There is currently a lot of interest amongst philosophers in the idea of philosophical ‘expressivism’. This is in so small measure due to the pioneering work of Robert Brandom, who uses the term ‘expressivism’ as a label not just for his own project, but for a whole philosophical tradition that encompasses thinkers as diverse as Kant, Hegel, the American pragmatists, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. According to Brandom, this tradition offers a source of insights which, when systematised, can mount a serious challenge to the long-standing dominant paradigm in philosophy, especially analytical philosophy: ‘representationalism’. The representationalist paradigm presumes that the representational relation – say between thought and object, word and thing, language and the world – is primitive, so that representations figure as first in the order of explanation of what we are able to think, know and say. Expressivism denies this and maintains that the ‘expressive’ relation is basic. Brandom’s systematic exposition of the expressivist alternative to representationalism has an impressive ‘staying power’, to use Habermas’s phrase, and it has rightly provided the focus for recent debates about the nature of expressivism.

It is surprising, though, that Charles Taylor’s work on expressivism, for which he was famous in the 1970s and 80s, has hardly featured in these debates. After all, it is fair to say that prior to the recent interest in expressivism sparked by Brandom’s work, the term ‘expressivism’ owed its currency in Anglophone philosophical circles chiefly to two sources: its use as a label for a position in meta-ethics also commonly called ‘emotivism’; and Taylor’s very different use of it (indebted, in turn, to Isaiah Berlin) to designate a conception of human agency and its relation to nature that emerged historically out of
Romantic thought. It is also unfortunate that Taylor’s work in this area has been neglected because it deals with an aspect of what it means to ‘express’ something which is of great philosophical importance, but which tends to remain in the background - hidden and perhaps even repressed - in the contemporary debate about expressivism. At least this is the claim I want to put forward here.

I begin by picking up on Brandom’s suggestion that expressivism follows American pragmatism in seeking to advance the cause of the Enlightenment. This provides us with a first point of contrast with Taylor’s understanding of expressivism, since Taylor takes expressivism to be inseparably bound up with the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment and as fundamentally opposed to Enlightenment naturalism. I then distinguish two features of what we ordinarily mean by the term ‘expression’, one of which provides an intuitive basis for understanding Brandom’s expressivist program, the other of which provides an interpretive key for understanding Taylor’s version of expressivism.

After looking briefly at the main tenets of Taylor’s expressivism, I conclude by considering its relation to Romanticism on the one hand, and to Brandom’s expressivist renewal of the Enlightenment project on the other.

Second Enlightenment Expressivism

In an essay entitled ‘The Pragmatist Enlightenment (and its Problematic Semantics)’, Brandom presents an intriguing account of classical American Pragmatism as ‘the announcement, commencement, and first formulation of the fighting faith of a second Enlightenment’. Like the first Enlightenment, the pragmatist second Enlightenment took reason to be ‘the sovereign force in human life’, where reason was understood ‘on the
model provided by the forms of understanding distinctive of the natural sciences’. Those forms of understanding underwent a shift in the nineteenth century - Darwinian biology took over from Newtonian physics as the paradigm - and the pragmatists sought to bring the Enlightenment project up to date in light of this development. But there were other features of the first Enlightenment the classical American pragmatists wanted to correct. Some of these, Brandom remarks, had already been noticed by the Romantics, and rejection of them gave the pragmatists and the Romantics common cause. Both rejected the ‘spectator theories of knowledge’ favoured by the first Enlightenment, both drew attention to the genesis of theoretical knowledge in practical involvement in the world, and both turned to a ‘concept of the organic’ for healing – as Brandom puts it – ‘the dualistic wound inflicted by the heedless use of an over-sharp distinction between mind and world’.

But for all their attachment to Romanticism, the pragmatists remained fundamentally committed to the rational principles of the Enlightenment. Whereas, according to Brandom’s story, the Romantics countered the first Enlightenment with an irrationalist ‘privileging of feeling over thought, intuition over experience, [and] of art over science’, the pragmatists held their nerve and sought (to borrow another phrase from Habermas) to enlighten the Enlightenment about itself. And although the pragmatists were seduced for a time by the ‘vitalistic biology’ and ‘organic metaphors’ of Romanticism, it soon managed to shake these off. While its semantics took longer to mature (due in part to its enduring weakness for organicism), pragmatism is now in a position not just to announce, but to defend in systematic fashion the cause of a second Enlightenment.

