

Time as Relevance: Gendlin's Phenomenology of Radical Temporality

Abstract:

In this paper, I discuss Eugene Gendlin's contribution to radically temporal discourse, situating it in relation to Husserl and Heidegger's analyses of time, and contrasting it with a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that draw inspiration from, but fall short in their interpretation of the phenomenological work of Husserl and Heidegger. Gendlin reveals the shortcomings of these approaches with regard to the understanding of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention, reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, geometric space and sensori-motor models of behavior. Gendlin traces the weaknesses of these approaches in the above areas to the way these perspectives construe time.

Introduction:

As a philosopher and practicing psychotherapist, Eugene Gendlin made significant contributions to scholarship in both disciplines over the course of six decades. However, due to the success of such works as 'Focusing' and 'How to Interpret Your Dreams', he may be more widely known today for his innovative psychotherapeutic techniques than for his philosophical ideas. In fact, the association of Gendlin's name with the practice of tuning into bodily felt meaning may have overshadowed his work in philosophy to such an extent that in the eyes of many academics Gendlin's entire project might amount to little more than an idiosyncratic variation within the larger field of phenomenologically informed embodied cognition.

In this paper, I gather together evidence from the breadth of Gendlin's philosophical writings disputing such a conventional reading of his work. I argue instead that his thinking calls into question fundamental assumptions grounding many of the current approaches in embodied cognitive psychology as well as phenomenology. In previous writings I have elucidated what I call the radically temporal approach to philosophy. I have articulated the varying ways that radical temporality manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and in Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project.

In what follows, I discuss Eugene Gendlin's contribution to radically temporal discourse, situating it in relation to Husserl and Heidegger's analyses of time, and contrasting it with a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that draw inspiration from, but fall short in their interpretation of the phenomenological work of Husserl and Heidegger.

Incorporating Gendlin's own critiques of their work, I will show that these authors' accounts of attention and behavior, and their integration of affect and intentionality remain burdened by traditional presuppositions of time, objectivity and causality that radical temporality puts into question. I will begin with a discussion of interpretations of Husserlian time by representatives

of current approaches. I will then contrast these approaches with Gendlin's model of time, fleshing out the argument with a discussion of the parallels between his thinking on time and Husserl and Heidegger. Finally, I will unfold the implications of Gendlin's radical temporality for the understanding of mathematical objectivity, attention, reflection, affectivity and intersubjectivity.

(Footnote: Among the authors whose work Gendlin has submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela, Shaun Gallagher, Alva Noe, Damasio, Dan Zahavi and Thomas Fuchs.)

Clock Time and Dynamically Reciprocal Time:

Modern phenomenology got its start with Husserl's assertion that stripping away the layers of historically acquired philosophical and scientific dogma via the reduction, in order to get to 'the things themselves', reveals to us an irreducible primitive of immediate present experience. But rather than this primitive subsisting in an objectively present 'now' point appearing once before being replaced by another in an infinite series of past and future punctual 'nows', Husserl proposed the 'now' as a tripartite structure composed of a retentional, primal impression and protentional phase. In doing so, he replaced a temporality justifying objective causation with the temporality of the intentional act. Events don't appear anonymously as what they are in themselves, they appear to someone, are about something, and reach out (protend) beyond their immediate sense.

For Husserl, the *way* that we experience a present event is always a complex relating process weaving together past, present and future in an indissociable unity. Influenced by Husserl's analysis of time, a number of current authors give priority to a personalistic over a naturalistic thinking, incorporating aspects of Husserl's time consciousness in their readings of phenomenology. Varela and Thompson reject the claim that scientific objectivity presupposes a belief in an observer independent reality. Evan Thompson (2001) writes:

"Another way to make this point, one which is phenomenological, but also resonates with William James' thought (see Taylor, 1996), is to assert the primacy of the personalistic perspective over the naturalistic perspective. By this I mean that our relating to the world, including when we do science, always takes place within a matrix whose fundamental structure is I-You-It (this is reflected in linguistic communication: I am speaking to You about It) (Patocka, 1998, pp. 9-10)."

Ratcliffe (2002) says:

"The unquestioned givenness of the objective world that is constitutive of scientific descriptions cannot capture the way in which the given is disclosed by a meaning-giving background. Thus, if anything, it is the transcendental, meaning-giving account that has ontological priority over an objective/causal description."

Zahavi(2008) concurs with Thompson, Varela and Ratcliffe:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

All these writers support a mutual enlightenment between phenomenology and scientific naturalism , but there is disagreement over what this entails ;whether , for example , the phenomenological should be given priority over the natural. Varela, Thompson, Depraz, Gallagher and Fuchs all believe that phenomenology can be naturalized in the direction of a mathematization of Husserl’s account of time consciousness.

Varela writes:

“It is our general contention indeed... that phenomenological descriptions of any kind can only be naturalized, in the sense of being integrated into the general framework of natural sciences, if they can be mathematized.” (Zahavi 2004b)

Gallagher(2011) elaborates:

“A number of theorists have proposed to capture the subpersonal processes that would instantiate this Husserlian model [of time] by using a dynamical systems approach (Thompson 2007; van Gelder 1996; Varela 1999). On this view, action and our consciousness of action arise through the concurrent participation of distributed regions of the brain and their sensorimotor embodiment (Varela et al. 2001).”

Thompson(2007) says:

“The present moment manifests as a zone or span of actuality, instead of as an instantaneous flash, thanks to the way our consciousness is structured. As we will see later, the present moment also manifests this way because of the nonlinear dynamics of brain activity. Weaving together these two types of analysis, the phenomenological and neuro biological, in order to bridge the gap between subjective experience and biology, defines the aim of neuro-phenomenology (Varela 1996), ` an offshoot of the enactive approach.

Varela’s attempt to ‘phenomenologize’ empirical accounts of time consciousness involves rejecting time as a fixed linear sequence of nows (what Husserl calls clock time) :

“In fact, we have inherited from classical physics a notion of time as an arrow of infinitesimal moments, which flows in a constant stream. It is based on sequences of finite or infinitesimal elements, which are even reversible for a large part of physics. This view of time is entirely homologous to that developed by the modern theory of computation. [...] This strict adherence to a computational scheme will be, in fact, one of the research frameworks that needs to be abandoned as a result of the neuro-phenomenological examination proposed here”

“The traditional sequentialistic idea is anchored in a framework in which the computer metaphor is central, with its associated idea that information flows up-stream . Here, in contrast, I emphasize a strong dominance of dynamical network properties where sequentiality is replaced by reciprocal determination and relaxation time.” (Varela 1997)

Varela(1997) offers a concept of duration that is independent of linear time:

“...time in experience is quite a different story from a clock in linear time. Thus, we have neuronal-level constitutive events that have a duration on the 1/10-scale, forming aggregates that manifest as incompressible but complete cognitive acts on the 1-scale . This completion time is dynamically dependent on a number of dispersed assemblies and not a fixed integration period, in other words it is the basis of the origin of duration without an external or internally ticking clock.”. “the fact that an assembly of coupled oscillators attains a transient synchrony and that it takes a certain time for doing so is the explicit correlate of the origin of nowness.”

Ratcliffe(2013) disagrees with Varela’s project of mathematicizing phenomenology.

“...Roy, Petitot, Pachoud and Varela insist that fruitful interaction between phenomenology and science ultimately requires naturalisation of the former, ‘even though Husserl himself strongly opposed naturalism’, where naturalisation is understood as integration ‘into an explanatory framework where every acceptable property is made continuous with the properties admitted by the natural sciences.”

