Chapter 6
Like-Mindedness: Plato's Solution to the Problem of Faction

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Abstract Plato recognizes faction as a serious threat to any political community (e.g., at *Rep.* 462a9-b2). The *Republic's* proposed solution to faction relies on bringing citizens into a relation of ὁμόνοια. On the dominant line of interpretation, ὁμόνοια is understood along the lines of "explicit agreement" or "consensus." Commentators have consequently thought that the καλλίπολις becomes resistant to faction when all or most of its members explicitly agree with one another about certain fundamentals of their political association—for example, they agree regarding who should govern in the καλλίπολις.

We argue that ὁμόνοια in Plato's political philosophy has been under-analyzed and misunderstood. We show that, in *Alcibiades* I, rendering ὁμόνοια simply as agreement results in confusion about how expertise, political friendship, and civic unity are compossible in a well-ordered political community. In our view, Plato refines and adds philosophical depth to the concept of ὁμόνοια in the *Republic*. We claim that ὁμόνοια is a relation of psychological "like-mindedness" that obtains among members of different occupational classes in a political community. A community is rendered resistant to faction, then, when its members are, in some significant way, psychologically alike. Additionally, while Platonic ὁμόνοια can naturally be expected to result in substantive agreement among citizens, we argue that Platonic ὁμόνοια does not consist solely in agreement.

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6.1 Introduction

The American founders were anxious about the threat factionalism presented to the fledgling democratic republic. James Madison's *Federalist 10* (published 1787), for instance, is devoted entirely to this threat.[1] In that work, Madison characterizes faction as follows:

> By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. (*Federalist* 10.56-7)

Madison is here drawing on classical sources, such as Cicero and Plato, where faction is understood as arising from individual and group interests that are opposed to the common good.

In *Federalist 10*, Madison considers and rejects two "methods" for defanging the threat of faction. "[T]he one," he writes, would work "by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence." But he contends that this approach would be

> worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. (*Federalist* 10.56-7)

The second method Madison identifies is obtained "by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, the same interests." Madison summarily dismisses this second method as "impracticable, as the first would be unwise" (*Federalist* 10.57).

Plato was also keenly aware of the dangers of faction. Political unrest during his own time clearly left its strong impression on Plato. So strong was this impression that Plato singles out faction in the *Republic* as the worst evil that can befall any political society (462a5-7). In the *Republic* and, arguably, in the *Statesman*, Plato aims to theoretically construct political societies which are maximally civically harmonious and unified, and thus fully resistant to faction. Understanding how Plato responds to the problem of faction is essential to understanding Platonic political philosophy. However, Plato's response to the problem of faction has received little explicit attention from scholars.

Plato's general response to the problem of faction is obviously quite different from that of Madison and the American founders. For one, Plato did not have the same interest in preserving the individual liberty that Madison holds to be essential to the existence of political life. In what follows, we contend that Plato's solution to faction—in the *Republic*, at any rate—relies on bringing members of the political

[1] The essays in the Federalist Papers, authored by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, were published anonymously in New York newspapers beginning in October 1787. A mostly complete collection of essays was published in book form in 1788. Historian Douglas Adair confirmed the authorship of the each of the Federalist Papers in his 1944 work.

community into a relation of ὁμόνοια, or like-mindedness. This Platonic solution to faction naturally results in a semblance of Madison's second rejected approach, in which all of the citizens will be made to share "the same opinions, the same passions, the same interests." But it is not precisely the achievement of these effects (which, as we will see, Plato also regards as "impracticable") that constitutes Plato's actual solution. Rather, Plato holds that the way in which the citizens of his καλλίπολις really will share opinions, passions, and interests to any degree must be under-written by strong psychological similarity among πόλις members. This strong psychological similarity, we argue, is ὁμόνοια properly speaking for Plato.

Scholars have commonly understood Platonic and Socratic references to political ὁμόνοια along the lines of "agreement." Many commentators on the *Republic*, for instance, understand ὁμόνοια as widely-shared agreement among members of the κκαλλίπολις concerning the fundamentals of their political association. Nettleship understands ὁμόνοια as agreement among the three classes of the καλλίπολις that their πολιτεία is correct (1955, p. 150). Klosko takes a key discussion of civic σωφροσύνη in *Republic* Book IV as crucially involving a "general consensus about who should rule" in the καλλίπολις (1986, p. 149).[2]

Recently, other commentators have followed Klosko in understanding ὁμόνοια as "agreement as to who should rule among the ideal city's citizens" (Bobonich 2002, p. 79; Kamtekar 2004, p. 133). Kamtekar holds that ὁμόνοια, understood in this way, is a result of the political justice that is promulgated in the καλλίπολις. On Kamtekar's account, despite pronounced epistemic and ethical differences among different classes:

> The *Republic* allows for the possibility of good, well-grounded, and virtuous agreement—that is, agreement to philosophers' rule for reasons better than that it procures false goods for non-philosophical citizens. (Kamtekar 2004, p. 155)

Kamtekar's account stands in sharp contrast to that of Bobonich. Bobonich argues that a substantial consensus between philosophers and non-philosophers in the καλλίπολις is not possible in Plato's view. Furthermore, Bobonich holds, if any stable agreement obtains between philosophers and non-philosophers, it will be one that is not founded on fostering virtue among all of the city's members (Bobonich 2002, p. 79). Kamtekar and Bobonich both assume that ὁμόνοια consists in agreement, and the two scholars' disagreement proceeds from this common ground. In our view, the starting assumption of this debate is orthogonal to what is most interesting about Plato's distinctive position on ὁμόνοια. We argue that ὁμόνοια in Plato's political theory takes up, redeploys, redefines, and adds philosophical depth to a concept that is common in contemporaneous political discussions. The result is that Plato's discussion of ὁμόνοια is importantly related to other political discussions of his time, but his discussion is also pointedly philosophical and is intimately related to his views concerning the nature of the soul, ethical motivation, and the role of the πόλις

[2] See also, Klosko (1986, p. 138). Others who understand ὁμόνοια along similar lines in Plato's political philosophy include Annas (1981, pp. 115–116), Cross and Woozley (1964, p. 104), and Schofield (1991, pp. 212–226, esp. 217).

in inculcating virtue. In focusing on political agreement, other interpretations miss these important features of Plato's thinking about ὁμόνοια.

A Platonic solution to the problem of faction cannot be understood without first understanding the precise nature of the problem. We first discuss faction as it arises within the *Republic*. Secondly, we find an intriguing exploration of the problem of faction in the *Alcibiades* I, one which demonstrates the fatal problems with understanding ὁμόνοια as political agreement.

