DANIEL W. SMITH

ESSAYS ON DELEUZE

Essays on Deleuze

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Daniel W. Smith

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Abbreviations

References to the works below are given in the text using the following abbreviations, followed by the page number(s). I have occasionally introduced slight modifications in the cited translations.

The seminars Deleuze gave at the Université de Paris VIII–Vincennes à St. Denis are in the process of being transcribed and made available online by Richard Pinhas (at *Web Deleuze*, webdeleuze.com) and Marielle Burkhalter (at *La Voix de Gilles Deleuze*, www2.univ-paris8.fr/Deleuze), and are referred to in the text by their date, e.g., 15 Apr 1980.

ABC	*L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet*, Paris: DVD Editions Montparnasse (1996, 2004). An English presentation of these interviews, by Charles Stivale, can be found at www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/d-g. References are by letter, not page number.
AO	Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977).
B	Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone, 1988).
D	Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
DI	Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts*, ed. Sylvère Lotinger, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004).
DP	Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (London and New York, Routledge, 2000).
DR	Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
ECC	Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
EPS	Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone, 1990).

ES Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

F Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

FB Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

FLB Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

K Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

KCP Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984).

LS Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester, with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

M Gilles Deleuze, *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone, 1989).

MI Gilles Deleuze, *The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

N Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995).

NP Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

NVC Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

OB Slavoj Žižek, *Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences* (London: Routledge, 2003).

PI Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone, 2001).

PS Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text*, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

PV Gilles Deleuze, *Périclès et Verdi* (Paris: Minuit, 1988).

RP "Reversing Platonism (Simulacra)," trans. Heath Massey, published as an appendix to Leonard Lawlor, *Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 163–77.

SPP Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988).

TI Gilles Deleuze, *The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Goleta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

TP Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

TRM Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*,

trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006).

WP Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Preface

This volume brings together twenty essays on the work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) that I have written over the past fifteen years. The first (Essay 6) was published in 1996, while the most recent (Essay 8) is appearing for the first time in this book. The original pieces were written as journal articles, book prefaces, and lectures, and although I have introduced minor revisions throughout—and in one case (Essay 2) restored an omitted section—the essays have been reproduced here largely in their original form. As a result, there remains a certain overlap among the essays, which occasionally return to the same themes from different points of view, while pursuing different trajectories. The essays have been organized into four sections, each of which examines a particular aspect of Deleuze's thought.

1. *Deleuze and the History of Philosophy*. Deleuze began his career with a series of books on various figures in the history of philosophy—Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson, and Spinoza—and the first set of essays explores three broad trajectories in Deleuze's approach to the history of philosophy. The first essay presents Deleuze's reading of Plato in light of Nietzsche's call for the "overturning" of Platonism, while the second essay uses Duns Scotus's concept of univocity to explore Spinoza's overturning of the medieval Aristotelian tradition. The final three essays constitute a trilogy that examines Deleuze's relationship to the pre- and post-Kantian traditions. Essay 3 provides a Deleuzian reading of Leibniz's philosophy, and Essay 4 discusses the frequently laid charge that Deleuze is anti-Hegelian. The fifth essay recapitulates these readings of Leibniz and Hegel by placing them in the context of the problem of the relation between logic and existence, and explores the reasons why Deleuze turned to the development of a philosophy of *difference*. Taken together, these essays show Deleuze's deep indebtedness to these traditions, as well as the manner in which he transformed them in the pursuit of his own philosophical project.

2. *Deleuze's Philosophical System*. Deleuze once remarked that he conceived of philosophy as a *system*, albeit a system that was open and "heterogenetic." The essays collected in this section attempt to explicate the broad outlines of Deleuze's philosophical system by taking as their initial point of reference one of the great

systems in the history of philosophy, namely, Kant's critical philosophy. In particular, the essays explore five philosophical domains derived from the architectonic structure of Kant's philosophy: *aesthetics* (theory of sensation), *dialectics* (theory of the Idea), *analytics* (theory of the concept), *ethics* (theory of affectivity), and *politics* (socio-political theory). Each essay, to a greater or lesser degree, shows how Deleuze takes Kant's characterization of these domains and reconceives them in a new manner, inserting them into a very different systematic framework. The use of these Kantian rubrics is primarily a heuristic device designed to exemplify the specificity of Deleuze's conception of a philosophical system, which, he says, "must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a *heterogenesis*"—that is, it must have as its aim the genesis of the heterogeneous, the production of difference, the creation of the *new*.*

3. *Five Deleuzian Concepts*. Similarly, Deleuze famously defined philosophy as the creation of concepts, and this section moves from the broad outlines of Deleuze's philosophical system to a consideration of five specific Deleuzian concepts. The essays on the "New" and the "Open" deal primarily with issues in Deleuze's metaphysics and ontology, while the essay on "Desire" examines the role this concept plays in Deleuze's ethics of immanence. Many of Deleuze's writings were devoted to philosophical analyses of the arts, and the essays on "Life" and "Sensation" deal with, respectively, Deleuze's analyses of literature in *Essays Critical and Clinical* and the "logic of sensation" presented in his work on the painter Francis Bacon.

4. *Deleuze and Contemporary Philosophy*. The last section, finally, is devoted to analyzing the position that Deleuze occupies within contemporary philosophy, and the implications that his thought has for future philosophy. The first three essays contrast Deleuze with the work of three of his influential contemporaries with regard to a specific topic of debate: Jacques Derrida (on the relation of immanence and transcendence), Alain Badiou (on the nature of multiplicities), and Jacques Lacan (on the concept of structure). The fourth essay presents a Deleuzian reading of the work of Pierre Klossowski, an often-overlooked figure who exerted a strong influence on Deleuze. The final essay examines Paul Patton's important work on the ways in which Deleuze's thought might serve to rejuvenate the liberal tradition in political philosophy.

* Gilles Deleuze, "Letter Preface," in Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas and Susan Dyrkton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 8: "I believe in philosophy as system. For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a *heterogenesis*—something which, it seems to me, has never been attempted."

PART I

Deleuze and the History of Philosophy

ESSAY 1

Platonism

The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism

The concept of the simulacrum, along with its variants (simulation, similitude, simultaneity, dissimulation), has a complex history within twentieth-century French thought. The notion was developed primarily in the work of three thinkers—Pierre Klossowski, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean Baudrillard—although each of them conceived of the notion in different yet original ways, which must be carefully distinguished from each other. Klossowski, who first formulated the concept in his extraordinary series of theologico-erotic writings, retrieved the term from the criticisms of the Church fathers against the debauched representations of the gods on the Roman stage (*simulacrum* is the Latin term for "statue" or "idol," and translates the Greek *phantasma*).[1] Deleuze, while acknowledging his debt to Klossowski, produced his own concept of the simulacrum in *Difference and Repetition*, using the term to describe differential systems in which "the different is related to the different *through* difference itself" (DR 299). Baudrillard, finally, took up the concept of the simulacra to designate the increasingly "hyperreal" status of certain aspects of contemporary culture.[2] It would thus be possible to write a philosophical history of the notion of the simulacrum, tracing out the intrinsic permutations and modifications of the concept. In such a history, as Deleuze writes, "it's not a matter of bringing all sorts of things under a single concept, but rather of relating each concept to the variables that explain its mutations" (N 31). That history, however, still remains to be written. What follows is a single sequence of that history, one that focuses on Deleuze's work, and attempts to specify the components of Deleuze's own concept of the simulacrum. As such, it can be conceived as a contribution to a broader reconsideration of the role that the notion of the simulacrum has played in contemporary thought.

THE REVERSAL OF PLATONISM

Deleuze developed his concept of the simulacrum primarily in *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and *Logic of Sense* (1969).[3] The problem of the simulacrum arises in the context of Deleuze's reading of Plato, or more precisely, in the context of his

reading of Nietzsche's reading of Platonism. Nietzsche had defined the task of his philosophy, and indeed the philosophy of the future, as the reversal of Platonism. In an early sketch for his first treatise (1870–1), he wrote: "My philosophy is an *inverted Platonism*: the farther removed from true being, the purer, the finer, the better it is. Living in semblance as goal."[4] Deleuze accepts this gauntlet that Nietzsche throws down to future philosophy. But what exactly does it mean to "invert Platonism"? This is the question that concerns Deleuze, and the problem is more complex than it might initially seem. Could not every philosophy since Aristotle be characterized as an attempt to reverse Platonism (and not simply a footnote to Plato, as Whitehead once suggested)?[5] Plato, it is said, opposed essence to appearance, the original to the image, the sun of truth to the shadows of the cave, and to overturn Platonism would initially seem to imply a reversal of this standard relation: what languishes below in Platonism must be put on top; the super-sensuous must be placed in the service of the sensuous. But such an interpretation, as Heidegger showed, only leads to the quagmire of positivism, an appeal to the *positum* rather than the *eidos*.[6] More profoundly, the phrase would seem to mean the abolition of *both* the world of essence *and* the world of appearance. Yet even this project would not be the one announced by Nietzsche; Deleuze notes that "the double objection to essences and appearance goes back to Hegel, and further still, to Kant" (LS 253).

To discover "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable,"[7] Deleuze argues, one must go back even further, to Plato himself, and attempt to locate in precise terms the motivation that led Plato to distinguish between essence and appearance in the first place. In Deleuze's interpretation, Plato's singularity lies in a delicate operation of sorting or selection that *precedes* the discovery of the Idea, and that turns to the world of essences only as a criterion for its selective procedures. The motivation of the theory of Ideas lies initially in the direction of a will to select, to sort out, to *faire la différence* (literally, "to make the difference") between true and false images. To accomplish this task, Plato utilizes a method that will master all the power of the dialectic and fuse it with the power of myth: the method of division. It is in the functioning of this method that Deleuze uncovers not only the sense of Nietzsche's inverted Platonism, but also what was the decisive problem for Platonism itself—namely, the problem of simulacra.

THE METHOD OF DIVISION AS A DIALECTIC OF RIVALRY

"The creation of a concept," Deleuze writes, "always occurs as the function of a problem" (ABC H). The problem that concerned Plato was the problem of the Athenian democracy—or more specifically, the agonistic problem of *rivalry*. This can be clearly seen in the *modus operandi* of two of Plato's great dialogues on division, the *Phaedrus* and the *Statesman*, each of which attempts to isolate, step by step, the true statesman or the true lover from the claims of numerous rivals. In the *Statesman*, for example, Plato proposes a preliminary definition of the statesman as "the shepherd of men," the one who knows the pastoral care of men, who takes care of humans. But in the course of the dialogue, numerous rivals—including

merchants, farmers, and bakers, as well as gymnasts and the entire medical profession—come forward to say, "*I* am the shepherd of men!" In the *Phaedrus*, similarly, an attempt is made to define madness, or more precisely, to distinguish well-founded madness, or true love, from its false counterparts. Here again, all sorts of rivals—lovers, poets, priests, soothsayers, philosophers—rush forward to claim, "*I* am the possessed! *I* am the lover!" In both cases, the task of the dialogue is to find a means to distinguish between the true claimant from its false rivals. "The one problem which recurs throughout Plato's philosophy," writes Deleuze, "is the problem of measuring rivals and selecting claimants" (DR 60).

Why did these relations of rivalry become "problematized" for Plato? Jean-Pierre Vernant and Marcel Detienne, in their work on the origins of Greek thought, have shown that such rivalries constituted an essential characteristic of the Athenian city. The path from myth to reason was not some sort of inexplicable "miracle" or "discovery of the mind," they argue, but was conditioned historically by the social structure of the Greek *polis*, which "laïcized" the mythic forms of thought characteristic of the neighboring empires by bringing them into the agonistic and public space of the *agora*.[8] In Deleuze's terminology, imperial states and the Greek cities were types of social formations that "deterritorialized" their surrounding rural territories, but they did so according to two different models. The archaic States "overcoded" the rural territories by relating them to a superior *arithmetic* unity (the despot), by subordinating them to a *transcendent* mythic order that was imposed upon them from above. The Greek cities, by contrast, adapted the surrounding territories to a *geometric* extension in which the city itself became a relay-point in an *immanent* network of commercial and maritime circuits. These circuits formed a kind of international market on the border of the eastern empires, organized into a multiplicity of independent societies in which artisans and merchants found a freedom and mobility that the imperial states denied them.[9]

This geometric organization was, in turn, reflected in the internal civic space of the cities. Whereas the imperial *spatium* of the state was centered on the royal palace or temple, which marked the transcendent sovereignty of the despot and his god, the political *extensio* of the Greek city was modeled on a new type of geometric space (*isonomia*) that organized the *polis* around a common and public center (the *agora*), in relation to which all the points occupied by the "citizens" appeared equal and symmetrical.[10] What the Greek cities invented, in other words, was the *agon* as a community of free men or citizens, who entered into agonistic relations of rivalry with other free men, exercising power and exerting claims over each other in a kind of generalized athleticism. In the Greek city, for example, a magistracy is an object of a claim, a function for which someone can pose a candidacy, whereas in an imperial State such functionaries were named by the emperor. This new and determinable type of human relation (agonistic) permeated the entire Greek assemblage; agonistic relations were promoted between cities (in war and the games), within cities (in the political Assembly and the legal magistratures), in family and individual relations (erotics, economics, dietetics, gymnastics), and even in the relation with oneself (for how could one claim to govern others if one could not govern oneself?).[11] What made philosophy possible, what constituted its historical

condition of possibility, in Deleuze's view, was precisely this *milieu of immanence* that was opposed to the imperial and transcendent sovereignty of the State, and implied no pre-given interest, since it, on the contrary, presupposed rival interests.[12]

Finally, these agonistic relations of rivalry, and the social conditions that produced them, problematized the image of the thinker in a new way. Whereas imperial empires or states had their wise men or priests, possessors of wisdom, the Greeks replaced them with the philosopher, *philo-sophos*, the *friend* or lover of wisdom, one who searches for wisdom but does not possess it—and who is therefore able, as Nietzsche said, to make use of wisdom as a mask, and to make it serve new and sometimes even dangerous ends.[13] For Deleuze, this new definition of the thinker is of decisive importance: with the Greeks, the friend becomes a presence *internal* to thought. The friend is no longer related simply to another person, but also to an Entity or Essence, an Idea, which constitutes the object of its desire (*Eros*). "I am the friend of Plato," says the philosopher, "but even more so, I am the friend of Wisdom, of the True, of the Concept." If the philosopher is the friend of wisdom rather than a wise man or sage, it is because wisdom is something to which he lays claim, but does not actually possess. In this manner, however, friendship was made to imply not only an amorous desire for wisdom, but also a jealous *distrust* of one's rival claimants. This is what makes philosophy Greek and connects it with the formation of cities; the Greeks formed societies of friends or equals, but at the same time promoted relations of rivalry between them. If each citizen lays claim to something, he necessarily encounters rivals, so that two friends inevitably become a claimant and his rival. The carpenter may claim the wood, as it were, but he clashes with the forester, the lumberjack, and the joiner, who say, in effect, "*I* am the friend of the wood!" These agonistic relations would also come to determine the realm of thought, in which numerous claimants came forward to say, "*I* am the friend of Wisdom! *I* am the true philosopher!" In the Platonic dialogues, this rivalry famously culminates in the clash between Socrates and the sophists, who "fight over the remains of the ancient sage."[14] The "friend," the "lover," the "claimant," and the "rival" constitute what Deleuze calls the *conceptual personae* of the Greek theater of thought, whereas the "wise man" and the "priest" were the personae of the State and religion, for whom the institution of sovereign power and the establishment of cosmic order were inseparable aspects of a transcendent drama, imposed from above by the despot or by a god superior to all others.[15] While it is true that the first philosophers may have been sages or wise men immigrating to Greece in flight from the empires, what they found in the Greek city was this immanent arena of the *agon* and rivalry, which alone provided the constituent milieu for philosophy.[16]

It is within this agonistic milieu that Deleuze contextualizes the procedures of division found in the *Phaedrus* and the *Statesman*. What Plato criticized in the Athenian democracy was the fact that anyone could lay claim to anything, and could carry the day by force of rhetoric. The Sophists, according to Plato, were claimants for something to which they had no right. In confronting such situations of rivalry—whether in the domain of love, politics, or thought itself—Plato confronted the question, How can one separate the true claimant from the false claimant? It is in response to this problem that Plato would create the *Idea* as a

philosophic concept: the Idea is used as a criterion for sorting out these rivals and judging the well-foundedness of their claims, authenticating the legitimate claimants and rejecting the counterfeits, distinguishing the true from the false, the pure from the impure.[17] But in so doing, Deleuze argues, Plato wound up erecting a *new* type of transcendence, one that differs from the imperial or mythic transcendence of the States or empires (although Plato would assign to myth its own function). With the concept of the Idea, Plato invented a type of transcendence that was capable of being exercised and situated *within* the field of immanence itself. Immanence is necessary, but it must be immanent *to* something transcendent, to an ideality. "The poisoned gift of Platonism," Deleuze comments, "is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning . . . Modern philosophy will continue to follow Plato in this regard, encountering a transcendence at the heart of immanence as such" (ECC 137).

From this point of view, Deleuze argues that Aristotle's later criticisms misconstrue the essential point of Plato's method. Aristotle interprets division as a means of dividing a genus into opposing species in order to subsume the thing being investigated under the appropriate species—hence the continuous process of specification in search for a definition of the angler's art. He correctly objects that division in Plato is a bad and illegitimate syllogism because it lacks a "reason"—the identity of a concept capable of serving as a middle term—which could, for example, lead us to conclude that angling belongs to the arts of acquisition, and to acquisition by capture, and so on.[18] But the goal of Plato's method of division is completely different. The method of division is not a dialectic of contradiction or contrariety (*antiphasis*), a determination of species, but rather a dialectic of rivals and suitors (*amphisbetesis*), a selection of claimants.[19] It does not consist of dividing genera into species, but of selecting a pure line from an impure and undifferentiated material; it attempts to distinguish the authentic and the inauthentic, the good and the bad, the pure and the impure, from within an indefinite mixture or multiplicity. It is a question of "making the difference," but this difference does not occur between species; it lies entirely within the depths of the immediate, where the selection is made *without mediation*. Plato himself likens division to the search for gold, a process which likewise entails several selections: the elimination of impurities, the elimination of other metals "of the same family," and so on. This is why the method of division can appear to be a capricious, incoherent procedure that jumps from one singularity to another, in contrast with the supposed identity of the concept. But, Deleuze asks, "is this not its strength from the viewpoint of the Idea"? With the method of division, "the labyrinth or chaos is untangled, but without a thread or the assistance of a thread" (DR 59).

THE PLATONIC IDEA AS A CRITERION OF SELECTION

How does the concept of the "Idea" carry out this selection among rival claimants? Plato's method, Deleuze argues, proceeds by means of a certain irony. For no sooner has division arrived at its actual task of selection than Plato suddenly intervenes with a *myth*: in the *Phaedrus*, the myth of the circulation of souls appears to interrupt

the effort of division, as does the myth of archaic times in the *Statesman*. Such is the second trap of division, the second irony: the first is the sudden appearance of rival claimants, the second this sudden appearance of evasion or renunciation. The introduction of myth seems to confirm all the objections of Aristotle; division, lacking mediation, has no probative force, and must thus allow itself to be replaced by a myth which could furnish it with an equivalent of mediation in an imaginary or narrative manner. Once again, however, this Aristotelian objection misses the sense of Plato's project. For the myth, says Deleuze, interrupts nothing, but is, on the contrary, the integrating element of division itself. If it is true that myth and dialectic are two distinct forces in Platonism in general, it is division that surmounts this duality and integrates, internally, the power of dialectic with that of myth, making myth an element of the dialectic itself.

In the Platonic dialogues, myth functions primarily as a narrative of *foundation*. In accordance with archaic religious traditions, the myth constructs a model of circulation by which the different claimants can be judged; it establishes a foundation which is able to sort out differences, to measure the roles and pretensions of the various rivals, and finally to select the true claimants.[20] In the *Phaedrus*, for example, Plato describes the circulation of souls prior to their incarnation, and the memory they carry with them of the *Ideas* they were able to contemplate. It is this mythic contemplation, the nature and degree of this contemplation, and the type of situations required for its recollection, that provide Plato with his selective criterion and allow him to determine the value and order of different types of madness (i.e., that of the lover, the poet, the priest, the prophet, the philosopher, and so on). Well-founded madness, or true love, belongs to those souls that have seen much, and retain many dormant but revivable memories. True claimants are those that "participate" in contemplation and reminiscence, while sensual souls, forgetful and narrow of vision, are denounced as false rivals. Similarly, the *Statesman* invokes the image of a god ruling both mankind and the world in archaic times. The myth shows that, properly speaking, only this archaic god merits the definition of the statesman as "king-shepherd of men." But again, the myth furnishes an ontological measure by which different men in the City are shown to share unequally in the mythical model according to their degree of participation—from the political man, who is closest to the model of the archaic shepherd-god; to parents, servants, and auxiliaries; and, finally, to charlatans and counterfeits, who merely parody the true politician by means of deception and fraud.[21]

The Platonic conception of "participation" (*metachein*, lit. "to have after") must be understood in terms of the role of this foundation: an elective participation is the response to the problem of a method of selection. "To participate" means to have a part of, to have after, to have secondhand. What possesses something firsthand is precisely the foundation itself, the Idea—only Justice is just, only Courage is courageous. Such statements are not simply analytic propositions but designations of the Idea as the foundation that possesses a given quality firsthand; only the Idea is "the thing itself," only the Idea is "self-identical" (the *auto kath' hauto*). "It is what objectively possesses a pure quality, or *what is nothing other than what it is*" (WP 29–30). Empirically speaking, a mother is not only a mother, but also a daughter, a lover,

perhaps a wife; but what Plato would call the Idea of a mother is a thing that would only be what it is, a mother that would be nothing but a mother (the notion of the Virgin Mary could be said to be the Christian approximation of the Idea of a pure mother).[22] Plato's innovation is to have created a veritable concept of the Idea of something pure, a pure quality. The Idea, as foundation, then allows its possession to be shared, giving it to the claimant (the secondhand possessor), but only in so far as the claimant has been able to pass the test of the foundation. In Plato, says Deleuze, things (as opposed to Ideas) are always something *other* than what they are; at best, they are only secondhand possessors, mere claimants or "pretenders" to the Idea itself. They can only lay *claim* to the quality, and can do so only to the degree that they *participate* in the pure Idea. Such is the doctrine of judgment. The famous Neo-Platonic triad follows from this: the unparticipated, the participated, and the participant. One could also say: the father (the foundation), the daughter (the object of the claim), and the suitor (the claimant). The triad produces a series of participations in length, a hierarchy (the "chain of being") that distinguishes different degrees and orders of participation depending on the distance from or proximity to the foundational principle.[23]

What is the mechanism that allows the Idea to judge this degree of elective participation? If the foundation as essence is defined by the original and superior identity or *sameness* of the Idea, the claimant will be well founded only to the degree that it *resembles* or imitates the foundation. This resemblance is not merely an external correspondence, as the resemblance of one thing with another, but an *internal* and spiritual (or "noetic") resemblance of the thing to the Idea. The claimant conforms to the object of the claim only in so far as it is modeled internally on the Idea, which comprehends the relations and proportions that constitute essence. The act of founding endows the claimant with this internal resemblance and, on this condition, makes it legitimately participate in the quality, the object of the claim. The ordering of claimants or differences (classification) thus takes place within the comparative play of two similitudes: the exemplary similitude of an original identity, and the imitative or "mimetic" similitude of a more or less similar copy. This in itself marks a philosophic decision of the greatest importance to Deleuze: Platonism allows differences to be *thought* only by subordinating them to the principle of the Same and the condition of Resemblance (DR 127). The concept of the Idea, in Deleuze's analysis, thus consists of three components:

1. the differential quality that is to be possessed or participated in (e.g., being just)
2. the pre-existent foundation or Idea that possesses it firsthand, as unparticipatable (e.g., justice itself)
3. the rivals that lay claim to the quality (e.g., to be a just man) but can only possess it at a second, third, or fourth remove . . . or not at all (the simulacrum) (WP 30).

For Plato, then, "pretension" is not one phenomenon among others, but the nature of every phenomenon. The claimant [*prétendant*] appeals to the foundation, and it is a claim [*prétention*] that must be founded (e.g., the claim to be just, courageous, or pious; to be the true shepherd, lover, or philosopher), that

must participate, to a greater or less degree, in the object of pretension, or else be denounced as without foundation. If Platonism is a response to the agonistic relations of power in the Greek world, the foundation is the operation of the *logos*; it is a test that sorts out and measures the differences among these pretensions or claimants, determining which claimants truly participate in the object of the claim.

THE COUNTER-METHOD OF THE SOPHIST: THE SIMULACRUM

An obvious implication follows from this analysis: does there not lie, at the limit of participation, the state of an *unfounded* pretension? The "truest" claimant, the authentic and well-founded claimant, is the one closest to the foundation, the secondhand possessor. But is there not, then, also a third- and fourth-hand possessor, continuing down to the nth degree of debasement, to the one who possesses no more than a mirage or simulacrum of the foundation, and is itself a mirage and a simulacrum, denounced by the selection as a counterfeit?[24] If the just claimant has its rivals, does it not also have its counterfeits and simulacra? This simulacral being, according to Plato, is in fact none other than the Sophist, a Protean being who intrudes and insinuates himself everywhere, contradicting himself and making unfounded claims on everything.

Thus construed, Deleuze considers the conclusion of the *Sophist* to be one of the most extraordinary adventures of Platonism. The third of the great dialogues on division, the *Sophist*, unlike either the *Phaedrus* or the *Statesman*, presents no myth of foundation. Rather, it utilizes the method of division in a paradoxical fashion, a "counter-utilization" that attempts to isolate, not the true claimant, but the false one, the sophist himself. From this point of view, Deleuze distinguishes between two spatial dimensions in Plato's thought. The dialogues of the *Phaedrus* and the *Statesman* move upward toward the "true lover" or the "true statesman," which are legitimated by their resemblance to the pure model and measured by their approximation to it. Platonic *irony* is, in this sense, a technique of *ascent*, a movement toward the principle on high, the ascetic ideal.[25] The *Sophist*, by contrast, follows a descending movement of *humor*, a technique of *descent* that moves downward toward the vanity of the false copy, the self-contradicting sophist. Here, the method of division can make no appeal to a foundational myth or model, for it is no longer a matter of discerning the true sophist from the false claimant, since *the true sophist is himself the false claimant*.

This paradoxical usage of the method of division leads the dialogue to a remarkable conclusion. "By dint of inquiring in the direction of the simulacrum," writes Deleuze, "Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant as he leans over its abyss, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it calls into question the very notion of the copy . . . and of the model" (LS 294). In the final definition of the Sophist, Plato leads his readers to the point where they are no longer able to distinguish the Sophist from Socrates himself: "The dissembling or ironical imitator . . . who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself."[26] The sophist appears in Deleuze as a particular "type"

of thinker, an "antipathetic" persona in the Platonic theater who haunts Socrates at every step as his double. Plato wanted to reduce the sophist to a being of contradiction: that is, the lowest power and last degree of participation, a supposed state of chaos. But is not the sophist rather the being that raises all things to their simulacral state, and maintains them in that state? Platonism in this manner "confronts sophism as its enemy, but also as its limit and its double; because he lays claim to anything and everything, there is the great risk that the sophist will scramble the selection and pervert the judgment" (ECC 136). This is the third moment of irony in Plato, irony pushed to its limit, to the point of *humor*, and it gives us another indication of what the overturning of Platonism entails for Deleuze. "Was it not necessary that irony be pushed to this point?" he asks, "and that Plato be the first to indicate this direction for the overthrow of Platonism?" (LS 295).

The essential Platonic distinction is thus more profound than the speculative distinction between model and copy, original and image, essence and appearance. The deeper, practical distinction moves between two kinds of claimants or "images," or what Plato calls *eidolon*.[27]

1. "Copies" (*eikones*) are well-grounded claimants, authorized by their internal resemblance to the ideal model, authenticated by their close participation in the foundation.
2. "Simulacra" (*phantasmata*) are like false claimants, built on a dissimilarity and implying an essential perversion or deviation from the Idea.

"It is in this sense that Plato divides the domain of *image-idols* in two: on the one hand the *iconic copies*, on the other the *phantastic simulacra*."[28] The great manifest duality between Idea and image is there only to guarantee the latent distinction between these two types of images, to provide a concrete criterion of selection. Plato does not create the concept of the model or "Idea" in order to oppose it to the world of images, but rather to select the true images, the icons, and to eliminate the false ones, the simulacra. In this sense, says Deleuze, Platonism is the *Odyssey* of philosophy; as Foucault comments, "with the abrupt appearance of Ulysses, the eternal husband, the false suitors disappear. *Exeuent* simulacra."[29]

In Deleuze's reading, then, Platonism is defined by this will to track and hunt down phantasms and simulacra in every domain, to identify the sophist himself, the diabolical insinuator (Dionysus). Its goal is "iconology," the triumph of icons over simulacra, which are denounced and eliminated as false claimants. Its method is the selection of difference (*amphisbetesis*) by the institution of a mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation, and the creation of the concept of the Idea. Its motivation is above all a *moral* motivation, for what is condemned in the simulacra is the malice by which it challenges the very notion of the model and the copy, thereby turning us away from the Idea of the Good (hence Plato's condemnation of certain poets along with the sophists). Put in naturalistic terms, the aim of Platonism is to deprive nature of the being that is immanent to it, to reduce nature to a pure appearance, and to judge it in relation to a moral Idea that transcends it, "a transcendent Idea capable of imposing its likeness upon a rebellious matter."[30] Finally, Platonism inaugurates a domain that philosophy would come to recognize

as its own, which Deleuze terms "representation." Although the term "representation" will take on various avatars in the history of philosophy, Platonism ascribes to it a precise meaning: every well-founded pretension in this world is necessarily a re-presentation, since even the first in the order of pretensions is already second in itself, in its subordination to the foundation. The Idea is invoked in the world only as a function of what is not "representable" in things themselves.[31]

THE CONCEPT OF THE SIMULACRUM

With this "portrait" of Platonism in hand, we are in a position to understand what Nietzsche's "inverted Platonism" means for Deleuze. It does not simply imply the denial of the primacy of the original over the copy, of the model over the image (the "twilight of the idols"). For what is the difference between a copy and a simulacrum? Plato saw in the simulacrum a "becoming-unlimited" pointing to a subversive element that perpetually eludes the order that Ideas impose and things receive.[32] But in subordinating the simulacrum to the copy, and hence to the Idea, Plato defines it in purely negative terms; it is the copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded copy, an infinitely slackened icon. To truly invert Platonism means that the difference between copy and simulacrum must be seen, not merely as a difference of degree but as a *difference in nature*. The inversion of Platonism, in other words, implies an *affirmation* of the being of simulacra as such. The simulacrum must then be given its own concept and be defined in affirmative terms. In creating such a concept, Deleuze is following a maxim that lies at the core of his philosophical methodology: "What is the best way of following the great philosophers, to repeat what they have said, or *to do what they have done*, that is, to create concepts for problems that are necessarily changing?" (WP 28). The Deleuzian concept of the simulacrum can be defined in terms of three characteristics, which stand in contradistinction to the three components of the Platonic Idea summarized above.

