

## 4 Sense and Literality

### Why There Are No Metaphors in Deleuze's Philosophy

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#### Introduction

Why does Deleuze claim that his philosophical concepts must be understood “literally”? From an initial viewpoint, numerous aspects of his philosophy seem metaphorical, whether his concepts themselves (rhizome, nomads, deterritorialization) or his related claims (we are made up of lines, the unconscious is a factory). Moreover, other philosophers have emphasized the metaphorical nature of language and concepts, including Nietzsche (truth is “a mobile army of metaphors”)<sup>1</sup> and Derrida, whose essay “The White Mythology” emphasized the role of the rhetorical figure of “catachresis” in the creation of concepts (and considered the concept of the concept itself to be metaphorical or catachrestic).<sup>2</sup> The notion of metaphor presumes the distinction between the literal and the figurative, and the movement from a literal sense to a figurative appropriation—though even this understanding of metaphor is hardly straightforward. As Ted Cohen pointed out long ago, John Donne’s phrase “no man is an island” can be considered to be a metaphorical statement, though it is also literally true—no man *is* an island.<sup>3</sup>

Deleuze’s claim that his own concepts are “literal” is thus a complicated one, and in the end the problem itself is not well-posed in terms of the literal-versus-metaphorical distinction. “There are no literal words, neither are there metaphors”, Deleuze writes. “There are only inexact words to designate something exactly”.<sup>4</sup> With regard to concepts, he adds, “there is no question of difficulty or understanding: concepts are exactly like sounds, colors, or images, they are intensities that suit you or not, that work or don’t work [*qui vous conviennent ou non, qui passent or ne passent pas*]. . . . There’s nothing to understand, nothing to interpret”.<sup>5</sup> For Deleuze, we should approach concepts in philosophy in the same way that we approach sounds in music, images in films, or colors in paintings—that is, as *intensities*. But what then is the nature of the “inexactitude” that goes beyond the literal and the metaphorical, and which is defined purely intensively? To answer this question, or at least

establish an approach to the question, we need to consider the theory of sense developed by Deleuze in his 1969 text *Logic of Sense*.<sup>6</sup>

### Three Dimensions of Language

In the second half of *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze traces out what he calls the *dynamic genesis* of language, drawing in part on texts from developmental psychology. “What renders language possible is that which separates sounds from bodies and organizes them into propositions, freeing them for the expressive function”.<sup>7</sup> If a speaker suddenly lapsed into violent babbling and began to utter incomprehensible noises, one might suspect that they had collapsed into psychosis. The dynamic genesis of language follows the opposite movement: it “concerns the procedure that liberates sounds and makes them independent of bodies”.<sup>8</sup> In tracing out this genesis, Deleuze distinguishes between three dimensions of language—or rather, three “stages” of the dynamic genesis, although each stage coexists reciprocally with the others: the *primary* order of language, which is found in the depths of the body; the *secondary* organization of language, which is the surface of sense (and non-sense); and finally, the *tertiary* arrangement of language, which is found in the propositions of languages, with their various functions of designation, manifestation, signification, and expression.

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#### *Three Dimensions of Language*

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Tertiary Arrangement	Height	Foundation	Propositions: designation, manifestation, signification, expression
Secondary Organization	Surface	Ground	Sense
Primary Order	Depth	Groundless	Intensities

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1. *The Primary Order of Language (noise, intensities)*. The dynamic genesis begins with the noises (or intensities) of the body, which constitutes what Deleuze calls the primary order of language. His starting point is the nursing infant, and the clamorous, noisy depth of its body: cries and ringings, gurglings and burpings, crackings and poppings, teeth-nashings, jaw-grindings. This is the dimension of noise, a first type of non-sense, and a first type of sonorous system. At this level, “everything is passion and action, everything is communication of bodies in depth, attack and defense”.<sup>9</sup> Daniel N. Stern describes the world of the infant (what Deleuze would call its “body without organs”) as a kind of human “weatherscape”, made up entirely of sequences of risings and fallings

of various *intensities*—the jolting of a bright light or a sharp noise, the calming of a voice, or the explosive breakout of a storm of hunger, with its knot of agony and cries, and then the passing of the storm when the baby is fed, and the subsequent sense of pleasure and satisfaction. It is a situation where the infant experiences no distinction between itself and the world, but only “intensities-in-motion”.<sup>10</sup>

2. *The Tertiary Arrangement of Language (designation, manifestation, signification, and expression)*. The second stage of the dynamic genesis then appears, which is in fact the end point of the genesis—the tertiary arrangement of language. In the midst of this world of intensities, there is a particular noise, a voice from on high, namely the voices of parents or other adults. This transference from depth to height entails an entire reorientation of the psychic and corporeal life of the infant. Even before the infant can understand the voice, it grasps language as something that pre-exists itself, as something already there: the familial voice that conveys tradition, or that affects the child as already being the bearer of a name. As opposed to the primary order of language (pure noise as the dimension of the body), the voice participates in what Deleuze calls the *tertiary* arrangement of language (*langue*, a fully formed language), which is made up of sentences or propositions. We will only make some summary remarks of Deleuze’s characterization of this tertiary arrangement, since his primary interest, as we shall see, concerns the secondary organization of sense.

In the important “Third Series” of the *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze analyzes in some detail the three primary dimensions of propositions in general, which he terms designation, manifestation, and signification. Designation, or denotation, is the relation of a proposition to an external state of affairs (“snow is white”, “that man is Socrates”). This is the relation of reference, which determines the truth value of the proposition (true or false). Manifestation marks the relation of the proposition to the beliefs and desires of the person who is speaking (“I desire to be loved”, “I believe the world will end tomorrow”). Its logical value is not the true and the false, but *veracity* and *illusion*. Signification, finally, is the relation of the proposition to other propositions, or to universal or general concepts. This is the domain of logic, with its relations of inference and demonstration between propositions (“implies”, “therefore”). Its logical value is no longer truth, as shown by the hypothetical mode of implications (if . . . then), but rather the *condition of truth*, the set of conditions under which the proposition would be true. The condition of truth is not opposed to the false but to the *absurd*, that which is without signification and thus neither true nor false.<sup>11</sup>

Propositions, in other words, can be related to the world and to objects within the world (designation); to subjects and their feelings, desires, and beliefs (manifestation); or to other propositions (signification). In Kantian language, each of these dimensions of the proposition is founded on

a certain principle or concept: the *World* and its states of affairs are the principle of reference or denotation; the *Self* or Soul is the principles of manifestation; and *God*, as the combinatory of abstract predicates, is the principle of demonstration or the form of possibility (the *Ens summum*). These are precisely the three transcendent Ideas that Kant identified as the terminal points of metaphysics in the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: the Self, the World, and God. Deleuze seems to be following Nietzsche—and many others—in suggesting that traditional metaphysical concepts are derived from language and its grammar, and from the most general structure of propositions or judgments.