It is able to do this, Brandom argues, because of the powerful theoretical resources that became available to philosophers in the twentieth century who focused on the
‘discontinuities with nature’ that language both ‘establishes’ and ‘enforces’. The emphasis placed on the ‘continuities between concept users and organic nature’ prevented the classical American pragmatists from developing an adequate theory of the conceptual. But Brandom acknowledges that the emphasis on continuity was not without its own warrant, and he concedes that ‘we have not yet sorted out the tensions between naturalistic assimilationism and normative exceptionalism about the discursive practices most distinctive of us’.11

This is a nice formulation of one of the most fundamental problems facing contemporary philosophy. But one also cannot help but be struck by how closely it defines the central problem that the Romantic movement (more so than the first Enlightenment) understood itself as facing. From its beginnings with Herder, Hölderlin, Schleiermacher, and others, the Romantic movement was concerned precisely with reconciling the autonomy (normative exceptionalism) and creaturely nature (naturalistic assimilationism) of the being marked above all by its language capacities (which is on this account the rational animal). And it was with a view to solving this problem that the Romantics first formulated the outlook that, thanks to the interpretations of Berlin and Taylor, has become widely known (especially amongst historians of ideas) as ‘expressivism’.

Thus, while Taylor and Brandom both take expressivism to rest on the thesis of the semantic priority of expression (that expression not representation comes first in the order of explanation of meaning), and while they substantially agree on who belongs to the expressivist canon (Hegel, Heidegger and Wittgenstein in particular), the Romantics also occupy a prominent place in Taylor’s (but not Brandom’s) pantheon of expressivists, and they do so because of (not despite) their concern to bring out the continuity that exists
between the rational human animal and the rest of organic nature. The twentieth-century philosopher arguably most taken up by this concern, Merleau-Ponty, also counts as a key expressivist for Taylor, but not for Brandom.12

In order to understand better where Taylor’s roughly speaking ‘Romantic’ paradigm of expressivism parts company with Brandom’s expressivism of ‘second Enlightenment’, we need to have a clearer idea of what it is about ‘expression’ that makes it fundamental from a semantic point of view. I will consider Taylor’s own views on this in a moment. But we find a clue to Brandom’s and Taylor’s different philosophical conceptions of expression in distinct features of the ordinary concept of expression, that is, the concept as it is used in everyday language. So let us briefly attend to these first.13

Two Features of Expression

First, consider what we ordinarily mean by a ‘facial expression’. One salient and obvious feature of a facial expression is that it involves activity of some kind. Smiling, grimacing, pouting, are things that we do, more or less voluntarily. I can smile in front of a camera if I decide to, or do it spontaneously and without forethought to acknowledge an approaching friend. As well as being a kind of act, facial expressions reveal something about our inner state. When my face drops at hearing some bad news I convey something about how I feel. Communication of course hinges on such expressions. But facial expressions don’t just seem to reflect how the subject feels. They also actually seem to help constitute the feeling. It may take more than a smile to make me feel happy, but expressing a feeling can certainly make a difference to what the feeling is like.
Think now of certain contexts in which the phrase ‘express yourself’ might be used. We can imagine it being used by the coach of a team of skilled players who, having gone through all the training, the tactics and so forth, are in the end told not to worry about obeying this or that instruction, and just play their own game. Of course, here too self-expression involves activity, a doing of something. But it also carries the implication of doing something new, something not done (or perhaps even conceived of) before. For the skilled player to express herself is not simply to repeat what she has done before, though the skill may have been acquired by constant repetition. Rather, it is to create a play, without necessarily meaning (in the sense of consciously intending) to do it, or without knowing in advance what will be done. This is the difference between expressing oneself and, say, asserting oneself. Both involve free action of sorts, but the mode of freedom involved in expression has an openness, contingency and room for creativity lacking in free self-assertion.