1. First, Deleuze claims that, whereas "the copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image *without* resemblance" (LS 257). How are we to understand this rather strange formula? Deleuze suggests that the early Christian catechisms, influenced by the Neo-Platonism of the Church fathers, have familiarized us somewhat with the notion of an image that has lost its resemblance: God created man in His own image and to resemble Him (*imago Dei*), but through sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. We have lost a moral existence and entered into an aesthetic one (Kierkegaard); we have become simulacra. The catechism stresses the fact that the simulacrum is a demonic image; it remains an image, but, in contrast to the icon, its resemblance has been *externalized*. It is no longer a "resemblance," but a mere "semblance."[33] If the "noetic" resemblance of an icon is like the engendered resemblance of a son to his father, stemming from the son's internal participation in the father's filial line, the semblance of the simulacra, on the contrary, is like the ruse and trickery of an imposter; though his appearance may reflect the father's, the relation is purely external and coincidental, and his claim to inheritance a subversion that acts "against the father," without passing through the Idea.[34] The simulacrum still simulates the *effects* of identity and resem-

blance, but these are now completely external effects (like optical effects), divorced from any internal principle, and produced by completely different means than those at work in the copy.[35]

Deleuze's theological references here are not fortuitous, for there was a whole range of Christian experience that was familiar with the danger of the simulacrum. In *On Christian Doctrine*, for instance, Augustine developed a Platonic semiotic aimed at "making the difference" between true signs and false signs, or rather between two modes of interpretation of the same sign. He located his criterion of selection, not in an Idea, but in God himself, the only "thing" that can (and must) be enjoyed in itself. What he called *caritas* is the interpretation of signs as "iconic copies" that propel the restless movement of the soul toward the enjoyment of God (for his own sake, as the firsthand possessor) and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbor (for the sake of God, as secondhand possessors). *Cupiditas*, on the contrary, is the interpretation of signs for their own sake, the enjoyment of "one's self, one's neighbor, or any corporeal thing" for the sake of something other than God. Augustine was explicit about the aim of his theology: "the destruction of the reign of cupidity" (simulacra).[36] Augustine's polemic against Varro in the *City of God* would recapitulate many aspects of Plato's polemic against the Sophists.[37]

If simulacra later became the object of demonology in Christian thought, it is because the simulacrum is not the "opposite" of the icon, the demonic is not the opposite of the divine, Satan is not the Other, the pole farthest from God, the absolute antithesis, but something much more bewildering and vertiginous: *the Same*, the perfect double, the exact semblance, the doppelgänger, the angel of light whose deception is so complete that it is impossible to tell the imposter (Satan, Lucifer) apart from the "reality" (God, Christ), just as Plato reaches the point where Socrates and the Sophist are rendered indiscernible. This is the point where we can no longer speak of "deception" or even "simulation," but rather the positive and affirmative "power of the false" (*pseudos*). The Temptation and the Inquisition are not episodes in the great antagonism of Good versus Evil, but variants on the complex insinuation of the Same. How does one distinguish a revelation of God from a deception of the devil, or a deception sent by God to tempt men of little faith from a revelation sent by the devil to simulate God's test (God so closely resembling Satan who imitates God so well . . .)? The demonic simulacrum thus stands in stark contrast to the theological "symbol" (as defined, for instance, by Paul Tillich or Mircea Eliade), which is always iconic, the analogical manifestation of a transcendent instance. It is this experience of the simulacrum that Klossowski has revived and explored throughout his work. Foucault suggests that the concern over simulacra continued through the Baroque period, and did not finally fall into silence until Descartes's great simulacrum: the Evil Genius of the first *Meditation*, God's "marvelous twin," who simulates God and can mime all his powers, decreeing eternal truths and acting as if 2 plus 2 equals 5, but who is expelled from any possible existence because of his malignancy.[38] If Plato maligns the simulacrum, it is not because it elevates the false over the true, the evil over the good; more precisely, the simulacrum is "beyond good and evil" because it renders them *indiscernible* and internalizes the difference between them, thereby scrambling the selection and perverting the judgment.

2. Second, if the simulacrum is an image without resemblance, it is because the Idea itself no longer has the identity of a self-same model, but rather is now constituted by *difference-in-itself*. If the copy is submerged in dissimilitude, it is because the model is plunged into difference, so that it is no longer possible to say which is the model and which is the copy. If identity and resemblance persist, it is because they are now simply the *external* effects of the internal differential machinery of the simulacrum. Plato himself specifies how the simulacrum obtains this non-productive external effect of resemblance:

> the simulacrum implies huge dimensions, depths, and distances that the observer cannot master. It is precisely because he cannot master them that he experiences an impression of resemblance . . . Resemblance is always on the exterior, and difference—small or large—occupies the center of the system. (LS 258, RP 171)

The simulacrum differs in nature from the copy because it has internalized the differential nature of the Idea, and is thus constructed on a fundamental *disparity*—a "'disparateness' within an original depth" (DR 51). The simulacrum, in other words, is constructed on an *internal difference*, an internal disparity, which is not derived from any prior identity; it has "the disparate" [*le dispars*] as a unit of measurement and communication. "Placing disparates in communication, resonance, forced movement, would thus be the characteristics of the simulacrum" (RP 170–1).

Deleuze here makes an oft-overlooked distinction between the concept of the Identical and the concept of the Same. In Platonism, "the model can be defined only by a positing of identity as the essence of the Same (*auto kath' hauto*), as the essence of Ideas, and the copy by an affection of internal resemblance, the quality of the similar" (DR 265). In an inverted Platonism, however, this link between the Same and the identical is severed. When the Same passes to the side of things rather than Ideas, and indicates the indiscernibilty of things and their simulacra (Socrates is indiscernible from the Sophists, God from Satan), it is the identity of things that suffers a corresponding loss.

> The distinction between the same and the identical bears fruit only if one subjects the Same [the Idea] to a conversion which relates it to the different, while at the same time the things and beings that are distinguished in the different [copies] suffer a corresponding radical destruction of their *identity*. Only on this condition is difference thought in itself, neither represented nor mediated.[39]

When Deleuze writes that "modernity is defined by the power of the simulacrum" (LS 265), he seems to be implying that each era must create its own anti-Platonism, and that his own "simulacral" version is informed, at least in part, by the structures and techniques of modernist literature. On this score, certain twentieth-century modernist writers, including James Joyce, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Raymond Roussel, Pierre Klossowski, and Witold Gombrowicz—whose work has nothing to do with

Platonism or its reversal—have none the less made the "internal difference" constitutive of the work of art evident in their literary techniques, and Deleuze frequently appeals to their writings as examples. In Roussel's novels, for example, a single narrative is made to tell two different stories *simultaneously*. The procedure of *La Doublure* rests on the double meaning of a homonym (the title can mean either "The Understudy" or "The Lining"), which opens up a space in the heart of the work that allows objects to take on a double meaning, each participating in two stories at the same time; *Impressions of Africa* complicates this procedure, starting with a quasi-homonym (b*illard* / p*illard*), but hiding the second story within the first.[40] Similarly, Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* can be said to have pushed such techniques of internal disparity to their limit, invoking a letter that makes all the divergent series or stories of the "chaosmos" communicate at once in a transversal dimension. Yet Deleuze insists that all the arts, such as painting and sculpture—and even premodernist arts—have their own techniques of internal difference, even if modern literature comes to be a privileged example.[41] Indeed, in an inverted Platonism, *all* things are simulacra; and as simulacra, they are defined by an internal disparity: "Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, and the difficulty facing everything is to become its own simulacrum . . . The important thing, for the in-itself, is that the difference, whether small or large, be internal" (DR 67, 121).

3. The third characteristic of the simulacrum, finally, concerns the *mode* under which this disparity or difference is apprehended, which Deleuze defines as a *problematic* mode. In the famous passage of the *Republic* where he expels the artist from the City, Plato appeals to the user–producer–imitator triad in order to preserve an "iconic" sense of imitation (imitation as *mimesis* rather than *apate* or "deception").[42] The user is at the top of the Platonic hierarchy because he makes use of true *knowledge*, which is the knowledge of the model or Idea. Copies then produced by the craftsman (*demiourgos*) are iconic to the degree that they reproduce the model internally; though the craftsman cannot be said to operate by true knowledge of the Idea, he is none the less guided by a correct judgment or *right opinion* of the user's knowledge, and by the relations and proportions that constitute essence. Right opinion, in other words, apprehends the external resemblance between the copy and the Idea only to the degree that it is guaranteed by their internal (noetic) similarity.

What, then, is left for the false resemblance and internal dissemblance of the simulacrum? Imitation takes on a pejorative sense in Plato only when it is applied to the simulacrum, which does not reproduce the *eidos* but merely produces the *effect* of resemblance in an external and unproductive way, obtained neither through true knowledge (the user) nor through right opinion (the craftsman), but by trick, ruse, or subversion, an art of *encounter* that lies outside of knowledge and opinion (the artist or poet).[43] The simulacrum can only appear under the mode of a *problem*, as a *question*, as that which forces one to think, what Plato calls a "provocative" ("Is it true or false, good or evil?").[44] The *Republic* does not attack art or poetry as such; it attempts to eliminate art that is simulacral or phantastic, and not iconic or mimetic. Perhaps the genius of the Pop Art of the twentieth century lay precisely in its ability to push the multiplication of images to the point where the mimetic copy changes

its nature and is reversed into the simulacrum (which is the originary model for Warhol's series of Campbell soup cans?).[45]

The "problematic" nature of simulacra points to the fact that there is something that contests *both* the notion of copy *and* that of model, and undermines the very distinction between the two. "By simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned" (DR 69). With the simulacrum, the order of participation is rendered impossible, since there is no longer any possible hierarchy, no second, no third. There is no privileged point of view, nor is there an object common to all points of view. Sameness and resemblance persist, but only as effects of the differential machinery of the simulacrum (will to power); the simulacrum simulates the father, the fiancée, and the claimant all at once in a superimposition of masks, for behind every mask there is not a true face, but another mask, and another mask behind that. As Nietzsche mused, in response to Plato's allegory of the cave: "Behind every cave, is there not, must there not be, another deeper cave—a more comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abysmally deep ground behind every ground, under every attempt to furnish 'grounds'?"[46] "The only illusion," Deleuze comments, "is that of unmasking something or someone"—the illusion of presuming a face behind the mask, an originary model behind the copy, a true world beyond the apparent world (DR 106). As a simulacrum, the false claimant can no longer be said to be false in relation to a supposedly true model. Rather, the "power of the false" (*pseudos*) now takes on a positivity of its own; it assumes its own concept, and is raised to a higher power (NP 96). The *false* must be distinguished from the *power of the false*; the false takes on a "power" of its own when it is freed from the form of truth—that is, when the false is no longer presented as being true (that is, as an "error").[47] The true world is no longer opposed to the false world of simulacra; rather, "truth" now becomes an affirmation of the simulacrum itself, falsity (art) affirmed and raised to a higher power.[48]

PURE DIFFERENCE AS AN IMMANENT IDEA

These characterizations of the simulacrum lead us to a new consideration of the status of an inverted Platonism. Deleuze's project of overturning Platonism must not be taken as a rejection of Platonism—on the contrary. "That the overturning [of Platonism] should conserve many Platonic characteristics," writes Deleuze, "is not only inevitable but *desirable*" (DR 59). The simulacrum may be the focus of Deleuze's analysis of Platonism, but it is not the final word. The simulacrum scrambles the criteria of selection established by Plato and gives both difference and falsity a concept of their own. Far from refusing Platonism in its entirety, however, Deleuze's inverted Platonism retrieves almost every aspect of the Platonic project, but now reconceived from the viewpoint of the simulacrum itself. The simulacrum thus plays a double role in Deleuze's reading of Platonism: it shows how Plato failed in his attempt to "make the difference," but at the same time it opens up a path toward a retrieval of the Platonic project on a new basis. In this sense, Deleuze's inverted Platonism can at the same time be seen as a rejuvenated Platonism and even a completed Platonism.

What is the nature of this rejuvenated Platonism? Plato's error was to have remained "attached to that old Wisdom, ready to unfold its transcendence again" (WP 148). Deleuze refuses Platonism's appeal to transcendence: "Every reaction against Platonism is a restoration of immanence in its full extension and in its purity, which forbids the return of any transcendence" (ECC 137). A purely immanent theory of Ideas must thus begin with the simulacrum: there is a *being* of simulacra, which Plato attempted to deny. If the resemblance of the iconic copy is built upon the model of the identity of an ideal sameness, the disparity of the simulacrum is based upon another model, a model of *difference*, from which the dissimilitude or "internalized difference" of the simulacrum derives its power. "Simulacra are those systems in which the different relates to the different *by means of* difference itself. What is essential is that we find in these systems no prior identity, no internal resemblance: it is all a matter of difference" (DR 299). Indeed, was it not the differential nature of simulacra that motivated Plato to exorcise them in the first place? "On the basis of a first impression (difference is evil), [Plato] proposed to 'save' difference by representing it" (DR 29). An inverted Platonism, in return, implies the affirmation of difference itself as a "sub-representative" principle that accounts for the constitutive disparity of the simulacrum itself. "The cruelty [of the simulacrum], which at the outset seemed to us monstrous, demanding expiation, and could be alleviated only by representative mediation, now seems to us to constitute *the pure concept or Idea of difference*" (DR 67). In other words, simulacra require a new conception of Ideas: Ideas that are *immanent* to simulacra (rather than transcendent) and based on a concept of pure *difference* (rather than identity). *Immanence* and *internal difference* are thus the two touchstones of Deleuze's rejuvenated Platonism in *Difference and Repetition*.

Where does Deleuze find resources for developing his immanent dialectic? Deleuze notes that difference and the dissimilar (becoming) occasionally appear, in several important texts of Plato himself, not only as an inevitable characteristic of created copies, as a defect that affects images, a counterpart to their resemblance (they must differ in order to resemble), but as *a possible model that rivals the good model of the Same*, a Platonic equivalent to Descartes's evil demon.[49] An echo of this tension resonates in the dialogues when Socrates asks, ironically: Is there an Idea of *everything*, even of mud, hair, filth and excrement—or is there rather something that always and stubbornly escapes the Idea?[50] Plato raises these possibilities only to conjure them away, but they bear witness to the persistent though subterranean activity of a Dionysian world in the heart of Platonism itself, and to the possibility of its own domain.[51] But it was primarily Kant who inaugurated a purely *immanent* interpretation of Ideas, and exposed the illusion of assigning to Ideas a transcendent object. In the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant identified three primary transcendent Ideas, which he identified as the terminal points of traditional metaphysics: the Self, the World, and God. Such Ideas can have a positive use, Kant argued, when they are merely employed in a regulative manner, as horizons or focal points outside of experience that guide the systematization of our knowledge (the legitimate *immanent* employment of Ideas). But when we grant Ideas a constitutive employment, and claim that they refer to corresponding

objects, we fall into an *illusion* of reason (the illegitimate *transcendent* employment of Ideas).

Yet even Kant was unable to push the immanent conception of Ideas to its limit. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant was willing to resurrect the transcendent Ideas and give them a practical determination as the postulates of the moral law. Deleuze's own project follows an initiative inaugurated by Salomon Maimon, who was the first post-Kantian to insist that Kant's own philosophy of immanence could only be completed through a return to the work of Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz. For Deleuze, Ideas are immanent within experience because their real objects are *problematic* structures: that is, multiplicities constituted by converging and diverging series of singularities-events. In Kant, it is only the transcendent form of the Self that guarantees the connection of a series (the categorical "and . . . and"); the transcendent form of the World that guarantees the convergence of continuous causal series that can be extended (the hypothetical "if . . . then"); and the transcendent form of God that guarantees disjunction in its exclusive or limitative use (the disjunctive "either . . . or"). Freed from these appeals to transcendence, Deleuze argues, Ideas finally take on a purely immanent status, and the Self, the World, and God share a common death.

> The divergence of the affirmed series forms a "chaosmos" and no longer a World; the aleatory point which traverses them forms a counter-self, and no longer a self; disjunction posited as a synthesis exchanges its theological principle of diabolic principle . . . The Grand Canyon of the world, the 'crack' of the self, and the dismembering of God. (LS 176)

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze will develop a set of formal criteria for Ideas in this purely immanent sense: difference, repetition, singularity, problematic, multiplicity, event, virtuality, series, convergence and divergence, zones of indiscernibility, and so on. *Difference and Repetition*, in this sense, presents a new conception of the *dialectic*. Platonism is dominated by the idea of establishing a criterion of selection between the thing itself and its simulacra: "Plato gave the establishment of difference as the supreme goal of the dialectic" (DR 67). But difference here remains an *external* difference between the authentic and the inauthentic; Platonism is able to "make the difference" only by erecting a model of the *Same* that assesses differences by their degree of resemblance to a transcendent Idea. In Deleuze's inverted Platonism, however, the distribution of these concepts is changed. If the difference between the thing and its simulacra is rendered indiscernible, then difference becomes *internal* to the thing itself (at the same time that its resemblance is externalized). Difference no longer lies between things and simulacra, since they are the *Same*; rather, difference is internal to things (things are themselves simulacra). What is required is thus a pure Idea of difference, an Idea that is *immanent* in things themselves. The immanent Idea is no longer a pure quality, as in Plato, but rather "the reason behind qualities" (DR 57). Deleuze describes his project in explicitly differential terms:

> Every object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences. Difference must be shown *differing* . . . The object must therefore be in no way identical, but torn asunder in a difference in which the identity of the object as seen by a seeing subject vanishes. Difference must become the element, the ultimate unity; it must therefore refer to other differences which never identify it but rather differentiate it. (DR 56)

It is this immanent theory of Ideas that constitutes what Deleuze will call a "transcendental empiricism." Identity and resemblance still persist, but they are now merely effects produced by the differential Idea. Difference

> produces an image of identity as though this were the *end* of the different. It produces an image of resemblance as the external *effect* of "the disparate" . . . However, these are precisely a simulated identity and resemblance . . . It is always differences that resemble one another, which are analogous, opposed or identical: difference is behind everything, *but behind difference there is nothing*. (DR 301, 57)

FIGURES OF AN INVERTED PLATONISM

Once the theory of Ideas is reconceived as both immanent and differential, the Platonic dialectic can be taken up anew: "*each moment of difference must then find its true figure*: selection, repetition, ungrounding, the question–problem complex" (DR 68). Our final task is to analyze the function these four figures play in Deleuze's inverted Platonism, and the link they have to Deleuze's theory of immanent Ideas.

1. *The question–problem complex*. First, Deleuze pursues his inverted Platonism by carrying out his critique at the level of what he calls the "question–problem complex" (DR 66). In archaic myth, there is always a task to be performed, a riddle to be solved; the oracle is questioned, but the oracle's response is itself a problem. In Plato, this question–problem complex reappears in a new form: the appeal to the Idea as a criterion of selection appears in the dialogues as the response to a particular *form of question*. "The idea, the discovery of the Idea, is not separable from a certain type of question. The Idea is first of all an 'objectity' [*objectité*] that corresponds, as such, to a way of posing questions."[52] In Plato, this questioning appears primarily in the form, What is . . .? [*ti estin?*].[53] Plato wanted to oppose this major form of the question to all other forms—such as Who? Which one? How many? How? Where? When? In which case? From what point of view?—which are criticized as being minor and vulgar questions of opinion that express confused ways of thinking.

When Socrates, for instance, asks "What is beauty?", his interlocutors almost always seem to answer by citing "the one that is beautiful." Socrates triumphs; one cannot reply to the question "What is beauty?" by citing *examples* of the beautiful, by noting *who* is beautiful ("a young virgin"), just as one cannot answer the question "What is justice?" by pointing to *where* or *when* there is justice, and one cannot reach the essence of the dyad by explaining *how* "two" is obtained, and so on. To

the question "What is beauty?" one must not point to beautiful things, which are only beautiful accidentally and according to becoming, but to Beauty itself, which is nothing but beautiful, that which is beautiful in its being and essence. Socrates ridicules those who are content to give examples rather than attain essences. The question "What is . . .?" thus presupposes a particular way of thinking that points one in the direction of essence; it is for Socrates *the* question of essence, the *only* question capable of discovering the Idea.[54]

One of Deleuze's most constant themes is that the critique of philosophers must take place at this level of questions or problems.

> A philosophic theory [he wrote in his first book] is a developed question, and nothing other. By itself, in itself, it consists not in resolving a problem, but in developing *to its limit* the necessary implications of a formulated question. It shows us what things are, what they would have to be, supposing that the question is a good and rigorous one. To place in question means to subordinate, to submit things to the question in such a way that, in this constrained and forced submission, they reveal an essence, a nature. To criticize the question means to show under what conditions it is possible and well-posed, that is, how things would not be what they are if the question were not posed in that way. Which is to say that these two operations are one and the same; or if you prefer, there is no critique of solutions, but only a critique of problems. (ES 119)

Thus the reversal of Platonism necessarily implies a critique of the question "What is . . .?"; for while it is certainly a blunder to cite an example of something beautiful when asked "What is beauty?", it is less certain that the question "What is . . .?" is a legitimate and well-formulated question, *even and above all for discovering essence*.

Already in Plato himself, the Socratic method only animates the early "aporetic" dialogues, precisely because the question "What is . . .?" prejudges the Idea as a simple and abstract essence, which is then obliged to comprehend the nonessential, and to comprehend it *in its essence*, which leads these dialogues into inextricable aporias. This is perhaps because the primary purpose of these early elenchic dialogues is preparative—their aim is to silence empirical responses in order to open up the region of the Idea *in general*, while leaving it to others to determine it *as* an Idea or as a problem. When Socratic irony is no longer taken *à la lettre*, when the dialectic is no longer confused with its propaedeutic, it becomes something serious and positive, and assumes other forms of questioning: Which one? in the *Statesman* and the *Phaedrus*, as we have seen; How many? in the *Philebus*; Where? and When? in the *Sophist*; In what sense? in the *Parmenides*. The "minor" questions of the sophists, Deleuze argues, were the result of a worked-out method, a whole sophistic art that was opposed to the Platonic dialectic and implied *an empirical and pluralistic conception of essence*, no longer as a foundation, but as an event or a multiplicity. "No doubt, if one insists, the word 'essence' might be preserved, but only on condition of saying that the essence is precisely accident, the event . . . The events and singularities of the Idea do not allow any positing of an essence as 'what the thing is'" (DR

191). Even in the Platonic texts, such a conception of the Idea was prefigured by the sophist Hippias, "he who refuses essences and yet is not content with examples" (NP 76). The fact is that the question "What is . . .?" poses the problem of essence in a blind and confused manner. Nietzsche wanted to replace the question "What is . . .?" with "Who is . . .?"; rather than posing the question, "What is truth?" he asks, "*Who* is in search of truth? What do those who ask 'What is truth?' really want? What type of will is being expressed in them?"[55] Similarly, when we ask "What is beauty?" we are asking, "From what viewpoint do things appear beautiful?"—and with something that does not appear beautiful to us, from what viewpoint would it become so? Where and When? (NP 75–9). If the sophists must be reproached, it is not for having utilized inferior forms of questioning, but for their inability to have determined the conditions within which they take on their transcendental meaning and their ideal sense, beyond empirical examples (DI 95).

Deleuze suggests that if one considers the history of philosophy, one will, in fact, search in vain for a philosopher who was satisfied with the question "What is . . .?" Aristotle's questions "*ti to on*?" and "*tis a ousia*?" do not signify "What is being?" or "What is substance?" but rather "*Which* [things] are beings?" ["*Qui, l'étant*?"] (DR 244n). Kant asked, "What is an object?" but only within the framework of a more profound question, "*How* is this possible?" When Leibniz was content to ask, "What is . . .?" he only obtained definitions that he himself considered nominal; when he attained real definitions, it was because of questions like "How?", "From what point of view?", "In which case?" Even Heidegger, when he formulated the question of Being, insisted that we can only gain access to Being by asking, not "What is Being?", but rather "*Who* is it?" (*Dasein*).[56] If Hegel took the question "What is?" seriously, it was because of his theological prejudices, since "the answer to 'What is X?' is always God as the locus of the combinatory of abstract possibilities" (DR 188). Deleuze's pluralist art does not necessarily deny essence, but it makes it depend in all cases upon the spatio-temporal and material coordinates of a problematic Idea that is purely *immanent* to experience, and that can *only* be determined by questions such as Who?, How?, Where and When?, How many?, From what viewpoint?, and so on. These "minor" questions are those of the accident, the inessential, of multiplicity, of difference—in short, of the event (problematics as opposed to theorematics).[57]

2. *Repetition*. Second, in an inverted Platonism, the notion of *repetition* can be said to assume an autonomous power along with that of *difference* (hence the title of Deleuze's magnum opus). Platonism relies on what Deleuze calls a "naked" model of repetition (representation): the copy repeats the identity of the ideal model as the first term in a hierarchical series (just as, in archaic religion, ritual is said to repeat myth). Naked repetition thus presupposes a mechanical or brute repetition of the Same: it is founded on an ultimate or originary instance or first time (A), which is then repeated a second, third, and fourth time (A^1, A^2, A^3, and so on.). In cases of psychic repetition, this originary term is subject to disguises and displacements, which are secondary yet necessary. In Freud, for instance, our adult loves "repeat" our childhood love for the mother, but our original maternal love is repressed and disguised in these subsequent loves by various mechanisms of condensation (metonymy) and displacement (metaphor). I repeat because I repress (amnesia),

and the task of therapy, through transference, is to recover this hidden origin (not to eliminate repetition, but to verify the authentic repetitions). In Plato, the form of time is introduced into thought under the category of reminiscence (*anamnesis*). The ultimate term or model is the Idea, but since Plato is unable to assign an empirical moment in the past when the Idea was present, he invokes an originary moment: the Idea has been seen, but in another life, in a mythical present (e.g., the circulation of souls in the *Phaedrus*). If to learn is to recollect, it is because the real movement of learning implies a distinction in the soul between a "before" and an "after"; there is a first time, in which we forget what we knew, and a second time, in which we recover what we have forgotten.[58] In either case, bare repetition refers back to a former present, whether empirical or mythical, which has a prior identity and provides the "thing" to be repeated. It is this originary identity, now lost or forgotten, that conditions the entire process of repetition, and in this sense remains independent of it.

But the question Deleuze poses is the following: are the disguises and variations, the masks and costumes, something added secondarily "over and above" the original term, or are they, on the contrary, "the internal genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constituent parts"? (DR 17). In this case, we would no longer have a "naked" repetition of the Same but a "clothed" repetition of the Different. It is in Proust's work that Deleuze finds a model for this clothed repetition, which he analyzes in detail in *Proust and Signs*. In Proust's novel *In Search of Lost Time*, the hero's various loves (for Gilberte, Mme. de Guermantes, Albertine) indeed form a series in which each successive love adds its minor differences and contrasting relations to the preceding loves. (Indeed, each particular love itself assumes a serial form—beginning, course, termination—in which the hero first explicates the hidden world enveloped in his lover, and then retraces his steps in forgetting her.) But in Proust, the series of loves does not refer back to the hero's mother; the childhood love for his mother is *already* a repetition of other adult loves (Proust's hero replays with his mother Swann's passion for Odette), and the mother's love in turn refers to repetitions he has not himself experienced. In other words, *there is no first term* in what is repeated that can be isolated from the series. My parents are not the ultimate terms of my individual subjectivity, but rather the middle terms of a much larger intersubjectivity. At the limit, the series of all our loves transcends our experience, and links up with repetitions that are not our own, thereby acceding to a transubjective reality. The personal series of our loves thus refers both to a more vast transpersonal series and to more restricted series constituted by each love in particular.[59]

What, then, is being repeated throughout these series? What is the "content" that is being affected or modified within these series? In clothed repetition, what is repeated is not a prior identity or originary sameness, but rather a virtual object or event (an "object = x") which, in Lacan's terminology, is always displaced in relation to itself and has no fixed identity. The repeated object is *a difference that differentiates itself in being repeated*.[60] There is indeed, one might say, an "essence" that governs the series of our loves, but this essence, Deleuze insists, "is always difference," and this difference differs from itself every time it is repeated.[61] It is a virtuality that is differenciated every time it is actualized. The variations, in other words,

do not come from without, but express differential mechanisms which belong to the essence and origin of what is repeated. There is not an originary "thing" (model) which could eventually be uncovered behind the disguises, displacements, and illusions of repetition (copies); rather, *disguise and displacement are the essence of repetition itself*, which is in itself an original and positive principle.

> Repetition is constituted only with and through the *disguises* which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operated above all by *displacement* . . . What is displaced and disguised in the series cannot and must not be identified, but exists and acts as the differenciator of difference. (DR 105, 300)

The clothed repetition of an inverted Platonism must thus be distinguished from the naked repetitions (re-presentation) of Platonism itself.

> *Re*-petition opposes *re*-presentation: the prefix changes meaning, since in the latter case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the former it is the univocal which is said of the different . . . When the identity of things dissolves, being escapes to attain univocity [Being = difference], and begins to revolve around the different. (DR 67)

Temporally, the differential object = x refers neither to an empirical moment nor to a mythical moment, but belongs essentially to the past, and as such is unrememberable in itself; what is repeated can never be represented in the present, but it always disguised in the roles and masks it produces. Clothed repetition, in other words, does not refer to something underneath the masks, but rather is formed from one mask to the other, in a movement of perpetual differentiation.

3. *Ungrounding.* Third, these two immanent principles of difference and repetition can be said to come together in the notion of an "ungrounding," a *sans-fond*. Plato saw chaos as a contradictory state that must be subject to an order or a law from the outside; the Demiurge subjugates a rebellious matter, imposing on it the effect of the Same. He thus reduced the Sophist to contradiction, to that supposed state of chaos, the lowest power and last degree of participation. In reality, however, the Sophist is not the being (or non-being) of contradiction, nor the being of the negative; rather, the Sophist is the one who raises everything to the level of simulacra—that is, to the level of difference—and who maintains and affirms them in that state. Far from being a new foundation, the simulacrum allows no installation of a foundation-ground; rather, it swallows up all foundations; it assures a universal collapse, an "un-founding" [*effondement*], but as a positive event, a "gay science." The Platonic project of opposing the cosmos to chaos finds itself replaced by the immanent identity of chaos and cosmos, the "chaosmos." There is no longer a thread to lead us out of Plato's cave, to inaugurate our ascent toward the transcendent Idea, but only, as Nietzsche saw, a deeper cave behind every cave, an abyss beneath every foundation.

> By "ungrounding" [Deleuze writes], we should understand the freedom of the non-mediated ground, the discovery of a ground behind every other ground, the relation between the groundless and the ungrounded, the immediate reflection of the formless and the superior form which constitutes the eternal return. (DR 67)

Deleuze thus links the immanent identity of cosmos and chaos with Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return—the third form of repetition, beyond both naked and clothed repetition. The eternal return "is not an external order imposed upon the chaos of the world; on the contrary, the eternal return is the internal identity of the world and of chaos, the Chaosmos" (DR 299). If Plato reduced the simulacrum to the lowest power and last degree of participation, the eternal return raises the simulacrum to the highest power, the "nth" power. The "nth" power does not pass through varying degrees of participation (second, third . . .), but rather is immediately affirmed of chaos itself in order to constitute the highest power. Difference itself is a plastic and nomadic principle that operates beyond or beneath forms themselves; it is a principle that is "contemporaneous with the process of individuation, no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them" (DR 38). The eternal return is the form of repetition that affirms difference itself, and raises it to the highest power.

> Repetition in the eternal return appears as the peculiar power of difference, and the displacement and disguise of that which repeats only reproduce the divergence and the decentering of the difference in a single movement of *diaphora* or transport. The eternal return affirms difference, it affirms dissemblance and disparateness, chance, multiplicity, and becoming. (DR 300)

4. *Selection.* Finally, the project of selection takes on a new form as well. The Platonic dialectic is dominated by the idea of establishing a criterion of selection between the thing itself and its simulacra.

