

Heidegger on Anxiety, Nothingness and Time: How Not to Think Authenticity Inauthentically

In his work through the early 1930's, Heidegger determines what it means to be an authentic self through fundamental attunements such as anxiety, boredom, uncanniness and guilt, and equi-primordially via understanding and thrown projection. The way that attunement and understanding structure authentic disclosure of being involves paradoxical gestures juxtaposing meaning and meaninglessness, presence and absence, affirmation and negation, possibility and reality, holism and individuation, normativity and own-ness. The key to navigating and unifying this tangle of contradictory moments, as Heidegger reminds his readers, is in understanding the dynamics of temporality. In this paper I discuss common ways that contemporary readers of Heidegger render authenticity inauthentic by interpreting such tropes as anxiety, the self and the nothing by reference to what Heidegger calls the ordinary conception of time, the sequential emerging, lingering and passing away of beings. Thought via ordinary time, nothingness opposes itself to presence, making authentic anxiety appear similar to depression as the breakdown of possibilities. I contrast these readings with my interpretation of authentic temporality, and explain how my reading of time changes the way the authentic self, attunement and projective understanding disclose themselves. In choosing the particular authors that I cite in support of my representation of inauthentic interpretations of authenticity, I do not mean to imply that these writers are united in their approaches to Heidegger. On the contrary, they differ amongst themselves concerning many aspects of his thinking. My purpose is to highlight what I take to be key points of intersection among their differing accounts.

I. Inauthentic Dasein:

a.) Ordinary Temporality:

In the ordinary disclosure of time, an object of experience inheres as a temporary presence occupying a time position. As objective presence, it persists, or endures, as itself (even if only instantaneously). Time is a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities. The 'being-about-something' instantiated by the pairing of past and present is a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the present object which supplements that past. This makes attention a hinge between relata, a propositional copula grounded in an objective time whose passage is marked by an attending to the appearance and disappearance of the succession ofnows. Being and nothingness, presence and absence are thought through a sequential temporality of beings that come into presence, linger for a while and then vanish away. As Heidegger(2013) describes the ordinary concept of time, "In asking after what happens, we have in mind a being, even when we name it a "becoming" and attend only to its arising, approaching and decaying." Richard Capobianco(2011) appears to be capturing ordinary time in asserting that

"The Simple – Being itself – is the temporal-spatial flow of all beings: the coming and going, appearing and disappearing, arriving and departing of beings; the emerging and lingering and passing

away of all that is. And we – Dasein – are carried along this flow, temporally stretched out.”

Mistaking ordinary time for original time means distinguishing the authentic present from the onto-theological conception of presence (the metaphysics of presence) on the basis of the difference between that which lingers briefly and that which lasts. Iain Thomson(2000) explains:

“...in the process whereby beings come into being, linger, and pass away, we can distinguish between their dynamic emerging and disappearing, on the one hand, and the more static aspect of that which lasts, on the other.”

A being is either here or it is gone, it is either something or it is nothing, it either shines forth or it vanishes, there is meaning or absence of meaning. Even if a being lingers for only a split second before it is gone, it is never both present and absent at the same time, as the same identity. As a result, inauthentic temporality interprets Dasein’s futurity, its coming back from out ahead of itself, as the shock and disturbance that jolts us out of one scheme, worldview, role, narrative, paradigm or perspective and into a new one in a dance between sameness and alterity, between human concepts and a reality, a “true beyond”...“unformed by these concepts”. (Braver 2013b)

In this thinking, the nothing situates itself as a meaningless purgatory between one presenting thing and another. Nullity marks the rift of arbitrariness and incommensurability separating the familiar intelligibility internal to subjective schemes from a separate past and future. This inauthentic future and the past are understood by reference to the present. My past, as it is disclosed within my present, functions to constrain and define this present and color my future. “...the past is there, merciless, like a hand on our shoulder, a weight dragging us down, the stage and props of our life’s unfolding drama.” (Slaby 2017).

Understanding history via ordinary time “explores, from out of a present, information about a past, and thereby at the same time calculates the future...” (Heidegger 2013)

Seemingly in accord with this historiographical view of temporalization, Ratcliffe(2002) depicts Heideggerian Care as the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future (projection)”.

Slaby(2017) concurs that for Heidegger factual situatedness

“is situatedness in a place and a time“.” Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.“ The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways.”

In inauthenticity, Dasein’s projection of possibilities is treated as the capability of utilizing past experience in order to anticipate future events. Dasein projects its possibilities from the things and equipmental relations it is surrounded by. This projecting includes its own goals, purposes, roles and identities, which may or may not be in conformity with normative practices of its culture. Projection is thought to be a conscious choosing drawing from our past history, and our

thrownness is the way past events, imposing themselves on us from outside of our volition as random accidents, constrain our future possibilities of decision.

“I am not pure possibility; I already have a life. I am already familiar with an established identity and world — the very world that anxiety is calling into question. Whatever I make of myself, I cannot radically disengage myself from the world — so I will have to exist on the basis of what I already am. This feature of my Being is my facticity, thrownness, or Being-already-in-the-world (236/192). Again anticipating Division II, we can view this dimension as our having a past. “ (Polt 1999)

“...we were born, “thrown” into this life... but not of our doing and not by our choice. We did not decide to be born, or where or when or as what, nor did we enact our own creation...This inescapable indebtedness is the “not” or nullity that lies at the very basis of our being anything at all...I can only project myself onto the possibilities that I find available in the world I find myself in although, conversely, one of the reasons I find myself in this environment is because of earlier projections, themselves organized and limited by facts I was thrown into.”(Braver 2014)

Projection and thrownness affect us by flinging ‘external’ circumstances or ‘inner’ resources forward from our past to influence our present and future. Projection and thrownness manifest the reciprocally causal dynamics of inauthentic being-in-the-world as the interaffection between subjective schemes and external constraints and affordances.

b.)The Inauthentic Self:

In inauthenticity the self is treated as a subjective consciousness which represents a world of objectively present things and ready-to-hand practices to itself.

...to represent means to bring what is present at hand before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it, and to force it back into, this relationship to oneself as the normative realm.”(Heidegger 1977)

We perceive the empirical world from within pragmatic, relevance-driven ready-to-hand schemes of interaction. We subjectively and intersubjectively set these in place in front of ourselves as schematic points of view, worldviews or narratives, and for a time they function to steadily unfold variations on a theme. While such schemes are ultimately beholden to changing empirical circumstances, we can become temporarily complacent in their use, with the result that these practices become sclerotically enclosed within their own mechanics. An intersubjective community sets in place and represents a world to itself via a process of reciprocal conditioning. The thinking of reciprocal causality turns on the ordinary formulation of time as the modal changes of a temporarily self-present object. Such thinking founds sameness and alterity as opposed structural aspects within a reciprocally affecting model. The equipmentality of readiness-to-hand expresses this inter-causal thinking. In reciprocally conditioning models, the individual accommodates, adapts and shapes itself to its world via causal bodily and interpersonal interchanges that impinge on each other ‘externally’, in semi-arbitrary ways (computers, offices, chalk, books, students, administrators, colleagues). Reciprocally causal beings are external to each other in that they affect each other without each completely expressing the meaning of the whole. Instead, the whole is treated as a concatenation of chains of

relations among temporarily present subsistences. Interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion as feed forward-feedback loops according to an inauthentic temporality of punctual nows appearing and passing away. An already existing subject is affected and changed by a world that impinges on it. Heidegger(1999) defines this everyday model of experiencing as

“striking up against something and indeed some-thing that strikes us; having to take in something that comes upon us and does something to us, "affects" us, encounters us without our complicity.”

