area and the lower part of the mid power differential area. Bullying cannot occur at the apex of the triangle or low power differential spot. Institutional responses to bullying represent the third person or outside person who serves as a moderator to conflict by changing rules, policies, and laws to reduce it. Other options to intervene in bullying include disempowering the bully or empowering the weaker side to even the power relations. Access to others on the internet has brought about cyber-bullying while transparency on the same internet supports the ability to recognize, expose, and reduce or stop it

(Anonymous, 2012). The value of the synthesis is that it leaves no party out of the system and shows clear personal and institutional results of bully actions.

## **CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION**

President Bashar al-Assad's story opened this dissertation. How would the knowledge of the synthesis have helped? The synthesis requires fundamental details to frame any conflict. These details help people understand immediately what to assess. What is the rival goal? What does that goal mean for each party? Who are the parties involved? Which is stronger and why?

In the al-Assad case, the goal of the public dialogue would be clearer, especially to those most vulnerable. That goal is to change the form of government from a repressive regime run by unilateral edicts to a rule of law enforceable through a set of fair and inclusive laws. For al-Assad, that means a loss of unilateral authority. Al-Assad's permission for the weaker side to speak was not a renunciation of his power to harm them if they said the wrong things. The zero-sum part of the synthesis was never accepted by al-Assad therefore no social transformation was possible. The synthesis protects the weak with knowledge of negative as well as positive payoffs from the outset by making them explicit.

The sides would be explicit. Al-Assad's permission to speak does not mean he is on the weaker party's side or is negotiating a positional shift in power. Al-Assad is not alone on the strong side; those who rule with him and their administrative supporters are there. The recognition of whose team others are on safeguards the weaker side from the

stronger. The synthesis supports the ability to identify and rally internal resources and wisely move toward the goal.

Social context in the synthesis includes human rights, biased rules, or enforcement of agreed upon rules, or creative collaboration. Sometimes, all of these are at play, but the highest power defines the level of power differential. In al-Assad's case, he temporarily lifted the otherwise firm ban on open communications. This type of ban brings control. He extended an olive branch in one hand and kept a sword nearby for the other hand in case he needed it. In other words, he lifted the leaders of the oppressed from the bottom to the apex of the pyramid power differential without them taking any real social power from him. He was remained in control; making critical decisions. When it was necessary, he acted by arresting, incarcerating, and killing.

I know of no group that went from a slave-dictator relationships to high-level of collaboration without first going through the middle level and vying in the marketplace of ideas first. Yet, this is what occurred during the Damascus Spring.

The al-Assad conflict struck at the heart of this system from the heart of the system itself. By this I mean, al-Assad was strategic in his use of the strategic middle section of power differential whether he intended to be or not. He used strategic communication. He feigned cooperation; then defected. He pretended to collaborate; then contended. He may have started in good faith, but it ended up becoming a bluff.

Viewed through the synthesis, it becomes clear that al-Assad never lost or gave up any control for even a moment. He started the conflict and he ended it. The synthesis indicates that there is a social ascent required to make it to the apex of the triangle with

success. Both of the social change thresholds, the lines parallel to the base of the triangle must occur before entering the apex. Today, Syria remains embroiled in social conflict. Al-Assad remains entrenched in his position of power and violence continues.

The outcome of al-Assad's conflict is a change in the total value Syria because control of Syria is the goal of the conflict. . The synthetic model predicts that operations in the high power differential zone have negative outcomes. The internal civil war in Syria during the last months of 2012 seems to support this hypothesis. How different everything might have been had al-Assad stuck with a more open way to embrace the Syrian people and allowed ideas of leadership change to emerge in a competitive, strategic, and challenging environment. The synthetic model predicts that if al-Assad had shared power in some reasonable and sustainable manner, a wealthier, more developed Syria would exist today.

### **Switching Sides**

My assumption is that the weaker side wants less power differential and not just to become an oppressive force like the one they are challenging. The familiar German leader Adolf Hitler was once oppressed and on the weaker side. When he came to power there was more oppression than before he was in power. There was no fundamental change in power differential. In fact, Hitler made it higher. The deeper goal of conflicts is the ability to influence social norms while keeping everyone secure in the ability to voice their own opinions. This is the middle power differential area. Getting to the apex cannot happen successfully without going through the middle. Even a new CEO of a company

can replace a domineering CEO yet the entire firm will need to establish the legitimate area of relationships prior to reaching a highly collaborative environment.