6.2 Faction in Plato's *Republic*

The problem of faction is raised early in the *Republic* during Socrates' discussion with Thrasymachus in Book I. Thrasymachus asserts that faction is an unalterable fact of political life.[3] Those in power will always act as to further their own interests, no matter whether these interests are opposed to the interests of others or to the common good of the πόλις. Those who are most effective politically, in Thrasymachus' view, will be those who can consistently ensure that their interests dominate those of other community members (343c1-d1). So, the clever ruler is the one who acts like a skilled shepherd and profits from the governed at their expense (343b1-c1). Further, the politically powerful seek to control the ideological terms of the debate. The powerful will define justice and injustice in terms of their own advantage, and so will effectively marginalize those who may oppose them (338e1-6).

Against Thrasymachus' grim political realism, Socrates argues two points. First, he does not accept that faction is a political inevitability. It is true that the *Republic* holds that most, if not all, real-world political systems are factious (496c5-e2, 497b1-c3, 520c6-d1, 592a7-b1). Realizing a faction-less, unified political community under the able governance of philosophical rulers (the καλλίπολις) should not be supposed to be an easy matter. But Plato's Socrates affirms that such a society is not impossible (502b6-9, 502c5-7). At the very least what Socrates assumes is that human nature or political organization in itself does not require faction.

Second, Socrates argues that faction is ultimately self-defeating. We should note here that three distinct types of faction are considered in the *Republic*: (i) faction within an individual or, more properly, within an individual's soul; (ii) faction in a political community; and (iii) faction among all Greeks. Let's deal briefly with type (iii) in order to put it aside. During the discussion of the proper conduct of warfare in Book V, Socrates argues that all Greeks are bound by ties of kinship, shared language and shared religious beliefs, and are thus "friends by nature" (470b6-7, 470c8-9). In contrast, barbarians are alien and are by nature enemies to Greeks.

[3] R. E. Allen holds that Thrasymachus argues that faction (στάσις) enters into "the very definition of government" (2006, p. ix). Allen regards Thrasymachus as thus raising a central question for Plato's political project: Can any human political society avoid faction?

Socrates characterizes faction in this context as hostility among those who are naturally friends or are akin (470b7-9).[4]

Something of this characterization of faction is preserved in the discussion of faction in the senses of (i) and (ii). Socrates characterizes faction as a state of disharmony within a political community. Faction obtains when the actions and interests of community members fail to be aligned as they should be. A political community is in a state of faction, that is, when the actions and interests of community members are not aligned towards important common goods for the community and the community's members.

Faction, in sense (ii), comes in degrees. The scalar nature of faction has the result that judgments about a community's factiousness can be contextual or relative to some threshold. Thus, in analyzing degenerate πόλεις in Book VIII, Socrates and his interlocutors will make comparisons of relative badness among political constitutions, and these judgments often rely on comparisons of relative factiousness. For example, democracy is a more factious political system than oligarchy, and tyranny is a more factious political system than democracy (556e3-557a1, 566a6-7). In other dialectical contexts, however, factiousness will be treated as a threshold concept. All existing πόλεις and degenerate political constitutions thus strictly fall below the threshold of civic harmony and are factious, regardless of degrees of faction when compared to each other. Only the ideal πόλις, the καλλίπολις, is entirely free of faction (520c3-520d4).

The discussants in the *Republic* move freely between discussing faction in political communities and faction in individuals, a move that is licensed by the analogy between the individual soul and a political community. We see these easy shifts between faction in sense (i) and sense (ii) most noticeably in Books I and VIII, but the *Republic* contains many such instances. Faction in senses (i) or (ii) is self-defeating because it renders both individuals and souls incapable of accomplishing their distinctive work, as Socrates argues against Thrasymachus in Book I (351d4-6, 351e9-352a4, 352a5-9). Thus, it is in the interest of any individual to reduce factiousness in her own soul, and it is in the interest of any political community to reduce factiousness within its ranks. Determining what measures will reduce factiousness is thus a key element in Socrates' defense of justice and its ultimate benefit for the possessor.

In what follows, we concentrate on political faction (in sense [ii]) and the measures Plato's Socrates proposes in the *Republic* to counteract such faction. However, we also hold that the *Republic*'s proposals for reducing political faction rely importantly on measures designed to reduce intra-personal psychological faction (in sense [i]). In brief, we contend that reducing intra-personal faction within individual souls creates the conditions for reducing inter-personal faction, in a way that is designed to alleviate faction in sense (ii). In this way, we propose a significant connection between the political theory and the psychology of the *Republic*.

[4] 470b7-9: ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρᾳ στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος.

6.3 Agreement and Like-Mindedness

Similarly to his Greek counterparts, Plato treats "ὁμόνοια" as the contrary term to "στάσις."[5] The authoritative Greek-English lexicon by Liddell, Scott and Jones (generally called the LSJ by Greek scholars) lists three main suggestions for translating ὁμόνοια into English: "oneness of mind," "unanimity," and "concord." Other political thinkers around Plato's time conceive of ὁμόνοια along the lines of "political concord" or "civic harmony." For instance, Demosthenes praises the restorers of the democracy in Athens as follows:

> they conquered their enemies, they fulfilled the prayers of every sound-hearted man by establishing concord (ὁμόνοιαν) throughout the city; and so they have bequeathed to us their imperishable glory, and excluded from the market-place men whose habits of life were what yours have always been. (Demosthenes, *Against Androtion*, 77.1-78.1, trans. Murray)[6]

Isocrates also treats ὁμόνοια as the antithesis of στάσις and employs the concept of ὁμόνοια prominently in his advocacy for the unification of all Greeks and for war against the barbarians:

> For we [the Athenians] were not jealous of growing states nor did we engender confusion among them by setting up conflicting polities side by side, in order that faction (στασιάζοιεν) might be arrayed against faction and that both might court our favor. On the contrary, we regarded harmony (ὁμόνοιαν) among our allies as the common boon of all, and therefore we governed all the cities under the same laws, deliberating about them in the spirit of allies, not of masters. (Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 104.1-104.8, trans. Norlin)[7]

These are but two instances of how ὁμόνοια is used in political discourse that forms the intellectual context for the *Republic*. Plato clearly draws on the meaning of ὁμόνοια in the sense of political concord or civic harmony, but he will further develop this meaning by linking ὁμόνοια with a sophisticated psychology of citizenry.