Is it possible to find a common “ground” of these relations within the proposition? In fact and in principle, each of these three dimensions is reciprocally determined by the others, and none of them can be considered to be foundational. As the locus of truth, denotation or reference would initially seem to be the primary relation. However, in the domain of speech, it is obviously manifestation that is primary (the “I”), since neither denotation nor signification is possible without it. Yet insofar as a person always speaks a specific language (*langue*), significations are primary, and they exist before manifesting a subject or denoting a state of affairs. But in logic, inferences are empty unless the premises from which they are derived are true, which grounds them in the relation of denotation. And even if the premises are true, Lewis Carroll’s celebrated text, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, shows the fundamental paradox that lies at the heart of every theory of symbolic implication, which prevents it from exercising the role of a final foundation.<sup>12</sup> In short, from denotation to manifestation to signification and back again, we are carried along in *the circle of the proposition*, “a complex structure in which each of the three relations of the proposition in general is in turn primary”, a structure that can collapse if it loses this complementarity.<sup>13</sup> It is this propositional structure as a whole that forms the tertiary arrangement of language.<sup>14</sup>

For this reason, philosophers have often identified a fourth dimension to the proposition—something in the proposition that cannot be identified with the state of affairs it denotes, nor the beliefs and desires it manifests, nor the concepts or inferences it signifies. This fourth dimension of the proposition is *sense*, which Deleuze, following Husserl, will call the dimension of *expression*: sense is what is “expressed” by a proposition.<sup>15</sup> To a certain degree, Deleuze is here indebted to the genius of thinkers like Frege and Russell, who discovered that the domain of sense was the condition of truth, or denotation. The true–false distinction finds its ground in the sense–non-sense distinction: in order for a proposition to be true, it must have a sense. The proposition, “My gruba is the color of an ockbar”, is neither true nor false, since “gruba” and “ockbar” are non-sensical words. A proposition without sense is neither true nor false; it is merely non-sensical. “We position ourselves immediately within sense whenever

we denote".<sup>16</sup> But as a superior condition, sense is not only the condition of denotation; it is the *form of possibility* for the proposition itself, in all its dimensions. "Sense is always presupposed as soon as I begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this presupposition".<sup>17</sup> It is sense, then, that constitutes the ground of the structure of the proposition, and it is the object of Deleuze's analyses in *Logic of Sense*.<sup>18</sup>

But the concept of sense will function in two registers in *Logic of Sense*, and these two registers correspond to two aspects of the notion of surface. In the first register, sense is a result of the tertiary arrangement of language. It is the *effect* of an already-constituted proposition: sense is what is expressed by the proposition, its "meaning" or "semantic content". This is the domain referred to when one says that the propositions "The tree is green" (English), "L'arbre est vert" (French) and "Der Baum ist grün" (German) all have the same meaning, even though this meaning is "expressed" through different words in different languages.<sup>19</sup> In Frege's well-known example, "Venus is the morning star" and "Venus is the evening star" are both true propositions that refer to the same object (the planet Venus), but they each express a different sense, a different *Sinn* (morning star, evening star).<sup>20</sup> Deleuze suggests that, in the history of philosophy, sense was first discovered by the Stoics (in a reaction against Platonism), a second time in the fourteenth century in Ockham's school, by Gregory of Rimini and Nicholas d'Autrecourt (in reaction against the problem of universals), and a third time by the philosopher and logician Meinong (in reaction against Hegelian logic and its lineage).<sup>21</sup>

Much of the early part of *Logic of Sense* is devoted to an analysis of this first aspect of sense, not from the point of view of post-Fregean analytic philosophy, but rather in the context of the Stoic distinction between corporeal states of affairs and incorporeal events. As is often the case in his work, Deleuze rejuvenates a contemporary problem by reconsidering it from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy. For Deleuze, the paradigmatic example of an incorporeal event is a *battle*, which has moreover been the subject of well-known literary descriptions in Stendahl, Hugo, Tolstoy, and especially Stephen Crane.<sup>22</sup> We can attribute "Battle of Waterloo", for instance, to a particular state of affairs, but what we find in that state of affairs are bodies mixing with one another: spears stabbing flesh, bullets flying through the air, cannons firing, bodies being ripped apart. Strictly speaking, the battle itself exists nowhere except in the expression of my proposition, which attributes "Battle of Waterloo" to this mixture of bodies. More precisely, we could say that the battle itself merely "insists" or "subsists" in the proposition. Hence one of the fundamental theses of *Logic of Sense*: sense is to propositions what attributes like "Battle of Waterloo" are to states of affairs. They are pure events that subsist or insist in both propositions and states of affairs. This is also the first meaning that Deleuze gives to the term "surface": sense is what lies at the surface between states of affairs and propositions. Sense is both

that which is expressed by propositions and that which is attributed to things (the static genesis). *Logic of Sense* provides detailed analyses of the structures (sterility, impassivity, neutrality) and paradoxes (indefinite proliferation, sterility, neutrality, absurdity) that characterize this first aspect of sense. We will not pursue these analyses here, which have been the object of a number of excellent studies.<sup>23</sup>

We might note, however, that what came to be known as the “philosophy of language” tended to focus almost exclusively on this tertiary arrangement of language. It was preoccupied, for instance, with the concept of *truth*, which is defined in terms of a proposition’s conformity with reality (reference) and logical principles (inference). But a deeper constraint was the focus on propositions themselves—that is, on the propositions of fully formed and already developed languages—without posing the question of their genesis. Bertrand Russell seems to have set the agenda for much subsequent philosophy when he declared in 1900: “That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof”.<sup>24</sup> Such an exclusive focus on propositions inevitably tended to confine the focus of the philosophy of language to the four primary dimensions of propositions: *designation* (the theory of reference, denotation, rigid designation), *manifestation* (the so-called propositional attitudes), *signification* (the principles of logic, inference, and demonstration), and *expression* (theories of meaning, and the meaning of meaning). To be sure, this is a vast simplification of the extraordinary work that took place in the philosophy of language in the twentieth century, but it allows us to highlight the fact that Deleuze’s concerns took him in a different direction. In biology, one does not discover the nature of the organism by simply examining a fully formed individual, since the individual itself is the result or effect of a complex genetic process, starting with the genetic code and passing through a series of developmental processes. The same is true of language: we are led astray if we analyze language in its full-blown adult state, without adopting a *genetic* point of view on it.