I mention these examples simply to draw attention to two different features of what in ordinary use ‘expressing’ something means. One is that expression is a matter of doing. The other relates rather to a bringing about, the creation of something that didn’t exist (or that only had the potential to exist) prior to the expression.

To the extent that representation involves a relation of correspondence between two distinct items, or a passive reflection of one thing in another, we can readily see how expression (both as a ‘doing’ and a ‘constituting’) contrasts with it. We can also readily see how expressing something, at least in the sense of a doing, is subject to norms. If through an expression one is doing something with something, we can straight away see that the correctness or incorrectness of the expression is a matter of the propriety or impropriety of
the deed. The normativity of expression would then be no more mysterious than that of any action and could be reconstructed from the basic principles of practical reason.

It is this feature of expression that the expressivism of the second Enlightenment draws on. As Brandom puts it, the pragmatists ‘tried to figure out what it is we do…that adds up to thinking or knowing something, even unsuccessfully’.\textsuperscript{14} Admittedly, some of the classical formulations of pragmatism suffered from a narrow, instrumentalist understanding of what the basic principles of practical reason were. They seemed to suggest that practical reason was simply a matter of determining the most efficient means to a given end. By rashly proposing that the truth of a theory, for example, consisted in its utility, or that instrumental control over an environment could provide the criterion of genuine knowledge, certain pragmatists repeated a mistake of the first Enlightenment. The instrumentalist error is also evident in the classical statements of ‘expressivist’ meta-ethics.\textsuperscript{15} This theory correctly analyses the meaning of moral judgements in terms of their expressive use rather than their putative representational function (which in any case they do not have: there is no independent moral reality to represent on this view). But it incorrectly reduces the norms implicit in that expression to those of instrumental rationality. For example, the meaning of ‘X is wrong’, on the standard ‘expressivist’ analysis of the emotivists, merely gives expression to a feeling (of disapproval) which has the practical purpose of eliciting disapproval in the addressee. But while this theory looks in the right place for the norms implicit in making moral judgements (namely, social practice), it reconstructs those practical norms in the wrong way. It is rightly ‘anti-representationalist’ and expressivist, but wrongly instrumentalist.
Taylor is also highly critical of emotivism, but even he would acknowledge that it touches on something important. This is the insight that moral judgements, understood as expressions, ‘bring something about’. Taylor would agree that the utterance of moral judgements brings about a certain social relation between the addressee and the addressee and this is an important aspect of their meaning. In principle such speech acts could serve to establish or support instrumental relations between people, but that will depend on the cultural context.\(^\text{16}\) A more serious objection Taylor has to emotivist expressivism, however, is that it assumes an ontology of natural facts onto which humans merely project their values. His fundamental objection is to the anti-realism of this kind of analysis, that is to say, its presumption that values are no more than a subjective matter, and that the only objective states of affairs are those described in a value-neutral manner by the modern natural sciences. Taylor thus rejects the subjectivist construal of what is ‘brought about’ by expressions of this kind, and by whom it is brought about. In Taylor’s view, the instrumentalist interpretation of what is done in making moral judgements is one reason for rejecting emotivist expressivism, the subjectivist interpretation of what is brought about by the use of moral language is another.

Taylor agrees with Brandom and the pragmatists that expression is a form of human activity. It is a kind of doing. As such, expressions are subject to practical norms. But the semantic significance of expression, in Taylor’s view, arises less from this feature than the second one I identified above, namely their ability to bring something about. This is also the feature of expression that Merleau-Ponty and the Romantic tradition - two key sources of Taylor’s but not Brandom’s expressivism - focused on. While not denying the pragmatist point that as a form of human activity expression is subject to practical norms,
the decisive point for the expressivists that inform Taylor’s understanding of expressivism is the role of expression in making something manifest. Let me now say a little bit more about where Taylor takes this idea.

