

## Heidegger's World Projection vs Braver's Concept of Worldview

### Abstract:

Heidegger's analysis of the use of tools under the rubric of the ready to hand , or handiness, introduced in the first division of Being and Time, has been an important influence on Lee Braver's thinking. Braver reads Heidegger's ready to hand alongside the later Wittgenstein's language games as articulations of a mode of creativity he describes as absorbed, engaged coping. This mode is both more immediate and more fundamental than representational, conceptual thinking. In this paper, I compare Heidegger's account of the ready to hand with Braver's model of engaged coping. My contention is that Heidegger's radically temporal understanding of the gesture of the ideal, the empirical and their relation differs significantly from Braver's existentialist reading of him. The latter's analysis of mindful and mindless coping falls within the orbit of the metaphysical epoch Heidegger called the age of the world picture. This causes Braver to misread Heidegger's concept of world projection as the formation of worldviews. As a consequence, Braver understands sameness and otherness, mindfulness and mindlessness in such a way as to reverse the roles concepts such as conspicuousness and inconspicuousness, concealment and unconcealment play in Heidegger's texts. Whereas when Braver studies the machinations of technology or the conformity of Das Man, he sees only the exclusion of alterity and subversive becoming, Heidegger sees a privative, dimmed down mode of understanding that nevertheless enacts self-transformative movement every moment.

### Introduction:

Heidegger's analysis of the use of tools under the rubric of the ready to hand , or handiness, introduced in the first division of Being and Time, has been an important influence on Lee Braver's thinking. Braver reads Heidegger's ready to hand alongside the later Wittgenstein's language games as articulations of a mode of creativity he describes as absorbed, engaged coping with the world. This mode is both more immediate and more fundamental than representational, conceptual thinking. The philosophy of engaged coping treats our involvement with things in the world holistically. The relations between aspects of our experience form an inseparable gestalt matrix in which the meaning of the parts cannot be understood independently of how they function within the whole constellation of worldly involvements that gives them relevance. Things don't just appear neutrally before our gaze. They already matter to us in some way in relation to our larger socially-embedded concerns and purposes. Engaged coping as Braver conceives it is grounded in a specifically organized complicity between the ideal and the empirical. The involvement of human concerns and practices in making possible the intelligibility of the world we encounter contributes a necessary ideal element to how beings appear to us. By the same token, if beings were not capable of surprising and subverting our scheme-driven expectations , reality would ossify into static meaninglessness. The inseparability of the ideal and empirical poles of being-in-the-world does not , however, preclude the

possibility of falling into ways of disclosing the world which hinder and resist the radical otherness of becoming. One of these ways of becoming stuck that Braver highlights is becoming so absorbed in the smooth machinations of coping that we fail to attend to beings themselves in their 'that it is-ness', their unique and exceptional luminosity as what they are and, more centrally, that they are. In support of this argument, Braver summons Heidegger's work on the dangers of modern technology. Braver asserts that Heidegger blames the mindlessness of modern technological disclosure on a mode of handiness corresponding to Braver's model of unreflectively mindless absorbed coping.

In this paper, I compare Heidegger's account of the ready to hand with Braver's model of engaged coping. My contention is that Braver misreads Heidegger's concept of world projection as worldview. As a consequence, Braver understands sameness and otherness, mindfulness and mindlessness in such a way as to reverse the roles concepts such as conspicuousness and inconspicuousness play in Heidegger's texts. Over the course of his career, Heidegger never ceased to target what Derrida dubbed the 'metaphysics of presence' as the culprit behind the resistance to thinking within philosophy, the sciences and modern technology. I believe Braver's understanding of both mindful and mindless coping fall within the orbit of such metaphysics, causing him to misread Heidegger's notion of world. Specifically, the resistance to becoming and alterity Braver attributes to absorbed handiness occurs for Heidegger only because the unity of beings as a whole is disturbed such that an aspect of the world becomes conspicuous as present at hand. In order to show this more clearly, let me briefly discuss Heidegger's treatment of the present at hand. Heidegger deals with the notion of the present at hand in different guises at different phases in his writing. I propose an arrangement of these modes of disclosure into three groupings. Firstly, there is persisting objective presence, which Heidegger traces back to Descartes's notion of unchanging substance. Objective presence does not require an eternally unchanging nature. Even that thing which exists for an infinitesimally brief period of time is objectively present at hand as long as it endures as what it is in its properties and attributes identically, constantly. Any object which can be measured in terms of quantitative magnitude (extensive duration) is present at hand for whatever length of time its attributes can be defined in terms of difference in degree rather than differences in kind.

Heidegger's later writing identifies a change in the mode of disclosure of presence that came with the advent of cybernetics, information technology and atomic physics, and from a focus on the steady presence of objects to the persisting presence of algorithmic ordering schemes. Heidegger(1977) says that with cybernetics, the final historical transformation of the interpretation of the presence of what is present has been fulfilled. It has

"lost the meaning of objectivity and objectiveness...the standing-reserves do not possess constancy in the sense of a steady, unchanged presence. The kind of presencing of the standing-reserves is orderability... The transformation of the presence of what-is-present from objectiveness to orderability is, however, also the precondition for the fact that something like the cybernetic way of representation can emerge and lay claim to the role of the universal science at all."

"The subject-object relation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure "relational," ie., ordering, character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. That does not mean that the subject- object relation vanishes, but rather the opposite: it now attains to its

most extreme dominance, which is predetermined from out of Enframing. It becomes a standing-reserve to be commanded and set in order.”

Heidegger describes a third mode of the present at hand in his lecture on the Age of the World Picture. This mode includes the algorithmic-like enframing of standing reserve, but also encompasses discourses critical of Kantian totalizing schemes. For philosophers embracing such a critique, the structural moment of totalization is inextricably tied to a genetic moment of liberation, subversion and incommensurability. For instance, Thomas Kuhn depicts a phase of empirical practice he calls normal science, during which time researchers operate ‘mindlessly’ within paradigmatic totalities or *gestalts*. During periods of revolutionary science, a familiar paradigm is overthrown in favor of a logically incommensurable alternative. I believe Heidegger would argue that Kuhn’s concept of paradigm presupposes the idea of world as picture. Only when the world is thought as a picture that a subject or community of subjects sets before itself can anything like a paradigmatic worldview make sense.

