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Staging an encounter between anthropology and philosophy: Hits and misses in the work of Michael Jackson

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Jackson, Michael, 2016. *As Wide as the World Is Wise: Reinventing Philosophical Anthropology*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Jackson, Michael., 2013. *Lifeworlds: Essays in Existential Anthropology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ABSTRACT
This review essay assesses Michael Jackson's ongoing project of staging an encounter between anthropology and philosophy in two books: *Lifeworlds* (2013) and *As Wide as the World Is Wise* (2016). Considering his philosophical enrichment of ethnographic theory and method, this essay addresses foundational questions about the prospects and practices of interdisciplinary engagement. It also suggests future avenues for continued dialogue between philosophy and anthropology.

KEYWORDS
Bourdieu; ethnography; existentialism; interdisciplinarity; phenomenology; philosophy; pragmatism; ritual; Wittgenstein

Anthropology's interaction with philosophy is as old as anthropology itself. Indeed, in the epilogue to *Lifeworlds*, his provocative collection of essays in "existential anthropology," Michael Jackson provides a compressed history of anthropology's relationship to philosophy. "Over two hundred years ago," he reminds us, "Immanuel Kant proposed four fundamental questions: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope for? What is a human being?" (Jackson 2013, 271). Anthropology, in a sense, was the culmination of philosophy. But it was "Kant's student and subsequent rival, Johann Gottfried Herder, who proposed that philosophy fully metamorphose into anthropology, so initiating the line of descent through von Humboldt, Hegel, Dilthey, Klemm, and Tylor," culminating with Kroeber's seminal essay, "The Superorganic" (Jackson 2013, 271).

But temptations to rationalism and cognitive colonialism are there at the beginning as well. "That Herder's anthropology was conceived of as a philosophy for the people (*Popularphilosophie*) rather than an academic or metaphysical speculation (*Schuldsphilosophie*) reminds us that the tension between achieving knowledge for knowledge's sake and knowing how to apply knowledge for the betterment of humankind has always vexed the Enlightenment tradition" (Jackson 2013, 271). The philosophical matrix that

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gave birth to the discipline also bequeathed to anthropology a kind of theoretical DNA that would incline it to an analysis of the human that became reductive, parochial, and even harmful. As a result of wrestling with the question, "What is a human being?" anthropology would have to revisit the questions of epistemology and ethics. Knowing is what these Germans taught us, so what are we doing with this knowledge?

Here we could then see Act Two of the encounter between anthropology and philosophy, staged through the course of the 20th century in the works of Winch, Bourdieu, Geertz, and many others, revisiting those fundamental questions of how we know and what we should do. This has been further enriched by feminist and postcolonial scholarship that has unmasked the (white) "man of reason" (Lloyd) smuggled into the epistemologies that dominated the social sciences. Michael Jackson's sustained work at the border of anthropology and philosophy continues this tradition, mostly with an interest in upending the assumptions and paradigms of this earlier legacy. That he does so with a memoir-ish voice, even a confessional bent, is a kind of performance of the argument he is trying to make.

In this review essay, I want to do three things: First, in conversation with Jackson, I will identify key, persistent themes and questions that arise for anthropology that are either philosophical in nature or at least have been traditionally addressed by philosophy. Second, I will assess the development of Jackson's own project and interventions in the movement from *Lifeworlds* to his more recent proposals in *As Wide as the World Is Wise*. Third, and finally, I will identify some missed opportunities and open paths that I believe would prove generative for a continued anthropological engagement with contemporary philosophy.

Knowledge, understanding, and a "Feel for the World"

While Jackson's curiosity is ranging, we might summarize his philosophical questions under four headings or clusters: (1) a critique of reifying description that is overly dependent on abstract concepts; (2) the perennial question of how to negotiate the universal and the particular; (3) the necessity for a non-reductionistic methodology that recognizes the primacy and irreducibility of practices; and (4) the need for an "existential" anthropology that refuses the flattening of "sociological" anthropology.

