

DOMINICAN DEBATES ON THE INTENSIFICATION OF
QUALITIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 14TH CENTURY:
HERVAEUS NATALIS AGAINST JAMES OF METZ
AND DURAND OF SAINT-POURÇAIN

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The theory of the succession of qualitative forms in processes of intensification or remission did not emerge suddenly in the early 1320s with Walter Burley, probably its most well known proponent. Despite the doubt cast by Anneliese Maier, it has been recently demonstrated that Godfrey of Fontaines did set forth this theory in the 1290s.¹ Still more recently, Brian Conolly has shown that Dietrich of Freiberg too had defended a similar solution.² With the present contribution, I would like to add James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain to the list of those who upheld, albeit with some perplexity, the succession theory before Burley.³ I also document that James and Durand bear witness to Godfrey's influence on some Dominicans at the beginning of the 14th century, as they receive the principles and arguments that support the theory directly from him. On the other hand, Hervaeus Natalis and some other Dominicans tried to counter this influence and the criti-

1. See J. CÉLEYRETTE – J.-L. SOLÈRE, “Godefroid de Fontaines et la théorie de la succession dans l'intensification des formes,” in: P. BAKKER et al. (eds.), *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluza*, Turnhout 2002, pp. 79-112; S.D. DUMONT, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in: S.F. BROWN – T. DEWENDER – T. KOBUSCH (eds.), *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Leiden 2009, pp. 39-125; J. CÉLEYRETTE – J.-L. SOLÈRE, “Edition de la question ordinaire n° 18, De intensione virtutum, de Godefroid de Fontaines,” in: J. MEIRINHOS – O. WEIJERS (eds.), *Florilegium Medievale. Etudes offertes à Jacqueline Hamesse*, Turnhout 2009, pp. 83-107. Medieval authors were well aware that Godfrey had introduced this theory. See DUMONT, “Godfrey of Fontaines,” and C. SCHABEL, “Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol's *Sentences* Commentary,” in: *Vivarium* 38/1 (2000), 117-161, p. 119.

2. “Dietrich of Freiberg on the Succession of Forms in the Intensification of Qualities,” in: *Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievale* 81/1 (2014), pp. 1-35.

3. The list also includes Thomas of Bailly (see DUMONT, “Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory,” pp. 95-102), and, as I hope to show elsewhere, John of Pouilly.

cism of Thomas Aquinas it entailed. A number of texts echo the lively debates that ensued. Thus, the question of intensification/remission opens a window on the complex intellectual situation of the Dominican order in Paris in the first decade of the 14th century.

1. THE COMPETING THEORIES

Before proceeding, it will be useful to review the main positions, each of which is best understood with reference to the others.

Three theories in the Middle Ages were competing to explain processes such as a thing becoming warmer, or whiter, or a soul becoming more virtuous—in brief, what is known as the augmentation and diminution of qualities, and, because the magnitudes in question are intensive magnitudes, is more aptly called intensification or remission of qualities.⁴

A. The addition theory, popular among the Franciscans, rests on the principle that intensification and remission are like augmentation or diminution inasmuch as they can happen only in wholes where parts can be distinguished and added to or subtracted from each other. Bonaventure, Richard of Menneville (Mediavilla), Olivi, and Duns Scotus all say that forms that intensify acquire something really new which is added to what they already had, that is to say, a new degree is added to the degrees previously contained in the essence of those forms, and constitutes with them a new whole.

The problem with this theory may be that these degrees or parts of essence that can be dissociated or welded together do not have a clearly defined ontological status. What does it mean for an essence to be divisible into parts that, obviously, are not its “subjective” or logical parts such as genus or specific difference? Greater whiteness or greater

4. See A. MAIER, “Das Problem der intensiven Grösse,” in: EAD., *Zwei Grundprobleme der Scholastischen NaturPhilosophie*, 3rd ed., Rome 1968, pp. 3-43; J.-L. SOLÈRE, “Plus ou moins: le vocabulaire de la latitude des formes,” in: J. HAMESSE – C. STEEL (eds.), *L'Elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age*, Turnhout 2000, pp. 437-488; ID., “D'un commentaire l'autre : l'interaction entre philosophie et théologie au Moyen Age, dans le problème de l'intensification des formes,” in: M.-O. GOULET (ed.), *Le Commentaire entre tradition et innovation*, Paris 2000, pp. 411-424; ID., “The Question of Intensive Magnitudes according to some Jesuits in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in: *The Monist* 84/4 (2011), pp. 582-616.

wisdom still are whiteness and wisdom, which is to say that the intensification/remission remains within the limits of a given species, with the same genus and the same specific difference. What are, on the other hand, these parts of an essence which can be acquired or lost, and which are therefore not essential?

B. On the opposite side, Thomas Aquinas upholds the principle that forms are indivisible (other than logically), and therefore cannot undergo any change.⁵ This principle has a Neoplatonic ring to it and was indeed transmitted by Boethius in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. Accordingly, Boethius' response to the question of intensification is that, since essences in themselves cannot change, only the *qualia*, that is, participations in a quality *Q*, can be more or less *q*, while *Q* in itself is not modified.⁶ Thomas follows suit and argues along the same lines: differences in intensity cannot affect the nature of the form that goes through this kind of change. Therefore, a qualitative variation has to come from an extrinsic factor, which can only be the way in which this form is received in a subject. William of Peyre of Godin, an influential Dominican towards the end of the 13th century (he probably lectured on the *Sentences* in Paris in 1299-1300), faithfully summarizes Aquinas's theory in his *Lectura Thomasina*:

[...] <caritas> augetur per intensionem vel secundum accessum ad terminum sicut qualitates prime. Circa quod notandum quod est augmentum primarum qualitatum ex causis suis, scilicet agente et recipiente. Ex agente autem in quantum ipsum agens per formam suam intendit reducere ipsum patiens de potentia in actum sue forme quantum possibile est sibi. Sicut autem non-calidum est in potentia calidum, ita minus calidum est in potentia respectu magis calidi; unde sicut per actionem calefaciendi efficitur aliquid de non-calido calidum, non quia ponatur ibi alius [ms. aliquis] calor, sed quia calor qui est in potentia reducitur in actum, ita etiam de minus calido efficitur magis calidum in quantum educitur calor qui erat in minus calido ut actus imperfectus in maiorem perfectionem et

5. See J.-L. SOLÈRE, "Thomas d'Aquin et les variations qualitatives," in: C. ERISMANN – A. SCHNIEWIND (eds.), *Compléments de Substance (Études sur les Propriétés Accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera)*, Paris 2008, pp.147-165.

6. "Sed hoc solum dicere possumus magis habere sanitatem aliquem, id est esse sanio-rem, et magis sanum, et minus sanum. Dicimus ergo quod ipsae quidem qualitates non suscipiunt magis et minus" (*In Categorias Aristotelis*, III, PL 64, 257 C). Aristotle himself left unanswered this question that he raised in the *Categories*, namely, whether the qualities or the *qualia* are susceptible of being more or being less what they are (*Cat.* 8, 10b 30 - 11a 2).

assimilationem agentis. Et hoc contingit etiam in minus calido ex parte subiecti secundum quod subiectum quod est in potentia et indeterminatum ad multa magis ac magis unitur et determinatur sub actu illo quod actingit<ur> in subiecto illo, secundum quod disponitur dispositione magis convenienti illi actui, secundum quam dispositionem sit susceptibilis illius actus et magis subicitur, sicut cum dyafanitas sit congrua dispositio ad luminis receptionem, quanto ergo aer plus attenuatur tanto plus sit dispositus et susceptior luminis [...] Aduertendum ulterius quod quedam sunt forme que in natura sua habent partes, sicut quantitas et sciencia que habent partes penes aliam; quedam autem non habent partes, ut calor, caritas et omnes qualitates que sunt in tertia specie qualitatis, et tales augentur per maiorem dispositionem subiecti [...].⁷

This theory sees intensification and remission as a particular case of alteration: a limited alteration that stays within the limits of a given species of quality instead of totally removing that quality and bringing about its contrary.⁸ As a consequence, it must be understood in the same terms as a wholesale alteration, that is, as the progressive actualization of the form of the agent in the patient. The process is the same whether it is from one contrary to another (for instance, from black to white), or from a lesser actuality of this form to a greater actuality (for instance, from a less intense white to a more intense white). This process can also be described as an “*accessus ad terminum*,”⁹ in which the form gets closer and closer to a maximum of actualization (or the opposite of it). The actualization of the form in the patient can vary either because of the action of the agent becoming stronger or weaker (as when one moves away from, or closer to, a source of heat), or, supposing that the action of the cause is uniform, because of a difference in the disposition of the receiving subject (at the same distance from the source of heat, a wet item will be heated less easily than a dry one; or, as Godin submits, air becomes more luminous when it gets thinner, while the illumination by the sun remains the same).