“... to represent [*vor-stellen*] means to bring what is present at hand [*das Vor‘handene*] before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into, this relationship to oneself as the normative realm. Wherever this happens, man “gets into the picture” in precedence over whatever is. But in that man puts himself into the picture in this way, he puts himself into the scene, i.e., into the open sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented. Therewith man sets himself up as the setting in which whatever is must henceforth set itself forth, must present itself [*sichprasentieren*], i.e., be picture. Man becomes the representative [*der Repriisentant*] of that which is, in the sense of that which has the ‘character of object.”(Heidegger 1977)

It is important to recognize that what characterizes the metaphysical epoch of the world as picture is not that either the representing subject, or the world it represents to itself, is grounded foundationally. The subject need not be assumed to have control over what it desires; it need not be thought of as volunteristically choosing to will what it wills. (As Nietzsche put it, “a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want.”). Rather, the subject-object binary pre-determines being in terms of the relation between a self-persisting, if finite, conceptual point of view or value positing, and that which appears before it. Put differently, to be a subject is to be a consciousness. Consciousness is always self-consciousness, self-affection, the present to handness of a self-knowing-itself. To be an object is be represented by, and to stand steadily in front of, a conscious subject. This is why Heidegger believes that Nietzsche’s value-positing, worldview-generating subject, despite its not volunteristically choosing to will what it wills, is trapped within the thinking of world as picture. Heidegger(2000) says Nietzsche “attributes a Being to values themselves. Here, Being at bottom means nothing other than the coming to presence of what is present at hand. It is just not present at hand in as crude and tangible a way as tables and chairs are.”

I want to show now how Braver’s existentialist reading of Heidegger renders Being in terms of the subject-object relation, that is, as world-picture. Then I will contrast this stance with what I believe to be Heidegger’s own thinking. How does Braver place Heidegger’s position within the confines of the metaphysics of world as picture? Braver begins from the idea that we perceive the empirical world from within pragmatic, relevance-driven schemes of interaction. We

subjectively and intersubjectively set these in place in front of ourselves as points of view, worldviews, paradigms, and for a time they function to steadily unfold variations on a theme. While such schemes are ultimately beholden to changing empirical circumstances, we can become temporarily complacent in their use, with the result that these practices become sclerotically enclosed within their own mechanics. These wholistic configurations of practices are what Braver understands as equivalent to Heidegger's ready to hand. Braver(2013) argues that the handiness of tool use can produce a mindless, thoughtless absorption.

“Humans become encased in a shell of self-confirming ways of thinking. When everything we encounter is subsumed within our concepts, we dissolve all alterity into what we expect to see and can understand.”

In conformity with this reading, he translates Heideggerian terminology such as Enframing, standing reserve and fallenness as references to practices of tool use that get stuck on auto-pilot. He states that Heidegger “consistently worries about familiar behavior's tendency to lull us into autopilot, a state he calls fallenness and consistently connects to the unthematic absorption in the world.” When Heidegger discusses how tools become inconspicuous and unobtrusive as they withdraw into ready to hand use, Braver understands these concepts as referring to the mindless narrowing of attention that takes place when we unthinkingly go with the flow of the task at hand. Braver(2013) thinks it is inconspicuous absorption that numbs Dasein.

“The problem is that the more familiar beings become and the more we master their use, the more they recede, just as Dreyfus describes. Although this greatly improves our performance, it means that we take for granted the most important thing – that they are at all and that we are aware of them.... Certainly tools withdraw when all goes smoothly, but this tendency to thoughtlessness represents an obstacle to the goal rather than the goal itself.”

Braver associates fallenness into average everydayness and modern technological thinking with ready to handness.

“The absorbed use of familiar tools inhibits this awareness, as suggested in Being and Time but more explicitly asserted in the later work, as readiness- to-hand (still pretty much the same in "The Origin of the Work of Art," for instance) evolves into technological Bestand, the contemporary source of forgetfulness.”(ibid)

Where does the impetus for conformity and averageness, being lulled into autopilot and mindlessly going with the flow come from? If it comes from the withdrawal of beings into the inconspicuousness of handiness, what is it about the ready to hand that is responsible for this situation? Is it because we lose explicit awareness of the mesh of handiness we are absorbed into, or does making this mesh explicit belong to present to handness? I have argued that Heidegger conceives of technological enframing and standing reserve as modes of present to handness. Rather than hiding from awareness the instrumental nature of handiness, enframing brings the ready to hand into prominent display. I therefore suggest that the form of persistent presence that Heidegger associates with cybernetics can be applied to the kinds of absorbed engaged coping that Braver considers mindless. Heidegger(1977) says enframing “assembles and

orders. It puts into a framework or configuration everything that it summons forth, through an ordering for use that it is forever restructuring anew.” This is an awareness that restricts itself to a form of disclosure that only construes meaning in reference to an instrumental ordering. If becoming explicitly aware of the contextual web of usefulness associated with an activity amounts to no more than disclosing it as present to hand, what sort of disclosure does Heidegger have in mind when he talks about the unconcealing of the being of beings? There is an important distinction to be made between the ready to hand and beings as a whole. When we disclose a tool in terms of what it is handy for, we have in mind a network of references which Heidegger calls the ‘in order to’, whereby the way we encounter things is determined instrumentally on the basis of a determined goal towards which these objects function as means. In Heidegger’s later writings the ready to hand is melded into the concept of orderability. Within the metaphysics of world as picture, the self locates itself as the subject of ready to hand ordering schemes. The subject is the end for which tools are the means. In other words, the self exists as what the conecture of tool’s in-order-to is for the sake of. The ready to hand meaning of the in-order-to uses of tools is subordinate to an overarching set of schematic goals put into place by a subject. Connected with this structure, the self’s being for the sake of itself points to the way the self transforms itself over time as a dialectic between ensconcement within and liberation from schematic entrapment. Heidegger’s Dasein, however, is not a subject, and the unity of the ‘self’ that exists for the sake of itself is not reckoned by an overarching set of goals to which the meaning of all objectively present and ready to hand entities in its purview conform. Rather, the unity of the self is understood by way of the being of beings as a whole. To disclose the being of beings is not to make explicit ready-to-hand schemes, since becoming explicitly aware of the ready to hand is a form of present to handness. On the contrary, ready-to-hand processes must withdraw into inconspicuousness in order for the being of beings to unveil itself. The being of beings is not any kind of goal-directed scheme but is in-itself the event of intimate non-goal-directed self-transformation, ontologically prior to any extant conceptual organization.

When beings as a whole are actualized as the instrumentality of enframing, orderability must become conspicuous as ground plan. Engaged coping is ‘mindless’ to the extent that it takes itself as subservient to an efficient cause, a pre-set purpose or plan. The way that such engaged coping is mindless is not that there is no awareness of a direction or goal or motive, but that the motive is bound up with the self-preservation of a persisting mode of goal-directed comportment toward the work (ready-to-handness). Braver says tools withdraw when all goes smoothly. it is true that the tool as an objectively present thing withdraws when all goes smoothly. But if what is going smoothly is the execution of a plan, then both the person and the tools being used become bound up within a system, in which what becomes conspicuous is the function of the subject and their tools in the execution of the plan. That is to say, the person and their equipment together form a tool as the means to an end. From this vantage, it can be shown that the extent to which what Braver calls mindless engaged coping is conformist and averse to novelty is a direct indication of the extent to which it gives itself over to the mode of the present to hand.