**3. The Secondary Organization of Language (sense and non-sense).** This brings us to the third aspect of the dynamic genesis, the third element of language, which lies “between” the primary order of language (the body, pure noise, intensities) and the tertiary arrangement of language (the proposition). This is what Deleuze calls the secondary organization of language, which is the domain of sense in its second register. Sense here is no longer a sterile *effect* of propositions (meaning or sematic content) but lies at the *genesis* of propositions. It is this second register of sense that is Deleuze’s primary interest in *Logic of Sense*. “At the heart of the logic of sense, one always returns to this problem, this immaculate conception, being the passage from *sterility* to *genesis*”.<sup>25</sup>

Here again, Deleuze uses Frege and Russell to provide an initial approach to the problem. Although Frege and Russell define sense as the

condition of the true, it is granted an extension larger than truth in order to account for the possibility of error: a false or erroneous proposition nonetheless remains a proposition endowed with sense. A proposition that does not have a sense can be neither true nor false; it is simply nonsensical. But in this manner, although the sense–nonsense relation is prior to the truth–falsity relation, sense only grounds the truth of a proposition by remaining *indifferent* to what it grounds. As a result, the values of truth and falsity are allowed to continue in the same state as before, “as if they were independent of the condition assigned to them”.<sup>26</sup> Truth still remains a matter of reference or denotation. This is why the determination of sense as *expression* is inadequate and is only the first aspect of the concept of sense.<sup>27</sup> “What would be the purpose of rising from the domain of truth to the domain of sense”, Deleuze asks, “if it were only to find between sense and nonsense a relation analogous to that of the true and the false?”<sup>28</sup> We cannot simply presume, in a Kantian manner, the existence of “truth” as a fact and then seek its condition in sense. The problem must be reformulated from the standpoint of *genesis*: “Truth and falsity do not concern a simple designation, rendered possible by a sense which remains indifferent to it. The relation between a proposition and what it designates must be established *within sense itself*: the nature of ideal sense is to point beyond itself towards the object designated”.<sup>29</sup> In other words, Deleuze’s aim is to provide a *genetic* account of truth, rather than seeking the conditions of truth as a mere “fact”. Truth must be seen to be a matter of *production* within sense (method of genesis) rather than *adequation* to states of affairs (method of conditioning).<sup>30</sup>

This then is what Deleuze considers to be “the most general problem of the logic of sense”: how do we move from understanding sense as a neutral and sterile surface effect of propositions (*expression*) to grasping it as a fruitful principle of *production*? This second aspect of sense concerns sense as the element of the *genesis* of propositions, and no longer simply is the effect of propositions. “Sense was first discovered in the form of an impassible neutrality by an empirical logic of propositions, which had broken away from Aristotelianism; and then, for a second time, sense was discovered in the form of a *genetic productivity* by transcendental philosophy, which had broken away from metaphysics”.<sup>31</sup> How then does sense function, in this second discovery, as an element of the genesis of propositions, rather than simply as the “expressed” meaning or effect of an already given proposition? And what is its relation to the literality–metaphor problematic (insofar as metaphor is taken to be a transfer of sense from a literal or proper sense to a figurative sense)?

### The Synthetic Surface Structure of Sense

In order to comprehend the structure of the secondary organization (the sense–nonsense relation), consider again the life of an infant. All of us

were born into what Deleuze calls the primary order of language: *noise*, which includes the primary sounds and affects of the body, with all its intensive variations. But in the midst of this, the infant hears a Voice on High, that is, the voices of those speaking an already constituted language. How does the infant move from the primary order of the body to the tertiary arrangement of language? Answer: through the secondary organization of sense. For the infant, the Voice on High already has all the dimensions of the “tertiary arrangement” of language: it *manifests* the emotional variations of the speaker (the voice that loves and reassures, attacks and scolds, withdraws and keeps silent, complains about being wounded); it *denotes* certain states of affairs, such as the “good” object (the breast) or introjected objects (like food); and it *signifies* something, namely all the classes and concepts that structure this domain of pre-existence. Yet the child itself does not know what the voice is denoting, manifesting, or signifying. For the child, the voice “has the dimensions of language without having its condition”, in other words, for the infant, the voice does not yet have a *sense*.<sup>32</sup> Whereas the noise of the depths is an *infra-sense*, an under-sense, an *Untersinn*, the Voice on High is a *pre-sense*. It still awaits the “event” (sense) that functions as the genetic element of language itself. But of course this is not simply an experience of infants. The passage from noise to voice is relived when the sounds reaching sleeping people are organized into the voice ready to wake them. More obviously, we experience it when we encounter someone speaking a foreign language. The Greeks called foreigners “barbarians”, because when foreigners spoke, the Greeks heard only the babbling non-signifying intensities of a non-Greek language (*bar bar bar*). They heard the voice, but they had no access to its *sense*. One could see that the voice had sense, that it “made sense”, but Greeks lacked access to the dimension of sense in the foreign language. In a similar way, Americans tend to caricature the vowel-y sound of French, just as the French tend to mock Americans for speaking as if they have a hot potato in their mouths, since most American vowel sounds are diphthongs.

For an infant (or foreigner) to gain access to the tertiary arrangement of language (the voice), it must pass through the secondary organization of language, which is the construction of the surface dimension of sense. This entails a long period of apprenticeship on the child’s part. Out of the continuous flow of the Voice on High, the child will begin to extract intensive elements of different orders, freeing them up in order to give them functions that are not yet linguistic. One might see this as an early formulation of Deleuze’s theory of flows: the voice is a flow from which non-signifying elements are extracted and combined. The first words of the infant are not formed linguistic units, but merely formative elements: phonemes, morphemes, semantemes. The fundamental thesis of the logic of sense is that “*sense always results from the combination of elements which are not themselves signifying*”.<sup>33</sup>