> The question [Deleuze writes] is whether such a reaction [against Platonism] abandons the project of a selection among rivals, or on the contrary, as Spinoza and Nietzsche believed, draws up *completely different methods of selection*. Such methods would no longer concerns claims as acts of transcendence, but the manner in which an existing being is filled with immanence . . . Selection no longer concerns the claim, but power. (ECC, 137)

This is what distinguishes the *moral* vision of the world (Plato, Kant) from an *ethical* vision of the world (Spinoza, Nietzsche). If morality consists in *judging* actions or beings by relating them to transcendent values, ethics *evaluates* what we do or think according to the immanent mode of existence it implies. What would these immanent methods entail? The selective difference can no longer be an external difference (between true and false claimants), but must depend on an internal difference (between active and reactive / passive power). The selection, in short, must

be based on the purely immanent criterion of a thing's *power* or capacities: that is, by the manner in which it actively deploys its power by going to the limit of what it can do, or on the contrary, by the manner in which it is cut off from its capacity to act. An immanent *ethical* difference (good / bad) is in this way substituted for the transcendent *moral* opposition (Good / Evil). The "bad" is an exhausted and degenerating mode of existence that judges life from the perspective of its sickness, that devaluates life in the name of "higher" values (the True, the Good, the Beautiful). The "good" is an overflowing, ascending, and exceptional form of existence, a type of being that is able to transform itself depending on the forces it encounters, always increasing its power to live, always opening new possibilities of life.[62] This ethical difference is internal to the existing being, and requires no appeal to transcendent criteria. "Only the philosophies of pure immanence escape Platonism," writes Deleuze, "from the Stoics to Spinoza or Nietzsche."[63]

EXEUNT SIMULACRA

Deleuze summarizes these contrasts between the copy and the simulacrum—between Platonism and inverted Platonism—by inviting us to consider two formulas: "Only that which resembles differs" and "Only differences can resemble each other." The first is an exact definition of the world as an icon; it bids us to think of difference only in terms of similarity, or a previous identity, which become the conditions of difference (Plato). The second defines the world of simulacra; it posits the world itself as a phantasm or simulacrum, inviting us to think of similarity and even identity as the result of a fundamental disparity, products or effects of a primary difference, or a primary system of differences (Nietzsche).

> What we have to ask [writes Deleuze] is whether these two formulas are simply two ways of speaking that do not change much; or if they are applied to completely different systems; or if, being applied to the same systems (at the limit, to the system of the World), they signify two incompatible interpretations of unequal value, one of which is capable of changing everything.[64]

In the end, Deleuze's analysis of the simulacrum entails more than a reading of latonism; it also constitutes one of the fundamental problems of contemporary thought.

> Modern thought [Deleuze writes in the preface to *Difference and Repetition*] was born out of the failure of representation, as the loss of identities, and the discovery of all the forces that were acting under the representation of the identical. The modern world is one of simulacra . . . All identities are only simulated, produced like an "optical effect" by a more profound play [*jeu*] which is that of difference and repetition. *We would like to think difference in itself, and the relation of the different with the different, independent of the forms of representation that lead it back to the Same*.[65]

Deleuze's entire philosophical project can be seen as an explication of this declaration of intent.

An assessment of Deleuze's theory of Ideas (which passes through a reappraisal of Kant as well as Plato) lies beyond the scope of this paper. It was initially through his reading of Plato that Deleuze was able to pose the problem that lies at the genesis of his theory of Ideas (the problem of simulacra), and to indicate the role that the overturning of Platonism plays in his thought. However, there is a coda to this story. After the publication of *Difference and Repetition* (1968), the concept of the simulacrum more or less disappears from Deleuze's work in favor of the concept of the *agencement* or "assemblage." "It seems to me that I have completely abandoned the notion of the simulacrum," Deleuze noted in 1993.[66] There seem to be two reasons for this evolution. On the one hand, the notion that things simulate a transcendent Idea has a meaning only in the context of Platonism. In Deleuze's own ontology, things no longer "simulate" anything, but rather "actualize" immanent Ideas that are themselves real, though virtual. Deleuze thus uses the notion of the simulacrum to pose the Nietzschean problem of "anti-Platonism" within Plato himself, but then drops the notion as he forges his own ontological terminology. Within Deleuze's own work, the concept of the simulacrum is ultimately replaced by the concept of the assemblage [*agencement*], and the process of simulation is more properly characterized as the process of actualization (or even more precisely, the complex process of "differen t/c iation"). On the other hand, Deleuze does not ascribe to Greek thought the importance that one finds in Nietzsche (for whom post-Greek thought was little more than the history of a long error)[67] or Heidegger (who tended to fetishize Greek and German language and thought). Nietzsche said that a truth never reveals itself immediately, at its birth, but only in its maturation. Similarly, Deleuze's philosophical heroes, so to speak, tend to be found, not at the origins of philosophical thought (Socrates, Plato), but in its maturation in the seventeenth century (Spinoza, Leibniz). After *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*, Plato's work does not receive another sustained discussion in Deleuze's writings until *What is Philosophy?* In this sense, Deleuze's sketch of Nietzsche's anti-Platonism serves as a propaedeutic endeavor whose primary role is to outline the motivations of Deleuze's own philosophical project. Finally, one could say that, as the concept of the simulacrum disappeared from Deleuze's writings, it was taken up by other writers (such as Baudrillard) and taken in a different direction, with different coordinates and in response to different problematics. Concepts, in this sense, have their own autonomy and history that go beyond the diversity of their adherents.

Notes

Essay 1: Plato
The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism

1. See, for instance, Pierre Klossowski, "Sacred and Mythical Origins of Certain Practices of the Women of Rome" [1968], in *Diana at her Bath* and *The Women of Rome*, trans. Sophie Hawkes (Boston: Eridanos, 1990), 132–8, as well as Jean-François Lyotard's commentaries (notably on the Augustine–Varro debate) in *Libidinal Economy* [1974], trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 66–76. In Klossowski, a *phantasm* is an obsessive but uncommunicable image produced within us by the unconscious forces of our impulsive life; a *simulacrum* is a reproduction of the phantasm that attempts to simulate (necessarily inadequately) this invisible agitation of the soul in a literary work, in a picture or a sculpture, or in a philosophical concept. Klossowski's concept of the simulacrum thus has very different components than those assigned to the concept by Deleuze.
2. See Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), esp. "The Precession of Simulacra," 1–42. For an analysis of Baudrillard's conception of simulacra, see Douglas Kellner, *Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 76–84.
3. *Logic of Sense* includes Deleuze's well-known article "Plato and the Simulacrum" as an appendix (LS 253–6). This article itself is a revised version of an earlier piece entitled "Renverser le platonisme," which first appeared in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 71/4 (Oct–Dec 1966), 426–38; an English translation by Heath Massey is included as an appendix to Leonard Lawlor, *Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 163–77, under the title "Reversing Platonism (Simulacra)."
4. Nietzsche, *Grossoktavausgabe* (Leipzig, 1905 ff.), Vol. 9, 190, as cited in Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. I: *The Will to Power as Art* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 154.
5. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), 29: "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
6. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. I: *The Will to Power as Art*, 151–2. Heidegger analyzes Nietzsche's anti-Platonism in terms of the "raging discordance" between truth and art (see 151–220).
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: Viking, 1954), 485–6.

8. See, above all, Jean-Pierre Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), and Marcel Detienne, *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone, 1999), esp. Chapter 5, "The Process of Secularization" (in French, *laïcisation*), both of whom link the advent of "rational" thought to the structure of the Greek *polis*, and explore the complex relations of philosophy to its precursors. Pierre Vidal-Naquet provides a helpful overview of the debates in "Greek Rationality and the City," in *The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World*, trans. Andrew Szegedy-Maszak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 249–62.
9. WP 86–8. On the distinction between the State and the City as social formations, see TP 432–3.
10. On the spatial organization of the Greek *polis*, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought Among the Greeks* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), Part 3, esp. Chapter 8, "Space and Political Organization in Ancient Greece," 212–34. On relations of rivalry, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, "City-State Warfare," in *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece* (New York: Zone, 1990), esp. 29, 41–2.
11. This is the theme of Michel Foucault's *History of Sexuality*, Vol. 2: *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1985). Foucault argues that, within this agonistic field of power relations, the Greeks invented a new and specific form of power relation which he termed "subjectivation" (the relation of oneself to oneself), whose historical variations constituted the object of his research in last two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*, and of which sexuality or erotics constituted only a part.
12. We are here drawing on the political theory that Deleuze and Guattari develop in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, in which they sketch out a typology of different social formations ("primitive" societies, cities, states, capitalism, war machines) and the correlative "images of thought" they imply. See AO 139–271 and TP 351–473.
13. NP 5–6, 107. See also Alexandre Kojève, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny* (New York: Free Press, 1963), 156. Nietzsche adds that, although the early philosophers could not help but adopt the mask of the wise man or priest, this strategy proved decisive for philosophy, since the philosopher increasingly came to adopt that mask as his own.
14. WP 9, translation modified. This concept of the "friend" is explored by Deleuze and Guattari in the introduction to *What is Philosophy?* (WP 2–6). See also N 162–3, F 100–3, and PV 16.
15. The important notion of "conceptual personae" is developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Chapter 3 of *What is Philosophy?* (WP 61–83). See also Vernant, *Origins*, 102–18.
16. Jean-Pierre Faye, *La Raison narrative* (Paris: Balland, 1990), 15–18: "It took a century for the word 'philosopher,' no doubt invented by Heraclitus of Ephesus, to find its correlate in the word 'philosophy,' no doubt invented by Plato the Athenian. The first philosophers were foreigners, but philosophy is Greek."
17. The word "claimant" translates the French *prétendant*, which can also mean "pretender," "suitor," or even "candidate." Its translation as "claimant" emphasizes the relation of the *prétendant* to its *prétention* ("claim"), but loses the connotations associated with the words "pretender" and "pretentious," which are also present in the French.
18. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, I, 31 and *Posterior Analytics*, II, 5 and 13. See Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 92–3, 163–4, 175–9, as well as Deleuze's comments in LS 254 and DR 59–60.
19. Plato, *Statesman*, 303 d–e. On the distinction between *antiphasis* and *amphisbetesis*, see DR 60 and LS 293.
20. DR 61–2. On the relation between Platonism and archaic religion, see Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). Eliade characterizes archaic religion by the repetition of mythic archetypes and the symbolism of

the Center, and notes its explicit parallels with Platonism: "It could be said that this 'primitive' ontology has a Platonic structure; and in that case Plato could be regarded as the outstanding philosopher of 'primitive mentality,' that is, as the thinker who succeeded in giving philosophic currency to the modes of life and behavior of archaic humanity" (34). Deleuze is none the less critical of aspects of Eliade's approach to religion: "The idea that primitive societies are without history, dominated by archetypes and their repetition, is particularly weak and inadequate. It was not conceived by ethnologists, but by ideologues attached to a tragic Judeo-Christian consciousness that they wished to credit with the 'invention' of history" (AO 150, translation modified).

21. Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophy is a discipline that consists in the creation of concepts, but Plato's concept of the Idea is an illuminating example of the complexity of this claim. Plato says that one must contemplate the Ideas, but *it was first of all necessary for him to create the concept of the Idea*. In this sense, writes Deleuze, Plato teaches the opposite of what he actually does:

> Plato creates the concept of the Ideas, but he needs to posit them as representing the uncreated that precedes them. He places time in the concept, but this time must be the Anterior. He constructs the concept, but as testifying to the preexistence of an objectity, under the form of a difference in time capable of measuring the distance or proximity of the possible constructor. This is because, in Platonic plane, truth is posited as presupposed, as already there. (WP 29)

22. See DR 85: "Beyond the lover and beyond the mother, coexistent with the one and contemporary with the other, lies the never-lived reality of the Virgin."
23. For Deleuze's interpretation of the Neo-Platonic heritage, see "Zones of Immanence," in TRM 261–4, and "Immanence and the Historical Components of Expression," in EPS 169–86.
24. In Augustine, for example, "absolute" dissimulation implies nothingness; thus the last of beings, if it is not nothingness, is at least an illusory simulacrum. See Étienne Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint-Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1929), 268.
25. On height, depth, and surface as orientations of thought, see LS, Series 18, "Of the Images of Philosophers," 127–33.
26. Plato, *Sophist*, 268b.
27. Plato, *Sophist*, 236c: "These then are two sorts of image-making [*eidolopoïike*]—the art of making likenesses [*eikones*], and phantastic or the art of making appearances [*phantasmata*]." See also *Sophist*, 264c–268d; and *Republic*, Book 10, 601d ff.
28. LS 296. Jean-Pierre Vernant has questioned the importance Deleuze ascribes to this distinction in "The Birth of Images," in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays*, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 164–85, esp. 169. But he none the less supports the thrust of Deleuze's reading when he says that the problem of the *Sophist* is "to articulate what an image is, not in its seeming but in its being, to speak not of the seeming of appearance but of *the essence of seeming, the being of semblance*" (182).
29. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 167. Deleuze employs the Homeric image in LS 254.
30. DR 128. For a reading of Deleuze's work along naturalistic lines, see Alberto Gualandi, *Deleuze* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998). Gualandi argues that, for Deleuze, the task of a true philosophy of Nature would be "to eliminate any trace of transcendence, and at the same time, to give back to Nature its authentic depth, the Becoming and the virtualities that are inherent in it, the Being that is immanent to it" (36). For Nietzsche, this naturalistic project found its precursor in Heraclitus; for Deleuze, its great ancient representative was Lucretius, whose naturalism Deleuze analyzes in his article "Lucretius and the Simulacrum" (LS 266–79):

> To distinguish in men what amounts to myth and what amounts to Nature, and in Nature itself, to distinguish what is truly infinite from what is not—such is the practical and speculative object of Naturalism. The first philosopher is a naturalist: he speaks about nature, rather than speaking about the gods. His condition is that his discourse shall not introduce into philosophy *new myths* that would deprive Nature of all its positivity. (LS 278)

The latter phrase is a reference to Plato.

31. On the use of the term "representation," see Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage, 1973), which identifies a "classic" world of representation in the seventeenth century and outlines its limitations. Deleuze's characterization of Platonism bears certain affinities with this statement of Richard Rorty's: "Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up into areas which will represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense to do so)." Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.
32. *Philebus* 24d. On this theme, see Deleuze, LS, Series 1, "On Pure Becoming," 1–3.
33. Stanley Rosen has criticized Deleuze's reading of the *Sophist*, noting that "an image that does not resemble X cannot be an image of X." But Rosen here collapses Deleuze's distinction: an "image" can be either a *resemblance* (a true copy or icon that participates internally in the model) or a mere *semblance* (a false simulacrum or phantasy that feigns a merely external reflection). Though their usages overlap, these English terms none the less indicate the essential distinction between an icon and a simulacrum that Deleuze is attempting to establish. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines resemblance as "the quality of being like or similar . . . A likeness, image, representation, or reproduction of some person or thing" (several of the historical examples in the OED refer, significantly, to the prelapsarian state of creation). Semblance, on the contrary, is defined as "the fact of appearing to view . . . An appearance or outward seeming *of* something which is not actually there or of which the reality is different from its appearance." Rosen's comment, it seems, would tend to collapse such terms as "image," "resemblance," "semblance," and even "mimesis" into mere synonymy. See Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 172–3.
34. Jacques Derrida, in his essay "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 61–171, locates a similar trinity at the heart of Platonism: the father of *logos*, *logos* itself, writing. Much of Derrida's early work focused on the Platonic conception of "writing" for precisely this reason: *writing is a simulacrum*, a false claimant in that it tries to capture the *logos* through violence and trickery without going through the father. In LS 297, Deleuze finds the same figure in the *Statesman*: the Good as the father of the law, the law itself, constitutions. Good constitutions are copies, but they become simulacra the moment they violate or usurp the law by evading the Good.
35. The simulacrum, in short, is a *differential system*, "a system where difference is related to difference *through* difference itself" (DR 277). It is precisely such systems that Deleuze analyzes in *Difference and Repetition*.
36. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), esp. 88–9.
37. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans*, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin, 1984), esp. Book VI. Klossowski's text *Diana at Her Bath* is explicitly presented as a kind of polytheistic inversion of Augustine's monotheistic *The City of God*; see his commentaries in *Diana at Her Bath and The Women of Rome*, 82–4, 131–8.
38. On all these themes, see Foucault's important essay on Klossowski, "The Prose of Acteon," trans. Robert Hurley, in Michel Foucault, *Essential Works of Foucault: 1954–1984*, Vol. 2:

Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1988), 123–35.

39. DR 66. See also DR 301: "The Same, forever decentered, effectively turns around difference only once difference, having assumed the whole of Being, applies only to simulacra which have assumed the whole of Being."
40. For a discussion of Roussel's work, see Michel Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986), esp. Chapter 2. For Deleuze's analyses, see DR 22, 121 and LS 39, 85. Roussel's language rests not simply on the combinatorial possibilities of language—the fact that language has fewer terms of designation than things to designate, but none the less can extract an immense wealth from this poverty—but more precisely on the possibility of saying two things with the same word, inscribing a maximum of difference within the repetition of the same word.
41. See DR 69, 55–6:

> It is not enough to multiply perspectives in order to establish perspectivism. To every perspective or point of view there must correspond an autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense . . . Representation has only a single center, a unique and receding perspective, and consequently a false depth . . . Movement for its part implies a plurality of centers, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially distort representation: paintings or sculptures are already such "distorters," forcing us to create movement.

42. Plato, *Republic*, X, 601d–608b. The notion of *mimesis* appears not to have been used in discussions of art prior to the fifth century. Until that time, the art of the poet had been regarded as one of "deception" (*apate*), and it is precisely this form of image-making that Plato aims to send into exile. See Vernant, "The Birth of Images," in *Mortals and Immortals*, 165, and note 2.
43. LS 265. On these points, see Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1: *The Will to Power as Art*, 162–99.
44. Plato, *Republic*, VII, 523b ff.
45. For an analysis of Warhol's work in this context, see Paul Patton, "Anti-Platonism and Art," in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routledge, 1994), 141–56.
46. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §289, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 414.
47. What disengages the false from the model of truth (as the universal and the necessary—what is true "at all times and in all places") is ultimately the form of time (see 12 Jun 1984). The phrase "power of the false" seems to be Deleuze's coinage, not Nietzsche's.
48. See NP 103:

> The activity of life is like a power of falsehood: duping, dissimulating, dazzling, and seducing. But, in order to be brought into effect, this power of the false must be selected, redoubled or repeated, and thus elevated to a higher power . . . It is *art* that invents the lies that elevate the false to this higher affirmative power, that turns the will to deceive into something that is affirmed in the power of the false. *Appearance*, for the artist, no longer signifies the negation of the real in this world, but this kind of selection, this correction, this redoubling, this affirmation. Then truth perhaps takes on a new signification. Truth is appearance. Truth signifies the effectuation of power, raising it to the highest power. In Nietzsche, "we the artists" = "we the seekers after knowledge or truth." (translation modified)

See also Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Reason in Philosophy," 6:

> For "appearance" in this case [the artist] means reality *once more*, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction. The tragic artist is no pessimist: he is precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the terrible—he is *Dionysian*. (484)

49. See DR 319 n30. In the *Theaetetus*, for example, Socrates speaks of "two patterns eternally set before humanity, the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched" (176e). Similarly, the *Timaeus* (27d–28d) sets before the demiurge two possible models for the creation of the world, and before humanity two possible models for science ("Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he created the world—the pattern of that which is unchangeable, or of that which is created?"). In TP 361–74, Deleuze analyses various "minor" sciences (Archimedean geometry, the physics of the atomists, the differential calculus, etc.) that were based on such a model of becoming, and replaced the hylomorphic model (the static relation of form–matter), which searches for laws by extracting constants, with a hydraulic model (the dynamic relation of material–forces), which placed the variables themselves in a state of continuous variation.
50. Plato, *Parmenides*, 130d.
51. See DR 127: "Insinuated throughout the Platonic cosmos, difference resists it yoke . . . It is as though there were a strange *double* which dogs Socrates' footsteps and haunts even Plato's style, inserting itself into the repetitions and variations of that style." On the effect that this "double" has on Plato's style, see DR 319 n29: "Plato's arguments are marked by stylistic reprisals and repetitions which testify to a meticulous attention to detail, as though there were an effort to 'correct' a theme in order to defend it against a neighboring, but dissimilar, theme that is 'insinuating' itself into the first."
52. See Deleuze's article "The Method of Dramatization," in DI 94–116, esp. 94–5. See also DR 64: "Being (what Plato calls the Idea) 'corresponds' to the essence of the problem or the question as such. It is as though there were an 'opening,' a 'gap,' an ontological 'fold' which relates being and the question to one another."
53. For an analysis of the role of the "What is . . .?" question in Plato, see Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953), esp. Chapter 5, "Socratic Definition," 49–60.
54. Contemporary "antifoundationalism" implies, at the very least, the rejection of this Platonic form of questioning, of this search for a foundational essence.

> I cannot characterize my standpoint better [wrote Wittgenstein] than to say it is opposed to that which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues. For if asked what knowledge is (*Theatatus* 146a) I would list examples of knowledge, and add the words "and the like" . . . whereas when Socrates asks the question "What is knowledge?" he does not even regard it as a *preliminary* answer to enumerate cases of knowledge. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, manuscript 302, ¶14, as quoted in Garth Hallett, *A Commentary to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 33–4.

In general, however, Deleuze was hesitant about Wittgenstein's work, which he thought had had a pernicious effect on Anglo-American philosophy; see ABC W.

55. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §556, 301: "The question 'What is that?' is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. 'Essence,' the 'essential nature,' is something perspectival and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies 'What is that for *me*' (for us, for all that lives, etc.)."
56. See Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 119–20. On all these points, see DI 94–5, 105–7; DR 188; NP 75–8.
57. On the relation between such "minor" questions and problematics, see Gottfried Wilhelm

Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 368:

> It should be borne in mind that sometimes it is a matter of finding a truth or falsity of a given proposition, which is the same as answering the "whether" question, i.e., whether it is or isn't so; while sometimes the question to be answered is (other things being equal) more difficult—when it is asked, for instance "By whom and how," in which case something more has to be added. It is only questions like this, which leave part of the proposition blank, that the mathematicians call "problems."

58. See DR 16–19 (on Freud), and DR 87–8, 141–2 (on Plato).
59. On the theme of series in Proust, see PS 67–83. One of the essential critiques that Deleuze and Guattari level against psychoanalysis is that it reduces the unconscious to the familial coordinates of the primal scene or the Oedipal triangle ("daddy–mommy–me"). See, for instance, AO 97, 91:

> The father, mother, and the self are directly coupled to the elements of the political and historical situation: the soldier, the cop, the occupier, the collaborator, the radical, the resister, the boss, the boss's wife . . . The family is by nature eccentric, decentered . . . There is always an uncle from America; a brother who went bad; an aunt who took off with a military man . . . The father and mother exist only as fragments . . . inductors or stimuli of varying, vague import that trigger processes of an entirely different nature.

60. Jacques Lacan develops this theme most famously in his "Seminar on *The Purloined Letter*," trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, *Yale French Studies* 48 (1972), 55: "What is hidden is never but what is *missing from its place*, as the call slip puts it when speaking of a volume lost in the library. And even if the book be on an adjacent shelf or in the next slot, it would be hidden there, however visibly it may appear." See also LS 40–1, which cites a parallel text of Lewis Carroll's.
61. PS 75. Chapter 6 of this book ("Series and Group," 67–83) explores the mechanisms of difference and repetition exemplified in Proust's serial conception of love: difference as the law or essence of the series; the repetition of the terms as variation and displacement. In the conclusion of Part I ("The Image of Thought," 94–102), Deleuze analyzes the "anti-Greek" image of thought found in Proust, implicitly aligning it with Nietzsche's theme of an inverted Platonism.
62. See DR 54:

> Nietzsche reproaches all those selection procedures based upon the opposition or conflict with working to the advantage of the average forms and operating to the benefit of the "large number." Eternal return alone effects the true selection, because it eliminates the average forms and uncovers "the superior form of everything that is."

63. ECC 127. For a discussion of the criteria of selection in an immanent ethics, see Essay 4 in this volume.
64. DR 117; see also LS 261–2. The two formulas are derived from Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon, 1962), 77. Arthur Danto makes a similar point in *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 171:

> The paradigm of a philosophical difference is between two worlds, one of which is sheer illusion, as the Indians believed this one is, and the other of which is real in the way we believe this very world is. Descartes' problem of distinguishing waking experience from dream experience is a limited variation of the same question . . . A world of sheer determinism might be imagined indistinguishable from one in which everything happens

> by accident. A world in which God exists could never be told apart from one in which God didn't . . . Carnap would have said that such a choice is meaningless precisely because no observation(s) could be summoned to effect a discrimination . . . Whatever the case, it is plain that philosophical differences are external to the worlds they discriminate.

65. DR ix (translation modified). See also DR 301: "The history of the long error is the history of representation, the history of icons."
66. See Gilles Deleuze, "Lettre-préface," in Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas and Susan Dyrkton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 8.
67. See LS 129: "Nietzsche takes little interest in what happened after Plato, maintaining that it was necessarily the continuation of a long decadence."

Essay 2: Univocity
The Doctrine of Univocity: Deleuze's Ontology of Immanence

1. See FB 11 and 25 Nov 1980.
2. DR 39 (35–42 contains Deleuze's "song" of univocity). See also LS 177–80.
3. Deleuze's interpretation of Duns Scotus relies primarily on Étienne Gilson's definitive *Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952). In English, see Gilson's historical discussions in *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), 454–71, and *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 84–95.
4. Deleuze almost certainly developed the notion of univocity while researching his "secondary" thesis on Spinoza for the Doctorat d'État. François Dosse, however, notes that Deleuze had largely completed his thesis on Spinoza in the late 1950s, before the publication of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in 1962, even though the thesis was not published until 1968. See his *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 118, 143.
5. 4 Jan 1974. This seminar includes Deleuze's discussion of the Scholastic approaches to the concept of Being.
6. Deleuze's 1956 essay, "Bergson's Conception of Difference," trans. Melissa McMahon, in John Mullarky, ed., *The New Bergson* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) is a reading of Bergson through the prism of Heidegger's problematic of ontological difference. See Constantin V. Boundas's analyses in "Deleuze-Bergsonian Ontology of the Virtual," in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton (London: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 81–106, which makes the comparison. Miguel de Beistegui's *Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004) is a superb analysis of the Heidegger–Deleuze relation.
7. DR 66. In the preface to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze cites "Heidegger's ever more pronounced orientation toward a philosophy of ontological Difference" (DR ix) as one of the factors that led him to write the book. The only direct confrontation, however, is the long footnote in Chapter 1 (DR 64–6), which concerns the notion of difference in Heidegger's thought. The note was apparently inserted at the insistence of Deleuze's thesis advisors, who no doubt recognized the subterranean battle lines being drawn in the book.
8. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 172.
9. SPP 63. To my knowledge, Deleuze is the only commentator to have drawn this link between Duns Scotus and Spinoza on the question of univocity.

10. See Reiner Schürmann, *Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 172–92. While recognizing Eckhart's affinities with immanence (see 176, 252 n56) and with an immanent causality (177), Schürmann none the less attempts to provide a qualified analogical interpretation of his teachings (179).
11. For Thomas Aquinas's formulations of analogy, see *Summa Theologica* 1.13.5. The way of affirmation found its greatest literary expression in Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and perhaps its most important modern proponent in Charles Williams. See, most notably, Charles Williams, *The Figure of Beatrice: A Study in Dante* (London: Faber & Faber, 1943).
12. See Spinoza, *Short Treatise*, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 65–90, as well as Deleuze's commentary in SPP 104–5 and EPS 49–51, 55–61, 70–7.
13. See Spinoza, *Theological-Political Treatise*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), particularly Chapter 2.
14. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, *From Philo to Spinoza: Two Studies in Religious Philosophy* (New York: Behrman House, 1977).
15. On the distinction between these three types of causality, see 22 Mar 1983.
16. In his *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), Alain Badiou rightly notes the influence of Heidegger on Deleuze, but wrongly presents Deleuze's "univocal ontology" as if it were a Neo-Platonic "philosophy of the One." For instance, when Badiou writes that, in Deleuze, "the paradoxical or super-eminent One engenders, in an immanent manner, a procession of beings, whose univocal sense it distributes" (26), he is giving a description of an *emanative* ontology, not a univocal one. In general, like many medievals, Badiou combines transitive, emanative, and immanent elements in his treatment of univocity, thereby seeming to confirm Deleuze's adage, cited above, that univocity is "the strangest thought, the most difficult to think."
17. Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
18. See in particular Jacques Derrida, *On the Name*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). John D. Caputo has analyzed Derrida's theological appropriations in *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
19. TRM 261.The term "crowned anarchy" is taken from what Deleuze considers to be Antonin Artaud's "masterpiece" (AO 211), his novelized biography of the third-century Roman emperor, *Heliogabalus, or The Crowned Anarchist*, trans. Alexis Lykiard (Clerkenwell: Solar, 2004).
20. Our analysis follows closely Deleuze's presentation of the univocity of modality in SPP, especially 93–4 (entry on the "Necessary") and 69–71 (entry on "Freedom").
21. Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 17, scholia ("Neither intellect nor will pertain to God's nature") and I, 32, corollary 1 ("God does not produce any effect by freedom of the will").
22. For the first argument, see Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 33, scholia 2: "If God had decreed, concerning Nature and its order, something other than what he did decree, that is, had willed and conceived something else concerning Nature, he would necessarily have had an intellect other than he now has, and a will other than he now has." For the second argument, see *Ethics*, I, appendix: "If God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something he lacks."
23. On the contrast that Spinoza establishes between abstractions and common notions, see SPP 44–8, 54–8.
24. SPP 70. Spinoza none the less distinguishes between the "idea of God" and his "infinite understanding" or infinite intellect; see SPP 80.
25. Deleuze discusses these illusions in SPP 20, 60. For the illusion of final causes, see *Ethics*, I, appendix ('all final causes are nothing but human fictions"); for the illusion of free will, see *Ethics*, V, preface ("the forces of the body cannot in any way be determined by those of the

mind"), as well as III, 2, scholia ("no one has yet determined what a body can do"); for the theological illusion, see *Ethics*, I, appendix ("they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he might worship God").

26. Spinoza, *Ethics*, IV, def. 3 and 4. See also I, 33, scholia: "A thing is called contingent only because of a defect in our knowledge."
27. Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, appendix; II, 35, scholia; V, preface. See also III, 2, scholia ("Men believe themselves free because they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined") and I, 32 ("The will cannot be called a free cause").
28. The formation of adequate idea through the "common notions" is one of the primary foci of Deleuze's analysis of Spinoza. See EPS 255–88, and the summary provided in SPP 54–8.
29. Spinoza, Letter 58, to G. H. Schuller, in *Spinoza: Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 908–9.
30. See Deleuze's essay on Klossowski in LS, where he contrasts the "order of God" with the "order of the Anti-Christ" (LS 292, 294).
31. See DR 40–1. Whitehead, in *Process and Reality*, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), proposes a similar modification of Spinoza: "Spinoza bases his philosophy upon the monistic substance, of which the actual occasions are inferior modes. The philosophy of organism inverts this point of view" (81). Similarly, if Deleuze is Leibnizian, it is only by eliminating the idea of a God who chooses the "best" of all possible worlds, with its pre-established harmony; in Deleuze, incompossibilities and dissonances belong to one and the same world, the only world, our world.
32. See Deleuze's interview with Arnaud Villani in the latter's *La Guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: Belin, 1999), 130: "I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician . . . Bergson says that modern science hasn't found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that interests me."
33. See Deleuze, "Letter Preface," in Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas and Susan Dyrkton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 8: "I believe in philosophy as system. For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a *heterogenesis*—something which, it seems to me, has never been attempted."
34. See Aristotle, *Categories*, 4, 1b25 (list of the categories) and *Physics*, Book 1, Chapter 2, 185a21 ("'Is' is used in several senses") in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 8, 220.
35. Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 102; cf. 117.
36. This diagram of Porphyry's tree is adapted from E. M. Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 29.
37. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III, 3, 998b22–7, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, 723:

> It is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that *if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one*.

38. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV, 2, 1003a33–4, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, 732 (translation modified): "Being is said in several senses, but always with reference to a single term (*pros hen*)."
39. On the relation between "common sense" and "good sense," see DR 269 and LS 75–9.
40. For Deleuze's summary of his criticisms of Aristotle, see DR 269–70.
41. The interpretation of Spinoza's "degree of power" in terms of the concept of intensity is another Deleuzian innovation. In *Difference and Repetition*, however, the concept of

intensity is no longer linked to that of substance, as in Spinoza, but takes on an autonomous status, defined formally (following Kant) as a difference that divides into itself, an *individuating difference*, in relation to a limit where intensity = 0.

42. See Eric Alliez, *La Signature du monde* (Paris: Cerf, 1993), Chapter 3, "Onto-éthologiques," 67–104.
43. DR 145. One could conserve the notion of a "category" in a univocal ontology, as do Peirce and Whitehead (see DR 284–5), on the condition of defining categories in a new manner, as differential concepts or Ideas. In an interview in Arnaud Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée* (Paris: Belin, 1999), Deleuze comments:

> The conclusion to *A Thousand Plateaus* is, in my mind, a table of categories (but incomplete, insufficient). Not in the manner of Kant [or Aristotle], but in the manner of Whitehead [or Peirce]. Category thus takes in a new meaning, a very special one. I would like to work on this point. (130)

François Dosse, in *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) cites a 1981 letter in which Deleuze suggests to Guattari that the evolving theory of categories be a focus of their project: "Pierce and Whitehead make modern tables of categories: how has this idea of categories evolved?" (4). The analytic of concepts developed in *What is Philosophy?* can be read as the direct result of Deleuze's rethinking of the problem of the categories.

44. See Deleuze, "Lettre-préface," in Jean-Clet Martin, *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas and Susan Dyrkton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), vii: "It seems to me that I have completely abandoned the notion of the simulacrum."
45. D57:

> The whole of grammar, the whole of the syllogism, is a way of maintaining the subordination of conjunctions to the verb to be, of making them gravitate around the verb to be. One must go further: one must make the encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make it topple over. Substitute AND [*ET*] for IS [*EST*]. A *and* B. The And is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole.

See also TP 25.

46. See, for instance, TI 180: "The whole undergoes a mutation, because it has ceased to be the One-Being, in order to become the constitutive 'and' of things, the constitutive between-two [*entre-deux*]."

Essay 3: Leibniz
Deleuze on Leibniz: Difference, Continuity, and the Calculus

1. See Deleuze's remark in his Letter-Preface to Jean-Clet Martin's *Variations: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas and Susan Dyrkton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), vii: "I feel that I am a very classical philosopher. I believe in philosophy as a system."
2. See EPS 11:

> What I needed was both (1) the expressive character of particular individuals, and (2) an immanence of being. Leibniz, in a way, goes still further than Spinoza on the first point. But on the second, Spinoza stands alone. One finds it only in him. This is why I consider myself a Spinozist, rather than a Leibnizian, although I owe a lot to Leibniz.

3. Deleuze also devoted two series of sessions of his seminar at the University of Vincennes-St. Denis to Leibniz, first in 1980, and then again in 1987, when he was at work on *The Fold*. My discussion here follows closely the deduction presented in the 1980 seminars.
4. For a discussion of Deleuze's relation to Maimon and the post-Kantian tradition, see Graham Jones, *Difference and Determination: Prolegomena Concerning Deleuze's Early Metaphysic*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 2002.
5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. and ed. Jonathan Bennett and Peter Remnant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 361.
6. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2nd edn., ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 307: "It is certain that every true predication has some basis in the nature of things, and when a proposition is not an identity, that is to say, when the predicate is not expressly contained in the subject, it must be included in it virtually" (*Discourse on Metaphysics* 8).
7. FLB 41. See Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 310: "Everything that happens to some person is already contained virtually in his nature or concept, just as the properties of the circle are contained in its definition" (*Discourse on Metaphysics* 13).
8. See Louis Couturat, "On Leibniz's Metaphysics," in Harry G. Frankfurt, ed., *Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 22: "The principle of identity states: every identity (analytic) proposition is true. The principle of reason affirms, on the contrary: every true proposition is an identity (analytic)."
9. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book 2, II, 994b, 22–5, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, 714: "How can we apprehend things that are infinite in this way . . . if we do not make a stop?"
10. See Benson Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 157: "To discover the reason for the truth of the essential proposition 'A is B' is to analyze the concept A far enough to reveal the concept B as contained in it." Deleuze, however, would disagree with Mates's statement that Leibniz "appears to use the terms 'reason' and 'cause' interchangeably" (158), despite the ambiguities of several Leibnizian texts.
11. DR 12. On the relation of difference and repetition in the classical theory of the concept, see DR 288: difference is always inscribed within the identity of the concept in general, and repetition is defined as a difference *without* a concept, that is, in terms of the numerically distinct exemplars or individuals that are subsumed under the generality of the concept (x^1, x^2, x^3, . . . x^n), and which block further conceptual specification.
12. DR 56. See also 222: "Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given as diverse."
13. However, Deleuze will argue, against Leibniz himself, that the analysis of essences must itself be infinite, since it is inseparable from the infinity of God. See FLB 42.
14. For an analysis of Deleuze's relation to the history of the calculus, see Essay 15.
15. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by That of Ordinary Algebra," in *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 545–6.
16. Deleuze analyzes this theory in an important chapter, entitled "Perception in the Folds," in FLB 85–99.
17. Alberto Gualandi, *Deleuze* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998), 49. Gualandi's book is one of the best short introductions to Deleuze's work, emphasizing Deleuze's philosophy of nature.
18. Kant had already objected that Maimon, by returning to Leibniz, thereby reintroduced the duality between a finite understanding (consciousness) and an infinite understanding (the divine), which the entire Kantian critique had attempted to eliminate. See Immanuel Kant, letter to Marcus Herz, 26 May 1789, in Arnulf Zweig, ed., *Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 150–6. Against Kant, however, Deleuze argues that

> the infinite here is only the presence of an *unconscious* in the finite understanding, a unthought in finite thought, a non-self in the finite self (whose presence Kant himself was forced to discover when he hollowed out the difference between a determining ego and a determinable ego). For Maimon as for Leibniz, the reciprocal determination of differentials does not refer to a divine understanding, but to minute perceptions as the representatives of the world in the finite self. (FLB, 118–19)

See also DR 192–3.

19. See DR 106–8 (as well as the whole of AO), which contain Deleuze's most explicit advocation of a differential unconscious (Leibniz, Fechner) over a conflictual unconscious (Freud).
20. See Leibniz's analysis of simple curves in "*Tentamen Anagogicum*: An Anagogical Essay in the Investigation of Causes," in Loemker, ed., *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 477–85.
21. See LS 174:

> Instead of a certain number of predicates being excluded by a thing by virtue of the identity of its concept, each 'thing' is open to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, and at the same time it loses its center, that is to say, its identity as a concept and as a self.

22. An early version of this paper appeared under the title "Difference, Continuity, and the Calculus," in Stephen Daniel, ed., *Current Continental Theory and Modern Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 127–47.

Essay 4: Hegel

Deleuze, Hegel, and the Post-Kantian Tradition

1. Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott Fox and J. M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 12: "In 1945, all that was modern sprang from Hegel . . . In 1968, all that was modern was hostile to Hegel." Kojève's course on Hegel was given at the École Pratique des Hautes Études from 1933 to 1939, and was regularly attended by figures such as Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, Alexandre Koyré, Pierre Klossowski, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Eric Weil, among others. The text of the course was compiled by Raymond Queneau and published in 1947. An English translation appeared in 1969: Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic, 1969).
2. Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 235, as cited in Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, 12.
3. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze links his concept of dialectics to the notion of the problematic: "Whenever the dialectic 'forgets' its intimate relation with Ideas in the form of problems . . . it loses its true power" (DR 164); "Problems are always dialectical: the dialectic has no other sense" (DR 179).
4. Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, trans. Lauretta C. Clough (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
5. François Châtelet, *Chronique des idées perdues* (Paris: Stock, 1977), 46. Michel Tournier provides a similar tribute in *The Wind Spirit: An Autobiography*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Boston: Beacon Ness, 1988), 127–8: as a student, Deleuze "possessed extraordinary powers of translation and rearrangement: all the tired philosophy of the curriculum passed through him and emerged unrecognizable but rejuvenated, with an air of freshness, undigestedness, and raw newness, utterly startling and discomfiting our weakness and laziness." See also 134–5 and 157.

6. Jacques Derrida, *The Post Card*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
7. See Michèle Le Dœuff, "Long Hair, Short Ideas," in *The Philosophical Imaginary*, trans. Colin Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 105–6. Deleuze himself makes a similar point in *Difference and Repetition*: "There is something amorous—but also something fatal—about all education"(DR 23).
8. See TP 526 n32: "Jean Wahl's works contain profound reflections on this sense of 'and,' on the way it challenges the primacy of the verb 'to be.'"
9. See D vii: "I have always felt that I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist."
10. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), section on "Sense Certainty." See also Deleuze's comment in NP 4: "Hegel wanted to ridicule pluralism, identifying it with a naive consciousness which would be happy to say 'this, that, here, now'—like a child stuttering out its most humble needs."
11. William James had already spoken of impressions of relations; see his *Principles of Psychology* [1890] (New York: Dover, 1950), Vol. I, 245: "We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue, a feeling of cold."
12. See N 122–4. The French term "Intercesseurs" in the title is translated as "Mediators."
13. Deleuze analyzes this notion in his cinema books, but it seems equally applicable to his own work. See MI 73: free indirect discourse "testifies to a system which is always heterogeneous, far from equilibrium."
14. Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 39: "Deleuze is a marvelous reader of Bergson, who, in my opinion, is his real master, far more than Spinoza, or perhaps even Nietzsche."
15. See N 145:

    > Setting out a plane of immanence, tracing out a field of immanence, is something all the authors I've worked on have done (even Kant—by denouncing the transcendent use of the syntheses, although he sticks to possible experience rather than real experimentation). (translation modified)

    Moreover, the central chapter of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is entitled "Critique"; beneath the explicit "anti-Hegelian" theme of the book there lies a profound engagement with Kant and the post-Kantian tradition in general, and of which Hegel is only a part (see NP 51–2 for Deleuze's comments on the relation between Nietzsche and post-Kantianism).
16. Deleuze's 1972 essay "How Do We Recognize Structuralism" (in DI 170–92) in effect defines structuralism by means of Deleuze's own "post-structuralist" terminology: difference, multiplicity, virtuality, and so on. Deleuze's radical critique of structuralism seems to have been what attracted Lacan to Deleuze's work prior to *Anti-Oedipus*: "You will see that he [Deleuze] says somewhere that the essence of structuralism, if this word has any meaning . . . is a blank, a lack in the signifying chain, and that which results from errant objects in the signifying chain" (Jacques Lacan, *Le Séminaire*, livre XVI: *D'un autre à l'autre (1968–1969)* (Paris: Seuil, 2006), 134, as cited in François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 188.
17. 14 Mar 1978. Martial Guéroult's book is *La Philosophie transcendentale de Salomon Maïmon* (Paris: Alcan, 1929). Guéroult's subsequent study, *L'Evolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte*, 2 vols. (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1930), also contains an important discussion of Maimon, and Deleuze relies heavily on both books. Maimon recounted his extraordinary and tragic life in his autobiography, which is available in a truncated English translation: *Salomon Maimon: An Autobiography* [1888], trans. J. Clark Murray (Champaign-Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 2001).

18. Salomon Maimon, *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* (1790), trans. Nick Midgley, Henry Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman, and Merten Reglitz (London: Continuum, 2010).
19. Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 151. Five years later, however, after leaving several letters from Maimon unanswered, Kant expressed a certain incomprehension of his project in a letter to Reinhold:

> For the past three years or so, age has affected my thinking . . . I feel an inexplicable difficulty when I try to project myself into other people's ideas, so that I seem unable to grasp anyone else's system and to form a mature judgment of it . . . This is the reason why I can turn out essays of my own, but, for example, as regards the "improvement" of the critical philosophy by Maimon . . . I have never really understood what he is after and must leave the reproof to others. (letter to K. L. Reinhold, 28 Mar 1794, 211–12)

The assessment, however, was not limited to Maimon: "I cannot even make Professor Reinhold's work clear to me" (letter to J. S. Beck, 1 Jul 1794, 217).

20. J. G. Fichte, *Briefwechsel*, III/2, 282, as cited in the Introduction to Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence*, 28.
21. Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 286. Beiser's study contains a chapter (285–323) analyzing the main themes of Maimon's thought. His articles "Introduction to Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1–24, and "The Context and Problematic of post-Kantian Philosophy," in *A Companion to Continental Philosophy*, ed. Simon Critchley (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 21–34, discuss Maimon's influence on post-Kantian thought. In English, one can also consult: Samuel Atlas, *From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Salomon Maimon* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); Samuel H. Bergman, *The Philosophy of Salomon Maimon*, trans. Noah L. Jacobs (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967); and Jan Bransen, *The Antinomy of Thought: Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation between Thoughts and Objects* (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1991).
22. Guéroult, *Fichte*, Vol. 1, 110: "For Maimon, the only untouchable aspect of the critical philosophy was the Copernican spirit of the method: nothing can be advanced that cannot be immediately justified from the viewpoint of the *immanent* consciousness in which alone the relation of the subject to the object must be determined."
23. On immanent critique in Kant, see NP 91; on Deleuze's relation to Kant, see N 145.
24. Deleuze, for instance, applies this Maimonian formula at various instances to the work of Schelling, Bergson, Nietzsche, Foucault, and even Pasolini.

> One must not raise oneself to conditions as to conditions of possible experience, but as to conditions of real experience: Schelling had already proposed this aim and defined his philosophy as a superior empiricism. The formula is valid for Bergsonism as well. (DI 36, translation modified)

> The Nietzsche and the Kantian conceptions of critique are opposed on five main points: 1. Genetic and plastic principles that give an account of the sense and value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations rather than transcendental principles which are conditions for so-called facts. (NP 93)

> Foucault differs in certain fundamental respects from Kant: the conditions are those of real experience, and not of possible experience. (F 60; the final phrase of this sentence is inadvertently omitted from the English translation)

> If it is worth making a philosophical comparison, Pasolini might be called post-Kantian (the conditions of legitimacy are the conditions of reality itself) while Metz and his

> followers remain Kantians (the falling back of principle upon fact). (TI 286 n8, translation modified)

25. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), Vol. 1, Book 2, Section 1, Chapters 2 and 3, 408–80.
26. Guéroult, in *Fichte*, Vol. l, 126–7, shows that in Maimon himself the relationship between difference and identity remains highly ambiguous, oscillating between all these positions; our discussion of Maimon here is necessarily simplified.
27. Maimon seems to have adopted the phrase "coalition system" from Kant himself, who used it in a pejorative sense in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (Book I, Chapter 1, Theorem II, Remark 1), in *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 158, where he accused his contemporaries of adopting "a *coalition system* of contradictory principles," rather than attempting to achieve consistency.
28. See FLB 89 (translation modified):

> Even more than Fichte, Salomon Maimon, the first post-Kantian to return to Leibniz, drew out all the consequences of such a psychic automatism of perception: far from perception presupposing an object capable of affecting us, and the conditions under which we would be affectable, the reciprocal determination of differentials (dy/dx) entails the complete determination of the object as perception, and the determinability of space-time as a condition. Beyond the Kantian method of conditioning, Maimon restores an internal subjective genesis.

29. Deleuze's comment on Nietzsche is equally applicable to himself: "The philosophical learning of an author is not assessed by number of quotations, but by the apologetic or polemical directions of his work itself" (NP 162).
30. NP 51–2. The footnote refers the reader to Guéroult's book on Maimon, as well as Jules Vuillemin's *L'Héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), which Deleuze cites frequently throughout his early writings.
31. For Nietzsche's problematization of knowledge and morality, see *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968): "The will to truth requires a critique—let us thus define our own task—the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question*" (Essay III, §24, 589); "Let us articulate this *new demand*: We need a *critique* of moral values, *the value of these values must first be brought into question*" (Preface, §6, 456).
32. Maimonian themes punctuate Deleuze's 1966 *Bergsonism*. (1) On the genetic method, and the search for conditions of real (and not merely possible) experience, see B 23, 26–8, 96–8 (Bergson's critique of the category of the possible). (2) On the principle of difference, B 91–3, and Deleuze's early article, "Bergson's Conception of Difference," trans. Melissa McMahon, in *The New Bergson*, ed. John Mullarkey (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 32–51.
33. See, for instance, Daniel Breazeale's criticisms in "The Hegel–Nietzsche Problem," in *Nietzsche-Studien* 4 (1975), 146–64.
34. François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, 119.
35. Aristotle, *Topics*, Book 1, 100a30–100b30, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (New York: Random House, 1941), 188. See DR 160.
36. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929): An Idea is "a problem to which there is no solution" (319, A328/B384); "if the universal is admitted as *problematic* only, and is a mere Idea, the particular is certain, but the universality of the rule of which it is a consequence is still a problem" (535, A646/B674). See Deleuze's analysis in DR 168–70.

Essay 5: Pre- and Post-Kantianism
Logic and Existence: Deleuze on the Conditions of the Real

1. This paper was originally presented at the conference "Deleuze and Rationalism," which took place on 16–17 March 2007 at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University, London.
2. Jean Hyppolite, *Logic and Existence* [1952], trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). This book completes the project Hyppolite began with *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit,"* trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1979), and examines the relation between the phenomenology and the logic. Deleuze wrote an important review of the book in 1954, "Jean Hyppolite's *Logic and Existence*," which is included as appendix to the English translation (191–5).
3. The paragraphs that follow are a recapitulation, in part, of the reading of Leibniz proposed in Essay 3.
4. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 408.
5. See Wilfred Sellers, "Meditations Leibniziennes," in *Leibniz: Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science*, ed. R. S. Woolhouse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 31. "If the nature of a substance is to account for its individuality, it must account for episodes [events], and not merely the capacities, powers, and dispositions—all, in principle, repeatable—which were traditionally connected with the natures of things."
6. Ian Hacking, "What Mathematics Has Done to Some and Only Some Philosophers," in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 103 (2000), 83–138: 105.
7. Leibniz, "On the Radical Origination of Things" [1697], in Leroy E. Loemker, ed., *Philosophical Papers and Letters* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1956), 486: "However far you go back to earlier states, you will never find in those states a full reason why there should be any world rather than none, and why it should be as it is."
8. Leibniz wrote a short text entitled "Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Mind" [1702], in Loemker, ed., *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 554–60, in which he shows that, although there is indeed a universal mind (God), it does not in any way prevent substances from being individual. See Deleuze's commentary in his seminar of 15 Apr 1980.
9. On Leibniz's derivation of the concept of point of view from the theory of conic sections, see Michel Serres, *Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques* (Paris: PUF, 1968), Part 3, "Le point fixe," 647–712.
10. See Leibniz, "Monadology" [1714], §57, in Loemker, ed., *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 648:

> Just as the same city viewed from different sides appears to be different and to be, as it were, multiplied in perspectives, so the infinite multitude of simple substances, which seem to be so many different universes, are nevertheless only the perspective of a single universe according to the different points of view of each monad.

11. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil*, trans. E. M. Huggard, ed. Austin Farrer (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985).
12. Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), §418. Deleuze analyzes this Christian tradition in his two-volume *Cinema*, where he draws a parallel between the philosophy of Pascal and Kierkegaard and the films of Bresson and Dreyer; see MI 114–16 and TI 176–9. Bresson perhaps even offers a fifth type of mode of existence in his great film *Au hasard, Balthazar*: the donkey who possesses the innocence of one who cannot choose, but who none the less suffers the effects of the choices or non-choices of

humans, which ultimately kill it—one of the most poignant scenes in the history of cinema (see MI 116).

13. *Qu'est-ce que fonder?* [What is Grounding?], cours hypokhâgne, at Lycée Louis le Grand, Paris, 1956–7, available at webdeleuze.com.
14. Although this quotation is from *Logic of Sense* (LS 176), it summarizes the essential themes of *Difference and Repetition*.
15. The limitation of so-called "analytic metaphysics" is its reliance on a logicist, formalist, and set theoretical metaphysics inherited from the nineteenth century. See, for instance, Ted Sider's stated assumption, in *Four-Dimensionalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), "that modern logic's quantificational apparatus mirrors the structure of reality" (xvi). As Whitehead pointed out, the notion of the *variable* is itself a derivative of the principle of identity. Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: Free Press, 1938), 106: "The variable, though undetermined, sustains its identity throughout the arguments." See also Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §512, 227: "Logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases"; and §516, 279: "Supposing there were no self-identical 'A,' such as is presupposed by every proposition of logic (and of mathematics) . . . ."
16. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 36[18], 24: "I take good care not to talk about chemical '*laws*': that has a moral aftertaste . . . ." See also EPS 268:

> The less we understand the laws of nature, that is, the norms of life, the more we interpret them as orders and prohibitions—to the point where the philosopher must hesitate before using the word "law," so much does it retain a moral aftertaste: it would be better to speak of "eternal truths."

Essay 6: Aesthetics
Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality

1. For Deleuze's formulations of the aesthetic problem, see DR 56–7, 68 and LS 260.
2. Plato, *Republic*, VII, 523b. Deleuze appeals to this text in DR 138–42, 236; NP 108, 210 n33); PS 100–1.
3. See Deleuze's analyses in KCP, esp. 15.
4. Plato, *Republic*, 524d; see also *Philebus*, 24d; *Parmenides* 154–5; and *Theaetetus*, 152–5. These paradoxes, known in antiquity as Megarian sorites ("How many grains constitutes a heap?"), are treated in formal logic as "vague predicates." See Pascal Engel, *The Norm of the True* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 199–215. Deleuze treats the theme of becoming in LS 1–3.
5. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 216–17; Erwin Straus, *The Primary World of the Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience*, trans. Jacob Needleman (New York: Free Press, 1963), 316–31; and Henri Maldiney, *Regard parole espace* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1973), 134–8. For Deleuze's criticisms, see MI 57, FB 37–9, and DR 137.
6. PS 37–8. Plato, in Deleuze's reading, remains tied to the model of recognition in two ways: in defining the sign as a qualitative contrariety, Plato confused the being of the sensible with a simple sensible being [*aistheton*], and he related it to an already-existing Idea that merely shifted the operation of recognition to the process of reminiscence. For the critique of Plato, see DR 141–2; for Proust's break with Platonism, see PS 108–15.
7. The analysis of images of thought is one of the central objects of Deleuze's philosophy: see in general PS 94–102, NP 103–10, and DR 127–67. More specific analysis of these "noological" themes can be found in LS 127–33 (height, depth, and surface as coordinates

of thought) and TP 3–25 (the tree and the rhizome as images of thought), 374–80 (the State-form versus "nomad" thought), and 474–500 (the smooth and the striated).

8. Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 28. Heidegger, however, still retains the theme of a desire or *philia*, substituting metaphors of the "gift" for those of violence, and adhering to the subjective presupposition of a pre-ontological understanding of Being. If Artaud plays an important role in Deleuze's thinking, it is because his case presents, in its clearest form, the fact that what thought is forced to think is its own impotence, its own incapacity to take on form on its own; Artaud's problem was not to orient his thought, but simply to manage to think *something*. Hence the determining importance of images of thought: can being mad belong to thought in principle, or is it simply a contingent feature of the brain that should be considered as a simple fact? See DR 146–7 (commentary on Artaud) and 321 n11 (criticisms of Heidegger).
9. Deleuze has analyzed each of these figures of negativity: on stupidity, see NP 105 ("stupidity is a structure of thought as such . . . it is not error or a tissue of errors . . . there are imbecile thoughts, imbecile discourses that are made up entirely of truths"); on convention, see PS 95 ("truths remain arbitrary and abstract so long as they are based on the goodwill of thinking. Only the conventional is explicit . . . Minds communicate to each other only the conventional"); on opinion, see WP 144–50 ("opinion is a thought closely molded on the form of recognition"); on clichés, particularly as they pose a problem for the artist, see MI 208–9 and FB 71–80.
10. According to Proust, jealousy is not a disease of love but its truth, its finality, and all love is "a dispute over evidence," "a delirium of signs" (PS 132, 138).
11. DR 144. See also EPS 149:

> One is always struck by the diverse inspirations of empiricists and rationalists. One group is surprised by what fails to surprise the others. If we listen to the rationalists, truth and freedom are, above all, rights; they wonder how we can lose our rights, fall into error or lose our freedom . . . From an empiricist viewpoint, everything is inverted: what is surprising is that men sometimes manage to understand truth, sometimes manage to understand one other, sometimes manage to free themselves from what fetters them.

12. Francis Bacon, *The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with David Sylvester* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1975), 18.
13. Kant presents this theory of common sense in the *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), §18–22 (81–9), §40 (150–4).
14. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §29, General Remark (127). Kant's "Analytic of the Sublime" lies at the centre of Jean-François Lyotard's conception of "postmodern" art, which he defines as that which *presents the unpresentable*. See his essay "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?," in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 71–82. There is a profound difference between Deleuze and Lyotard, despite numerous lines of convergence between their respective theories of art: Deleuze's theory is derived from an analysis of sensibility (intensity), whereas Lyotard's is derived from the faculty of the imagination (the sublime). Lyotard sometimes speaks of the "imagination or sensibility" in the same sentence (e.g., 80, 81), but without ever taking the further step of extracting the limit-element of sensibility, which is precisely not that of the imagination. The difference would seem to bear on the nature of the Ideas appealed to in each instance: transcendent in the case of the imagination, immanent in the case of sensibility. For Lyotard's analysis of the sublime, see his important commentaries in *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime*, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
15. Salomon Maimon, *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* [1790], trans. Nick Midgley, Henry

Somers-Hall, Alistair Welchman, and Merten Reglitz (London: Continuum, 2010). For commentary, see above all Martial Guéroult, *La Philosophie transcendental de Salomon Maimon* (Paris: Alcan, 1929), esp. 55ff and 76ff; Sylvain Zac, *Salomon Maïmon: Critique de Kant* (Paris: Cerf, 1988), esp. Chapter 6; and Frederick Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 295–303.

16. *Note on the differential relation.* The nature of the differential relation can be made clear by comparing three types of relation distinguished in mathematics. A first type is established between elements that are themselves independent or autonomous, such as 3 + 2 or 2/3. The elements are real, and these relations themselves must be said to be *real*. A second type, e.g., $x^2 + y^2 - R^2 = 0$ (the algebraic equation for the circle), is established between terms whose value is unspecified, but which nevertheless must *in each case* have a determined value. Such relations can be called *imaginary*. But the third type of relation is established between elements that themselves *have no determined* value, but that nevertheless are determined reciprocally in the relation: thus ydy+ xdx = 0 (the universal of the circumference or the corresponding function), or dy/dx = –x/y (the expression of a curve and its trigonometric tangent). These are *differential* relations. The elements of these relations are undetermined, being neither real nor imaginary: *dy* is completely undetermined in relation to *y*, *dx* is completely undetermined in relation to *x*. Yet they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation; the terms themselves do not exist apart from the differential relation into which they enter and by which they are reciprocally determined. This differential relation, in turn, determines a singular point, and it is the set of these points that determines the topological space of a given multiplicity or manifold (a triangle, for example, has three singular points, while curves and figures are derived from more complex distributions). See Deleuze, "How Do We Recognize Structuralism?," in DI 170–92, FLB 88, and DR 172–5.
17. For Deleuze's interpretation of Leibniz's theory of perception, see FLB, Chapter 7, "Perception in the Folds," 85–99, from which the above examples are taken. For Leibniz's primary texts, see *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), esp. *Discourse on Metaphysics*, §33 (324–5); *Monadology*, §20–25 (645); and *Principles of Nature and Grace*, §13 (640), as well as *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Chapter 1.
18. Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1946), 225. Deleuze analyses this example in "Bergson's Conception of Difference," in DI 32–52, and draws out its consequences in LS 136:

    > To have a color is not more general than to be green, because it is only this color, and this green which is this nuance, and is related in the individual subject. This rose is not red without having the redness of this rose.

    Deleuze is closer to Goethe than Newton. Goethe's theory of color has similarly been retrieved in certain contemporary scientific theories. Redness is no longer perceived as a band-width of light but as a singularity within a chaotic universe, whose boundaries are not always easy to describe; see James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York: Viking 1987), 164–6.
19. Likewise, one could speak of a white society or a white language, which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualized in the diverse languages and in the remarkable parts of a *same* language; see DR 203–7. For a fuller analysis of musical form along these lines, see Jean-François Lyotard, "Several Silences," in *Driftworks*, ed. Roger McKeon (New York: Semiotext(e), 1984), 99–110.
20. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 203–4, A169/B21:

> Every sensation has a degree, that is, an intensive magnitude which can always be diminished [to the point where the intensity = 0] . . . Every color, as for instance red, has a degree which, however small it may be, is never the smallest; and so with heat, the moment of gravity, etc.

21. Hermann Cohen, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, 2nd edn. (Berlin: Dümmler, 1885), 428:

> Space and time itself, the sensible conditions of the unity of consciousness, insofar as they represent *quanta* continua, are constituted as continua by the reality of intensive magnitude as the condition of thought. Intensive magnitude consequently appears immediately as the prior condition of the extensive . . . Such as the necessity that led to the finitely small, positing something that became a unity not in relation to One but in relation to Zero.

See Jules Vuillemin's commentaries in *L'Héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne: Fichte, Cohen, Heidegger* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 132–207.

22. See DR 20:

> By "sign" we mean what happens within such a [differential] system, what flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates. The sign is indeed an effect, but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qua sign, the productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends to cancel it.

23. Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, admitted that this schematizing power of the imagination was "blind" (112, A78/B103), "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul," an activity "nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover" (183, A141/B180–1). It is for this reason that Heidegger took the imagination as the focal point of his reading of Kant, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), although Deleuze breaks with Heidegger's reading.

24. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), Essay II, §1, 493–4:

> What we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it . . . as does the thousandfold process involved in physical nourishment . . . so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no *present*, without forgetfulness.

Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone, 1988), 35–6: we never perceive objects *per se*, but rather objects minus those aspects that do not interest us as a function of our needs.

25. DR 237. In the chapter on "The Perception-Image" in *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze argues that, if the cinema goes beyond normal perception, it is in the sense that it reaches this genetic element *of all* possible perception: "In the "kino-eye," Vertov was aiming to attain or regain the system of universal variation in itself," to "reach 'another' perception, which is also the genetic element of all perception" (MI 80–6).

26. DR 213. Martial Guéroult discusses the role this notion played in post-Kantian philosophy in *L'Évolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1930), Vol. 1, 14–15: "Clear and distinct understanding was posited as the fruit of a continuous development whose point of departure was the confused understanding, the sole form under which the totality of the universe could be given originally in the finite mind."

27. Paul Klee, "Schopferische Konfession," in *Das Bildnerische Denken*, ed. Jürg Spiller (Basel: Schwabe, 1964), 76, as quoted in FB 48 and TP 342. See also Maldiney's commentary in *Parole regard espace*, 143–6. Lyotard's similar formula—"not to represent, but to present the unpresentable"—is discussed in "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde," in *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 89–107.

