CHISHOLM’S PHENOMENAL ARGUMENT REVISITED: A DILEMMA FOR
PERDURANTISM

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1.

According to perdurantism, objects persist by being spread out over time just as
composite three-dimensional objects are spread out over space. Just as a composite three-
dimensional object is spread out over space by having spatial parts, objects persist,
according to perdurantism, by having temporal parts. Perdurantism can be stated more
precisely by saying what exactly a temporal part is. In the sequel, Theodore Sider’s
definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’ shall be assumed:

\[ x \text{ is an instantaneous temporal part of } y \text{ at instant } t = \text{df. (1) } x \text{ exists at, but only at, } t; (2) x \text{ is part of } y \text{ at } t; \text{ and } (3) x \text{ overlaps at } t \text{ everything that is part of } y \text{ at } t. \]

(2001: 59)

Much more could be and has been said about how perdurantism should be formulated.1
Though interesting in their own right, nothing of importance here turns on these matters
of formulation.

In ‘Problems of Identity’ (1971), Roderick Chisholm argued that reflection on
phenomenal experience reveals that persons do not have temporal parts. Chisholm’s
Phenomenal Argument, hereafter simply ‘the Phenomenal Argument’, has received much
less attention than it deserves.2 To this point, the only extended discussion of it is in
(Heller, 1990: 20-6). This paper develops and defends a version of the Phenomenal
Argument. To be clear, the Phenomenal Argument does not constitute an \textit{ultima facie}
case against perdurantism. Such a case would require a much more lengthy treatment in
which all of the costs and benefits of perdurantism—at least all those one can think of—
are carefully weighed against one another. However, it will be shown that the
Phenomenal Argument deserves a prominent place within disputes about persistence and
persons; it should be among the many factors to be considered in a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis of competing views of persistence and persons.

2.

The Phenomenal Argument focuses on phenomenally conscious experiences—
experiences that have some distinctive phenomenal character, a something that it’s like to
have them—such as \textit{smelling a freshly brewed cup of coffee, feeling the anodyne effects
of opium, hearing a song in D-minor, experiencing the sights, sounds and smells of a
circus, etc.}3 In particular, the argument focuses on diachronically non-uniform
phenomenal experiences, phenomenal experiences that change qualitatively during their
occurrence. Many, perhaps most, phenomenal experiences are diachronically non-
uniform. Some examples: \textit{hearing a musical note grow louder, seeing an object brighten
in hue, feeling a headache increase or decrease in intensity, hearing the birdcall ‘bobwhite’—to cite Chisholm’s example. After supposing that someone hears the birdcall ‘bobwhite’, Chisholm argues that perdurantism is incompatible with that supposition:

But consider an experience of even shorter duration: one hears the birdcall “Bob White”. The experience might be described by saying “There exists an $x$ such that $x$ hears ‘Bob’ and $x$ hears ‘White’.” But we want to make sure we are not talking about the experience wherein one hears two sounds at once—‘Bob’ from one bird and ‘White’ from another. And so we might say … “There exists an $x$ such that $x$ hears ‘Bob’ and then $x$ hears ‘White’.” … [A perdurantist] would say that the experience could be adequately described by using two variables: “There exists a $y$ and a $z$ such that $y$ hears ‘Bob’ and $z$ hears ‘White’”. But the latter sentence is not adequate to the experience in question. The man who has the experience knows not only (1) that there is someone who hears ‘Bob’ and someone who hears ‘White’. He also knows (2) that the one who hears ‘Bob’ is identical with the one who hears ‘White’. And what is crucial to the present problem, he knows (3) that his experience of hearing ‘Bob’ and his experience of hearing ‘White’ were not also had by two other things, each distinct from himself and from each other. (1971: 15)

Chisholm’s statement of the Phenomenal Argument raises three initial questions that shape the version to be developed below: First, why must a perdurantist describe hearing ‘bobwhite’ in the way Chisholm suggests? The answer, though not explicitly given by Chisholm, involves an application of a familiar point about perdurantism. As shall be seen, it is important for this to be reflected in a statement of the Phenomenal Argument.