A critique of pure analysis

In some ways, Jackson returns to terrain that was covered by Bourdieu (1977, 1990): specifically, the challenge of distance and engagement, objectivity and immersion. If anthropology is going to have critical purchase, if it is going to sustain itself as a scholarly, "scientific" enterprise, it requires some kind of

stance that grants the distance to see what unreflective immersion does not. Historically, we've named this distance "objectivity" (even if we qualify it in a thousand ways). But if that critical insight is actually going to see *into* the realities it is trying to explain—if it is going to do justice to the complexity of lived experience and open it up from the inside—it needs a familiarity and intimacy that is more like "insider" knowledge. However, if the anthropologist imposes upon that intimate familiarity a conceptuality and lexicon that is foreign to it, the explanation shuts down rather than opens up. On the other hand, "[i]f it is to be more than the projection of personal feelings," Bourdieu points out, "social science necessarily presupposes the stage of objectification" (1990, 11).

Jackson's ongoing work inhabits this tension and walks this tightrope, even if he sometimes stumbles into the mere projection of feelings or, at other times, reimposes foreign conceptualities on the communities he is trying to understand. Such are the occupational hazards of doing this work well. In some ways, Jackson points out, this challenge is the fruit of the fact that we can so easily make ourselves at home:

> One thing that struck me time and time again during our early days in the desert … was how quickly the neutral and anonymous space of the world gets transformed into a place you think of as your own. You turn off a desert track, drive across spinifex, bumping over the rough ground toward a desert oak, stop the vehicle, get out, build a fire, boil a billy, lay out your swags, and within half an hour an area that had no prior or particularly personal associations begins to take on meanings that are uniquely yours. Everything you do and say and feel in that place intensifies this almost proprietal sense that you and the place are now inextricably linked. This transformation, whereby something we think of as impersonal and other—as an "it"—becomes something we experience as personal—as "ours"—is one of the miracles of human life (Jackson 2013, xiv).

Even the strange and other can be quickly absorbed and become "ours," thereby undermining the goods of objectivity that motivate the research in the first place.

But Jackson's concern tends to be on the other end of the continuum: that under the banner of objectivity we colonize the other by subsuming it under concepts we've brought with us from our North Atlantic educations and Eurocentric habits of mind. The foil here is what Jackson calls "sociological anthropology," by which he seems to mean a mode of anthropology "grounded in reified notions of culture, society, history, religion, or biology" (2013, 24) that imposes theoretical abstractions onto experience in ways that are unhelpful and unjust. "[T]he good of philosophy," he argues, "is a matter of its ability to do justice to life" (2013, 24). And he tends to see philosophy—with its penchant for the abstract, the logical, and hence the universal—as a primary culprit. Insofar as the social sciences have looked to philosophy for their theoretical frameworks and conceptual apparatus, they are exporting a

particular take on human experience *as if* it were timeless, eternal, and universal. Thus, he is interested in criticisms internal to philosophy that have bearing on the task of anthropology: "Even more urgently, Adorno's concept of nonidentity helps liberate anthropology from one of its most persistent fallacies, namely, the tendency to presuppose an isomorphic relation between words and world, or between experience and episteme" (2013, 7). But he also notes "the ethnographic case against philosophy": "that it is incorrigibly Eurocentric, deploying pejorative distinctions that make reason superior to superstition, science superior to religion, history superior to myth, and literacy superior to illiteracy" (2016, 11).

Indeed, at times Jackson seems to worry that language itself is characterized by this sort of violence—that the very endeavor of trying to articulate and explain is doomed to fail precisely because of the limits of thought and language. "Could language and thought ever **fully** capture, cover, or contain the wealth of human experience, or hope to mirror the thing in itself?" he asks. Well, of course not. But did it ever pretend to? That would be a map the size of the territory. That "fully" is a straw man—an overreaching criticism on Jackson's part that obscures what is still a legitimate and probably perennial concern: How can we explain the liminal? How can we conceptualize the preconceptual?

