

Why Justification Matters

Justification is one among many dimensions of epistemic evaluation. We evaluate beliefs not only in terms of justification, but also truth and falsity, reliability and unreliability, knowledge and ignorance, and so on. Moreover, justification comes apart from these other dimensions of epistemic evaluation in such a way that justified beliefs fall short of knowledge if they are false or, as in Gettier cases, if they are true, but unreliable. One of the central tasks for a theory of justification is to explain what justification is and how it differs from these other dimensions of epistemic evaluation.

The methodology that I adopt in this chapter is to approach questions in the theory of justification by considering the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation. Here, I am adapting Edward Craig's methodology for the theory of knowledge, which he sums up as follows:

We take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would be like, what conditions would govern its application. (1990: 2)

The strategy is to begin by considering the role of a concept in epistemic evaluation and then to use this in constraining a theory of the epistemic property that is picked out by the concept in question. This imposes a constraint of adequacy on a theory of the nature of justification. Whatever its nature, justification must be the kind of property that is capable of underwriting the role that our concept of justification plays in epistemic evaluation.

This methodology promises various benefits. First, it illuminates the importance of justification. After all, we do evaluate beliefs as justified or unjustified, and these evaluations seem to matter, so a theory of justification should explain why they matter – that is, why justification is an important dimension of epistemic evaluation. Second, it illuminates the nature of justification, since we can ask what justification must be like in order to play its distinctive role in epistemic evaluation. Third, it helps to resolve conflicts of intuitions about cases, since we can appeal to claims about the role of justification in adjudicating between conflicting intuitions. And fourth, it helps to avoid purely terminological debates about how to use the word 'justification'. What matters is

not which terminology we use to pick out an epistemic property, but rather the nature and importance of its role in epistemic evaluation. All of these points will figure in the discussion to follow.

This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. In section three, I distinguish between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argue that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. In section four, I argue that the propositional version of access internalism also explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. In section five, I conclude with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility and personhood.

1. Justification and Critical Reflection

What is the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation? I want to begin by elaborating on William Alston's (1989: Chs. 8 & 9) suggestion that the concept of justification plays an important role in epistemic evaluation because of its connection to the practice of critical reflection. Thus, he writes:

Why is it that we have this concept of *being justified in holding a belief* and why is it important to us? I suggest that the concept was developed, and got its hold on us, because of the practice of critical reflection on our beliefs, of challenging their credentials and responding to such challenges – in short, the practice of attempting to *justify* beliefs. (1989: 236)

Critical reflection, as Alston construes it, is the activity that we engage in when we try to justify our beliefs by reflecting on what makes them justified. Alston is careful to distinguish between the activity of *justifying* our beliefs through critical reflection and the property of *being justified*, which is what we reflect upon when we engage in the activity. Moreover, he insists that having justified beliefs requires neither engaging in the activity

of justifying one's beliefs nor even having the psychological capacities required to do so. The suggestion is not that engaging in critical reflection is what makes one's beliefs justified, but rather that the significance of the property of being justified consists in its implications for the activity of critical reflection.

Alston elaborates this suggestion in the following passage:

It would be absurd to suggest that in order to be...justified, a belief must actually have been put to the test and emerged victorious. In suggesting that the concept has developed against the background of such a practice the idea is rather that what it is for a belief to be justified is that the belief and its ground be such that it is in a position to pass such a test; that the subject has what it takes to respond successfully to such a challenge. A justified belief is one that *could* survive a critical reflection. (1989: 225)

Alston's proposal, in broad outline, is that justification is the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has what it takes to survive critical reflection.¹ A justified belief need not *actually* survive critical reflection, but it must have the *potential* to survive critical reflection in the sense that if it were subjected to critical reflection, then it would survive. My aim in the remainder of this section is to refine and develop Alston's proposal.

First, a justified belief has the potential to survive critical reflection in virtue of the way in which it held on the basis of some justifying ground or basis. An unjustified belief could survive critical reflection if its basis were to change in the process, but a justified belief is one that would survive critical reflection on its *actual basis*.²

Second, the subject of a justified belief need not have the potential to engage in critical reflection.³ After all, the basis of a justified belief is what grounds its potential to survive critical reflection. A justified belief is based in such a way that it would survive on its actual basis if it were subjected to critical reflection – perhaps by some idealized counterpart of the subject.

Third, we need to idealize not only the subject's capacity to engage in critical reflection, but also the way in which this capacity is exercised. After all, if one's critical reflections are bad enough, then justified beliefs may be abandoned and unjustified beliefs may be retained. Therefore, the crucial issue is whether a belief would survive

critical reflection that is sufficiently idealized.⁴ The nature and extent of the relevant idealization will be discussed in more detail below.

Fourth, given an appropriate idealization, we can analyze not only the conditions for *doxastic* justification – that is, what it takes for a belief to be justified – but also the conditions for *propositional* justification – that is, what it takes to have justification to believe a proposition.⁵ In light of these points, I hereby propose the following analysis of doxastic and propositional justification:

- **An analysis of doxastic justification:** one's belief that *p* is justified if and only if one's belief that *p* would survive ideal critical reflection on its actual basis.
- **An analysis of propositional justification:** one has justification to believe that *p* if and only if one would believe that *p* after ideal critical reflection on a basis that one actually has.

In what follows, I will clarify the analysis and defend it against various objections.

The analysis faces a version of the conditional fallacy objection, since the very process of idealization seems to affect which propositions one has justification to believe. For instance, if I were to engage in critical reflection, then I would believe that I had done so, although as things are, I don't have justification to believe this. Moreover, I have justification to believe that I haven't engaged in critical reflection, although I wouldn't believe this if I were to engage in critical reflection. As I will explain, however, we can understand the process of idealization in a way that brackets its psychological side-effects and thereby avoids the conditional fallacy objection.

Critical reflection is an activity that can be applied to itself. After reflecting on which propositions one has justification to believe and revising one's beliefs accordingly, one may proceed to engage in further critical reflection on how to revise one's beliefs in light of the critical reflection just undertaken, and so on without end. For the purposes of the analysis, however, let us stipulate that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one would believe that proposition after *just one* iteration of critical reflection. This avoids the problematic implication that one has justification to believe whatever one would believe after engaging in further iterations of critical reflection on the activity of critical reflection itself. If the process of idealization is understood in this way, then the conditional fallacy objection can be avoided.