Deleuze analyzes this surface organization of sense in terms of three moments, which are defined by three types of series or syntheses: connective, conjunctive, and disjunctive syntheses. (1) In the first moment (*connection*), the child extracts pure phonemes from the current of the Voice on High, and connects them together in “a concatenation of successive entities” such as *ma ma*, *da da*, or *bay bee*, which can then enter into more complex relations, or even an alignment of clusters.<sup>34</sup> (2) In the second moment (*conjunction*), there is the construction of the first *esoteric words* out of these phonemes, which is brought about not by a simple *addition* of preceding phonemes, but rather through the *integration* of the phonemes into convergent and continuous series, as in Lewis Carroll’s contraction of *your royal highness* into *y’reinse*.<sup>35</sup> Such a contraction aims at the extraction of the global sense of an entire proposition in order to name it with a single syllable—what Carroll calls an “unpronounceable monosyllable”.<sup>36</sup> (3) In the third moment (*disjunction*), the child starts making these esoteric words enter into relation with other divergent and independent series. If *Logic of Sense* presents itself in part as a reading of Lewis Carroll’s work, it is because Carroll was one of the great explorers of this surface dimension of sense. Although his famous *portmanteau words* seem to establish conjunctive syntheses between two heterogeneous series (snark = snake + shark; slithy = slimy + lithe; mimsy = flimsy + miserable), Deleuze argues that their deeper function is to create ramifications in the surface of sense. Carroll himself explains the functioning of the word “frumious” (fuming + furious) in disjunctive terms: “If your thoughts incline ever so little towards ‘fuming’, you will say ‘fuming-furious’; if they turn, even by a hair’s breadth, toward ‘furious’, you will say ‘furious-fuming’; but if you have the rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say ‘frumious’”.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, the real definition of the portmanteau word, Deleuze argues, must be found in its ramifying function (or disjunctive synthesis) throughout the surface of sense.<sup>38</sup>

These three syntheses constitute the production of the *surface* of sense out of the voice.<sup>39</sup> The structure of this surface corresponds to the components of the “Idea” that Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition*: a multiplicity in which differential relations between determinable elements (e.g., phonemes) constitute singularities (e.g., esoteric words), in the “neighborhood” of which the sonorities and significations of language will be constituted.<sup>40</sup> A phoneme, for instance, is the smallest linguistic unit capable of differentiating two words with different meanings: for instance, *bat* and *cat*. Although the phoneme is incarnated in letters, syllables, and sounds, it is not reducible to them. In itself, the phoneme is inseparable from the differential relation that unites it to other phonemes: *b/c*. Phonemes do not exist independent of the differential relations into which they enter and through which they reciprocally determine each other. In turn, esoteric words of different kinds guarantee the separation,

coordination, and ramifications of the various series that constitute the surface organization of sense and non-sense (the Idea). What distinguishes the secondary organization of sense (surface) from the primary order of noise (depth) is that “the depth is not organized in series”.<sup>41</sup> Thus, while the *static genesis* concerns the actualization of sense in a state of affairs (what is *expressed* in a proposition is *attributed* to a state of affairs), the *dynamic genesis* concerns the production of sense out of the depths of the body. “What matters here is the preliminary, founding or poetic organization—that is, this play of surfaces in which only an a-cosmic, impersonal, and pre-individual field is employed, this exercise of nonsense and sense, and this deployment of series which precede the elaborate products of the status genesis”.<sup>42</sup>

The surface of sense points to a domain that is difficult to access. On the one hand, it implies a dimension of speech that adults have long ago “forgotten”, even though each of us occupies the domain of sense continuously. If you are capable of understanding the propositions of an interlocutor, it is because you inhabit and sustain the structure of sense that underlies them. This is the function of the surface organization of sense: it separates sounds from the body and begins to turn them into the elements of speech. The creation of sense (out of non-signifying elements) is what allows the sounds coming out of one’s mouth to participate fully in a shared linguistic world. But the converse is also true. If a child comes to a language it cannot yet grasp as a language, but only as a familial hum of voices, perhaps conversely it can grasp what adults no longer grasp in their own language, namely *the differential relations between the formative elements of language*. From the flow of the voice, children extract elements of different orders, but they give them a function that is still pre-linguistic. For the child, there is “an apprenticeship of *formative elements* before there is any understanding of *formed linguistic units*” that would be able to denote things, manifest persons, or signify concepts.<sup>43</sup> What Deleuze says about language is equally true for living organisms: an embryo passes through experiences—foldings, migrations, and so on—that would destroy an adult. “Embryology already displays the truth that there are systematic vital movements, torsions and drifts, that only the embryo can sustain: an adult would be torn apart by them”.<sup>44</sup> The implication, as we have seen, is far-reaching: we are led astray when we focus on fully formed individuals in biology or fully formed propositions in linguistics.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the concept of sense in Deleuze’s work, and indeed in our own lives. If you are capable of understanding the propositions of an interlocutor, it is because of the element of sense that underlies them. Sense is this surface, this boundary, this frontier that exists between the noises of one’s body (the primary order) and the sentences of language (the tertiary arrangement). Sense is what allows the noises coming out of one’s mouth to participate fully in

the linguistic world we share. Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty showed, the same is true not only for the noises coming out of one's mouth, but for the whole of one's body, which is "expressive" through and through, having a sense in every one of its gestures (bodily intentionality).<sup>45</sup> In other words, the same syntheses of sense are at work in the body of the infant. Indeed, how can they not be, since the dynamic genesis is what extracts the surface of sense from bodily states?<sup>46</sup> As the body gets caught up in the system of language, Deleuze writes, "there is a co-system of sexuality that mimics sense, nonsense, and their surface organization".<sup>47</sup> Long before the infant experiences its body (or its mother's body) as an organism, it experiences its body as a geography of intensities and gradients. Freud, for instance, identified "erogenous zones" of pregenital sexuality in the infant, each of which is a dynamic formation of a surface space around a singularity constituted by an orifice surrounded by a mucous membrane (oral, anal, urethral zones), and development of the infant concerns the more general problem of organizing these surfaces and bringing about their coordination and integration. For Deleuze, the important idea is that there are orientations in the biopsychic life of the infant that have variable or shifting dimensions—an entire geography and geometry of living dimensions. The dynamic genesis is nothing other than the formation of surfaces (or zones) and their coordination, both in the body and in speech.

### The Fragility of Sense: Two Types of Non-Sense (the Psychotic Procedure)

At the same time, we are also aware of the fundamental *fragility* of this surface domain of sense, and the fact that it can break down at any moment into non-sense. In fact, for Deleuze this domain of non-sense is even more revealing than the domain of sense—the sense–non-sense relation is far more important to philosophy than the truth–falsity relation, which depends on it. In fact, Deleuze distinguishes between two types of non-sense, the non-sense of as-yet inarticulate words (surface) and the non-sense of the body (depth). The second is more profound than the first: "What is essential is the threat that depth begins to be on all the other dimensions".<sup>48</sup>

The first type of non-sense, as we have seen, is the non-sense of Lewis Carroll, who takes the formative elements of language and establishes new syntheses between them. Carroll's famous poem *Jabberwocky*—itself a portmanteau word, combining "jabber" (a voluble, animated, or chattering discussion) with "wocer" (offspring or fruit), that coincides with its function—begins with a famous first line: "Twas brillig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe, all mimsy were the borogroves, and the mome raths outgrabe". To which Alice responds, "Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas—only I don't exactly know what

they are!”<sup>49</sup> The poem *seemed* to make sense to Alice, but she nonetheless had no idea what it was about. It seems to make “sense” because Carroll combines the formative elements of language in a way that produces in Alice a feeling of sense, even though the combination of elements lies outside the tertiary structure of language. “Slithey” is a combination of “slimy” and “lithe”, and thus seems to have a sense, even though it is a non-sensical combination of elements.