Plato scholars, however, have frequently understood ὁμόνοια simply as "agreement" when it occurs in Plato's political works.[8] As a Greek term, "ὁμόνοια" is a compound of "ὁμό-," which means "same," "similar," or "like" and "-νοια" for

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[5] For example, at *Republic* 351d4-6, Socrates says: "For faction, Thrasymachus, accompanies injustice and hatred and war of each against each other, but justice accompanies ὁμόνοια and friendliness." (Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν).

[6] Demosthenes: …ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κρατοῦντες, καὶ ἃ πᾶς τις ἂν εὖ φρονῶν εὔξαιτο, τὴν πόλιν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἄγοντες, ἀθάνατον κλέος αὑτῶν λελοίπασι, τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας οἷα σοὶ βεβίωται τῆς ἀγορᾶς εἴργοντες (*Against Androtion*, 77.1-78.1).

[7] Isocrates: Οὐ γὰρ ἐφθονοῦμεν ταῖς αὐξανομέναις αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ταραχὰς ἐνεποιοῦμεν πολιτείας ἐναντίας παρακαθιστάντες ἵν' ἀλλήλοις μὲν στασιάζοιεν, ἡμᾶς δ' ἀμφότεροι θεραπεύοιεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν συμμάχων ὁμόνοιαν κοινὴν ὠφέλειαν νομίζοντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις διῳκοῦμεν, συμμαχικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ δεσποτικῶς βουλευόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅλων μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες (*Pangyricus* 104.1-104.8).

[8] Hence, in a recent discussion of *Alcibiades* I and *Republic*, Rachana Kamtekar (2004) consistently translates ὁμόνοια as "agreement" or "agreeing." Reeve's translation of the *Republic* (in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997) also takes ὁμόνοια at 432a7 as "agreement."

"νοῦς," which refers to "mind" or "thought." Thus, to translate "ὁμόνοια" more closely to the Greek original, we would get "same-minded" or "like-minded."[9]

One *could* understand ὁμονοεῖν as indicating that two individuals are in agreement with one another, and there is no doubt that ὁμονοεῖν and its cognates often function in this way. But we hold that Plato recognizes a significant difference between understanding ὁμόνοια as "agreement" and understanding ὁμόνοια as "like-mindedness." In our view, being like-minded is a stronger relation of similarity between two individuals than mere agreement.[10] Two individuals, that is, could well be in agreement with one another and yet not be "like-minded" in any strong sense.

Strictly speaking, agreement is relative to some subject matter. Typically, two individuals who are in agreement will display a similar pattern of assent to and dissent from claims made regarding that subject matter. The strength of the similarity will indicate the strength of the agreement. Agreement of this kind might be more accurately signaled by use of the Greek word "ὁμολογεῖν"—that is, to "say the same" or to "say similarly." We might call this "external agreement" because this form of agreement relies on a similarity in external signs, that is, in the answers that individuals produce to questions, or in other linguistic behavior.[11]

Like-mindedness, on the other hand, is a relation that presupposes that two individuals are psychologically similar. Individuals standing in ὁμόνοια are *internally* similar, not just externally similar in their behavior. We will later discuss what such psychological similarity could come to for Plato. For the time being, it is simply

[9] A sample of translations of ὁμόνοια as it appears at *Republic* 351d5: Jowett (2000) and Larson (1979) translate "harmony"; Grube-Reeve (1992): "common purpose"; Reeve (2004) renders ὁμόνοια (perhaps in an overtranslation) as "a sense of common purpose"; Griffith (2000): "co-operation"; Lee (1987): "unity of purpose"; Sterling and Scott (1985): "unity." Of the translations we surveyed of 351d5, only four chose one of the *LSJ* suggestions for 351d5: Bloom (1968) and Allen (2006) chose "unanimity," Shorey (1937) selects "oneness of mind," and Waterfield (1993) chose "concord." At 432a8, translators were more likely to cleave to one of the LSJ meanings of ὁμόνοια (or to the version provided by previous translators). Shorey (1937) translates ὁμόνοια as "concord"; Bloom (1968), Grube-Reeve (1992), Lee (1987), Reeve (in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997), and Waterfield (1993) as "unanimity." We should note that "unanimity" can be understood as consisting either in agreement or as psychological similarity. So, the philosophical issues we raise here cannot be settled by translation alone.

[10] Agreement can also be signaled by the Greek term: ὁμοδοξία (similarity in belief or sameness of belief). We contend that, for Plato, ὁμόνοια does not simply consist in ὁμοδοξία. Aristotle makes this point at *Nicomachean Ethics* (IX.6 1167a23ff.): "Concord (ὁμόνοια) appears to be friendly feeling. This is not merely agreement in beliefs (ὁμοδοξία)." Aristotle will go on in this chapter to argue that ὁμόνοια is political friendship in which citizens are "of one mind" about their common ends and interests (1167a29-30). We hold that Plato's view provides a distinctive and interesting account of the psychology that underlies this kind of "one-mindedness."

[11] The author of *Alcibiades* I makes much of these linguistic indicators of agreement. There is ample textual evidence in *Alcibiades* I, in fact, that linguistic competence is the model for agreement (for example, at 111a5-112e2). Those similarly competent in some natural language (a) respond similarly to the same questions; and (b) referentially pick out the same items with the same terms. We will have more to say about the treatment of ὁμόνοια in the *Alcibiades* I in the next two sections.

worth noting that psychological similarity might be expected to *produce* but not to *consist in* external agreement of the kind outlined above. Individuals who are sufficiently similar in their souls might also be expected to exhibit similar linguistic behavior. If two individuals are like-minded, these individuals might be expected to display a similar pattern of assent to and dissent from questions regarding that subject matter.

6.4 Agreement in *Alcibiades* I

Alcibiades I is a Socratic dialogue of dubious pedigree. We are not concerned here to argue either for the merits nor the Platonic bona fides of the *Alcibiades* I. It will be enough for our purposes that this dialogue takes on the topics of agreement, political friendship, justice, and ὁμόνοια, and examines these in a Socratic-Platonic way.

The difficulties of understanding ὁμόνοια as (external) agreement plays a key role in the discussion between Alcibiades and Socrates in the *Alcibiades* I. In the dialogue, Alcibiades states his intention to enter the public arena and to go before the Assembly to advise the Athenian people on matters of political importance. It is just at this point in Alcibiades' life that Socrates is compelled to speak with Alcibiades, after waiting in the wings for so long (103a1-b2, 105e6-106a8).

Socrates, as may be expected, argues that Alcibiades must first demonstrate significant knowledge about justice and injustice before he will be able to advise and benefit the Athenians. Socrates will press Alcibiades about his knowledge of justice and injustice—How has he learned about justice and injustice? Has Alcibiades learned from some expert? Or has he investigated and learned on his own?