One might push the objection further by arguing that idealization can affect which propositions one has *a priori* justification to believe. For instance, one might argue that, after sufficient idealization, everyone would believe all *a priori* truths of logic, mathematics and philosophy, although no one in fact has justification to believe all *a priori* truths. What motivates this objection is the assumption that one has *a priori* justification to believe a proposition only if one stands in some appropriate mental relation to that proposition, such as understanding a proof, or an argument, or having an intuition that the proposition is true. On this view, the process of idealization affects which propositions one has *a priori* justification to believe by affecting one's mental relation to the relevant propositions.

This objection raises fundamental issues about the nature of a *a priori* justification, which deserve more extended discussion elsewhere. In brief, though, my response is that the process of idealization does not affect which propositions one has *a priori* justification to believe, but only which *a priori* justified beliefs one is in a doxastic position to form. Everyone has *a priori* justification to believe all the *a priori* truths of logic, mathematics and philosophy, but not everyone is in a doxastic position to form *a priori* justified beliefs in those propositions, since not everyone satisfies the relevant mental conditions. On this view, mental conditions, such as having an intuition or understanding an argument or a proof, are not the source of one's *a priori* justification to believe a proposition; rather, these mental conditions put one in a doxastic position to use the *a priori* justification that one already has in forming an *a priori* justified belief.⁶

One might protest that this idealized conception of justification loses touch with our ordinary practice of epistemic evaluation. For instance, Frege's belief in Axiom V was justified by ordinary standards, despite the fact that it was not suited to survive ideal critical reflection on Russell's set-theoretic paradoxes. However, our ordinary standards of epistemic evaluation can be explained as an approximation towards more ideal standards. For instance, we can give a contextualist semantics on which the sentence, 'Frege's belief is justified,' is true when uttered in an ordinary context if and only if it constitutes a sufficient approximation towards the ideal of critical reflection given the human limitations that are salient in that context. Thus, our ordinary standards of epistemic evaluation can be explained by reference to ideal standards that abstract away

from normal human limitations together with further assumptions about the nature and extent of those limitations.⁷

These objections raise more general questions about how to understand the idealization that figures in the analysis. We can idealize an epistemic agent along many different dimensions, but not all of these idealizations are relevant for understanding the notion of justification. For instance, we cannot assume that ideal critical reflection involves omniscience and infallibility about a posteriori as well as a priori propositions, since this would imply that one has justification to believe all and only true propositions. Ideal critical reflection must be understood in a way that is consistent with the possibility of ignorance and error about empirical matters of fact. Intuitively, ideal critical reflection is not a matter of acquiring more accurate and complete information about the world, but is rather a matter of reflecting on one's actual state of information, which may be both inaccurate and incomplete, and revising one's beliefs in light of those reflections. This point is crucial for capturing a dimension of epistemic evaluation that concerns what one ought to believe given one's limited state of information about the world.

As I understand the idealization, ideal critical reflection is a matter of engaging in critical reflection in a way that is fully *justified*. Critical reflection is the activity of reflecting on which propositions one has justification to believe and revising one's beliefs with the aim of bringing them into line with one's higher-order reflections about which propositions one has justification to believe. Therefore, in its ideal form, critical reflection is a matter of believing a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition.

Clearly, the analysis contains an element of circularity, since the relevant idealization cannot be explained without using the concept of justification. However, while it follows that the analysis is *non-reductive*, it does not follow that the analysis is *trivial*. The general form of the analysis is that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one would believe that proposition in *ideal conditions*. If ideal conditions are simply defined as those in which one believes whatever one has justification to believe, then the analysis is trivial. On the current proposal, in contrast, ideal conditions are defined as those in which one brings one's beliefs into line with justified higher-order beliefs about which propositions one has justification to believe. It

is a substantive commitment of the proposed analysis that beliefs formed in this way are themselves justified. Moreover, the analysis is illuminating because of the way in which it connects the concept of justification with the activity of critical reflection.

Justification cannot be defined as the epistemic property that turns true belief into knowledge, since it is merely one among many epistemic properties that are necessary for a true belief to be knowledge.⁸ In this section, I have been concerned to argue that justification is an important dimension of epistemic evaluation, but this is quite consistent with acknowledging a form of epistemic pluralism on which there are many other epistemic properties that also play important roles in epistemic evaluation. My primary concern here has been to emphasize what makes justification distinctive and sets it apart from these other dimensions of epistemic evaluation, is its connection with the activity of critical reflection.

2. The Accessibility of Justification

One branch of the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology concerns the nature and extent of one's access to epistemic facts about which propositions one has justification to believe.⁹ To a first approximation, *access internalism* affirms, whereas *access externalism* denies, that one always has access to the epistemic facts about which propositions one has justification to believe. However, we cannot make progress in this debate without first defining the relevant notion of accessibility. Let us say that a fact is *positively accessible* just in case one has justification to believe that it obtains if and only if it obtains. And let us say that a fact is *negatively accessible* just in case one has justification to believe that it does not obtain if and only if it does not obtain. For current purposes, access internalism affirms, whereas access externalism denies, that the facts about which propositions one has justification to believe are positively and negatively accessible in the sense defined. Thus, the debate concerns whether or not the following conditions are satisfied for every proposition, *p*:

- (i) **Positive accessibility:** one has justification to believe that *p* if and only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to believe that *p*; and
- (ii) **Negative accessibility:** one lacks justification to believe that *p* if and only if one has justification to believe that one lacks justification to believe that *p*.