This was also Bourdieu's question: "Practice has a logic which is not that of the logician," as he put it (1990, 86; see also Smith 2013, 75–100). That's not a reason to sequester practice from understanding, of course, encasing it behind some pristine glass of "respect for the other" that mistakenly tries to honor it by not touching it with curiosity. That would be to replay the dismissal carried in our faux-reverence for something as "exotic." To the contrary, Bourdieu sees this challenge as an impetus to look for a *different* logic, a more suitable theory, a more appropriately attuned mode of understanding and explanation that does justice to difference. Perhaps somewhat scandalously, Bourdieu's point is not to trade objectivism for subjectivism, but to objectify *better,* differently. "Distance is not abolished by bringing the outsider fictitiously closer to an imaginary native, as is generally attempted; it is by distancing, through objectification, the native who is in every outside observer that the native is brought closer to the outsider" (1990, 20).

Jackson sees "lifeworld" as a way to navigate this precarious space between the world of lived experience and anthropology's academic impulse for analysis and explanation. "If I prefer the term 'lifeworld' to 'culture' or 'society,'" he says, "it is because I want to capture this sense of a social field as a force field (*kraftfeld*), a constellation of both ideas and passions, moral norms and ethical dilemmas, the tried and true as well as the unprecedented, a field charged with vitality and animated by struggle" (2013, 7). While he gives a nod to Husserl, Jackson tends to cherry-pick the term "lifeworld" without then making himself accountable to the rich subsequent discussion of it throughout the

20th century. This is a pattern of selective interaction with philosophical concepts to which I will return below.

Universal/particular

The tension between lived experience and theoretical explication—the distance between *doing* and *knowing,* you might say—is related to another continuum of tension: between the universal and the particular. Explanation and understanding are akin to a codification, and as Derrida and Wittgenstein would point out, there is no codification or articulation without availing oneself of a code that is shared, yea, universal (see Wheeler 2000 for a helpful discussion of this point). In short, since there is no private language, there is no private explanation. Articulation transcends the idiosyncratic; the very endeavor of explanation pitches us toward the universal. But if anthropological research is going to be empirical and actually accountable to what it encounters; indeed, if it is going to expand the store of human knowledge and understanding, it has to be sensitively attuned to the particular, to *this* people, *this* place, at *this* time, under *these* conditions. The very impetus of anthropology pitches us toward the particular. But if we inhabit the particular without remainder, we forfeit explanation. Once again, Jackson's work inhabits this space "between philosophy, which tends to universalize its subject, and ethnography, which tends to singularize it" (2016, x).

In *Lifeworlds,* Jackson seems to be mostly warding off a naïve valorization of particularity that would forfeit the good of explanation and understanding. Thus, it is intriguing to hear him guarding the necessity of some kind of universality: "In order to know what makes us human we have to reconcile a desire to do justice to the multiplicity of human viewpoints, representations, strategies, and experiences with a desire to grasp what all human beings may have in common. Given that we are incapable of omniscience, what conception of the universal remains open to us?" (2013, 20). This question is at the very heart of Jackson's concern.

In an age that is concerned about cultural appropriation, Jackson's point is jarring. He is not embarrassed to admit the significance of Terence's dictum on his career: *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto* (I am a man, I consider nothing that is human alien to me; 2013, 10).

"I have never thought of my research among the Kuranko as elucidating a unique lifeworld or foreign worldview. Rather, this was the laboratory in which I happened to explore the *human* condition with focus and discipline" (2013, 28).