The inauthentic self locates itself as the subject of ready to hand ordering schemes. The subject is the end for which tools are the means. In other words , the self exists as what the conecture of tool’s in-order-to is for the sake of. The ready to hand meaning of the in-order-to uses of tools is subordinate to an overarching set of schematic goals and narratives put into place by a subject ensconced within and shaped by the practices of an intersubjective community. Being inauthentically for the sake of one's own self is an attending “to what Dasein is, can do, and takes care of in everyday being-with-one-another...to what has moved it, what it has pledged itself to, what it has let itself be involved with.” (Heidegger 2010). Throughout its interactivity with a world, the self maintains its agential integrity. The authentic self, understood inauthentically, chooses possible roles, narratives and identities by which it can define itself. For instance, Denis McManus(2014) interprets anxiety as the subjective self’s taking control of its decisions, rather than allowing itself to be influenced by others in the world. The authentic self governs its life according to projectsthat speak to it rather than taking its guidance from the They.

“...in making decisions on the basis of my own reasons, I am deciding both to decide and to be the one who decides. I am choosing myself as the one who will choose—rather than deferring the judgment in question to someone else—to ‘the world’ or the They—and their assessment of what matters.”

Richard Polt(1999) writes:

“...instead of tending my garden, I may decide to become a social worker, poet or entrepreneur. I may also choose to remain who I am — but in such a way that I truly choose this identity, instead of just letting it happen. Heidegger refers to our need to determine our own identity as Dasein’s ..being-ahead -of-itself....

“Conscience can remind him that it is his responsibility to make something of himself on the basis of who he already is. Now he may choose a very different course for his life — or he may choose to remain a lawyer. In either case, he has gained a clearer understanding of who he is, what is truly important to him, and what he needs to do in the world.”

The assumed internal unity of the self defines its separateness from world. Simon Critchely(2009) defines primordial anxiety as

“a mood in which we pull back from the world and see it as something distinct from us... when the self first distinguishes itself from the world and becomes self-aware... one is suddenly seized by the feeling of meaninglessness, by the radical distinction between yourself and the world in which you find yourself.”

Lee Braver(2014) also reads anxiety as that which “separates us from our world which is what normally defines us...we can't be exhaustively defined by worldly things and activities since we're still ourselves even while all of that is on hold.”

Kevin Aho(2018) says:

“Narrative unity is structured by some sense of, what Heidegger calls, the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (das Worumwillen), referring to the background sense we have of our own ‘futura’ (zukünftig), that is, of who we want to be based on where our life-story is heading.”

Matthew Shockey(2016) writes:

“The essential methodological move in Descartes, as seen from Heidegger’s perspective, is thus to withdraw from the world in such a way as to find a standpoint in which nothing, i.e., no thing, no entity, is present, for this will be at the same time the standpoint from which one’s own being comes into view, and, through that, the fundamental basis of the intelligibility of other entities as well.”

c.) Inauthentic Anxiety: Breakdown of the Ready-to-Hand

From an inauthentic perspective on temporality, Heidegger’s discussion of breakdowns of tool use is an opportunity to apply the oppositional relation between presence and absence, ready to hand schemes and their dislocation that this disclosure of time makes possible. When a set of meaningful possibilities is closed down, other meaningful ready-to-hand contextures can get ‘lit up’. Making a tool conspicuous as a result of the breakdown of its use leads to the lighting up of the object as present at hand, and it also brings into explicit awareness a chain of referential connections in which the tool is entangled. As Heidegger(2010) describes it, in a disturbance of tool use, reference becomes conspicuous.

“This circumspect noticing of the reference to the particular what-for makes the what-for visible and with it the context of the work, the whole "workshop" as that in which taking care of things has always already been dwelling... with this totality world makes itself known.”

But, significantly, he adds making world visible this way belongs to the mode of ontic rather than ontological disclosure. The referential chain “does not yet become explicit as an ontological structure, but ontically for our circumspection.”(Ibid). In other words, Heidegger reminds us that the lighting up of equipmental contextures as a result of breakdown is not an authentic disclosure. The reason for this is because, even when breakdowns lead to awareness of an expanded context of relevance, surprises and unusability are already within the scope of understanding of unthematic absorbed handiness, which is why disturbances are treated with a certain familiarity. When Heidegger talks about breakdowns of tool use, such disturbances don’t simply oppose themselves to the smoothly flowing context of the use of the tool. Because handiness implicitly spreads itself out as the inseparable unity of a totality of relevance, breakdowns, disruptions and surprises function as deficient modes within an already

recognizable larger context of meaningfulness. “One always sees something as something. Of course, thereby one can see something as something unknown, strange, unfamiliar, and so forth, but even then still as something....” (Heidegger 1987).

Breakdowns in tool use cause us to change our attention from one aspect of the ready to hand context to another. The kinds of shifts of attention that make us notice the work we were involved in in a different light does not break with the larger context of relevance of our tool use. It merely dwindles down the scope of handiness to the identification of the tool, or widens its scope to encompass the tool’s web of instrumental uses. Breakdown is an accidental occurrence leading to disclosures (the lighting up of equipmental relations) which get their sense from the same total contexture of relevance (beings as a whole) as the activity which underwent breakdown. A breakdown of tool use is only noticed as a disturbance because we continue to be invested in the overarching goals and purposes that the breakdown reinforces by further articulating our involvement with these goals. In the inauthentic interpretation of tool use breakdown, the everyday temporal understanding of past, present and future comes into play. One can remember and learn from the past practices that have been rendered inoperable by breakdown , while suffering through the present purgatory of incoherence and hoping to move ahead into fresh possibilities of meaningful involvement with tools.

The fact that Heidegger brands disruptive attunements such as anxiety, boredom and guilt as authentic, but not the breakdown of tool use, doesn’t prevent the former from being treated as similar in their structure to the latter. After all, what makes anxiety and boredom authentic is that in their occurrence the self is brought before its ownmost potential for being a self. When the self’s existing authentically for the sake of its self is mistakenly disclosed inauthentically, what constitutes its primordality is leveled down to the ready-to-hand orderability of subjective plans, purposes and roles. In other words, formulated inauthentically, the self’s ‘authenticity’ differs from its inauthentic dealings with equipment strictly on the basis of the assumed overarching categorical nature of its purview. All that needs doing is to expand the scope of involvement of the self from specific tasks and projects to the totality of the self’s interest in the world, and one can now substitute the breakdown of the self’s ‘for the sake of itself’ for the breakdown of the ‘in order to’ of ready to hand projects. Lee Braver(2007) writes:

“... fundamental moods like anxiety or boredom represent the equipmental breakdown writ large...“If a tool’s breakdown makes the world light up, the breakdown of our lives in anxiety lights up being-in-the-world.(Braver 2014)”

Inauthentic despair and depression can then masquerade as authentic anxiety as one applies the ordinary conception of time to fundamental attunement: One remembers and learns from the lighting up of past engagements in a world whose meaningfulness has presently been shattered by the breakdown of depression, despair and anxiety, while suffering through the present purgatory of nihilist nothingness and hoping to move ahead into fresh possibilities of goal-directed self-defining meaning. Lee Braver(2014) declares: “Not-being-in-a-world gives us the perspective we need to see our usual being-in-the-world.”