Alcibiades takes himself to understand what justice and injustice are, and to have had knowledge about justice and injustice since he was a child (110c3-4). However, Alcibiades also concedes, under the pressure of elenctic questioning, that he did not learn about these matters from any expert, nor has he investigated and found out about these matters on his own (109d1-110d6). Alcibiades proposes that he has learned about justice and injustice from "the many" (110d9-e1), in much the same way that he (and others) have learned to speak Greek. But can this be accurate?

Socrates' elenctic investigation proceeds from 111a5 to 112e2 as follows: If one or more individuals are to teach a subject, they must know the subject. Socrates asks rhetorically, "don't people who know something agree (ὁμολογεῖν) with each other, not disagree (διαφέρεσθαι)?" (111b3-4). And, Socrates continues, "If people disagree about something, would you say that they know it?" (111b6-7). Alcibiades answers that they do not. Socrates then raises this objection to Alcibiades' initial claim: "The many" agree about how to speak Greek, but disagree all the time about justice and injustice (111e11-112a3). Socrates draws the elenctic conclusion at 111d11-e2: "Isn't the fact that [the many] disagree (οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν) with each other about these things enough to show you that they don't understand them (οὐκ ἐπίστανται), and are

not four-square teachers of them?" Alcibiades' claim to have learned about justice and injustice from "the many" is thus defeated.

6.5 Ὁμόνοια and ὁμολογία: *Alcibiades* I, 126b8-127c9

We hold that it is crucial to Plato's solution to the problem of faction to distinguish between agreement (ὁμολογία) and like-mindedness (ὁμόνοια). Confusions will arise if one conflates agreement and like-mindedness. *Alcibiades* I (126b8-127c9) provides a prime example of the dangers of assimilating ὁμολογεῖν and ὁμονοεῖν. Here we see Alcibiades failing to distinguish correctly between ὁμολογεῖν and ὁμονοεῖν, much to his own befuddlement and consternation. Standard translations (e.g., D. S. Hutchinson in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997) of *Alcibiades* I fail to exhibit the flow of argument in this section of the dialogue properly because these translations render "ὁμόνοια" and its cognates as "agreement" without further disambiguation. These standard translations do not help to illuminate Alcibiades' puzzlement; rather, these translations fall into precisely the same confusions as Alcibiades himself does.

It is evident that the argument at 126b8-127c9 should be treated as a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*. Alcibiades is agreeing to premises in this argument which are at odds with other claims he endorses, and which will lead to inconsistency. This argument, then, is an instance where Alcibiades "does not agree with himself" about an important matter—here the relation between expertise, justice, and political friendship. Since the argument is a *reductio*, we should be alert to which premises must be disambiguated or rejected, in order to correct whatever goes wrong.

It will be useful here to go through the passage step-by-step. To simplify the flow of the argument, we will only include statements that have been agreed to by Alcibiades in the synopsis below. In closely examining this passage, we should be mindful of the differences in meaning that result if we translate "ὁμόνοια" as "agreement," as compared with "like-mindedness." In order to allow us to draw these comparisons, we shall leave "ὁμόνοια" untranslated in the synopsis below.

1. Mutual friendship is the distinctive good-making state or feature of cities; it is the feature of cities that is akin to health in bodies and sight in eyes (126c1-3).
2. When mutual friendship is present in a city, hatred and faction are absent (126c3).
3. Political friendship crucially involves ὁμόνοια (126c4-5). If ὁμόνοια is absent, so is political friendship.[12]

[12] From the text, it is not clear exactly what is being claimed about the relation between political friendship and ὁμόνοια. Socrates asks: "When you say 'friendship', do you mean ὁμόνοια or [not]?" (126c4). There is no verb, although the "is" is assumed. As is quite usual in Greek, this still leaves the meaning rather indeterminate among a number of interpretive and logical choices. The formulation, political friendship [is] ὁμόνοια, suggests at least the following possibilities: (1) Political friendship is identical with ὁμόνοια; (2) Political friendship consists (entirely) in ὁμόνοια;

4. Ὁμόνοια has a domain and is achieved through some skill (for example, in arithmetic, or measurement). Two experts in some skill stand in a relation of ὁμόνοια with one another (126c6-7).
5. If two or more individuals specialize in different areas of expertise, they do not stand in a relationship of ὁμόνοια (126e5-127a11).
6. Political friendship and political ὁμόνοια are analogous to familial ὁμόνοια (126e2-4).
7. Familial friendship crucially involves ὁμόνοια. (From 3 to 6). If ὁμόνοια is absent, so is familial friendship.[13]
8. Men and women specialize in different areas of expertise. Women specialize in weaving. Men specialize in military matters (126e5-127a11).[14]
9. Men and women do not stand in a relationship of ὁμόνοια (127a9-10). (From 5 to 7)
10. There is no familial friendship between men and women. Women and men do not love one another (127a12-b4). (From 7 to 9)
11. Similarly, in any city where inhabitants specialize in different areas of expertise, they do not stand in a relationship of ὁμόνοια (127b5-6).[15]
12. In any city where inhabitants specialize in different areas of expertise, political friendship doesn't obtain (127b8-9). (From 3 to 11)

From this reasoning, Socrates draws the conclusion: "So neither are cities well governed when the different groups each do their own work" (127b5-6). It seems from the reasoning agreed to by Alcibiades that expertise and occupational specialization have been shown to be inconsistent with political friendship, justice, and good governance.

Understandably, Alcibiades balks at this result: "But, Socrates, I think they *are* [i.e., cities are well-governed when different groups do their own work]" (127b10-11). Alcibiades thus objects to the putative conclusion of the elenctic argument. But in his confusion, he cannot identify where he has gone amiss. The discussion ends aporetically, with Alcibiades throwing up his hands in confusion and Socrates

(3) Political friendship consists (partly) in ὁμόνοια; (4) Ὁμόνοια is at least a necessary condition for political friendship such that there cannot be political friendship without ὁμόνοια; (5) Ὁμόνοια is a sufficient condition for political friendship such that if ὁμόνοια obtains, so does political friendship.

[13] See last note. 126c4-5 indicates that ὁμόνοια is at least a necessary condition for political friendship, but is not determinate enough to help us say if the relation between political friendship and ὁμόνοια is understood as a stronger relation, e.g., constitution, sufficiency, or even identity.