But if Jackson defends a certain kind of universality, he consistently refuses to really wrestle with the next question in the neighborhood: normativity. Instead, what we tend to get are appreciations for "common" human life coupled with a rather simplistic dismissal of any notion that this might

involve common or universal notions of the Good. In *Lifeworlds,* for example, the universal seems to emerge from the particular while also transcending it: "[T]he 'universal' should never be either one's own local or particular view projected onto the world at large, or a view from afar, allegedly liberated from social and worldly ties. Rather, the word is best used to denote an enlarged understanding that comes from a sustained *practical and social engagement* in the lifeworld of others" (2013, 260). This sounds an awful lot like Hegelian *Sittlichkeit,* making the absence of Hegel in Jackson's work all the more curious (see Pippin and Farneth). "It is not that we necessarily cease condemning and condoning; rather that such value judgments are less likely to precede than to follow from our investigations, which rely on a method of suspending our accustomed ways of thinking, not by an effort of intellectual will but by *a method of displacing ourselves from our customary habitus*" (2013, 260).

In *As Wide as the World,* the appeal feels even less sophisticated or careful: "our humanity is often compromised[1] by moral codifications, religious dogmas, and the generalizations and abstractions of social science and redeemed by a return to the particular. Freedom from the autarky of concepts does not simply consist in realizing that concepts are the end of product of reification; it means *remembering* the nonconceptual soil from which concepts spring in the first place. Inasmuch as that soil may be said to be our common humanity, the task of philosophical anthropology is to *re-cognize* that oneself and the other are of a kind—humankind—regardless of any specific morality, law, or concept of human rights. This challenge implies an ethics before ethics whose quintessential expression is love—one's capacity to set one's ego aside in order to enter into the situation of someone else, to see the world from his or her standpoint" (2016, 19). But whence this "ethic before ethics?" And is it universal? Is this a common, universal, human *obligation*? Says who? Jackson hasn't escaped the tacit normativity that attends discourse about universality. I note this, not to criticize a failure to achieve a goal but rather to suggest the goal itself is misguided: trotting out the canard that one can and ought to set aside the normative is a norm that pretends to be otherwise. Let's stop pretending. (We'll return to this theme below.)

Reading practices

Related to the themes we've already highlighted, Jackson persistently argues for the primacy and irreducibility of practice—what we might call "know-how"—to the discursive, propositional modes of analysis (knowing-that). Anthropology by its very nature, he argues, is caught between the two: between "the disinterested inquiry (*l'enquête*) of Enlightenment science and

[1]This is such a strong, odd claim that the first couple of times I read him as if he said "comprised" here.

the painful initiation (*l'épreuve*) of traditional education" (2013, 12). Anthropology is scientific impetus to *undergo* precisely because anthropology hopes to understand the unsaid, to analyze what is *done*—the doomed-to-failure hope of converting the know-how of a people or community to a knowing-that. The anthropologist is trying to understand a play for which no script is needed. At stake here is really a philosophy of action—a tacit understanding of how and why we do what we do (compare Smith 2013, 31–74).

For an appreciation of the irreducibility of know-how and the primacy of practice, Jackson tends to turn to phenomenologists in the wake of Husserl or pragmatists working in the stream of Wittgenstein and Dewey. "According to Sartre—and his view was shared by Merleau-Ponty—most human action is unreflective, which is to say we do not necessarily form any conscious idea of our intentions before we act. But this absence of conceptualization does not imply that we are at the mercy of blind *habits,* or that our actions are ruled by *unconscious* drives. Rather, it is as though the world variously 'offered itself,' 'appeared,' or 'closed itself off' to us as a field of instrumental possibilities. Conceptualization, reflection, and representation tend to follow *from* our actions; they are seldom scripts or scores that precede it" (2013, 24–25).

Indeed, theory itself is a "technics" (2013, 26), thinking is another way of doing. "Thought is construed not as a superior way of knowing and naming the essence of things, divining origins, identifying causes, and transcending the mundane; rather it is taken to be one of the many *technics* that we human beings deploy in our struggle for life in a world that is precarious, unpredictable, and largely beyond our grasp" (2013, 251). (This is akin to Richard Rorty's [1979] famous description of knowing as a kind of "coping" [1979, 355–56; compare Smith 2014: 94–105].) Philosophy is its own mode of being-in-the-world (Jackson 2013, 266). Thus, Jackson appeals for a philosophy "that enters more deeply into a dialogue with the empirical" (251).