28. See PS 18: "Time seeks out bodies in order to become visible, seizing bodies wherever it encounters them so as to cast its magic lantern," modifying this feature of someone we knew long ago, elongating, blurring, or crushing that one. Deleuze distinguishes four structures of time in Proust: lost time is both "passing time" and "wasted time"; time regained is both a "time recovered" at the heart of time lost, and an "original time" that is affirmed in art.
29. For these examples, see TP 343 and FB 48.
30. Quoted in Milan Kundera, *The Art of the Novel*, trans. Linda Asher (New York: Grove, 1988), 5, 36.
31. Bacon, *The Brutality of Fact*, 23.
32. Ibid., 18.
33. See Gilbert Simondon, *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964); Deleuze was strongly influenced by Simondon's text.
34. Paul Klee, *On Modern Art*, trans. Paul Findlay, intro. Herbert Reed (London: Faber, 1966), 53: "Had I wished to present man 'as he is,' then I should have had to use such a bewildering confusion of lines that pure elementary representation would have been out of the question. The result would have been vagueness beyond recognition."
35. The primary texts on these sensible syntheses in art are: FB 60–1, WP 167–8, and PS 148–60.
36. In Newton, for example, the "optical" grey is obtained through a combination of black and white, whereas in Goethe the "haptic" grey is obtained through a combination of green and red. See Goethe, *Color Theory*, ed. Rupprecht Matthaei (New York: Van Nostrand, 1971). On Cézanne's relation to the Impressionists with regard to color, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cézanne's Doubt," in *The Essential Writings*, ed. Alden L. Fischer (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), 236.
37. MI 118. On these relations of color, see Deleuze's discussion in FB, Chapter 15, "Bacon's Trajectory," 109–15.
38. On the role of resonance in involuntary *memory*, see PS, Chapter 6, "The Secondary Role of Memory," 52–66 (Joyce's "epiphanies," Deleuze argues, can be analyzed in the same manner). On coupling in Bacon, see FB, Chapter 9, "Couples and Triptychs," 55–61.
39. On "forced movement" in Bacon, see FB, Chapter 10, "What is a Triptych?," 62–70. The question concerning the conditions under which disjunction can be a form of synthesis (and not an analytic procedure that excludes the predicates of a thing by virtue of the identity of its concept) is one of the decisive questions posed by a philosophy of difference, though it lies beyond the scope of this paper. For Deleuze's discussions of the problem, see "La synthèse disjonctive" (with Guattari), *in L'Arc* 43 (1970), 54–62 and LS 172–6, 294–7.
40. In WP 168, Deleuze suggests that, of all the arts, it is perhaps sculpture that presents these three syntheses in an almost pure state: first, there are the sensations of stone, marble, or metal, which vibrate according to strong and weak beats; second, there are the protuberances and cavities in the material, which establish powerful combats that interlock and resonate with each other; and finally, there is the set-up of the sculpture, with large empty spaces between groups, or even within a single group, in which one no longer knows if it is the light or air that *sculpts* or is sculpted.
41. On the relation of the sensation to the material, see WP, Chapter 7, esp. 191–7.
42. See AO 42: the work of art "is a whole *of* its constituent parts but does not totalize them; it is a unity *of* its particular parts but it does not unify them; rather, it is added to them as a new part fabricated separately." On Deleuze's use of the concept of transversality, originally formulated by Guattari, see PS 168 (and 188 n5).

Essay 7: Dialectics
Deleuze, Kant, and the Theory of Immanent Ideas

1. This paper was originally presented as a lecture entitled "Idea and Immanence in Deleuze" at the Collegium Phenomenologicum in Città di Castello, Italy, on 31 July 2003, directed by Leonard Lawlor, and benefited from the critical comments of the Collegium members.
2. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 309, A312/B368: "Despite the great wealth of our languages, the thinker often finds himself at a loss for the expression which exactly fits his concept, and for want of which he is unable to be really intelligible to others or even to himself." One finds a similar passage in the preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Preface, 5:11, 145.
3. The themes of difference and affirmation—as well as the confrontation with Hegel—largely disappear from Deleuze's writings after the publication of *Difference and Repetition* in 1968.
4. See François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 119.
5. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 319, A328/B384: An Idea is "a problem to which there is no solution."
6. DR 161–2. In the calculus, it is the differential that defines the nature of problems, which is why it must disappear in the solution.
7. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 534, A645–6/B673–4:

> These concepts of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we interrogate nature in accordance with these Ideas, and consider our knowledge defective as long as it is not adequate to them. By general admission, *pure earth*, *pure water*, *pure air*, etc., are not to be found. We require, however, the concepts of them (though, insofar as their complete purity is concerned, they have their origin solely in reason) in order properly to determine the share which each of these natural causes has in producing appearances.

8. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 298–9, A295–6/B352.
9. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 299, A296/B352: "*Transcendental* and *transcendent* are not interchangeable terms."
10. For the components of the Platonic Idea, see Essay 10, in this volume.
11. DR 168–221. The title in French is "Synthèse idéal de la différence," "The Ideal Synthesis of Difference."
12. See Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 286: "To study Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel without having read Maimon's *Versuch* [*Essay on Transcendental Philosophy*] is like studying Kant without having read Hume's *Treatise*."
13. Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 151.
14. The analyses that follow are summaries of Deleuze's detailed reading of the *Critique of Judgment*, which can be found in his article, "The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics", trans. Daniel W. Smith, *Angelaki*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Dec 2000), 39–70.
15. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), §59, 223.
16. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §42, 159, translation modified.
17. Alain Badiou makes this point in *The Century*, trans. Alberto Toscano (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 153–4, in the context of developing his own nascent theory of the Idea. See also his "The Idea of Communism," in *The Communist Hypothesis*, trans. David Macey and Steve Corcoran (London: Verso, 2010), 229–60.

18. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).
19. Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 61; Deleuze uses these two phrases to characterize Leibniz's philosophy as a whole.
20. See DR 191: "No doubt, if one insists, the word 'essence' might be preserved, but only on condition of saying that the essence is precisely the accident, the event."
21. Note how Kant inverts the relation between immanence and transcendence in the passage from the first to the second critique:

> It is incumbent to the *Critique of Practical Reason* as such to prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will [or desire]. If it is proved that there is pure reason, its use alone is immanent; the empirically conditioned use, which lay claim to absolute rule, is on the contrary transcendent and expressed itself in demands and commands that go quite beyond its sphere—precisely the opposite relation from what could be said of pure reason in its speculative use. (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Introduction, 5:16, 148–9.)

22. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction, §3, 15–16: "The faculties of the soul are reducible to three, which do not admit of any further derivation from a common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire."
23. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Preface, 5:9n, 143–4.
24. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:89, 212.
25. Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, 6:213, 374:

> The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground . . . lies within the subject's reason is called the will. The will is therefore the faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action, but rather in relation to the *ground* determining choice to action.

26. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:89, 212.
27. See Spinoza, *Emendation of the Intellect*, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. E. Curley, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), §85, 37: "So far as I know they [the ancients] never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton"); and Leibniz, "Clarification of the Difficulties Which Mr. Bayle has Found in the New System of the Union of Soul and Body," in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 495: "The soul is a most exact spiritual automaton."
28. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §129, 129.

Essay 8: Analytics
On the Becoming of Concepts

1. An early version of this paper was presented at the workshop entitled "Between Deleuze and Simondon," 18–19 September 2009, Palazzo Pesaro-Papafave, Venice, Italy, which was the fourth workshop sponsored by the European Network in Contemporary French Philosophy. I am indebted to the founders and organizers of the network: Miguel de Beistegui, Arnold I. Davidson, Frédéric Worms, and Mauro Carbone.
2. WP 2, citing Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §409, 220: Philosophers "must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but must first *make* and *create* them, present them and make them convincing." Whitehead seems to have had a similar conception of philosophy: "Progress in truth . . . is mainly a progress in the framing of

concepts." Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York: Fordham, 1996), 131.

3. Guattari, who did not explicitly assume the mantle of a philosopher, seemed to have seen the activity of thought in a different vein, preferring the production of flows or diagrams over the creation of concepts (TRM 238). For analyses of Guattari's "diagrammaticism," see Gary Genosko, *Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction* (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), and Jannell Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought* (London: Continuum, 2009). The publication of Guattari's *The Anti-Oedipus Papers* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006) opened an interesting window into Guattari's working methods. For a review, see Daniel W. Smith, "Inside Out: Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus Papers*," in *Radical Philosophy* 140 (Nov–Dec 2006), 35–9.
4. EPS 321. Although it was published in 1968, François Dosse notes that Deleuze had largely completed his secondary thesis on Spinoza (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*) in the late 1950s, before the publication of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in 1962. See François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 118, 143.
5. WP 1. For a different approach to Deleuze's analytic of concepts, oriented around the notion of the event, see Daniel W. Smith, "'Knowledge of Pure Events': A Note on Deleuze's Analytic of Concepts," in *Ereignis auf Französisch. Zum Erfahrungsbegriff der französischen Gegenwartsphilosophie: Temporalität, Freiheit, Sprache*, ed. Marc Rölli (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2003), 363–74.
6. WP 2. Deleuze considered the *Critique of Judgment* to be "one of the most important books in all of philosophy" (31 Mar 1981).
7. See also DI 261: "I've undergone a change. The surface–depth opposition no longer concerns me. What interests me now is the relationships between a full body, a body without organs, and flows that migrate."
8. The same is true of Deleuze's other concepts as well. The concept of affect, for example, first arises in Deleuze's work on Spinoza, where it designates the passage from one intensity to another in a finite mode, which is experienced as a joy or a sadness. In *A Thousand Plateaus* and *What is Philosophy?*, however, the affect is no longer "the passage from one lived state to another," but has assumed an autonomous status—along with percepts—as a becoming that takes place between two multiplicities. See WP 173: "The affect is not the passage from one lived state to another but man's nonhuman becoming."
9. What is important to Deleuze is not only the concept of multiplicity, nor even the *types* of multiplicities he analyses, but the relations and transformations between these types (WP 152): that is, the transformation from the continuous to the discrete, from the problematic to the axiomatic, the intensive to the extensive, the non-metric to the metric, the non-denumerable to the denumerable, the rhizomatic to the arborescent, the smooth to the striated, the molecular to the molar, and so on. When asked about the concept of "microphysics" in the 1981 interview with Arnaud Villani, Deleuze responded:

   > The distinction between macro and micro is very important, but it perhaps belongs more to Félix than to myself. For me, it is rather the distinction between two types of multiplicities. For me, that is the essential point: that one of these two types refers to micro-multiplicities is only a consequence. Even for the problem of thought, and even for the sciences, the notion of multiplicity, as introduced by Riemann, seems much more important than that of microphysics. (Arnaud Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée* (Paris: Belin, 1999), 130)

10. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1929), "The Ideas in General," 309–14, A312–20/B368–77.
11. Deleuze first mentioned *What is Philosophy?* (1991) in the 1981 interview with Arnaud

Villani, in response to a question about the books he was hoping to write after completing *A Thousand Plateaus*: "I have just finished a book on Francis Bacon, and all I have left now are two projects: one on 'Thought and Cinema,' and another which would be a large book on 'What is Philosophy' (with the problem of the categories)." See Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée*, 130.

12. See DR 284–5:

> We have continually proposed descriptive notions . . . None of this, however, amounts to a list of categories. It is pointless to claim that a list of categories can be open in principle: it can be in fact, but not in principle. For categories belong to the world of representation, where they constitute forms of distribution according to which Being is repartitioned among beings following the rules of sedentary proportionality. That is why philosophy has often been tempted to oppose notions of a quite different kind to categories, notions which are really open and which betray an empirical and pluralist sense of Ideas: 'existential' as against essential, percepts as against concepts, or indeed the list of empirico-ideal notions that we find in Whitehead, which makes *Process and Reality* one of the greatest books of modern philosophy.

13. Deleuze made this remark in his interview with Arnaud Villani. See Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée*, 130. François Dosse, in *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, cites a 1981 letter from Deleuze to Guattari which presented the problem of the categories as an integral part of their joint project: "Pierce and Whitehead make modern tables of categories: how has this idea of categories evolved?" (14).
14. For the distinction between expression and exemplification, see Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976).
15. Summarizing all these becomings, Deleuze comments: "There's nothing more unsettling than the continual movement of something that seems fixed" (N 157).
16. See Deleuze's article, "What is the Creative Act?" (TRM 312–24), which was originally presented as a lecture to the Fémis film school in Paris under the title, "Having an Idea in Cinema."
17. TRM 176, translation modified. See Gilles Deleuze, "8 ans après: Entretien 1980" (interview with Catherine Clément), in *L'Arc* 49 (rev. edn., 1980), special issue on Deleuze, 99.
18. For an analysis of the concepts Deleuze creates in his *Francis Bacon*, see Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze on Bacon: Three Conceptual Trajectories in *The Logic of Sensation*," in FB vii–xxxiii.
19. For an analysis of the relation between Deleuze's treatment of concepts in *What is Philosophy?* and the treatments of social assemblages in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, see Craig Lundy, *History and Becoming in Deleuze's Philosophy of Creativity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).
20. TI 129. In this essay, I have left to the side Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of science, which none the less seems to have gone through a certain evolution. In 1983, Deleuze noted in a seminar , simply, that "concepts can be of different types, they can be scientific, they can be philosophical" (13 Dec 1983). By May 1984, however, Deleuze was clearly seeking to distinguish science from philosophy, defining the former as a "system of operators"—although Deleuze immediately added that the notion of an *opérateur* could function as a definition of science only if one was capable of answering the question, "What are the differences between mathematical operators, physical operators, and chemical operators?" (29 May 1984). Deleuze would make use of the term *opérateur* in the 1985 *The Time-Image* as well (TI 129). In the same seminar, Deleuze defined art as the creative activity that consists in creating "characters" [*personages*], as if he had not yet clearly disengaged the notion of "conceptual personae," which, in *What is Philosophy?*, serves as a

condition for the philosophical creation of concepts. The definition of science in terms of *functions*, in *What is Philosophy?* (1991), thus seems to have been a rather late formulation, itself the result of a series of experimentations and becomings.

21. See Alfred North Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 54: "I am in full accord with Bergson, though he uses 'time' for the fundamental fact which I call the 'passage of nature.'"
22. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art* (1915), trans. M. D. Hottinger, from the 7th German edition (1929) (New York: Dover, 1932). Wilhelm Worringer would later undertake a similar conceptual analysis of the concept of the Gothic, which Deleuze appeals to frequently. See Wilhelm Worringer, *Form in Gothic* (1911), ed. Herbert Read (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927), as well as *Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style* (1908), trans. Michael Bullock (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1997).
23. For a penetrating analysis of Wölfflin's work along these lines, see Arnold I. Davidson, "Styles of Reasoning: From the History of Art to the Epistemology of Science," in *The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 125–141.
24. Arnold I. Davidson, "Closing Up the Corpses: Diseases of Sexuality and the Emergence of the Psychiatric Style of Reasoning" and "Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality," in *The Emergence of Sexuality*, 1–65. See also David Halperin's now-classic analysis, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek Love* (New York: Routledge, 1989).
25. See, in general, Ian Hacking, "Making Up People," in *Historical Ontology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 99–114; and "Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers," in *Humanities in Society* 5 (1982), 279–95. For Hacking's analysis of specific concepts and their corresponding modes of existence, see: (1) on *multiple personality*: "The Invention of Split Personalities," in *Human Nature and Natural Knowledge*, ed. Alan Donagan, Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., and Michael V. Wedlin (Dordrecht: Springer, 1986), 63–85; (2) on *child abuse*: "The Making and Molding of Child Abuse," in *Critical Inquiry* 17 (Winter 1991), 253–88; and (3) on *autism*:"What is Tom Saying to Maureen?," in *London Review of Books*, Vol. 28, No. 9 (May 2006), 3–7.
26. See N 156, LS 261–2, and DR 116. These texts are all referring to Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon, 1963), 77: "It is not the resemblance, but the differences, which resemble each other."
27. For a comprehensive analysis of Deleuze's concept of time, which we are merely summarizing here, see James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). Williams focuses primarily on *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense* rather than the analyses of time presented in the *Cinema* books (see 159–64), although the later works seem to expand on Deleuze's earlier discussions of time in crucial ways.
28. Plato, *Timaeus*, 37d. Aristotle's definition is similarly indexed on movement: "time is the number of motion in respect of before and after" (*Physics* 219b2).
29. Deleuze discusses the conceptions of time in Plato and Plotinus; see the series of seminars from 7 February 1984 to 27 March 1984. Descartes's modern solution to the same problem was to conserve something invariant "in" movement: namely, the quantity of movement, *mv*, the product of mass times velocity.
30. See Michel Serres, *The Birth of Physics*, trans. Jack Hawkes, ed. David Webb (Manchester: Clinamen, 2000), 67; and Michel Serres, *Atlas* (Paris: Julliard, 1994), 100.
31. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* [1905]; *and Other Writings* (London: Penguin, 2002), as well as 27 Mar 1984.
32. For Deleuze's elucidation of these themes, see 17 Apr 1984 and 4 May 1984. See also TRM

238: "Philosophy creates concepts, which are neither generalities nor even truths; they are rather of the order of the Singular, the Important, the New."

33. One of the themes of Deleuze's two-volume *Cinema* is that the cinema, in its much shorter history, none the less recapitulated this philosophical revolution in the movement–time relation. For a useful summary of this revolution in the concept of time, albeit from a slightly different perspective than Deleuze's, see John Dewey, "Time and Individuality" (1940), in *The Essential Dewey*, Vol. 1., *Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, ed. Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 217–26.
34. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *The Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence*, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), 15:

    > As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something purely relative, as time is – that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things that exist at the same time, considered as existing together, without entering into their particular manners of existing. And when many things are seen together, one consciously perceives this order of things among themselves.

35. Deleuze insists that it is important not to confuse the synthesis of time with time itself. Martin Heidegger, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), reintroduced an originary time because he wrongly consider the synthesis of time to be an originary time. See Deleuze's critique in 17 Apr 1984.
36. For the *active syntheses* of the transcendental ego found in Kant, Deleuze substitutes a theory of *passive synthesis*, derived in part from Husserl. Joe Hughes provides an insightful analysis of the concept of passive synthesis in *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation* (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), esp. 8–19. See also Keith Faulkner, *Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).
37. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 13.
38. Bellour nicely summarizes the tension inherent in Deleuze's analytic when he asks: "How can the concept be both what suspends, arrests, consists, and what flees, opens all lines of flight?" See Raymond Bellour, "Thinking, Recounting: The Cinema of Gilles Deleuze," trans. Melissa McMahon, in *Discourse*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall 1998), 56–75 (71).
39. Paul Patton makes the comparison between Deleuzian concepts and hypertext documents in his review of *What is Philosophy?* in the *Times Literary Supplement*, 23 Jun 1995, 10–12.
40. See Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée*, 130:

    > I feel myself to be Bergsonian, when Bergson says that modern science has not found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it needs. It is this metaphysics that interests me . . . It is in this manner, it seems to me, that philosophy can be considered as a science: determining the conditions of a problem.

    Following Deleuze, Michel Foucault would later take up this concept of "problematization" in interpreting the course of his own work. See Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 381–90.
41. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 319, A328/B384: "The absolute whole of appearances [the World] is only an Idea, since it remains a *problem* to which there is no solution."
42. B 17–18. See Bergson's classic article "The Possible and the Real," in Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1946), 91–106.

43. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1951*, ed. James Klagge and Alfred Mordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 193. No doubt this was one reason Deleuze was not sympathetic to Wittgenstein: the dissolution of false problems has as its necessary correlate the construction of true problems.
44. Kierkegaard argued that the *interesting* is one of the fundamental categories of philosophy. See Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 1985), 109: "The category I would like to examine a little more closely is that of the *interesting* . . . ."
45. See N 130: "Poincaré used to say that many mathematical theories are completely irrelevant, pointless. He didn't say they were wrong—that wouldn't have been so bad."
46. N 25. For the idea of a "philosophy of circumstances," see Michel Serres, *The Five Senses*, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley (London: Continuum, 2008), esp. 282–88.
47. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of Chronotope in the Novel," in *The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 84–258.
48. Similarly, one could say that our culture has yet to develop a secularized relation to science; see Serres, *The Five Senses*, 334–5.
49. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Essay III, §24, 153.
50. On the concept of information, in this sense, see Gilbert Simondon, *L'Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information* (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2005).
51. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols*, "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable," in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954), 486.
52. See TI 134, 145, as well as 8 Nov 1983 and 12 Jun 1984.
53. Spinoza, Letter 32, to Oldenburg, 20 Nov 1665, in *Spinoza: The Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 849.
54. James made a similar point in his analysis of what he called "the stream of thought." See William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), Vol. 1 (New York: Dover, 1950), 224–5:

> The first fact for us . . . is that thinking of some sort goes on . . . If we could say in English 'it thinks,' as we say 'it rains' or 'it blows,' we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that *thought goes on*.

55. Spinoza, *The Emendation of the Intellect*, §85, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 37: "So far as I know they [the ancients] never conceived the soul (as we do here) as acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton." Leibniz, for his own reasons, appealed to the same image. See "Clarification of the Difficulties which Mr. Bayle has Found in the New System of the Union of Soul and Body," in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2nd edn., ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 495: "The soul is a most exact spiritual automaton."
56. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §17, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 214.
57. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34 (= Notebook 38[1] = KSA 11:38[1]). See also DR 118:

> It is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial, completed, and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartesian Cogito: thought is, rather, one of those terrible movements which can be sustained only under the conditions of a larval subject.

58. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), §§25–7, 35.
59. William James, *Pragmatism* [1907] (New York: Dover, 1995), 24.
60. Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 64.
61. DR xxi. Deleuze and Guattari similarly suggest that *Anti-Oedipus* was written out of ignorance: "We would like to speak in the name of an absolute incompetence" (AO 380; cf. 232, 238, 334).
62. On the time (or temporal synthesis) proper to painting, see 31 Mar 1981.

Essay 9: Ethics
The Place of Ethics in Deleuze's Philosophy: Three Questions of Immanence

1. See Monique Canto-Sperber, "Pour la philosophie morale," in *Le Débat* 72 (Nov–Dec 1992), 40–51.
2. See the introduction to Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1985), 3–32, where Foucault explains the reformulation of the project.
3. See N 135: "Everything tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche identity"
4. See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 4: *Nihilism*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), section 12, "Nietzsche's 'Moral' Interpretation of Metaphysics," 76–7: "By 'morality,' Nietzsche usually understands a system of evaluations in which a transcendent world is posited as an idealized standard of measure."
5. NP 1. For the distinction between "morality" and "ethics," see N 100, 113–14. "Règles facultatives" is a term Deleuze adopts from the sociolinguist William Labov to designate "functions of internal variation and no longer constants"; see F 147 n18.
6. On the notion of "dramatization," see NP 75–9.
7. At best, the Spinozistic and Nietzschean critiques were accepted as negative moments, exemplary instances of what must be fought against and rejected in the ethico-moral domain. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd edn. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), who, for his part, summarized the contemporary ethical options in the chapter entitled, "Aristotle or Nietzsche?": "The defensibility of the Nietzschean position turns *in the end* on the answer to the question: was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle?" (117).
8. NP 89–90. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), §7, Remark, 165: the consciousness of the moral law is "not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of pure reason, which, by it, proclaims itself as originally lawgiving."
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968). Preface, §6, 456; Essay 3, §24, 589.
10. The discussion that follows is a summary of Deleuze's analysis of the Moral Law in Chapter 7 of *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*, entitled "Humor, Irony, and the Law" (M 81–90).
11. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 72–3.
12. M 86–90. "Perversion" plays an important role in Deleuze's writings as a specific type of mode of existence that retains a positivity of its own.
13. For Deleuze's analysis of the slave and the priest as modes of existence, see NP, Chapter 4, "From Ressentiment to the Bad Conscience," 111–45. Deleuze provides a useful summary of his interpretation in PI 17–41.
14. Deleuze's analysis of this tradition is found in his two-volume *Cinema*, where he draws a parallel between the philosophy of Pascal and Kierkegaard and the films of Bresson and Dreyer. See MI 114–16 and TI 176–9.

15. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §83, 51–2.
16. DR 86–7. The concept of "passive synthesis" is taken from Husserl; see Joe Hughes, *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation* (London: Continuum, 2008), 10–19.
17. See EPS for Deleuze's three formulations of "the ethical question" in Spinoza:
    . 1. Of what affections are we capable? What is the extent of our power? (226)
    . 2. What must we do to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions? (273)
    . 3. How can we come to produce active affections? (246)
18. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §532, 289; see also §489, 270.
19. On the distinction between "arborescent" and "rhizomatic" models of thought, see TP 3–25. For Spinoza's critique of the Aristotelian tradition, see SPP 44–8, and EPS 277–8.
20. See Spinoza, *Ethics*, Book 3, prop. 3, scholium, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, trans. Edwin Curley, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 495: "No one has yet determined what a body can do." This phrase is repeated like a leitmotif in several of Deleuze's books.
21. See the final volumes of Michel Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*: Vol. 2: *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1985), and Vol. 3: *The Care of the Self*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986). The fourth volume of the series, *Les Aveux de la chair* (*The Confessions of the Flesh*), was written but never published.
22. This is particularly true of a certain Hegelianism of the right that still dominates political philosophy, and weds the destiny of thought to the State (Alexandre Kojève and Eric Weil in France, Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom in America). See TP 556 n42.
23. Modern thought thus found itself subordinated to an image of thought derived from the legislative and juridical organization of the State, leading to the prevalence, in political philosophy, of such categories as the republic of free spirits, the tribunal of reason, the rights of man, the consensual contract, inquiries into the understanding (method, recognition, question and response, judgment), and so on. On these themes, see TP 374–80.
24. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 316, A323/B379: "We have to seek for an *unconditioned*, first, of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject*; secondly, of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a *series*; thirdly, of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a *system*."
25. AO analyses "primitive" societies, the State, and capitalism (139–271); TP adds to this an analysis of the nomadic war machine (351–423), and in an essential chapter entitled "Apparatus of Capture" (424–73), it attempts to lay out in specific terms the complex relations between these various typologies. For analyses of the typology of social formations developed in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, see Eugene Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus": An Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), and Ian Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus": A Reader's Guide* (London: Continuum, 2008).
26. D 125; TP 277. John Protevi has explored the political implications of Deleuze's theory of the affects, most notably in *Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida, and the Body Politic* (London and New York: Athlone, 2001), and *Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
27. On "infantile leftism," see Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Couzens Hoy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 51. On "neo-conservatism," see Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
28. Deleuze analyzes these distinctions in detail in EPS, notably in Chapter 16, "The Ethical Vision of the World," 255–72. See also SPP, entry on "Power," 97–104.
29. See WP 74:

> There is not the slightest reason for thinking that modes of existence need transcendent values by which they could be compared selected, and judged relative to one another. There are only immanent criteria. A possibility of life is evaluated through itself in the movements its lays out and the intensities it creates on a plane of immanence: what is not laid out or created is rejected. A mode of existence is good or bad, noble or vulgar, complete or empty, independently of Good or Evil or any transcendent value: there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life.

30. For instance, in a famous text, which in some respects parallels Nietzsche's analyses in the *Genealogy of Morals*, Spinoza showed how the notion of the Law arose among the Hebrews from a misunderstanding of affective relations. When God forbade Adam to eat the fruit of the Garden of Eden, he did so because he knew it would affect Adam's body like a poison, decomposing its constitutive relation. But Adam, unable to perceive these affective relations, mistook the prohibition for a *commandment*, the effect of decomposition as a *punishment*, and the word of God as a *Law*. See Spinoza, Letter 19, to Blijenbergh, in *Collected Works*, 357–61. On the question, Can there be inherently evil modes of existence?, see SPP 30–43.
31. Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), esp. 81–125. See also LS 142–53 ("On the Moral Problem in Stoic Philosophy").
32. See EPS 273–320 (Chapters 17–19), and NP 147–98 (Chapter 5).
33. See Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, 25–30.
34. For Deleuze and Guattari's development of the concept of the "minor," see TP 105–6, 291–2, 469–73, and K 16–27.
35. N 177–82. See also the analyses in Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politiøcs*, trans. Mark Polizzotti (New York: Semiotext(e), 1986).
36. On these interrelated Foucauldian themes, see F 115–19.

Essay 10: Politics

Flow, Code, and Stock: A Note on Deleuze's Political Philosophy

1. This article is an excerpt from a set of lectures given at the *Collegium Phaenomenologicum*, 13–31 July 2009, in Città di Castello, Italy, organized by Peg Birmingham, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. An early version was presented as a paper at *ConnectDeleuze*, the Second International Deleuze Studies conference at the University of Cologne on 10–13 August 2009, organized by Leyla Haferkamp and Hanjo Berressem.
2. I can give no notion by references or citations of what this paper owes to previous studies of *Anti-Oedipus*, notably Eugene Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus": Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (New York: Routledge, 1999), Nick Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), and Ian Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's "Anti-Oedipus": A Reader's Guide* (London: Continuum, 2008), as well as the articles included in the special issue of *Deleuze Studies* (2009) "Deleuze and Marx," Vol. 3, Supplement (Sept 2009). On the relation of Marx and Keynes, see Antonio Negri, *Revolution Retrieved: Writings on Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis, and New Social Subjects (1967–1983)* (London: Red Notes, 1983).
3. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "In Flux," in Félix Guattari, *Chaosophy*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1995), 98. See also 14 Dec 1971: "It is not yet important for us to have a real definition of flows, but it is important, as a starting point, to have a nominal definition and this nominal definition must provide us with an initial system of concepts."
4. Paul Virilio has shown that the problem for the police is not one of confinement (Foucault),

but concerns the flux of the "highways," speed or acceleration, the mastery and control of speed, circuits and grids set up in open space. See F 42.

5. Deleuze and Guattari provide a similar list in TP 468: "The four principal flows that torment the representatives of the world economy, or of the axiomatic, are the flow of matter-energy, the flow of population, the flow of food, and the urban flow."
6. Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers*, rev. 7th edn. (New York: Touchstone, 1999).
7. N 171. Jacques Derrida made a similar claim in *Spectres de Marx: L'État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale*, Paris: Galilée, 1993), 101: "Marxism remains at once indispensable and structurally insufficient *but* provided that one transforms and adapts it to new conditions." See also the analyses in Alain Badiou, *D'un désastre obscur: droit, état, politique* (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 1991), and Félix Guattari and Antonio Negri, *Communists Like Us* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991).
8. Jean-François Lyotard, "Energumen Capitalism" (review of *Anti-Oedipus*), *Critique* 306 (Nov 1972), 923–56.
9. Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2009).
10. See AO 116:

> From the beginning of this study we have maintained both that social production and desiring-production are one and the same, and that they have differing regimes, with the result that a social form of production exercises an essential repression of desiring-production, and also that desiring-production—a "real" desire—is potentially capable of demolishing the social form.

11. John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (New York: Harcourt, 1964). Deleuze seems to have relied in part on a study of Keynes by Daniel Antier entitled *L'Étude des flux et des stocks* (Paris: Sedes, 1957); see 14 Dec 1971.
12. Niall Ferguson, *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the* World (New York: Penguin, 2008), 121. In speaking of desire, Keynes often had recourse to the phrase "animal spirits":

> Most of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits . . . and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitiative probabilities. (Keynes, *The General Theory*, 161)

13. Dynamic systems theory was formalized by Jay W. Forrester in his *Principles of Systems*, 2nd edn. (New York: Pegasus, 1968), who referred to stocks as "levels," and to flows as "rates."
14. One can point to many examples of "decoding" that Deleuze does not mention. In the Middle Ages, for instance, *usury*, the lending of money at interest, was considered to be a sin—whence the figure of Jewish moneylenders such as Shylock, who were not subject to the Christian restriction: a line of flight in an otherwise overcoded economy. Similarly, it was not until 1971, a few months before *Anti-Oedipus* was published, that the U.S. dollar was removed from the gold standard and instead allowed to float freely on the exchange market—a further decoding of money that broke the centuries-old link between money and precious metal.
15. TP 453. Bernard Schmitt, in his *Monnaie, salaires et profits* (Paris: PUF, 1966), advanced a profound theory of money that Deleuze has drawn heavily from, describing the full body of capital as "a flow possessing the power of mutation" that does not enter into income and is not assigned to purchases, a pure availability, non-possession and non-wealth. See AO 237 and N 152.
16. See AO 290: "Molecular biology teaches us that it is only the DNA that is reproduced, and not the proteins. Proteins are both products and units of production; they are what constitute the unconscious as a cycle or as the auto-production of the unconscious."