[14] Here Alcibiades assumes a conventionally-recognized gendered division of work. Socrates may not fully endorse this gendered division of work, but notes at 127a5-7 that this division is presupposed by Alcibiades' argument (κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον). In *Republic* V, for example, Plato's Socrates will argue against just such a gendered division of labor in the καλλίπολις.

[15] Another logical issue with this argument is that it makes the move from qualified to general claims. For example, Alcibiades moves from holding that citizens are not in ὁμόνοια regarding their areas of specialization, to concluding that there is no ὁμόνοια among citizens tout court. Clearly, this is an illegitimate move and may further point to Alcibiades' general confusion. We can amend things by disambiguating between ὁμόνοια with respect to some subject matter or other.

recommending further education and dialogue (127e5-7). Alcibiades is not ready, and he may never be ready, to appreciate the deeper psychological relationship of similarity that characterizes participants in a well-ordered political community, on the Socratic-Platonic view. But the author of *Alcibiades* I points the way towards this more substantive source of civic unity—after the extended exchange of 126b8-127c9, the dialogue shifts to a discussion of the importance of self-care and soul-care, topics which have strong relevance for ὁμόνοια in the sense of beneficial psychological similarity.

6.6 Epistemic Deference and Agreement

We should note that the passage at *Alcibiades* I. 126b8-127c9 turns on a central analogy between political friendship and familial friendship (φιλία). It seems that this analogy would not have been controversial for the writer of the *Alcibiades* I. In *Republic* V, for example, Plato uses familial relationships as a model for political friendship. But while premise 6 would have not been controversial, premise 10 is intended to provoke dissent. Greek common sense would have held that, of course, men and women in families love each other and are bound by relationships of familial friendship. This premise, then, should alert us to the source of trouble in the argument.

We can see better where Alcibiades goes wrong in the 126b8-127c9 passage by observing what happens if we translate "ὁμόνοια" as "agreement" and "ὁμονοεῖν" as "agree" throughout this passage. If we translate ὁμόνοια and ὁμονοεῖν with English cognates of "agree" throughout the passage, as Hutchinson's translation does, one result is an interpretation of premise 5 along the lines of: "If two or more individuals specialize in different areas of expertise, they do not stand in a relationship of agreement" (126e5-127a11). Consequently, one would conclude that because men and women specialize in different areas of expertise, they do not agree with one another.

But why should Alcibiades concur? If a garden-variety Greek man were to observe that (as far as he could tell) his wife was a skilled weaver, would it be correct to say that he did not agree with his wife about weaving? Would it also be correct to assume that Greek women did not agree with their husbands about soldiering? It seems inapt to say that two individuals disagree merely because they specialize in different areas of expertise. For one, neither party seems to possess grounds for disagreement with the other. The Greek husband can truthfully say that he doesn't know whether Attic or Spartan wool is better for weaving. But it would be odd for him to *disagree* with his wife on this point, since he lacks the relevant expert craft-knowledge.

Secondly, the proper epistemic attitude of the unskilled novice towards the skilled expert is one of epistemic deference. That is, since the husband does not possess the relevant craft-knowledge, he should defer to his wife when the subject is weaving. (The case will be similar for the attitude of Greek women towards their

skilled husbands on the subject of military defense). It will be an open question at this point whether or not someone can have *knowledge* of items agreed to via epistemic deference. But the issue here is less about knowledge than about agreement. It seems perfectly sensible to say that the husband agrees with his skilled wife when she makes assertions about weaving. If she asserts: "The Spartan wool is superior to the Attic wool for weaving summer garments," it would make sense for her husband to *agree* that this is the case. The husband might add: "But what do I know? …" to his assent—that is, he may recognize that he lacks the epistemic grounds available to his wife—but this does not negate his agreement.

Let's assume that agreement can be signaled through linguistic signs, as seems to be the case in *Alcibiades* I. Two individuals are in agreement if they (a) respond similarly to the same questions and (b) similarly pick out instances using the same terms. Here again, the proper epistemic attitude of the unskilled novice towards the skilled expert is one of epistemic deference. Thus, if asked "Is Spartan wool superior to Attic wool for weaving summer garments?" the husband would do well to follow the lead of his wife and answer similarly to her. The novice would do well, in general, to exercise epistemic deference and answer questions similarly to the expert. The Greek man should also follow his wife's lead about what objects are picked out by terms such as "spindle," "woof," "weft," and "shuttle." That is, the novice would do well to exercise epistemic deference and assent to the referential identifications the expert employs with her terminology. In the absence of relevant craft-knowledge, epistemic deference is the most responsible strategy for the novice to utilize.

This way of understanding agreement also dissolves one of Alcibiades' confusions at 126b8-127c9. Men and women can agree (ὁμολογεῖν) about military matters and weaving, even if they differentially specialize. Men may epistemically defer to their wives on matters relevant to weaving, and women may epistemically defer to their husbands on matters relevant to military defense. If φιλία requires that the parties to a relationship do not disagree, then it seems there is no reason to think that husbands and wives must lack φιλία on these grounds. Men and women can be friendly towards one another, even if they specialize in different areas. If we move beyond the analogical case, then, we should be able to say that citizens can be friendly towards one another, even if they specialize in different areas. Citizens need not engage in factious or toxic disagreement, because they can (and should) exercise epistemic deference with regard to areas in which they are unskilled.

6.7 Problems About Political Agreement

Alcibiades ends up confused at 126b8-127c9 because he affirms that two individuals who specialize in different craft-areas do not stand in a relationship of ὁμόνοια with one another (premise 5 above). Alcibiades is here relying on one of the meanings of "ὁμόνοια"—as "agreement." As we have noted, English translators have understood "ὁμόνοια" also in this way, with the result that the argument at 126b8-127c9 makes less sense than it should. For example, if we understand ὁμόνοια as

agreement along the model proposed at 111b11-c2, then premise 5 is false, as we have shown.

Alcibiades concedes premise 11. But, it seems, only because he is befuddled. Novices lack the epistemic grounds for disagreement.[16] It would be bizarre and irrational for the novice to insist on disagreeing with the expert weaver about her craft. The novice should practice epistemic deference. If he does so by copying the expert, the novice will answer similarly to the same questions and will referentially pick out the same items with the same terms. Thus, the novice will be in agreement (ὁμολογεῖν) with the expert. Contrary to what Alcibiades holds at 126b8-127c9, then, occupational specialization poses no great risk to political stability because novices will (or at any rate, should) generally exercise epistemic deference towards experts.