Second, why must a subject of a ‘bobwhite’ experience know what Chisholm says he would? Chisholm’s answer appeals to the so-called unity of conscious experience. According to Chisholm, a diachronically non-uniform experience exhibits a kind of unity, the same kind of unity exhibited by a synchronically non-uniform experience such as simultaneously seeing and hearing a television program. Commenting on remarks from Brentano (1973) on the unity of synchronically non-uniform phenomenal experiences, Chisholm says:

In short, when you see and hear something at the same time, the experience cannot be adequately described by saying “There exists an $x$ and a $y$ such that $x$ sees something, $y$ hears something, and $x$ is other than $y$.” We can use just one personal variable (“There exists an $x$ such that $x$ sees something and $x$ also hears it”) or if we use two (“There exists an $x$ such that $x$ sees something and there exists a $y$ such that $y$ hears it”), then we must add that their values are one and the same (“$x$ is identical with $y$”). (1971: 14)

The argument in the above passage is underdeveloped. One might wonder, for instance, why exactly it is that when describing a synchronically non-uniform experience one must, as Chisholm puts it, use just one personal variable. What is it about the unity of conscious experience that makes that so? And one might wonder why what must be said
about a synchronically non-uniform experience must also be said about a diachronically non-uniform experience. To say simply that they exhibit the same kind of unity will not do. Again, all that Chisholm says about an experience of such unity is that one must use just one personal variable in an adequate description of it. And that is just what someone might say is not true of diachronically non-uniform experiences. Mark Heller (1990: 23-6) objects in this way to the Phenomenal Argument. There is a lacuna here in the Phenomenal Argument and a primary burden of this paper is to fill it.

Finally, even if what Chisholm says is correct, does it show that perdurantism is false? No. It could be that Chisholm’s remarks above are true and yet persons persist by having temporal parts. But as the version below will reveal, the Phenomenal Argument poses a *prima facie* objectionable dilemma for perdurantism: either persons aren’t subjects of phenomenal experiences or they persist no longer than particular diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences of which they are subjects.

It will be useful to have a bare-bones outline of the Phenomenal Argument. For concreteness, consider a particular diachronically non-uniform experience, Chisholm’s example of hearing ‘bobwhite’ will do. For simplicity, suppose that this experience changes qualitatively only once during its occurrence corresponding to the experiences of hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’ respectively. (What this supposition amounts to, then, is that the experiences of hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’ are diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences.) Here is an outline of the Phenomenal Argument:

1. If perdurantism is true, then no one is a subject of both hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’.
2. Being a subject of hearing ‘bobwhite’ requires being a subject of both hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’.
3. If perdurantism is true, then there is no subject of hearing ‘bobwhite’ and, generalizing, there are no subjects of diachronically non-uniform phenomenal experiences.
4. If perdurantism is true, then only diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences have subjects and these subjects persist no longer than the diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences of which they are subjects.
5. If perdurantism is true, then either persons aren’t subjects of phenomenal experiences or they persist no longer than the diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences of which we are subjects.

Before arguing for (1) and (2) and defending the subsequent inferences, it is worth pointing out why (5), if true, represents a *prima facie* objectionable dilemma for perdurantism. It seems that persons persist much longer than short-lived diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences. Suppose someone is the subject of a diachronically uniform experience such as hearing ‘bob’. It seems that he persists longer than that experience. After all, it seems that he existed before that experience occurred and now that it’s over, he seems to have outlasted it. Grasping the second horn of the above dilemma is not a very attractive option. Grasping the first horn seems no better. To have
to accept that persons aren’t subjects of phenomenal experiences would be a significant cost of perdurantism. At the very least, it would be quite interesting if the moral of the Phenomenal Argument turned out to be that according to perdurantism, persons are philosophical zombies. Perhaps the point of each horn can be blunted. Perhaps, for instance, the overall benefits of perdurantism outweigh the respective costs associated with each horn. Perhaps, but to repeat: The aim here is not to develop a conclusive refutation of perdurantism. For the purposes of this paper, the above dilemma needs only to be prima facie objectionable, which it is.