My aim in this section is to argue for access internalism by appealing to the connection between justification and critical reflection defended in the previous section.¹⁰ Here again, I take my inspiration from Alston, who argues that a belief is justified, and so has the potential to survive critical reflection, only if the justifying ground or basis of the belief – which he calls its ‘justifier’ – is accessible to the subject on the basis of critical reflection alone:

A justified belief is one that *could* survive a critical reflection. But then the justifier must be accessible to the subject. Otherwise the subject would be in no position to cite it as what provides a sufficient indication that the belief is true. (1989: 225)

According to Alston, however, one must have access to one’s justifiers, but one need not have access to the fact that they justify one’s beliefs. Alston claims that one’s justifiers play their role in justifying one’s beliefs in virtue of their reliable connections to the world. On his view, one’s justifiers must be accessible, but the properties in virtue of which they justify one’s beliefs – namely, their reliable connections to the world – need not be so accessible. Thus, Alston’s hybrid view, which he dubs “internalist externalism”, is not consistent with access internalism as it is defined above.

Alston’s hybrid view is unstable, since his weak version of the accessibility requirement fails to sustain the connection between justification and critical reflection. Indeed, Alston himself makes the crucial observations in the following passage:

Suppose that the sorts of things that can count as justifiers are always accessible to me, but that it is not accessible to me which items of these sorts count as justifications for which beliefs. I have access to the justifiers but not to their justificatory efficacy.... To illustrate, let’s suppose that experiences can function as justifiers, and that they are accessible to us. I can always tell what sensory experiences I am having at a given moment. Even so, if I am unable to tell what belief about the current physical environment is justified by a given sensory episode, I am thereby unable to regulate my perceptual beliefs according as they possess or lack experiential justification. (1989: 221)

If my justifiers are accessible, but not the fact that they justify my beliefs, then my justified beliefs will not necessarily have what it takes to survive ideal critical reflection.

Suppose I form a justified belief on the basis of perceptual experience. And suppose my perceptual experience is accessible, but not the fact that it justifies my belief. In that case, my belief does not have what it takes to survive ideal critical reflection. After all, the aim of critical reflection is to bring my beliefs into line with justified higher-order reflections about which propositions I have justification to believe. If I don't have higher-order justification to believe that I have justification to believe the proposition in question, then my belief doesn't have what it takes to withstand ideal critical reflection. Thus, my belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection only if the fact that I have justification for such a belief is accessible to me on the basis of critical reflection.

The upshot of this critique of Alston's hybrid view is that access internalism can be motivated as a consequence of the analysis of justification defended in section one. Consider the following argument for the positive accessibility thesis:

- (1) One has justification to believe that p if and only if one would believe that p after ideal critical reflection.
- (2) One would believe that p after ideal critical reflection if and only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p . Therefore,
- (3) One has justification to believe that p if and only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p .

Both premises of this argument were defended in section one. The first premise restates the analysis of justification in terms of ideal critical reflection, while the second premise restates the explication of ideal critical reflection as a matter of reflecting on which propositions one has justification to believe and believing a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe it.

Opponents of access internalism may reject one or both of these premises, but they must be careful in doing so to avoid the risk of purely terminological disagreement. Merely replacing the proposed analysis with some alternative threatens to change the subject by simply using the word 'justification' to pick out a different epistemic property. Access internalism is consistent with epistemic pluralism, according to which there are many important epistemic properties, which play a range of different roles in epistemic evaluation. It is not committed to the implausible claim that all epistemic properties are accessible, including knowledge, reliability, and truth, but only to the claim that there is

an epistemic property that is accessible and for which it reserves the term ‘justification’. Anyone who accepts the existence of such a property, but uses the term ‘justification’ to pick out a different property, has only a terminological disagreement with access internalism. Therefore, those who oppose access internalism on substantive grounds must argue that no important epistemic property is accessible in the relevant sense.¹¹

In order to complete the case for access internalism, we need an argument for the negative version, as well as the positive version, of the accessibility thesis. The argument for negative accessibility is slightly more complicated, since it relies on some additional assumptions, but the basic line of reasoning is very similar. The first step is to extend the argument for positive accessibility to include all doxastic attitudes – that is, not just belief, but also disbelief and withholding. The argument can be extended as follows:

- (1) One has justification to adopt doxastic attitude D towards the proposition that p if and only if one would adopt D towards p after ideal critical reflection.
- (2) One would adopt D towards p after ideal critical reflection if and only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to adopt D towards p . Therefore,
- (3) One has justification to adopt D towards p if and only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to adopt D towards p .

Given some plausible assumptions, we can now derive negative accessibility from the extended version of positive accessibility. The first assumption is the uniqueness thesis, which states that for every proposition, there is a unique doxastic attitude D (that is, either belief, disbelief, or withholding) that one has justification to adopt towards the proposition in question.¹² The second assumption is that if the uniqueness thesis is true, then it is an a priori truth and so one has a priori justification to believe it.¹³ The third assumption is a closure principle for justification, which states that one has justification to believe a conditional if and only if one has justification to believe the consequent if one has justification to believe the antecedent.¹⁴ Given these assumptions, we can argue for the negative accessibility thesis as follows:

- (1) One lacks justification to believe that p if and only if one has justification to disbelieve or to withhold belief that p . (By uniqueness.)

- (2) One has justification to disbelieve or to withhold belief that p if and only if one has justification to believe that one has justification to disbelieve or to withhold belief that p . (By positive accessibility.)
- (3) One has justification to believe that one has justification to disbelieve or to withhold belief that p if and only if one has justification to believe that one lacks justification to believe that p . (From 1, by closure.¹⁵)
- (4) Therefore, if one lacks justification to believe that p , then one has justification to believe that one lacks justification to believe that p . (From 1, 2, 3.)

This completes my argument for access internalism. If access internalism is true, then a theory of justification should explain *why* it is true – that is, it should give an account of the determinants of justification that explains why justification is accessible. This is a task that I take up in other work.¹⁶

3. Propositional and Doxastic Accessibility

Access internalism, as I have formulated it, is a thesis about propositional justification, rather than doxastic justification: it is not a thesis about which of one's beliefs are justified, but about which propositions one has justification to believe.¹⁷ Justified belief requires not only *having* justification to believe a proposition, but also *using* it – that is, believing the proposition on the basis of one's justification to believe it. Therefore, propositional justification is necessary but not sufficient for doxastic justification, since one may have justification to believe a proposition without using it and, I will argue, without having any capacity to use it. As I will explain, this distinction between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism is crucial for avoiding some familiar objections.