**Taylor’s ‘Romantic’ Expressivism**

Taylor’s explicit point of departure for thinking about expression is that ‘an expression makes something manifest in an embodiment’. This simple formula already reveals much about Taylor’s expressivist philosophical orientation. If this is what, for philosophical purposes, we mean by expression, then idea that expression is first in the order of explanation of meaning implies that embodiment is an essential feature (or presupposition) of the things that carry meaning. Obviously, one thing we think of as bearing meaning is human experience. If that is the case, then the ‘meaning-content’ of experience cannot, at a fundamental level, be separated from its manifestation in the human body. It would be wrong to suppose, for instance, that experience (as a bearer of meaning) is only contingently connected to the body in which it is made manifest. This idea is encouraged, though, by representationalist theories of experience that oppose an inner realm of representations to an outer realm of represented objects. Taylor’s expressivism is from the start opposed to the ‘inner-outer’ sorting that accompanies standard representationalist theories of the mind. Indeed, the whole point of expressivism, what is so attractive about it from Taylor’s point of view, is that it avoids this kind of dualism. Instead, it conceives the mind as inseparable from its incarnation in matter. This is a fundamental axiom of Taylor’s expressivism which he is convinced of early on by Merleau-Ponty, and which his studies of Romantic thought and its legacy (especially Hegel) impressed on him further.
According to this kind of expressivism, human beings share with other animals a natural capacity to express feelings, desires and purposes in action, and speech is a natural development of this capacity for action. Following Herder, Taylor takes a genetic approach to language that traces it back to our engaged, embodied stance in the world. Our original condition is not that of minds with private thoughts and feelings which are subsequently communicated in speech (though this is an ability we later acquire as a refinement of our capacity for linguistic expression). Rather, the thoughts and feelings we recognise in ourselves and others come to be as we recognise them through the way we express and articulate those thoughts and feelings. To say that language expresses meaning is to say that the meaning language conveys is bound up with its linguistic embodiment: the meaning does not pre-exist its linguistic form in the mind of the language user. In this way, meaning is realised and not just communicated in what Taylor calls ‘the semantic dimension’. According to Taylor’s Herder-inspired view, the primary function of language is not to describe something already there, something that would be there even without language; though again this is not to say that language is not often descriptive. Rather language originally expresses things that can only be made manifest through the expression, that is, internally to the semantic dimension.

But if meanings do not pre-exist expression, in an important sense the expression constitutes the meaning. This meaning-productive, constitutive role of expression is never far from the focus of Taylor’s writings on language, and it would only be a small exaggeration to say that his whole expressivist philosophy of language is geared towards recovering a sense of its significance. The three main ways in which Taylor takes meanings to be constituted internally to language are as follows. First, and as mentioned
before, there are certain interpersonal relations that only come about insofar as they issue from an expressive act. All sorts of social relations are only possible on account of the right word being said, at the right time, in the right way. Just by saying ‘sorry’ for instance, a whole new social space can be opened up. Second, there is a range of emotions whose very content depends on the words used to express them. By finding just the right expression, for instance, a confusing, troubling emotion can become clear, and with the clarity a new feeling manifests itself. And third, Taylor draws attention to moral standards whose ability to convince and move us is conditioned by the expression we give to them. In all three cases, linguistic expression brings something about which cannot exist without language or outside the semantic dimension. By expressing thoughts, feelings, desires and purposes in language we can transform them. By giving them a reflective dimension we can, in effect, create new ones. In this sense language is productive of meaning, and the capacity to generate or create meaning is intrinsic to it. Language thereby creates possibilities that don’t exist for non-linguistic beings.