If Braver’s notion of mindless coping can be attributed to a mode of the present at hand, how does his concept of mindfulness stand in relation to Heidegger? According to the thinking of world as picture, worldviews and value systems are historically contingent, being continually

replaced by alternative configurations of practices (whereas their becoming is totalized within Hegelianism, there need be no overarching progressive telos, as Nietzsche's Eternal Return demonstrates). Braver locates the impetus of subversive becoming in the places in Heidegger's writing where he speaks of disturbances and breakdowns in the smooth use of tools that cause the tool itself to become conspicuous. Because Braver equates readiness to hand with mindlessly regurgitating the themes of a pre-given scheme, whenever Heidegger uses terms of dislocation such as startled dismay, surprise, strangeness, jolts, shocks, anxiety, uncanniness and wonder, Braver associates all of these with the experience of getting unstuck from confining normative ready to hand schemes. Braver says, "Division II emphasizes phenomena that knock us out of our unreflective routine such as breakdowns, resistance, and unfamiliarity."(ibid). For Braver, value systems inhere in themselves apart from their historical relation to other value systems. What comes to rescue a stagnant coping pattern is a temporarily self-present alterity. Braver apparently doesn't see this conspicuous beingness as a present to hand. When Braver identifies presence-at-hand staring at a thing and the mindless auto-pilot of engaged coping as examples of inauthentic awareness, he doesn't consider the latter as a species of the former.

"Authenticity contrasts with theory's pretense of disinterest and distortive casting of all beings into the mode of presence-at-hand, but it also contrasts with the mindless preoccupations we flee into when shaken by premonitions of meaninglessness and death."(ibid)

It seems to be the case that from Braver's perspective a being is not present at hand as long as we don't try to nail down its content. For instance, Braver(2013) denies that becoming conspicuously aware of a tool as a way of shaking ourselves out of mindless absorption involves defining the nature of objects conceptually, which would only freeze them into static forms. "...while operating smoothly, ready-to-hand tools dissolve inconspicuously into their circuits of use, but stopping to study them stiffens them into present-at-hand objects that just sit there." Braver says we can get around such reification by opting for vague, indirect or poetic language instead of representational concepts to indicate beings. When Braver admonishes us to become aware of the fact that beings ARE, lest we become stuck in the thoughtless autopilot of unreflective coping, he certainly is not lighting things up as Cartesian eternally persisting substances or phenomena already domesticated by Kantian schemes. But is he not resting on a presupposition concerning what beings are when he deems them to be what comes to conspicuousness when attention to ready to hand use is disturbed? Specifically, are these beings not assumed to persist as temporarily enduring self-presences? If this is the case, then Braver is conceiving Heidegger's articulations of the authentic, unconcealing happening of truth, that which is brought forth in a work of art, in terms of what discloses itself as present to hand. What becomes conspicuous when Braver becomes aware of the tool is the obtrusively vacuous and ordinary redundancy of pointing to an objectively present thing.

"Beings are what is indifferent and obtrusive at the same time, in the same undecidedness and randomness...What is ownmost is disturbed and only as such does it come into truth as the correctness of representing."(Heidegger 1999)

To be fair, Braver's point isn't that making a tool conspicuous leads to the lighting up of truth merely by forcing us to stare at it, but it also brings into explicit awareness a chain of referential connections in which the tool is entangled. As Heidegger(2010) describes it, in a disturbance of

tool use, reference becomes conspicuous. “This circumspect noticing of the reference to the particular what-for makes the what-for visible and with it the context of the work, the whole “workshop” as that in which taking care of things has always already been dwelling... with this totality world makes itself known.” But, significantly, he adds making world visible this way belongs to the level of ontic rather than ontological disclosure. The referential chain “does not yet become explicit as an ontological structure, but ontically for our circumspection...” What does this mean? To disclose matters ontologically is to uncover the meaning of Being. As I will elaborate further in the next section, the meaning of being refers to beings as a whole, which is what world signifies for Heidegger. Becoming aware of a contexture of relevance animating one’s use of tools falls short of disclosing a world in terms of the unified possibilities for a self. Instead of explicitly grasping world as its possibilities, it modifies these into actual at-hand presencing. Furthermore, it may be the case that breakdowns lead to awareness of an expanded context of relevance, but surprises and unusability are already within the scope of understanding of unthematic absorbed handiness, which is why disturbances are treated with a certain familiarity. When Heidegger talks about breakdowns of tool use, such disturbances don’t simply oppose themselves to the smoothly flowing context of the use of the tool. Because handiness implicitly spreads itself out as the inseparable unity of a totality of relevance, breakdowns, disruptions and surprises function as deficient modes within an already recognizable larger context of meaningfulness. “One always sees something as something. Of course, thereby one can see something as something unknown, strange, unfamiliar, and so forth, but even then still as something...” (Heidegger 1987). Breakdowns in tool use cause us to change our attention from one aspect of the ready to hand context to another. Braver’s focus on the kinds of shifts of attention that make us notice the work we were involved in in a different light not only does not break with the larger context of relevance of our tool use, but, by dwindling down the scope of handiness to the identification of the tool, or widening its scope to encompass the tool’s web of instrumental uses, it conceals beings as a whole. The tool as an objectively present thing can become withdrawn and inconspicuous while one uses it in the execution of a technological plan, only to re-emerge as conspicuously present to hand in the guise of an instrumentally causal setting in place by a subject.

What about Braver’s claim that consciously lighting up a previously concealed web of references associated with tool use gives us the opportunity to break out of a stuck pattern? Heidegger argues that understanding the world as picture involves not just the blind perseverance within a scheme-driven set of goals, but also the disassembling and reassembling (whether minor or revolutionary) of schemes under the influence of changing external reality. The issue for him isn’t our relation to schemes (aware or mindless, complacent or questioning) but what the very notion of scheme conceals. Braver believes his reading of conspicuous awareness avoids conceptuality and representationalism, and the incoherence of just staring at something, by somehow “marrying coping’s engagement to theory’s attentiveness”. But for Heidegger the subject-predicate ‘is’ grammar of present to handness is presupposed by awareness of a tool as a thing or a network of use-relations. When Heidegger experiences the wonder ‘that beings ARE’, he is not thinking about the Being of beings conceptually via the propositional copula of the ‘is’, but the ontological difference between being and beings understood via the more fundamental ‘as’ structure, of which the propositional ‘is’ represents a derivative mode. The ‘as’ structure is not a glue connecting subject and object, the subjective awareness that a thing or

process predicatively 'is'. As Derrida(1978a) argues against Levinas's reading of Heidegger, the Being of a being "is not the concept of a rather indeterminate and abstract predicate, seeking to cover the totality of existents in its extreme universality... because it is not a predicate...". Braver acknowledges it is the relationship that is primary, and the *relata* must be understood from it, but his *relata* accommodate themselves to rather than deconstruct persisting, orderable presences. Braver treats these presences as temporarily self-persisting things or relational processes set up by a subjective or intersubjective consciousness. In opposition to Braver, Heidegger argues that the election of the tool into prominent conspicuousness as a present thing, or as lighting up a ready-to-hand pattern, confuses and dims down signification by concealing the meaning of beings as a whole.