The model suggests two things for the weaker parties in conflict. First, recognize the present power differential zone and play by those relationships until you are able to achieve a lower power differential. Secondly, teach weaker parties about the power differential structures so they can be better prepared when a radical change does happen. This way they are prepared to govern better based on the lower power differential. This piece is often, if not always, missing. It is a challenge for the weaker side to realize that the social structure may be stacked against them ever becoming strong but they must become strong to change the social structure. Weak parties must work outside the present social system to change it from within.

### **Egypt's Example**

An example of the unpreparedness to engage freedom is Egypt's recent Arab Spring revolution. Egyptians deposed President Mubarak to gain more self-determination. Using the newly acquired freedom, Egyptians have succeeded in assigning the high power differential creating military to more policing and protection activities. Policing and protection of legitimately established laws is a middle power differential use of force as protection and stability. The issue of Sharia law or Islamic leadership is the choice of the democratic process. So far, the type of law was not a cause for zone 9 type conflict. It was the unilateral control of the president. The same concern came up and led to large public demonstrations under the newly elected President Morsi. Under intense pressure, he backed down. The process of creating and keeping legitimate processes for

creating and keeping legitimacy is the challenge for the new leadership and followers.

This model can help detail the process.

### **Social Facts, Laws, and Power Differential**

The dissertation focused on a narrow definition of conflict, filtered out psychological conflict because it is not social, accounted for personality, spanned ideological frameworks, integrated interdisciplinary approaches, and identified a common set of dynamically interacting factors related to power differential. The implied or explicit outcomes of the dynamics flow along a continuum of power differential from negative outcomes to positive values adds although a zero-sum game of relative power differential plays out between parties.

The concept of a social fact, attributable to Emile Durkheim's study of suicide, did not control for the fact that power differential in more dense social settings might be the causal factor in the decision of parties to commit suicide (Behuniak, 2003; Durkheim, 1982, p. 71). Pescosolido and Georgianna used network theory to show that the predictive factors surrounding suicide were not simply related to a breakdown of social organization but a lack of the regulatory and integrative benefit of social networks (Pescosolido & Georgianna, 1989). Social networks are sources of power that individuals and those in authoritarian cults lack. The scholars further showed that where such integration was out of balance with no social network controls or authoritative control, suicide was more likely. Thus, suicide and loss of social networks or individual power appear related.

Pescosolido and Georgianna (1989) indicated that suicide was significantly lower for those with a balanced level of social network support. A continuum of support runs

from no support to authoritarian control. That continuum of support is parallel to the power differential synthesis. The power differential concept and related behavior must be further researched to be validated or invalidated as social fact.

### **Social Fact and Natural Science**

Imagine a person dropping something on purpose. It falls to the ground. Those who stand by say, So what? Everyone knows that things fall when dropped. Then, Isaac Newton, states that there is a law of gravity. It is measurable. Measurement and accurate prediction prove it. Classical physics, a set of concepts or laws on the natural movements of physical bodies is focused on movement and energy. In the same way, when social conflict happens, people know someone will win and someone will lose. Those who watch say, Everyone knows that! Then social scientists come along and say that there is a law of conflict. Inputs and outcomes are measurable, predictable, and controllable. The key is to understand power differentials and related outcomes.

Low power differential increases the total value of the sought goal. As the power differential increases, total value of the goal decreases and eventually reaches a point where it becomes negative. The concept is a long way from as exact measures. The applications for increasing value in business, governance, freedom of association, ethics, and scientific advancement is significant. Is there scientific or a scholarly basis for comparing conflict and Newtonian physics? As far back as Comte, sociologists have considered this (Turner, 2006). Is the centrality of goals in human experience analogous to gravity in natural objects? I believe the effect of goals can be measured through power differential, and a more specific mathematical relationship created and understood

without de-humanizing anyone. This is a step beyond the subject today, yet the field is heading more toward integration of science and human consciousness.

The connection between gravity and goals is that all objects of mass have gravity and fully functioning people have goals. Gravity is a function of mass and goals are a function of human life, perhaps consciousness. Both draw their objects in specific directions. Both relate to movements. Gravity is directed toward other mass. Goals are self-directed but related to others with goals. Both are of uncertain origin and form. This synthesis points to a possible bridge between natural science and social or moral science through the centrality of goals.