Ratcliffe believes something is missing from empirical naturalism and that something is the personalistically situated grounding of empirical data. There may be legitimate differences between Ratcliffe and Varela on the relation between naturalism and phenomenology, and I do believe Ratcliffe’s approach exposes the limitations of various forms of objective naturalism. But I also maintain that, rather than abandoning a causal motivational grounding entirely , Ratcliffe has instead replaced it with a more sophisticated brand of causality. There are a number of perspectives within the larger phenomenological philosophical community which are compatible with current embodied motivational accounts (Stein, Scheler, Henry) but my position is that for Gendlin, Husserl and Heidegger , such thinking retains remnants of naturalist naïveté, or , as Husserl puts it, “falls a victim to the inconsistency of a transcendental philosophy that stays within the natural realm.”

Common to the approaches I am critiquing is an interactive concatenating schematics consisting of reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions and body states. Unlike more traditional empirical approaches, such reciprocal models do not ground causation in a universal lawfulness , but instead determine the nature of causation in relation to the contextual functioning of local systems. At the same time, they inherit from the tradition a temporal thinking according to which an object of experience inheres as a temporary presence that occupies a time position. As objective presence, it persists, or endures, as itself(even if only extremely briefly or even instantaneously) . The sophisticated brand of reciprocal causality that I have attributed to Ratcliffe et al turns on this formulation of time as the modal changes of a temporarily self-present object. The analyses of Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin uncover an indissociable link between the extended, enduring object which natural causality presumes, and

the mathematical. From this vantage, even those approaches, such as Ratcliffe's, that reject attempts to mathematicize phenomenological insights begin from the same idealization of time that makes mathematical naturalism possible.

Gendlin's Model of Time: Occurring into Implying

In various writings, Gendlin distinguishes his Heideggerian account of time from phenomenologically-influenced causal interactionist readings such as those of Gallagher, Varela, Fuchs and Sheets-Johnstone (See Gendlin 2008, 2012).

"I propose an expanded model of time. Time does not consist only of nows." Linear time consists merely of positions on an observer's time line. The positions are supposed to be external and independent of what happens. Linear time is an empty frame. "The linear unit model of successive self-identical times is generated from the more intricate model of time." (Gendlin 2012)

As Gendlin(1997b) argues,

'The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to what is next to it...'(p.71).

Based on their efforts to integrate Husserlian time consciousness with neurological models, the researchers I discussed above may believe that in replacing a sequentially linear time with a reciprocally causal dynamical time, they have arrived at the sort of intricate, personalistic time that Gendlin is advocating for. However, there remain important differences. In embodied cognitive models, interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point, whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning organization somehow "knows about", belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part. And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself(even if just for an instant). What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization precedes the existence of individual entities?

Gendlin(1997b) explains:

In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it.. In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, If it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it." (p.40)

Addressing causally interaffecting organizational models, Gendlin says:

If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly...“Inter-affecting” and “coordination” are words that bring the old assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been formulating “original inter-affecting”. This makes sense only if one grasps that “they” inter-affect each other before they are a they(p.22).

Gendlin digs beneath such causative approaches to locate a more fundamental notion of interaction. “This ‘interaction’ is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact. I call it ‘interaction first’.” ‘Interaction first’ functions as what Gendlin(2008) calls implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous change.

“Here we chose to put occurring and implying first in our model, and we will derive perception and objects from these. We put occurring into implying (carrying forward) at the start, and these will inhere in all the other terms. Space, time, and perception are derivative from them. The body and its environment as one interaction is prior in our model. From this we can derive separate individual things and units.”

“Implying has (makes, brings, is) time, but not only the linear merely positional time. Though far from clear (we are only beginning), we want the sequence to define time for us. We did not begin with a clear notion of time. Let us say that the relation between occurring and implying generates time, rather than saying that life processes go on in time. (The latter statement would involve an already assumed time.)”

“Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. (See A Process Model, IVB. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of “future” and a kind of “past” that are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the linear model by considering just occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying.”

Comparing Gendlin’s model of temporality with Heidegger’s, we see that for Heidegger also , the past, present and future don’t operate as sequential modes which mark distinct states of objects. They interpenetrate each other so completely that they together form a single unitary event of occurrence.

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment [my experience of something ‘as’ something], and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.”(Heidegger 2010b)

The returning from a totality of relevance in the act of understanding something constitutes temporality not as a present object happening IN time but as temporalization.

“Temporalizing does not mean a “succession” of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein ”occurs out of its

future". "Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having– been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010)

Gendlin(1997b) echoes Heidegger’s unification of the components of time.

“The future that is present now is not a time-position, not what will be past later. The future that is here now is the implying that is here now. The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past.”“.....the past functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in”(p.37)

In comparing Gendlin’s and Heidegger’s models of time with the embodied versions of it discussed earlier in this paper, we see that others split temporality into three separated time positions. For instance, Ratcliffe says Heideggerian Care is ”the way that we are anchored in the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future (projection)” (Ratcliffe (2002). Ratcliffe says “ The experience of significant possibilities being actualized... characterizes the transition from future to present to past...”

For Gendlin and Heidegger , the actualization of significance doesn’t take place and time as the transition from one discrete time position to the next (future to present to past), it temporalizes as a single unified event of occurring. Slaby refers to his model of affect as ‘radical situatedness’ and yet shares Ratcliffe’s traditional, inauthentic understanding of affective temporality as causal dispositional state taking place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is divided into separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is not yet now, and the past as what is no longer now.

Slaby(2017) says factual situatedness

“is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic”. “Affectivity ultimately is time, namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders that infuse, burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.” “ The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension between what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is furthermore “out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our situation in unforeseeable ways.”

For Heidegger, affectivity is neither a separate past that burdens the present nor a generator of future possibilities as a hypothetical present that has not happened yet. Instead, it encompasses all three temporal ecstasies as the way in which I find myself changed.

“The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty, logical possibility and from the contingency of something objectively present, where this or that can "happen" to it. As a modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet real and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less than reality and necessity. “(Being and Time p.135)

The above writers follow Husserl's method of reduction up to a point, stripping away acquired concepts associated with a naive belief in the independence of subject and object from each other. They don't complete the reduction though, allowing subject and object to occupy separate moments. They have succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, but still find it necessary to root intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering objectivities (the "arising and subsiding, emergence and decay" of transitional forms which inhere in themselves for a moment, occupying a unit of time before relating to an outside). "...we are concerned with the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance." (Varela, F., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. (1991)). In these interpretations of time, change is the movement between events, that is, between temporarily inhering, subsisting entities or self-presences.

Footnote: Zahavi's articulation of presence as inherence deserves particular note for its proximity to Kantian subjectivity. He claims the subjective dimension of the subject-object interaction is not contingently but transcendently self-identical, non-horizontal and non-ecstatic.

"To speak of an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority, is by no means to accept a classical Cartesian dualism. It is merely to insist upon the existence of an absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation, without which no hetero-manifestation would be possible" (Zahavi 2004)

Husserl on the Origin of the Mathematical as Self-Identical Object

The failure of causal models to think time primordially leads to numerous consequences. One that has been explored by Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin concerns the inability of such approaches to locate the origin of the mathematical in a more fundamental generating process. Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin have shown in different ways that a quantifiable, mathematizable nature presupposes the kind of time which consists of self-presences transitioning from future to present to past in sequential movement (existing 'in' time). What does it imply to make a time measurement, to state that it takes certain amount of time for some process to unfold? Recall, for instance, Varela's discovery of "neuronal-level constitutive events that have a duration on the 1/10-scale" "...an assembly of coupled oscillators attains a transient synchrony and it takes a certain time for doing so..."