In sum, in thinking the world as picture, Braver reads Heidegger through a grounding same-other opposition. Fundamentally world-changing shocks and surprises never take place where absorbed coping keeps the tools being used, and aspects of instrumental goals they are associated with, from becoming noticed. By the same token, belongingness to itself, the steadiness of resting within itself, sameness and constancy are sidelined by the exposure to the absolute alterity of conceptually undefined present-to-hand being. In spite of Braver's characterization of unreflective engagement as distinct from the present at hand, as he represents them both the circumstance of mindless absorbed coping as well as mindful awareness of beings can be accounted for as modalities of the present at hand. Given this fact, where do we locate Heidegger's mindful awareness of being within Braver's perspective? I believe that in order to uncover the functioning of world, as beings as a whole, in Braver's texts, we will have to follow Heidegger's lead in deconstructing the metaphysics of world as picture. Rather than opposing a region of alterity to that of configurations of the same, and attaching mindlessness to the latter and mindfulness to awareness of the former, Heidegger introduces us to a beginning for thinking that is ontologically prior to the distinction between the same and the other, auto-pilot and subversion, schemes and their dislocation, the relevant and the strange, binding and separating. What Heidegger elaborated in the guise of the 'as' structure, temporality and the making of the work of art marries these gestures within the same paradoxical moment.

Thus, when Heidegger depicts the authentic opening of truth in terms of strangeness, wonder and shock, this is not to be opposed to all notions of relevant self-belonging. Rather, it offers a way to think continuity and belonging together with displacement. For Heidegger mindfulness is not the escape from the confines of the Same (whether the Same is defined in terms of just staring at a thing or unthinkingly iterating variations of a totalizing theme via engaged coping), and into the embrace of the alterity of the Other, but the 'startled, dismayed, wonder-filled' awareness that the Other is internal to the Same. That is to say, Dasein only continues to be the same differently. This is what Heidegger(1995) means when he states that Dasein ex-ists as "an exiting from itself in the essence of its being, yet without abandoning itself." "The constancy [Standigkeit] of the self is proper to itself in the sense that the self is always able to come back to itself and always finds itself still the same in its sojourn [Aufenthalt]." (Heidegger 1987). Note the paradoxical juxtaposition, in Heidegger's depiction of the creation of the work of art, of shock and jolt on the one hand, and non-interruption, inconspicuousness and steadiness on the other. "The shock that the work is as this work, and the not-interrupting of this inconspicuous jolt, make out the steadiness of the resting-within-itself at work in the work." (ibid)



Braver lifts out from Heidegger's discussions of the creation of the work of art only terms that convey disruption and dislocation (shock, jolt, strangeness, wonder) and when Heidegger describes the absorbed, inconspicuous use of tools, Braver pays attention only to what is steadily self-consistent in handiness. He is not able to see how both gestures function simultaneously in all disclosure of being. For instance, Braver(2013) interprets the fact that "the more handy a piece of equipment is, the more inconspicuous it remains that, for example, this particular hammer is" (Heidegger 2010) in the following way: "Equipment's withdrawal is why "the making of equipment never directly affects the happening of truth", whereas the artwork's disruptive strife lights up what is usually transparent." Braver reads 'equipment's withdrawal' strictly as the capturing of thinking by the self-enclosed transparency of mindless handiness, and the 'artwork's disruptive strife' narrowly as what opposes itself to the inconspicuousness, steadiness and constancy of handy absorption. As a result, he doesn't seem to appreciate that for Heidegger equipment's withdrawal into handiness is a prerequisite for the withdrawal of handiness itself into beings as a whole as the steady constancy of the shocking, jolting irruption into unconcealment of the work of art. Only in becoming attentive to beings as a whole can Dasein be displaced into the happening of truth. In contrast, the thematically explicit attention to tools and their associated routines and references that is Braver's idea of the artwork's truth, is for Heidegger a narrowing of the scope of relevance, and the hallmark of the technological making of equipment.

When Dasein becomes aware of disclosing beings as a whole, rather than in terms of the instrumentality of tool use, then its mode of disclosure is transformed from present at hand technological machination to the inconspicuousness of something like the making of a work of art. To come face to face with and reveal beings as a whole is to displace them as a whole, which nihilation the attunements of authentic anxiety and boredom express. To experience the wonder that things ARE is to experience a displacing occurrence, a transition, a transformation, an in-between, rather than a thing or pattern conspicuously persisting in itself, even if only for an instant. When our attention is drawn conspicuously to a tool from out of its withdrawn usage as the work, this attentiveness is not simply a highlighting of what was already there working in the background, which Braver appears to assume when he claims that in not explicitly thematizing tools as present at hand things we are 'taking their existence for granted'. This is like saying that in perceiving a train whistle as a whistle rather than as sensory noises and complexes of sound, we are taking for granted the existence of the sensations. The point isn't simply that the full relevance of the tool is only revealed when we understand its role within a totality of relations of which it is a part. Rather, the tool only has its existence as a present thing the moment we create this existence by modifying our previous handy engagement such as to produce a privative disclosure. In other words, our attention to the tool doesn't just discover an entity, even if we deny the tool an independently objective reality. Rather, it creates what it discloses as this present to hand thing by concealing beings as a whole. Even waking up to its referential contexts of use after the breakdown of the tool, while widening the scope of disclosure relative to the funneled attention of smoothly proceeding absorbed tool-use, fails to put us in contact with beings as a whole, and so conceals the happening of the truth of being. Both the tool as a thing and the contexture of the tool's use as a pattern must withdraw into beings as a whole in order for the happening of the truth of being to be possible. Applying this to the example of the train whistle, in order for the authentic being of the being of the sensation complex to unveil

itself, it must withdraw into the perception of the whistle, the whistle must disappear into inconspicuousness within the larger context of relevance relations, and this totality of relevance must withdraw into the awareness of the being of beings as a whole.

One might get the impression from what I have just said that arriving at Heidegger's 'that it is', as the truth of the being of beings, amounts to no more than a widening of the scope of awareness from the trivially subordinate to the consequentially superordinate aspects of an extant relational structure of meaning. If this were all there was to it, there would be nothing in my corrective to threaten the overall substance of Braver's interpretation of the authentic truth of being. But shifting from mindlessness to mindfulness is not a matter of enlarging the scope or intensity of awareness. It is instead a question of how we understand the basis of awareness in temporality. Put differently, to be mindfully aware is not to 'light up' an extant object or relational 'in order to' process by noticing it, but to find oneself in the midst of transit. The revealing of the 'as a whole' is not the conscious awareness of an objective thing or pragmatic use context, but a self-displacing happening. Not a discovery of what is, but a making of what will be. "Knowing-awareness has nothing to do with "consciousness", which entirely and exclusively maintains itself in the forefront corner of the subject-object relationship." (Heidegger 2016). Braver (2007) gets it backwards when he declares "...if I become preoccupied with something else while using a pen and let it fade from conscious awareness, then I make it ready-to-hand". The explicit awareness of pragmatic relevance in its full scope as beings as a whole, is not the concealing of the meaning of the pen, as though being occupied elsewhere meant shifting one's attention from one object (the pen) to another (the writing activity), thereby depriving oneself of awareness of the pen's luminous features. Rather, singling out the pen as a being in the midst of other beings is a concealing forgetting of beings as a whole. The mode of disclosure in which we attend to things, process or schemes as a discovering revealing of their directly perceived essence belongs to a subjective setting-before-oneself. Heidegger argues this setting in place presupposes the concept of subjective consciousness, which he considers a hallmark of the metaphysics of world as picture. Shifting awareness from beings as a whole to the specific ready-to-hand use-context of the tool to directly seeing the tool as a thing moves in the direction of an increasingly narrow kind of making that settles for a flattening, confusing ordinariness and irrelevance.