17. TP 10, citing Rémy Chauvin, *Entretiens sur la sexualité*, ed. Max Aron, Robert Courrier, and Étienne Wolf (Paris: Plon, 1969).
18. TP 10–11, citing François Jacob, *The Logic of Life*, trans. Betty E. Spellman (New York: Pantheon, 1973).
19. See AO 141–2:

> The social machine is literally a machine, independently of any metaphor, in that it presents an immobile motor and undertakes diverse kinds of cuts: selection [*prélèvement*] from the flows, detachments from the chain, distribution of parts. Coding the flows implies all these operations. This is the highest task of the social machine, in that the selections [*prélèvements*] of production correspond to detachments from the chain, resulting in a residual share for each member, in a global system of desire and destiny that organizes the productions of production, the productions of recording, and the productions of consumption.

Essay 11: Desire
Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanent Theory of Ethics

1. A shorter version of this paper was originally presented as a talk in the "Ethics and Recent Critical Theory" lecture series at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, on 30 November 2005, organized by Gregory Flaxman.
2. N 135: "Everything tended toward the great Spinoza–Nietzsche identity." Deleuze devoted a full-length monograph and a shorter introductory volume to both of these thinkers: *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962) and *Nietzsche* (1965); *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968) and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* (1970; revised and expanded edition, 1981).
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Essay 1, §17, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 491.
4. See WP 74:

> There is not the slightest reason for thinking that modes of existence need transcendent values by which they could be compared selected, and judged relative to one another. There are only immanent criteria. A possibility of life is evaluated through itself in the movements its lays out and the intensities it creates on a plane of immanence: what is not laid out or created is rejected. A mode of existence is good or bad, noble or vulgar, complete or empty, independently of Good or Evil or any transcendent value: there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life.

5. For instance, in a famous text, which parallels Nietzsche's analyses in the *Genealogy of Morals*, Spinoza argues that the notion of the Law arose among the Hebrews from a misunderstanding of affective relations. When God forbade Adam to eat the fruit of the Garden of Eden, he did so because he knew it would affect Adam's body like a poison, decomposing its constitutive relation. But Adam, unable to perceive these affective relations, mistook the prohibition for a *commandment*, the effect of decomposition as a *punishment*, and the word of God as a *Law*. Spinoza, Letter 19, to Blijenbergh, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 357–61. On the important question, "Can there be inherently evil modes of existence?" see Deleuze's article, "The Letters on Evil (Correspondence with Blyenbergh)," in SPP 30–43.
6. See AO 29: "The fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly: 'Why do men fight *for* their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?'" Deleuze is referring to a text in Spinoza's *Theological-Political Treatise*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1998), Preface, 3:

> The supreme mystery of despotism, its prop and stay, is to keep men in a state of deception, and with the specious title of religion to cloak the fear by which they must be held in check, so that they will fight for their servitude as if for salvation, and count it no shame, but the highest honor, to spend their blood and their lives for the glorification of one man.

7. I should note that Deleuze himself rarely uses the language of "drives"; in NP, he instead utilizes the language of "forces" in analyzing Nietzsche's work. See also AO 35: "It is certainly not in relation to drives that sufficient current definitions can be given to the neurotic, the pervert, and the psychotic; for drives are simply the desiring-machines themselves. They can only be defined in relation to modern territorialities."
8. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press, 1982), §119, 76.
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1980), Vol. 9, Notebook 6, §70, as cited in Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul: The Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 292. My discussion here is indebted to Parkes's work.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §481, 267.
11. Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, §109, 64–5. See Parkes's analysis in *Composing the Soul*, Chapter 8, "Dominions of Drives and Persons," 273–318, especially 290–2.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §36, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 237.
13. Parkes, *Composing the Soul*, 292.
14. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §19, in *Basic Writings*, 215–17.
15. Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, §119, 74.
16. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §387, 208.
17. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §307, 245–6.
18. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §§116 and 115, 174.
19. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §36, in *Basic Writings*, 237–8:

> Suppose nothing else were "given" except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives . . . : Is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this "given" would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? . . . In the end not only is it permitted to make this experiment; the conscience of *method* demands it.

20. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Essay I, §13, in *Basic Writings*, 480–1.
21. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Essay I, §13, in *Basic Writings*, 482.
22. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Essay II, §16, in *Basic Writings*, 520–1, as quoted in NP 128.
23. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), notably Chapters 20 and 21. For a related text, see *The Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence*, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), Leibniz's Fifth Paper, §§14–17, 58–60.
24. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §357, 305.
25. Leibniz, *New Essays*, 165, 188.

> What usually drives us are those minute insensible perceptions which could be called sufferings that we cannot become aware of, if the notion of suffering did not involve

> awareness . . . We are never completely in equilibrium and can never be evenly balanced between two options. (188)

26. Leibniz, *New Essays*, 166:

> These impulses are like so many little springs trying to unwind and so driving our machine along . . . That is why we are never indifferent, even when we appear to be most so, as for instance over whether to turn left or right at the end of a lane. For the choice that we make arises from these insensible stimuli, which . . . make us find one direction of movement more comfortable than another.

27. Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, §129, 129.
28. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen, 1913), 171, 176.

Essay 12: Life
"A Life of Pure Immanence": Deleuze's "Critique et clinique" Project

1. Deleuze's *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty* is an expansion of ideas first developed in "De Sacher-Masoch au masochisme," in *Arguments* 5/21 (Jan–Apr 1961), 40–6. See also the short but important interview with Madeleine Chapsal, "Mysticism and Masochism," in DI 131–4.
2. N 142: "I've dreamed about bringing together a series of studies under the general title Critique et clinique." For other explicit references to the project, see M 15; LS 83, 92, 127–8, 237–8; and D 120, 141. François Dosse, in his *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), notes that "most of the unpublished articles that appeared in *Essays Critical and Clinical* were written in Limousin," the locale of the Deleuze family's summer house (359).
3. See DR xv: "A philosophical concept can never be confused with a scientific function or an artistic construction, but finds itself in affinity with these in this or that domain of science or style of art." Deleuze and Guattari analyze the precise relations between philosophy, art, science, and logic in WP. On philosophy's need for such "intercessors" or mediators, see N 123–6.
4. TRM 176. Deleuze was responding to a question concerning the "genre" of *A Thousand Plateaus*, but his response is equally applicable to all his books.
5. Deleuze has established numerous such links in his works—between, for instance, Chekhov's short stories and Foucault's "Infamous Men" (N 108, 150); between Shakespeare's Hamlet and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (ECC 28); between Alfred Jarry and Martin Heidegger (ECC 91–8); and in the cinema, between Kierkegaard and Dreyer, and between Pascal and Bresson (MI 114–16). One might note that Stanley Cavell presents his own interest in the cinema in similar terms:"I discuss the blanket in *It Happened One Night* in terms of the censoring of human knowledge and aspiration in the philosophy of Kant; and I see the speculation of Heidegger exemplified or explained in the countenance of Buster Keaton." See "The Thought of Movies," in *Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 6–7.
6. Gilles Deleuze, "Lettre-préface," in Mireille Buydens, *Sahara: L'Esthétique de Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: Vrin, 1990), 5; and N 143. The term "non-organic life" is derived from Wilhelm Worringer, *Form in Gothic* (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927), 41–2, who used it to describe the vitality of the abstract line in Gothic art (see TP 496–8).
7. Charles Dickens, *Our Mutual Friend*, Book 3, Chapter 3, in *The Oxford Illustrated Dickens* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 443.
8. See NP 1: "We always have the beliefs, feelings, and thoughts we deserve, given our way of

being or our style of life." On the distinction between ethics and morality, see N 100, 114–15; and SPP 17–29. *Règles facultatives* is a term Deleuze adopts from the sociolinguist William Labov to designate "functions of internal variation and no longer constants" (F 146–7 n18).

9. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Essay 1, §17, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 491.
10. N 143; WP 171. See Deleuze's summary of Melville's conception of the relation of the novel to "Life" in ECC 81–2:

> Why should the novelist believe he is obligated to explain the behavior of his characters, and to supply them with reasons, whereas life for its part never explains anything and leaves in its creatures so many indeterminate, obscure, indiscernible zones that defy any attempt at clarification? It is life that justifies; it has no need of being justified . . . The founding act of the American novel, like that of the Russian novel, was to take the novel far from the order of reasons, and to give birth to characters who exist in nothingness, survive only in the void, defy logic and psychology, and keep their mystery until the end . . . The novel, like life, has no need of justification.

11. Deleuze was responding to a question posed to him during the Cerisy colloquium on Nietzsche in 1972; see *Nietzsche aujourd'hui* (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 10/18, 1973), Vol. 1, *Intensities*, 186–7. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari have distanced themselves from certain Heideggerian problematics that Derrida has taken up: "The death of metaphysics or the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for us" (WP 9). Deleuze none the less cites Derrida on numerous occasions, and the many lines of convergence between their respective works remain to be explored.
12. M 133. The history of medicine, Deleuze suggests, can therefore be regarded under at least two aspects. The first is the history of diseases, which may disappear, recede, reappear, or alter their form depending on numerous external factors (the appearance of new microbes or viruses, altered technological and therapeutic techniques, and changing social conditions). But intertwined with this is the history of symptomatology, which is a kind of "syntax" of medicine that sometimes follows and sometimes precedes changes in therapy or the nature of diseases: symptoms are isolated, named, and regrouped in various manners. While external factors can make new symptomatologies possible, they can never determine them as such. See, for instance, Deleuze's comments on post-World War II developments in symptomatology in N 132–3.
13. See LS 237: "From the perspective of Freud's genius, it is not the complex which provides us with information about Oedipus and Hamlet, but rather Oedipus and Hamlet who provide us with information about the complex."
14. See, in particular, Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Philosopher as Cultural Physician" (1873), in *Philosophy and Truth*, ed. Daniel Brezeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), 67–76, though the idea of the philosopher as a physician of culture occurs throughout Nietzsche's writings. For Deleuze's analysis of the symptomatological method in Nietzsche, see NP x, 3, 75, 79, 157.
15. On all these points, see the important passage in AO 132–6, especially on the status of psychosis in literature (Artaud). For Freud, the libido does not invest the social field as such except on the condition that it be "desexualized" and "sublimated"; any sexual libidinal investment having a social dimension therefore seems to him to bear witness to a pathogenic state, either a "fixation" in narcissism or a "regression" to pre-Oedipal states. For Deleuze's reflections on the present state of "the space of literature" and the fragile conditions for the literary production, see N 22–3, 128–31. On the effect of marketing on both literature and philosophy, see Deleuze's critique of the "new philosophers," "À propos des nouveaux philosophes et d'un problème plus général," *Minuit* 4, supplement (5 Jun 1977), n.p.

16. See Gilles Deleuze, "De Sacher-Masoch au masochisme," in *Arguments* 5/21 (Jan–Apr 1961), 40–6: 40. For an analysis of the role of the "sexual instinct," whose various transformations and inversions were used to account for the "perversions" in nineteenth-century psychiatry, see Arnold I. Davidson, "Closing Up the Corpses," in *The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1–29.
17. Deleuze summarizes the results of his clinical analyses in eleven propositions in the last paragraph of the book (M 134). For the analyses of Sade's and Masoch's literary techniques, see M 25–35. For the relation to minorities, see M 9–10, 93; N 142.
18. DI 133. "Mystique et masochisme," 12–13. Asked why he had treated only Sade and Masoch from this point of view, Deleuze replied,

    > There are others, in fact, but their work has not yet been recognized under the aspect of a creative symptomatology, as was the case with Masoch at the start. There is a prodigious table [*tableau*] of symptoms corresponding to the work of Samuel Beckett: not that it is simply a question of identifying an illness: but the world as symptom, and the artist as symptomatologist. (DI 132)

19. See N 142: "The *Recherche* is a general semiology, a symptomatology of different worlds."
20. See Deleuze's discussion of the three components of the "critique et clinique" project in D 120–3; the third component (lines of flight) is discussed in the latter sections of this essay.
21. Gilles Deleuze, "Schizophrénie et positivité du désir," in *Encyclopédie Universalis* (Paris: Encyclopédie Universalis France, 1972), Vol. 14, 735; English translation in TRM 17–28.
22. The definition of schizophrenia as a process has a complex history. When Émile Kraepelin tried to ground his concept of dementia praecox ("premature senility"), he defined it neither by causes nor by symptoms, but by a process, by an evolution and a terminal state; but he conceived of this terminal state as a complete and total disintegration, which justified the confinement of the patient in an asylum while awaiting his death. Deleuze and Guattari's notion is closer to that of Karl Jaspers and R. D. Laing, who formulated a rich notion of process as a rupture, an irruption, an opening (*percée*) that breaks the continuity of a personality, carrying it off in a kind of voyage through an intense and terrifying "more than reality," following lines of flight that engulf both nature and history, both the organism and the mind. See AO 24–5.
23. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "La Synthèse disjonctive," *L'Arc* 43 (1970), special issue on Pierre Klossowski, 56.
24. TP 4; N 23. See also TRM 25: "Let us resign ourselves to the idea that certain artists or writers have had more revelations concerning schizophrenia than the psychiatrists and psychoanalysts."
25. This text is included in the English translation under the title "The Literary Machine" (PS 105–69).
26. PS 145; for the comparison with Joyce's epiphanies, see PS 155.
27. PS 146. The notion that "meaning is use" comes from Wittgenstein, though to my knowledge Deleuze makes only two references to Wittgenstein in his books. In the first, he writes approvingly that "Wittgenstein and his disciples are right to define meaning by use" (LS 146); in the second, he writes that Whitehead "stands provisionally as the last great Anglo-American just before Wittgenstein's disciples spread their mists, their sufficiency, and their terror" (FLB 76). His disapproval perhaps stems from the reintroduction, by certain of Wittgenstein's followers, of a form of common sense in the guise of a grammar that would be properly philosophical and a form of life that would be generically human.
28. PS 156. See also 145, where Deleuze cites Malcolm Lowry's description of the "meaning" of his novel (*Selected Letters of Malcolm Lowry*, ed. Harvey Breit and Margerie Bonner Lowry (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1965), 6:

> It can be regarded as a kind of symphony, or in another way as a kind of opera—or even a horse opera. It is hot music, a poem, a song, a tragedy, a comedy, a farce, and so forth. It is superficial, entertaining and boring, according to taste. It is a prophecy, a political warning, a cryptogram, a preposterous movie, and a writing on the wall. It can even be regarded as a sort of machine: it *works* too, believe me, as I have found out.

29. AO 324. See also "Balance-Sheet Program for Desiring Machines," in Félix Guattari, *Chaosophy*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e),1995), 145:

> How can elements be bound together by the absence of any link? In a certain sense, it can be said that Cartesianism, in Spinoza and Leibniz, has not ceased to reply to this question. It is the theory of the real distinction, insofar as it implies a specific logic. It is because they are really distinct, and completely independent of each other, that ultimate elements or simple forms belong to the same being or to the same substance.

30. PS 105–69. Thomas Wolfe, in his essay "The Story of a Novel," in *The Autobiography of an American Artist*, ed. Leslie Field (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), describes his compositional technique in similar terms:

> It was as if I had discovered a whole new universe of chemical elements and had begun to see certain relations between some of them but had by no means begun to organize and arrange the whole series in such a way that they would crystallize into a harmonious and coherent union, From this time on, I think my effort might be described as the effort to complete that organization.

31. See Ernst Mayr, "An Analysis of the Concept of Natural Selection," in *Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 98: "Selection would not be possible without the continuous restoration of variability."
32. TI 129. On the philosophical use of scientific functions, see N 123–6.
33. See "Klossowski, or Bodies-Language," in LS 292–4, where Deleuze contrasts "the order of God" with "the order of the Anti-Christ."
34. FLB, Chapter 5, 59–75; and LS 110–11. For the distinction between the virtual and the actual, Deleuze relies on the model proposed in Albert Lautman's theory of differential equations in *Le Problème du temps* (Paris: Hermann, 1946), 42. Lautman argues that a singularity can be grasped in two ways. The conditions of a problem are determined by the nomadic distribution of singular points in a virtual space, in which each singularity is inseparable from a zone of objective indetermination (ordinary points). The solution appears only with the integral curves and the form they take in the neighborhood of singularities within the field of vectors, which constitutes the beginning of the actualization of the singularities (a singularity is analytically extended over a series of ordinary points until it reaches the neighborhood of another singularity, and so on).
35. Jorge Luis Borges, "The Garden of Forking Paths," in *Ficciones* (New York: Grove, 1962), 98, emphasis added. For Deleuze's various references to this story, see FLB 62; LS 114; TI 131; DR 73; F 145 n3.
36. TI 303. For Leibniz's narrative, see his *Theodicy*, trans. E. M. Huggard, ed. Austin Farrer (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985), §§405–17, 365–73.
37. TI 126–55. The following themes are summaries of this chapter, some of which are developed in more detail in *The Fold*, where Deleuze makes use of Leibniz's work to develop a concept of the "Baroque."
38. See LS 174:

> The whole question, and rightly so, is to know under what conditions disjunction is a veritable synthesis, instead of being a procedure of analysis which is satisfied with the

> exclusion of predicates from a thing by virtue of the identity of its concept (the negative, limitative, or exclusive use of disjunction). The answer is given insofar as the divergence or the decentering determined by the disjunction become objects of affirmation as such . . . an *inclusive disjunction* that carries out the synthesis itself by drifting from one term to another and following the distance between terms.

For the concept of the rhizome, see TP 3–25, esp. 7.

39. N 126. See also TI 133: "Narration is constantly being modified in each of its episodes, not according to subjective variations, but as a consequence of disconnected spaces and de-chronologized moments."
40. For Deleuze's analysis of the three types of portmanteau words in Lewis Carroll's work, see "Of Esoteric Words," in LS 42–7. Deleuze cites Carroll's explanation of the disjunctive portmanteau word:

> If your thoughts incline ever so little towards "fuming," you will say "fuming-furious"; if they turn, even by a hair's breadth, towards "furious," you will say "furious-fuming"; but if you have the rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say "frumious". (46)

41. See Michel Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986), esp. Chapter 2. For Deleuze's analyses, see DR 22, 121, and LS 39, 85. Roussel's language rests not simply on the combinatorial possibilities of language—the fact that language has fewer terms of designation than things to designate, but none the less can extract an immense wealth from this poverty—but more precisely on the possibility of saying two things with the same word, inscribing a maximum of difference within the repetition of the same word.
42. On Gombrowicz, see DR 123, and LS 39; on Joyce, see DR 121–3, and LS 260–1, 264.
43. Joë Bousquet, *Les Capitales* (Paris: Le Cercle du Livre, 1955), 103, as cited in LS 148. It is in the context of his discussion of Bousquet that Deleuze defines ethics in terms of the relation of the individual to the singularities it embodies: an active life is one that is able to affirm the singularities that constitute it, to become worthy of the events that happen to it. "Everything was in order with the events of my life before I made them mine," writes Bousquet. "To live them is to find myself tempted to become their equal." A reactive life, by contrast, is driven by a *ressentiment* of the event, grasping whatever happens to it as unjust and unwarranted. "Either ethics makes no sense at all," writes Deleuze, "or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us" (LS 149).
44. Antonin Artaud, "Here Lies," in *Selected Writings*, ed. Susan Sontag, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1977), 540; and Vaslav Nijinsky, *Diary* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1936), 20, 156, as cited in AO 15, 77. On the role of included disjunctions in the schizophrenic process, see Deleuze and Guattari, "La Synthèse disjonctive," 59: "Schizophrenization: a disjunction that remains disjunctive, and which none the less affirms the disjoint terms, affirms them through all their distance, without limiting one by the other or excluding one from the other."
45. ECC 154.

> Beckett's great contribution to logic is to have shown that exhaustion (exhaustivity) does not occur without a certain physiological exhaustion . . . Perhaps it is like the front and back side of a single thing: a keen sense or science of the possible joined, or rather disjoined, with a fantastic decomposition of the "self." (ECC 154)

Deleuze himself, however, draws a sharp distinction between the virtual and the possible; see DR 211–14.

46. WP 173. Deleuze's monographs in the history of philosophy all inhabit such a zone of indiscernibility, which accounts for the sense that they are fully "Deleuzian" despite the variety of figures he considers.
47. Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick*, Chapter 36, "The Quarter-Deck," as cited in TP 245.
48. MI 102. We might note here a shift that seems to take place in Deleuze's terminology. In Spinoza, an "affection" (*affectio*) indicates the state of a body in so far as it is affected by another body, and an "affect" (*affectus*) marks the passage from one state to another as an increase or decrease in the body's power as a function of its affections. This terminology, which Deleuze analyzes in detail in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, is largely retained throughout *A Thousand Plateaus*. In *The Movement-Image* and *What is Philosophy?*, however, Deleuze replaces these terms with perception and affection respectively, reserving the word "affect" for the pure qualities or powers that are extracted from affections and achieve an autonomous status.
49. MI 98. This text contains Deleuze's analysis of Firstness and Secondness in Peirce and makes the comparison with Biran.
50. Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights* (New York: Norton, 1990), Chapter 9, 62–4.
51. François Zourabichvili, "Six Notes on the Percept (On the Relation between the Critical and the Clinical)," in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 190. Zourabichvili's article provides a profound analysis of the clinical status of the percept in Deleuze's work.
52. Virginia Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1925), 11, as cited in TP 263. For Deleuze's analysis of the role of affects and percepts in T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, see his essay "The Shame and the Glory: T. E. Lawrence" (ECC 115–25).
53. See Joachim Gasquet, *Cézanne: A Memoir with Conversations*, trans. Christopher Pemberton (London: Thames & Hudson, 1991), 160: "man absent from but entirely within the landscape." Cézanne's phrase captures exactly the paradox of the percept.
54. Claude Samuel, *Conversations with Olivier Messiaen*, trans. Félix Aprahamian (London: Stainer & Bell, 1976), 61–3.
55. Virginia Woolf, *The Diary of Virginia Woolf*, ed. Anne Olivier Bell (London: Hogarth, 1980), Vol. 3, 209, as cited in TP 280 and WP 172.
56. WP 170. It is precisely in this context that Deleuze considers the effects of drugs and alcohol on literary creation. Though drugs can indeed open the "doors of perception," drug-induced works rarely, if ever, attain the level of the percept; the effects of such perceptive experimentations, Deleuze argues, must be brought about "by quite different means—that is, in art. For Deleuze's discussions of drugs, see TP 282–6, which is an elaboration of an earlier article, "Deux questions" (Two questions), which appeared in *Recherches*, 39 bis (Dec 1979), 231–4. The first question concerns the "specific causality" of drugs, which Deleuze locates in a "line of flight" that invests the system of perception directly. Drugs "stop the world" and release pure auditory and optical percepts; they create microintervals and molecular holes in matter, forms, colors, sounds; and they make lines of speed pass through these intervals (see MI 85). The second question, however, concerns the inevitable "turning point": in themselves, drugs are unable to draw the plane necessary for the action of this "line of flight," and instead result in "erroneous perceptions" (Artaud), "bad feelings" (Michaux), dependency, addiction, and so on. This is why Burroughs formulates the aesthetic problem posed by drugs in the following manner: How can one incarnate the power of drugs without becoming an addict? "Imagine that everything that can be attained by chemical means is accessible by other paths" (LS 161).
57. See Deleuze and Guattari's comments in *A Thousand Plateaus*: "Is it not necessary to retain a minimum of strata, a minimum of forms or functions, a minimal subject from which to extract materials, affects, and assemblages?" (270).

> You don't reach the plane of consistency by wildly destratifying . . . Staying stratified—organized, signified, subjected—is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. (160–1)

58. TP 356. For the comparison between Goethe and Kleist, see TP 268–9.
59. WP 88–9. This is how Deleuze defines Proust's project: to render visible the invisible force of time. "'Time, which is usually not visible, in order to become so seeks bodies and, wherever it finds them, seizes upon them in order to project its magic lantern upon them,' quartering the fragments and features of an aging face, according to its 'inconceivable dimension'" (PS 160).
60. On Deleuze's use of embryology and the model of the egg, see DR 214–17, 249–52.
61. William Burroughs, *Naked Lunch* (New York: Grove, 1966), 8, 131, as cited in TP 153, 150.
62. George Büchner, "Lenz," in *Complete Plays and Prose*, trans. Carl Richard Mueller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1963), 141, as cited in AO 2:

> He thought that it must be a feeling of endless bliss to be in contact with the profound life of every form, to have a soul for rocks, metals, water, and plants, to take into himself, as in a dream, every element of nature, like flowers that breathe with the waxing and waning of the moon.

63. D. H. Lawrence, *Fantasia of the Unconscious* (New York: Viking, 1960).
64. Arthur Rimbaud, *A Season in Hell*, in *Rimbaud: Complete Works, Selected Letters*, trans. Wallace Fowlie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 177, 179, 189, 193.
65. See Pierre Klossowski, "The Euphoria at Turin," in *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Klossowski cites one of Nietzsche's final fragments, in which the two poles of delirium are mixed:

> I touch here the question of race. I am a Polish gentleman, pure blood, in whom not a drop of impure blood is mixed, not the slightest. If I seek my most profound opposite . . . —I always find my mother and my sister: to see myself allied with such German riff-raff was a blasphemy against my divinity. The ancestry on the side of my mother and sister to this very day (—) was a monstrosity. (250)

66. D 36–51. The Anglo-American writers that appear most frequently in Deleuze's writings include Samuel Beckett, William Burroughs, Lewis Carroll, Charles Dickens, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Allen Ginsberg, Thomas Hardy, Henry James, James Joyce, Jack Kerouac, D. H. Lawrence, T. E. Lawrence, H. P. Lovecraft, Malcolm Lowry, Herman Melville, Henry Miller, R. L. Stevenson, and Virginia Woolf.
67. On the geography of American literature, see TP 19, 520 n18; on the process of demolition, see AO 133, 277–8, and D 38–9, 140–1.
68. See, for example, Paul Klee, *On Modern Art*, trans. Paul Findlay (London: Faber, 1966), 55: "We have found parts, but not the whole. We still lack the ultimate power, for the people are not with us. But we seek a people."
69. On all these points, see the short section in *The Time-Image* (TI 215–24) that analyzes the conditions of a modern political cinema. In a parallel section of the book that would deserve a separate discussion (TI 262–70), Deleuze analyzes the conditions under which the cinema is capable of fighting an internal battle against informatics and communication (a "creation beyond information").

70. See N 171–2. For Deleuze and Guattari's critique of the concept of class, see AO 252–62.
71. In TP 469–70, Deleuze and Guattari provide a set theoretical interpretation of the major / minor distinction. What defines a minority is not its number but rather relations internal to the number: a majority is constituted by a set that is *denumerable*, whereas a minority is defined as a *non-denumerable* set, no matter how many elements it has. The capitalist axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets, whereas minorities constitute fuzzy, non-denumerable, and non-axiomizable sets, which implies a calculus of problematics rather than an axiomatic.
72. "1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine," in TP 351–423, which could be read as an attempt to set forth the type of political formation that would correspond with the "active" mode of existence outlined in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*. Revealingly, in *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, ed. Stéphane Nadaud, trans. Kélina Gotman (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), Guattari indicates that, in September 1972, a mere six months after the publication of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze was already hard at work on the "Nomadology" chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*. "Gilles is working like a madman on his nomads" (397), Guattari writes, almost as if Deleuze had realized, even before finishing *Anti-Oedipus*, that its tripartite typology of social formations (primitives, States, capitalism) was inadequate, and would have to be complemented with a fourth type—the nomadic war-machine.
73. Pier Paolo Pasolini develops this notion of free indirect discourse in *L'Expérience hérétique* (Paris: Payot, 1976), 39–65 (in literature), and 139–55 (in cinema). For Deleuze's analyses, see MI 72–6.
74. See Herman Melville's essay on American literature, "Hawthorne and his Mosses," in *The Portable Melville*, ed. Jay Leyda (New York: Viking, 1952), 411–14; and Franz Kafka's diary entry (25 Dec 1911) on "the literature of small peoples," in *The Diaries of Franz Kafka: 1910–1913*, ed. Max Brod, trans. Joseph Kresh (New York: Schocken, 1948), 191–8.
75. N 174. Bergson develops the notion of fabulation in Chapter 2 of *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. T. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton with W. Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt, 1935).
76. D 43. For the concept of "minority," see TP 105–6, 469–71. On the conditions for a political cinema in relation to minorities, and Bergson's notion of "fabulation," see TI 215–24.
77. Marcel Proust, *By Way of Sainte-Beuve*, trans. Sylvia Townsend Warner (London: Chatto & Windus, 1978), 194–5: "Great literature is written in a sort of foreign language. To each sentence we attach a meaning, or at any rate a mental image, which is often a mistranslation. But in great literature all our mistranslations result in beauty."
78. See Gilles Deleuze, "Avenir de linguistique," preface to Henri Gobard, *L'Aliénation lingistique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1976), 9–14, translated as "The Future of Linguistics" in TRM 67–71. See also K 23–7: "The spatiotemporal categories of these languages differ sharply: vernacular language is 'here,' vehicular language is 'everywhere,' referential language is 'over there,' mythic language is 'beyond'" (K 27).
79. On all these points, see K 15–16, 23. Pierre Perrault encountered a similar situation in Quebec: the impossibility of not speaking, the impossibility of speaking other than in English, the impossibility of speaking in English, the impossibility of settling in France in order to speak French (see TI 217).
80. TP 101. See also TP 76: "A rule of grammar is a power marker before it is a syntactical marker."
81. In addition to the essays collected in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, see Deleuze's essay "Of the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl" in LS 82–93, which compares the procedures of Carroll and Artaud. See especially LS 83, where Deleuze notes that the comparison must take place at both a "clinical" and a "critical" level.

82. See Gilles Deleuze, "One Manifesto Less," in *The Deleuze Reader*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
83. N 140–1. With regard to this "outside" of language in philosophy, Deleuze writes that "style in philosophy tends toward these three poles: concepts, or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and hearing; and affects, or new ways of feeling" (N 164–5).
84. AO 133, 370–1, 106. For this use of the term experimentation, see John Cage, *Silence* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 13: "The word experimental is apt, providing it is understood not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown."
85. N 146–7. See also TP 100: "Only continuous variation brings forth this virtual line, this continuum of life, 'the essential element of the real beneath the everyday.'"
86. ECC 126–35. On the distinction between "transcendent judgment" and "immanent evaluation," see TI 141:

    > It is not a matter of judging life in the name of a higher authority which would be the good, the true; it is a matter, on the contrary, of evaluating every being, every action and passion, even every value, in relation to the Life which they involve. Affect as immanent evaluation, instead of judgment as transcendent value.

87. On the notion of immanent criteria, see K 87–8 and TP 70. "Although there is no preformed logical order to becomings and multiplicities, there are criteria, and the important thing is that they not be used after the fact, that they be applied in the course of events" (TP 251).
88. See D 141:

    > *Critique et Clinique*: life and work are the same thing, when they have adapted the line of flight that makes them the components of the same war-machine. In these conditions, life has for a long time ceased to be personal, and the work has ceased to be literary or textual.