A time calculation counts identical instances of a meaning whose sense is kept fixed during the counting. To count is to count continuously changing instances OF something that holds itself as self-identical through a duration or extension.

"The consideration of the conditions in principle of the possibility of something identical that gives itself (harmoniously) in flowing and subjectively changing manners of appearance leads to the mathematization of the appearances as a necessity which is immanent in them.

A true object in the sense of logic is an object which is absolutely identical "with itself," that is,

which is, absolutely identically, what it is; or, to express it in another way: an object is through its determinations, its quiddities [Weisheiten], its predicates, and it is identical if these quiddities are identical as belonging to it or when their belonging absolutely excludes their not belonging. Purely mathematical thinking is related to possible objects which are thought determinately through ideal-"exact" mathematical (limit-) concepts, e.g., spatial shapes of natural objects which, as experienced, stand in a vague way under shape-concepts and [thus] have their shape-determinations; but it is of the nature of these experiential data that one can and by rights must posit, beneath the identical object which exhibits itself in harmonious experience as existing, an ideally identical object which is ideal in all its determinations; all [its] determinations are exact—that is, whatever [instances] fall under their generality are equal—and this equality excludes inequality; or, what is the same thing, an exact determination, in belonging to an object, excludes the possibility that this determination not belong to the same object.” (Husserl 1970)

“Every thingly being is temporally extended; it has its duration, and with its duration it is fit within Objective time in a strict manner. Thus with its duration it has a fixed place in the one world-time, which is a universal form of existence for all thinghood. Everything else that a thing" is," according to every other essential determination which belongs to it, it is that in its duration, with the more precise determination of its "when.”” (Husserl 1989)

Husserl argues that the self-identical object on which duration and mathematical quantification is based is transcendent to what is actually experienced; it is an idealization, a synthesis pieced together from moments of experience that never reproduce their sense identically. Actual experience does not subsist, inhere or endure, and this does not produce countable instances. In the following passages, Husserl makes a distinction between the time of constituting subjectivity and the time of constituted objects. He maintains that both kinds of temporality are perceived simultaneously in ongoing experience in what he refers to as a double intentionality. The time of constituted objects corresponds to the way that current embodied theorists treat temporality, as objects that come into presence and endure for whatever length of time before disappearing. Over the course of their duration, they can change in some subordinate respect(spatial displacement as continuous succession) that can be measured as taking a certain amount of time.

The time of constituting subjectivity corresponds to a more primordial time that consists not of self-identical objects which endure for a ‘period of time’ but a flow of qualitative change that forms no process of continuous succession. Without the concept of continuous succession to ground them, notions like ‘faster’ and ‘slower’ lose their sense. This is the time of Gendlin’s occurring into implying. It is never precisely the same noematic object that is filling out the temporal duration from moment to moment. The meant sense is that of an enduringly identical tone because of the noetic idealizing unification of the varying sensations that it encompasses. For Husserl, primary sense data represents a more fundamental form of temporality than adumbrated ‘real’ spatial objects. Notions of nowness as a countable duration occurring in time, occupying a moment of time, correspond to Husserl’s apperceived time of real spatial objects, but underlying this level of constitution is a more primordial temporality, corresponding to the time of Gendlin’s occurring into implying.

“Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream)

endures, and necessarily endures -that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into change.

Now if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession, and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change", and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration."(Husserl 1964).

The constituted time forms itself as a kind of faith or belief in persistent self-identity that accompanies the moments of the primordial flow from the intending subjective side of the subject-object synthesis.

“The consciousness of its [the object’s] existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present.”

The object is “a unity which “appears” continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego.” “The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.”(Husserl 1973)

“ Every temporal being "appears" in one or another continually changing mode of running-off, and the "Object in the mode of running-of" is in this change always something other, even though we still say that the Object and every point of its time and this time itself are one and the same.”(Husserl 1964)

In describing an unchanging enduring tone, for instance, Husserl emphasizes “...the incessantly

changing mode of givenness of this duration.” “However, ...through a continual coinciding of sense a unity of the objective sense can be formed and be maintained through the alteration of lived experiences.”

It would be a mistake to think the temporality of sense data lacks duration because it is instantaneous, momentary or extremely brief. Instantaneity presupposes objective time. Rather, the primordial now returns to itself moment to moment as qualitatively altered. Husserl asserts that the intentional ‘belief’ in self-identity constitutes an empirical object out of what are in fact changing senses. Husserl’s point isn’t simply that there are no straight lines or perfect circles in nature. Rather, it is that scientific as well as ordinary conceptions of time and space assume that geometric ideality grounds the imperfect shapes of nature. Natural shapes are considered imperfect relative to a presupposed normative framework that defines objectivity in terms of an ideal geometry of extended space and enduring time. Extension and duration are products of the idealizing synthesis which constitutes self-identical objects. These in turn make possible mathematical quantification and various components of enumeration such as magnitude and the historical genesis of ideal geometric shapes, which includes geometric space-time. The ideal figure of pure line, for instance, makes possible various characteristics of number.

Heidegger on Objective Presence, Motion and Time:

Heidegger(1987), in a move similar to Husserl, traces the origin of the mathematical and of empirical science to the concept of enduring objective presence undergirding constituted time (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time).

“What does it mean to be "in time"? This "being-in-time" is very familiar to us from the way it is represented in natural science. In natural science all processes of nature are calculated as processes which happen "in time." Everyday common sense also finds processes and things enduring "in time," persisting and disappearing "in time." When we talk about "being-in-time," everything depends on the interpretation of this "in." In order to see this more clearly, we ask simply if the glass on the table in front of me is in time or not. In any case, the glass is already present-at-hand and remains there even when I do not look at it. How long it has been there and how long it will remain are of no importance. If it is already present-at-hand and remains so in the future, then that means that it continues through a certain time and thus is "in" it.”

“Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as *remanens capax mutationem*, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being.”(Heidegger 2010)

Heidegger explains that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence.

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to

present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.

Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.”(Heidegger 2010)

Heidegger(1982) shows how the common notion of time dates back to Aristotle’s derivation of time from motion.

“The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are interwoven with the experience of time.”(basic problems of phenomenology) “ So far as time is *kineseos ti*, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion.”
“Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a how-long, a duration.”

Time is making present according to Aristotle, (the present at hand) and in so doing is a counting of time as now, now, now.

“And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly "objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time.”

“The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present; for it itself moves "in time." We say that in every now it is now, in every now it already disappears. The now is now in every now, thus constantly present as the same, even if in every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show at the same time the constant presence of itself as this changing thing.” (Heidegger 2010)

In this connection, I mentioned earlier that the sophisticated reciprocal dynamics of embodied approaches to temporality are in a position to question the model of time as a linear sequential continuity. But does this mean that they reject Descartes view of objective being as constant objective presence, and Aristotle’s model of time as motion? Heidegger says vulgar time is “the constant presence of itself as this changing thing.” By this he means that of which changing instances are instances is objective time. When naturalized phenomenological approaches such as Varela’s measure a temporal duration, time plays the role of constant objective presence, remaining self-identical throughout the measurement of a changing thing. Non-linear dynamical systems descriptions remain within Heideggerian vulgar time (and Husserlian constituted time) due to the fact that a causal metaphysics still underpins this thinking. Reciprocally determinative processes occur WITHIN in time, they take up and endure through a span of time. That they have duration makes them quantifiable. The ‘now’ takes a certain number of milliseconds.

In discussing Husserl’s distinction between constituting and constituted time, and Heidegger’s contrast between vulgar and authentic temporality, I aimed to show how attempts to naturalize phenomenology by recourse to mathematical description reify objects into abstract units.