Thomas Sheehan(2015) says anxiety “directs you to the very things that you experience as slipping out of meaning.”, while Matthew Ratcliffe (2012b) reads primordial anxiety as a crisis

of relevance, in which the dissolution of salient meaning provides an opportunity to reflect back on what has been lost.

“...in anxiety, all practical significance falls away and what we previously took for granted becomes salient in its absence.....and thus amenable to phenomenological reflection when it is lost or distorted.”

What makes it easy to lump anxiety together with despair and depression is the assumption generated by ordinary time that presence and absence, meaning and loss of meaning cannot co-exist at the same time within the same identity, even if they form a dialectical opposition. We find ourselves either ensconced within a world of meaning or in a purgatory between worlds of meaning. Anxiety, like despair, is thus the awareness of the loss of significance of a prior familiar world of meaning and not yet having arrived at a new structure of relevance. Ratcliffe says that the structure of Heidegger's primordial anxiety “is very similar to that of depression”(p.172), which he characterizes in terms of a degradation of the salience and meaningfulness of objects and subjects in the world. Taylor Carman(2015) writes: “In its psychological manifestation, existential Angst is very like what we ordinarily call “anxiety” or “depression...., the closing down of possibilities...” Lee Braver offers:

Anxiety gives me nothing to do; it closes off activities rather than disclosing them. Like the similar states-of-mind of extreme depression and boredom, when I am struck by malaise I find myself repelled from the equipment I normally use for entertainment and enjoyment...In the sense Heidegger gives it, I'm not in my world anymore since I'm not concerned with any of its goals or activities, leaving me unable to press forward into its possibilities.”

Kevin Aho(2018) asserts:

“The capacity to create a story that unifies and holds together this narrative structure is essential for selfhood. But anxiety can undermine this capacity for narrative self-creation. For Heidegger, what distinguishes anxiety from other kinds of moods is that it doesn't open up a range of meaningful possibilities that I can press into; rather, it closes off possibilities by disclosing a world that is fundamentally meaningless....”

We can see that the same reasoning applies to what Heidegger considers inauthentic attunements and the breakdown of tool use. In both cases disturbance does not make the ready to hand contextures within which they arise irrelevant and meaningless. In the case of affects like depression and despair, the world that appears unreal, insignificant, irrelevant or un-engaging, is meaningful precisely in its unreality and deficiency as disorienting, confusing, un-engageable, numbing. Experience of ongoing deprivation, lack and loss is not the degeneration of meaningful ready to hand significance but a privative disclosure of it. To be situated inauthentically in everydayness is to recognize a familiarity in what impinges on me, no matter how shocking or unexpected. In this way, inauthentic attunement constitutes the essence of the irreducibly situated felt significance a world always already has for me, a meaningfulness within whose bounds pathological conditions such as depression appear as modifications, but whose basis they can never undermine.(Heidegger would say that their possibility as deficiencies or privations is proof for the essentiality of

Befindlichkeit.).

Such experiences are predicaments within concerned circumspective dealing with things and people, rather than crises of situatedness. The supposed crisis of situatedness which leads to apparent impairment and even incompetence in capacity to experience significant meaningfulness must be understood in the same terms as breakdowns in tool use. For Heidegger, within the thinking of *Das Man*, there can be only existential predicaments, not disorders of situatedness. Since I am always already relevantly involved in a world, depression has to do with the kind of relevance I experience, not my capacity or competence to experience it. "Hopelessness, for example, does not tear *Da-sein* away from its possibilities, but is only an independent mode of being toward these possibilities." (Heidegger 2010)

For Heidegger, emotional breakdowns do not pull the rug out from under our inauthentic situated comportment toward the world. That is, there can be no overall loss, erosion or diminishment of mattering and significance, only shifts in where significance finds itself. Even so, both complacent engagement with an everyday world and emotional breakdown represent a flattened, distorted, concealment of *Dasein's* authentic disclosure of possibilities. From the vantage of ordinary time, if the self's temporary situatedness within familiar social structures of normative rationality encourages the belief in the rationality of existence, the loss of such groundedness in anxiety exposes existence as radically contingent and absurd, as the self transforms itself over time in a dialectic between ensconcement within and liberation from schematic entrapment. Taylor Carmen argues that anxiety reminds us that "...lives are not just in principle vulnerable, not just susceptible to potential crisis, but rather – like soap bubbles – essentially and constantly prone to dissolution and collapse..."

Thomas Sheehan(2015) declares:

"... short of death I can experience another, crucial failure of meaning, one that issues in what Heidegger calls "dread" (*Angst*). Here a complete collapse of meaning in the very midst of my life lets me see the absurdity, the utter groundlessness, of my engagement with meaning... in a flash of insight you realize that your world of meaning is based on nothing solid at all and has no final reason that can account for it."

Robert Stolorow(2013) says anxiety is a form of trauma:

"Massive deconstruction of the absolutisms of everyday life exposes the inescapable contingency of existence on a universe that is random and unpredictable and in which no safety or continuity of being can be assured. Trauma thereby exposes "the unbearable embeddedness of Being." ... As a result, the traumatized person cannot help but perceive aspects of existence that lie well outside the absolutized horizons of normal everydayness."

According to the inauthentic view of *Das man*, Heidegger's antidote to the stagnation of mindlessly absorbed entanglement with technological producing and social conformity consists in being forced to become explicitly aware of these schemes so as to free up the possibility of changing them. Iain Thomson likens the explicit identification and transformation of schemes of understanding to our initiation of a gestalt shift between perceiving a duck and a rabbit in the

famous drawing. As Thomson(2004) puts it, "I must find some way to accede to and affirm (or else disown and transform or relinquish) these self-understandings, and so take responsibility for myself...". In our entanglement in the average everydayness of Das Man, we get caught up in unthinkingly routinized ways of behaving that follow the herd, causing us to neglect to 'choose' for ourselves (choice here does not mean strictly under our control) .

Authentic anxiety alerts us to the fact that we have allowed ourselves to get stuck in the auto-pilot of social and technological patterns. Inauthentic Dasein believes that Heidegger's task in introducing the notion of Das Man is to warn us of the dangers of falling into entrenching social , technological schemes and values, and to teach us how to escape them. This Kierkegaardian-influenced view of authentic choice as existential commitment sees Heideggerian resoluteness as involving the negating of a subjective pattern of worldly involvement and the clearing of a space for new commitments. We construct conceptual categories on the basis of a mediated interaction with a world whose becoming will regularly escape and violate our interpretive frames. This is intended to 'deconstruct' the subject-object binary by exposing the dependence of our conceptual schemes, categories and desires on a world which always escapes closure within these schemes. Attending to the truth of Being allows us to remain open to the subversive impetus of this worldly becoming. From the vantage of an inauthentic thinking, authenticity is a subject's glimpsing of the possibility of loosening worldly entanglements, voluntarily or otherwise. However , whether one chooses to be a revolutionary or is forced by circumstances beyond one's control to shake up the significance of their world as a whole, in either case the mode of disclosure that is operative is inauthentic everydayness. Everyday dasein is a goal-directed, plan-forming subject who jumps from one contingent scheme to another in a temporally sequential dance that oscillates between familiar intelligibility and arbitrary, nihilative transit.