In this cluster of concerns, Jackson is rightly contesting a dualism that dies hard—what Charles Taylor (echoing Bourdieu) described as an "intellectualism" that imagines practices and rituals somehow "express" prior thoughts and ideas (Taylor 1993). Jackson cites Bourdieu: "Rites, more than any other type of practice, serve to underline the mistake of enclosing in concepts a logic made to dispense with concepts; of treating movements of the body and practical manipulations as purely logical operations" (2013, 59). Similarly, from Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*: "What makes the character of ritual action is not any view or opinion, either right or wrong" (2013, 59). The point is that practice is its own kind of know-how; doing is not reducible to "expression," nor is it necessarily preceded by deliberation. "[T]o hold that every act signifies something is an extravagant form of abstraction, so long as this implies that the action stands for something other than itself" (2013, 60). Practice has its own "logic," as Bourdieu

would put it (1990, 80–97). Jackson very much shares this concern, and may be reinventing the wheel a bit. Certainly Bourdieu offers a more sophisticated account, and I didn't see any way that Jackson improves on Bourdieu in this respect.

Existential versus sociological

Jackson describes his project as an "existential" anthropology: a qualifier that remains hazy until the end of *Lifeworlds* when he finally defines the term: "I have used the term 'existential' to name that terrain of practical activity, thought, and endeavor that is *there* before it is apprehended academically and constructed substantively as *the* social, *the* cultural, *the* religious, *the* historical, *the* political" (2013, 251). What he's after, it would seem, is an angle of approach, a "method" (if we can use the term loosely), that does justice to the irreducibility of lived experience and doesn't flatten or denude it by a mode of analysis that runs roughshod over its particularity. Building on Arendt, Jackson argues for a mode of anthropological judgment that "grows out of our relationships with others rather than from first principles" (2013, 259). This picture of judgment as *social* and communal, as an act that is inescapably relational and hence conventional, resonates with a pragmatist trajectory from Wittgenstein, through Rorty, up to the work of Robert Brandom (see Brandom 1994, 2000; for commentary, see Smith 2014, 115–49). Judgment, then, is as much a feat of imagination as intellect: "judging, in Arendt's sense of the term, is always, in practice, less a question of a person's *intellectual* acuity than of his or her emotional and social capacity" (Jackson 2013, 257).

Following Arendt, Jackson argues that constructive ethnography requires "training 'one's imagination to go visiting'" (2013, 260). This is the vocation of anthropology: "anthropological understanding is never simply a cognitive matter, and perhaps no other intellectual discipline combines dispassionate observation and personal ordeal in the way that fieldwork does" (261).

"Judging implies journeying, and travel means travail—a succession of changing horizons, arduous digressions, and unsettling perspectives. The art of ethnography is to turn this deterritorialization to good account, to make a virtue out of not being at home in the world" (2013, 262)—what we more commonly call "stranger value" (263). Existential anthropology is the work of exiles.

What defines an "existential" anthropology, then, is not just a method, but an aim. So the conclusion of *Lifeworlds* illuminates its opening in a new way. At the beginning of the book, Jackson claims that "the goal of ethnography is metanoia" (2013, 11—*metanoia* being the Greek term often translated as *repentance* in religious texts). "That I was drawn to ethnography was because it licensed the kind of controlled experimentation on myself that might

enlarge my understanding of what it means to be human. Ethnography throws one into a world where one cannot be entirely oneself, where one is estranged from the ways of acting and thinking that sustain one's accustomed sense of identity" (2013, 10). "This is why suffering is an inescapable concomitant of understanding—the loss of the illusion that one's own particular worldview holds true for everyone, the pain of seeing in the face and gestures of a stranger the invalidation of oneself" (2013, 11).