Whatever is quantifiable is a countable change in degree belonging to a series whose qualitative identity encompasses the series as a whole. As in the case of continuous motion, the series is treated as an object whose qualitative meaning endures self-identically over the temporal increments of the measurement of its numeric units. It would seem, then, that to be a participant element in a reciprocally causal dynamical process is to harbor, prior to and outside of exposure to qualitative transformation of meaning, temporarily persisting self-identity. Going on the assumption this is a fair characterization of mathematically naturalized embodied models like Varela's, we might then wonder if collapsing the distinction between change of degree and change in kind embraced by both empirical and mathematical discourses would be enough to bring these approaches into alignment with the pre-mathematical temporality of Gendlin, Husserl and Heidegger.

It may be useful to consider Deleuze's work on time and quantification in this connection. I mention Deleuze because he provides a reciprocally causal account that has many features in common with those of the embodied community. More significantly, within his formal account any difference of degree, any quantitative repetition, any numeration qualitatively changes the sense of what counts at every quantitative repetition.

Deleuze's (1994) concept of intensive magnitude succeeds in deconstructing the quantity-quality binary by establishing a 'ground' (as metamorphosis) in difference that is neither qualitative nor quantitative, and thus a basis of number that does not measure.

"Let us take seriously the famous question: is there a difference in kind, or of degree, between differences of degree and differences in kind? Neither." "In its own nature, difference is no more qualitative than extensive"

"The number is no longer a universal concept measuring elements according to their emplacement in a given dimension, but has itself become a multiplicity that varies according to the dimensions considered (the primacy of the domain over a complex of numbers attached to that domain). We do not have units (unites) of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of measurement." (Deleuze 1987, p.8)

"If there exists a primitive "geometry" (a proto-geometry), it is an operative geometry in which figures are never separable from the affectations befalling them, the lines of their becoming, the segments of their segmentation: there is "roundness," but no circle, "alignments," but no straight line, etc." (ibid, p.212)

"A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). ... An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections." (Ibid, p.8)

Deleuze fashioned his model with the aim of moving away from what he considered to be a subjectivist emphasis on the part of phenomenology. In this effort he was aided by Bergson, Nietzsche and Simondon. Nevertheless, writers such as Protevi (2006) and Rosenberg (1996)

claim significant affinities between the organizational dynamics of Deleuze's model and the autopoietic enactivism of Varela, Thompson, Slaby and others who incorporate phenomenological elements in their work. Their shared emphasis on the determination of singularities as nodes within a reciprocally causal multiplicity, and the incessantly mobile and transformative character of these multiplicities, allows one to imagine that enactivists like Thompson might be receptive to the idea that the mathematization of nature via quantitative measurement is a useful idealization rather than an irreducible ground. More specifically, number may be treated as pure difference of degree for the sake of convenience without denying that difference in kind is co-implicit by every difference in degree.

Footnote : This hope may be optimistic. For instance, Jack Reynolds(2008,2010) , an advocate of naturalized phenomenological approaches like Thompson's, embraces a liberal form of naturalism (John McDowell and Hilary Putnam are among early formulators of this perspective) he opposes to what he considers the idealism of Deleuzian temporality.

Does Deleuze's deconstruction of the quantity-quality, degree-kind binary offer a path toward a reconciliation between phenomenology and embodied causal accounts? I don't think it does. While there is not space here to present a detailed argument, Deleuze's approach falls short in many of the ways that, as I claim in this paper, embodied accounts do (particularly with regard to the treatment of affect and intersubjectivity) owing to a common weakness in the understanding of temporality.

We saw that in Gendlin's notion of "original inter-affecting", elements inter-affect each other before they are a they." This 'interaction' is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact." A difference is "a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other in this 'occurring into implying'".

In Deleuze's model, a singular difference is not already changed by what it interacts with, but exists first instantaneously as an intrinsic content before it is then changed by what it interacts with. This is the distinction between reciprocal inter-causation and original inter-affecting.

While Deleuzian difference closes off the possibility of countable duration and extension, it retains the idea of instantaneous intrinsic presence. Deleuze denudes everything from traditional notions of presence and cause in an entity except instantaneous identity. Deleuze's notion of intrinsicity as a differential "produced in a time smaller than the minimum continuous time thinkable." remains a notion of temporality as 'in-timeness', as the occupying of a moment of time by a content. Only an element which takes a moment of time to inhere as what it is can interact in a causal way within an assembly of differential relations.

Gendlin's Deconstruction of Motion and Mathematical Time-Space:

In an analysis complementing those of Husserl and Heidegger, Gendlin(2009b) traces the origin of the concept of motion to the presumption of time as a sequence of self-identical units.

"What has identity is 'self-identical' Once we separate something out, it has its own identity. It becomes self-identical. It is a unit. I say it functions 'as itself'. But it was not like that before being separated out. When the many are only implicit, they are not units located each in its own

position in time. The contrast is sharp: Something self-identical has identity conditions and occurs in its own time location. It is a unit. But before we separate some of them out, they don't exist separately.”

”Existence includes not just single events and self-identical units, but also what functions implicitly. It was long held that what exists must be self-identical. Since self-identically have space and time locations, it was assumed that only what fills space and time can exist.”

“If only what appears exists, then what exists is “external,” in front of us, other than us, as if alone from us, over-there from here. To “exist” came to mean to appear to us. The very word for things became (and still is) “phenomena.” This is the old subject-object puzzle: what exists can only be a known-by. The metaphysical puzzle comes here only if we first assume that what exists must have a self-identical shape in space and time. Then there seems to be nothing but formed forms imposed on — nothing“

For Gendlin, calculative repetition and the concepts of duration and magnitude that they rest on lose their justification. Units are no longer units if they cannot be said to belong to the same process. Sameness and identical repetition become limiting cases of transformative change.

“We predict that physics must eventually give up pointwise localization in space and time and single, non-interacting particle states. There will always be two or more particles, and their definitions, as well as those of places and times, will be definable only backwards, from interaction... For us the same units do not need to last through a change. If they do, it is a narrower special case. In the old model events must occur within a static multiplicity of space points, time points, and particles. A particle alone is "this one," "the same one" that was earlier there and is now here...In the new model the occurrence forms its own new multiplicity. If a space time-particle grid is desired, it is determined from the occurrence. Nothing in the new model forces us to lose anything from the old, if we want it. But with the new model we do reject the assumption that occurring must be determined and necessitated by the units of previous occurrence.” (Gendlin 1983)

“Although the spectator thinks of most sequences as repetitious, I have argued that repetition depends on someone comparing the sequence to a previous one. Internally the process occurs freshly. Occurring into implying is a change. From the change process we can derive sameness and repetition as a special kind of change.” (Gendlin 1997)

Drawing on his derivation of objective space-time from the radical temporality of occurring into implying, Gendlin critiques the current emphasis on sensorimotor coupling in embodied models. Gendlin explains that descriptions of animal behavior in terms of sensorimotor interactions rely on objective space-time, and as a result they replace an intricate sense making process with a reductive causality.

“There are current proposals for a ‘sensorimotor coupling’. Current researchers are looking for a tie between perception and motion, not between perception and behavior. But living things never just change location; there is always more involved and perceived in behavior (O’Regan & Noë, 2001) (Gendlin 2009b)

“Noë, O’Regan, Gallagher and others miss the space of behavior possibilities because they think of

behavior as motion. But motion is what the “external” logical grid splits off. Motion is a sophisticated product which requires an observer to define this here and that there. It involves paths of changes in mere location. Behavior does not consist of motions and cannot be reduced to motion. Noë says, for example, quite rightly that seeing an apple includes seeing the ways we could move with and around it. But motion is a separated abstract product of cognition. Behavior does not consist of this much later product. We might walk around the apple, or eat it, or save it for someone and tell them about it.”(Gendlin 2009c)

Note the similarities among Gendlin’s depiction of motion as change within a mathematical space-time grid, Husserl’s analysis of constituted time as self-identically enduring objects in continuous succession of change or rest, and Heidegger’s account of vulgar time as motion (“So far as time is *kinesios ti*, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it.”).