II.Authentic Dasein:

a.)Authentic Temporality

In the previous section I showed how an inauthentic reading of time grounds an everyday interpretation of the authentic self and anxiety. In this section I introduce an alternative reading of time and unfold the changes in understanding of selfhood and anxiety that follow from it. A crucial point to understand about the nature of authentic temporalization is that the contingency it produces is neither teleologically guided nor arbitrary, accidental and absurd. Rather than opposing negation to extant , present at hand configurations, schemes and purposes , and attaching meaning and significance to the latter and meaninglessness to awareness of the former, Heidegger introduces us to a beginning for thinking that is ontologically prior to the overt distinction between the present and the absent, the same and the other, familiarity and subversion, schemes and their dislocation, something and nothing, the relevant and the strange, binding and separating, identity and difference. What Heidegger elaborated in the guise of the 'as' structure, temporality and the making of the work of art marries these gestures within the same paradoxical moment. Heidegger constantly struggled to come up with an adequate way of articulating a notion of transit, othering and difference that the grammatical structure of language mitigates against, an essencing which is neither simply present nor absent, neither something nor

nothing, neither future, now nor past. (unsettling, displacing, disposing, nihilating, occurring , opening, happening, strife, rupture, finitude, individuation, the in-between, transcendence, thrownness)

Thus, when Heidegger depicts the authentic opening of truth in terms of strangeness, terror and shock, this is not to be opposed to all notions of relevant self-belonging. Rather, it offers a way to think continuity and belonging together with displacement. For Heidegger negation and nothingness are not a nihilist meaningfulness opposing itself to the extant presence of relevant , significant schemes, purposes and things. It is instead the 'startled, dismayed, wonder-filled' awareness that the Other is internal to the Same. That is to say, Dasein only continues to be the same differently. This is what Heidegger(1995) means when he states that Dasein ex-ists as "an exiting from itself in the essence of its being, yet without abandoning itself." Heidegger grounds the orienting capacity of attuned understanding in a radical notion of temporality rather than in a schematic interconditioning among body states, discursive practices and material circumstances. Heidegger's grounding of disclosure in temporality means that the unfolding of practices within a region of culture is not a matter of subordinate changes within a mostly unchanging superordinate structure. Even as experience can maintain an ongoing thematic consistency for periods of time, nevertheless each interpretive moment of attuned understanding subtly modifies beings as a whole by developing their possibilities. Each presenting experience, each 'NOW', is a subtle shift of the meaning of beings as a whole in relation to the previous moment of time.

Thus, if such things as paradigm shifts can be said to punctuate a stable thematic of intelligibility, this interruption is only a more extreme variant of the always already in process self-displacement that defines the temporal unfolding of experience for each Dasein. The relative consistency over time of a stable background presupposes moment to moment punctuations. It is built from these displacements, which allow it to remain the same slightly differently. The condition of possibility for *Befindlichkeit* , for a world-constituting space of possibilities, is that this totality of relevance be modified anew each moment in an act of bringing forth. For Heidegger, the world that Dasein projects transforms itself every moment. In the inauthentic mode of disclosure of everydayness , this self-transformation is not explicitly revealed, but remains implicitly operative. The world worlds. Dasein is world projecting. Projection, in making possible the 'as' structure, brings forth what 'is' as a creative act.

From the vantage of ordinary time, projection is the capability of utilizing past experience in order to anticipate future events. Iain Thomson(2004) says "...the roles, goals, and life-projects implicitly organizing my current experience stretch out into the future." But rather than telegraphing possibilities forward into the future that it draws from a now gone past (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of history), projection brings back to the present from out of its future a new world from within which it can encounter actual things. Dasein is "ahead of itself' in coming back to its present from its future, rather than in anticipating its future on the basis of what it has already experienced. To attend to and notice a being is to interpret it (a kind of making) from out of this totality which is brought back to me from out of my future. As authentic history rather than everyday 'vulgar history', my past arrives already modified by my future. It arises from this future.

The projection is...a casting ahead that is the forming of an 'as a whole' into whose realm there is spread out a quite specific dimension of possible actualization. Every projection raises us away into the possible, and in so doing brings us back into the expanded breadth of whatever has been made possible by it. The projection and projecting in themselves raise us away to possibilities of binding, and are binding and expansive in the sense of holding a whole before us within which this or that actual thing can actualize itself as what is actual in something possible that has been projected. ...“the irrupting of this 'between'-this projection is also that relating in which the 'as' springs forth.”(Heidegger 1995). “Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment, and on closer analysis it turns out to be time.”(Heidegger 2010)

The returning from out ahead of itself of beings as a whole in the act of understanding something constitutes temporality not as a present event happening IN time but as temporalization. The past, present and future don't operate for Heidegger as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects, as is assumed within reciprocally causal schemes. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.

“Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.” (Ibid)

The 'as' structure enacts a crossing of past, present and future such that the past and present are already affected and changed by the future in this context of dealing with something. When we take something as something, we understand this thing from within the nexus of a totality of relevance such as to render what is presenting itself to us as recognizable in some fashion. But this totality of relevance, out of the context of which the disclosed thing gets its meaning, is modified in the very act of disclosing the something as a something. The totality is torn away from us and brought back from the future as almost imperceptibly different new world projection. In everyday experience, we may behave as naive realists, only noticing the thing as what it supposedly is in itself, with its self-persisting attributes and properties. Or we may perhaps understand the intelligibility of the fact of the thing's beingness as arising out of its role within an equipmental contexture. For Heidegger, both of these modes of disclosing beings amount to what he calls errancy, the forgetful concealing of beings as a whole. Reciprocally causal, extant beings are external to each other in that they affect each other without each completely expressing the meaning of the whole. Instead, the whole is treated as a concatenation of chains of relations among temporarily present subsistences, and their interrelations are subtended by the sequential temporality of ordinary time, of punctual nows appearing and passing away.

By contrast, for Heidegger each extant being and functional relation that is actualized out of the possibilities projected by beings as a whole is internal to every other being and equipmental relation within a totality of relevance. Each being within the whole meaning organization always already “knows” and expresses the meaning of every other being, rather than each thing or equipmental nexus subsisting in itself first and only externally affecting and being affected

by other elements. It is not simply that the whole precedes the parts, but that each 'part' is already the whole in its totality, disclosed in a peculiarly forgetful manner. The difference between authentic and inauthentic unconcealment of being is not that in the latter case Dasein fails to comport toward beings as a whole. Rather, our awareness of this whole remains only tacit and implicit while our explicit attention is narrowed down to what obtrudes as present to hand.