But there is a second kind of non-sense, which is exemplified in the schizophrenic writings of Antonin Artaud. Artaud did not admire Lewis Carroll, and he used a rather technical term to describe Carroll’s writing: pigshit (*la cochonnerie*).<sup>50</sup> Artaud speaks of the “caca of being and of its language”.<sup>51</sup> The reason: Carroll remained at the surface, playing his little combinatorial game, combining “shark” and “snake” into “snark” and making a poem out of it. But that kind of non-sense is nothing—absolutely nothing—compared with the non-sense of the body, with its pure intensities and noises, which Artaud expressed in his “scream-breaths”, his *cris-souffles*—and which was tied, moreover, to a schizophrenic pathology, to an extraordinary lived experience. Artaud followed the reverse path of the infant, though “regression” is hardly an adequate concept for this process. The infant starts in the primary order of the body, and attains the tertiary arrangement of language by passing through—or rather constructing—the secondary organization of sense. And yet, as Artaud knew, “nothing is more fragile than the surface”.<sup>52</sup>

Artaud’s pathos moved in the opposite direction. The tertiary arrangement of language (the proposition) is “grounded” in the “secondary organization” of sense (which is what Carroll plays with). And yet, following what Deleuze sometimes calls the “bend” or “twist” in sufficient reason, the dimension of sense itself threatens to collapse into the ungrounded “primary order” of noise. In the primary order of schizophrenia, “there is no longer anything to prevent propositions from falling back onto bodies and from mingling their sonorous elements with the body’s olfactory, gustatory, or digestive effects. Not only is there no longer any sense, but there is no longer any grammar or syntax either—nor, at the limit, are there any articulated syllabic, literal, or phonetic elements”.<sup>53</sup> There are only Artaud’s *cris-souffles*, which are “the asyntactical limit toward which all language tends”: “Ratara ratara ratara Atara tatara rana Otara otara katara”.<sup>54</sup> The schizophrenic treats words as if they were things; “things and proposition no longer have any frontier between them”.<sup>55</sup> The schizophrenic body is no longer anything but depth; it no longer has a surface organization. The surface has collapsed.<sup>56</sup>

Indeed, Deleuze will argue that “psychosis is inseparable from a variable linguistic procedure (*procédé*). The procedure is the very process of the psychosis”.<sup>57</sup> One of his most important essays on this score is his essay entitled “Louis Wolfson; or, The Procedure”.<sup>58</sup> Wolfson was a schizophrenic, but also a student of languages, and he developed a

specific procedure to deal with his English-speaking mother: whenever she began to speak, he would immediately “translate” her speech into a multi-lingual non-sense.

Given a word from the maternal language, he looks for a foreign word with a similar meaning that has common sounds or phonemes (preferably in French, German, Russian, or Hebrew, the four principal languages studied by the author). For example, *Where?* will be translated as *Wo? Hier? où? ici?*, or better yet, as *Woher*. *Tree* will produce *Tere*, which phonetically becomes *Dere*, and leads to the Russian *Derevo*. Thus, an ordinary maternal sentence will be analyzed in terms of its phonetic elements and movements so that it can be converted into a sentence, in one or more foreign languages, which is similar in sound and meaning. . . . The sentence *Don't trip over the wire* becomes *Tu'nicht tréb über èth hé Zwirn*.<sup>59</sup>

For Wolfson, his mother's voice had to be stripped of its sense, without delay, “decomposed into its phonetic elements and recomposed into inarticulate blocks”.<sup>60</sup> It was never a question of recovering sense but of destroying the word and conjuring up an affect, transforming the painful passion of the body into a triumphant action, but “always in this depth beneath the fissured surface”.<sup>61</sup> A similar case was that of Jean-Pierre Brisset, whose procedure was to focus on words and phrases whose sounds were identical but whose meanings were completely different: prisoners were first drenched *dans l'eau sale* (in dirty water), they were *dans la sale eau pris* (taken away in dirty water), thus becoming *salauds pris* (*saloperies*) (captured bastards/shit), who were then sold *in la salle aux prix/pris* (the price room/the prisoner's room).<sup>62</sup> In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the case of a young patient of Bruno Bettelheim named Joey, who would not only decompose words (“Connecticut” became “connect-I-cut”), but who could live, eat, defecate, and sleep “only if he is plugged into machines provided with motors, wires, lights, carburators, propellers, and steering wheels: an electrical feeding machine, a car-machine that enables him to breathe, an anal machine that lights up”.<sup>63</sup> Deleuze has developed a set of interrelated concepts to analyze such cases: if the enunciable refers to a procedure (*procédé*), the visible refers to a process (*processus*), and taken together a procedure and a process constitute a proceeding (*procedure*). A proceeding is a combination of a visible process and an enunciative procedure.<sup>64</sup>

Deleuze compares these psychotic procedures with the well-known compositional procedure of the writer Raymond Roussel, to whom Michel Foucault devoted an important book.<sup>65</sup> In his novel *Impressions of Africa*, Roussel famously converted an initial sentence (*les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux billard* = the white man's letters on the hoards of the old plunderer) into another sentence with similar sounds

and phonemes, but with a completely different meaning (*les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux pillard* = the white letters on the cushions of the old billiard table). Roussel amplified the procedure, creating a novel that “surreptitiously tries to say two things with the same words”.<sup>66</sup> Unlike Wolfson or Brisset, Roussel was able to create a work of art from his procedure, filling up the interval between the original sentence and its conversion “with marvelously proliferating stories”.<sup>67</sup>