7. GUILLELMUS PETRI DE GODINO, *Lect. Thom.* I, d. 17, ms. Universitätsbibliothek Graz 475, f. 13 rb-va. The transcriptions of this manuscript and of the other manuscripts of other authors quoted hereafter have been made in collaboration with Jean Céleyrette for an edition project.

8. See the analysis of alteration in ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, V.2, 226b 1-2.

9. The expression comes from the *Liber Sex Principiorum* (ed. L. MINIO-PALUELLO – B.G. DOD, in: *Aristoteles latinus*, I, 6-7 [*Categoriarum supplementa*], Bruges – Paris, 1966, n° 89-90, p. 56).

However, Aquinas's response is not entirely satisfying. He contends that to be more "established" or "rooted" in a subject means, for an accidental form, to augment "in essence" (*essentialiter*). But this does not account sufficiently for canonical expressions such as "charity deserves to be augmented" (*caritas meretur augeri*), which seems to imply that charity itself can be intensified, and not just that an immutable form of charity can become more established in a soul, or is more participated in that soul.¹⁰ The inherence of an accidental form in a subject certainly can increase or decrease, but inherence is a property that is common to all accidents and is different from their quidditative content or specific nature. What we want to be able to say is that the quidditative content itself varies, not just the "being in" of the form; and what we want to know is why certain accidental forms only (those of the third kind of qualities)¹¹ can be intensified and diminished, and not the others, whereas all are "in" a subject. Must not this be related to their intrinsic nature?

We shall see that, as a result of this problem with Aquinas's solution, some self-styled followers of Aquinas such as Hervaeus Natalis are inclined to admit a "latitude" within intensifiable forms.¹² These forms must have a certain margin of indetermination to make possible their being participated in more or less by the subjects in which they are received. The novel point is that the variation in reception is conditioned not only by the receptivity of the subject, but also by this relative indetermination of the form, instead of the form being absolutely rigid and not modifiable. This represents a departure from Aquinas's original position, even though Aquinas himself seems to say as much in a few texts.¹³

C. On the other hand, other followers of Aquinas on this count strictly maintain the absolute determination and immutability of the forms. This is the case with both Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines. For Giles, the *esse* of the form can vary (in accordance with the way it is received in a subject), while its essence remains what it is without

10. The expression comes from Augustine and Alypius, *Epist. 186 (ad Paulinum)*, 3.10 (CSEL t. 57, p. 53). It is most often adduced in discussions about charity in commentaries on d. 17 of book I of Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, which is the locus classicus for theologians to discuss the intensification/remission of qualities.

11. See ARISTOTELES, *Categoriae* 8, 10b 27-29.

12. See J.-L. SOLÈRE, "Les variations qualitatives dans les théories post-thomistes," in: *Revue Thomiste* 1 (2012), pp. 157-204. Cf. a similar remark about the too simple image of Nédellec as "champion of Thomism" in: I. IRIBARREN, *Durandus of St Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas*, Oxford 2005, p. 92.

13. See J.-L. SOLÈRE, "Thomas d'Aquin et les variations qualitatives," p. 155-157.

any variation.¹⁴ For Godfrey, essences are likewise incapable of variation, and their intensification or remission consists in a succession of individually distinct forms. Naturally, they are tokens of the same species or nature; but each is a different “individual contraction” of that nature, as Godfrey puts it. Each form is in itself non-intensifiable and represents a fixed degree of a quality. When they succeed each other, a variation in degree occurs, each being more intense (or less) than the previous one.¹⁵ However, the introduction of a new form or degree presupposes that the previous one is destroyed, since two forms of a same species cannot be actualized at the same time in the same subject; nor can the new one merge with the previous one or combine with it. Consequently, the apparent continuous increase or decrease of one and the same quality is in fact, for Godfrey, a series of instantaneous replacement of one form by another of the same species but of a different intensity, that is to say, a series of corruptions and generations of different accidents. Transitory forms unceasingly succeed each other in the same subject until the end of the process.

As I will show in the following pages, Godfrey’s solution was favorably received by James of Metz and Durand of Saint-Pourçain as an alternative to both Giles’ theory and Godin’s mere repetition of Aquinas. This led them to steer away from the official Thomistic orthodoxy sought by the Dominican order, and triggered the intervention of Hervaeus Natalis (even though he himself was not completely faithful to Aquinas, as noted above and as we will see again below).

2. GODFREY’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE SUCCESSION THEORY

Let us first review some of Godfrey’s arguments, since they will be tirelessly discussed by those who support his view as well as those who push back against it.

14. *Egidii Primus sententiarum ... correctus a Augustino Montifalconio*, Venice 1521, d. 17 p. II, q. 1, a. un., f. 95 va – 96 vb.

15. “Quare cum non possit attendi magis et minus in qualitatibus secundum rationem speciei quia in indivisibili consistit, oportet quod attendatur secundum rationem individuorum. Et quia etiam esse individui in quantum individui est, simplex est, si fiat transmutatio in individuo secundum magis et minus, sit etiam transmutatio ipsius individui, manente tamen specie eadem” (*Quodlibet II*, q. 10, éditée par ed. M. DE WULF – A. PELZER, *Les Quatre Premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1904, p. 145. See the studies mentioned in fn. 1.

G1: An action has a form for end point (*terminus*), that is, it is directed at the actualization of a form. Two different actions must have two different end points.¹⁶ For instance, as Aristotle remarks, the health (which is an accidental form) restored after a disease is not the same health that was had before the disease, because each of them results from a different action.¹⁷ Now, if we warm up something to a certain degree of heat, stop for a moment, then warm it up again to a higher degree, two actions have been successively carried out. Therefore, two different end points have been successively reached; two forms have been successively actualized.

This is to say that the second degree is not the first degree intensified, but another form, distinct from the first one. The first form has been actualized, then destroyed and replaced by another more intense form.

G2: If the higher degree of the quality is not a form that is other than the lower degree of the same quality, the higher degree is not really different from the lower degree, which is absurd. There must be in the higher degree something that was not in the lower degree. But if there is in the higher degree something that was not in the lower degree, they are two different forms, because forms are indivisible.¹⁸

G3: The starting point and the end point of a change process, i.e. the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*, must be really distinct from each other, otherwise there would be no change.¹⁹ This is obvious in local motion (one has to leave a place in order to arrive at another), and also in alteration in the

16. *Q. Ord.* 18, ed. J. CÉLEYRETTE – J.-L. SOLÈRE, p. 96: “duo actiones non terminantur ad unam formam, sed contingit calidum factum fieri postea magis calidum et constat quod alia actione; ergo corrumpitur calor primus et generabitur nouus et sic idem calor non poterit intendi et remitti.”

17. *Q. Ord.* 18, p. 97: “sanitas in mane et vespere non est una, sicut videtur philosophus innuere quinto physicorum, et hoc quia pluribus actionibus conseruata, ergo a simili et multo plus, calor intensus et remissus ad quos terminantur diuerse actiones non possunt esse unus calor.”

18. *Quodl. XIV* q. 5, ed. J. HOFFMANS, *Les Quodlibets treize et quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1935, p. 416: “impossibile est quod magis album differat a minus albo aliquo modo realiter, et tamen magis album non sit res alia a minus albo, vel in magis albo non sit res aliqua quae non erat in minus albo.”

19. *Quodl. XIV* q. 5, p. 415: “nulla transmutatio realis est in qua terminus ad quem realiter non differt a termino a quo.” *Q. Ord.* 18, p. 97: “in motu intensionis fit motus a minus calido ad magis calidum, sed nunquam mobile pertingit in aliquo motu ad terminum ad quem nisi prius totaliter ablato termino a quo; ergo nunquam aliquid potest moueri ad acquiendum calorem intensum nisi prius corrupto calore remisso et sic idem quod prius.”

strict sense, for instance in a change of color (from white to black, say).²⁰ The same rule applies to *intensio/remissio* changes, like a change from white to whiter. This entails that the more intense whiteness is really distinct from the less intense whiteness that was in the same subject; it has to be another form.

In other words, the two forms are numerically distinct, although they belong to the same species. Their subject is not determined by the same *contractio* of the accidental quality before and after the change.²¹ Through the intensification process, the same specific nature remains, but the individual occurrences of this nature succeed each other. An ever more intense occurrence of this nature replaces the previous ones.