## **Beings as a Whole vs Conceptual Worldview**

In order to gain a clearer sense of the relation between creative transformation and the structurality of pragmatic systems of meaning for Heidegger, the following questions need to be answered: If the thinking of world as picture is the subject's setting up and representing to itself of a schematic view of the world, how does this differ from Heidegger's account of Dasein as world-making? How are cultural worldviews unlike Heidegger's epochs of Being? Is Dasein not in both cases embedded in the world as a holistic configuration organized as a totality of relevance? A crucial difference is that when the world is interpreted as picture, Dasein fixes a point of view, constraining both the object of its attention and itself within this framework of intelligibility. This is the case even when the subject doesn't volunteristically choose to will its

point of view.

...to represent [vor-stellen] means to bring what is present at hand [das Vorhandene] before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into, this relationship to oneself as the normative realm. Wherever this happens, man "gets into the picture" in precedence over whatever is."(Heidegger 1977)

To be more precise, an intersubjective community sets in place and represents a world to itself via a process of reciprocal conditioning. Braver finds sameness and alterity as opposed structural aspects within a reciprocally affecting model, which he describes in terms of a circulation of tokens. The radical belonging between self and world that Heidegger's being in the world instantiates renders all experience as intrinsically relevant and significant. By contrast, in reciprocally conditioning models, personal experience accommodates, adapts and shapes itself in accordance with bodily and interpersonal inputs that impinge on it in semi-arbitrary ways. This makes such models incapable of manifesting ready to hand relevance in Heidegger's radical sense. Not only is relevance not a given, but when it is achieved, it amounts to an externally imposed association between elements. For Heidegger, the totality of one's pragmatic-valuative-affective comportment toward the world functions and changes as a single unit, with all of its 'parts' implying each other. Heidegger calls this 'as a whole' world. By world he doesn't mean a natural realm of empirically present objects, but the producing of an inclusive, integral, pragmatically unified net of specific possibilities that binds actualized beings under its sway. He also refers to beings as a whole as the being of beings, or the ontological-ontic difference between being and beings, which pertains to the distinction between the possibilities projected by worldmaking and the specific beings that are actualized out of these possibilities. The being of beings connects specific things to the total world contexture providing them with their meaning. This totality comprises the self's 'for the sake of itself'.

In its encompassing reach, worlding acts like a worldview. But unlike a worldview, it is not set in place by a representing subject or intersubjective community, to be repeatedly applied to what appears in front of it. Instead, a self is displaced into a world. Put more radically, the self IS what comes back to itself AS its world. This eliminates the world-picture notion of objects appearing before and affecting a worldview forming subject. More importantly, the displacing projection of a world occurs continually, as the movement of time itself. The integral nature of handiness is such that even the most subordinate event within an overarching framework of intelligibility and attunement alters at once, in a unified manner, the framework as a whole. In authentically disclosing being, Dasein can experience this understanding as a whole. By contrast, in everyday circumstances one does not typically make explicit this implicit understanding as a whole, but rather attends to only a subordinate aspect of one's experiencing in the guise of the generic everydayness of the present at hand.

"...in all comportment we become aware of comporting ourselves in each case from out of the 'as a whole', however everyday and restricted this comportment may be...However concerned we are to comport ourselves with respect to various issues and to speak in terms of individual things, we nevertheless already move directly and in advance within a tacit appeal to this 'as a whole'...We are always called upon by something as a whole. This 'as a whole' is the world." (Heidegger 1995)

The difference between authentic and inauthentic unconcealment of being is not that in the latter case Dasein fails to comport toward beings as a whole. Rather, our awareness of this whole remains only tacit and implicit while our explicit attention is narrowed down to what obtrudes as present to hand. As the disclosure of beings dwindles down to ordinariness and indifference, the being of beings fails to shock and surprise us under these circumstances, because in abstracting away the relations that make it relevant we impoverished its significance. This in spite of the fact that our disclosure of present at hand things springs forth from out of a displacing projection of a unified totality of beings.

### **World Projection as Radical Temporality**

It is not possible to grasp the nature and genesis of the unified organization of beings as a whole as world projection without understanding the manner in which this holistic organization temporalizes itself. Heidegger grounds the orienting capacity of attuned understanding in a radical notion of temporality rather than in a schematic interconditioning among body states, discursive practices and material circumstances. Heidegger's grounding of disclosure in temporality means that the unfolding of practices within a region of culture is not a matter of subordinate changes within a mostly unchanging superordinate structure. Even as experience can maintain an ongoing thematic consistency for periods of time, nevertheless each interpretive moment of attuned understanding subtly modifies beings as a whole by developing their possibilities. Each presenting experience, each 'NOW', is a subtle shift of the meaning of beings as a whole in relation to the previous moment of time. Thus, if such things as paradigm shifts can be said to punctuate a stable thematic of intelligibility, this interruption is only a more extreme variant of the always already in process self-displacement that defines the temporal unfolding of experience for each Dasein. The relative consistency over time of a stable background presupposes moment to moment punctuations. It is built from these displacements, which allow it to remain the same slightly differently. This is why Dasein is not enframed into the attitude of enframing. The condition of possibility for *Being-in-the-world*, for a world-constituting space of possibilities, is that this totality of relevance be modified anew each moment in an act of bringing forth. For Heidegger, the world that Dasein projects transforms itself every moment. The world worlds. Dasein is world projecting. Projection, in making possible the 'as' structure, brings forth what 'is' as a creative act. Braver's(2014) subjectivist existential reading treats projection as the capability of utilizing past experience in order to anticipate future events. "In order to project, I depend on the particular world that I am thrown into and my specific past that both restricts and opens possibilities for me." But rather than telegraphing possibilities forward into the future that it draws from a now gone past, projection brings back to the present from out of its future a new world from within which it can encounter actual things. Dasein is "ahead of itself" in coming back to its present from its future, rather than in anticipating its future on the basis of what it has already experienced. To attend to and notice a being is to interpret it (a kind of making) from out of this totality which is brought back to me from out of my future. My past arrives already modified by my future. It arises from this future.