“...in all comportment we become aware of comporting ourselves in each case from out of the 'as a whole', however everyday and restricted this comportment may be...However concerned we are to comport ourselves with respect to various issues and to speak in terms of individual things, we nevertheless already move directly and in advance within a tacit appeal to this 'as a whole'...We are always called upon by something as a whole. This 'as a whole' is the world.” (Heidegger 1995)

Heidegger is challenging us not only to recognize how the thinking of conceptual schemes and value systems conceal beings as a whole, but to grasp the way that this world production, in ever so slight a fashion, displaces its ground of sense, its possible ways to be, in every act of directly comporting ourselves to beings 'as' beings. The meaning of Being is not ordinary time, conceived as the awareness of beings that appear, linger and vanish; the limbo of the nothing isn't opposed to the presencing of a world, it is the displacing groundlaying of world. Time projects the self away into the future, and comes back from this future to the present, laying down an expanse of beings as a whole on its way to the having been. Since the three ecstasies all occur at once, dasein always already finds itself in a world, rather than rising away and coming backing in a set of sequential steps. Authentic disclosure explicitly uncovers what everydayness conceals, the moment by moment shift in sense of beings as a whole and self.

Iib.)The Authentic Self:

As I discussed in the first section, the world is treated as distinct from the self in inauthentic everydayness, where the self is a present at hand subject relating to present at hand objects in a present at hand world. But authentic anxiety pulls back from and makes the present at hand world and the present at hand self insignificant, revealing the dasein in us as the unity of self and world in their co-transformation. The self finds itself by coming back to itself from its thrown projection, not in the way an already existing being embraces new experience. The self doesn't pre-exist what it projectively makes possible. The self only exists as the temporally structured occurrence of making possible. As Derrida(2016) remarks:

“That the self projects itself does not mean that this self exists first and then projects itself or not, but that the self constitutes itself in projecting itself. The self is this projection. Authenticity is this projection when it is taken up...

Braver(2014) claims that for the Heidegger of Being and Time “we become a certain kind of person by taking up specific roles like student or friend or daughter. Heidegger calls this role our “for-the-sake-of-which”“. But the self that Dasein exists for the sake of is not an extant self, consciousness, identity, goal or role (the self as teacher, parent or friend).Only within the

everydayness of Das Man can Dasein's 'for the sake of' subsist as socially constructed role. "...in the "first of all and most of all" of everyday concern, the temporally particular Dasein is always what it pursues. One is what one does...One is a shoemaker, tailor, teacher, banker." (Heidegger 1985). Being authentically for the sake of one's own self is not an attending "to what Dasein is, can do, and takes care of in everyday being-with-one-another, not even to what has moved it, what it has pledged itself to, what it has let itself be involved with." (Heidegger 2010). Understood authentically, Dasein's being for the sake of itself is the self's coming back to itself displaced and transformed by a world (beings as a whole) that projects itself back from the future. To exist for the sake of itself is to exist for the sake of its continually remade possibilities by the always transfigured world it is thrown into. The self is nothing but its possibilities, its possibilities form a unity or whole, and this whole of beings, this world, temporalizes by flinging the self into a new world of possibilities every moment. Dasein IS itself as the way the world alters it, differently every moment. If the self's projected possibilities actualize themselves as, among other things, the ready-to-hand role of teacher in its equipmental contexture of computers, offices, chalk, books, students, administrators and colleagues, then what it means to be a teacher, and the meaning of the functional relations that envelop it, are displaced and redefined as a unified whole in every moment of world projection, uniquely for every Dasein. Contrary to Braver's insistence that "I am not pure possibility; I already have a life.", this 'always already' is not the bygone past of ordinary time, constraining and conditioning the future from behind via its subsistence as present-at-hand. Rather, the 'always already' is a having-been which "arises out of the future" (Heidegger 2010). In projecting a new world every moment, authentically futural Dasein is indeed pure possibility. The temporal 'as' structure of world projection renders the disclosure of beings as a whole as an irruptive displacement of self-via-world. This is the difference between awareness of the 'that it is' as a subject experiencing objective beings, and awareness of the 'that it is' as Dasein BEING the experience, as the nullifying absencing of transit.

When Heidegger refers to Dasein's own most nonrelational possibilities of being a self, what makes these possibilities non-relational is not that they separate a self's goals, interests and predispositions from the normative demands of culture, but that they also separate the self's disclosure of itself from its own schematic goals, purposes and pre-dispositions. No one can take over my life, but in authentically being ahead of myself, the self-affecting 'I' doesn't take over my life either. My authentic possibilities are drawn neither in relation to extant community practices nor in relation to my supposedly pre-existing own patterns of acting. In authentic disclosure I understand what I fail to realize in everydayness, that I continue to be myself only by being other than myself moment to moment. The radical alterity of the nothing is not what opposes itself to presence, self, being, but is Being itself. Radical otherness as projective transcendence is not lack, absence, nihilation, a collapse of meaning. It is meaning itself. The goal-directed, narrative-forming self belongs as much to the everydayness of das man as does the one who defers decisions to others. For Heidegger, authenticity is not a matter of choosing an internal over an external locus of control, the consulting and reflecting on inner resources rather than the giving into external causes, the following of trajectories of actions that are projected forward from the self's extant narrative identity, goals and interests. On the contrary, the thinking of self in terms of equipmental goals, roles, identities, guiding interests and vocations belongs to the ready to hand forgetfulness of das man. The making possible that

anxiety opens up is precisely not remembering, drawing upon and being guided by past subjective roles or narratives, any more than it is a drawing upon objective facts or conventional values from the world. Such a self, as well as its world of involvements with other Daseins, represent ready to hand and present to hand beings belonging to an inauthentically disclosed world.

One doesn't arrive at anxiety's authentic disclosure of being until one renders not only the world of present at hand objects and ready to hand fellow Daseins insignificant and irrelevant, but also makes irrelevant one's ready to hand self of guiding interests. Neither an extant network of reciprocal causal things and people, nor a stark, extant, agential self are attended to in anxiety. What anxiety focuses on is not a nihilative, meaningless nothing, not the absence of a relevant world, but the event of making a world possible. The self and its world always exist together, and only do so in the displacing regrounding of the ground of beings as a whole. Self and world only exist as their re-invention. Anxiety is not a change in awareness in how a subjective self relates to an extant world. Understood authentically, the self is not an extent being, and doesn't relate, plan, use guidance with respect to a world of extant beings.

“As authentic being a self, resoluteness does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than authentically being-in-the-world?...Existing, Da-sein IS its world.... Angst individualizes and thus discloses Da-sein as "solus ipse." This existential "solipsism," however, is so far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Da-sein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world.”(Heidegger 2010).

For a self to become self-aware is for it to understand itself from its world. But to distinguish oneself from one's world in the manner that the authors I have mentioned attempt to do is to separate oneself from one's possibilities. Since the self is nothing but its possibilities, separating self from world is eliminating the authentic self rather than becoming self-aware. In anxiety and boredom, and in the making of the work of art, the alienating world of extant possibilities is refused in order for Dasein to be itself most authentically in terms of making possible. Inauthentic world is refused in favor of authentic world formation. To say that Dasein is beyond beings as a whole is to say the same thing as that it is beyond itself, and therefore no-thing. As thrown projection, the self comes back to itself from its future. Projection carries the self out and away from itself. Projection is a making possible, and as such is no-thing. “Dasein means: being held out into the nothing. Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call “transcendence”(Heidegger 1995). Giving Dasein a possibility in anxiety does not mean that at some ‘time in the future’ Dasein may come into new concrete possibilities of being. It does not mean that one is preparing oneself for a period of confused searching, during which time one finds ‘nothing’ of significance to relate to until one arrives at a new set of life narratives to replace those one left behind in anxiety. It means that right now, immediately, Dasein already finds itself in possibilities. There is no period of searching, and no need for accepting diminished expectations, even temporarily, concerning the meaningfulness of life.