3. JAMES OF METZ

An early witness to the influence of Godfrey on some Dominicans at the beginning of the 14th century is James of Metz.²² It is believed that the manuscript 992 kept in the “Médiathèque du Grand Troyes,” as the town library is now called, contains his first round of lectures on the *Sentences*, probably given in Reims before 1300, and “Additions” which are believed to derive from a James’s *secunda lectura*, probably given in Paris in 1300-1301, just after Godin, according to Chris Schabel’s latest research.²³ The

20. *Quodl. IX* q. 11, ed. J. HOFFMANS, *Le Neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, Louvain 1928, p. 249: “ut manifeste patet in motu locali, mobile toto tempore habet semper esse in alio et alio nisi secundum rem, licet non in actu; iam enim non esset motus.”

21. *Quodl. XIV* q. 5, p. 416: “Et sicut ibidem declaratum fuit, non sufficit dicere quod magis et minus dicunt diversos modos reales eiusdem formae secundum quos fieri potest talis variatio realis, quoniam impossibile est quod magis album differat a minus albo aliquo modo realiter et tamen magis album non sit res alia a minus albo vel in magis albo non sit res aliqua quae non erat in minus albo (...)” (modified punctuation).

22. Cf. M. OLSZEWSKI, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads. A Critical Edition and Study of the Prologues to the Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences by James of Metz and Hervaeus Natalis*, Münster in W. 2010, p. 334.

23. C. SCHABEL, “James of Metz’s *Lectura* on the *Sentences*,” in: R.H. PICH – A. SPEER (eds.), *Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought. A Tribute to Kent Emery, Jr.*, Leiden 2018, pp. 342-426; ID., “James of Metz and William of Peter of Godin on the procession of the Holy Spirit (and the generation of the Son),” in the present volume. W. DUBA – C. SCHABEL, “Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year *Sentences* lecture at Paris,” in: *Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévales* 84/1 (2017), pp. 143-179, convincingly show that in general lectures on all four books of the *Sentences* were delivered within the span of a single academic year, rather than over two years, which implies a revision of all timelines (see the list of the Dominican *sententiarum* *ibid.*, p. 157, and also C. SCHABEL, “James of Metz’s *Lectura* on the *Sentences*,” p. 355).

other manuscripts of James's work reflect another version of this *secunda lectura*. I will rely mostly on the Troyes manuscript, which, with its *Additiones*, offers a fuller picture of James's thinking about the intensification and remission of qualities.

On that topic, James's main target in book I, d. 17, p. 2, q. 1, is Giles of Rome. However, he significantly departs from Aquinas's position too, insofar as Giles and Thomas, while they think that in general essences cannot vary in any way, both make an exception for those that derive their species from something to which they are related. The argument brought up by Giles to make room for this sole exception is directly borrowed from Aquinas. So when James criticizes this argument, it is in effect a passage of the *Summa Theologiae* (I^aII^{ae}, q. 52, art. 1) that he is taking to task. No type of accidental form has a special status, he objects, and what is said of one must be said of the others. If some accidental forms cannot vary in essence by intensification, none can. But this is belied by obvious examples, including motion. Conversely, if some accidental forms can have a variation in essence, then all can, contrary to Thomas's and Giles's claim.

In the next question (q. 2), James turns to the way in which intensification or remission are carried out. After first gainsaying the addition theory with the standard argument that no addable or subtractable distinct parts can be isolated in an essence, and then presenting a theory of Thomistic inspiration which might be Thomas of Sutton's, James introduces Godfrey's theory of succession and supports it with four arguments.

The first one is directly borrowed from Godfrey's own first argument. It rests on the relation between an action and the *terminus* of the action:

J1: Any new action, and therefore any augmentation or remission, has a new end point, that is to say, results in the actualization of a new form, which presupposes the corruption of the previous form; hence, the process is a succession of different forms.²⁴

However, James develops this argument in an interesting way. The end point of an intensification or remission is either an essence, or some *esse*, or a mode of being (this tripartite division is supposed to exhaust all the possibilities).²⁵

24. Ms. Troyes Bibl. Munic. 992 (hereafter T) f. 45ra l. 42 – f. 45 rb l. 19.

25. In this question James again principally targets Giles of Rome.

a) If the end point of the action is a new essence, either the previous essence has been corrupted, which is what had to be proven, or it has not been corrupted. If the second, then the previous essence remains while the new end point is acquired. This new end point must be aggregated to the essence previously held, because two essences of the same kind cannot coexist in the same subject. Therefore, the augmented nature has parts and is not simple—which cannot be admitted.

b) If the end point of the action is a new *esse* (which is specifically Giles's view), the same demonstration ensues: either this *esse* subsists together with the new *esse* of the acquired form, but this is impossible because the *esse* of a form must be as simple as its essence is; or the *esse* of the initial form is destroyed, and so its essence is destroyed too, QED.

c) If the end point is a mode of being (*modus essendi*) of the form, two alternatives branch out. First, this mode might be something absolute, that is, a form. But then, by the same reasoning as before, the previous mode must be corrupted, and so why not admit that the previous form itself (not just its mode) is corrupted? Or, second, one might claim that this mode is something relative. But this is impossible because the intensification or remission, which is a real action, cannot have for its end point something which is not absolute.

James's second argument rephrases Godfrey's second argument:

J2: In any change whatsoever, and at every instant, that according to which there is change is always different. For instance, in a local motion the place (*ubi*) of the body in motion is constantly different. But that according to which there is change is always a form; such is the case for the *ubi*, or for a quality of the third kind in an intensification/remission. In fact, any change whatsoever always involves a modification of one of the forms that the subject of the change has. Whereas the subject itself remains the same through an accidental change, one of its accidental forms varies, and this is why the subject can be said to be now otherwise than it was. But if the accidental form is modified, it has to become radically other, because this form is the instantiation of a certain essence, and as such is simple. This particular form is the quality obtaining in a certain degree, and another degree has to

be another form, another instantiation of the same quality. Therefore, the previous form must be corrupted and a new one introduced.²⁶

James's third argument rests on the nature of change itself, in accordance with Godfrey's third argument:

J3: In any change whatsoever, the initial condition (*terminus a quo*) and the end point (*terminus ad quem*) must be different and cannot occur simultaneously: the very nature of change is the passing from one to the other, the subject leaving the initial condition to acquire a new state. Therefore, the same form cannot obtain at the start and at the end of the change.²⁷

The Additions of the Troyes manuscript offer a fourth argument, described as "trickier" (*difficilior*). Let us note first that this argument seems to be James's creation, and second that it is found only in the version of the *secunda lectura* given by the Troyes Additions, and not in the other manuscripts of the *secunda lectura*.

J4: Suppose that a fire just starts warming up water. This is the very beginning of an alteration, but no form of heat is actualized yet, for if one immediately stops the process, the water is still cold, and the form coldness cannot coexist with the form of heat (we'll get back to this point momentarily). However, the fire did act, and therefore did cause something in the water. The only possibility left is that it caused a lesser coldness, rather than some heat. But this lesser coldness cannot be the initial form of coldness that would have been simply diminished, because such weakening would only be a privation, whereas the action of the fire, which is a real and positive action, must have a positive result. Thence, one must conclude that the fire actualized a new form, which is a token of coldness at a lesser degree. This, in turn, implies that the initial form of coldness has been destroyed, for the reasons we saw above.²⁸

However, one might ask, why would cold and heat not be able to coexist in the same subject? James notes that some people maintain that this is

26. T f. 45 rb l. 19-29. Cf. C. SCHABEL, "Place, space, and the physics of grace," pp. 127-130.

27. T f. 45 rb l. 29-35.

28. T f. 16 rb l. 13-37.

not impossible if cold and heat are not in their maximum degrees, but are each in an intermediary degree.²⁹ But he rejects this idea. Even if cold and heat are attenuated qualities and are not maximally contrary to each other, they have respectively the status of *terminus a quo* and *ad quem* and are therefore incompatible in the same instant. This again is the thrust of Godfrey's second argument: the two limits (*termini*) of change, the starting point and the end point, cannot coexist. The first state of affairs must have ceased to exist before the second can be reached. In other words, the first form must be destroyed for another one to be actualized.

In a somehow endearing manner, James does not rest his case but raises four doubts about the theory he has just defended, and in the end candidly admits he has no response for one of them, namely the difficulty that arises from the fourth argument I have just presented. The problem with the idea that, by a brief application of heat to cold water, a diminished cold succeeds to a more intense cold, is that it looks absurd that something hot should cause coldness, albeit a diminished one. Something hot can only actualize heat, because every agent produces something similar to itself. James envisions two ways of solving this difficulty.³⁰

The first way distinguishes between production of the last effect of a process and production of an intermediary effect, that is a step towards the last effect. An example of this is the production of sperm, which precedes the production of the end effect, a new living being. This example is supposed to show that it is possible for an agent (a living being) to produce first, as an intermediary effect, an effect that does not resemble it (the sperm, which is not a living being), before producing the end effect, which does resemble it (another living being). Likewise, heat may begin its action by producing something opposite to its nature (remitted coldness), provided that this is only a step towards the end of the action, which is to cause heat in the water. James, however is reluctant to accept this solution. It defies our imagination, he says, to admit that heat could cause coldness in any way whatsoever.