Jackson looks to Hermes as the "patron saint of ethnography" since "he stands on the border or at the crossroads between quite different countries of the mind" (2013, 11). The existential anthropologist learns the value of doubt: "for it is through the loss of firm belief that one stands to gain a sense of belonging to a pluralistic world whose horizons are open—a world in which no one has the right to exercise power in the name of what he or she considers to be true and good, a world in which differences are no longer seen as obstacles to overcome but aporias to be accepted" (2013, 11–12). This all sounds lovely in a kumbaya sort of way; but what if the communities we are trying to understand resolutely refuse this valorization of doubt and epistemic relativism? What if "their" world refuses this? Can "they" ethnographize *us*? If we're uncomfortable with that, doesn't it show that we do, in fact, universalize our own norms? Once again, such reflections pitch up questions of normativity that Jackson assiduously avoids.

Two steps back?

I found Jackson's analysis and argument in *Lifeworlds* to be careful, nuanced, provocative, and persuasive. Unfortunately, while *As Wide as the World Is Wise* looks like an extension and development of this project, I have to confess it felt like a step backwards for me. Indeed, while *Lifeworlds* was instructive for my own work and set me on new paths, I found *As Wide as the World* to be a frustrating book. I think there are several reasons for this. First, *As Wide* lacks the sustained engagement with philosophical figures and arguments that characterized *Lifeworlds*. The interaction with philosophy here is more like a series of sorties and forays, dipping into philosophical works for some quotes as if looking for a kind of profundity by association. Sometimes it seems that philosophers are cited simply to signal an intellectual capaciousness, without any submission to the authority of these texts or the intellectual norms of the discipline. What in their original context are offered as sustained arguments and analyses are here treated as discrete nuggets of insight to be lifted and deployed on their own like intellectual talismans. This begins to feel like an intellectual exercise that is caught up in the shininess of certain beads when the philosopher in question is offering a bracelet. Granted, philosophical interaction with other disciplines (including anthropology) can be equally guilty of this sort of reductionistic instrumentalization, gleaning

gems for illustrative flourish. But then I would be equally critical of philosophy in this regard. Two wrongs don't make a right. Jackson's more recent engagement with philosophy is so cursory it *dis*courages a conversation we need to foster.

Second, *As Wide* is much weaker in its conception and execution. The book is organized around a series of binaries (Analogy and Polarity, Identity and Difference, etc.) that then become catchalls for meandering chapters that include theoretical questions, philosophical excursions, illustrations from field notes, all with a view to allegedly deconstructing the binary. But the conceit doesn't hold up. More importantly, the setup is ultimately guilty of falling back into what *Lifeworlds* rightly criticized. The binaries and categories that structure the book are exactly the sorts of abstract categories imposed from above as "universals" that Jackson rightly criticized in *Lifeworlds* (see 2013, 259–60).

Finally, I think the author was given just a bit too much license in *As Wise*. The book borders on indulgence to the extent that it was, at times, almost unreadable. It's as if Jackson couldn't decide between a memoir and a collection of theoretical essays and so thought he'd try to pull off both in one volume. The result is a failure on both fronts, I'm afraid. The exercise also grants too long of a leash to Jackson's weakness for sentimentalist prose that says nothing—far too many lines of this sort of guru-ish variety: "Art, like philosophy, overcomes the limitations of life" (2016, 182). This seems to either mean nothing, or mean something that is obviously false. Unfortunately, the development from *Lifeworlds* to *As Wide as the World Is Wise* is more of a regression.

Pathways and possibilities

This regression is unfortunate, because I share Jackson's enthusiasm for the importance and necessity of an ongoing conversation between philosophy and anthropology. There are lots of reasons why both philosophy and anthropology should be co-pilgrims characterized by the "traveling imagination" Jackson calls for at the end of *Lifeworlds*. But *As Wide as the World* is a detour to a dead end. This is a missed opportunity.