3.

Chisholm does not explicitly defend (1), but rather, takes it for granted that a perdurantist would accept it. It is instructive to see, though, that a case for (1) can be made on the basis of a familiar point about perdurantism. In addition, pointing this out will prove useful when considering in the next section an objection that attempts to assimilate this paper’s version of the Phenomenal Argument to another more prominent criticism of perdurantism.

First, the familiar point: According to perdurantism, persisting things undergo change not by having the temporarily instantiated properties involved in a change, but rather by having temporal parts (or proper sums thereof) that have the temporarily instantiated properties. For example, suppose a burning candle changes from being 10 cm tall to being 8 cm tall. Here there is a particular change, C, involving the temporary instantiation of the properties being 10 cm tall and being 8 cm tall. But how can the candle be a subject of C without having the incompatible properties of being 10 cm tall and being 8 cm tall? The perdurantist’s answer: The candle doesn’t have the properties being 10 cm tall and being 8 cm tall; there is nothing that has both of those properties. Rather, the candle is a subject of C by having a temporal part at one time (or a proper sum of temporal parts at some interval of time) that has being 10 cm tall and a distinct temporal part at another time (or a distinct proper sum of temporal parts at some distinct interval of time) that has being 8 cm tall, and there is nothing contradictory about this.

The above remarks apply mutatis mutandis to the diachronically non-uniform experience of hearing ‘bobwhite’. If perdurantism is true, then there is nothing that has both of the temporarily instantiated phenomenal properties that correspond to the experiences of hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’; so, there is nothing that has both of those experiences. That is, if perdurantism is true, then there is no subject of both hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’, which is what (1) says. Now let us turn to (2).

4.

As discussed above, Chisholm argues for (2) by appealing to the so-called unity of conscious experience. As also discussed, Chisholm provides little by way of explanation of this unity. For that reason, it is not clear why the unity of an experience such as hearing ‘bobwhite’ requires there to be a subject of a ‘bob’ experience and a ‘white’ experience. It is not here denied that hearing ‘bobwhite’ exhibits the relevant kind of unity. Nor is it denied that a proper understanding of the unity of conscious experience would reveal (2) to be true. The following defense of (2), however, will not
appeal to the unity of conscious experience. This is because a stronger case for (2) can be made by focusing on the fact that hearing ‘bobwhite’ is a *phenomenally complex* phenomenal experience, that is, hearing ‘bobwhite’ is a phenomenal experience constituted by other phenomenal experiences. Towards developing this case, consider the following remarks.

A phenomenal experience has a distinctive phenomenal character. Put differently: There is a distinctive something that it’s like to have a phenomenal experience. So, a *phenomenally complex* experience has a phenomenal character. Moreover, the phenomenal characters of the distinct experiences that make up a phenomenally complex experience are related in such a way as to constitute the phenomenal character of that complex experience. Consider the complex experience of *seeing, hearing and smelling a circus*. When one has that experience, the phenomenal characters of *seeing a circus*, of *hearing a circus* and of *smelling a circus*, though distinct, are related in such a way as to constitute the complex phenomenal character of *seeing, hearing and smelling a circus*. Phenomenal characters related so as to constitute a complex phenomenal character, I will say are *constituents* of that complex character. In general, then, there is a something that it’s like to have a complex phenomenal experience, where this something that it’s like is itself in some way or other constituted by a something that it’s like to have *such-and-such* experience and a something that it’s like to have *so-and-so* experience, and so on for the other phenomenal characters that are constituents of the complex phenomenal character in question.

Given these remarks about complex phenomenal characters, consider the following claim:

(2a) It is impossible for a subject to experience a complex phenomenal character without also experiencing each of its constituent phenomenal characters.