The propositional version of access internalism states that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. The doxastic version, by contrast, states that one's belief in some proposition is justified if and only if it is based on a justified higher-order belief that one has justification to believe that proposition. For instance, one of the key premises of Laurence Bonjour's (1985: Ch.2) argument against foundationalism is

that a belief B is justified if and only if it is held on the basis of a meta-justificatory argument of the following form:

- (1) B has feature ϕ .
- (2) Beliefs having feature ϕ are highly likely to be true.
- (3) Therefore, B is highly likely to be true.

According to Bonjour, “it is necessary, not merely that a justification along the above lines exist in the abstract, but also that [the subject] himself be in cognitive possession of that justification, that is, that he believe the appropriate premises of forms (1) and (2) and that these beliefs be justified *for him*.” (1985: 31)

The doxastic version of access internalism is subject to an over-intellectualization problem, since it is plausible that some human infants and non-human animals can form justified beliefs, although they do not have the conceptual or reflective abilities to form justified beliefs about which propositions they have justification to believe. Moreover, the doxastic version of access internalism faces a regress problem, since one’s first-order beliefs are justified only if they are based on justified second-order beliefs, but these second-order beliefs are justified only if they are based on justified third-order beliefs, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, one has justified beliefs only if one has an infinite hierarchy of increasingly complicated higher-order justified beliefs. And yet no finite creature can have this kind of infinite hierarchy of increasingly complicated higher-order justified beliefs, which generates the skeptical conclusion that no finite creature has justified beliefs.¹⁸

The propositional version of access internalism avoids the over-intellectualization problem, since it does not imply that one’s beliefs are justified only if they are based on justified higher-order beliefs about which propositions one has justification to believe. It does generate an infinite regress, since it implies that one has first-order justification to believe a proposition only if one has second-order justification to believe that one has first-order justification, and one has second-order justification only if one has third-order justification to believe that one has second-order justification, and so on ad infinitum. However, it does not imply that one must believe any of these higher-order propositions in order to have justified beliefs and so the infinite regress is not vicious, but benign.

It might be objected that while *having* justification to believe a proposition does not require *using* it in forming a justified belief, it does require having the *capacity* to use it in forming a justified belief. We might call this *the capacity principle*. If the capacity principle is true, then the problems of over-intellectualization and vicious regress arise for propositional as well as doxastic versions of access internalism. After all, human infants and non-human animals have justification to believe certain propositions, despite being unable to form justified higher-order beliefs about whether or not they have justification to believe those propositions. Moreover, normal human adults have justification to believe certain propositions, despite being unable to form an infinite hierarchy of higher-order justified beliefs of ever-increasing complexity.

For the purposes of this objection, it is important to distinguish between idealized and non-idealized versions of the capacity principle. According to the idealized version, one has justification to believe a proposition only if one has the capacity to use it in forming a justified belief *after sufficient idealization*. However, the idealized version of the capacity principle is innocuous. After all, human infants and non-human animals would form justified higher-order beliefs after sufficient idealization. Moreover, there is no upper limit on the number of justified higher-order beliefs that would be formed after sufficient idealization and hence there is no higher-order proposition that one has justification to believe, but which one is unable to believe after sufficient idealization. In order to generate problems for the propositional version of access internalism, we need to assume a non-idealized version of the capacity principle. In what follows, however, I will argue that there is no good reason to assume that one's doxastic capacities impose limits on which propositions one has justification to believe.

Many epistemologists have found it plausible to suppose that there is an analytic connection between propositional and doxastic justification. Some define propositional justification in such a way that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has a capacity to form a justified belief in that proposition. For instance, Alvin Goldman defines the distinction between *ex ante* and *ex post* justification like this:

Person S is *ex ante* justified in believing *p* at *t* if and only if there is a reliable belief-forming operation available to S which is such that if S applied that

operation to his total cognitive state at t , S would believe p at t -plus-delta (for a suitably small delta) and that belief would be *ex post* justified. (1979: 21)

It is a straightforward consequence of this analysis that the limitations of one's doxastic capacities (or, in Goldman's terminology, one's belief-forming operations) impose corresponding limits on which propositions one has justification to believe. Arguably, though, propositional justification is more basic than doxastic justification in the order of philosophical analysis and so doxastic justification should be analyzed in terms of propositional justification, rather than vice versa.¹⁹ Thus, one has the capacity to form a justified belief in a certain proposition if and only if one has justification to believe that proposition and, moreover, one has the doxastic capacities required to use one's justification to believe that proposition in forming a justified belief. This has the advantage of leaving open a question that should not be closed by definition – that is, whether or not it is required for having justification to believe a proposition that one has also the doxastic capacity to use it in forming a justified belief.

In section one, I argued for an analytic connection between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one would believe that proposition after ideal critical reflection. But there are two key points to note here. First, the proposed analysis is consistent with the priority of propositional justification over doxastic justification, since the explication of ideal critical reflection appeals to the concept of propositional justification. And second, the analysis supports an idealized, rather than non-idealized, version of the capacity principle, according to which one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has the capacity to believe that proposition after an idealized process of critical reflection. If it is understood in this way, the analytic connection between propositional and doxastic justification provides no support for the claim that one's doxastic capacities impose limits on which propositions one has justification to believe.

An influential line of argument for doxastic limits on propositional justification appeals to a deontological conception of justification together with an ought-implies-can principle.²⁰ On this view, epistemic justification is a source of epistemic obligations, which are binding only insofar as one has the psychological capacities required to discharge them. The argument proceeds roughly as follows:

- (1) If one has justification to believe a proposition, then one ought to form a justified belief in that proposition.
- (2) If one ought to form a justified belief in a proposition, then one can form a justified belief in that proposition.
- (3) So, if one has justification to believe a proposition, then one can form a justified belief in that proposition.

However, the conclusion of the argument is subject to intuitive counterexamples in which one is incapable of believing what one has justification to believe owing to the corrupting influence of drugs, brainwashing or mental illness.²¹ In these cases, one's doxastic incapacity is enough to excuse one from blame, but the mere absence of blameworthiness is not sufficient for the presence of justification. So, while it is plausible that there are doxastic limits on blameworthiness, it does not follow that there are doxastic limits on which propositions one has justification to believe.