29. This is what DUNS SCOTUS, for instance, objects against Godfrey in *Ordinatio*, l. I, d. 17 pars 2, q. 2, in: *Opera Omnia*, t. V, Vatican 1959, § 242, p. 255.

30. T f. 16 rb l.60 - 16 va l.44. Cf. IOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Ordinatio*, l. I, d. 17 pars 2, q. 1, in: *Opera Omnia*, t. V, Vatican 1959, § 212, p. 243. We will review below another difficulty raised by James, together with the objection made by the *Correctorium fratris lacobii Metensis* (see, below, **COI**, p. 314).

The second way relies on the idea that two agents, one hot and the other cold, for instance fire and air, can act on the same patient and produce one shared effect. Thus, the fire heats the water while the surrounding air cools it down, and their common effect that is first produced is a diminished coldness, because at that moment the action of the air is still more powerful than the action of the fire. In this process, the fire produces nothing but heat; but the action of the air explains that the result is for now only a diminished coldness. However, James rejects this solution too. Suppose that the water is heated up in an oven. There, the air is hot too. Take the water container out of the oven just after having put it in: the water is still cold, even if it is cold in a lesser degree. Nonetheless, both the fire and the hot air must have had an action, however brief, and this action cannot be but the actualization of some heat. What happened to this heat? "I do not see any solution to this," James confesses. What perplexes him is that instead of simply admitting that the action of heat is to destroy some degrees of the form of coldness (as the addition theory wants it), he is committed to show that it causes a whole new form of coldness, and he cannot explain how this is possible. This is a serious blow to the succession theory, which James leaves unanswered. In his wake, opponents and supporters of the theory will fiercely discuss the case at hand.³¹

4. HERVAEUS NATALIS AND THE *CORRECTORIUM FRATRIS IACOBI METENSIS*

James quickly was the target of reprehensions emanating from his own order. On the one hand, in his commentary on the *Sentences* Hervaeus Natalis criticizes James. On the other hand, a text known as the *Correctorium fratris Iacobi Metensis*, today preserved in a single manuscript, Le Mans Bibliothèque Municipale 231, discusses forty-three contentious theses of James. In both works, the succession theory is part of what James is blamed for.

Hervaeus likely commented on the *Sentences* in 1302-1303,³² that

31. Peter Auriol still uses the same example around 1317. See the passage of the *Reportatio* quoted by C. SCHABEL, "Place, Space, and the Physics of Grace in Auriol's *Sentences* Commentary," in: *Vivarium* 38/1 (2000), 117-161, pp. 119-120.

32. According to W. DUBA – C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year *Sentences* lecture at Paris," p. 157 (see also C. SCHABEL, "James of Metz's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*," p. 355). Earlier, it was generally believed that Hervaeus lectured in Paris from 1302 to 1304.

is, shortly after James. In a recent book, Mikolaj Olszewski has identified the manuscripts Bordeaux Bibliothèque Municipale 147 and Troyes Bibliothèque Municipale ("Médiathèque du Grand Troyes") 262 as witnesses of a first version (a *reportatio*? an *ordinatio*?) of Hervaeus' commentary, whereas the second version, a later redaction, is more common and well-known.³³ However, as far as the question on how intensification and remission occur is concerned (l. I, dist. 17, <q. 5> "Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem"), the first version³⁴ does not differ much from the second version,³⁵ which I have consulted in the 1647 edition checked with the manuscripts Basel Universitätsbibliothek B IV 13 and Firenze Bibl. Naz., conv. sopp. B I 569. As I will show, in both versions Hervaeus discusses James's *secunda lectura*.³⁶

As for the *Correctorium*, it was probably written about the same period. James likely disappeared from the stage shortly after having commented on the *Sentences* for the second time (in any case, we have no other trace of him whatsoever.) But Josef Koch has noted that the following passage of the *Correctorium* talks about James as if he were still alive: "Sed iste [James] dicit quod non videt hanc solutionem. Roget ergo Deum ut aperiat sibi oculos, ut possit videre; non video aliud remedium."³⁷ If that is correct, the *Correctorium*, which refers also to James's *secunda lectura* (as I'll show momentarily), must have been compiled not too long after 1301, that is to say, around the time Hervaeus was commenting on the *Sentences* in his turn.

In fact, Koch attributed the *Correctorium* to Hervaeus himself, on the grounds that there are numerous parallel passages in Hervaeus' *Commentary*.³⁸ This ascription has recently been challenged by Olszewski because the conception of theology as a discipline that the *Correctorium* attacks

33. OLSZEWSKI, *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, p. 11.

34. Troyes BM 262, f. 46vb – 48ra; Bordeaux BM 147, f. 47r-48r.

35. Except that in the Bordeaux manuscript, the question suddenly ends after the presentation of the third opinion, with the result that it includes neither Hervaeus' answer nor the replies to others' arguments.

36. This counterbalances OLSZEWSKI's remark (*Dominican Theology*, p. 3) that Hervaeus used James's *prima lectura* to write the prologue to his *Commentary*. To be clear: I do not deny that Hervaeus knew the *prima lectura*; I will just point out that he discusses an argument that is probably James's and is found only in the latter's *secunda lectura*.

37. Ms. Le Mans 231, f. 170 va. See J. KOCH, "Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P.," in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 4 (1929-30), 169-232, pp. 206-207, and *id.*, *Durandus de S. Porciano O. P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. I. Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster in W. 1927, p. 271.

38. See KOCH, "Jakob von Metz," pp. 194-202.

is not only James's but also Hervaeus³⁹ – unsurprisingly so, because, as Olszewski has shown too,⁴⁰ Hervaeus extensively reproduced passages of the prologue of James's *Commentary on the Sentences* in his own *Commentary*. As for the latter point, however, I'll note that, as strange as it may be, it would not be the only time that a censor plagiarized (to use an anachronistic concept) the very victim of his censorship. Even though James of Lausanne was, as a *baccalaureus sententiaris*, a member of the Dominican commission presided over by Hervaeus that investigated Durand of Saint-Pourçain's alleged errors in 1314, he felt free to copy extensively from Durand's *Commentary* when, in the same year or the following one, he wrote his own *Commentary* (hopefully on topics that were not among the articles censored; at least, that is the case for the issue of intension/remission.)⁴¹ So the fact that Hervaeus took advantage of James's prologue may be not conclusive regarding Hervaeus' non-involvement in the *Correctorium*. Perhaps Olszewski's other argument, based on the conception of theology attacked by the *Correctorium* and shared by James and Hervaeus, is more decisive. However, as far as the two questions on the intensification/remission of forms are concerned, not only is the *Correctorium* perfectly in phase with Hervaeus' position, but q. 6 contains two passages that are word for word identical with Hervaeus' *Commentary on the Sentences*, book I, d. 17, q. 4, a.1. These passages constitute the core of the *responsio* in the *Correctorium*, and they are respectively 38 and 47 lines long, out of the 137 lines of the whole question. Furthermore, q. 7 contains four shorter passages that are nearly identical with passages of q. 5 of Hervaeus' *Commentary*. This raises the question of whether the author of the *Correctorium* copied from Hervaeus, or Hervaeus from the author of the *Correctorium*, in case they are not one and the same person.⁴² I shall leave at that the question of the authorship of the *Correctorium*, which still requires much research. Whatever the case may be, it is certain that the author, as Hervaeus in

39. *Dominican Theology at the Crossroads*, p. 315.

40. *Ibid.*, p. vi, 3, 11, and *passim*.

41. See J. CÉLEYRETTE – J.-L. SOLÈRE, "Jacques de Lausanne, censeur et plagiaire de Durand de Saint-Pourçain: édition de la q. 2, d. 17 du l. I, de son *Commentaire des Sentences*," in: K. EMERY – R.L. FRIEDMAN – A. SPEER, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, Leiden 2011, pp. 855-890.

42. Another possible explanation would be that the *Correctorium* has in fact several authors. Hervaeus would have taken care of the part on intensification/remission (among other topics), while the nature of theology would have been dealt with by someone else, who happened to be in disagreement with Hervaeus too.

his *Commentary*, was using James's *secunda lectura*,⁴³ at least for book I, since he mentions some *dubia* about James's d. 17, p. 2, q. 1 that are only in the Troyes *Additiones*, and discusses the meaning of the passage of Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* quoted by James solely in the Troyes *Additiones*. Very likely, the author of the *Correctorium* worked on a text close to the one we know through the Troyes manuscript under the form *prima lectura* plus *Additiones*.