Nonetheless, there is a temptation to think that agreement based on epistemic deference is, at best, a weak form of agreement. This type of agreement stands in marked contrast to the full-blooded agreement that obtains between two craft-experts. Agreement between two or more craft-experts is founded on relevant shared knowledge. The novice and expert, as we've seen, lack grounds for disagreement because the novice lacks the grounds for knowledge, and the proper epistemic attitude of the novice is one of epistemic deference. In contrast, two or more experts lack grounds for disagreement because both *have* the relevant craft-knowledge. Shared knowledge is sufficient for agreement (as is noted at 111b3-4).

The linguistic-competence model applies to the case of agreement between experts, but in a different way than it applies in the case of the novice and the expert. Two experts will answer similar questions similarly, and they will referentially pick out the same items with the same terms. However, the agreement between experts does not *consist* in these linguistic competencies. These linguistic competencies are merely signs of the agreement that obtains courtesy of shared craft-knowledge. The expert has the grounds for knowledge, and so agrees with another expert, but not as a matter of epistemic deference. For this reason, epistemic deference may be thought to provide a weaker or more superficial form of agreement than the robust agreement that holds between skilled experts.

Let's consider the case of political expertise, the subject at issue in the *Alcibiades* I.[17] Political expertise will present a particular challenge to the two types of agreement we have thus far examined. As Socrates' discussion with Alcibiades shows,

[16] We might like to say here that novices lack "first-order" epistemic grounds. That is, the husband will lack whatever would *primarily* ground the belief "Spartan wool is superior for weaving summer garments." However, the husband might have grounds for the belief "my wife is superior in weaving to me." Thus, the husband possesses "second-order" epistemic grounds. These second-order epistemic grounds might license certain other beliefs such as "when my wife tells me that Spartan wool is better, I should believe her."

[17] Despite Alcibiades' failure to demonstrate political expertise, it is a background assumption of the Alcibiades is that political expertise is possible—it is possible for a human being to have knowledge about justice and injustice, and to have knowledge about how to make a community more just, both internally as well as in its dealings with other communities. If political expertise were not possible, there would be little point to Socrates' attempted intervention with Alcibiades.

political expertise is a rare thing. Only few, if any, of those who are members of a given political community will possess political expertise.[18] Any reasonable solution to the problem of faction, then, cannot rely on shared political expertise among all or most members of a given political community.[19] In other craft areas, shared knowledge guarantees agreement. But since so few will be political experts, shared craft-knowledge cannot be the foundation for a civically-unified πόλις. The solution to faction cannot, it seems, require full-blooded agreement along the lines of shared craft-knowledge.

This seems to leave the apparently weaker form of agreement which results from epistemic deference. We suppose here that there are some who possess political expertise, and the vast majority who do not possess political expertise. The proper epistemic stance of the majority, who are novices, is one of epistemic deference towards those who possess political expertise. Faction would be prevented on this model, allegedly, because the many lack the grounds for disagreement with those who are political experts. According to the linguistic competency model, the novice-level majority will (a) answer similar questions similarly by mimicking the responses of those with political expertise and will (b) referentially pick out the same items with the same terms by following the cues of those with political expertise.

But there are difficulties with this weaker form of political agreement. For one, as Plato frequently notes, we have no guarantee that anyone in a given πόλις will possess political expertise. If the individual with political expertise is to provide the standard to which non-experts epistemically defer, then it is not clear how there can

[18] This point is stressed in several of Plato's dialogues, for example, the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Apology* and *Statesman*.

[19] Kamtekar (2004), understanding "ὁμόνοια" as "agreement," has argued that robust political ὁμόνοια is achieved in the καλλίπολις despite the epistemic differences between philosophers and non-philosophers. In Kamtekar's view, both knowledge and virtue admit of degrees. Philosophers possess the highest degrees of virtue and knowledge, courtesy of their direct connections with the Forms. According to Kamtekar, however, non-philosophers are capable of possessing "demotic" virtue and knowledge, which are genuine but of lesser degree than that possessed by philosophers. First, in Kamtekar's view, non-philosophers in the καλλίπολις acquire true beliefs as a result of their cultural education. Second, non-philosophers are justified in these beliefs because these beliefs are "reliably connected with facts that make them true" (Kamtekar 2004, p. 142).

Accordingly, Kamtekar embraces the view we have rejected—political ὁμόνοια is to be understood, in her view, in terms of some degree of shared skill-knowledge. Note that Kamtekar's view is sustained by attributing to Plato a wholly externalist account of knowledge. Non-philosophers count as knowing because their beliefs are connected in a reliable way to what makes these beliefs true. Non-philosophers may thus know without having access to cognitive states that are directly related to the Forms (contrary to what Plato has Socrates say on this subject in Book V of the *Republic*). They also need not be capable of (internally) accessing, that is, the justifiers for their true beliefs. It will be enough, in Kamtekar's view, if education ensures that non-philosopher's true beliefs *in fact* track what makes those beliefs true. We find no reason to accept that Plato would count something as knowledge if the epistemic agent were not able provide justification when challenged to supply it (or worse, would provide as justification something that was, in fact, false, such as what Plato calls the "Noble Lie"—see note 28, below). We do not, however, deny that Plato thinks that knowledge also has at least some externalist condition (see Smith 2000).

be political agreement in the absence of a political expert. If political agreement cannot be reached, then faction threatens.

Secondly, even if a political expert exists in a given state, political expertise may go unrecognized by non-experts. In other cases, craft experts are recognized as having craft knowledge, even by non-experts. Even novices are able to judge that the results of the craft are successful. The novice can recognize, for example, that the expert doctor produces health in the patient, and that the expert weaver produces a high-quality garment. But political expertise is, apparently, more difficult to discern. Socrates refers to himself in the *Gorgias* as the likely sole practitioner of "the true political art" (521d6-e1). This sentiment is affirmed in the *Alcibiades* I where Socrates proposes that soul-care is essential to the true political art (127e9-135e8). On the assumption that Socrates does indeed possess political expertise, it is clear that his fellow Athenians do not recognize that Socrates is a political expert. In contrast, those who demonstrably lack political expertise (Alcibiades, for example) are often treated as political experts by the Athenian many.

Plato is well aware of the problem of non-recognition of political expertise. The problem has implications for political agreement as grounded in epistemic deference. The novice will not epistemically defer to the expert unless he recognizes that the expert possesses expertise. Some who are political experts are not recognized as such. Some who are *not* political experts will be taken to have expertise. Epistemic deference will not be a help here. The novice many will frequently epistemically defer to someone who seems to, but really lacks, political expertise. They will similarly answer questions and similarly referentially pick out items following the person they take to have expertise. However, their answers and referential practices will, in many cases, deviate from what the genuine expert would answer and pick out.