How could a subject experience a phenomenal character that is *constituted by other phenomenal characters* without also experiencing those constituent phenomenal characters? To experience a phenomenally complex phenomenal character *just is* to experience its constituent phenomenal characters. Suppose a subject knows what it’s like to see, hear and smell a circus. How could that subject experience that complex phenomenal character—which is at least partly constituted by what it’s like to see a circus, what it’s like to hear a circus, and what it’s like to smell a circus—without also experiencing each of what it’s like to see a circus, what it’s like to hear a circus and what it’s like to smell a circus?

Or think about it like this. Suppose someone claimed to be able to provide a complete phenomenological description of some complex phenomenal character, but he was unable to provide a description of each of its constituent phenomenal characters. Suppose, for instance, he claimed to be able to provide a complete phenomenological description of the something that it’s like to hear ‘bobwhite’, but he wasn’t able to provide a description of the something that it’s like to hear ‘bob’ and/or wasn’t able to provide a description of the something that it’s like to hear ‘white’. In that case, the conclusion to draw is that our subject did not have the initially claimed ability to provide a complete phenomenological description of what it’s like to hear ‘bobwhite’. Indeed, the extent to which a phenomenological description of a complex phenomenal character
approximates a complete phenomenological description of that phenomenal character depends (at least in part) upon the accuracy and completeness of the descriptions of its constituent phenomenal characters. And part of the explanation for this is that in order for a subject to experience some complex phenomenal character—and so to stand any chance at describing that phenomenal character—one must also experience each of its constituent phenomenal characters.8

So, as (2a) entails, experiencing a complex phenomenal character requires experiencing each of its constituent phenomenal characters. But being a subject of a phenomenally complex phenomenal experience just is experiencing its complex phenomenal character. So, being a subject of a phenomenally complex phenomenal experience requires being a subject of each of its constituent phenomenal experiences. Hearing ‘bobwhite’ is a phenomenally complex phenomenal experience. Thus, being a subject of ‘bobwhite’ requires being a subject of its constituent phenomenal experiences hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’, which is just what (2) says.

The above argument for (2) can be further strengthened by considering two potential objections. First, though, note that (3) follows from (1) and (2). Clearly, (1) and (2) entail that if perdurantism is true, then there is no subject of the experience of hearing ‘bobwhite’, where the relevant features of hearing ‘bobwhite’ are its being diachronically non-uniform and phenomenally complex. It was supposed that hearing ‘bobwhite’ changes qualitatively only once, but this was a mere simplifying assumption, and relevant analogues of (1) and (2) would hold for any diachronically non-uniform phenomenal experience. So, (1) and (2) entail that if perdurantism is true, then, in general, there are no subjects of diachronically non-uniform phenomenal experiences. This alone is significant. For again, many experiences seem to be diachronically non-uniform. Now onto the aforementioned objections.

As noted earlier, Mark Heller has taken Chisholm’s Phenomenal Argument seriously enough to reply to it; Heller’s reply must then be considered. Doing so will also serve to reinforce the difference between Chisholm’s argument for (2) and the one developed here. Again, Chisholm’s argument for (2) appeals to the alleged unity of hearing ‘bobwhite’. Heller’s objection consists in describing a case in which a person experiences that unity yet fails to be a subject of hearing ‘bob’. Heller sets up his case with a sketch of a possible explanation of the unity of a conscious experience. He says:

Chisholm does not himself explain how it is that we experience a unity of consciousness. Consider the following sketch of one plausible explanation. The experience of ‘bobwhite’ has two smaller experiences as parts, that of ‘bob’ and that of ‘white’. But a ‘white’ experience that is immediately preceded by a ‘bob’ experience is significantly different from a ‘white’ experience that has no lead-in. Let us call the first of these a white-1 experience and the second a white-2 experience…Perhaps the white-1 experience carries with it a memory trace of the ‘bob’ experience. Since the white-2 experience does not follow a ‘bob’ experience, it does not carry such a memory trace. This is why the white-1 experience is itself experienced as the conclusion of a ‘bobwhite’ experience, whereas the white-2 experience is not perceived in this way. (1990: 23-24)
According to Heller, the following case is possible given his sketch of what explains the unity of a ‘bobwhite’ experience:

God could create someone *ex nihilo* … and create him having a white-1 experience. His experience will include memory traces of a ‘bob’ experience, even though he was not around to have had the ‘bob’ experience. The ‘white’ experience and the memory traces together are enough to make this newly created person perceive himself as having had a unified ‘bobwhite’ experience. So it seems that the experience of a unity of consciousness does not require that a single object have both a ‘bob’ experience and a ‘white’ experience. (1990: 24)

Crucial to assessing Heller’s proposed counterexample to Chisholm’s claim about the unity of hearing ‘bobwhite’ is determining how plausible it is to describe the imagined *ex nihilo* person as having experienced the unity of hearing ‘bobwhite’. Perhaps Chisholm would reply by saying that the *ex nihilo* person should not be so described. However, what Chisholm would or could say in reply to Heller’s case is neither here nor there for the purposes assessing the above argument for (2). For recall that that argument did not appeal to the unity of conscious experience. For that reason, the above case for (2)—and in turn this paper’s version of the Phenomenal Argument—is immune to Heller’s objection *even if* it constitutes a genuine counterexample to Chisholm’s claim about what the unity of conscious experience requires. Moreover, seeing why this is so fortifies the case for (2).

In Heller’s case, there is no subject of the phenomenally complex experience of hearing ‘bobwhite’. Accordingly, Heller’s case does not involve a subject experiencing the distinctive phenomenally complex character of that experience. So, the case doesn’t show that it’s possible to experience a phenomenally complex phenomenal character without also experiencing each of its constituent phenomenal characters. Thus, Heller’s case doesn’t threaten (2a), the linchpin of the above argument for (2). Notice that (2a) is consistent with Heller’s suggestion that there are interesting relations of interdependence between distinct phenomenal experiences in the form of memory traces. Let Heller’s *ex nihilo* person (apparently) remember having a ‘bob’ experience. However, apparently remembering having a ‘bob’ experience is not sufficient for experiencing the phenomenal character of a ‘bob’ experience, which again is partly constitutive of the complex phenomenal character of a ‘bobwhite’ experience.

At this point, someone might be tempted to fill in Heller’s case by supposing that a white-1 experience, in addition to carrying a memory trace of a ‘bob’ experience, also carries with it the phenomenal character of a ‘bob’ experience so that in having a white-1 experience one also thereby has a ‘bob’ experience. This, however, will not do if one’s purpose is undermining the above argument for (2). For in the case so modified, even though the *ex nihilo* person may very well experience the phenomenally complex character of a ‘bobwhite’ experience, he would also experience its constituent phenomenal characters, namely, the phenomenal character of a ‘bob’ experience and the phenomenal character of a ‘white’ experience. So, Heller’s case modified in that way would still fail to be a counterexample to (2a). Moreover, this point suggests that there is no way of modifying Heller’s case to obtain a counterexample to (2a). As just noted, a white-1 experience needs to be described so as to carry along more information than a
mere memory trace of a ‘bob’ experience. In particular, it would need to be described in such a way that having a white-1 experience is sufficient for having the phenomenal character of a ‘bob’ experience. But, as also just noted, a case involving a white-1 experience so described is no counterexample to (2a)—that it is impossible to experience a phenomenally complex phenomenal character without also experiencing each of its constituent phenomenal characters.

In sum, even if Heller’s objection undermines Chisholm’s original argument, it completely misses the mark when applied to the version of the Phenomenal Argument developed here. Indeed, the above considerations reinforce the above argument for (2) by highlighting how undemanding that argument actually is; it is neutral with regard to a wide variety of explanations of the alleged unity of conscious experience as well as a wide variety of suggestions about relations of interdependence between distinct phenomenal experiences.