4.1. THE LATITUDE OF FORMS ACCORDING TO HERVAEUS AND THE *CORRECTORIUM*

Even though they criticize James, let us note that, in the matter of why certain qualitative forms can vary in intensity and whether this variation affects their essence, both the *Correctorium* (f. 151 vb – 152 rb, <q. 6>) and Hervaeus' *Commentary* (*Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 4) substantially modify Aquinas's position, inasmuch as they abandon the fixity of the forms that are intensifiable.⁴⁴ These forms are not exactly like numbers, contrary to Aristotle's *dictum*; they comprise a certain margin of indetermination, a range of possible degrees.⁴⁵ Aristotle only wanted

43. As J. KOCH had noticed ("Jakob von Metz," pp. 202-207).

44. Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Sum. Theol.* I^{II}^{ae}, q. 52 a.1 c.: "(...) species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei, necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor et albedo (...)."

45. See ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, VIII.3, 1043b33- 1044a9; cf. JAMES OF METZ, *Secunda lectura*, T f. 15 vb l. 29-35, and HERVAEUS NATALIS, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria*, l. I d. 17 q. 4 a. 2, *ad 3^m*, Paris 1647, p. 95a C-D. *Ibid.*, pp. 93b D - 94a A: "(...) videtur mihi quod ratio quare aliqua forma suscipit magis et minus, est indeterminatio formae specificae, secundum quam est indeterminata ad hoc quod in sua essentia, vel saltem in suo esse ut alii dicunt, sit magis perfecta vel minus perfecta: quam indeterminatorem alii latitudinem vel in essentia vel in esse nominant." Cf. *Subtilissima Heruei Natalis Britonis (...) quolibeta undecim* (...), Venise 1513, reprint Ridgewood (N.J.) 1966, *Quodl.* VI q. 11, f. 135 vb: "in formis suscipientibus magis et minus, est quedam latitudo graduum, ita quod albedo intensa est quantum ad essentiam suam perfectior quam albedo remissa, non ita quod ista differentia graduum sit secundum absolutam rationem forme, quia differre secundum absolutam rationem forme est differre specie. Sed quia in natura forme est habitas ad istam latitudinem graduum habendam in sua essentia, ex hoc quod non determinat sibi gradum indivisibilem et precisum quo participetur a suo subiecto, siue sit accidens separabile siue non, siue habeat esse in pluribus speciebus siue non." I take this occasion to say that, although the authenticity of this 6th *Quodlibet* (one of the *Quodlibeta minorum*) ascribed to Nédellec has been doubted, its q. 11 presents no doctrinal difference with Nédellec's other texts and is extremely close in the language, as can be seen in the previous passage and other quotes below. See also Amerini's article in this volume p. 173 fn. 19.

to say that their indetermination has limits, which cannot be exceeded without the intensification becoming a true alteration, that is, a change of species. In this, the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* are in agreement with James. The doctrine that all forms are totally rigid (i.e., that there is no latitude in intensifiable qualities) proved to be untenable for these Dominicans of the beginning of the 14th century.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* try to interpret Aquinas in a way that aligns him with this view. Thomas's thought is misinterpreted, they claim, if one makes him say (as Giles of Rome does) that absolute accidental forms such as qualities do not have in themselves a latitude of degrees.⁴⁷ A more intense whiteness is not just the same form received more perfectly. It is in itself (as opposed to: *qua* received) a more perfect whiteness than a less intense whiteness. Admittedly, the participation of the form by the subject can be greater or lesser, but the condition for this is that there must be a greater or lesser perfection in the essence of the accidental quality itself ("maioritas vel minoritas quantum ad perfectionem forme").⁴⁸ Thus, a more intense whiteness has a greater perfection in essence than a less intense one. Both the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* invoke the *ad tertium* of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* II^aII^{ae}, q. 24, a. 4, where Thomas writes that for an accidental form, to be more rooted in its subject is to be augmented in essence. This expression must be taken literally, which implies that something has changed in the essence itself. And when Aquinas writes (I^aII^{ae}, q. 52 a. 1) that that from which things have their species must be indivisible, one must understand that he is not speaking of some indivisibility in degrees within a form, but only of the formal differences that divide a genus. This is why Thomas does not say that that from which things have their species is strictly indivisible, but that it is "*quasi* indivisible," the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* contend.

However, our authors do not lapse into the Franciscan conception of the composition of forms. The linchpin of their thesis consists in admitting, not distinct degrees in this latitude, as in the Franciscan

46. Cf. already IOHANNES PARISIENSIS (QUIDORT), *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, ed. J.-P. MÜLLER, Rome 1961, vol. 1, p. 207 l. 136-137: "Dicendum ergo quod forma accidentalis habet latitudinem infra quam sunt diversi gradus secundum quos potest augeri et minui" (see also p. 201 l. 61, p. 202 l. 82).

47. See HERVAEUS NATALIS, *I Sent.*, d. 17 q. 4 a. 1, p. 93a.

48. See HERVAEUS NATALIS, *ibid.*, p. 94a-b.

theory, but “virtual parts,” which are not determinable (*signabiles*) and cannot be added to each other properly speaking, but have a lesser or greater perfection in such a way that an inferior degree is virtually contained in a higher degree.⁴⁹

As for the exception Aquinas makes regarding relative forms (*Sum. Theol.* II^aII^{ae}, q. 24, a. 5), his thinking may have been poorly explained by some (probably Giles again), the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus’ *Commentary* claim.⁵⁰ James is right, they both concede, when he points out that the *terminus ad quem* of a process, which is the form acquired by that change, is not different from the change itself. Change, in fact, is the very same form on the way towards actualization; complete actualization is the end of the process. James is also right to say that it is impossible that something obtains its intrinsic essence by reference to something extrinsic, especially in the case of forms that belong to an absolute category of being (in contrast to the category of relation), such as qualities are. However, a specific nature may include something extrinsic *in obliquo*, for instance a final cause (at least the proximate final cause) or an efficient cause. This is how, for instance, a habit is specified by that towards which it is directed. Although they have by themselves their own nature, this nature includes a reference to their object. It is in that sense, the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus’ *Commentary* contend,

49. *Correctorium* q. 7, ms. Le Mans 231, f. 152 va: “Modo dico quod forma intensa non est diversa a remissa sicut totum a toto, sicut albedo a nigredine, sed magis sicut totum a parte, ita quod forma remissa se habet sicut pars et sicut id quod exceditur, sed intensa se habet sicut totum, non quidem secundum partes signabiles sed secundum partes virtuales.” Nédellec, *I Sent.* d. 17 q. 5, p. 98a, A-C: “Quarta opinio quae videtur mihi ad praesens magis probabilis, est quod illud augmentum non fiat per additionem gradus ad gradum, ita quod sint ibi duo gradus distincti, quorum unus addatur alteri, et unus possit distincte signari ab altero: sed fit tale augmentum per hoc quod forma eadem quae prius erat imperfecta fit perfectior, ita quod ipsa facta intensa, habet plus quam prius, non secundum diversas partes signabiles, sed virtuales: ita quod primus gradus continetur in secunda virtute: sicut si aliqua aqua bicubita rarefiat et fiat tricubita, quantitas aquae rarefactae continet plus quam prius (...) non quidem secundum partem signabilem quae posset divisim signari ab aliis duobus cubitis praecedentibus, sed secundum partes virtuales.” Nédellec perhaps shows here some hesitation, as he submits, he says, “the opinion which presently seems to me more probable.” However, as we will see in his *Quodlibet II*, this solution will become definitive. For the sake of room, I cannot explore more this notion of virtual parts here, but I intend to show elsewhere that Nédellec probably took this idea from IOHANNES PARI-SIENSIS (QUIDORT), *I Sent.* (ed. MÜLLER, vol. 1, q.71 [= d.17 q.3], pp. 208-209) or Peter of Auvergne’s *Quodlibet III*. On the example of rarefactions, cf. Peter Auriol as explained by C. SCHABEL, “Place, space, and the physics of grace,” p. 123.

50. *Correctorium*, q. 6, f. 151 vb – 152 ra; HERVAEUS NATALIS, *I Sent.* d. 17 q. 4, p. 93a-b. The two passages are nearly identical.

that the whole of Aquinas's remark must be understood. Let us note, however, that the point is moot: Thomas introduced this remark to accommodate the exceptional case of motion and like realities that do intensify or increase in essence, but the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* admit as much for all intensifiable natures.