Now the normativity of language, on this view, is set by the multiple standards of correctness and incorrectness that hold sway across the semantic dimension, not just truth and falsity. Rightness is not just a question of the fit between the expression and what is expressed, or between a proposition and its object. It is not just descriptive or assertive expressions that are subject to norms. Standards of correctness and incorrectness apply to other kinds of expression too. For example, a word or articulation can be the proper one for establishing a desired interpersonal relation (‘sorry’ bringing about reconciliation); it can be right for clarifying an indeterminate feeling (say as indignation rather than anger); or it can guide an agent to act in the way called for by the situation.
According to Taylor’s expressivism, therefore, there are normative constraints on non-designative modes of language use, usages which do not involve talking about an independently existing object. We have to look for the right word, or the right articulation, in a plurality of contexts. And in some contexts, being true to the phenomena, or expressing them rightly, may require radical linguistic innovation. Linguistic or semantic innovation can itself constitute the meaning. Not just descriptive prose, but broadly speaking ‘poetic’ modes of expression, may be required for getting (in a manner of speaking) at the truth. This suggests that in doing things such as evoking the right mood, or articulating a feeling with the right nuance, we are just as accountable (or subject to norms) as we are when making literal assertions about some thing. Descriptive prose then loses its status as the paradigm locus of meaning. And it was this productive power of language, Taylor reminds us, that the Romantics took as their point of departure. In looking to the work of art as the paradigm locus of meaning the Romantics were not so much rejecting reason, science and rationality as responding to the distinctive capacity of expressive language to ‘make possible its own content’. Taylor is sympathetic to this move, and his reconstructions of the rationale behind it have done much to bring out the contemporary relevance of Romantic expressivism.

The Post-Romantic Agenda
At the same time, it is misleading to say that Taylor himself is a ‘Romantic’ expressivist. Certainly, it is not a consequence of his expressivism to privilege feeling over thought or intuition over experience. Nor does Taylor show any proclivity for the ‘concept of the organic’ or ‘vitalistic biology’ with which pragmatism briefly flirted under the spell of
Romanticism. He agrees with Brandom that the concept of nature has been so thoroughly
disenchanted by the natural sciences that the project of recovering meaning in nature at the
‘ontic’ level - that is, at the levels at which objective scientific descriptions work and the
metaphysical discourses that ground them - has had its day. But in Taylor’s view this does
not mean that the problem of reconciling mind and nature, with which the Romantics
grappled with only partial success, has gone away. Nor, in Taylor’s view, can this problem
simply be attributed to ‘the heedless use of an over-sharp distinction between mind and
world’ as Brandom suggests. This is because, for all the progress that the theory of
concepts has been able to make by focusing on the discontinuity between concept users
and organic nature, concept users are still always embodied in nature and their
understanding develops out of genetically more basic pre-conceptual expressive capacities.
Failure to keep in view how meaning finds expression at this level would undermine the
whole expressivist project, at least as Taylor understands it. Conversely, retrieval of the
pre-conceptual content of lived experience suggests itself as a more promising (and
philosophically less demanding) way of reconciling mind and world than full-blooded
Romantic organicism.

Taylor’s expressivism also cannot be considered ‘Romantic’ if that means it
privileges art over science as a medium for expressing truth. On Taylor’s account, as I
have already suggested, objective scientific description realises a potential for expressive
‘correctness’ that non-scientific discourses cannot match. Alongside science, art realises
other kinds of expressive potential, and has its own standards of appropriateness, much as
the Romantics declared. But even here Taylor does not think that art realises powers of
expression in quite the way the Romantics supposed. There are several reasons for this.
One has to do with what Taylor calls the ‘fracturing’ of ‘the expressive turn’ initiated by the Romantics, whereby expressive practices that make manifest an order of significance in which the subject is set are diversified and brought into conflict with each other. A related reason has to do with the collapse of what Taylor calls a ‘publicly established order of references’ - which the Romantics could presume but which no longer obtains in the post-Romantic world - in relation to which expression through art could claim intersubjective validity. A third reason concerns the contestability of the Romantic assumption that art could reconcile mind and nature by disclosing nature as what Taylor calls a ‘constitutive good’, that is, a reality worthy of unambiguous affirmation. It fell to Romantic art to reveal, and to make manifest, the course of life (élan vital) running through nature and the heightening of life that came about when nature expressed itself as art – all, of course, in a context of burgeoning industrialisation. But in our own ‘Post-Romantic’ historical context, the goodness of nature, and the worth of a life led in ‘contact’ with it, cannot so readily be taken for granted.