Alcibiades I leaves us with this dilemma regarding political agreement: Shared political knowledge seems to set the bar too high when it comes to agreement among the inhabitants of a political community. On the other hand, mere agreement, on the model of linguistic competence, seems to set the bar too low. Epistemic deference presents both an application problem and an epistemic problem. Without mechanisms to produce them, political experts arise (as it were) by accident. Epistemic deference may ward off faction in principle, but in application it is too unreliable to be an adequate defense. Finally, there is the epistemic problem. The political expert must be recognized by those in political communities, if political expertise is to be successful in guarding against faction. However, such recognition is frequently not forthcoming. Thus, while occupational specialization as such may pose no great threat to civic unity, problems around political expertise do.

6.8 Civic Unity in the *Republic*

Alcibiades I usefully frames the problem of faction, and helpfully points the way towards difficulties with potential solutions to the problem. Plato will have an interest in cutting between the horns of the dilemma we have outlined above. The guard against faction must be some state that is stronger than mere agreement and epistemic deference, but weaker than shared substantive political expertise. Civic unity is not merely the absence of faction, but is a good state of a πόλις that will make a political community resistant to faction over some period of time.[20] The state of inhabitants that makes a πόλις faction-resistant must be robust enough to ground both political friendship and civic unity.

As we have already indicated, it is clear that Plato regards faction as a serious problem in the *Republic*, perhaps the most serious problem faced by any political community. In the *Republic* Book I discussion with Thrasymachus, for example, Socrates holds that in both the individual and the community "faction and not being ὁμονοοῦντα" renders the individual or a community "an enemy to itself and to the just" (352a5-8).[21] Civic disunity is a bad-making feature for a πόλις (462a5-7). A πόλις is defective to the extent that it is civically disunified. Thus, when degenerate πόλεις are discussed in Books VIII and IX, these forms each illustrate a progressive unraveling of civic unity and an increase in faction.

Plato wishes to preserve the conceptual connections among political friendship, civic unity, and ὁμόνοια in the *Republic*. At the same time, Plato will clarify and reinterpret these connections and present a fresh approach to the problem of faction. Justice in a πόλις is accompanied by "ὁμόνοια and friendship" (351d5-6). A key component in a city's justice is a strong form of civic unity. Civic unity in the *Republic* contributes to the goodness of the πόλις, so that there is "no greater good than that which binds [a πόλις] together and makes it one" (462a9-b2). As Socrates characterizes it in the *Republic*, civic unity co-varies with civic goodness. A given πόλις can only be good to the extent that it is civically unified.

At *Alcibiades* I (127b8-127c9), we saw that Alcibiades identifies occupational specialization as a potential threat to a city's ὁμόνοια. In the context of the *Republic*, any potential threat to ὁμόνοια would also be a threat to the civic unity of a πόλις. However, occupational specialization does not pose a particular threat to ὁμόνοια or civic unity in the *Republic*. Occupational specialization in the *Republic* is secured by a city's adherence to the principle that each inhabitant does the work for which he or she is best naturally suited (the Principle of Specialization [PS]). In the *Republic*, Socrates finds that occupational specialization along these lines causes

[20] The analogy with a body is helpful here. Faction is analogous to disease in a body. Civic unity will not simply be the absence of faction. Rather, civic unity is analogous to health in a body, a positive state that will tend to make a body resistant to disease. Interestingly, in the *Republic*, Plato's Socrates presents a πόλις that is resistant to faction, but not entirely immune from it.

[21] The formulation echoes the *Alcibiades* I's remarks concerning individuals who "disagree with themselves" and who are thus at odds with themselves.

"justice to be present" in those πόλεις which adhere to PS (433a8-b5, 434c7-10, 435b4-5, 443c4-7).

Adherence to PS promotes functional unity in a πόλις. Occupational specialization, that is, ensures that the functional parts of a πόλις perform their proper work for the good of the πόλις as a whole. Functional unity, as we understand it, will not be sufficient for strong civic unity. For one, strong civic unity will be accompanied by political friendship and ὁμόνοια. The same cannot be said for functional unity. It is possible for occupational classes in a πόλις to perform their proper work absent robust political friendship and absent ὁμόνοια.[22]

6.9 Ὁμόνοια in the Republic

Let us turn, then, to investigate more closely the role of ὁμόνοια in the *Republic*. In Book IV, Socrates connects σωφροσύνη in a πόλις to ὁμόνοια within that πόλις. As with an individual, a πόλις is correctly described as σῶφρον (or moderate) if it can be accurately said to be "a master of its pleasures and of itself" (431c10-431d2). The maximally good human πόλις will be, among other things, one that is σῶφρον.

But achieving mastery over pleasures is no small matter. We should recall that the *Republic* presents us with three soul-types: those who are naturally ruled by reason, those who are naturally ruled by spirit, and those who are naturally ruled by their appetitive desires. Socrates argues in the *Republic* that the best kind of πόλις will be the πόλις in which those who are naturally ruled by reason are charged with governance. These are the famous philosopher-rulers. It will be a critical matter, then, to bring the souls of those who are non-philosophers into conformity with the reasoned dictates of the philosopher-rulers. Natural pleasure-seekers will, presumably, find it difficult to appreciate the goodness of the philosopher-rulers' wise counsels (431c2-7).

Ordinary citizens in the *Republic* do not possess political expertise. Thus, shared political knowledge cannot be the basis for political friendship or a ground for civic unity.[23] At this point, one might advise that non-philosophers practice epistemic deference, along the lines suggested in *Alcibiades* I. Philosopher-rulers are acknowledged experts in political and ethical matters. These individuals have been singled out for their sterling personal and intellectual qualities. They have further undergone a long and involved program of education and training. It further seems as if, contrary to ordinary political communities, non-experts are able to recognize that philosophers

[22] Catherine McKeen has argued elsewhere that adherence to the Principle of Specialization secures functional unity in the καλλίπολις (McKeen 2004). While functional unity is an important component of overall civic unity, it is weaker than what is needed for robust civic unity. As an illustration of this, CM notes the city of pigs in *Republic* II. This πόλις is functionally unified by adherence to a modified form of PS, but falls short of the more complete unity achieved in the καλλίπολις.

[23] See note 19 above.

are political experts in the καλλίπολις (Book V). Would agreement on this model thus be sufficient for strong civic unity?