The projection is...a casting ahead that is the forming of an 'as a whole' into whose realm there is spread out a quite specific dimension of possible actualization. Every projection raises us away into the possible, and in so doing brings us back into the expanded breadth of whatever has been made possible by it. The projection and projecting in themselves raise us away to possibilities of

binding, and are binding and expansive in the sense of holding a whole before us within which this or that actual thing can actualize itself as what is actual in something possible that has been projected.

...“the irrupting of this 'between'-this projection is also that relating in which the 'as' springs forth.”(Heidegger 1995). “Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.” (Heidegger 2010)

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment, and on closer analysis it turns out to be time.”(ibid)

The 'as' structure enacts a crossing of past, present and future such that the past and present are already affected and changed by the future in this context of dealing with something. When we take something as something, we understand this thing from within the nexus of a totality of relevance such as to render what is presenting itself to us as recognizable in some fashion. But this totality of relevance, out of the context of which the disclosed thing gets its meaning, is modified in the very act of disclosing the something as a something. The totality is torn away from us and brought back from the future as almost imperceptibly different new world projection. In everyday experience, we may behave as naive realists, only noticing the thing as what it supposedly is in itself, with its self-persisting attributes and properties. Or we may perhaps understand the intelligibility of the fact of the thing's beingness as subordinated to a value system and instrumental goals we connect it to. For Heidegger, both of these modes of disclosing beings amount to what he calls errancy, the forgetful concealing of beings as a whole. “Wherever the concealment of beings as a whole is conceded only as a limit that occasionally announces itself, concealing as a fundamental occurrence has sunk into forgottenness.” (What is Metaphysics). Heidegger is challenging us not only to recognize how the thinking of conceptual schemes and value systems conceal beings as a whole, but to grasp the way that this world production, in ever so slight a fashion, displaces and replaces its ground of sense, its possible ways to be, in every act of directly comporting ourselves to beings 'as' beings. The meaning of Being would not be time, as Heidegger insists it is, if it amounted to no more than the awareness or identification of the manner of being of beings as a whole. It would remain within metaphysics as a conceptual predicate. Because he treats being in terms of objects appearing before a subjective consciousness, Braver(2014) splits off the 'that it is' of the truth of Being from Heidegger's radically temporal notions of displacement, transition and nullity. He interprets the shock of the 'that it is' of Being as the coming before consciousness of a present at hand use-relation.

“If you don't think about the pen's penness while you write or when you stare at it, how much less do you think about the mere fact that the pen is, that it's real?...Along with the pen's being, we also don't notice the correlative fact that we are aware of it.”

This places Braver's characterization of the truth of being a number of steps removed from Heidegger's unconcealment of the jolting “that it is' of the truth of being. To begin with, given that for Heidegger thinking about the pen's reality as an objectively present thing is the ultimate

example of forgetful absorption in the world, it would be necessary to withdraw our attention from the 'that it isness' of pens as present at hand things to pens as what we are using them for, what Braver calls their manner of being. This is what Braver appears to be advocating in directing us to the pen's 'pennness'. He understands the being of beings in this restricted sense as the specific context of use surrounding an object, but this is not what Heidegger means by the being of beings. To access what Heidegger's phrase points to, we must first scale up from the limited domain of the use context of particular things to a totality of relevance weaving together all beings in our world into a single unity. We then have to proceed from the ontic disclosure of this total context of relations of 'in order to' to the ontological disclosure of world, which implicates the self's 'for the sake of which' alongside the referential totality of use. In other words, to be aware of beings as a whole (the ontic-ontological difference) is not for a I to attend to, notice, discover an IT, but to be aware of ourselves. This does not mean that an already existing subject is affected and changed by a world that impinges on it. Rather, Dasein IS itself as the way the world alters it. The temporal 'as' structure of world projection renders the disclosure of beings as a whole as an irruptive displacement of self-via-world. This is the difference between awareness of the 'that it is' as a subject experiencing objective beings, and awareness of the 'that it is' as Dasein BEING the ex-perience, as the nullifying absencing of transit.

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Footnote: Derrida's notion of iterability is informed by a radical view of temporality he shares with Heidegger. The repetition of the same meaning intention one moment to the next is the fundamental origin of the contextual break, and our exposure to otherness. Iterability, as difference, would be an

"imperceptible difference. This exit from the identical into the same remains very slight, weighs nothing itself...(Derrida 1995, p.373)". "It is not necessary to imagine the death of the sender or of the receiver, to put the shopping list in one's pocket, or even to raise the pen above the paper in order to interrupt oneself for a moment. The break intervenes from the moment that there is a mark, at once. It is iterability itself, ..passing between the re- of the repeated and the re- of the repeating, traversing and transforming repetition."(Derrida 1988)

The repetition of this very slight difference dividing self -identity from itself produces a self that returns to itself the same differently. Implicit in this split within self-identity is a deconstruction of the notion of consciousness and self-affection.

"...there is singularity but it does not collect itself, it "consists" in not collecting itself. Perhaps you will say that there is a way of not collecting oneself that is consistently recognizable, what used to be called a 'style' "(Derrida 1995, p.354)

Contrary to a Saussurian structure, where a system is oriented around a center of meaning formed of mutual differences among its parts, the construal of each element of a Derridean system changes, at every moment, the sense of the system as a whole. There is no total synthesis, only a repetition of differentiation such that what would have been called a form or structure is a being the same differently from one to the next.

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The simultaneous gestures of binding and separating at work in the 'as' structure bring us to the heart of the paradoxical play of the foreign and the familiar in Heidegger's oeuvre. The direct disclosure of an actual being such as a tool, whether in the guise of predictability or breakdown and surprise, is always familiar and recognizable inasmuch as its intelligibility is wholly dependent on the context of handiness of beings as a whole. Yet, at the same time, this worldly totality of relevance displaces itself through its temporal repetition. This means that while the actual tool is familiarly ensconced 'in the midst of' beings, these beings as a whole producing the tool's familiarity constitute an irrupting occurrence. This is why Heidegger(2010) says "tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon." In the process of interpreting what is projectively recognizable to us, the 'as' structure takes apart what it puts together. Put differently, Dasein is thrown into its NOW as surprised self-recognition.

...something first gives itself to us only when we are already moving within projection, within the 'as'. In the occurrence of projection world is formed, i.e., in projecting something erupts and irrupts toward possibilities, thereby irrupting into what is actual as such, so as to experience itself as having irrupted as an actual being in the midst of what can now be manifest as beings...

In projecting, the Da-sein in [man] constantly throws him into possibilities and thereby keeps him subjected to what is actual. Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual." (Heidegger 1995)

In thinking world as picture, Braver's account flattens the 'as' structure into a propositional 'is' system of reciprocal coordinations among present-at-hand entities, schemes and values. But in taking something AS something, we are not simply associating two externally related entities in relation to each other and with reference to a more encompassing reciprocally conditioning framework. Beings can only be produced because the foundation of their being is created anew as a 'ground-laying' every time we see something as something. Seeing the ground of beings is a ground-laying. Laying a ground is a displacement of a previous ground. Having a disposition toward beings "displaces us into such and such a relation to the world, into this or that understanding or disclosure of the world..."