There are two options for responding to this argument, The first is to deny the second premise by arguing that 'ought' does not always imply 'can'. Thus, Richard Feldman (2000) argues that there are so-called 'role oughts' that apply to whoever plays a certain role, regardless of how well they are capable of playing that role – for instance, chefs ought to make delicious food and jugglers ought to keep their balls in the air. Similarly, Feldman argues, there are epistemic 'oughts' that apply to us in virtue of our role as believers: "It is our plight to be believers. We ought to do it right. It doesn't matter that in some cases we are unable to do so." (2000: 676)

The second option is to deny the first premise of the argument by rejecting the deontological conception of justification in favour of an evaluative conception. Thus, Alston (1989: Chs. 4 & 5) argues that justification is a source of epistemic values or evaluative ideals, rather than obligations. Deciding between these two options depends on how we understand the nature of the relationship between values and obligations. Are we obliged to achieve evaluative ideals or merely to approximate them as closely as we can? Perhaps there is an attenuated sense in which we ought to achieve ideals regardless of whether we are capable of doing so.²² But there seems also to be a more robust sense, which is closely connected with our assessments of praise and blame, in which we are obliged merely to approximate towards ideals to the extent that we are capable of doing

so.²³ In this robust sense, our epistemic obligations can be reconstructed from epistemic ideals together with further assumptions about our contingent doxastic limitations.

If justification is a source of evaluative ideals, rather than obligations, then we need not assume that there are doxastic limits on propositional justification. Rather, propositional justification corresponds to an evaluative ideal that abstracts away from our contingent doxastic limitations. On this view, the propositions that one has justification to believe are those propositions that one would believe if one were to be idealized in certain ways. However, not all ideals need be humanly attainable. Epistemic ideals – like ideals of morality, scientific understanding, and chess – may lie beyond our limited human capacities. Therefore, the limits on human doxastic capacities need not constrain our understanding of the epistemic ideal, but only the extent to which we are capable of approximating towards the ideal. As David Christensen (2004: 162) puts the point, “Not all evaluation need be circumscribed by the abilities of the evaluated. In epistemology, as in various other arenas, we need not grade on effort.”

4. Intuitions about Cases

Michael Bergmann (2006: Ch.1) argues that access internalism is motivated by intuitions about cases, which cannot be explained except by a version of access internalism that generates a vicious regress. Thus, he argues, access internalism is faced with a dilemma: either it is viciously regressive or it is unmotivated. I will argue, in response to Bergmann, that the propositional version of access internalism defended in this paper is both strong enough to explain the relevant intuitions about cases and weak enough to avoid a vicious regress. Therefore, I conclude that Bergmann’s dilemma for access internalism is unsuccessful.

According to Bergmann, access internalism is motivated by intuitions about cases, such as Laurence Bonjour’s (1985) case of the clairvoyant, Norman:

Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no

evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (1985: 41)

BonJour's intuition about the case is that Norman's belief is unjustified, despite the fact that it is formed on the basis of a clairvoyant power that is reliable in the circumstances. This intuition is widely shared, but not everyone is persuaded. So, why not simply bite the bullet and insist that Norman's belief is justified? As Bergmann reconstructs matters, BonJour confronts his opponents with the following objection:

- **The Subject's Perspective Objection:** If the subject holding a belief isn't aware of what that belief has going for it, then she isn't aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. And that implies that it isn't a justified belief. (2006: 12)

Moreover, the same objection applies to any theory of justification that does not endorse the following strong awareness requirement on justification:

- **The Strong Awareness Requirement:** S's belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B...and (ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of X [as contributing to the justification of B].²⁴ (2006: 9)

As Bergmann explains, however, the strong awareness requirement generates a vicious regress. Consider the doxastic version of the strong awareness requirement, according to which S's belief B is justified only if S has (or potentially has) a justified belief that X contributes to the justification of B.²⁵ This implies that S's belief B1 is justified only if S has (or potentially has) a justified belief B2 that X1 contributes to the justification of B1, and S has a justified belief B2 only if S has (or potentially has) a justified belief B3 that X2 contributes to the justification of B2, and so on ad infinitum. And yet no finite subject has (or potentially has) an infinite series of increasingly complicated higher-order beliefs. Bergmann concludes with a dilemma: if access internalism accepts the strong awareness requirement, then it generates a vicious regress, but if not, then it is unmotivated.

My response to Bergmann's dilemma trades on the distinction between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism. To recap, the doxastic version of access internalism states that one's belief that *p* is justified only if it is based on a

justified higher-order belief that one has justification to believe that p . This generates a vicious regress, since it implies that one has a justified belief only if one has an infinite hierarchy of increasingly complicated justified higher-order beliefs. The propositional version, by contrast, states that one has justification to believe that p only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p . This also generates an infinite regress, since it implies that one has justification to believe a proposition only if one has justification to believe an infinite regress of higher-order propositions. In the previous section, however, in the previous section, I argued that this infinite regress is not vicious, but benign. If this is correct, then the propositional version of access internalism avoids the first horn of the dilemma.

What about the second horn? Presumably, Bergmann will claim that if the propositional version of access internalism is weak enough to avoid the regress problem, then it is not strong enough to explain internalist intuitions about cases and so it is unmotivated. My reply has two parts. First, I deny that the propositional version of access internalism is motivated solely by intuitions about cases. As I argued in section two, it is independently motivated by theoretical considerations about the role of justification in epistemic evaluation as an ideal of critical reflection. Second, as I explain below, the propositional version of access internalism is strong enough to explain and vindicate internalist intuitions about cases. Taken in tandem, these points have important methodological consequences for the role of intuitions in epistemological theory. On my theory of justification, for instance, it is not simply a brute deliverance of intuition that Norman's clairvoyant beliefs are unjustified. Rather, this is the conclusion of an argument whose premises are independently motivated by theoretical considerations about the connection between justification and critical reflection.