Is not perhaps the greatness—and the great pathos—of Artaud that he was able to speak and write out of the depths of the primary order of the body? Nietzsche was unable to do so, and lapsed into silence. We can nonetheless get a glimpse into the nature of Nietzsche’s delirium in the letters and postcards he wrote in the ten days following his initial collapse in 1889, in which his language takes on a purely intensive use. It directly expresses the “primary order” of Nietzsche’s body and its intensive states, each of which receives a proper name—some designating his “attractive” allies, or manic rises in intensity (Prado, Lesseps, Chambige, “honest criminals”, Dionysus), others designating his “repulsive” enemies, or depressive falls in intensity (Caiaphus, William, Bismark, the “antisemites”, the Crucified)—a chaos of pure oscillations that is ultimately invested, as Nietzsche says, by “*all the names of history*”.<sup>68</sup> And yet, was it not precisely this experience that Nietzsche was confronting throughout all his writings? At the end of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche included a telling lament about his writing: “Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts? Alas, always only what is on the verge of withering and losing its fragrance! Alas, always only storms that are passing, exhausted, and feelings that are autumnal and yellow! Alas, always only birds that grew weary of flying and flew astray and now can be caught by the hand—by *our* hand. We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer—only weary and mellow things!”<sup>69</sup> Nietzsche’s illness was not a part of the process, but rather an arrest or stopping of the process.<sup>70</sup>

But is Nietzsche’s or Artaud’s experience any different from our own? In a sense, yes, absolutely yes, since both shared a profound pathology most of us will never experience. In *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze muses about people like himself, writing on Artaud’s schizophrenia, Nietzsche’s collapse, Hölderlin’s madness, Woolf’s suicide, Fitzgerald’s breakdown, and so on—all the while standing on the shore, dipping toes in the water, but unable to dive in and plunge beneath the surface.<sup>71</sup> But in another sense, no, the experience is not so different, for a simple stammer or a stumbling over a word (a “Freudian slip”) is itself an intrusion of the dimension of noise, and is enough to indicate the fundamental fragility of the surface of sense, which covers the groundlessness that constantly threatens to bubble up and subsume everything, making us fall into “the undifferentiated abyss of a groundlessness which only permits the pulsation of a monstrous body”.<sup>72</sup>

## The Intensive: Beyond the Literal and the Metaphorical

We seem to be far away from our theme of literality and metaphor, but we have never been so close. Let us return to Deleuze's statement that we cited at the start: "There are no literal words, neither are there metaphors. . . . There are only inexact words to designate something exactly".<sup>73</sup> No less a thinker than Kant had made a similar observation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Despite the great wealth of our languages, the thinker often finds himself at a loss for the expression which exactly fits his concept, and for want of which he is unable to be really intelligible to others or even to himself".<sup>74</sup> This is why Deleuze can define philosophy, famously, as the creation of concepts: philosophy is the creation of inexact words to designate something exactly, "literally". From this viewpoint, the analyses of concepts proposed in *What Is Philosophy?* are a transposition of the analysis of language provided in *Logic of Sense*. The path followed by the infant is to construct the secondary surface of sense in order to pass from the primary noise of the body to the tertiary arrangement of language. In creating concepts, the philosopher pursues a similar path, closer to Artaud's, and attempts to follow (or create) a line of flight within language itself that will extract its formative or genetic elements (the components of the concept) in order to create something new.

Strictly speaking, however, while it is easy to comprehend Deleuze's rejection of the suggestion that his concepts are "mere" metaphors, it would likewise be inexact to say that Deleuze's concepts must therefore be taken "literally". The reason is that the literal-metaphorical distinction itself operates entirely within the realm of sense: it involves the movement from a "proper" meaning or sense of a word or phrase to a figurative or metaphorical meaning. At this level of analysis, it is easy to see how the phrase "the unconscious is a factory" can be understood in a metaphorical manner as a transfer of meaning from a literal to a figurative sense. A factory is literally a milieu of production; to say that the unconscious is a factory is to transfer the literal sense of "production" (in a factory) in a figurative manner to a new milieu (in the unconscious). There is a transfer of meaning that operates there entirely within the first realm of sense (or expression).

But this is only the first aspect of sense: sense (or meaning) as an *effect* of propositions; meaning is what is "expressed" by a proposition. The second aspect, as we have seen, concerns sense as an element in the *genesis* of propositions from its formative elements (the three syntheses), and it is this aspect that concerns us here. From this viewpoint, sense is the "ground" of language, but this ground itself rests on the "groundlessness" of the primary order of noise. (As geology and plate tectonics teach us, no ground is ever entirely secure.) This is why Artaud ultimately plays a more important role in *Logic of Sense* than does Carroll. Artaud's intensive "scream-breaths", uttered from the depth of his pathology (the

primary order), are worth far more than Carroll's extensive word-plays, which remain at the surface (the secondary surface). The genesis of language must be found at the relation between the intensive depth (noise) and the extensive surface (sense).

Thus, just as the sense-non-sense complementarity conditions the true--false dichotomy (a proposition can be true or false only if it has a sense), one could say that *the intensity-becoming complementarity conditions the literal-metaphorical distinction*. In several texts, Deleuze speaks of literary procedures, like those of Roussel, that go beyond sense and point to a purely intensive use of language. This can take place "when sense is actively neutralized . . . when there remains only enough of sense to direct the lines of escape . . . in order to liberate a living and expressive material that speaks for itself and has no need of being put into a form".<sup>75</sup> *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, for instance, speaks of a

language, torn from sense. . . [that] no longer finds its value in anything but an accenting of the word, an inflection. . . . Children are well skilled in the exercise of repeating a word, the sense of which is only vaguely felt, in order to make it vibrate around itself. Kafka tells how, as a child, he repeated one of his father's expressions in order to make it take flight on a line of non-sense: "end of the month, end of the month" . . . [The phrase] no longer forms anything but a *sequence of intensive states*, a ladder or circuit for intensities that one can make race around in one direction [*sens*] or another, from high to low, or from low to high. . . . There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a *distribution to states that is part of the range of the word*.<sup>76</sup>

Like Artaud's scream-breaths, the word here becomes linked with its own intensive conditions in the primary order. Such an intensive use of language marks what Deleuze calls a "line of flight" or a "line of escape": "a language of sense is traversed by a line of escape in order to liberate a living and expressive material that speaks for itself and *has no need of being put into a form*".<sup>77</sup> What Deleuze calls a "minor" use of language is nothing other than an intensive use of language.

When Deleuze and Guattari published *What Is Philosophy?* in 1991, they similarly defined the components of philosophical concepts as "intensive ordinates".<sup>78</sup> The components of a concept are not spatiotemporal coordinates (extensions), but intensive ordinates that lie outside any coordinates (pure events). Intensive ordinates are "pure and simple" singularities that are brought together in the concept through the establishment of "zones of indiscernibility" between them.<sup>79</sup> The Cartesian concept of the *cogito*, for instance, has as its intensive ordinates the concept of doubting, thinking, and being. To create a concept is "to make the sequences vibrate, to open the word onto unexpected internal

intensities".<sup>80</sup> Like the literary procedures of Roussel and Kafka, the creation of concepts is an asignifying and intensive utilization of language.