A key text in Book IV might superficially be taken to indicate that such agreement is sufficient for political friendship and strong civic unity. At 431d9-431e2, Socrates says, "And, yet, if there is the very same belief (ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα) in any πόλις in both those ruling and those ruled about whoever ought to rule, this [shared δόξα] will obtain in this [the καλλίπολις]." If we were to read this text in light of the linguistic model of the *Alcibiades* I, we might be tempted to think that individuals subscribe to the same δόξα when they display a similar pattern of assent and dissent to similar questions, and when they similarly pick out instances using the same terms. But we must ask ourselves whether political friendship *consists in* such shared δόξα, or whether shared δόξα are, rather, simply an indication of some other underlying state.

Another key text in Book IV shows that political friendship and civic unity demand something stronger than mere agreement (in δόξα) and epistemic deference:

> σωφροσύνη stretches across the whole [of a πόλις], creating concord (συνᾴδοντας) between the weakest, the strongest, and the intermediate—on the one hand (if you wish) in judgment (φρονήσει), and on the other hand (if you wish) in strength, or in numbers, or in means, or in any other like respect. And so we are quite right to say that σωφροσύνη is this ὁμόνοια (like-mindedness) in which there is a natural harmony (κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν) between the better and the inferior about which of them is to rule, both in a πόλις and in an individual. (431e10-432a9)

We take this text as a governing text for understanding the remarks regarding shared δόξα at 431d9-431e2. According to the text at 431e10-432a9, inhabitants in a πόλις do not merely agree with one another or share δόξα. Rather, they are like-minded, ὁμονοεῖν, in some stronger way. The natural harmony that obtains between those ruling and those ruled holds because the καλλίπολις succeeds in making rulers and ruled psychologically similar. Philosopher-rulers exhibit psychological health in the strongest way. In the souls of philosopher-rulers, their reason rules appropriately over the spirited and appetitive soul-parts. Thus, their souls achieve the highest form of unity.

Non-philosophers in the καλλίπολις are also ruled by reason—the spirited and appetitive parts of their souls are effectively controlled so that the πόλις as a whole is σῶφρον. In non-philosophers, however, the reason that rules their souls comes from without, from the philosopher-rulers. This is crucial to Plato's solution to the problem of faction and is illustrated by a number of texts from *Republic* Book IX:

> [1] Therefore, when the whole soul follows the philosophic part and is without faction (μὴ στασιαζούσης), then each part is just and will entirely perform its own function, and will reap its own pleasures and those that are best, and insofar as this is possible, the truest pleasures. (586e4-587a1)[24]

[24] Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι.

> [2] Then, so that such a one [the non-philosopher] is ruled similarly (ὁμοίου) to the best person, we say that the [non-philosopher] must become the slave (δοῦλον) of the best person, the one in whom the divine part rules … (590c7-590d1)[25]
>
> [3] Not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus supposed for those governed, that this slave [i.e., non-philosopher] must be ruled for his own harm, but because it is better for everything to be ruled by divine wisdom, and it is better for that ruling to be in him and his own (οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ), but if not this, then from that which is imposed externally (ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος), in order that we all might be similar and be friends (ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι), under the same guidance (τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι). (590d1-6)[26]

Non-philosophers in the καλλίπολις will be trained so that the spirited and appetitive parts of their souls respond to the rational commands of the philosopher-rulers. Untrained non-philosophers could not be relied upon to respond to reason in the way that non-philosophers in the καλλίπολις do. The way that this state of affairs comes about is a rather long story, and one that is beyond the scope of the current paper. We will only note here that "medicinal falsehoods," such as the Noble Lie, will play a key role in this training (459c8-d2).[27]

It should be noted the result is aptly described as a "harmony" between the rulers and the ruled. That is, both the souls of the rulers and the ruled are organized similarly. There is an isomorphism between both types of souls, but beyond this isomorphism, there is also a natural affinity. Reason rules in both types of souls. Appetitive and spirited parts in both souls fulfill their respective functions within the boundaries set by reason. Each citizen, then, whether ruler or ruled end up sharing to some degree the achievement of a soul that is "a master of its pleasures and desires and of itself" (431c10-431d2).

Furthermore, individuals who stand in this kind of relation of ὁμόνοια can be expected to agree about which among them should rule. They will subscribe to the same foundational δόξα regarding the καλλίπολις, but this agreement will be the result of an underlying ὁμόνοια. Individuals who stand in this relation of ὁμόνοια will further be primed for political friendship and civic unity. They will recognize each other not simply as fellow πόλις-inhabitants or as fellow beneficiaries of a political order, but will recognize each other as mutual political friends. Psychological similarity will result in the residents of the καλλίπολις being similarly motivated towards the common good.

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[25] Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἵουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον.

[26] οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι. (The text is framed as a rhetorical question, drawing out the contrast between the Socratic-Platonic view and Thrasymachus' view, and thus nicely tying the culminating view of the *Republic* with the preliminary remarks about faction in Book I).

[27] This also seems to us to count against Kamtekar's claim that those outside the ruling class in the *Republic* should count as having a share of knowledge insofar as their beliefs reliably track what makes the beliefs true, since any falsehood that served to justify such beliefs (as would inevitably be the case resulting from a use of falsehood in political rule) would serve as a defeater for such "knowledge." See note 19, above.

This, as we take it, is Plato's answer in the *Republic* to the problem of faction. Plato aims to make the inhabitants of his καλλίπολις psychologically similar to one another. To do this is to split the difference between shared political expertise and mere agreement based on epistemic deference to political experts. In doing so, Plato effectively resists the dilemma proposed in the *Alcibiades* I. Contrary to what some scholars have claimed,[28] Plato's answer to faction, moreover, does not require "giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests," the second approach to faction that Madison opposed. The Platonic solution does require making the inhabitants of a πόλις psychologically similar. The desired psychological similarity will result in πόλις-members sharing many of the same opinions, passions, and interests. Sharing some of the same δόξαι, particularly those central to the πόλις, will be an indication of psychological similarity among the city's residents. But political ὁμόνοια will not consist solely in this.

The way Plato proposes to achieve this goal of commonality of motivational psychology is by instituting not only a common basic education for all members of the state, but also with a number of other programs designed to create not just functional unity, but also friendship based upon some share of virtue among the citizens. It may be that many of the specific proposals Plato includes for such purposes—denying rulers any access to private property, eliminating private families, denying most citizens all access to political rule, and so on—cannot be counted as feasible within a modern democratic framework. Even so, as our own political structures seem increasingly paralyzed by the kind of faction they were supposed to prevent, we might still find in Plato some encouragement for considering whether there remains some workable way to promote friendship and greater commonality of character among our fellow citizens.

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[28] Again, see Kamtekar (2004), and our notes 19 and 27 above.

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