Gravity is not something that stops movement. A macro view of gravity demonstrates how the solar orbit of the Earth works in concert with the pull of Earth's gravity on the moon. The moon is always falling toward the Earth but as it does, the Earth moves just enough around the Sun to avoid the Moon. Gravity does not pull the planets together as much as it balances them in a harmonious dance.

The movement of the Earth and Moon supports human life. In the same way, social conflict is not something to bring people into fisticuffs. It keeps us moving with strength of body, mind, and creative spirit toward our unknown future goals and meaning. The only physical contact is in the high power differential area that is to be avoided is positive outcomes are desired. Conflict requires management just like an ocean requires navigation. Avoidance of competition is often counterproductive. Power differential, as stated throughout this dissertation is critical to managing conflict prosperously. Future work needs to be pursued on measuring power differential and relating power differential

to the outcomes of the goal of conflict. The best base to start measuring is power balance or low power differential. Once the more specific and measurable criteria are identified, great increases in goal value may be made.

### **Fractals: More than Just Three Levels**

Tracking the idea of the three power differential levels finds a ubiquity of this hierarchy in Western literature. Giddens's structuration theory has three structures of signification or meaning, legitimization or rules, and domination or raw power (Giddens, 1986). Why do the five paradigms, plus Giddens have three levels? Is it just that three the best number? What if there were levels within each level? It may be that each level has a set of similar levels as steps within that power differential. There may be a physical power differential in high, medium, and low power differentials. Mental, social, and emotional power differentials may be present in each level too.

The middle level of power differential is ripe for deeper empirical work leading to new levels of power differential. The apex area of low power differential can be more deeply viewed in terms of relative power. Perhaps the coercive area has some additional partitions as well. It may or may not be of scholarly value to pursue such a path of inquiry. Perhaps other cultures have devised some methods not yet identified that could enhance the power differential map to some level beyond three partitions.

### **Egalitarian Society**

This pattern of conflict sociology supports an egalitarian view as an organizational structure that improves processes and outcomes related to goals. This normative orientation seems supported by the paradigms, case study, and empirical work. The set of

relationships that characterize the top of the structure are cooperation, power-free dialogue, bargaining structures, collaboration, positive attitudes, and win-win orientations. This creates most of the total gain in the value related to the goal. Conflict brings parties to the table. Parties stay at the table because of the goal or goals that bind their interests. It is at the table where social structures change.

### **Power Differential as Indicative**

Power differential in rival goal seeking is the factor most indicative of how positive the outcome of the conflict will be in each of the five paradigms. The long-term outcome often includes the weaker side strengthening itself to engage more powerfully in the future. Once a balance of power has been reached, the creative approaches to a particular goal that benefits both parties is required by both parties or no agreement will occur.

There is no indication in any of the paradigms that this apex is a sustainable equilibrium. Indeed, I have every indication that the power-balanced relationships will break down as new entrants come along to challenge all the top collaborators through some form of some disruptive technology or idea. Thus, a new round of power balancing begins.

In the triangular pattern both sides meet at the apex in a power balance similar to Hegel's synthesis of the thesis and anti-thesis. Just as the dialectic is an iterative process, so is conflict. There is not equilibrium at the apex of the synthetic model because ideas will come based on new goals that will supersede the significance of the former goal.

A deeper function of power differential may information exchange. An information exchange seems to grow as sides become more positively related and focused on creative

solutions. In traditional high power differential situations, opposing parties rarely share information to any extent. In the middle area, the transfer of information increases but is mediated by things like markets, prices, and access to educational settings and material. In the low power differential area, information is shared much more freely. Thus, power and information may be nearly synonymous.

### **Future Considerations: Leadership**

Leaders seek ways to empower people they lead, and increase total value while remaining leaders. This structure has implications for leaders who wish to empower their colleagues while not giving up any of their own power. The challenge of such a situation in this synthetic model is that it is not power that a leader would give up but simply an advantage. To be 75% leader in a billion dollar market is a powerful position. Market leadership might be maintained through some mildly unfair industry rules, subsidies, or other advantages. However, a more fair set of rules could help the market grow to two billion dollars but the leader now might only enjoy 50% of that market. The leader has more total dollar value but less market share. This is the idea proposed by the conscious capitalist movement (Sisodia et al., 2007). Applications of this model in leadership development could be transformational in many industries and social contexts.