It is in this manner that we must understand Deleuze's claims such as "the unconscious is a factory". As long as we remain at the tertiary arrangement of language or the secondary organization of sense, we cannot help but see the relationship between the two words as a kind of transfer of sense, a relationship of resemblance, or imitation, or *mimesis*, or even an imaginary identification. But once we reach the intensive level, the relationship between the two words becomes, precisely, a relationship of *becoming*. A zone of indiscernibility is established between the two words "unconscious" and "factory", such that we can say that the unconscious literally *is* a factory, or more precisely, *becomes* a factory. This is what happens in *Wuthering Heights*, when Emily Brontë has Catherine say, "I am Heathcliff", or in *Moby Dick*, when Herman Melville says that Captain Ahab "becomes" Moby Dick. Catherine does not "really" become Heathcliff any more than Ahab "really" becomes a whale. In a becoming, one term does not simply resemble the other; rather, each term encounters the other, and the becoming is something that passes between the two, outside the two. In literature, this "in between" is a pure *affect* or *percept*, such that both Ahab and Moby Dick lose their status as subjects in favor of "an infinitely proliferating patchwork" of affects that escape their form, like the "the furrows that twist from Ahab's brow to that of the Whale".<sup>81</sup>

One could say that, in philosophy, these inbetweens, or these becomings, produce *concepts*. When Deleuze says that "the unconscious is a factory", it marks the *becoming* of the concept of the unconscious, or rather (which amounts to the same thing) the creation of a new concept. Deleuze defines concepts as multiplicities, but a multiplicity is defined by the limits and borders where it enters into relations with other multiplicities and changes nature, transforms itself, and follows a "line of flight" (even while remaining itself). When Deleuze says that "the unconscious is a factory", he makes the concept of the unconscious enter into a becoming. The phrase creates an objective zone of indistinction or indiscernibility that always exists between any two multiplicities—in this case, the two concepts or terms—and that precedes their taking on a sense.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, it is only by entering into this becoming that the term "the unconscious" can be said to have taken on a new sense, a new "literal" sense (this unconscious *is* a factory, and not a theater). Or, put differently, the concept of the unconscious can be said to have changed, to have altered one of its intensive ordinates. The intensive primary order is the condition that makes possible "the perpetual, invisible, and silent displacement of linguistic sense".<sup>83</sup>

For Deleuze, this is the very movement of thought itself, the creation of the new within thought. Our ordinary use of language is extensive—or, in the language of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, it is reterritorializing.

Language is a deterritorialization of noise that becomes reterritorialized in sense; and it is sense that allows the noises of the body to become linguistic elements. This is what Deleuze means when he speaks of a “minor” use of language (in philosophy or elsewhere), or cites Proust’s phrase that writers create a kind of foreign language within their own language. It is a process that involves taking *any* linguistic variable—phonological, semantic, syntactical, or grammatical—and placing it in variation, pushing language to the point where it “stops being representative in order to move toward its extremities or its limits”,<sup>84</sup> in order to create new possibilities within thought itself. Style and philosophy in this way come together: “This is what style is, or rather the absence of style—asyntactic, agrammatical: the moment when language is no longer defined by what it says . . . but by what causes it to move, to flow, to explode. . . . For [philosophy] is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal . . . a pure process that fulfills itself, and that never ceases to reach fulfillment as it proceeds—[philosophy] as ‘experimentation’”.<sup>85</sup> A philosophical concept is not a metaphor but a *metamorphosis*.

## Notes

1. See Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” [1873], in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), p. 46.
2. Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy”, in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 209–71.
3. Ted Cohen, “Figurative Speech and Figurative Acts”, in *Journal of Philosophy* 72.19 (1975): 669–84. The line is from Donne’s *Meditation XVII*: “No man is an island / Entire of itself / Every man is a piece of the continent / A part of the main”.
4. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 3.
5. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 4, translation modified. Kafka wrote, in one of his diaries, “Metaphors are one of the things that make me despair of literature”.
6. Gilles Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester, with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 181. We should note that Deleuze himself expressed reservations about this part of *Logic of Sense*: “I attach little importance to the text on structuralism [“How Do We Recognize Structuralism?”], and very little importance to the whole part of *Logic of Sense* that was still under the influence of psychoanalysis (the empty case, and a far too structuralist conception of series)”; letter to Arnaud Villani, December 1981, reprinted in *Les Styles De Deleuze: Esthétique et philosophie*, ed. Adnen Jdey (Paris: Les Impressions nouvelles, 2011), “Cinq Lettres de Gilles Deleuze”, p. 286.
7. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 181.
8. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 186.
9. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 192.
10. Daniel N. Stern, *Diary of a Baby* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 14: “A sudden increase in interest; a rising, then a falling wave of hunger pain; an

- ebbing of pleasure”. See also Daniel N. Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
11. See Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, chapter three, “Of the Proposition”, pp. 12–22.
  12. Lewis Carroll, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, in *The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll*, illus. John Tenniel (New York: Modern Library, 1936), pp. 1125–1130.
  13. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp. 17, 184 and 119–20.
  14. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 119. For Deleuze’s more detailed account of the relations within the proposition, see *Logic of Sense*, pp. 13–19 and 119.
  15. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 104.
  16. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 17.
  17. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 28.
  18. Deleuze’s theory of sense seems to have been inspired, in part, by Bergson’s analysis of memory. See Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1990), p. 57: “Bergson analyzes language in the same way as memory. The way in which we understand what is said to us is identical to the way in which we find a recollection. Far from recomposing sense on the basis of sounds that are heard and associated images, we place ourselves at once in the element of sense, then in a region of this element”. (Deleuze is referring to a text in Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul [New York: Zone Books, 1988], p. 116: “The hearer places himself at once in the midst of the corresponding ideas . . .”.) Summarizing these links, Deleuze writes elsewhere: “What the past is to time, sense is to language and idea is to thought” (Gilles Deleuze, *The Time Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989], p. 99). In other words, sense is “the interiority of language” (Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 185), just as intensity is the interiority of sensibility.
  19. While some philosophers reserve the term “proposition” for the meanings (semantic content) of sentences, Deleuze utilizes the term in a more general manner as the equivalent to a sentence.
  20. Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference” (1892), trans. M. Black, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, eds. Peter Geach and Max Black, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
  21. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 19. Deleuze refers to the work of Hubert Elie, *Le Complexe Significabile* (Paris: Vrin, 1936), which compares the doctrines of Gregory of Rimini and Nicolas d’Autrecourt with Meinong’s theories (and Russell’s critiques), showing how a similar polemic was repeated in the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries.
  22. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp. 100–1.
  23. See in particular Sean Bowden, *The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s “Logic of Sense”* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), and James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze’s “Logic of Sense”: A Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
  24. Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz* [1900] (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 8. Curiously, in the very next sentence, Russell admits that this self-evident claim was perhaps not self-evident to Leibniz (“That Leibniz’s philosophy began with such an analysis is less evident”).
  25. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 97.
  26. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 153.
  27. See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 153: “Two dimensions may be distinguished in the proposition: *expression*, in which a proposition says or