Attention and Reflection:

A consequence of generating the movement of time from a causative cobbling together of static presences is that it separates into opposed and alienated states dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and becoming, alterity and identity, feeling and intention, state and transition. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in current conceptualizations of attentional processes. Phenomenological informed empirical accounts describe attention as a multi-phasic activity involving a shifting of focus bringing objects from the margins to the center of awareness. As well as its function as magnification of objects, it is studied as vigilance, orientation, selection, filtering and priming. Embodied writers typically employ the metaphor of a spotlight highlighting pre-existing contents to describe attentive grasping. For instance, Zahavi(2005) depicts Husserl’s approach to attention in the following way:

“...the concepts of attention and attentional modification are taken from the domain of object consciousness and are related to the distinction between thematic and marginal objects. The attentional modification is what is at stake when we shift our focus between different objects, bringing those at the margin into the center of attention.”

“To perceive an object is always to perceive an object situated in a perceptual field; whenever we pay attention to something, we single it out from its surroundings. Thus, one might describe the appearance of a thematic object as an appearance out of a field or background.”

A look at certain of Husserl’s writings might give the impression he too considered the metaphor of a highlighting or singling out of existing objects from a field to be an acceptable characterization of attention.

“Attention is usually compared to a spotlight. The object of attention, in the specific sense, lies in the cone of more or less bright light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into the completely dark region. Though the metaphor is far from adequate to differentiate all the modes which can be fixed phenomenologically, it is still designative in so far as it indicates alterations in what appears, as what appears. These changes in its illumination do not alter what appears with respect to its own sense -composition; but brightness and obscurity modify its mode of appearance: they are to be found and described when we direct our regard to the noematic

Object." "...we say that the alteration consists merely of the fact that, in one of the compared cases, one moment of the object is "favored" and, in another case, another; or of the fact that one and the same moment is "paid attention to primarily" at one time and only secondarily at another time, or "just barely noticed still," if not indeed "completely unnoticed" though still appearing."(Husserl 1982)

Husserl's description of attention as a form of highlighting appears consistent with that of Zahavi and other writers as long as one remains focused on the object's noematic sense. But what appears as a minor, peripheral alteration relative to an unchanging objective core in the natural attitude reveals a continual and thoroughgoing modification when we shift our focus from the noematic to the noetic side of attention. What makes possible the appearance of a self-identical object being noticed in one mode of prominence or another relative to a field is a continuously varying creative synthesis.

"Every apprehending turning-toward which arrests what is given in the flux of sensuous experience, i.e., turns toward it attentively and by way of contemplation searches into its properties, is already an achievement..."(Husserl 1973).

"Each attention-series is, as a series, something like a ray, and in each series "the same thing" is intentionally grasped. It is a series grasping one and the same thing ever more richly and more perfectly, analogously to the way in which I, by coming closer to an Object, hence in the corresponding series of orientations, gain an ever more rich knowledge of the Object and grasp it always better and more fully."(Husserl 1989)

Rather than the noticed object pre-existing the attending grasp, the attentional ray noetically creates and then enriches the sense of an ongoingly identical object phase by phase.

"The original tendency of the process, along with what has accrued to it from what has been realized hitherto, is fulfilled phase by phase, and it is at the same time extended as a tendency and exhibits new stages of fulfillment."(Husserl 1973)

In sum, for Husserl attention does not merely single out or prime the appearance of objects. Rather, the focused attention on an object is a synthesis of creative acts which first constitute and then continue to fulfill the 'self' of the object that is being 'noticed'. The object in itself is transcendent, never seen as an actual whole, but rather from moment to moment as a changing concatenation of retentive memory, protentional anticipation and impressions of immediate sense. Turning toward and heeding an object implies a belief in its continuity, a continuity which is nothing other than this constantly changing flow of sensations synthetically held together as a unitary object via memory and anticipation. Thus, the initial 'turning toward' an object is already a synthetic act of constitution. Attention, as a species of intention, is sense-making, which means it is sense-changing. Attention is affectively, valuatively and meaningfully implicated in what it attends to as co-participant in the synthesis, creation, constitution of objects of regard.

In utilizing the spotlight metaphor of attention, Zahavi, Depraz and others remain within the natural attitude to the extent that they treat the constituted products of intentional syntheses (temporarily self-identical objects) as fundamental and in the process fail to reduce these noematic appearances to the constituting intentional acts of which they are idealizations. In

splitting off the appearing object from the constituting subjective process, they reify not only the objective but the subjective pole of the self-world relation. Writers such as Bitbol(2009), Varela(1991) and Thompson(2001) assert a bare, raw, pre-reflective, non-objectifying, pre-intentional form of attentive self-awareness, while Zahavi(2004) speaks of an absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation that subsists in itself as a pure interiority.

Husserl's (1982) critique of empirical psychological approaches for construing attention as a mere singling out of a pre-existing object would seem to apply to embodied theorists as well.

“Attention is one of the chief themes of modern psychology. Nowhere does the predominantly sensualistic [empiricist] character of modern psychology show itself more strikingly than in the treatment of this theme, for not even the essential connection between attention and intentionality-- this fundamental fact: that attention of every sort is nothing else than a fundamental species of intensive modifications-- has ever, to my knowledge, been emphasized before.” “Dazed by the confusion between object and mental content, one forgets that the objects of which we are ‘conscious’, are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can merely be found in it and snatched at in it; but that they are first constituted as being what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective intention...One forgets that... an intending, or reference is present, that aims at an object, a consciousness is present that is the consciousness of this object. The mere existence of a content in the psychic interplay is, however, not at all this being-meant or being-referred-to. This first arises when this content is ‘noticed’, such notice being a look directed towards it, a presentation of it. To define the presentation of a content as the mere fact of its being experienced, and in consequence to give the name ‘presentations’ to all experienced contents, is one of the worst conceptual distortions known to philosophy.”

Like Husserl, Heidegger(1994) considers the encounter with objects in the world in an act of attention to be a creative process altering self and world in the same gesture.

"The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative.... To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing. "

Beings (essences) are produced by Dasein in the act of taking something as something because the ground (the totality of relevance) of their being is created anew in our encounter with them.

“Every “foundation” in the sense we discussed comes too late with regard to the positing of the essence, because the productive seeing of the essence is itself a productive seeing of that in which the essence has its ground—a productive seeing of what its ground is. Knowledge of the essence is in itself a ground-laying. It is the positing of what lies under as ground... It is not the subsequent adding of a ground for something already represented.”(Heidegger 1994)

Consistent with this thinking, for Gendlin cognition and propositional belief are not simply a

‘being about something’, directedness toward or an aiming at an object, but transform and enrich what they ‘represent’, creatively altering their sense. In Gendlin’s approach, experiencing is always a crossing between the past and what is being encountered in an act of sense making such that each is interbled with the other, so that no outside can be differentiated from an inside. The crossing is not an alienated opposition between subjective and objective sides of the encounter but an intimate unity of implication. Gendlin reveals the oppositional character of current accounts of subject-object interaction in his critique of their treatment of attention, intention and reflection as features of a ‘being about something’. In taking something AS something, we are not simply associating two externally related entities in relation to each other and with reference to a more encompassing causal framework. If a cognition or intention is merely about something, then it functions as external binding, coordinating and relating between two objectively present participants.