Perhaps a perdurantist will react to the above discussion by claiming that the real moral to draw from Heller’s objection is that there simply are no diachronically non-uniform phenomenal experiences such as hearing ‘bobwhite’; there is a subject for hearing ‘bob’ and a distinct subject for hearing ‘white’ but no subject for the alleged experience of hearing ‘bobwhite’. As for the appearance of being a subject of such an alleged diachronically non-uniform experience, we can simply appeal to Heller’s memory traces between the ‘bob’ and ‘white’ experiences.11

There are at least two replies to such a reaction. First, drawing the above moral from Heller’s objection involves embracing the second horn of the dilemma posed by the Phenomenal Argument according to which persons persist no longer than diachronic uniform experiences of which they are subjects. And it has already been noted that such a result is prima facie objectionable. The reaction under consideration, then, concedes the primary aim of this paper. Second, appealing to Heller’s memory traces does not seem to explain the appearance of being a subject of a diachronically non-uniform experience. Again, let Heller’s ex nihilo subject (apparently) remember having had a ‘bob’ experience. As already noted, that sort of memory—which is best understood as an apparent memory that I had a ‘bob’ experience—is not sufficient for experiencing the phenomenal character of a ‘bob’ experience. For that reason, it’s hard to see how such a memory could be sufficient for appearing to have had the phenomenal character of a ‘bobwhite’ experience. Moreover, understanding the memory trace to involve more than the apparent memory that I had a ‘bob’ experience—perhaps to include the phenomenal character of hearing ‘bob’—is of no help to the perdurantist. For in that case, the subject in question would be simultaneously having a ‘bob’ experience and ‘white’ experience (cf. fn. 10 below), which would not be sufficient for the appearance of having the diachronically non-uniform experience of hearing ‘bobwhite’.12

I now turn to the second objection advertised above. This objection, though imaginary, is likely to occur to anyone familiar with the so-called ‘No-Change Objection’ to perdurantism. This objection purports to show that the argument for (2) is merely an instance of the No-Change Objection, to which perdurantists already have a plausible reply.13 Here is how someone might put such an objection:

Consider again the sample change, C, above involving the properties being 10cm tall and being 8cm tall. Someone might say that the nature of change implies that
to be a subject of C requires having both being 10cm tall and being 8cm tall. In fact, some philosophers—those that promote the No-Change Objection to perdurantism—do say this. Nevertheless, those philosophers are wrong and the No-Change Objection fails. For change is analogous to cases of synchronic variation of properties. The synchronic variation of a three-dimensional multi-colored object does not require that object to have the varying color properties; rather, the three-dimensional object need only have different parts that have the varying properties. Similarly, all that is required for something to be a subject of C is for it to have a temporal part (or proper sum of temporal parts) that has being 10cm tall and a different temporal part (or a different proper sum of temporal parts) that has being 8cm tall. Indeed, this is just the account of change one should expect given the truth of perdurantism. And the above argument for (2) fails for similar reasons. Or if it does not, that is only because it presupposes the general thesis that being a subject of change requires being a subject of the properties involved in that change. But in that case, the Phenomenal Argument—even the allegedly improved version of it offered here—is just an instance of the No-Change Objection, in which case we need not bother with it.

Contrary to what the imagined objector says, the above argument for (2) is independent of and so distinct from the No-Change Objection. One way to see this is to notice that someone could consistently endorse the argument for (2) and reject the No-Change Objection. For someone could consistently endorse the argument for (2) and maintain that there is a subject of a change—in the perdurantist’s very own sense of change—involving the phenomenal properties corresponding to the experiences of hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’. Endorsing the argument for (2) and maintaining that there is a subject of a change involving the experiences of hearing ‘bob’ and hearing ‘white’ does require either concluding that there really is no phenomenal experience such as hearing ‘bobwhite’ or that experiences such as hearing ‘bobwhite’ fail to have subjects. The important point here, however, is that the argument for (2) can be consistently combined with rejecting the No-Change Objection. Accordingly, the case for (2) offered above does not depend upon and so is distinct from the No-Change Objection.