In the following passage, BonJour appeals to the connection between justification and critical reflection in explaining why Norman's belief is unjustified:

Norman's acceptance of the belief about the President's whereabouts is epistemically irrational and irresponsible, and thereby unjustified, whether or not he believes himself to have clairvoyant power, so long as he has no justification for such a belief. Part of one's epistemic duty is to reflect critically upon one's

beliefs, and such critical reflection precludes believing things to which one has, to one's knowledge, no reliable means of epistemic access. (1985: 42)

According to BonJour, Norman's belief is unjustified because he violates an epistemic duty to subject his belief to critical reflection and is therefore guilty of epistemic irresponsibility. The suggestion is that a belief is justified only if it is held on the basis of critical reflection in a way that is epistemically responsible. As Bergmann (2005: 430) comments, "It seems that he [i.e. BonJour] thinks that Norman must take up some doxastic attitude towards [the proposition that he has justification to believe that p] in order for his belief that p to be justified." Thus, BonJour's reasoning can be made explicit in the form of an argument that relies on a doxastic version of access internalism:

- (1) One's belief that p is justified if and only if it is based on a justified higher-order belief that one has justification to believe that p .
- (2) Norman's belief that the President is in New York City is not based on a justified higher-order belief that he has justification to believe that the President is in New York City.
- (3) Therefore, Norman's belief that the President is in New York City is unjustified.

The problem with BonJour's reasoning is that the doxastic version of access internalism falls prey to the familiar objections from over-intellectualization and vicious regress.

Like BonJour, I want to explain why Norman's belief is unjustified by appealing to the connection between justification and critical reflection. However, I understand this connection rather differently from BonJour, since I take it to motivate a propositional version of access internalism, rather than a doxastic version. Thus, BonJour's reasoning may be usefully compared and contrasted with my own:

- (1) One has justification to believe that p if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that p .
- (2) Norman does not have higher-order justification to believe that he has justification to believe that the President is in New York City.
- (3) Therefore, Norman does not have justification to believe that the President is in New York City.

In my view, the crucial issue is not whether Norman subjects his clairvoyant belief to critical reflection or even whether he has the capacity to do so. Rather, the crucial issue is

whether his belief has what it takes to survive an idealized process of critical reflection. Whether or not he reflects on the matter, Norman's belief does not have the potential to survive ideal critical reflection, since he does not have higher-order justification to believe that he has justification to believe that the President is in New York City.²⁶ Therefore, it follows that he lacks justification to believe that the President is in New York City and so his belief is unjustified.

The practice of relying on intuitions about cases as data for an epistemological theory has been the target of criticism by recent work in experimental philosophy. For instance, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) present experimental evidence to support the claim that there is cultural and socio-economic variation in epistemic intuitions. This raises questions about which epistemic intuitions, if any, should carry evidential weight in cases of disagreement. As they put the question, "Why should we privilege our intuitions rather than the intuitions of some other group?" (2001: 435)

One possibility, of course, is that the appearance of disagreement is misleading, since different parties use the term 'justification' to pick out different epistemic properties. If so, then there may be no substantial disagreement about which epistemic properties are instantiated in a given case, as opposed to a purely terminological disagreement about which of these properties deserves the name 'justification'. Indeed, Alston suggests the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology may be a purely terminological debate and suggests the following diagnosis: "Norman exhibits one epistemically important desideratum – a belief formed in a reliable way – and lacks another. We can then discuss what the further implications are of the possession or lack of each of these desiderata." (2005: 55)

Alston's methodological recommendations are highly congenial to the approach that I have adopted in this paper. As far as I am concerned, what matters is not which terminology we use to pick out an epistemic property, but rather the importance of its role in epistemic evaluation. We can avoid terminological disputes about whether the word 'justification' applies in a particular case by asking instead whether the case instantiates properties that are suited to play an important and distinctive role in epistemic evaluation.²⁷ It seems to me that Alston underestimates the extent to which the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology depends on substantive, as opposed

to purely terminological, disagreement. My main concern here is to emphasize that these disagreements need not ground out in conflicting intuitions about cases. On the contrary, intuitions about cases can and should be vindicated in light of theoretical considerations about the role of a property in epistemic evaluation.

This reflects a more general constraint of adequacy on a theory of justification, which is that it should not merely conform to intuitive judgements about how the word 'justification' applies in actual and counterfactual cases; it should also vindicate those intuitive judgements by explaining how the property picked out by those intuitive judgements plays an important role in epistemic evaluation. To the extent that this cannot be done, intuitive judgements about cases should be corrected in light of theoretical considerations about what the extension of the word would have to be like in order to play an important epistemic role.²⁸ Otherwise, why should we care about justification?

5. Why Critical Reflection Matters

My main goal in this paper has been to argue that justification is an important dimension of epistemic evaluation because of its role as a regulative ideal for the activity of critical reflection. However, the argument so far leaves a crucial question unanswered. Why should we assume that critical reflection is an important activity and hence that there is an important regulative ideal that corresponds to doing well in that activity?

One might argue that critical reflection is an important activity because, when it is sufficiently ideal, it increases the overall reliability of our beliefs by weeding out logical fallacies, hasty generalizations, baseless prejudice and wishful thinking. However, there is no guarantee that ideal critical reflection will necessarily make us more reliable, since this depends on contingent facts about the actual state of the world. There are possible states of the world in which irrational dispositions make us more reliable and in which ideal critical reflection reduces our overall reliability.

In my view, critical reflection need not necessarily make us more reliable in order to count as a valuable activity.²⁹ Of course, the challenge remains to explain why critical reflection is an important activity if it doesn't necessarily make us more reliable. Following Tyler Burge (1996, 1998), I will argue that critical reflection is an important activity because it is a distinguishing mark of being a person, who can be held

responsible for one's beliefs and choices, that one has the capacity to engage in critical reflection. I take it as a datum that being a person is an important status, so if the capacity for critical reflection is essential for being a person, then critical reflection is an important activity. Moreover, if critical reflection is an important activity, then justification is an important dimension of epistemic evaluation, since it corresponds to an important regulative ideal.

Reasoning and other forms of rational belief-revision are not always performed under the guidance of critical reflection. Normal human adults are unique in having the ability to engage in critical reflection – that is, to reflect upon which propositions they have justification to believe and to revise their beliefs accordingly. But not all of our reasoning is carried out under the guidance of critical reflection. Our beliefs are often formed, revised and maintained in a way that is highly automatic and unreflective. Moreover, some human infants and non-human animals engage in unreflective reasoning, while lacking any capacity to engage in critical reflection.