Anxiety is not worry directed toward (projected from) either the individual things or equipmental relations one is losing interest in. And it is not worry directed toward the self's 'for the sake of which' disclosed inauthentically as its ability to order and arrange things according to schemes and narratives of goal-directed action. The 'for sake of which' is not the inauthentic self that projects its possibilities- to-be from extant ready to hand purposes and schemes. It emanates from a future not already conditioned by present and past trajectories of interest and purpose. Anxiety doesn't cause being-in-the-world to light up. It doesn't spur us to attend to contextures of equipmentality that have been concealed from us, or reflect on a past involvement which has become presently meaningless. On the contrary, anxiety causes the withdrawal of the total contexture of relevance of beings as a whole. In anxiety and boredom, we don't reflect back on the world we have left behind us (or that has been cut off from us) in order to "grasp its meaning", we refuse that inauthentic world, learning nothing from it, and look forward into the making possible of world. Anxiety is precisely not the despairing grieving over the loss of prior enthusiastic engagement with a meaningful world, not an 'existential crisis'. In anxiety we are not bothered by our inability to care any more about the familiar world we are in the midst of. This is not what we are anxious about. Rather, our concerns lie with the strangeness of our coming into being as possibility.

"By virtue of the projected sketch set into the work of the unconcealedness of what is, which casts itself toward us, everything ordinary and hitherto existing becomes an unbeing. This unbeing has lost the capacity to give and keep being as measure." (Heidegger 1971)

"In Angst, Da-sein is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and benumbed by it. But this numbness not only takes Da-sein back from its "worldly" possibilities, but at the same time gives it the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being." (Heidegger 2010)

The self's authentic for the sake of itself is projected from the possibilities of a new world. Anxiety can only be because one is always already within world projection, which is a turning of disclosure away from an alienating, extant world toward thrown projection, which displacingly makes possible a new expanse of world. "Resoluteness means letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the they" into its own most possibilities.

IIc.)Authentic Anxiety:

I mentioned in the first section that a number of scholars associate Heidegger's account of disturbance of tool use with anxiety, and anxiety with despair and depression. Emotional disturbances leading to despair and depression focus our attention on the loss of previously meaningful involvements in the world, on a thinking of nothingness as nihilism. The recognition of loss of meaning and relevance, and its implications for one's life is a kind of understanding, but it is not what Heidegger means by the fundamental attunements of anxiety, boredom, guilt and uncanniness. Ontic disturbance and breakdown, as Heidegger illustrates with tool use, can't bring us from the inauthentic everydayness of circumspective concern to the authenticity of anxiety. In the first place, by their very nature, equipmental disruptions and surprises belong within the order to of the ready to hand. Emotional health and disturbance, understood as loss of possibilities and significance, are modes of the inauthenticity of das man, of dasein's concerned

dealings with itself and others. The loss that despair represents is an ontic deprivation, having to do with a deprivation of things or equipmental relations with others that we count on.

More importantly, fundamental anxiety is not a breakdown or loss of significance, not a nothingness understood nihilistically. It is not an existential crisis, not, as Stolorow(2013) puts it, “anticipation of the collapse of all meaningfulness.” On the contrary, anxiety puts us in touch with the most profound and fundamental ground of meaning. Anxiety prepares us for anticipative resoluteness, the projective self-understanding of making possible. For Heidegger(2013), authentic anxiety and boredom are anything but a despairing degradation of meaningfulness. Anxiety is “not, to be sure, an “elated” mood but also not a “depressed” one...”

“Not everything negative needs to be deficient and certainly not miserable and lamentable...It never enters the field of view of our calculating reason that a no and a not may arise out of a surplus or abundance, may be the highest gift, and as this not and no may infinitely, i.e., essentially, surpass every ordinary yes.” (Heidegger 1994)

Heidegger(1995) similarly argues that profound boredom “does not have the character of despair... never leads to despair.” In authentic boredom, “there is not even anything enticing about beings any more” because, in a moment of vision, Dasein has become entranced by the authentically disclosed temporal horizon.

“Dasein as such can no longer go along with them [beings] only if it is entranced as Da-sein, and indeed as a whole. What entrances is nothing other than the temporal horizon...The moment of vision which properly makes Dasein possible is simultaneously announced in this telling refusal of beings as a whole.”

Only when temporalization is thought via the ordinary time of subjective schemes, goals, roles, narratives and their dislocation is contingency assumed to be an arbitrary or absurd movement. One might be tempted to read what I've said about the paradoxical marriage of presence and absence in authentic temporalization in such a way as to accept the incessant nature of change in personal identity while wrapping this movement around, and accommodating it to, present at hand and ready to hand things and practices. It would seem to be the case that in order for there to be change, difference, transit, there must first be something (object, narrative, scheme, the 'now') to undergo such processes. Something must first be what it is by appearing 'at rest' in the present tense, before it can undergo transformation.

“In accordance with metaphysics, all beings, changeable and moved, mobile and mobilized, are represented from the perspective of a "being that is at rest," and this even where, as in Hegel and Nietzsche, "being" (the actuality of the actual) is thought as pure becoming and absolute movement.” (Heidegger 1998c)

“What is present and at hand counts as a being. Therefore it is difficult for us, wherever we encounter something apparently "negative," not only to see in it the "positive" but also to conceive something more original, transcending that distinction.”(Heidegger 1994)

Such an assumption, however, cannot help but privilege identity over difference, the present over the future. In failing to think difference in itself, it becomes difficult to fathom how the

invalidating of an entire world in anxiety, and its replacement by mere ‘possibilities’ can be seen as anything but a loss of meaning, even if we see this loss as a temporary effect of a transition to a new outlook, or we recognize contingency to be a more realistic stance toward life in general than clinging to frozen ideals. Bringing Dasein before its ownmost possibilities of being seems to imply that in becoming anxious one sacrifices the security of actual, albeit contingent, meaningfulness for the sake of more realistic expectations (for instance, recognizing that in my everyday complacency I deluded myself into believing that life is not absurd). Heidegger(1995) recognized that the notion of authentic Dasein as an irreducible in-between, a no-thing, was likely to be misinterpreted according to the present at hand oppositions of ordinary time.

“Now if ordinary understanding encounters this clarification of the fundamental relations of Dasein and its existence, and hears talk of the nothing and the fact that Dasein is supposedly held out into this nothing, then it hears only the nothing-which is somehow present at hand-and it also knows Dasein only as something present at hand. Thus it concludes that man is present at hand in the nothing, properly speaking he has nothing and consequently is himself nothing. Any philosophy which asserts such a thing is pure nihilism and the enemy of all culture. And this is all perfectly correct if we understand things the way in which they appear in the newspaper. For here the nothing is isolated and Dasein is placed into the nothing as something present at hand, instead of seeing that being held into the nothing is not some present at hand property of Dasein as compared with something else equally present at hand, but is rather a fundamental way in which Da-sein as such brings forth its ability to be. The nothing is not an empty nothingness that allows nothing to be present at hand, but is that power which constantly thrusts us back, which alone thrusts us into being and lets us assume power over our Dasein.”