Essay 13: Sensation
Deleuze on Bacon: Three Conceptual Trajectories in "The Logic of Sensation"

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* (Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1981), in the series *La vue le texte*, edited by Harry Jancovici, now out of print. A revised version appeared from Éditions de la Différence in 1983, incorporating fifteen new paintings by Bacon and one minor emendation to the text (on 25). The French book is currently available in a paperback edition published in 2002 by Éditions de Seuil, in the series L'Ordre philosophique, edited by Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin. Deleuze also gave an important series of seminars on art from 31 Mar 1981 through 2 Jun 1981, apparently after the book had been written, which were no longer focused on Bacon's work in particular.
2. See, for instance, Patrick Vauday's early review in *Critique* 426 (1982), as well as Christine Buci-Glucksmann, "Le Plissé baroque de la peinture," *Magazine littéraire* 257 (Sep 1988).
3. Ronald Bogue's three-volume work on Deleuze and the arts, which includes *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts*, *Deleuze on Cinema*, and *Deleuze on Literature* (New York: Routledge, 2005), is a definitive study of Deleuze's "philosophy of art." My comments here are indebted to Bogue's wide-ranging work.
4. Gilles Deleuze, "8 ans après: Entretien 1980" (interview with Catherine Clément), *L'Arc* (rev. edn., 1980), special issue on Deleuze, 99.
5. John Russell, *Francis Bacon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971; rev. edn., 1979).
6. See Jean-François Lyotard, *Que peindre? Adami, Arakawa, Buren* (Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1987), and Michel Butor, *Comment écrire pour Jasper Johns* (Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1992).

7. See Michel Leiris, *Francis Bacon: Full Face and in Profile*, trans. John Weightman (New York: Rizzoli, 1983), and *Francis Bacon*, trans. John Weightman (New York: Rizzoli, 1998).
8. See Michael Peppiatt, *Francis Bacon: Anatomy of an Enigma* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1996), 276.
9. See ABC C: Deleuze

> doesn't believe in culture, rather he believes in encounters (*rencontres*), but these encounters don't occur with people. People think that it's with other people that encounters take place, like among intellectuals at colloquia. Encounters occur, rather, with things, with a painting, a piece of music. With people, however, these meetings are not at all encounters; these kinds of encounters are usually so disappointing, catastrophic.

10. Peppiatt, *Francis Bacon*, 305–6.
11. "La Peinture enflammé," interview with Hervé Guibert, in *Le Monde*, 3 Dec 1981, 15, in TRM 181–7: 185, 187.
12. David Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon 1962–1979*, 3rd edn. (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1987).
13. From Francis Bacon's introductory text to the "The Artist's Eye" exhibition at the National Gallery, London, as cited in Peppiatt, *Francis Bacon*, 310; whence the famous phrase, variously attributed, "talking about music is like dancing about architecture."
14. "La Peinture enflammé," 15, in TRM 181–7: 185.
15. Erwin Straus, *Vom Sinn der Sinne* (1935), translated as *The Primary World of the Senses: A Vindication of Sensory Experience*, trans. Jacob Needleman, 2nd edn. (New York: Free Press, 1963).
16. Marius von Senden, *Space and Sight: The Perception of Space and Shape in the Congenitally Blind Before and After Operation*, trans. Peter Heath (London and Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
17. See Daniel N. Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology* (New York: Basic, 1985) and *Diary of a Baby* (New York: Basic, 1992).
18. Straus, *The Primary World of the Senses*, 351.
19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 102–6. Oliver Sacks's famous case of *The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) explores the opposite condition (visual agnosia): a patient who had retained the abstract and categorical, but lost the concrete (7–22).
20. This reading can be found in Deleuze's seminars of 28 Mar and 4 Apr 1978, which are are available online at webdeleuze.com in an English translation by Melissa McMahon.
21. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 144 (A120): "There must exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of the manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination."
22. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 105 (A68/B93): "The only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them."
23. Immanuel Kant [1952], *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University, Press, 1978), 5§26,105. Deleuze considered the *Critique of Judgment* to be "one of the most important books in all of philosophy" (31 Mar 1981).
24. Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 140.
25. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. James Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 5.
26. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §26, 98.

27. See Henri Maldiney, "L'Esthetique des rhythmes," in *Regard parole espace* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1973), 147–72: 149–51.
28. Joachim Gasquet, *Cézanne: A Memoir with Conversations*, trans. Christopher Pemberton (London: Thames & Hudson: 1991), 160. See Deleuze's commentary on this text in the seminar of 31 Mar 2981.
29. Paul Klee, *On Modern Art*, trans. Paul Findlay (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), 43. See TP 312 as well as 28 Mar 1978.
30. In Kant, sensibility is a mere receptive faculty; it simply presents a diversity of a manifold in space and time. The task of the imagination (through synthesis), the understanding (through concepts), and reason (through Ideas) is to unify this diversity (the form of recognition and common sense).
31. Gary Genosko, *Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction* (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), 180. Genosko presents an analysis of Guattari's "diagrammatism" on 178–85.
32. Charles Sanders Peirce, *The Collected Papers*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935–1966), Vol. 4, 531 (as cited in Genosko, *Félix Guattari*, 179).
33. TP 531 n41. Deleuze and Guattari note that they "borrow his [Peirce's] terms, even while changing their connotations," such that they are able to assign to the diagram "a distinct role, irreducible to either the icon or the symbol." For their use of the term diagram, see TP 141–4.
34. WP 203: "The struggle with chaos that Cézanne and Klee have shown in action in painting, at the heart of painting, is found in another way in science and in philosophy."
35. Deleuze none the less occasionally makes use of this term; see, for instance, TP 497: "The figurative as such is not inherent to any 'will to art.'"
36. Maldiney, *Regard parole espace*, 195.

Essay 14: The New
The Conditions of the New

1. An early version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the British Society for Phenomenology at St. Hilda's College, Oxford University, in April 2005, on the theme of "The Problem of the New," organized by Robin Durie.
2. See, for instance, the following: "The aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (*creativeness*)" (D vii); Bergson "transformed philosophy by posing the question of the 'new' instead of that of eternity (how are the production and appearance of something new possible)" (MI 3); "The new—in other words, difference—calls forth forces in thought that are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognized and unrecognizable *terra incognita*" (DR 136). None the less, it is true that the *new* is merely an operative concept in Deleuze's philosophy, which he himself tends to thematize under the rubric of *difference*.
3. On these issues, Deleuze did not hesitate to identify himself as a metaphysician, in the traditional sense. "I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician. Bergson says that modern science hasn't found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that interests me" (Arnaud Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze* [Paris: Belin, 1999], 130.)
4. See Mario Bunge, *Causality and Modern Science*, 3rd rev. edn. (New York: Dover Books , 1979), 17–19 ("The Spectrum of Categories of Determination").
5. See the discussion in Mario Bunge, *Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2001), esp. 49, 222.

6. Bergson, Henri, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 1.
7. Martial Gueroult, *L'Évolution et la structure de la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte*, 2 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres), I, 126.
8. In a Deleuzian context, it might be preferable to speak about the conditions of the *real*, rather than *real experience*, since the latter seems to imply a link to a (transcendental) subjectivity. But we can perhaps retain the phrase if we instead link it to the notion of pure experience in the Jamesian sense—that is, an experience without a subject or an object.
9. DR 38. See also DR 54: "The search for a ground forms the essential step of a 'critique' which should inspire in us new ways of thinking . . . [But] as long as the ground remains larger than the grounded, this critique serves only to justify traditional ways of thinking."
10. See LS 19: in order to assure a real genesis, the genesis requires an element of its own, "distinct from the form of the conditioned," something unconditioned, an "ideational material or 'stratum.'"
11. Leibniz and Spinoza will both claim, for example, that Descartes's *clear and distinct* ideas only find their sufficient reason in *adequate* ideas. On the relation of the foundation to the ground, see DR 79: "The foundation concerns the soil: it shows how something is established upon this soil, how it occupies and possesses it; whereas the ground . . . measures the possessor and the soil against one another according to a title of ownership."
12. On the role of the *sans-fond* in artistic creation, see Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze on Bacon: Three Conceptual Trajectories in *The Logic of Sensation*," translator's preface to Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), vii–xxxiii.
13. Ian Stewart, *Does God Place Dice? The Mathematics of Chaos*, 2nd edn. (London: Blackwell, 1989), 32–3.
14. Bunge *Causality and Modern Science*, 74–5, citing Bertrand Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996), 122. As Bunge notes, however, "the advances of science elicit the invention of fresh mathematical tools" (75), and there is thus no reason to privilege differential equations *per se*.
15. See 22 Apr 1980: "It is because it [the calculus] is a well-founded fiction in relation to mathematical truth that it is consequently *a basic and real means of exploration of the reality of existence*." Deleuze makes a similar point in 29 Apr 1980:

    > Everyone agrees on the irreducibility of differential signs to any mathematical reality, that is to say, to geometrical, arithmetical, and algebraic reality. The difference arises when some people think, as a consequence, that differential calculus is only a convention—a rather suspect one—and others, on the contrary, think that its artificial character in relation to mathematical reality allows it to be adequate to certain aspects of physical reality.

16. See DR 42–50, where Deleuze analyzes and compares the projects of Hegel and Leibniz on this score: "differential calculus no less than the dialectic is a matter of 'power' and of the power of the limit" (43).
17. Strictly speaking, the list of concepts that follows, as Deleuze points out, is not a list of categories, nor could it be (without changing the concept of a category): they are "complexes of space and time . . . irreducible to the universality of the concept and to the particularity of the now here" (DR 285).
18. But this forces Leibniz into a new problem: What is the relation between the two judgments of attribution "A is larger than B" (in the concept A) and "B is smaller than A" (in the concept B)? Leibniz reduces relations to attributions, but then he divides the relation into two relations. If we have "A R1 B" and "B R2 A" (where R1 and R2 are the relations), then what is the relation between R1 and R2? Leibniz's genius was to create another new concept

to account for this second relation: the "pre-established harmony": in God's understanding there is a correspondence and a harmony between everything that is contained in the concept A and everything that is contained in the concept B. In other words, there is a single and unique world that is expressed in the concepts of real beings.

19. 14 Dec 1982. See also ECC 86–7, and David Lapoujade, "From Transcendental Empiricism to Worker Nomadism: William James," trans. Alberto Toscano, in *Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 9 (2000), 190–9, who analyzes James's "radical empiricism" in a similar light.
20. See TP 232–309, the plateau entitled "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible . . . ." The concept of becoming appears earlier, in NP, for example, but it does not yet have the components that Deleuze will eventually assign to it in this text, and which will be further developed in later concepts such as the interstice, affect and percept, and so on.
21. See D 30: Mrs. Dalloway was "laid out like a mist between the people she knew best."
22. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by That of Ordinary Algebra," in *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1956), 545–6. For a fuller analysis of Leibniz's text, see Essay 11.
23. By contrast, in *The Fold*, Deleuze begins his deduction of concepts with the differential concept of *inflection*.
24. Miguel de Beistegui, in his *Truth and Genesis: Philosophy and Differential Ontology* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), has analyzed in detail the shift from substance to multiplicity brought about by Deleuze's differential ontology.
25. Alfred North Whitehead makes a similar point in *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 173: "We can never get away from the questions: —How much, —In what proportions?—and In what pattern of arrangement with other things? . . .. Arsenic deals out either health or death, according to its proportions amid a pattern of circumstances."
26. The analysis that follows derived from Deleuze's seminar of 10 Mar 1981, which forms part of a series of fourteen seminars that Deleuze gave on Spinoza between December 1980 and March 1981. In certain respects, the contents of these seminars differ significantly from the interpretation of Spinoza given in EPS.
27. Like most seventeenth-century thinkers, Leibniz also proposed a concept of the actual infinite that was opposed to the indefinite:

> I am so in favor of the actual infinite that instead of admitting that Nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that Nature makes use of it everywhere, in order to show more effectively the perfections of its Author. Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, I do not say divisible, but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures. (Letter to Foucher, 16 Mar 1693, in *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, ed. C. J. Gerhardt (Berlin: George Olms, 1965), I, 416)

28. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 319, A327/B384.
29. Steven Strogatz, *Sync: The Emerging Science of Spontaneous Order* (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 181.
30. Ian Stewart, *Does God Place Dice?: The Mathematics of Chaos* (London: Blackwell, 1989), 73–4.
31. See B 98: "It is not the real that resembles the possible; it is the possible that resembles the real." The concept of possibility is subject to the same critique that Deleuze offers of Kant's conception of conditions of possibility: "the error of all determinations of the transcendental as consciousness is to conceive of the transcendental in the image and resemblance of what it is supposed to found" (LS 105).
32. For this reason, Deleuze's work has been seen to anticipate certain developments in

complexity theory and chaos theory. Manuel De Landa in particular has emphasized this link in *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, London and New York: Continuum, 2002). For a general presentation of the mathematics of chaos theory, see Ian Stewart, *Does God Place Dice? The Mathematics of Chaos*.

33. See B 97: "The characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differenciated, and is forced to differenciate itself, to create its lines of differenciation in order to be actualized."
34. On this topic, see Morris Kline, *Mathematical Thought From Ancient to Modern Times* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 1096–7: "After the dawn of rigorous mathematics with Cauchy, most mathematicians followed his dictates and rejected divergent series as unsound," but with the advent of non-Euclidean geometry and the new algebras, "mathematicians slowly began to appreciate that . . . Cauchy's definition of convergence could no longer be regarded as a higher necessity informed by some superhuman power."

Essay 15: The Open

The Idea of the Open: Bergson's Three Theses on Movement

1. This paper was originally presented as a talk in Stavanger, Norway, on 7 November 2008, at a conference entitled "Deleuze 2008: Deleuze in the Open," which was organized by Arne Fredlund.
2. Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
3. See 3 May 1987:

   > The two parts of a mixture are never equal. One of the two parts is always more or less given, the other is always more or less to be made. It is for this reason that I have remained very Bergsonian. He said very beautiful things on that. He said that in a mixture, you never have two elements, but one element which plays the role of impurity and that one you have, it's given to you, and then you have a pure element that you don't have that must be made. That's not bad.

4. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 330: "Ancient science thinks it knows its object sufficiently when it has noted some of its privileged moments, whereas modern science considers the object at any moment whatever."
5. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 331.
6. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 330.
7. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 331: "Galileo thought there was no essential moment, no privileged instant."
8. For the Greeks, a figure is defined by its form: that is, by its privileged points (a circle has one privileged point, its center; a finite line has two privileged points, its ends or extrema; a triangle has three privileged points, a square has four, a cube has eight, and so on).
9. MI 4. Bergson develops these points in the fourth chapter of *Creative Evolution*.
10. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 336, as cited in MI 4.
11. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 37: "The essence of mechanical explanation is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that *the whole is given* [*tout est donné*]." See also 39, 45, 345.
12. Whitehead—whom Deleuze considered to be the last great American philosopher—would take up this question in his own manner; what he called a *concrescence* is the production of something new in the world (*creativity*).
13. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 32: "Such a science would be a *mechanics of transformation*, of which our *mechanics of translation* would become a particular case."

14. For Bergson's famous example of mixing sugar in a glass of water, see *Creative Evolution*, 9–10.
15. This section is a recapitulation of themes that are developed in more detail in Essay 12.

Essay 16: Jacques Derrida
Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought

1. Giorgio Agamben, "Absolute Immanence," in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 220–39: 239. Edith Wyschogrod, in *Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), distinguishes between philosophers of difference (Levinas, Derrida, Blanchot) and philosophers of the plenum (Deleuze and Guattari, Genet) (191, 223, 229), but this distinction seems less germane than Agamben's.
2. An early version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the International Association of Philosophy and Literature at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, in June 2002. The ideas developed here originated in discussions with Andrew Haas and Andrew Montin at the University of New South Wales, and benefitted from the critical comments of Paul Patton and John Protevi.
3. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York: Noonday, 1957), as well as Deleuze's comments in LS 98–9, 343–4. Deleuze will retain Sartre's notion of an impersonal transcendental field, stripping it of any determination as a constituting consciousness.
4. See WP 46:

   > Kant discovered the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection).

5. See ECC 137: "The poisoned gift of Platonism was to have reintroduced transcendence into philosophy, to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning." Deleuze is here referring primarily to ontological transcendence.
6. See also Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 4: *Nihilism*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 4:

   > "Christian God" also stands for the "transcendent" in general in its various meanings—for "ideals" and "norms," "principles" and "rules," "ends" and "values," which are set "*above*" Being, in order to give Being as a whole a purpose, an order, and—as it is succinctly expressed—"meaning."

7. In this, Derrida is certainly more faithful to Heidegger, and is attempting, in an explicit manner, to carry forward a trajectory already present in Heidegger's work: the immanent question of being and its transcendental horizon (time), which is posed in *Being and Time*, comes to be progressively displaced by the transcendent themes of *Ereignis* (the "event") and the *es gibt* (the "gift" [*Gabe*] of time and being). The trajectory is continued in the Derridean themes of revelation and promise. See Derrida's comments in "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," in *Derrida and Negative Theology*, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 122–4.
8. See Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), where Derrida characterizes history as "the very movement of transcendence, of the excess over the totality, without which no totality would appear" (117).
9. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 6–7. See also 10: one must "borrow the syntactic and lexical resources of the language of metaphysics . . . at the very moment one deconstructs this language."

10. Derrida, *Positions*, 6.
11. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 168: "*Différance*, the disappearance of any originary presence, is *at once* the condition of possibility *and* the condition of impossibility of truth."
12. Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme," in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 67.
13. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in *Acts of Religion*, ed. Gil Anidjar (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 243.
14. See Arnaud Villani, *La Guêpe et l'orchidée: Essai sur Gilles Deleuze* (Paris: Belin, 1999), 130.
15. Significantly, Derrida says the first question he would have asked Deleuze would have concerned the term immanence—a term "on which he always insisted." See "I'm Going to Have to Wander All Alone," in Jacques Derrida, *The Work of Mourning*, ed. and trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 189–96.
16. Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme," in *Margins of Philosophy*, 67.
17. For Deleuze's interpretation of Platonism, see in particular "Plato and the Simulacrum" in LS 253–66, although the concept of the simulacrum developed there assumes less and less importance in Deleuze's work.
18. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Deleuze never discusses Levinas's work directly, except as an instance of Jewish philosophy (in WP 233 n5). See, however, Alain Badiou's critiques in *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001).
19. For their respective discussions of the divine names tradition, see Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone, 1990), Chapter 3 (EPS 53–68), and Jacques Derrida, *On the Name*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
20. For Thomas Aquinas's formulations of analogy, see *Summa Theologica*, 1.13.5. The great modern proponent of the way of affirmation was Charles Williams; see his book *The Figure of Beatrice: A Study in Dante* (New York: Faber & Faber, 1943).
21. See Reiner Schürmann, *Meister Eckhart: Mystic and Philosopher* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), especially 172–92. While recognizing Eckhart's affinities with immanence (see 176, 252 n56) and with an immanent causality (177), Schürmann attempts to provide a qualified analogical interpretation of his teachings (179).
22. Derrida characterizes the nature of deconstruction itself in terms derived from the tradition of negative theology. See Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend," in *Derrida and Difference*, ed. David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 5: "What is deconstruction? 'Nothing of course!' And what is deconstruction *not*? 'Everything, of course!'"
23. Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials," in *Derrida and Negative Theology*, 74.
24. Ibid., 77, 79.
25. Derrida, *On the Name*, 69.
26. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 298–9 (A295–6/B352).
27. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 257 (A236–7/B294–5):

> We have now not merely explored the *territory* of pure understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth—enchanting name!—surrounded by a wide and stormy *ocean*, the native home of illusion.

28. Derrida himself draws the analogy between Kantian Ideas and his own concepts at numerous points throughout his work. For instance, the structure or logic of the gift, Derrida tells us, has "a form analogous to Kant's transcendental dialectic, as relation between thinking and knowing. We are going to give ourselves over to engage in the effort of thinking or rethinking a sort of *transcendental illusion* of the gift" (Jacques Derrida, *Given Time*, Vol. 1: *Counterfeit Money*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 29–30, emphasis added). Similarly, Derrida notes that

    > I have on several occasions spoken of "unconditional" affirmation or of "unconditional" "appeal." . . . Now, the very least that can be said of "unconditionality" (a word that I use not by accident to recall the character of the categorical imperative in its Kantian form) is that it is independent of every determinate context, even of the determination of a context in general. It announces itself as such only in the *opening* of context. (Jacques Derrida, *Limited ABC*, ed. Samuel Weber (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 152–3)

    To be sure, Derrida's thought cannot be accommodated within these Kantian formulations:

    > Why have I always *hesitated* to characterize it [deconstruction] in Kantian terms, for example, or more generally in ethical or political terms, when that would have been so easy and would have enabled me to avoid so many critiques, themselves all too facile? Because such characterizations seem to me essentially associated with philosophemes that themselves call for deconstructive questions. (*Limited ABC*, 153)

    For an analysis of Derrida's relation to Kant, see Martin Hägglund, *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), Chapter 1, "Autoimmunity of Time: Derrida and Kant," 13–49.
29. Derrida, *Aporias*, 16. See also *The Gift of Death*, 84, where Derrida is still hesitating between the two terms: "The concept of responsibility [would be] paralyzed by what can be called an aporia or an antinomy."
30. Derrida, *Aporias*, 15.
31. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Essay II, §8, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 1968), 506, as quoted in NP 213–14.
32. Derrida, "Post-Scriptum," in *Derrida and Negative Theology*, 290.
33. For a summary of Deleuze's theory of desire, see his seminar of 26 Mar 1973, "Dualism, Monism and Multiplicities (Desire–Pleasure–*Jouissance*)," in *Contretemps: An Online Journal of Philosophy* 2 (May 2001), 92–108.
34. Derrida, *Given Time*, 29.
35. For the idea that the deconstruction of the law "operates on the basis of the infinite 'Idea of justice,'" see Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in *Acts of Religion*, esp. 250–58. See also *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida*, ed. John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 17: the Idea of justice implies "non-gathering, dissociation, heterogeneity, non-identity with itself, endless inadequation, *infinite transcendence*." On the Idea of justice being "independent of all determinable contexts," see Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997), 215–16.
36. Jacques Derrida, *Resistances to Psychoanalysis*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 36. Thanks to Andrew Montin for this reference.
37. Derrida, *On the Name*, 37.
38. See, for example, Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, 24.

Essay 17: Alain Badiou
Mathematics and the Theory of Multiplicities: Deleuze and Badiou Revisited

1. F 42 (Deleuze was speaking of Virilio's relation to Foucault). A shorter version of this article was presented at the conference "Ethics and Politics: The Work of Alain Badiou," which was held at the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at the University of Cardiff on 25–6 May 2002, organized by Jean-Jacques Lecercle and Neil Badmington, and was published in *Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy*, ed. Peter Hallward (London: Continuum, 2004). My understanding of Badiou's work is strongly indebted to Peter Hallward's book *Subject to Truth: The Work of Alain Badiou* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), which presents a superb overview and critical analysis of Badiou's philosophy. I would like to thank Prof. Hallward for providing me with an early copy of his manuscript, and for the insights and clarifications he provided on both Badiou and Deleuze during numerous e-mail correspondences. This essay was written before the 2006 publication of Badiou's *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event 2*, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009).
2. Alain Badiou, *Being and Event*, trans. Oliver Feltham (London and New York: Continuum, 2005).
3. Gilles Deleuze, "A Philosophical Concept," in *Who Comes After the Subject*, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 95.
4. Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 4.
5. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 1.
6. See Badiou, *Being and Event*, 483: "the latent paradigm in Deleuze is 'natural' . . . Mine is mathematical." Similarly, in his review article of Deleuze's book on Leibniz, Badiou writes: "There have never been but two schemas or paradigms of the Multiple: the mathematical and the organicist . . . This is the cross of metaphysics, and the greatness of Deleuze . . . is to choose without hesitation for the animal" (Alain Badiou, "Gilles Deleuze, 'The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque'," in Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, eds., *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 55. This same theme is continued in Badiou's article "Deleuze's Vitalist Ontology," in Alain Badiou, *Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology*, ed. and trans. Norman Madarasz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 63–72.
7. See, for instance, the articles on Badiou's book by Éric Alliez, Arnaud Villani, and José Gil, collected in *Futur Antérieur* 43 (April 1998).
8. Badiou, "Deleuze's Vitalist Ontology," in *Briefings on Existence*, 71.
9. See Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, 54:

   > A "crisis" in mathematics is a moment when mathematics is constrained to think its own thought *as the immanent multiplicity of its own unity*. It is at this point, I believe, and at this point alone, that mathematics, that is to say, ontology, functions as a condition of philosophy.

   For Badiou, philosophy itself is "meta-ontological," since it is the task of philosophy to establish the thesis that mathematics is the discourse of Being-as-such (Badiou, *Being and Event*, 13).
10. See DR 323 n22: Given the irreducibility of "problems" in his thought, Deleuze writes that "the use of the word 'problematic' as a substantive seems to us an indispensable neologism."
11. Alain Badiou, "One, Multiple, Multiplicities," in *Theoretical Writings*, ed. and trans. Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 71.
12. See TP 374: "Only royal science has at its disposal a metric power that can define a conceptual apparatus or an autonomy of science (including the autonomy of experimental

science)." And TP 486: "Major science has a perpetual need for the inspiration of the minor; but the minor would be nothing if it did not confront and conform to the highest scientific requirements."

13. Badiou, *Being and Event*, 184.
14. Badiou, "One, Multiple, Multiplicities," in *Theoretical Writings*, 72.
15. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 46: "I uphold that the forms of the multiple are, just like Ideas, always actual and that the virtual does not exist." Deleuze agrees with this characterization of sets: "Everything is actual in a numerical multiplicity; everything is not 'realized,' but everything there is actual. There are no relationships other than those between actuals" (B 43).
16. AO 371–2. For Badiou's appeal to Lautréamont, see "Mathematics and Philosophy, " in *Theoretical Writings*, 11–12; and *Briefings on Existence*, 71.
17. TP 363. See Deleuze's well-known comments on his relation to the history of philosophy in N 5–6. The best general works on the history of mathematics are Carl B. Boyer, *History of Mathematics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) and Morris Kline, *Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
18. Proclus, *Commentary of the First Book of Euclid's Elements*, trans. Glenn R. Murrow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 63–7, as cited in DR 163; TP 554 n21; and LS 54. See also Deleuze's comments in TI 174: theorems and problems are "two mathematical instances which constantly refer to each other, the one enveloping the second, the second sliding into the first, but both very different in spite of their union." On the two types of deduction, TI 185.
19. For instance, determining a triangle the sum of whose angles is 180 degrees is theorematic, since the angles of every triangle will total 180 degrees. Constructing an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line, by contrast, is problematic, since we could also construct a non-equilateral triangle or a non-triangular figure on the line (moreover, the construction of an equilateral triangle must first pass through the construction of two circles). Classical geometers struggled for centuries with the three great "problems" of antiquity—trisecting an angle, constructing a cube having double the volume of a given cube, and constructing a square equal to a circle—though it would turn out that none of these problems is solvable using only a straightedge and compass. See E. T. Bell's comments in *Men of Mathematics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1937), 31–2.
20. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1931), §74, 208. See also *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, ed. John P. Leavey, Jr. and David B. Allison (Stony Brook, NY: H. Hayes, 1978), which includes Jacques Derrida's commentary. Whereas Husserl saw problematics as "proto-geometry," Deleuze sees it as a fully autonomous dimension of geometry, but one he identifies as a "minor" science; it is a "proto"-geometry only from the viewpoint of the "major" or "royal" conception of geometry, which attempts to eliminate these dynamic events or variations by subjecting them to a theorematic treatment.
21. DR 160. Deleuze continues:

> As a result [of using *reductio ad absurdum* proofs], however, the *genetic* point of view is forcibly relegated to an inferior rank: proof is given that something cannot not be, rather than *that* it is and *why* it is (hence the frequency in Euclid of negative, indirect and *reductio* arguments, which serve to keep geometry under the domination of the principle of identity and prevent it from becoming a geometry of sufficient reason).

22. The language of the rectilinear dominates ethics as well: to "rectify" a wrong, to "straighten" someone out, to make a situation "right"; the French term *droit* means both "straight," in the geometric sense, and "right," in the legal sense; an *angle droit* is a "right" angle; a moral person is someone who is "upright"; the wrong is a deviation from the "straight and narrow" (the line).

23. See DR 174:

> The mathematician Houël remarked that the shortest distance was not a Euclidean notion at all, but an Archimedean one, more physical than mathematical; that it was inseparable from a method of exhaustion; and that it served less to determine the straight line than to determine the length of a curve by means of a straight line—"integral calculus performed unknowingly" (citing Jules Houël, *Essai critique sur les principes fondamentaux de la géométrie élémentaire* [Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1867], 3, 75)

Boyer makes a similar point in his *History of Mathematics*, 141:

> Greek mathematics sometimes has been described as essentially static, with little regard for the notion of variability; but Archimedes, in his study of the spiral, seems to have found the tangent to the curve through kinematic considerations akin to the differential calculus.

24. Badiou, "Deleuze's Vitalist Ontology," in *Briefings on Existence*, 70–1.
25. Boyer, *History of Mathematics*, 393.
26. TP 484. On the relation between Greek theorematics and seventeenth-century algebra and arithmetic as instances of "major" mathematics, see Deleuze, DR 160–1.
27. Boyer, *History of Mathematics*, 394. Deleuze writes that "Cartesian coordinates appear to me to be an attempt of reterritorialization" (22 Feb 1972).
28. TP 554 n23, commenting on Léon Brunschvicg, *Les Étapes de la philosophie mathématique* (Paris: PUF, 1947; new edn.: Paris: A. Blanchard, 1972). Deleuze also appeals to a text by Michel Chasles, *Aperçu historique sur l'origine et le développement de méthodes en géométrie* (Brussels: M. Hayez, 1837), which establishes a continuity between Desargues, Monge, and Poncelet as the "founders of a modern geometry" (TP 554 n28).
29. See Brunschvicg, *Les Étapes de la philosophie mathématique*, 327–31.
30. See Carl B. Boyer, *The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development* (New York: Dover, 1959), 267. Deleuze praises Boyer's book as "the best study of the history of the differential calculus and its modern structural interpretation" (LS 339).
31. For a discussion of the various uses of the term "intuition" in mathematics, see the chapters on "Intuition" and "Four-Dimensional Intuition" in Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, *The Mathematical Experience* (Boston, Basel, and Stuttgart: Birkhäuser, 1981), 391–405, as well as Hans Hahn's classic article "The Crisis in Intuition," in J. R. Newman, ed., *The World of Mathematics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956), 1956–76.
32. Boyer, *The History of Mathematics*, 598 (in the chapter on "The Arithmetization of Analysis").
33. Giulio Giorello, "The 'Fine Structure' of Mathematical Revolutions: Metaphysics, Legitimacy, and Rigour," in *Revolutions in Mathematics*, ed. Donald Gilles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 135. I thank Andrew Murphie for this reference.
34. 22 Feb 1972. See also DR 172: "The limit no longer presupposes the ideas of a continuous variable and infinite approximation. On the contrary, the notion of limit grounds a new, static and purely ideal definition of continuity, while its own definition implies no more than number."
35. See Penelope Maddy, *Naturalism in Mathematics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 51–2, for a discussion of Cantorian "finitism."
36. Deleuze provides a summary of these developments in DR 176:

> The real frontier defining modern mathematics lies not in the calculus itself but in other discoveries such as set theory which, even though it requires, for its own part, an axiom of infinity, gives a no less strictly finite interpretation of the calculus. We know in effect that the notion of limit has lost its phoronomic character and involves only static

considerations; that variability has ceased to represent a progression through all the values of an interval and come to mean only the disjunctive assumption of one value within that interval; that the derivative and the integral have become ordinal rather than quantitative concepts; and finally that the differential designates only a magnitude left undetermined so that it can be made smaller than a given number as required. The birth of structuralism at this point coincides with the death of any genetic or dynamic ambitions of the calculus.