Same sex marriage is a controversy in the US today. Conservative religious groups tend to think that allowing same sex marriages with the same legal status as heterosexual couples will ruin marriage. The conflict structure here indicates the opposite. If same sex marriage is recognized through behaviors in the middle to lower power differential

pattern, then the synthetic model predicts that marriage relationships overall will be increased in quality and value. This requires testing but can be proven or disproven.

Teaching this pattern to new conflict management students can provide a strong and integrated overview of the field, even if the structure is quite general. It can be taught to all people who are involved in conflict. It can be taught to those who are oppressed. This way, when they are ready to win freedom, they also have the ability to self govern without falling into the same situation or worse. I have heard the concerns of conservative politicians who ask what the cost will be to provide such education. This pattern tends to respond by asking what it will cost in lost potential value and violent conflict not to provide it.

Another factor of leadership vision may be indicated based on the levels of development from one power differential level to another. Research may follow in an attempt to indicate if problems and conflicts at high levels of power differential are usually, if not consistently, addressed from the perspective of a level of power differential much lower. For example, human rights are best understood in terms of fairness. It is from a standpoint of fairness that violations of human rights are framed. Yet, today we are still stuck in the determination of what is fair to the individual and to the group. We are besieged on the left and the right with rhetoric about responsibility and relationship. The fairness level will not be solved without solutions from the next lower power differential level. That is the level of positive relationships.

The creative solutions birthed in positive relationships may contain seeds that lead to something even higher and more relative to conflict, growth, and belonging. Since we

are struggling as a civilization determining fairness in terms of living wage, deskilling, and social contracts, among many other concerns, it may be these can only be understood from the next level in the power differential pyramid, low power differential or positive relations. Once positive relations are established, the creative ability of civilization may have new challenges and opportunities of organization and consciousness. Although this all seems very metaphysical, metaphysics is the domain of both science and philosophy when it comes to framing important phenomenological considerations.

### **Formal Results of Hypothesis**

Hypothesis 1a. has support. Support for the concept that the broadness of conflict research material may be adequately addressed in any one analysis or set of paradigms. Consistent themes were synthesized from the five paradigms without doing significant violence to the original intent. Each paradigm exhibited three distinct levels of process and outcome that were comparable. Conflict research is a broad and confusing subject because it poorly differentiates or defines characteristics, qualities, and dynamics. When parties and personalities in conflict, goals sought made all inclusive, and culture relatively normalized, fundamental human qualities of conflict are evident.

Hypothesis 2a. has support. The leading paradigms of conflict share a similar set of principles. Each focus on rival goals, Power differential, two or more parties, behaviors, and outcomes that are predictable or narrow based on the application of the principles. Each paradigm showed the same directional and dynamic interaction between these variables.

Hypothesis 2b. has substantial support. Power differential is either explicitly or implicitly the salient factor in the outcomes in each paradigm. Supporting literature in conflict studies provides a reasonable basis for affirming the hypothesis. The total value of the goal sought in conflict is predicted to rise as power differential falls. Total value is expected to fall as power differential rises.

Hypothesis 3a. has support. The leading paradigms do not diverge so significantly that no comparison is possible. Although each paradigm addresses a different social context, all substantive factors remain the same.

Hypothesis 4a. does not have support. A win-win bias as the desired outcome was not found in a way to skew the real application or interpretation of the paradigms. Although win-win is a goal of conflict scholars and practitioners due to the positive human relations that make positive outcomes possible, in many cases, this is not the immediate target. Attempting to achieve a win-win can expose weaker parties to severe loss at different points in the social context.

The most important use for this material on power differential is in conflict education as an initial lens. Which party is able to inflict the greatest level of power upon the other with relative impunity? Can one party physically or constructively force another party to act in a way other than it would want to? Expect negative outcomes overall. Can one party dominate another by information, media, or various other intellectual and socially normative powers? Expect a highly competitive and relatively productive outcome over time. Are both parties relatively evenly matched with neither able to

physically harm the other with impunity or dominate the information stream that flows in society? Expect a positive outcome for both sides.

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