What Heidegger means here is not that the nothing is a power that thrusts us back into being by allowing us to turn back to the past and appreciate the meaningfulness of beings that we have lost and left behind us, thereby inspiring us to create new meanings, but that it thrusts us back from the future to the present, displacing us into a new world. This displacing occurring of world projection is the “fundamental way in which Da-sein as such brings forth its ability to be.” Heidegger is urging us to leap into a discourse of self-transcending difference not as secondary to and accommodating of presence, but as prior to it. “As being, being “is” itself difference and is never a part or a side of the decisively separate, or one of the differentiated.” (Heidegger 2013) The self-same present is an inadequately conceived disclosure of the grounding of beings. How so?

Heidegger describes three ways that the grounding rooted in transcendence is laid out:
1) grounding as establishing (projection for the sake of) ; grounding as taking up a basis (being already in the midst of beings);(3) grounding as the grounding of something. These ways of grounding are equiprimordial and simultaneous, corresponding to the ecstatic structure of time. The transcendence proper to the grounding projection of possibilities returns from the future to lay down a present grounding as an expanse of world, in the midst of which Dasein finds itself and relates to present beings . This is a radical departure from the thinking of past, present and future in terms of entities which exist ‘in the present’ before they undergo change and become ‘past’ or point toward a future. “a historiographical reckoning ...explores, from out of a present, information about a past, and thereby at the same time calculates the future...”(Heidegger 2013).

That the threefold grounding of future projection, finding oneself in a present world, and the always already having been of this world is simultaneous means that there is nothing, no substrate, no 'now' that precedes change, differing, in-between-ness.

“The occurrence of transcendence as grounding is the forming of a leeway into which there can irrupt the factual self-maintaining of factual Dasein in each case in the midst of beings as a whole...Dasein grounds (establishes) world only as grounding itself in the midst of beings.”(Heidegger 1998)

Only when Dasein explicitly discloses the transcending, projective way of grounding Being does it attain authenticity. Everyday inauthentic comportment is an indirect, non-explicit unveiling of truth because it only explicitly uncovers the grounding of something as something. Anxiety, in opening up possibilities, at the same time unveils beings as a whole and factual Dasein, but rather than attending explicitly and exclusively to beings, it pays them no heed in order to attend to the projective character of ground.

“This distress, as such a not knowing the way out of or into this self-opening "between," is a mode of "Be-ing," in which man arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first time experiences-but does not explicitly consider-that which we are calling the "in the midst" of beings.” (Heidegger 1994))

To say that the projective establishing of ground is simultaneous with being in the midst of a world, and with disclosing present at hand things as things, is to indicate the following: Coming back from out ahead of myself, from the transcendence of the nothing, is internal to the being of a present at hand something. The present at hand something is itself a nothing, but only implicitly. Explicitly, it is 'nothing-less'. To be more precise, an objectively present thing is understood implicitly as all three types of ground. It is simultaneously nothing (the self's transcendence as projecting of possibilities), beings as a whole alongside the self, and this particular present at hand thing, this something I see as something. Put differently,

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment, and on closer analysis it turns out to be time.”(Heidegger 2010)

What's crucial to understand here is that every temporal repetition of my seeing something as something, whether it be the 'same' or a different thing, transcends beings as a whole and throws me into a new world and a new self. The present thing is implicitly grounded in this self-transcending, world-displacing 'nothing' even when it is explicitly treated as its own ground. This unique world and everything in it, including the self that I 'am', have a life expectancy of one moment, the instant of futural world projection and the self's simultaneous coming back to itself as a present being in the midst of a radically finite present world. Not to worry, though. My world and self will continue to be the same in the next instant as in the previous, but they will be the same differently, returning from the other side of an abyss of alterity. Derrida(2016) says the point of Heidegger's formulation of anxiety as being-towards-death is not to remind us of the nihilism of meaninglessness but to orient us toward the radical futurity and open possibility of temporality:

“...the point is not to resign oneself to one’s mortality...but to constitute the present as the past of a future: that is, to live the present not as the origin and absolute form of lived experience (of ek-sistence), but as the product, as what is constituted, derived, constituted in return on the basis of the horizon of the future and the ek-stasis of the future, this latter being able to be authentically anticipated as such only as finite to-come, that is, on the basis of the insuperability of possible death, death not being simply at the end like a contingent event befalling at the far end of a line of life, but determining at every — let’s say moment — the opening of the future in which is constituted as past what we call the present and which never appears as such.”

Derrida’s chain of deconstructive tropes (difference, gramme, trace) directs us to the futural difference within presence, the way that a would-be identity comes back to itself differently as the same. Derrida’s notion of iterability is informed by a radical view of temporality he shares with Heidegger. The repetition of the same meaning intention one moment to the next is the fundamental origin of the contextual break, and our exposure to otherness. Iterability, as difference, would be an

"imperceptible difference. This exit from the identical into the same remains very slight, weighs nothing itself...(Derrida 1978)". “It is not necessary to imagine the death of the sender or of the receiver, to put the shopping list in one’s pocket, or even to raise the pen above the paper in order to interrupt oneself for a moment. The break intervenes from the moment that there is a mark, at once. It is iterability itself, ..passing between the re- of the repeated and the re- of the repeating, traversing and transforming repetition.” (Derrida 1988). “Pure repetition, were it to change neither thing nor sign, carries with it an unlimited power of perversion and subversion.” (Derrida 1978)

The repetition of this very slight difference dividing self-identity from itself produces a self that returns to itself from its future the same differently.

“...there is singularity but it does not collect itself, it "consists" in not collecting itself. Perhaps you will say that there is a way of not collecting oneself that is consistently recognizable, what used to be called a 'style' “(Derrida 1995, p.354)

Derrida’s thinking here bears a remarkable resemblance to Heidegger’s(1971a) insistence that identity is never simply present to itself, but differs from itself as the same.

“The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical...The same...is the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say "the same" if we think difference.”