On my proposal, all justified beliefs have the potential to survive an idealized process of critical reflection, but not all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of critical reflection, since justified beliefs can be formed on the basis of reflective and unreflective reasoning alike. Moreover, human infants and non-human animals can have justified beliefs without having any capacity to engage in critical reflection. Nevertheless, it is plausible that human adults can be held responsible for the justificatory status of their beliefs, since they are capable of engaging in critical reflection on their beliefs. Thus, unreflective subjects can have beliefs that are justified or unjustified, but only reflective subjects can have beliefs that are held in a way that is responsible or irresponsible. This is because one cannot be held responsible for one's beliefs unless one has the capacity for reflecting on their justificatory status and revising them accordingly.

Responsibility is the distinguishing mark of personhood. Persons are distinguished from animals by the fact that they can be held responsible for their beliefs and choices. This is why we do not normally regard it as appropriate to adopt reactive attitudes, such as praise and blame, or gratitude and resentment, towards human infants and non-human animals.³⁰ After all, it is not appropriate to praise or blame subjects for their beliefs and choices unless they can be held responsible for those beliefs and choices.

However, one cannot be held responsible for one's beliefs and choices unless one has a capacity to revise one's beliefs and choices in light of critical reflection. Some human infants and non-human animals can form justified beliefs on the basis of unreflective reasoning, but they cannot be held responsible for the justificatory status of their beliefs, since they do not have the capacity for critical reflection. Thus, persons are distinguished from other animals by their ability to engage in critical reflection, which enables them to be held responsible for their beliefs and choices.³¹

Many internalist theories of justification emphasize the importance of the relationship between justification and responsibility. Thus, Bonjour (1985: 8) writes, "The idea of avoiding...irresponsibility, of being epistemically responsible in one's believings, is the core of the notion of epistemic justification." In my view, however, the nature of the relationship between justification and responsibility has been widely misunderstood. Internalism is often credited with the implausible thesis that a belief is justified if and only if it is held in a way that is responsible. In response, externalists quite rightly protest that this is an over-intellectualization, since responsibility requires a capacity for critical reflection, whereas justified belief does not. According to my own version of internalism, not all justified beliefs are responsibly held, and not all unjustified beliefs are irresponsibly held, since one cannot be held responsible for the justificatory status of one's beliefs unless one has a capacity to engage in critical reflection. Nevertheless, there is a connection between justification and responsibility, since a justified belief is one that has the potential to survive an idealized process of critical reflection in a way that is epistemically responsible.

Others have drawn related distinctions between those epistemic properties that do and those that do not require the possession of reflective capacities. Thus, Ernest Sosa (1991) draws a distinction between *animal knowledge*, which is *apt* in the sense that it derives from a reliable intellectual virtue or disposition, and *reflective knowledge*, which is *justified* in the sense that it comprises part of a coherent higher-order perspective on one's beliefs.³² Similarly, Tyler Burge (1996) draws a distinction between *entitlement* and *justification*, according to which the former is distinguished from the latter on the grounds that it need not be conceptualized by the subject.³³ Sosa and Burge use the term 'justification' to pick out an epistemic property that applies only to reflective capacities,

whereas my use includes reflective and unreflective creatures alike. Moreover, this terminological difference reflects an underlying disagreement of substance, since Sosa and Burge assume that internalist theories of justification apply only to reflective creatures and so they develop externalist theories of the epistemic properties that apply to unreflective creatures. Thus, Burge (2003: 504) writes, “Epistemic externalism ... constitutes an antidote to hyper-intellectualization.” However, the internalist theory of justification developed in this paper undermines the influential view that externalism is mandated by the need to avoid hyper-intellectualization in epistemology.

The debate between internalism and externalism about justification tends to oscillate between two extremes. On the one hand, internalist theories tend to over-intellectualize the requirements for justification in such a way as to rule out the possibility of unreflectively justified belief. On the other hand, externalist theories tend to allow for the possibility of unreflectively justified belief by severing the connection between justification and epistemic responsibility altogether. This dialectical situation is exacerbated by the fact that the connection between justification and epistemic responsibility disappears from view when we restrict our attention to cases of unreflectively justified belief. After all, the significance of the concept of justified belief emerges only in the context of its role as an ideal of critical reflection. In order to reach a satisfactory resolution of the debate between internalism and externalism, we need to make sense of the possibility of unreflective justification without losing sight of the role of justification in the practice of critical reflection. My proposal is designed to occupy this elusive middle ground.³⁴

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¹ Compare Audi’s (1988: 6) process-property integration thesis: “a belief is justified (has the property of justifiedness) if and only if it has one or more other, non-normative properties such that (i) in virtue of them it is justified, and (ii) citing them can, at least in principle, both show that it is justified and (conceptually) *constitute* justifying it.” Thanks to Peter Graham for the reference.

² The first-order basis of a justified belief may be supplemented by an appropriately related higher-order basis after critical reflection. Thanks to Brian McLean for discussion on this point.

³ This undermines Alston’s (1989: 226, n. 45) doubts about whether the concept of justification applies to creatures that are incapable of critical reflection.

⁴ Foley (1993) gives a related analysis of egocentric rationality as invulnerability to self-criticism by one’s own deepest epistemic standards. However, Foley’s analysis does not allow for idealization in one’s epistemic standards, or in one’s ability to apply them, but only in the conditions in which they are applied. Therefore, Foley counts some dogmatic and delusional beliefs as rational, whereas I count them as unjustified because they would not survive appropriate idealization in one’s capacity for critical reflection.

⁵ See Firth (1978) for the distinction between doxastic and propositional justification.

⁶ See Peacocke (2004: 205-7) for a congenial account of a priori justification on which having a conscious impression of the truth of a logical proposition is not the source of one’s a priori justification to believe it, but is rather a rational response to the existence of an a priori justification, which is independent of one’s conscious mental state.

⁷ Compare Christensen’s (2004: Ch. 6) discussion of the ideal of probabilistic coherence and its connection with our ordinary practices of epistemic evaluation. In more recent work, Christensen (2007) raises a problem for the ideal of probabilistic coherence that relies on assumptions about higher-order evidence, which I plan to address in detail elsewhere.