The subject-object nexus is not a system of reciprocal coordinations among objectively present entities, states and dispositions. The ‘is’ connecting S with P is not a causal copula, but a transformative relevant altering in one gesture both the S and the P. In Gendlin’s terms, the ‘as’ enacts a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other in this ‘occurring into implying’ (context of dealing with something). When we take something as something, we have already projected out from a totality of relevance such as to render what is presenting itself to us as familiar and recognizable in some fashion. But in this act of disclosure, we only have this totality of relevance by changing it.

“Supposedly cognizing the “external” things does not change them. Cognizing is only about them. This “only about” assumes that our cognition does not change the behavior context, the situation including what our scientific work is about. But I will argue that it does change the behavior space...It has not been clear how cognition is a bodily process. “Only about” has meant that cognition happens in representations.”

The bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities, as we have seen, is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the occurring into implying of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it. Gendlin says that the attending to an object of cognition is a creative act rather than an encounter between already self-inhering subject and object. Since no self-inhering subjective or objective pole precedes the crossing that occurring into implying effectuates, it makes no sense to speak of a pre-reflective immediate affective self-awareness and a gap between this felt sense and an intended object. Any awareness that takes place is awareness of a change. This change precedes the causal opposition between immediate affective self-consciousness and mediate object. The affectively subjective and the intentionally objective are unified features of the crossing.

“There are not two consciousnesses, the implicit one and attention. Rather, attention is the one occurring which results from the crossed multiplicity of implying. Any single thing of which we are explicitly aware is an occurring produced by an implicitly functioning process. The implicit cannot be called “**pre-reflective**” or “**pre-verbal**” since it includes what previously came with attention, perception, cognition, and words. Implicit functioning is not pre-reflective or pre-verbal. It is pre-verbal only in regard to *the next* set of words, and pre-reflective only in regard to *the next* act of

reflection.” (Gendlin 2008)

For embodied theorists, both acts of intention and of reflection depend on the notion of time as a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities. The ‘being-about-something’ instantiated by the pairing of past and present is a conjunction of separate, adjacent phases or aspects: the past which conditions the present entity or event, and the present object which supplements that past. This makes attention a hinge between *relata*, a propositional copula grounded in an objective time whose passage is marked by an attending to the appearance and disappearance of the succession of *nows*.

For Gendlin, the dynamic ‘now’ consists of a coupling of a past and present already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all. As a consequence, an attentional copula is conspicuously absent, along with the *relata* that it would bind and separate. In its place is an implying into occurring crossing. From this vantage, for writers like Zahavi reflection is an opposition or alienation within the self not simply because in reflecting the present self is compared with a past version, but because their way of conceiving the relation between past and present artificially splits them apart.

“...reflection and explication are often considered as if they were a mere looking back, as if the past remained there to be looked back to... It sounds all right if we say that the present goes on "in the context of" the past, but we have to mean the context it regenerates. **The process goes on -- not in the context that was (and isn't here to be gone on in), but -- in the context that is changed by the it.**”(Gendlin 1997))

“...the reaching behind itself in going forward constitutes a re-reception, a reception of the fact of reception, which is also the further implying that brings the further occurring.”

“I must point out the sharp difference between this reflexive re-reception internal to experiencing, on the one hand, and what we call "reflection" on the other hand. The reflexive re-reception generates the process. It generates each next bit of process. A first-person process happens through this reflexive re-reception. On the other hand, when we reflect, we take a *separate* stand in relation to the past. The reflexivity of carrying forward is not the past, not reflection. It is the self-generating of the present. "Reflexivity" is a more complex concept of the present.”

Heidegger(1982) makes a similar point concerning the distinction between the concept of reflection as an objectively present subject staring at its past self, and self-disclosure as a self coming back to itself from its future, in the same instant defining and transforming itself:

“ Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only a mode of self-apprehension, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure. The way in which the self is unveiled to itself in the factual *Dasein* can nevertheless be fittingly called reflection, except that we must not take this expression to mean what is commonly meant by it—the ego bent around backward and staring at itself—but an interconnection such as is manifested in the optical meaning of the term “reflection”. “To reflect means, in the optical context, to break at something, to radiate back from there, to show itself in a reflection from something.”

In a 2003 paper, How to Investigate Subjectivity, Zahavi suggested that Heidegger’s depiction of

the self's reflecting itself back to itself from the world may point to a non-objectifying form of reflection "that is nothing but a higher form of wakefulness,... a more articulate and intense form of self-awareness... a special form of attention..."

Two years later, Zahavi(2005) appeared to change his mind, claiming that, rather than being an attentive modification of awareness, Heideggerian self-disclosure should be understood as an objectifying reflection, "a type of self-fragmentation that we do not encounter on the level of pre-reflective self-awareness."

Indeed, when Gendlin tells us that the concept of self-reflection as it is employed by contemporary embodied accounts amounts to taking a separate stand in relation to the past, and when Heidegger characterizes reflection as "the ego bent around backward and staring at itself" one might be tempted to interpret them as agreeing with Zahavi's contention concerning the difference between self and hetero-affection. That is to say, it could seem as though they are acknowledging that when the self takes itself as an object it becomes alienated and split off from itself.

But what must be understood is that Heidegger's primary self-disclosure, like Gendlin's reflexive re-reception, represents neither the pure inwardness of pre-reflective attentive awareness nor the alienation of a reflective stance that turns back toward what was originally purely apprehended. The primordial structure of self-awareness functions prior to Zahavi's splitting of experience into an opposition between self-presenting subject and appearing object, and is more originary than supposedly immediate, pre-intentional attentive self-awareness. As a consequence, for Gendlin and Heidegger, even the most 'alienating' forms of reflection cannot rend the implicatory unity and continuity of the self-world hinge. Rather, they are deficient or inauthentic modes of this irreducible self-belonging.

As Heidegger(2010) explains:

"However, alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factually torn away from itself...this alienation, which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely getting stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself."

Gendlin reveals how reflexive re-reception functions within both so-called pre-reflective attention and reflection as the temporality of occurring into implying.

"mere attention" is not mere. What attending lifts out is a product. Attention has the same power to lift something out, as any distinction in a phenomenological treatise does. Attention is an active symbolizing, but never arbitrary. The response to it can surprise us and force us to change our categories. Attention, (consciousness, awareness, presence-to, . . .) is no merely neutral beam of light, although in some respects this can be said of it. It is always also a special kind of *further* symbolizing and entitizing.

No attention operates alone. It always comes from and with a mesh of physically sensed relevance just as any other kind of symbolizing does, and it is therefore questionable, relative, and various, and yet also always in a precise and demanding relation to the implicit intricacy which motivates it. The

attentional "beam" emerges from an intricate mesh of knowing, bodily feeling, and doing which are not separate departments. When this mesh changes, what attention can possibly bring, changes as well. We can enter this mesh at any time and carry forward some of what "was" functioning in it.