37. For a discussion of Weierstrass's "discretization program" (written from the viewpoint of cognitive science), see George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez, *Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being* (New York: Basic, 2000), 257–324.
38. Maddy, *Naturalism in Mathematics*, 28.
39. Reuben Hersh, *What is Mathematics, Really?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13.
40. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 47.
41. Freeman Dyson, *Infinite in All Directions* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 52–3. John Wheeler, in *Frontiers of Time* (Austin: Center for Theoretical Physics, University of Texas, 1978), has put forward the stronger thesis that the laws of physics are themselves "mutable" (13).
42. Kurt Gödel, cited in Hao Wang, *From Mathematics to Philosophy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), 86.
43. Hermann Weyl, *The Continuum: A Critical Examination of the Foundations of Analysis* (1918), trans. Stephen Pollard and Thomas Bole (New York: Dover, 1994), 23–4 (although Weyl still argues for a discrete interpretation of the continuous continuum). Bertrand Russell makes the same point in his *Principles of Mathematics* (New York: Norton, 1938), 347, citing Poincaré:

    > The continuum thus conceived [arithmetically or discretely] is nothing but a collection of individuals arranged in a certain order, infinite in number, it is true, but external to each other. This is not the ordinary [geometric or "natural"] conception, in which there is supposed to be, between the elements of the continuum, a sort of intimate bond which makes a whole of them, in which the point is not prior to the line, but the line to the point. Of the famous formula, the continuum is a unity in multiplicity, the multiplicity alone subsists, the unity has disappeared.

44. Abraham Robinson, *Non-Standard Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 83. See also 277:

    > With the spread of Weierstrass' ideas, arguments involving infinitesimal increments, which survived particularly in differential geometry and in several branches of applied mathematics, began to be taken automatically as a kind of shorthand for corresponding developments by means of the e, d approach.

45. See FLB 129–30: "Robinson suggested considering the Leibnizian monad as a infinite number very different from transfinites, as a unit surrounded by a zone of infinitely small [numbers] that reflect the converging series of the world."
46. Hersh, *What is Mathematics, Really?*, 289. For discussions of Robinson's achievement, see Jim Holt's useful review, "Infinitesimally Yours," in *The New York Review of Books*, 20 May 1999, as well as the chapter on "Nonstandard Analysis" in Davis and Hersh, *The Mathematical Experience*, 237–54. The latter note that

    > Robinson has in a sense vindicated the reckless abandon of eighteenth-century mathematics against the straight-laced rigor of the nineteenth century, adding a new chapter in the never ending war between the finite and the infinite, the continuous and the discrete. (238)

47. Albert Lautman, *Mathematics, Ideas, and the Physical Real*, trans. Simon Duffy (London: Continuum, 2011), 88.
48. Jean Dieudonné, *L'Axiomatique dans les mathématiques modernes*, 47–8, as cited in Robert Blanché, *L'Axiomatique* (Paris: PUF, 1955), 91.
49. Nicholas Bourbaki, "The Architecture of Mathematics," in *Great Currents of Mathematical Thought*, ed. François Le Lionnais, trans. R. A. Hall and Howard G. Bergmann (New York: Dover, 1971), 31. Bourbaki none the less insists—as do Deleuze and Guattari—that the analogy is not a precise one: mathematicians do not work mechanically as do workers on an assembly line, since "intuition" plays a fundamental role in their research.

    > This is not the intuition of common sense [explains Bourbaki], but rather a sort of direct divination (prior to all reasoning) of the normal behavior he has the right to expect from the mathematical entities which a long association has rendered as familiar to him as the object of the real world. (31)

    Deleuze and Guattari make a similar point in AO 251.
50. See 22 Feb 1972:

    > The idea of a scientific task that no longer passes through codes but rather through an axiomatic first took place in mathematics toward the end of the nineteenth century . . . One finds this well formed only in the capitalism of the nineteenth century.

    Deleuze's political philosophy is itself based in part on the axiomatic-problematic distinction: "Our use of the word 'axiomatic' is far from a metaphor; we find *literally* the same theoretical problems that are posed by the models in an axiomatic repeated in relation to the State" (TP 455).
51. TP 362. See also TP 141–2: "The phrase 'politics of science' is a good phrase for these currents, which are *internal* to science, and not simply circumstances and state factors that act upon it from the outside."
52. Henri Poincaré, "L'œuvre mathématique de Weierstrass," *Acta Mathematica* 22 (1898–9), 1–18, as cited in Boyer, *History of Mathematics*, 601. Boyer notes that one finds in Riemann "a strongly intuitive and geometrical background in analysis that contrasts sharply with the arithmetizing tendencies of the Weierstrassian school" (601).
53. See FLB 48: "axioms concern problems, and escape demonstration."
54. TP 361. This section of the "Treatise on Nomadology" (361–74) develops in detail the distinction between "major" and "minor" science.
55. DR 323 n22. Deleuze is referring to the distinction between "problem" and "theory" in Georges Canguilhem, *On the Normal and the Pathological*, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (New York: Zone, 1978); the distinction between the "problem-element" and the "global synthesis element" in Georges Bouligand, *Le Déclin des absolus mathématico-logiques* (Paris: Éditions d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1949); and the distinction between "problem" and "solution" in Albert Lautman. All these thinkers insist on the double irreducibility of problems: problems should not be evaluated extrinsically in terms of their "solvability" (the philosophical illusion), nor should problems be envisioned merely as the conflict between two opposing or contradictory propositions (the natural illusion) (DR 161). On this score, Deleuze largely follows Lautman's thesis that mathematics participates in a *dialectic* that points beyond itself to a meta-mathematical power—that is, to a general theory of problems and their ideal synthesis—which accounts for the genesis of mathematics itself. See Albert Lautman, *Nouvelles Recherches sur la structure dialectique des mathématiques* (Paris: Hermann, 1939), particularly the section entitled "The Genesis of Mathematics from the Dialectic":

    > The order implied by the notion of genesis is no longer of the order of logical reconstruction in mathematics, in the sense that from the initial axioms of a theory flow

> all the propositions of the theory, for the dialectic is not a part of mathematics, and its notions have no relation to the primitive notions of a theory. (13–14)

Badiou frequently appeals to Lautman's name, but rarely (if ever) to his works, and is opposed to Lautman's appeal to a meta-mathematical dialectic.

56. Badiou, "One, Multiple, Multiplicities," in *Theoretical Writings*, 72.
57. DR 161. See also DR 177–8: "If the differential disappears in the result, this is to the extent that the problem-instance differs in kind from the solution-instance."
58. Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1946), 33. See also 191: "Metaphysics should adopt the generative idea of our mathematics [i.e., change, or becoming] in order to extend it to all qualities, that is, to reality in general."
59. DR 179. See also D ix: "It seems to us that the highest objective of science, mathematics, and physics is multiplicity, and that both set theory and the theory of spaces is still in its infancy."
60. For analyses of Deleuze's theory of multiplicities, see Robin Durie, "Immanence and Difference: Toward a Relational Ontology," in *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 60 (2002), 1–29; Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); and Manuel De Landa, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002).
61. Ian Stewart and Martin Golubitwky, *Fearful Symmetry* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 42.
62. See Kline, *Mathematical Thought*, 759: "The group of an equation is a key to its solvability because the group expresses the degree of indistinguishability of the roots. It tells us what we do *not* know about the roots."
63. DR 180, citing C. Georges Verriest, "Évariste Galois et la théorie des équations algébriques," in *Œuvres mathématiques de Galois* (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1961), 41.
64. ECC 149, citing a text by Galois in André Dalmas, *Évariste Galois* (Paris: Fasquelle, 1956), 132.
65. DR 170, referring to Jules Vuillemin, *La Philosophie de l'algèbre* (Paris: PUF, 1962).

> Jules Vuillemin's book proposes a determination of structures [or multiplicities, in Deleuze's sense] in mathematics. In this regard, he insists on the importance of a theory of problems (following the mathematical Abel) and the principles of determination (reciprocal, complete, and progressive determination according to Galois). He shows how structures, in this sense, provide the only means for realizing the ambitions of a true genetic method. (DI 306 n26)

66. Albert Lautman, "Essay on the Notions of Structure and Existence in Mathematics," in Albert Lautman, *Mathematics, Ideas, and the Physical Real*, trans. Simon Duffy (London : Continuum, 2011), 87–193. In this important volume, Duffy has made available to English-speaking readers almost the entirety of Lautman's work in the philosophy of mathematics. Although Badiou occasionally appeals to Lautman (see *Deleuze*, 98), his own ontology is largely *opposed* to Lautman's; moreover, Badiou never considers Deleuze's own appropriation of Lautman's theory of differential equations, even though Deleuze cites it in almost every one of his books after 1968.
67. For discussions of Poincaré, see 29 Apr 1980, as well as Kline, *Mathematical Thought*, 732–8 and Lautman, *Mathematics, Ideas, and the Physical Real*, 259. Such singularities are now termed "attractors": using the language of physics, attractors govern "basins of attraction" that define the trajectories of the curves that fall within their "sphere of influence."
68. For this reason, Deleuze's work has been seen to anticipate certain developments in complexity theory and chaos theory. De Landa in particular has emphasized this link in *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002). For a presentation of

the mathematics of chaos theory, see Ian Stewart, *Does God Place Dice?: The Mathematics of Chaos* (London: Blackwell, 1989), 95–144.

69. See Lautman, *Mathematics, Ideas, and the Physical Real*, 112:

> The constitution, by Gauss and Riemann, of a differential geometry that studies the intrinsic properties of a variety, independent of any space into which this variety would be plunged, eliminates any reference to a universal container or to a center of privileged coordinates.

70. See Lautman, *Mathematics, Ideas, and the Physical Real*, 97–8:

> Riemannian spaces are devoid of any kind of homogeneity. Each is characterized by the form of the expression that defines the square of the distance between two infinitely proximate points . . . It follows that "two neighboring observers in a Riemannian space can locate the points in their immediate vicinity, but cannot locate their spaces in relation to each other without a new convention." Each vicinity is like a shred of Euclidean space, *but the linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined and can be effected in an infinite number of ways. Riemannian space at its most general thus presents itself as an amorphous collection of pieces that are juxtaposed but not attached to each other.*

71. See DR 183, 181: A Riemannian multiplicity "is intrinsically defined, without external reference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would be submerged . . . It has no need whatsoever of unity to form a system."
72. Badiou, "One, Multiple, Multiplicities," in *Theoretical Writings*, 78.
73. See, in particular, DR 183, although the entirety of the fifth chapter is an elaboration of Deleuze's theory of multiplicities.
74. See DR xxi: "We are well aware . . . that we have spoken of science in a manner which was not scientific."
75. See De Landa, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, 15 (on attractors), and Chapters 2 and 3 (on symmetry-breaking cascades).
76. De Landa, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, 102.
77. See DR 117: "In accordance with Heidegger's ontological intuition, difference must be articulation and connection in itself; *it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever*."
78. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 20. For Badiou's Neo-Platonic characterization of Deleuze, see 26: "It is as though the paradoxical or supereminent One immanently engenders a procession of beings whose univocal sense it distributes."
79. This conflation is stated most clearly in Badiou, *Deleuze*, 46: "the univocal sovereignty of the One." For discussions of Badiou's reading of the doctrine of univocity, see Nathan Widder, "The Rights of Simulacra: Deleuze and the Univocity of Being," in *Continental Philosophy Review* 34 (2001), 437–53, and Keith Ansell-Pearson, "The Simple Virtual: A Renewed Thinking of the One," in *Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 97–114.
80. See, for instance, Badiou, "One, Multiple, Multiplicities," in *Theoretical Writings*, 70: The One "may take the name of 'All,' or 'Whole,' 'Substance,' 'Life,' 'the Body without Organs,' or 'Chaos.'"
81. Ernst Mayr, "Is Biology an Autonomous Science?," in *Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 8–23.
82. Badiou, "One, Multiple, Multiplicities," in *Theoretical Writings*, 73.
83. 22 Apr 1980. See also 29 Apr 1980:

> Everyone agrees on the irreducibility of differential signs to any mathematical reality, that is to say, to geometrical, arithmetical, and algebraic reality. The difference arises

> when some people think, as a consequence, that differential calculus is only a convention—a rather suspect one—and others, on the contrary, think that its artificial character in relation to mathematical reality allows it to be adequate to certain aspects of physical reality.

84. See DR 178:

> Modern mathematics leaves us in a state of antinomy, since the strict finite interpretation that it gives of the calculus nevertheless presupposes an axiom of infinity in the set theoretical foundation, even though this axiom finds no illustration in the calculus. What is still missing is the extra-propositional or sub-representative element expressed in the Idea by the differential, precisely in the form of a problem.

85. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 14. See DR 192: "Representation and knowledge are modeled entirely upon propositions of consciousness which designate cases of solution, but those propositions by themselves give a completely inaccurate notion of the instance which engenders them as cases."
86. See Paul Hoffman, *The Man Who Loved Only Numbers: The Story of Paul Erdós and the Search for Mathematical Truth* (New York: Hyperion, 1998), 17.
87. See N 130: "Poincaré used to say that many mathematical theories are completely irrelevant, pointless. He didn't say they were wrong—that wouldn't have been so bad."
88. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 1, 98–9. See also 70, where Badiou links Deleuze with Plato's "metaphorical mathematics." Badiou is referring to Deleuze's notorious distaste for metaphors, but there is no reason to think that distaste disappears here. The concept of the "fold," for instance, is not a metaphor, but a literal topological transformation. Even the concept of the "rhizome," whatever its metaphorical resonance, is directed primarily against the literal uses of "arborescent" schemas in mathematics and elsewhere (tree structures, branches and branchings, etc.).
89. 14 Mar 1978: "The abstract is lived experience. I would almost say that once you have reached lived experience, you reach the most fully living core of the abstract." See also 21 Mar 1978: "You can live nothing but the abstract and nobody has lived anything else but the abstract."
90. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 36.
91. TP 570 n61. See also TP 461:

> When intuitionism opposed axiomatics, it was not only in the name of intuition, of construction and creation, but also in the name of a calculus of problems, a problematic conception of science that was not less abstract but implied an entirely different abstract machine, one working in the undecidable and the fugitive.

92. Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, 50. Badiou's claim that Deleuze's methodology relies on intuition is discussed in *Deleuze*, Chapter 3, esp. 31–40.
93. Badiou, *Briefings on Existence*, 71.
94. For the role of the scholia, see EPS 342–50 (appendix on the scholia); for the uniqueness of the fifth book of the *Ethics*, see ECC 149–50.
95. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 1. See Badiou's essay on Spinoza, "Spinoza's Closed Ontology," in *Briefings on Existence*, 73–87.
96. See DR 161, 323 n21. See also Hersh's comments on Descartes in *What is Mathematics, Really?*, 112–13: "Euclidean certainty boldly advertised in the *Method* and shamelessly ditched in the *Geometry*."
97. See TP 455: "Our use of the word 'axiomatic' is far from a metaphor; we find *literally* the same theoretical problems that are posed by the models in an axiomatic repeated in relation to the State." In part, this is a historical thesis: it is not by chance that Weierstrass's

program of arithmetizing mathematics and Taylor's program of organizing work developed at the same time. See 22 Feb 1972:

> The idea of a scientific task that no longer passes through codes but rather through an axiomatic first took place in mathematics toward the end of the nineteenth century, that is, with Weierstrass, who launches a static interpretation of the differential calculus, in which the operation of differentiation is no longer considered as a process, and who makes an axiomatic of differential relations. One finds this well formed only in the capitalism of the nineteenth century.

98. See 22 Feb 1972:

> The true axiomatic is social and not scientific . . . The scientific axiomatic is only one of the means by which the fluxes of science, the fluxes of knowledge, are guarded and taken up by the capitalist machine . . . All axiomatics are means of leading science to the capitalist market. All axiomatics are abstract Oedipal formations.

99. In one text, Badiou seems to recognize the problematic–axiomatic distinction in his own manner:

> Today, one starts rather from already complex concretions, and it is a question of folding or unfolding them according to their singularity, to find the principle of their deconstruction-reconstruction, without being concerned with the plane of the set or a decided foundation. Axiomatics is left behind in favor of a mobile apprehension of surprising complexities and correlations. Deleuze's rhizome wins out over Descartes' tree. The heterogeneous lends itself to thought more than the homogeneous. (*Briefings on Existence*, 50)

But Badiou none the less seems to be moving in a Deleuzian direction when, in his more recent essay on "Being and Appearing," he introduces a minimal theory of relation (through logic and topology), and even assigns the "event" a minimal ontological status: the event "is being itself, in its fearful and creative inconsistency, or its emptiness, which is the without-place of all place (see *Briefings on Existence*, 168).

100. TP 471. And AO 255: "The theoretical opposition lies elsewhere: it is between, on the one hand, the decoded flows that enter into a class axiomatic on the full body of capital, and on the other hand, the decoded flows that free themselves from this axiomatic."
101. See Badiou, *Deleuze*, 91: "Deleuze always maintained that, in doing this, I fall back into transcendence and into the equivocity of analogy."
102. Badiou, *Deleuze*, 91. See also 64: "Truth must be thought as 'interruption.'"

Essay 18: Jacques Lacan

The Inverse Side of the Structure: Žižek on Deleuze on Lacan

1. "Le 'Je me souviens' de Gilles Deleuze" (interview with Didier Éribon) in *Le Nouvel Observateur* 1619 (16–22 Nov 1995), 50–1.
2. Slavoj Žižek, *Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences* (London: Routlege, 2003).
3. F 42. Deleuze was speaking of Virilio's relation to Foucault.
4. See Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 3–4.
5. LS 124. See also LS 96:

> How are we to reconcile these two contradictory aspects [of sense]? On one hand, we have *impassibility* in relation to states of affairs and neutrality in relation to propositions; on the other hand, we have the power of *genesis* in relation to propositions and in relation to states of affairs themselves.

6. N 170. Elie Sambar was the editor of the *Revue des études palestiniennes*.
7. Eugene Holland's *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (New York: Routledge, 1999) is one of the few works that deals extensively with the Deleuze–Lacan relationship (see, for example, 89–91).
8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), Introduction, §3, footnote 1, 16n1. See also TRM 309:

> *Anti-Oedipus* had a Kantian ambition, we attempted a kind of *Critique of Pure Reason* at the level of the unconscious. Hence the determination of the synthesis belonging to the unconscious; the unfolding of history as the effectuation of these syntheses; and the denunciation of Oedipus as the "inevitable illusion" falsifying all historical production.

9. Jacques Lacan, "Kant with Sade," in *October* 51 (Winter 1989), 55–75. For Deleuze's use of Lacan's reading of Sade, see his "Humor, Irony, and the Law," in M 81–90.
10. AO 26–7. At one point, Deleuze and Guattari describe the project of *Anti-Oedipus* in explicitly Kantian terms:

> In what he termed the critical revolution, Kant intended to discover criteria immanent to understanding so as to distinguish the legitimate and the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of *transcendental* philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore denounced the transcendent use of the syntheses such as appeared in metaphysics. In a like fashion, we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis has its metaphysics—its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution—this time materialist—can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria, and a corresponding practice that we shall call schizoanalysis. (75)

11. ECC 7–22. See also AO 310:

> Elisabeth Roudinesco has clearly seen that, in Lacan, the hypothesis of an unconscious-as-language does not closet the unconscious in a linguistic structure, but leads linguistics to the point of its auto-critique, by showing how the structural organization of signifiers still depends on a despotic Great Signifier acting as an archaism.

12. In *Logic of Sense*, the distinction between surface and depth is paralleled in the difference between Lewis Carroll (surface) and Antonin Artaud (depth), but Deleuze's preference for Artaud and the dimension of depth (rather than surface) is already evident: "We would not give a page of Artaud for all of Carroll. Artaud is alone in having been an absolute depth in literature, and in having discovered a vital body and the prodigious language of this body" (LS 93).
13. In any early work, Judith Butler, for instance, characterizes Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire as "an originary unrepressed libidinal diversity subject to the prohibitive laws of culture," an a-historical or "pre-cultural ideal" à la Rousseau or Montesquieu, a "natural eros which has subsequently been denied by a restrictive culture," arguing that Deleuze and Guattari promise "a liberation of that more original, bounteous desire." See Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 214–15, 206. Žižek, rightly, does not follow this interpretation.
14. See Gilles Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," in *Foucault and his Interlocutors*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 185–6, and TP 215.
15. Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," in *Foucault and his Interlocutors*, 186.
16. Jacques Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan*, Book 20: *Encore*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 1999), 62. I would like to thank Emily Zakin for this reference. Lacan was speaking

of Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *The Title of the Letter: A Reading of Lacan* (1973), trans. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).

Essay 19: Pierre Klossowski

Klossowski's Reading of Nietzsche: Impulses, Phantasms, Simulacra, Stereotypes

1. This essay is a reading of Pierre Klossowski's *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), which is cited in the text as NVC.
2. Cited in Johannes Gachnang, "De la conquête des images," in *Pierre Klossowski* (Paris: Flammarion; Brussels: Ludion, 1996), 9 ("I am a 'maniac,' period, that's all!").
3. Pierre Klossowski, "Postface," in Jean Decottignies, *Klossowski* (Paris: Henri Veyrier, 1985), 137.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §§492, 489–91.
5. See Alain Arnaud, *Pierre Klossowski* (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 8–9, who cites Augustine, Meister Eckhardt, and Theresa of Ávila as precursors to Klossowski. Arnaud's book is one of the best general introductions to Klossowski's work.
6. In English, the only treatment of Nietzsche's conception of the impulses comparable to Klossowski's is Graham Parkes's magisterial work, *Composing the Soul: The Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §259, 149.
8. Cited in Parkes, *Composing the Soul*, 291–2.
9. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §481, 267.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §109, 65.
11. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §387, 208: "The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires; and as if very passion did not possess its quantum of reason."
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §307, 245–6.
13. Deleuze's essay on Klossowski, "Klossowski, or Bodies-Language" (LS 280–301) emphasis Klossowski's relation to Kant:

    > The order of God includes the following elements: the identity of God as the ultimate foundation, the identity of the world as the surrounding milieu, the identity of the person as a well-founded agent, the identity of bodies as the base, and finally the identity of language as the power of *denoting* everything else. But this order of God is constructed against another order, and this order subsists in God, and consumes him . . . The order of the Antichrist is opposed point by point to the divine order. It is characterized by the death of God, the destruction of the world, the dissolution of the person, the disintegration of bodies, and a change in the function of language, which now expresses nothing but intensities. (292, 294)

14. Pierre Klossowski, "Nietzsche, Polytheism and Parody," in *Such a Deathly Desire*, trans. Russell Ford (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 99–122.
15. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954), Part 3, §8, "Of the Apostates," 290–4: 294. For a historical treatment of this theme, see Jonathan Kirsch, *God Against the Gods: The History of the War Between Monotheism and Polytheism* (New York: Viking Compass, 2004).
16. See Maurice Blanchot's essay on Klossowski, "The Laughter of the Gods," in *Friendship*, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 169–82.

17. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §1038, 534, as cited in NVC 209.
18. Pierre Klossowski, "Diana at her Bath," in *Diana at her Bath* and *The Women of Rome*, trans. Sophie Hawkes (Boston: Eridanos, 1990), 3–84, esp. 82–4.
19. Klossowski analyzes these criteria in Chapter 4 of *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, "The Valetudinary States at the Origin of Four Criteria: Decadence, Vigor, Gregariousness, the Singular Case" (NVC 74–92).
20. Friedrich Nietzsche, letter to Franziska Nietzsche, mid-July 1881, in *Unpublished Letters*, ed. and trans. Kurt F. Leidecker (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), Letter 29, 81–2, as cited in NVC 21.
21. Nietzsche, Letter to Dr. O. Eisner, Jan 1880, as cited in NVC 20.
22. For a detailed analysis of Klossowski's theory of the *suppôt*, see Jean-Pol Madou, *Démons et simulacres dans l'œuvre de Pierre Klossowski* (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck, 1987), 35–41.
23. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §354, 298–9.
24. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, §479, 266.
25. Nietzsche, unpublished notes from 1881, as cited in Parkes, *Composing the Soul*, 300.
26. Pierre Klossowski, "Protase et apodose," in *L'Arc* 43 (1970), 10. Portions of this essay have been reprinted in Klossowski's *La Ressemblance* (Marseille: André Dimanche, 1984).
27. Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, *Le Peintre et son démon: Entretiens avec Pierre Klossowski* (Paris: Flammarion, 1985), 61.
28. Jean-François Lyotard, *Libidinal Economy*, trans. Ian Hamilton Grant (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 72.
29. Henri Bergson, "Philosophical Intuition," in *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1946), 107–29.
30. Pierre Klossowski, *Les Lois de l'hospitalité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), 342, 349. Klossowski's trilogy includes three separately published titles: *Roberte ce soir* (Paris: Minuit, 1954), *La Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes* (Paris: Minuit, 1959), and *Le Souffleur ou le théâtre de société* (Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1960). The first two have appeared in English translation: *Roberte ce soir* and *The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes*, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Grove, 1969). The best work on Klossowki in English is Ian James's *Pierre Klossowski: The Persistence of a Name* (Oxford: Legenda, 2000).
31. Pierre Klossowski, *The Baphomet*, trans. Sophie Hawkes and Stephen Sartarelli (Boston: Eridanos, 1988).
32. Cited on the back cover of Alain Arnaud, *Pierre Klossowski*.
33. Nietzsche, Notebook of Fall 1885 to Spring 1886, as cited in NVC 216.
34. Klossowski initially retrieved the concept of the simulacrum from the criticisms of the Church fathers (Tertullian, Augustine) against the debauched representations of the gods on the Roman stage. See Pierre Klossowski, "Sacred and Mythical Origins of Certain Practices of the Women of Rome," in *Diana at her Bath* and *The Women of Rome*, 89–138, esp. 132–5, as well as Jean-François Lyotard's commentaries on Klossowski in *Libidinal Economy*, 66–94.
35. Klossowski, *La Ressemblance*, 6.
36. Madou, *Démons et simulacres*, 88.
37. For Klossowski's theory of the stereotype, see "On the Use of Stereotypes and the Censure Exercised by Classical Syntax," in "Protase et apodose," 15–20.
38. Pierre Klossowski, *Sade My Neighbor*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evantson, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 14. See also Klossowski, "Protase et apodose," 19: "In the domain of communication (literary or pictorial), the stereotype (as "style") is the residue of a simulacrum (corresponding to an obsessional constraint) that has fallen to the level of current usage, disclosed and abandoned to a common interpretation."
39. Klossowski, "Protase et apodose," 16–19.
40. Klossowski, *La Ressemblance*, 78, as cited in Arnaud, *Pierre Klossowski*, 60.

41. Arnaud, *Pierre Klossowski*, 104.
42. On these themes, see Michel Foucault's essay on Klossowski, "The Prose of Actaeon," in *Essential Works of Foucault: 1954–1984*, Vol. 2: *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1988), 123–35, esp. 123: "What if the Devil, the Other, were the Same? And what if the Temptation were not one of the episodes of the great antagonism, but the subtle insinuation of the Double?" Klossowski considered Foucault's essay to be one of the best commentaries on his work.
43. The observations by Gast and Overbeck are recorded in Ronald Hayman, *Nietzsche: A Critical Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 340–1.
44. Pierre Klossowski, *La Monnaie vivante* (Paris: Éric Losfield, 1970; Paris: Gallimard, 2003).

Essay 20: Paul Patton

Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition: Normativity, Freedom, and Judgment

1. This essay is a review of Paul Patton's *Deleuze and the Political* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), which is cited in the text as DP. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2000 annual meeting of the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP), University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 23–5 November 2000. I am indebted to the comments of the other panelists, Linnell Secombe and Stephen Meueke, as well as the response by Paul Patton.
2. Routledge's important "Thinking the Political" series is edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Simon Critchley, and thus far includes volumes on Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, and Lyotard.
3. See Paul Patton, "Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom," in *Political Studies* 37/2 (Jun 1989), 260–76; "Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes and Nietzsche," in Paul Patton, ed., *Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 144–61; and "Foucault's Subject of Power," in Jeremy Moss, ed., *The Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy*, London: Sage, 1998), 64–7.
4. See Paul Patton, "Mabo, Freedom, and the Politics of Difference," in *Australian Journal of Political Science* 30/1 (Mar 1995), 108–19; and "Sovereignty, Law and Difference in Australia: After the Mabo Case," in *Alternatives* 21 (1996).
5. Jean-François Lyotard, "Energumen Capitalism," in *Semiotext(e)*, 2/3 (1977), 11–26.
6. In this respect, Patton's primary precursors are Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, whose works, though overtly Marxist, also include an important analysis of the liberal tradition from a broadly Deleuzian perspective. See their influential *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2000), as well as the earlier *The Labors of Dionysus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997).
7. Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 22. For a critique of Arendt's position, see Alain Badiou, "Against 'Political Philosophy,'" in *Metapolitics*, trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), 10–25.
8. For instance, Patton argues that the concept of the social contract, as an expression of absolute deterritorialization, "can be regarded as an expression of the pure and indeterminate event of a political system based upon equality before the law" (28).
9. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 309–10, A312/B368ff.
10. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 16.
11. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1962), 182–5, H143–5.
12. See PV 14–17; and "What is a 'dispositif'?" in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, ed. François Ewald, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 162.

13. One might note here that the concept of "nomadic war machines"—which was introduced in *A Thousand Plateaus*—is Deleuze and Guattari's attempt to address the question of a social formation that would itself be constructed along such movements or lines of flight. Patton suggests that such assemblages should in fact be called "metamorphosis" machines (110), a suggestion that will no doubt be taken up by others.

    > Metamorphosis machines would be the conditions of actualization of absolute deterritorialization and the means by which relative deterritorialization occurs: "They bring *connections* to bear against the great *conjunction* of the apparatuses of capture or domination." . . . A metamorphosis machine would then be one that . . . engenders the production of something altogether different. (110)

14. James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
15. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Freedom," in *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–72.
16. Charles Taylor, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty," in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 211–29.
17. Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1985), 8.
18. In his book on Kant, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Deleuze discusses the ambiguities of judgment, which always depends on a certain accord of the faculties. See the short but important section entitled "Is Judgment a Faculty?" (KCP 58–61).
19. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, rev. and enlarged edn., New York: Viking, 1965), 294–5.
20. Alain Badiou, *D'un désastre obscur: droit, état, politique* (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 1991), 39–57.
21. Jacques Derrida, "Préjugés," in *La Faculté de juger* (Paris: Minuit, 1985), 96–7.
22. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority," in Drucilla Cornell, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 25–7.
23. Alberto Gualandi, *Lyotard* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999), 119. See also Gualandi's *Deleuze* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998): Lyotard's and Deleuze's respective theories of judgment figure prominently in Gualandi's analyses.
24. Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present* (London and New York, 1999), 143.
25. For an example of the kind of critique that has been leveled against the notion of the imaginary, see Pierre Bourdieu's *Masculine Domination*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Polity, 2001), 40:

    > The language of the "imaginary," which one sees used somewhat recklessly here and there, is even more inadequate than that of "consciousness" [as in "consciousness raising"] inasmuch as it inclines one in particular to forget that the dominant principle of vision is not a simple mental representation, a fantasy ("ideas in people's heads"), an ideology, but a system of structures durably embedded in things and in *bodies*.

    Deleuze, however, follows Spinoza in equating the imaginary with the affective, even if he generally utilizes the latter term rather than the former one.
26. See Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present*; Michèle Le Dœuff, *The Philosophical Imaginary*, trans. Colin Gordon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991); Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).

27. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 180–7, A137–47/B176–87.
28. Although Deleuze considers the schematism to be among the most novel and important innovations of Kantian thought, he himself takes the notion in a quite different direction. If the "schema" is outside the concept in Kant, what Deleuze calls a "dramatization" is internal to Ideas in the Deleuzian sense: "Everything changes when the dynamisms are posited no longer as *schemata of concepts* but as *dramas of Ideas*" (DR 218). Under a similar inspiration, Pierre Bourdieu, thoughout his work, distinguishes between "categories or cognitive structures" and "schemes or dispositions" (the habitus) (see *Masculine Domination*, 8–9).
29. See Jacob von Uexküll, *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans*, with *A Theory of Meaning*, trans. Joseph D. O'Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 44–52.
30. See 28 Mar 1978 and 4 Apr 1978.
31. See Patton's recent book, *Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

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