"The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative.... To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing." (Heidegger 1994)

The inexplicitness of handiness withdraws from the ordinariness of the present to hand thing, and the indeterminacy of beings as a whole withdraws from the instrumentality of handiness to temporalize itself as the uncanniness and strangeness of the work's coming back from out

ahead of itself. This coming back from out ahead of itself is not the shock and disturbance that jolts us out of one scheme, worldview, habit, paradigm, configuration, gestalt or pattern and into a new one in a dance between sameness and absolute alterity, but the in-between which functions from within. Heidegger's accounts of the 'as' structure and the work of art show how the inconspicuous withdrawal of the tool allows absorbed instrumentality, and the withdrawal of instrumentality into the totality of beings as a whole, opens *dasein* up to the occurrence of throwing its character forward before itself as the extraordinariness of the unconcealment of the truth of being.

"Handiness is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself initially a theme for circumspection. What is peculiar to what is initially at hand is that it withdraws, so to speak, in its character of handiness in order to be really handy. What everyday association is initially busy with is not tools themselves, but the work. What is to be produced in each case is what is primarily taken care of and is thus also what is at hand. The work bears the totality of references in which useful things are encountered." (Heidegger 2010)

In the above quote, we see how at-hand tools withdraw into handiness. In the making of the work of art, handiness 'withdraws' into the jolting, displacing 'that it is' of the work of art's being as a whole.

"Of course it belongs also to the disponible [available] tool found in use, "that" it is finished. But this "that-it-is" does not break-forth out of the tool, it vanishes in serviceability. The more handy a tool is to the hand, the more it remains unobtrusive, e. g. that such a hammer is, the more exclusively the tool holds itself in its being-tool (in seinem Zeugsein). We can altogether remark of anything at-hand—before-us, that it is; but this is also noted only in order to remain just as soon forgotten in accordance with its kind of ordinariness. For what is more ordinary than this, that a being (Seiendes) is? In the work, by contrast, this, that it is as such a work, is the extraordinary. The Ereignis of its being-created (seines Geschaffenseins) does not simply vibrate in the work, rather the work throws its character as Ereignis (das Ereignis—hafte), that the work is as this work, forward before itself, and has it constantly thrown about itself. The more essentially the work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the uniqueness of this, that it is and not rather is not. The more essentially this shock comes into the open, the stranger and more solitary the work becomes. In the bringing-forth of the work, lies this bringing-there of the 'that it be.'" (Heidegger 1971)

What is primary, extraordinary and unique is not the privative, conspicuous 'is' of the being of the tool, or even the being of its referential complex of involvements, but the withdrawal of these modes into the 'as' structure of the being as a whole of the work, such that the work 'throws its character forward before itself'.

"...projection is an occurrence which, as raising us away and casting us ahead, takes apart as it were; -in that apartness of a raising away, yet as we saw, precisely in such a way that in this process there occurs an intrinsic turning toward on the part of whatever has been projected, such that that which has been projected is that which binds and binds together."(Heidegger 1995)

In the non-explicit, unthematic bringing-forth of the work as a unified whole from out ahead of itself, raising away and returning from this future to bind together, *Dasein* experiences the



luminosity, wonder and strangeness of the “that it be”. What is brought forth in the work is not the product of what is set in place by the original genius of a subject. Nor is the shock or jolt of what is brought forth the result of an outside alterity making itself conspicuously present to a subject. The unconcealedness of being as the ‘that it is’ becomes impossible when it is disturbed such that a present Otherness becomes conspicuous. This only hides the being as a whole of the work, which is not the executing of a ground plan, the coasting along within an unquestioned, preconceived path or purpose. When handiness is withdrawn into the referential totality of beings as a whole, disclosure is no longer tethered to the subjective will of an instrumental purpose. The shock of the work is thus paradoxical, both a wondrous jolt and a steadiness of resting within itself, an exiting from itself without abandoning itself. This steadiness is a constantly being-thrown before itself, a returning to itself from out ahead of itself. It continually regrounds its ground via the world-projecting ‘as’ structure. For Heidegger, self-intimacy goes hand in hand with the uncanniness of wonder and anxiety.

In contrast with Heidegger’s radically temporal perspective, the consequence of Braver’s treating the world as picture is that he takes at face value, and believes that Heidegger buys into, the notion that the world which appears can become ‘subsumed within our concepts’. Braver takes the idea of world as picture as the Kantian assumption that we make use of a foundational worldview or value system in our dealing with beings, subordinating all novelty to self-perpetuating themes, desires, categories, rules and imperatives. Our willful desires do not allow themselves to be revolutionarily altered by a reality refusing capture within any human scheme. Braver argues that Heidegger’s Kehre was born of the necessity to rid himself of the vestiges of this ‘Kantian paradigm’ lurking within the pages of *Being and Time*. Sketched out in Division II of *Being and Time*, but explicitly articulated via a poeticized language after the Kehre, Heidegger’s antidote to the stagnation of mindlessly absorbed entanglement with technological producing and social conformity consists in being forced to become explicitly aware of these schemes so as to free up a decision to stay with them or change them. In our entanglement in the average everydayness of *Das Man*, we get caught up in unthinkingly routinized ways of behaving that follow the herd, causing us to neglect to ‘choose’ for ourselves (choice here does not mean strictly under our control). Authentic anxiety alerts us to the fact that we have allowed ourselves to get stuck in the auto-pilot of social and technological patterns. Braver’s Kierkegaardian-influenced view of authentic choice as existential commitment sees Heideggerian resoluteness as involving putting ourselves back in the driver’s seat by giving ourselves the opportunity to determine if we want to continue to mindlessly follow the herd or to become receptive to radical change.

“Lately, I’ve become interested in these moments of revolutionary experience, when our whole sense of what the world is like gets turned inside out and we are forced to form entirely new concepts to process what is happening. According to what I am calling Transgressive Realism these are the paradigmatic points of contact with a reality unformed by human concepts, when a true beyond touches us, sending shivers through our conceptual schemes, shaking us out of any complacent feeling-at-home.”

According to Braver, we construct conceptual categories on the basis of a mediated interaction with a world whose becoming will regularly escape and violate our interpretive frames. Braver believes that Heidegger deconstructs the subject-object binary by exposing the dependence of our

conceptual schemes, categories and desires on a world which always escapes closure within these schemes. Attending to the truth of Being allows us to 'staunchly remain open' to the subversive impetus of this worldly becoming. However, contrary to Braver's reading, it wasn't simply vestiges of the Kantian paradigm in Being and Time that post-Kehre Heidegger sought to vanquish. He sought to eliminate the remnants of the subject-object metaphysics behind Braver's assumption that the fundamental ground of being in the world is a dialectical tension between confining conceptual schemes and an outside reality, untouched by concepts, capable of destabilizing and renewing them. The aim of Heidegger's analyses of Das Man, modern technology and the metaphysics of the world as picture can be seen as attempts at answering the question of how man came to conceal from himself the truth of the 'true beyond' as internal to the structure of the conceptually self-same. The scope of the present to hand for Heidegger goes far beyond the stupid staring at something and the employment of sterile conceptual categories to include Braver's belief that such things as confining conceptual schemes function as Braver sees them as doing. Such personal and interpersonal schemes never constrict us in the first place in the way that Braver thinks they do. It is not the assumed confining nature of schemes, but our treatment of them as persisting presences, which limits and distorts our disclosure of being. The consequence of this belief in the irreducible present-to-handness of conceptual schemes is to associate freedom with the arbitrary lurching from one meaning configuration to the next.