4.2. REFUTATION OF JAMES OF METZ

On the other hand, the question of how intensification occurs is the real bone of contention between James and his fellow Dominicans. Both the *Correctorium* (f. 152 rb – 152 vb <q. 7>) and Hervaeus' *Commentary* (I, d. 17, q. 5) strenuously oppose the succession theory. However, the *Correctorium* focuses on James, as one would expect, whereas Hervaeus' *Commentary* takes a wider view: "Ista positio, licet sit magnorum et subtilis ...,"⁵¹ Hervaeus writes, by which he surely alludes not to James, but more likely to the venerable Godfrey, and to Thomas of Bailly, who resolutely defended Godfrey's thesis.⁵² Nevertheless, after presenting in support of the succession theory two arguments that can be traced back

51. P. 97a, D.

52. See the note in the margin: "Contra opinionem Thomae" (p. 97a C), which refers, not to Thomas Aquinas, who does not hold this position, as we saw, but to Thomas of Bailly, who does sustain it in q. 15 of his *Quodlibet III* (see below p. 315). See also Bailly's *Quodl. III* q. 16 and *Quodl. IV* q. 11. Licensed in theology around 1300, Bailly disputed as master *actu regens* six quodlibetal questions between 1301 and 1307. He became chancellor of the University in 1316. Dumont suggests that he jumped into the defense of Godfrey's theory after Scotus's extensive attack against the latter ("Godfrey of Fontaines and the succession theory," p. 102). Additionally, let us note that Godfrey was back to teaching in Paris around 1303-1304. R. LAMBERTINI, "Political *Quodlibeta*," in: C. SCHABEL (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta*, t. I, p. 459, has shown that the date of his *Quodlibet III* must be moved earlier than the year 1305 suggested by Glorieux (P. GLORIEUX, *Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie*, Paris 1933, notice 214; *La Littérature quodlibétique II*, Paris 1935, pp. 273-277). Given that it is certain that Bailly's *Quodlibet IV* was held at Lent 1304 (since Bailly mentions the bull *Inter cunctas*, dated Feb. 17, 1304, and speaks of Benedict XI as being alive, whereas the latter died on July 7, 1304), his *Quodlibet III* must have been disputed in 1303 (Lent or Advent), which makes quite likely a dialogue with Nédellec, who was commenting or had just commented the *Sentences* at that time. This is confirmed, I think, by the fact that Bailly discusses and rejects at length the case of nutrition as a suitable comparison for intensification processes (*Quodl. III*, q. 15, ed. P. GLORIEUX, *Quodlibets, texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables*, Paris 1960, pp. 211 and 216-217), which precisely is used by Nédellec and the *Correctorium* (see below pp. 317-318). The fourth opinion that Bailly attacks in q. 11 of his *Quodl. IV* (ed. P. GLORIEUX, pp. 284-285) is also probably Nédellec's (cf. CR2/NR2 and CR3/NR3 below, p. 318).

to Godfrey (see arguments **G3** and **G2**, above),⁵³ Hervaeus adds a third one, which I have found only in James: **J4** (see **NO2** hereafter). Unless this argument has in fact another origin, this seems to imply that James was important enough for Hervaeus to take him into account in his *Sentences* commentary. Moreover, discussions about this argument recur in the debate between Hervaeus and Durand of Saint-Pourçain that we will review next. As for the *Correctorium*, it reports, naturally enough, only the arguments found in James, namely, the three arguments that were already in the *prima lectura* (**J1**, **J2**, **J3**), plus the additional argument introduced by the *secunda lectura* (**J4**). Interestingly, the *Correctorium* presents them in the following order: **J1**, **J4**, **J2**, **J3**. This is perhaps the sign that the author had a version of James's *secunda lectura* in which **J4**, known to us from the *Additiones* in the Troyes manuscript, was included in the main text as the second argument (as it should if one follows the instructions given by the *Additiones*, T f. 16 rb l. 10-13). If so, this version of the *secunda lectura* was different from what we have, since **J4** is found in no other manuscript than Troyes, as I said earlier. Further, perhaps as another indication of a different version of James's *secunda lectura*, it is noteworthy that in **J4** as reported by both the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* the example offered is the opposite of the example proposed in the Troyes *Additiones*: instead of an intensification of heat, the talk is of a diminution of heat.

Let us first examine the objections presented by the *Correctorium* and Hervaeus' *Commentary* against the succession theory.

The *Correctorium* notes with irony that James himself raised enough objections against his own position.⁵⁴ Hence, the author decides that he does not have to add more objections (contrary to what Hervaeus does in his *Commentary*), but only to refute James's arguments in favor of the succession theory. However, after rejecting these arguments (as we'll see momentarily), the *Correctorium* lingers on the third doubt that James formulated against his own solution.⁵⁵ If in each instant of an intensification the previous form is destroyed and a new form generated, this change is in reality a discontinuous series of mutations, or, rather,

53. Also argument 2 in Bailly's *Quodlibet III* q. 15, p. 209.

54. Ms. Le Mans 231, q. 7, f. 152 va. See above p. 310.

55. *Correctorium* f. 152 vb.

of *mutata esse*, or again, if you will, a series of leaps from degree to degree, whereas an essential characteristic of change, in the framework of Aristotelian natural philosophy, is its continuity.⁵⁶

A first answer to this difficulty, which James reports, was given by Godfrey himself.⁵⁷ During a local motion, the mobile is at no time totally in actuality in a place (this would be rest); it is only in a place in actuality mixed with potentiality, passing through this place and tending to another one. This, according to Godfrey, makes its motion continuous. Likewise, in an intensification/remission the mobile never is in complete actuality under any of the intermediary forms. As each of these forms only has an imperfect being (*esse imperfectum*), their distinction and succession does not prevent the change from being continuous. However, James is not convinced by this response. At every moment of the process, he thinks, the subject of change must be under a form in full actuality: it has a certain degree of heat or a degree of whiteness, for instance.

Instead, James proposes giving up on the requirement of continuity for changes in the category of quality, as opposed to other changes.⁵⁸ Local motion is continuous because of the continuous quantity (*magnitudo*) in which it takes place. In a qualitative change, there may be continuity too with respect to the subject, due to its extension, that is to say, in case its parts are affected one after the other, without interruption. But as far as intensification as such is concerned (i.e. the intensification of a quality in one and the same part), continuity is not necessary. The model to follow is not that of local motion, but that of illumination. The whole volume of air is instantaneously illuminated (or so the Aristotelians believed) as soon as the source of light is actualized, at least if all the parts of air are equally disposed to receive this illumination. Likewise, in an alteration, when a subject is in the ultimate state of preparation, it receives a quality instantaneously. But,

56. T f. 45 rb l. 48 – 45 va l. 2: “Aliud dubium est quod mutatio ad formam accidentalem que est alteratio non erit continua set componeretur ex tot mutatis esse quot sunt gradus in essencia forme, puta albedinis uel caritatis.” T f. 16 va l. 45-49 (Addition, *secunda lectura*): “Tertium dubium est quod secundum hanc positionem alteracio non esset motus continuus sed agregatio mutatorum esse, quoniam videmus <quod> mutatio est corruptio unius et generatio alterius. Set per te in alteratione non est nisi corruptio gradus imperfecti forme et generatio gradus perfecti. Ergo non sunt ibi nisi mutata esse, quod est contra philosophum 6° physicorum.”

57. T f. 45 va l. 2-12. Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodl. IX* q. 11, p. 249.

58. T f. 45 va l. 12-23.

in an intensification/remission, each degree is the ultimate preparation for the next degree. Therefore, passing from one to the other is instantaneous, that is, is a mutation rather than a continuous change.

The *Correctorium* staunchly rejects this idea:

CO1: Continuity is essential to any kind of change (“est passio motus in communi”). When Aristotle says that something can be instantaneously altered (like the air illuminated), he is not speaking of an alteration as a process, but of the result of this process, the resulting state (*alteratum esse*), which obtains immediately. When there really is a process, this change cannot be but continuous, and if there is an interruption at some point, what happens next is another process, not the continuation of the same process. It is therefore impossible that an intensification or a remission be a series of leaps or instantaneous changes.⁵⁹

On the other hand, Hervaeus’ *Commentary*, probably due to the reference to the “magni,” discusses the succession theory rather *reverenter*. Hervaeus does not declare it absurd, or even false, but only warns that it is open to serious objections. He presents three of them.

NO1: A change made of successive, numerically different forms, would require an infinite number of such forms. The reason behind this is that in the span of time in which this change takes place, there is an infinity of instants. Accordingly, there must be an infinity of degrees of the quality, because if the change is not interrupted, there are no two instants in which the quality has the same degree, the intensity of that quality changing constantly. Moreover, given that changes are distinguished by the forms that are acquired, one would in reality have an infinite number of changes (*mutationes*) in what is apparently one change, and there would accordingly be an infinity of states (*mutata esse*) of the subject of change.⁶⁰

59. *Correctorium* q. 7, f. 152 vb.