- expresses some idea; and *designation*, in which it indicates or designates the objects to which what is said or expressed applies. One of these would then be the dimension of sense, the other the dimension of truth and falsity. However, in this manner sense would only found the truth of a proposition while remaining indifferent to what it founds. Truth and falsity would be matters of designation. As Russell says, ‘The question of truth and falsehood has to do with what words and sentence indicate, not with what they express’. The latter quote is from Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 201.
28. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 68.
  29. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 154.
  30. See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 154: “The relation between a proposition and what it designates must be established within sense itself: the nature of ideal sense is to point beyond itself towards the object designated. Designation, insofar as it is achieved in the case of a true proposition, would never be grounded unless it were understood as the limit of the genetic series or the ideal connections which constitute sense. If sense points beyond itself toward the object, the latter can no longer be posited in reality exterior to sense, but only at the limit of its process. . . . Sense is the genesis or production of the true, and truth is only the empirical result of sense”.
  31. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 105. The discovery of the first aspect of sense (as an effect of propositions) was due to the Stoics, and was continued in Meinong, Frege, and Russell; the discovery of the second aspect of sense (as an element of the genesis of proposition) was due in part, Deleuze suggests, to Husserl.
  32. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 194.
  33. Gilles Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?”, in *Desert Island and Other Texts, 1953–1974*, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 175.
  34. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 231.
  35. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 43.
  36. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 234.
  37. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 46.
  38. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 47.
  39. We might note that Chomsky uses the phrase “surface structure” in an analogous way to Deleuze, although Chomsky’s “deep structure” refers to what Deleuze calls the “tertiary arrangement of language”. See Noam Chomsky, *Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapter three, “Deep and Surface Structure”, p. 79: “Using some recent terminology, we can distinguish the ‘deep structure’ of a sentence from its ‘surface structure’. The former is the underlying abstract structure that determines its semantic interpretation; the latter, the superficial organization of units which determines the phonetic interpretation and which relates to the physical form of the actual utterance, to its perceived or intended form. In these terms, we can formulate a second fundamental conclusion of Cartesian linguistics, namely, that deep and surface structures need not be identical. The underlying organization of a sentence relevant to semantic interpretation is not necessarily revealed by the actual arrangement and phrasing of its given components”.
  40. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 50.
  41. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 224.
  42. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 246.
  43. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 230.
  44. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 118.

45. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior* [1942], trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963). Deleuze, however, does not refer to Merleau-Ponty in *Logic of Sense*, and, indeed, in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 23, Deleuze and Guattari criticize Merleau-Ponty's concept of the *body image* as "the final avatar of the soul, a vague conjoining of the requirements of spiritualism and positivism".
46. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 187.
47. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 243.
48. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 244.
49. Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*, in *The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll*, pp. 153–5.
50. Antonin Artaud, "All Writing is Pigshit", in *Artaud Anthology*, trans. Jack Hirschman (San Francisco: City Lights Publishers, 1965), pp. 38–40.
51. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 193.
52. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 82.
53. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 91.
54. Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 5. See also Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 83.
55. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp. 86–7.
56. See Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp. 88–9: "Triumph may now be reached only through the creation of breath-words (*mots-souffles*) and howl-words (*mots-cris*), in which all literal, syllabic, and phonetic values have been replaced by values which are explosively tonic and not written. To these values a glorious body corresponds being a new dimension of the schizophrenic body, an organism without parts which operated entirely by Insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission (the superior body without organs of Antonin Artaud). . . . What defines this second language and this method of action, practically, is its consonantal, guttural, and aspirated overloads, its apostrophes and internal accents, its breaths and its scansions, and its modulation which replaces all syllabic or even literal values. . . . The word becomes an action of the body without organs".
57. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, "Louis Wolfson; or, The Procedure", p. 9. Michel Foucault comments on Deleuze's essay in his 1970 piece "Sept propos sur le septième ange" ["Seven Remarks on the Seventh Angel"], reprinted in *Dits et écrits 1954–1988* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 13–24.
58. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, pp. 7–20.
59. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, pp. 7–8.
60. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 194. See also p. 88 of the same work: "The word no longer expresses an attribute of the state of affairs; its fragments merge with unbearable sonorous qualities, invade the body where they form a mixture and a new state of affairs, as if they themselves were a noisy, poisonous food and canned excrement. The parts of the body, its organs, are determined in virtue of decomposed elements which affect and assail them. In this passion, a pure language-affect is substituted for the effect of language: 'All writing is PIG SHIT' (that is to say, every fixed or written word is decomposed into noisy, alimentary, and excremental bits)".
61. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 88.
62. For an analysis of Brisset's procedure, see Foucault, "Sept propos sur le septième ange", pp. 13–25.
63. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), p. 37.
64. For the *procédé-processus-procedure* distinction, see Gilles Deleuze, seminar of 22 October 1985 (on Foucault).

65. Michel Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*, trans. Charles Ruas, intro. John Ashbery (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1986), esp. chapter 2, “The Cushions of the Billiard Table”, pp. 13–28.
66. Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth*, p. 16.
67. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 10.
68. For a penetrating study of Nietzsche’s collapse, frequently cited by Deleuze, see Pierre Klossowski, “The Euphoria at Turin”, in *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 208–53.
69. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), §296, pp. 236–7 and 426–7, the last fragment of the book, at the end of the section “What Is Noble?”
70. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 3.
71. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp. 157–8.
72. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, p. 120.
73. Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, p. 3.
74. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 309, A312/B368–69.
75. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 21.
76. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p. 22.
77. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p. 21.
78. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 20.
79. Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 20 and 25.
80. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p. 22.
81. Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, p. 77.
82. Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* p. 173. Deleuze’s monographs in the history of philosophy all inhabit such a zone of indiscernibility, which accounts for the sense that they are fully “Deleuzian” despite the variety of figures he considers.
83. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 123.
84. Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p. 23.
85. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 133 and 370–1. For this use of the term “experimentation”, see John Cage, *Silence* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 13: “The word *experimental* is apt, providing it is understood not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown”.

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