⁸ Plantinga (1993) defines ‘warrant’ as the property that turns true belief into knowledge, but Williamson (2000: Ch.1) argues that there is no property distinct from knowledge that satisfies this definition.

⁹ See Goldberg (this volume) for a different perspective on the debate between internalism and externalism. Strictly speaking, there is not just one debate, but a cluster of related debates that are often grouped

together under the same rubric. For instance, Alston (1989: Ch.8) distinguishes “access internalism” from “perspectival internalism”, which he defines as the thesis that which propositions one has justification to believe depends on the subject’s beliefs and other mental states that figure within one’s subjective perspective or point of view on the world. Smithies (2012) argues that access internalism and perspectival internalism stand or fall together, while many others regard them as orthogonal.

¹⁰ My argument for access internalism does not appeal to a deontological concept of justification, unlike those proposed by Ginet (1975) and criticized by Alston (1989: Ch.8), Plantinga (1993: Ch.1), Goldman (1999) and Bergmann (2006: Ch.4). See Smithies (forthcoming, a) for an independent argument for access internalism that appeals to the epistemic version of Moore’s paradox that is generated by belief in Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘ p and I don’t have justification to believe that p ’.

¹¹ Williamson (2000: Ch.4), Greco (1990, 2005) and Bergmann (2006: Ch.1) argue that no important epistemic property is accessible in the relevant sense. I respond to Williamson’s argument in Smithies (forthcoming, b) and to Greco’s and Bergmann’s arguments in sections three and four below.

¹² See White (2005) for detailed discussion and defence of the uniqueness thesis.

¹³ I assume here that all epistemic principles are a priori truths or falsehoods.

¹⁴ In symbols, the closure principle states that $J(p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (Jp \rightarrow Jq)$.

¹⁵ Premise (1) can be symbolized as follows: $\sim Jp \leftrightarrow (J\sim p \vee J?p)$. Since one has justification to believe this, we can add: $J(\sim Jp \leftrightarrow (J\sim p \vee J?p))$. So, by the closure principle, we may conclude: $J\sim Jp \leftrightarrow (JJ\sim p \vee JJ?p)$.

¹⁶ Smithies (2012) argues that access internalism is explained by a form of perspectival internalism on which the facts about which propositions one has justification to believe are determined by facts about one’s introspectively accessible mental states.

¹⁷ One reason for this is that the basing relation is not accessible. Schaffer’s (2010) debasing demon could make one’s beliefs unjustified by undetectably changing the basis on which they are held without thereby undermining one’s justification to believe that they are justified.

¹⁸ The regress problem is developed in various different ways by Alston (1989: Ch.8), Greco (1990) and Bergmann (2006: Ch.1).

¹⁹ Kvanvig and Menzel (1990) argue that propositional justification is more basic than doxastic justification, while Turri (2010) argues for the opposing view that doxastic justification is more basic than propositional justification. There is also logical space for a no priority view on which propositional and doxastic justification are equally basic.

²⁰ Alston (1989: Ch.5) discusses a closely related line of argument that the deontological conception of justification implies that one has voluntary control over one’s beliefs.

²¹ For examples of this kind, see Feldman and Conee (1985: 17), Alston (1989: 95-6), Pryor (2001: 114-5) and Christensen (2004: 161-2).

²² Thus, Feldman and Conee (1985: 19) claim: “In any case of a standard for conduct ... it is appropriate to speak of ‘requirements’ or ‘obligations’ that the standard imposes.”

²³ Pryor (2001: 115, fn. 36) draws a related distinction between thick and thin notions of ‘obligation’.

²⁴ Bergmann (2006: 13) distinguishes between strong versions of the awareness requirement, which endorse the condition stated in square brackets, and weak versions, which reject it. Bergmann (2000: 19-21) argues that weak versions of the awareness requirement are unmotivated, since they are vulnerable to the subject's perspective objection.

²⁵ Bergmann (2006: 14-19) also considers a nondoxastic version of the strong awareness requirement and argues that it also generates a vicious regress.

²⁶ Notice that proponents of reliabilist theories of justification cannot deny the second premise of the argument without taking on an implausible commitment to the accessibility of facts about reliability.

²⁷ Chalmers (2011) recommends a similar approach towards terminological debates.

²⁸ These considerations also explain why the methodology of experimental philosophy cannot substitute for the methodology of analytic epistemology, since theoretical considerations should play a role in deciding which intuitions to accept and which to reject. Indeed, I doubt that there is ultimately any sharp distinction to be drawn between intuitions and theory.

²⁹ Here, I am rejecting what DePaul (2001) calls "value monism" in epistemology, which is the view that truth is the only epistemic good. I doubt that the value and importance of justification can be explained non-reductively in terms of its reliability or truth-conduciveness.

³⁰ See Strawson (1962) for a classic discussion of the reactive attitudes and their connection with the concept of responsibility.

³¹ Locke's (1689: II xxvii 9) famous definition of personhood requires not only reason and consciousness, but also reflection and self-consciousness; thus, a person is "a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can think of itself as itself, a thinking intelligent thing, in different times and places."

³² "For animal knowledge one needs only belief that is apt and derives from an intellectual virtue or faculty. By contrast, reflective knowledge always requires belief that is not only apt but also has a kind of justification, since it must be belief that fits coherently within the epistemic perspective of the believer." (1991: 145)

³³ "I take the notion of epistemic warrant to be broader than the ordinary notion of justification. An individual's epistemic warrant may consist in a justification that the individual has for a belief or other epistemic act or state. But it may also be an *entitlement* that consists in a status of operating in an appropriate way in accord with norms of reason, even when these norms cannot be articulated by the individual who has that status." (1996: 94)

³⁴ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Australian National University in February 2008 and at the Chambers Conference at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln in September 2010. I am grateful to audiences on those occasions and especially to David Chalmers, Stewart Cohen, Trent Dougherty, Jeremy Fantl, David Henderson, Brent Madison, Brian McLean, Nicholas Silins, Sigrun Svavarsdottir, and Daniel Stoljar for helpful comments and discussion.