Every enumerable difference in degree is at the same time a difference in kind; every increment of a counting of the duration of a thing gets its sense from the uncanny and incalculable occurrence of world projection. Calculative thinking

“is unable to foresee that everything calculable by calculation - prior to the sum-totals and products that it produces by calculation in each case - is already a whole, a whole whose unity indeed belongs to the incalculable that withdraws itself and its uncanniness from the claws of calculation.”
(Heidegger 1998a)

Contrary to reciprocally causal models, where beings subsist temporarily as extant presences before they are altered by their reciprocal relations with other beings, the disclosure of any element of a Derridean system both produces and modifies the sense of the system as a whole. In Heideggerian terms, the disclosure of a present at hand entity transcendently produces and modifies beings as a whole, albeit only implicitly and privatively. Understood from within the sequentiality of ordinary time, schemes exist as present at hand entities before their dislocation, subversion and transformation. For instance, in the example of the ambiguous duck-rabbit drawing, the image of a duck discloses itself inauthentically as a present at hand perceptual scheme. As perceptual interpretation transitions from the image of the duck to the discovery of the rabbit, there ensues a moment of indeterminacy, a present at hand experience of vacuous nothingness, the vanishing of the previous being prior to the emergence of the present being. But from the perspective of authentic temporalization, the formulation of change as a gestalt shift from one scheme of understanding to another comes too late. The 'as' structure of seeing the duck as a duck already divides the identity of the duck via its temporal repetition. To see the duck as what it 'is', and continues to be, means to displacingly project a new ground of world every moment, from within which we understand the image of the duck as a thing in the world. In the everyday thinking of temporal change via gestalt or paradigm shifts between perceptual schemes, we fail to make explicit this deconstructive difference functioning already within what is supposedly present as a duck or a rabbit. Not only is it the case that the meaning of the duck, or the rabbit, continues to be itself differently before any 'gestalt shift' from one to the other takes place, but more importantly, it does so because the world and self from which the present thing derives its intelligibility is subtly re-invented every moment. Is it any wonder that, discovering that the world grounding the meaning of ordinary beings reinvents its sense every moment, Heidegger says the disposition of wonder experiences the most ordinary as the most unusual?

Disclosing beings as objectively present things is the ultimate example of forgetful, flattening, meaning-deprived absorption in the world. In order to reveal being in its fuller meaningfulness, we may withdraw our attention from the 'that it isness' of present at hand things in the direction of the ready to hand context of their use. But in doing so we remain within a privative mode of understanding. Even 'scaling up' from the limited domain of the use context of particular things to a totality of relevance weaving together all beings in our world into a single unity doesn't reveal the Being of beings authentically. We have to turn away from the ontic disclosure of this total context of relations of 'in order to' toward the ontological disclosure of world in such a way that the self's 'for the sake of which' as the transcending projection of possibilities is uncovered. One might get the impression from what I have just said that arriving at Heidegger's 'that it is', as the truth of the being of beings, amounts to no more than a widening of the scope of awareness from the trivially subordinate to the consequentially superordinate aspects of an extant relational structure of meaning. If this were all there was to it, there would be nothing in my analysis to threaten the overall substance of the accounts of the authentic self I have been critiquing here. But shifting from inauthenticity to authenticity is not a matter of enlarging the scope or intensity of awareness. It is instead a question of how we understand the basis of awareness in temporality. Put differently, to disclose beings or oneself authentically is not to 'light up' an extant object, relational 'in order to' or purposeful self by noticing it, but to find oneself in the midst of transit. The authentic revealing of the 'as a whole' of world is not the conscious awareness of an objective thing, pragmatic use context or the self as the totality of its interests, involvements and

goals, but a self-displacing happening wherein the beyond-itself of a futural making-possible simultaneously comes back to deposit Dasein in the midst of a present expanse of world. This movement is not a discovery of what is, but a making of what will be. “Knowing-awareness has nothing to do with “consciousness”, which entirely and exclusively maintains itself in the forefront corner of the subject-object relationship.”(Heidegger 2016a).

In shifting our mode of disclosure from objectively present thing to ready to hand contexture to extant beings as a whole to the projective occurrence of making possible, we are not each time supplementing or enriching a form of meaning which subsists independently of the change in mode of disclosure. The authentic truth of Being is not a categorical supplement to or container of beings. It is “not merely becoming conscious of what is—and thereby meaning that because knowledge is a “more” and an “in addition” it therefore would already be a transformation” (Heidegger 2016). The present at hand and ready to hand are derivative modes which always imply, as intrinsic to the nature of their own being-in-itself, what they conceal from explicit awareness (projective transcendence). The critical distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic lies with the difference between implicit and explicit understanding. The fact that we aren’t explicitly aware of our Dasein’s incessant self-othering transit doesn’t mean that such displacing transit doesn’t underlie the apparent self-identical persistence of an object we stare at. “The nothing nihilates incessantly without our really knowing of this occurrence in the manner of our everyday knowledge.”(Heidegger 1998b). Das man’s not knowing about the incessant occurrence of the self-transcending movement of the nothing expresses the fact that in everydayness the integral and intimate movement of authentic Dasein deteriorates into a fragmented, arbitrary form of transit. Everyday familiarity has this quality of the fragmented and arbitrary. Thus, anxiety’s transcendence of beings as a whole toward possibilities is not a sacrifice of, or supplement to, an independently subsisting meaningfulness associated with present at hand and ready to hand beings. It’s not as though the concept of a present at hand hammer, with its properties and attributes, has any intelligibility whatsoever in itself, apart from its role in a contexture of functionality. And it’s not as though this equipmental contexture, and the totality of relevance of beings as a whole, has any meaning in itself persisting beyond the fleeting, anxious, uncanny, finite, unique moment of its establishment as this whole in projection. We must know all of these facets of the threefold grounding implicitly, simultaneously, in order to know what a hammer is, even when all we know explicitly is the present at hand hammer seemingly subsisting in itself ‘in the now’.

Uncanniness and anxiety don’t tell us that the familiarity of persisting identity, the lingering of beings, is temporary and its sense will eventually be transformed ‘over time’. They tell us that the former are themselves forms of uncanniness just as is anxiety, but they are privative, alienated, confused, ambiguous modes of uncanniness (Dasein’s lostness in the They).

“The most insidious manner of forgetting is the progressive "repetition" of the same. One says the same with a constantly new indifference; the mode of saying and interpreting changes.”(Heidegger 2015)

Authentic temporality reveals within the movement of history an irreducible integrity, intimacy and relevance missing from accounts which depend on a thinking of ordinary time. An inherent violence attaches to the becoming of the world in the extent to which change is construed as

arbitrary and incommensurable. The perceived arbitrariness and externality of change is a symptom of understanding beings to BE in themselves as present at hand things, schemes, narratives. Throughout his work, Heidegger associates flattened, closed-off, forgetful, alienated, distorted and confused thinking with modes of interpretation and attunement which see the world in terms of co-ordinations among present at hand and ready-to-hand subjects and objects. Even as one's world can be made to appear familiar and predictable through such attunements, its very familiarity and self-identity rests on a sort of self-alienation. As such, the depictions of the self's sense of belonging to a world I mentioned in the first section of this paper, from ensconced familiarity to extreme estrangement and depression, amounts to a self-alienating concealing of the intimate relation between self and world fundamental to Dasein's authentic attuned self-understanding. Despair and depression belong with familiar, confident comportment as privative modes of disclosure, an alienating concealing of possibilities compared with anxiety's intimate engagement with possibilities. Authentic anxiety opens up possibilities that fear and depression conceal.

“Depression forces Da-sein back to its thrownness, but in such a way that its thrownness is precisely closed off.” (Heidegger 2010)

“He who is resolute knows no fear, but understands the possibility of Angst as the mood that does not hinder and confuse him. Angst frees him from "null" possibilities and lets him become free for authentic ones.” (Ibid)

“The fundamental possibilities of Da-sein, which is always my own, show themselves in Angst as they are, undistorted by innerworldly beings to which Da-sein, initially and for the most part, clings.” (Ibid)

“It never enters the field of view of our calculating reason that a no and a not may arise out of a surplus or abundance, may be the highest gift, and as this not and no may infinitely, i.e., essentially, surpass every ordinary yes.” (Heidegger 1994)

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