60. *I Sent.* d. 17 q. 4, pp. 97a D – 97b A: “(...) quot sunt quae differunt secundum intensum et remissum, tot sunt formae differentes numero ab inuicem. Sed in qualibet alteratione successiua sunt infinita talia. Ergo in qualibet alteratione sunt infinitae formae differentes numero. (...) Minor probatur, quia quot sunt nunc in toto tempore alterationis, tot sunt differentes gradus secundum intensum et remissum, quia in toto tempore alterationis non est dare duo nunc in quibus forma secundum quam alteratio sit, sit in eodem gradu. Sed in quolibet tempore sunt infinita nunc. (...) Hoc autem est inconueniens, quia motus et mutationes plurificantur secundum formas quae acquiruntur per motum; et sic in qualibet alteratione essent infinitae mutationes in actu et infinita mutata esse.”

Although this objection may be related to **CO1** and James's third doubt because of the expression "mutata esse," Hervaeus does not place the emphasis on the discontinuity that would ensue, but on the infinity of steps that an intensification would have to go through—which, implicitly, makes it impossible, since going through an infinity is not a task that can be ever completed. The thrust of the objection is made explicit by Thomas of Bailly, who addresses it in his *Quodlibet* III, q. 15.⁶¹ Hervaeus does report that the defenders of the succession theory answer that this infinity is *in fieri* and in potentiality.⁶² But their response is not tenable, he claims. If the forms are numerically distinct, they cannot be in continuity with each other; therefore, there is an actual infinity of such forms, and consequently an actual infinity of *mutata esse*.

Interestingly, Hervaeus' second objection turns James's fourth argument (**J4**) on its head:

NO2: When something cold diminishes heat, it does not actualize coldness in the patient, because coldness cannot coexist with heat. It does not actualize a lesser heat either, because coldness cannot produce heat.⁶³ Therefore, the agent does nothing. However, this cannot be taken in an absolute sense, because its action is real. Rather, it must be understood literally, so to speak, in the sense that the cold does not produce anything but simply takes away some of the heat (which is the "privative" action that James does not admit.) Now, this entails that the same form of heat is diminished, rather than another form of a lesser degree produced.⁶⁴

61. "First difficulty," ed. GLORIEUX, p. 212. *Pace* DUMONT ("Godfrey of Fontaines and the succession theory," pp. 101-102), I do not think that the two objections, on discontinuity and infinity, raised by Scotus in his Parisian lecture are exactly the same as the one at hand. Moreover, the Oxford *Lectura* does raise the discontinuity objection, in terms that, in the end, are closer: "si per recessum a quocumque gradu generetur aliud suppositum, igitur supposita sibi invicem continue succedunt secundum successionem motus. Quaero igitur an quodlibet illorum suppositorum persistit in indivisibili, aut divisibiliter et in divisibili temporis. Si in indivisibili, tantum manens per instans, igitur *motus componeretur ex mutatis esse (...)*" (*Lectura*, l. I d. 17 p. 2, q. 1, Opera Omnia t. XVII, Vatican 1966, n° 143, p. 226).

62. *I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 4, 97b A. The potential infinite reply is in THOMAS DE BAILLY (*Quodl.* III q. 15, pp. 213-214), but for the *in fieri* reply one probably has to go back to Godfrey himself (*Quodl.* IX, q. 11, p. 249).

63. On these two counts, then, Hervaeus thinks that James is right.

64. *I Sent.* d. 17 q. 4, p. 97b B.

Finally, Hervaeus lodges a third objection:

NO3: When a greater quantity *succeeds* a smaller quantity because one subject succeeds another, one does not say that this is an augmentation of the smaller quantity. For instance, when fire, which expands more, is engendered from air or water, which take less room, this is not a process of augmentation. It is a process of generation, and correlatively a new, greater form of quantity has replaced the lesser form of quantity. On the contrary, in a process of augmentation of the same thing, numerically the same accidental form of quantity is augmented. Likewise, if an intensification is really an increase, then it must be the same form that, initially imperfect, becomes perfect. If, on the contrary, a more perfect form replaced a less perfect form (as the succession theory wants it), one could not say that there is an increase.⁶⁵

After this array of objections to the succession theory, we still have to survey the rebuttal of the arguments that support the theory.

As expected, the *Correctorium* refutes each of James's four arguments. These refutations all have parallel passages in Hervaeus' *Commentary*. Although the latter does not report, and therefore does not discuss, **G1/J1**, the *Correctorium* gainsays **J1** in the same way as one of the *Commentary*'s rebuttals of the addition theory. The *ad tertium* of the *Commentary*'s q. 5⁶⁶ is supposed to respond to the third argument *quod sic* at the very beginning of the question, and this argument supports the addition theory (the *incipit* of the question being: "Utrum caritas augeatur per additionem.") However, there is in fact a common point between the addition theory and the succession theory: both argue that if a change is real, it must bring something new, which was not already present (a "part" or degree of the form according to the addition theory; a new form of a different degree for the succession theory).⁶⁷ This is why the *Correctorium* can use against **J1** the same response as the one given by the *Commentary*'s *ad tertium*:

65. *Ibid.*, p. 97b B-D.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 98a D - 98b A.

67. Cf. **G2** above and the third argument *quod sic* in Hervaeus' question: "Praeterea aut aliquid acquiritur de novo in eo quod movetur motu intensionis, aut nihil; si nihil, ergo motus realis est ad nihil; si aliquid, ergo illud est additum de novo ei quod praexistebat" (p. 96b B).

CR1: The fact that every action brings about something that is new and different from the starting point can be understood in two ways. Either the *terminus ad quem* differs entirely from the *terminus a quo*; or it differs from it in part only. But a more intense quality differs from a less intense that preceded it not in totality (like white differs from black, for instance), but in such a way that the less intense becomes included in something greater, like a part in a whole. The new quality is not something altogether different; it is the same as the less intense one, but completed, more perfect.⁶⁸

Of course, the talk is here about “virtual parts,” as we saw earlier, and not distinguishable (*signabiles*) parts within the intensified form as if one could really differentiate (*signari actu distincter*) what the initial degree was and what has been brought about by the intensification.

Another response in q. 5 of Hervaeus’ *Commentary*, the *ad quintum*,⁶⁹ which directly answers **G2** (and therefore **J2**, as we’ll see momentarily), can also indirectly rebut **J1**. The *Correctorium* does use it to provide an alternative refutation of **J1** (“Vel potest dici...”):

CR1’: True, something must be acquired during an intensification, but this something can be aggregated to what was before, not as a part actually distinct, but as a part distinct by disposition (*habitu*).⁷⁰

As an illustration of this kind of distinction, the *Correctorium*, like Hervaeus’ *Sentences* commentary,⁷¹ points to the paradigm of nutrition. Food is aggregated to the matter of the body; however, the food remains somehow distinct, not in actuality, but by disposition, because it could exist just by itself if it were taken away.⁷² Likewise, what is brought about by the intensification becomes one with the quality that preexisted, and nevertheless is different from it. The increased quality

68. F. 152 va. Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.*, VI q. 11, f. 135 vb: “(...) dico quod motus intensionis terminatur ad aliquid reale habendum, quod quidem reale est aliquis gradus forme que prius non habebat, sed ille gradus cedit in eandem essentiam cum preexistente albedine, que eius adventu efficitur perfectior quam prius, et ideo dicitur quod subiectum per modum intensionis reducitur in perfectiorem actum (...).”

69. P. 98b A-B.

70. F. 152 va.

71. *Ad 5m*, p. 98b A-B.

72. Medieval discussions occasioned by *De generatione* I.5 revolved around the problem of how an alien matter can be merged with matter already existing under a specific form. See P.L. REYNOLDS, *Food and the Body: Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology*, Leiden 1999.

“has” more than before, but, the *Correctorium* adds, it becomes in fact more simple, not more complex, because it becomes more actualized. The initial degree is contained virtually in the higher degree. If the initial degree did not somehow subsist, the agent would not be intensifying a given quality properly speaking, but producing instead a quality that is altogether different.