Nonetheless, the idea that the work of art is a paradigm case of expression, precisely in the sense that it ‘makes something manifest in an embodiment’, remains fundamental to Taylor’s expressivism. Taylor owes this idea to the Romantics, but in retrospect he can say that the Romantics had a restricted and in some respects naïve understanding of what such expression involved. They rightly saw that in the modern world the creative imagination has an indispensable role to play in the articulation (or expression) of our intuitive sense of belonging to a spiritually significant reality. The work of art makes a ‘moral reality’ manifest that would otherwise be inaccessible; it ‘discloses a world’. But from Taylor’s post-Romantic perspective, the understanding reached through
such expressions is ‘indexed to a personal vision’ in a more radical manner than the
Romantics could have seen. This is not to say that the ‘moral reality’ disclosed in a work
of art is just an invention of the subject, a mere product of the imagination with no external
grounding. But it is to acknowledge the unavoidably subjective manner in which that
ground comes to expression.

At this point Taylor parts company with Hegel’s rationalist expressivism, and by
implication with Brandom’s. On the one hand, Taylor claims that the work of art can give
legitimate, non-conceptual and non-substitutable expression to a subject’s intuitive sense
of reality. Art is not just the self-awareness of Spirit ‘in default of concepts’, as Hegel
supposed, but a genuine source of understanding that at least in some cases lies beyond the
reach of the conceptual. Taylor thus rejects the Hegelian idea of Absolute Knowledge, of
an Aufhebung of art by philosophy. On this account his expressivism amounts to a
hermeneutics of finitude that contrasts with the Absolute Idealism Brandom finds
congenial. On the other hand, Taylor maintains that it is an open question whether the
norms to which expressions are subject have a human or non-human source. Brandom’s
expressivism settles this matter decisively in favour of the secular option. Indeed grasping
this is precisely what Absolute Knowledge is all about: taking responsibility for the
discursive practices that characterise us. It is also the founding principle of pragmatism,
and of the ‘Enlightenment project’ pragmatism advanced. Richard Rorty has remarked that
Brandom has managed better than anyone else to vindicate this core principle of
Enlightenment thought philosophically, and it is hard to disagree with him. Brandom
shows how authority by way of expression rests on the freedom of those who participate in
expressive practices themselves. The idea that the subject of expression is accountable to
some non-human source of norms is anathema to this version of expressivism. Taylor’s expressivist might reply that while the authority lent to expression is just a human, social matter, excellence by way of expression may require the acknowledgement of non-human sources of significance (such as the natural environment or other species). Such acknowledgement would not have to involve obedience to something non-human, but it would seem to require openness to possibilities that the Enlightenment view rules out a priori.

The stakes of the debate between Taylor’s and Brandom’s expressivism are thus high. It is a debate well worth taking further.

Notes


4 Not that Berlin and Romanticism are the only sources of Taylor’s understanding of expressivism. As I have shown elsewhere (Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity, Cambridge, Polity, 2002, chapter 1), Taylor is just as indebted to the ‘expressivist’ account of perception presented by Merleau-Ponty in The Structure of Behaviour and The Phenomenology of Perception. See also note 11.

5 I leave to one side discussions of expressivism triggered by Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza - which admittedly has had a large impact on ‘Continental Philosophy’ in recent years. See Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin, Zone, London, 1990. Other influential discussions of expression in the Continental tradition I won’t have space to consider include Levinas’s in Totality and Infinity.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. p. 3, and for Habermas’s case for an ‘enlightened enlightenment’, see Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.


11 Ibid.

13 For Brandom’s and Taylor’s own reflections on how their philosophical conceptions of expression relate to the concept as it is used in ordinary language, see Brandom, Articulating Reasons p. 7f, and Taylor, ‘Action as Expression’.


16 While broadly sympathetic to MacIntyre’s meta-ethics, Taylor does not go as far as to endorse MacIntyre’s thesis in After Virtue that emotivism merely reflects the degenerate state of morality in modern society. See Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed, London: Duckworth, 1984.

17 Taylor, ‘Action as Expression’, p. 73.


21 See Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, p. 103.


23 See Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 390.

24 Ibid., p. 491.
25 Ibid., p. 93.
26 Ibid., p. 510.
27 Taylor, Hegel, p. 467.