Braver misreads authenticity as a self-reflexive self's becoming aware of what it has introjected, 'taken in' from culture, and thereby achieving the freedom to choose or reject those mindlessly absorbed norms. But for Heidegger what the self discloses to itself in average everydayness is not introjected meanings from a community, mindless or otherwise. The self never simply introjects from an outside to an inside. The radically temporal 'as' structure of Dasein makes such introjection impossible. Heidegger's task in introducing the notion of Das Man is not to warn us of the dangers of falling into entrenching social schemes and values, or to teach us how to escape them, but to explain how it is that we come to believe that we can be conditioned by introjected norms and practices in the first place. In other words, it is the belief in the undeconstructable reality of conditioned schemes that is confining, not the alleged reality of the schemes. Heidegger chooses words like average, vague, flattened, confused, uprooted state of suspension, and ambiguous to describe Dasein's being as Das Man, to indicate that the projective self-displacing impetus of the 'as' structure is still primordially and implicitly operative even when it is explicitly concealed and suppressed. Average everyday discourse has to be vague, approximate, superficial and ambiguous enough to conceal, disguise, cover over, miss, obscure, suppress the fact that the meaning of culturally 'shared' norms and practices is never interpreted identically from one person to the next, and subtly changes its sense moment to moment for each individual.

Our belief in scheme as self-enclosing inter-causal pattern conceals from us the self-displacing movement, functioning within the heart of such idealizing forms, keeping these structures open, for each person, from the inside every moment of their instantiation. Whereas when Braver studies the machinations of technology or the conformity of Das Man, he sees only the exclusion of alterity and subversive becoming, Heidegger sees a privative, dimmed down mode of understanding that nevertheless enacts transformative movement every moment. Even the most stultifying structures of intelligibility continue to be themselves differently. If the effect of this

mobility is subtle enough that it appears for all intents and purposes as though the reign of the dominating objectivizing scheme were absolutizing for a period of time, it is crucial to recognize that even in such situations that seem to exemplify the a priori neutralization of otherness, a more originary, radically self-dissimulating activity is in play, always right now, this instant.

Braver(2014) treats projection as a conscious choosing drawing from our past history, and views our thrownness as the way past events, imposing themselves on us from outside of our volition as random accidents, constrain our future possibilities of decision.

“...we were born, “thrown” into this life... but not of our doing and not by our choice. We did not decide to be born, or where or when or as what, nor did we enact our own creation...This inescapable indebtedness is the “not” or nullity that lies at the very basis of our being anything at all.”

Contrary to this thinking, I contend that authentically becoming oneself via projection does not represent a conscious subjectivity’s marshaling of its extant resources in order to gain a semblance of control in the midst of random, accidental circumstances it has been helplessly thrown into. In the first place, neither projection nor thrownness affect us by flinging ‘external’ circumstances or ‘inner’ resources forward from our past to influence our present. They come toward us to remake us from our future. Secondly, thrownness and projection are not simply interconnected but synonymous with each other. We are thrown into the world we project ahead of ourselves, and this throw remakes our world, and ourselves, every moment. Authentic decision does not originate in some outside perspective from which we glimpse, on the one hand, our ossified routines and habits of thought and on the other hand, entertain, or be forced into, the possibility of maybe perhaps embracing significant changes of meaning. Braver(2012) proclaims :

“There is no escape from the world, but certain fundamental, temporal experiences still allow us to temporarily loosen the worldly entanglements that usually absorb us, so that we can lay claim to our self, so that “Dasein can be authentically itself.””

But authenticity is not a subject’s glimpsing of the possibility of temporarily loosening worldly entanglements. It is the full-throttled, resolute awareness of the happening of the world’s escaping and displacing itself right now, and every moment. Thrownness, nullity, not being at home, uncanniness, the nothing, authentic guilt, anxiety and boredom all point to the displacing impetus of projection which destructures each moment of time. Because this self-displacement is profoundly subtle and intimate, authenticity doesn’t abandon Dasein to arbitrariness, but neither does it make Dasein essentialistically self-determining. Braver’s existentialist narrative deeming inauthentic absorption in the world as escaping the incessant movement of temporalization (he says conceptual schemes ‘dissolve’ alterity) belongs to the forgetfulness of Das Man. Because it misses the ‘as’ structure functioning within the ‘is’ to assure that each moment of experience comes back to itself differently, the forgetful concealment of this event enacts a meaning-impooverished, confused modification of thrown projection.

This does not make Braver wrong to point out the reifying, conformist effects of a variety of metaphysical realisms and anti-realisms. But Heidegger’s contribution to the understanding of technological and social machination is to expose the ways in which philosophical critics of

schematic hegemony can remain partially caught up in the metaphysics of the perspectives they oppose. Heidegger's concern is not to pry us loose from our templates, norms and schemes, but to deconstruct the basis of the notion of template, mindless habit, impersonal conceptual scheme, consciousness, point of view, world picture, willful positing. Whereas Braver claims that, by way of a regress, "...we are enframed into the attitude of enframing", Heidegger's approach consists in uncovering the genesis, as a concealing of the displacing occurrence of beings as a whole, of the idea of subjectively and intersubjectively willed concepts acting as present at hand conditions which form objects according to their point of view, and objects acting as present at hand counter causes, capable of shaping conceptualization from outside extant subjective schemes in the guise of uncontrollable external circumstance. That is to say, Dasein is not enframed into the attitude of enframing. Dasein is not the mutually conditioning interaction, contact, standing-before of subjective and objective present-at-hand beings.

Braver's opposition between the mindful and the mindless, the same and the other is testament to the power of present at hand self-inherences to arbitrarily and polarizingly condition each other as well as, paradoxically, to resist the advent of novelty. An inherent violence attaches to the becoming of the world in the extent to which change is construed as arbitrary and incommensurable. The perceived arbitrariness and externality of change is in turn a function of how we understand beings to BE in themselves as present. The paradox of Heidegger's radically temporal thinking is that it enacts a carrying-forward which re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, deconstructing notions of conscious choice without rending the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity. Heideggerian attunement exposes a relentless global self-world transformational mobility within every moment of, but invisible to Braver's dialectic of mindless and mindful coping, and at the same time imparts to our ongoing world situatedness an irreducible integrity, intimacy and relevance.

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