The fact that so much – and especially we ourselves – are implicitly involved in the humble "beam" of attention can now come together with what I have said about experiencing as a "carrying forward" process, and about internal time. We might miss the inherent togetherness of self-consciousness and the internal time of carrying forward, because we are so accustomed to read the model of perception into everything, as if our consciousness were only a perceiver, added on to percepts. But here we have been pursuing a philosophical lead, the sense that self-consciousness is structurally inherent in the very making of experiencing, not just the perceiver of it. Rather than a merely added light, consciousness is *the self-generating of* experiencing.(Gendlin 2004)

It is not a matter of becoming aware of something that doesn't change as a result. "Coming aware" must not be thought about with the flashlight model. To "be aware" is a sequence. To be aware without changing something away is to "pause" it, to have a string of versions of that "same" thing, rather than carrying forward it away. Thereby whatever it is acquires a new nature which is then after all its own, rendered in the new medium. "(Gendlin 1997b)

Gendlin on Feelings:

It is not possible to adequately grasp the transformative nature of attention without appreciating the central role that affectivity plays in structuring temporality. Gendlin's term "original inter-affecting" captures the idea that, rather than existing as themselves first before being related, the poles of the subject-object relation "inter-affect each other before they are a they".

Once we recognize that attention is not a neutral beam illuminating appearances, but instead a change in what appears, we have the basis for a proper understanding of affectivity. Gendlin(1997) explains:

“But notice, this is not the concept of "consciousness" in the Western tradition, something like a mere light shining on something given there in advance. With our new concept "feeling" is the behavior; it is the series of bodily impacts of the body's own doing in the environment.”

Gendlin's notion of feeling emerges from the 'self-generating of experience, via the structure of occurring into implying, and is closely intertwined with the concept of 'relevanting' that the temporal structure of implying-occurring generates. Gendlin founds his concept of feeling in a novel model of body-environment interaction grounded in this radical inter-affecting. He asks:

“How does the organism 'select and interpret' what is relevant to it? Selection and interpretation would not be necessary if by 'environment' we meant the organism's own which it actively participates in generating. Recently some authors speak of organism and environment as mutually causing each other (Gallagher, 2007)”(Gendlin 2009)

Gendlin digs beneath such causative approaches to locate a more fundamental notion of interaction, grounded in radical temporality. “This 'interaction' is prior to two separate things

that would first meet in order to interact. I call it 'interaction first'." 'Interaction first' functions as what Gendlin(2008) calls implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous change.

"We feel the change made by the actual environment occurring into the body's implied behavior context. The feedback occurs into the implying which carries the sequence forward into further implying and occurring, as our little model says. Behavior forms only as perceptions and feelings of this kind." Feeling is a change made in an implicit mesh of intercorrelated understandings. "A bodily felt sense is a crossing of the relevant facets" of a situation, a change made that carries forward...In the bodily implying all perceptions and cognitions may function implicitly."(Gendlin 2008)

"The body moves further as the effect of the registry of how it just moved. It moved and is then affected by re-recognizing what it just did. Each bit of the sequence includes (is made by) the bodily impact (the registry) of how it just was. We could say that the body feels its own doing! Let us try to call this "feeling". "Feeling is the series of changes made by the impacts of the renditions of how the body was." "What I call "re-recognition" enables us to understand how feeling locates into itself. In feeling the body "feels itself" but not as if it were an object along with other objects. Rather, the body feels its environment by re-recognizing what it just did. Feeling is the series of impacts of what the body just did. With feeling the body not only is, but feels the impact of what it "was." This is sentience. We have derived consciousness!"(Gendlin 1997)

Concepts like 'interaction first', 'original interaffecting', and occurring into implying share features with Husserl's associative synthesis, in particular the belonging of new sense to what it occurs into via dimensions of commonality and likeness. It also shares features with Heidegger's concerned dealing with entities oriented in relation to a pragmatic totality of relevance. Relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via a bodily feeling state, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience.

"A process is a relevanting. This verb says both that a process occurs relevantly, and that the relevance is made by the process. What occurs makes itself relevant. So we cannot use relevance as if it were on another level from which one can pre-determine what will occur." (Gendlin 1997)

Because most current approaches make self-inhering states do most of the work of establishing the awareness of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between the subject and the world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. In these accounts, movement and transformation are treated as secondary to self-inherence, so that the affective and cognate aspects of events are artificially split into separated entities and then have to be pieced together again in an interaction. To ground experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in continuous self-transforming movement.

In embodied cognitive models, feeling processes adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cognitive environment. Affect is linked to a milieu outside of itself and with which

the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive feeling-intending associations. There is a partial independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional. In Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*, which has been variously and imperfectly translated as attunement, mood, self-finding and state of mind, we find a phenomenological articulation of the inseparable relation of affect, intention and temporality. Gendlin recognizes a strong affinity between Heidegger's concept of *Befindlichkeit* and his philosophy of the implicit. In his essay, "Befindlichkeit: Heidegger and the Philosophy of Psychology," Gendlin observes that:

'Heidegger's concept denotes how we sense ourselves in situations. Whereas feeling is usually thought of as something inward, Heidegger's concept refers to something both inward and outward, but before a split between inside and outside has been made.' (Gendlin 1978/79).

The relation, the in-between is the irreducible basis of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, the subjective and the objective, are not primordially understood as belonging to an interaction between immediately felt and mediatively given states of being; they are instead the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of transition, otherwise known as *Dasein's* equi-primordial temporality, attunement and understanding. There are no self-inhering entities, either in the guise of affects or intended objects. In the place of a three-part structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object, Heidegger proposes a unified totality. No relational connector is needed to tie subject and object together when subject and object are no longer assumed as inherences. The awareness of the relation between self and world is not a secondary or tertiary derivation from a primordial awareness of distinct subjective and objective manifestations. On the contrary, both feeling and intentional meaning are produced only in and through *Dasein's* projective self-world relation.

Gendlin's occurring into implying process, like Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*, guarantees that the relevance, significance, mattering, salience of experience is never in question, even in the midst of the most severe depression. "Irrelevant events are not produced by the body" (Gendlin 1997b). Since relevance is already presupposed by the structure of implying-occurring fundamental to all living processes, and this in turn is grounded in structure of temporality, Gendlin does not need to draw upon affect as a motivational conditioning agent supplying events with, or depriving them of, salience, enticement and allure. Gendlin's organizational principle of radical interaffecting, made possible by his Heideggerian approach to temporality, exposes the concept of states, dispositions, and causal interactions between felt and intentional factors founding embodied models as an abstraction derived from a more primary, intricate and intimate process in which feelings and intentions, like Heidegger's attunement and understanding, are equi-primordial rather than one being causally oriented by the other. According to Ratcliffe, intentional states (propositional beliefs, cognitive schemata) are framed and given their significance by a global possibility space, but function within their own bounds via the logic of causal association. For Gendlin, by contrast, cognition and propositional belief are not simply a 'being about something', directedness toward or an aiming at an object, but transform and enrich what they 'represent', creatively altering their sense.

The bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities, as we have seen, is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the occurring into implying of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it. “To feel something as an inner object is a change..., not just a representation; feeling something makes a change in it.”(Gendlin 1991)

The current understanding of situatedness differs from Heidegger’s and Gendlin’s in a number of crucial ways. First, unlike the latter, situatedness and relevance is not an irreducible apriori of temporality, but instead is the contingent product of a complex configuration of bodily and perceptual elements. Affective attunement for them is the achievement of a concatenating process. When we delve beneath these global schemes to locate the invariant and essential condition of possibility of feeling-perceptual concatenations, we arrive at a reciprocally causal model of co-determinative interactive bits. But having arrived at this ‘apriori’, we are not yet in the vicinity of *Befindlichkeit*. *Befindlichkeit* is not the product of an orienting device, adaptation or conditioning scheme, and not the ground of any reciprocally causal schematic structure, except as that structure be understood as a derived abstraction concealing its own basis in temporality.

Gendlin doesn’t need to employ a notion of feeling as selective hedonic reinforcement of intentional organization, since it is temporality that organizes implicit bodily meaning. Feeling, as meaningful “sensed complexity”, “implicit understanding sensed in living”, makes reference to implicit bodily organizational process and by doing so contributes to the process as a further change within it. For Gendlin as for Heidegger, feeling is a function of intricate change.