Here is another way to see that the imagined objection fails. In a very important respect, the above argument for (2) is stronger than the No-Change Objection. For in reply to the latter, the perdurantist can lean heavily upon an arguably plausible analogy with cases of synchronic variation of properties between distinct parts. However, there is no remotely plausible analogy for the perdurantist to lean upon in reply to the above argument for (2). After all, it is not as if when considering a synchronically complex phenomenal character—such as the phenomenal character distinctive of simultaneously seeing, hearing and smelling a circus—it is somehow obvious that one could experience it without experiencing its constituent phenomenal characters. On the contrary, experiencing simultaneously what it’s like to see, hear, and smell a circus without also experiencing what it’s like to see a circus, what it’s like to hear a circus, and what it’s like to smell a circus is also impossible. It is a general point about complex phenomenal characters (whether their complexity is synchronic, diachronic or a combination of the two) that it is impossible to experience them without also experiencing each of their constituent phenomenal characters. Conclusion: The fact—which has been granted for
the sake of argument—that the perdurantist has a plausible reply to the No-Change Objection fails to impugn the argument for (2) developed above.

What the discussion so far reveals is that a successful objection to (2) must reject (2a)—that it is impossible to experience a phenomenally complex phenomenal character without also experiencing each of its constituent phenomenal characters. It shall be left as a challenge for those hoping to resist (2) to make their case for how one could experience a complex phenomenal character without also experiencing its constituent phenomenal characters. If such a case can plausibly be made, then the above argument for (2), along with this paper’s version of the Phenomenal Argument, fails. However, it is not at all obvious how such a case is to be made. Moreover, such a case, were it to be made, would almost certainly reveal something interesting about phenomenal experience. So ends the discussion of (1), (2) and their entailed conclusion (3). Defending the inferences from (3) to (4) and from (4) to (5) is all that remains.

5.

Recall the step from (3) to (4):

(3) If perdurantism is true, then there is no subject of hearing ‘bobwhite’ and, generalizing, there are no subjects of diachronically non-uniform phenomenal experiences.

Therefore,

(4) If perdurantism is true, then only diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences have subjects and these subjects persist no longer than the diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences of which they are subjects.

To see that (4) follows from (3), suppose that (3) and perdurantism are true. It then follows that no one is a subject of a diachronic non-uniform phenomenal experience. Therefore, if a diachronic phenomenal experience has a subject, then that experience must be a diachronically uniform phenomenal experience, that is, a phenomenal experience that doesn’t undergo change during its occurrence. However, no sum of temporal parts that persists longer than a diachronically uniform phenomenal experience can be a subject of that experience. In order for perdurantism to avoid the problem of change, such a sum of temporal parts can have only a temporal part (or a proper sum of temporal parts) that is a subject of that experience. To illustrate the point, suppose that the argument for (2) is mistaken and a perdurantist can maintain that hearing ‘bobwhite’ has a subject. That subject, a sum of temporal parts persisting longer than the experience of hearing ‘bob’, could not be a subject of hearing ‘bob’; a subject of hearing ‘bob’ would persist no longer than that ‘bob’ experience and likewise for a subject of hearing ‘white’. So, from (3) and perdurantism, it follows that only diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences have subjects and these subjects persist no longer than the diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences of which they are subjects. That is, (4) follows from (3).

Finally, reconsider (5):
(5) If perdurantism is true, then either persons are not subjects of phenomenal experiences or they persist no longer than the diachronically uniform phenomenal experiences of which they are subjects.

Suppose (4) is true. Then, if persons are subjects of phenomenal experiences, they persist no longer than those experiences, which are diachronically uniform. This entails that either they aren’t subjects of phenomenal experiences or they persist no longer than the diachronically phenomenal experiences of which they are subjects. Thus, (4) entails (5). This concludes the defense of this paper’s version of the Phenomenal Argument, an argument that deserves more serious consideration within on-going disputes about the metaphysics of persistence and persons.14

References


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1 For a representative sampling of the issues here see (Crisp and Smith 2005), (Hawley 2001), (Hudson 2001), (Lewis 1986), (Markosian 1994), (McKinnon 2002), (Merricks 1994 and 1999), (Sider 2001), and (Zimmerman 1996).