I suppose it is natural that, in our interdisciplinary ranging, when we interlope into other disciplines, eager to bring insights back to our "home" discipline, we tend to pick up those works and themes and conclusions from the field that have reified into monuments. We engage the stable artifacts of the other discipline rather than stepping onto the shifting sands of contemporary debates. So when I, as a philosopher, wade into the fields of sociology or anthropology or behavioral economics, I'm like the provincial on a first visit to the big city. Unfamiliar with the terrain, I tend to be suckered by the bright flashing lights and the tourist traps and have a checklist of

"the sights" to visit—the parts of the city that actual inhabitants of the city avoid. The earnest Michigander gourmand comes to New York City with *Bon Appetit*'s list of the "10 Best New Restaurants in Brooklyn," ready to encounter the avant-garde. But, of course, if *Bon Appetit* knows about it, you can be assured the locals have moved on. The philosopher whose philosophical questions have pushed her into matters of ethnography and anthropology is going to be fascinated by Bourdieu and Geertz when the "locals" of the discipline have moved on to new debates.

In other words, the situation of interdisciplinary engagement is very much akin to an *anthropological* situation as described by Jackson. It requires immersion, attention, openness, epistemic humility. The "visiting imagination" means undergoing an ordeal. But I don't see Jackson the anthropologist in his excursions into philosophy; that is, I don't see Jackson bringing his ethnographic habits to his encounter with philosophy. Instead, I see a tendency to cherry-pick the "interesting," selectively instrumentalizing what already serves his project. I would love to see the fruit of a "visit" to philosophy where Jackson practices the same disciplines that make him an anthropologist. In other words, I'd love to see what Jackson would produce were he to make the same effort to become a "native" in philosophy.

This is not a critical judgment. As I've suggested, it's likely inherent to interdisciplinary encounter. But the more we can keep conversations dynamic, active, and reciprocal, the more we can invite one another into the energetic forefronts of our disciplines, inviting our colleagues from other fields to the hot spots that haven't yet made headlines or scored reviews on academic Yelp. Thus, in conclusion, in a spirit of invitation, I'd like to invite anthropologists like Jackson into neglected areas of contemporary philosophical discussion that I think would be generative for anthropology.

- *"Experimental" philosophy*: Over the past decade there has been a growing conversation at the intersection of empirical observation and philosophical reflection that bills itself as "experimental" philosophy (see Sytsma and Buckwalter 2016; Stanley 2005). By its nature, this conversation ends up visiting themes very much akin to anthropology.
- *Phenomenology after Husserl*: Jackson tangentially interacts with Husserl, but seems unaware of the riches of the methodological conversation in phenomenology from Husserl's later "Crisis" texts that were themselves the fruit of his chastening encounter with Heidegger's *Being and Time*—which was itself the late fruit of the young Heidegger's methodological wrangling with just how philosophy could ever come up with a conceptuality that would do justice to "facticity" (see Heidegger 2010, reproducing his early lectures from 1920–1921). The young Heidegger was very much wrestling with a challenge like Jackson's. Jackson might be particularly interested in later work on "lifeworld" in the wake of Husserl, particularly in the creative work of Anthony Steinbock (1995).

- *Phenomenology and cognitive science*: Jackson would be encouraged to see how the seminal work of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre has spawned a dynamic, ranging conversation between phenomenology and cognitive science, including evolutionary accounts. The forefront of the conversation is found in the journal *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* (see also Schmicking and Gallagher 2010; Gallagher 2006). The notion of "enacted" mind would be a particularly fruitful point of contact (Rowlands 2010, 51–84).
- *The liturgical turn in religious studies*: Given Jackson's own interest in religion, it might be worth noting something of a "liturgical turn" in religious studies, philosophy of religion, and even theology that bears on the intersection of philosophy and anthropology (see Smith 2008; Cuneo 2016).

Some of these are areas of contemporary debate in philosophy that would profit from anthropological insight (in short: we need help). (Reciprocal invites appreciated!) If this feels like a whirlwind tour, that is only in order to provide an overview with a hope that you'll consider a return visit and dive into one of these philosophical neighborhoods "like a local."

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