“The scheme I have developed renders psychological events such that only change is felt. Rather than viewing feelings as static entities, the opposite conclusion results: if something were unchanged, it would not be felt. Feeling, or sentience, is the change made in the body, i.e., in the implying.”(Gendlin 1973)

The Body, Language and Culture:

In conclusion, I would like to briefly address the implications of Gendlin’s temporal model for the understanding of the body’s relation to language and culture. Current embodied and phenomenological interpretations consider the embeddedness of the embodied subject in a world of linguistic cultural practices to be of fundamental importance to the understanding of behavior.

“...intersubjective (social and cultural) factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world, even in the immediacy of our embodied and instrumental copings with the environment.”(Gallagher 2012b)

While Gendlin agrees with Gallagher and others that the experiencing body is inherently an environmental, and thus social interaction, he construes the nature of this intersubjectivity differently. The reciprocally causal temporality underpinning the embodied approaches mentioned in this paper leads necessarily to the idea of intersubjectivity as an interdependent

cobbling and co-ordination between personal history and cultural signs in which the 'joints' of such interactive bodily and social practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my community. Socialization is seen as a direct introjection or conditioning from the cultural environment, leaving personal experience with only a weak pragmatic self-consistency.

This is what Gallagher calls primary intersubjectivity, after Merleau-Ponty's notion of intercorporeality.

By contrast, Gendlin's occurring into implying grounding of temporality produces an implicatory rather than a reciprocally causal account of relation between body and world. This imbues bodily sense making with a pragmatic integrity, intricacy and self-intimacy missing from other accounts of intersubjectivity.

Gendlin's re-envisioning of the body as radical interaffecting, like Heidegger's Being-with, locates the genesis of meaning-making in a more fundamental process than that of socially distributed joint activity.

"Our bodily sense of situations is a concretely sensed interaction process that always exceeds culture, history, and language." "It is not the body of perception that is structured by language. Nor is the body's interaction structured by culture and language alone. Rather, it is the body of interactional living in its environment. The body's interaction is always more intricate than language. It is after and with language, always again freshly ongoing and constellating this situation in the present."

"To think that we are the creation of culture is not a view one can maintain if one senses ongoing bodily experiencing directly. The intricacy you are now living vastly exceeds what cultural forms have contributed to you. With focusing we discover that we are much more organized from the inside out."

"In living, our bodies generate, imply, and enact language and culture; but with and after those, our bodies imply (project, experience, sense, practice, demand . . .) more. What they imply is inherently interactional and social, but it is more precise and implies what has never as yet formed and happened." (Gendlin 1994)

Failing to reduce the causal temporality of presencing objects to the more primordial time of implicatory intricacy, current models are forced to treat that any account which claims to give priority to intimate pragmatic self-belonging over socially induced self-alteration as representing a retreat from a model of full social embeddedness into a person-centered solipsistic essentialism.

Gallagher's critique of Heidegger's account of the social exemplifies this blindness to what Gendlin calls the experiential intricacy. According to Gallagher, Dasein's being-with-others is what he dubs a form of philosophical autism, a retreat from the immediate contingency of world-exposure, (primary intersubjectivity), the choosing of solipsist instrumentality at the expense of robust and primordial being with others.

Gallagher(2010) says:

“In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.”

Rather than a retreat from a thoroughgoing notion of sociality, the radically temporal relevanting Gendlin’s model shares with Heidegger is a re-situating of the site of the social as a more originary and primordial grounding than that of the over-determined abstractions represented by discursive intersubjectivities. Those larger patterns of human belonging which intercorporeal approaches discern in terms of joint activities and cultural language practices hide within themselves a more primary patterning. While our experience as individuals is characterized by stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar within-person continuity. It also has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to understand human action based on reciprocally casual between-person configurations.

For Heidegger and Gendlin, the within-person dynamic is already a between-person in that it is a thoroughgoing exposure to , and continuous self-transformation via, an outside, an alterity, an otherness. The radically inseparable interaffecting between my history and new experience exposes me to the world, and modifies who I am, in an immediate, constant and thoroughgoing manner, producing every moment a global reshaping of my sense of myself and others outpacing the transformative impetus realized via Gallagher’s inter-causal notion of primary intersubjectivity. My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed through direct and indirect social engagement, but in a manner which presupposes and is made possible by the unified synthetic continuity of my implicit understanding of the world.

Before there is a pre-reflective personal ‘I’ or interpersonal ‘we’, there is already within what would be considered THE person a fully social site of simultaneously subjective-objective process overtaking attempts to understand human action based on either within-person constancies or between-person conditionings. Gendlin and Heidegger maintain that what is implicated for me in an interpersonal social situation is not ‘the’ social forms as shared homunculi, based on what Gallagher calls a ‘common body intentionality’ between perceived and perceiver, but aspects hidden within these so-called forms which one could say are unique to the implicative thrust of my own construing, belonging to me in a fashion that exceeds my own calculative grasp even as it transcends strictly shared social normativity.

As participant in an intersubjective community my implicative experiencing shapes and orients my reciprocal interactions with others in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through it. That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority of my social encounters is a peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency.

For even the most apparently trivial cultural routine (getting on a plane, ordering in a restaurant), what I perceive as socially ‘permitted’, ‘constrained’, ‘regulated’ or ‘normed’ behavior and

understanding of signs is already qualitatively distinctive in relation to what other participants recognize. Each individual who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history(which is itself reshaped by its participation in these situations) , even when they believe that their interpersonal interactions are guided by the constraints imposed by essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their language community.

Conclusion:

In this paper , I have tried to demonstrate that Gendlin's psychotherapeutic work identifying , articulating and creatively integrating bodily feeling with respect to objective and interpersonal relationships is an outgrowth of an ambitious philosophical effort to critique and rethink assumptions held by a range of writers in embodied cognitive psychology and phenomenology. Among the assumptions Gendlin questions are current views on relevance and affective motivation , attention , reflection , the notion of geometric space and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture. Gendlin shows that each of these aspects of human functioning gets its sense and is necessarily interlinked with all the others on the basis of an overarching model of temporality that splits up the flow of time into separated units of presence. Gendlin rejects this causal model of time in favor of a radically internal time that shares a number of features in common with the temporal models of Husserl and Heidegger.

In sum, the consequences of Gendlin's radically temporal approach are as follows:

1)Mathematical Naturalism:

In opposition to current attempts to produce a mathematical naturalization of Husserlian time consciousness , Gendlin argues that change of degree (quantitative) is always at the same time change in kind (qualitative). As a result , the world does not appear primordially as countable units, and Objects do not have mathematically calculable spatial extension or temporal endurance.

2) There is no pre-reflective awareness. The primordial structure of self-awareness functions prior to a splitting of experience into an opposition between self-presenting subject and appearing object, and is more originary than supposedly immediate, pre-intentional attentive self-awareness. Attention is inherently intentional and self-transforming.

3)Feeling:

In current accounts, affect is the contingent product of a complex reciprocally causal configuration of bodily and perceptual elements. In Gendlin's radically temporal account affective relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via a bodily feeling state, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience.

4) Intersubjectivity:

Gendlin's occurring into implying grounding of temporality produces an implicatory rather than a reciprocally causal account of intersubjectivity, locating the genesis of meaning-making in a more fundamental process than that of socially distributed joint activity.

This imbues bodily sense making with a pragmatic integrity, intricacy and self-intimacy missing from other accounts of intersubjectivity.

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