2 Chisholm’s so-called *entia successiva* argument (1979) has garnered more attention. Dean Zimmerman (2003) discusses and offers an extended defense of a version of Chisholm’s *entia successiva* argument, which is a pre-cursor to the so-called ‘Too Many Thinkers’ objection to perdurantism. Friends of the Too Many Thinkers objection include Olson (1997: 162-168), Merricks (2001: 97-99) and Zimmerman (2003: 501-503) and the objection is criticized by Noonan (2003: 209-213).

3 The version of the Phenomenal Argument developed here is consistent with the leading theories of phenomenal consciousness. The argument is consistent with representational theories—see (Byrne 2001), (Dretske 1995), (Tye 1995 and 2000)—functionalist theories—see (Lycan 1987 and 1996), (Shoemaker 1975)—as well as theories according to which phenomenal consciousness is an irreducible intrinsic feature—see (Block 1990), (Chalmers 1996), (Jackson 1982) and (Nagel 1973).

4 It is worth noting that stage theorists—those who say that we and other ordinary everyday continuants, such as footballs and kangaroos, are instantaneous stages—can slip through the horns of this dilemma. See (Hawley, 2001: 37-99) and (Sider, 1996 and 2001: 188-
for versions and defenses of stage theory. Stage theorists can say that a person can be the subject of some diachronically uniform experience such as hearing ‘bob’ by being an instantaneous stage existing within the interval during which a ‘bob’ experience occurs and being related in the right sorts of ways to other stages in that interval. And stage theorists can also say that a person existed before and will exist after that ‘bob’ experience by being related in the right sorts of ways to other instantaneous stages that exist before and after that experience. This looks to be a mark in favor of stage theory over perdurantism. At any rate, the Phenomenal Argument is aimed at perdurantism, not stage theory.


6 I include the qualification ‘or a proper sum of temporal parts at some interval of time’ to underscore that perdurantism is compatible with changes that involve temporarily instantiated properties that require some period of time over which to be instantiated. In such cases of change, a perdurantist can say that those properties are had by sums of temporal parts exactly located at the intervals required for the instantiation of those properties.

7 Much has been and continues to be said about the unity of consciousness. For a very thorough overview and extensive bibliography see (Brook and Raymont 2006).

8 Note that the claim is not that a subject must be able to provide a complete phenomenological description of a complex phenomenal character in order to experience it. The claim is about only what would be the case if a subject were able to provide such a description.

9 Perhaps Chisholm would reply by saying that the unity of hearing ‘bobwhite’ is not separable from a ‘bobwhite’ experience as Heller’s case presupposes. Chisholm might concede that the ex nihilo person’s white-1 experience together with the memory traces of a ‘bob’ experience are sufficient for experiencing the unity of some experience or other. But, what Chisholm might deny is that the experience of unity enjoyed by the ex nihilo person is the experience of unity that would be enjoyed by a subject of a ‘bobwhite’ experience.

10 Also, in modifying the case as described, it would no longer involve a diachronically non-uniform phenomenal experience. By being carried along in an experience of white-1, the experience of the phenomenal character of hearing ‘bob’ would co-occur with the experience of the phenomenal character of hearing ‘white’.

11 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for raising this concern and suggesting that I consider it.

12 I am also grateful to the anonymous referee mentioned in fn. 11 for suggesting this reply.

13 McTaggart (1927, XXXIII, sects. 315-316) was perhaps the first to raise this objection. More recent versions of the No-Change objection can be found in (Geach, 1972, sect. 10.2), (Hinchliff, 1996: 120-121), (Lombard, 1986: 108-9), (Mellor, 1981:110-111), and (Simons 1987: 134-137). See (Sider, 2001: 214-216) and (Hawley, 2001: 12-14) for what I take to be the standard reply to the No-Change Objection. This is the reply put into the mouth of the perdurantist in the imaginary objection discussed in the main text.

14 Thanks to Ken Akiba, Tom Crisp, Marian David, Eugene Mills, Trenton Merricks, Alvin Plantinga, Mike Rea, Catherine Sutton, Peter van Inwagen, Dean Zimmerman and an anonymous referee for this journal for comments on and/or discussion of earlier versions of this paper.