To James’s second argument (J2), Hervaeus’ *Commentary* (*ad quintum*, more likely against G2, but applicable to J2), and, in a much shorter way, the *Correctorium* (*ad tertiam rationem*),⁷³ respond that:

CR2/NR2: The accidental form which is that according to which change occurs only has to be, in the *terminus ad quem*, different from what it was in the *terminus a quo* in the same manner as a completed form differs from an incomplete form, as we saw above in the responses to J1. It need not be a different form.⁷⁴

To James’s third argument (J3), the *Correctorium* (*ad quartam rationem*)⁷⁵ and Hervaeus’ *Commentary* (*ad quartum*, more likely against G3, but applicable to J3) answer that:

CR3/NR3: The *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* are not incompatible with each other in regard to the positive essence of the quality, which they share. They are opposed to each other only with regard to the privation of perfection (in the case of an intensification), which is present at the beginning and then eliminated by the change (and conversely for a remission).⁷⁶

Finally, to James’s fourth argument (J4), both the *Correctorium* (*ad secundam rationem*) and Hervaeus’ *Commentary* (*ad sextum*) answer the following:

CR4/NR4: An agent that cools down a hot thing acts inasmuch as it obstructs the power that conserves heat, preventing this power from maintaining the heat in the same state. The same goes for local motion: an

73. Recall that the *Correctorium* inserts J4 between J1 and J2 (see above, p. 310), which means that the latter becomes third.

74. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Sent.*, p. 98b A-B; *Correctorium*, f. 152 vb.

75. Recall again that the *Correctorium* inserts J4 between J1 and J2.

76. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Sent.*, p. 98b A; *Correctorium*, f. 152 vb.

obstacle that prevents a thing that is falling from moving further down does not subtract something from the accidental form of motion, nor introduces something in this form, but, simply, resists the motion by opposing its own action to that of the moving power.⁷⁷

As we can see through the above analysis of Hervaeus' *Commentary* and the *Correctorium fratris Iacobi*, the first infiltration of Godfrey's theory in the Dominican order, in the person of James of Metz, was opposed by a strong barrage. The fight was not over though, as another supporter of the succession theory, or at least a variant of it, was looming within the Dominican order: Durand of Saint-Pourçain.

5. HERVAEUS' *QUODLIBET* II AND DURAND OF SAINT-POURÇAIN

In the second of the quodlibetal questions he disputed a few years later as regent master (1308 or 1309),⁷⁸ Hervaeus Natalis had to address again the matter of intensification and remission in q. 13 ("Utrum in qualibet alteratione infinite forme differentes sint, siue si remissus et intensum realiter different").⁷⁹ Godfrey's theory had found defenders other than James of Metz. As Walter Burley will later point out, "many" endorse this solution.⁸⁰ Among those was, as we saw earlier, Thomas of Bailly, a prominent actor on the Parisian stage,⁸¹ and Hervaeus deals with some of his arguments in the first part of the question. On the evi-

77. *Correctorium*, f. 152 va-vb; HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Sent.*, p. 98b B-C.

78. 1308 for J. KOCH (1927), pp. 61-64, 269, followed by GLORIEUX II, p. 138. A. DE GUIMARÃES ("Hervé Noël (m. 1323): Etude biographique," in: *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum*, 8 (1938), 5-81, p. 48) proposes Lent 1309 in order to allow some more time for Hervaeus' reaction to Durand's teaching (more on this below). He is seconded by P.T. STELLA, "A proposito di Pietro da Palude (*In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1): la questione inedita 'Utrum Deus esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari' di Erveo Natalis," in: *Salesianum* 22/2 (1960), 245-325, p. 252, who adds an argument based on the fact that John of Pouilly's *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, to which Hervaeus seems to reply in q. 1 of his own quodlibet, was held in the Advent of 1308. After discussing this secondary literature, R.L. FRIEDMAN, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330," in: C. SCHABEL (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, Leiden 2007, p. 435, concludes that with this sparse information one cannot exclude either date.

79. *Quodlibeta*, ff. 58 vb - 61 rb.

80. GUALTERUS DE BURLEY, *De intensione et remissione formarum*, c. 4, Venice 1496, f. 11 rb.

81. See above fn. 52. For other reactions to Bailly's defense of the succession theory in his *Quodlibet* III, see DUMONT, "Godfrey of Fontaines and the succession theory," pp. 102-105.

dence I present below, however, I submit that the succession theory had also found a defender in the person of Durand of Saint-Pourçain. I also submit that Durand, who was *baccalareus sententiarus* at the time, was involved in the debate when this quodlibetal question was disputed.

The general outline of the question is somewhat peculiar. It comprises two main parts:

A) Discussion of the validity of the following inference: "If an intensified form is numerically different from the remitted form, there is an infinity of successive forms in an intensification."⁸²

B) Discussion of the premiss of the inference, i.e., whether an intensified form is numerically different from the remitted form.⁸³

So, before coming to the core of the issue, namely, whether the succession theory is true, the whole first part is about the legitimacy of a deduction which, as we saw, amounts to an objection to the succession theory (see **NO1**, above), since going through an infinity of forms was thought to be an impossibility. This shows that the question put to Hervaeus is highly contextualized, and that the reader, so to speak, jumps in the middle of an ongoing discussion about the fairness of that objection, which had been raised by Hervaeus in his commentary on the *Sentences* and addressed by Thomas of Bailly in his *Quodlibet* III in 1303. Hervaeus intends here to demonstrate that the succession theory proponents do have to concede that an intensification comprises an infinity of successive forms (which makes the theory untenable), and he refutes two responses given by Thomas of Bailly: (1) even though all the forms of different degrees are numerically different within a given change, these forms nevertheless are one by continuity; (2) their infinity is only infinite in potentiality.⁸⁴ For the sake of brevity, I will leave aside this discussion.

The second part of the question begins with (1) a refutation of the premise of the inference, that is, the very thesis of the succession theory, thanks to a number of objections and the refutation of counter-objections. Then, (2) Hervaeus explains how it is possible that a form remains numerically the same throughout the process while acquiring what it did not first possess. I will leave these points aside too. Finally,

82. Ff. 58 vb – 59 va.

83. Ff. 59 va – 61 rb.

84. See THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodlibet* III q. 15, ed. GLORIEUX, p. 214.

(3) the discussion flares up again with the presentation of twelve objections to Hervaeus' thesis (which are so many arguments in favor of the succession theory), followed by their systematic refutation.⁸⁵ The addition of these twelve objections at the end makes the structure of the second part peculiar too and gives the impression of a live debate, in which a participant launches a new attack on the *respondens* with a new set of objections.

There are reasons to think that this objector was Durand. Bernard Lombardi, a Dominican who wrote a *Sentences* commentary in the late 1320s,⁸⁶ reports very extensively Durand's discussion of the intensification of forms. Durand's solution on the "how" of intensification/remission, as Lombardi presents it, is a variant of the succession theory, and the arguments in favor of this theory attributed to Durand by Lombardi correspond to eight of the twelve final objections in Hervaeus' question. There is no room for uncertainty about their ascription to Durand: instead of the usual "quidam dicunt" with at best an abbreviated name in the margin, the main text in one of the manuscripts reads in full letters: "Alia opinio est Durandi qui ponit quod forma non subscipit magis et minus sic quod gradus remissus remaneat adueniente intenso, ymo corrumpitur."⁸⁷ Moreover, after rebutting Durand, Lombardi provides a solution which is (without him saying it) mostly a long summary, sometimes a paraphrase, sometimes even word for word excerpts, of q. 13 of Hervaeus' *Quodlibet* II⁸⁸ – not only of the core of his solution, but also of the objections and responses that his question

85. Ff. 60 rb ("Contra hoc objicitur multipliciter...") – 61 rb.

86. See S.A. POREBSKI, "La question de Bernard Lombardi concernant la différence réelle entre l'essence et l'existence," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* XVII (1973), 157-185, pp. 158-160, and T. KAEPPELI, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, Rome 1970, t. I, p. 228, n. 640: Lector in the convent of Beziers before 1323, prior of the Provence province in 1322, *baccalaureus sententiarum* in Paris in 1327-28, and *magister theologiae* in Paris in 1331-32. Distinction 17 of book I of his *Sentences* commentary is found in three manuscripts: Naples Naz. VII G 98 on the one hand, Leipzig Univ. 542 and Erfurt CA 2° 368 on the other hand. The differences between them point to two different *lecturae*, or perhaps at least one *reportatio*. See also C. SCHABEL – R.L. FRIEDMAN – I. BALCOYIANNPOULOU, "Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents," in: *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001), 182-300, pp. 218 and 247-248. Contrary to the case of book I dist. 38 that they examine, Bernard's report of Durand's opinion cannot have been derived from Peter of Palude, as the latter's q. 2 of dist. 17 is very different.

87. Book I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, Naples ms., f. 27ra. Durand's name is in the margin of the Erfurt manuscript, f. 91va.

88. Leipzig f. 37rb-38ra, Erfurt f. 91vb-92vb.

contains. This may indicate that Lombardi was well aware of the debate between Hervaeus and Durand, and probably presented their two positions as they were, historically, pitted against each other.

In itself, the ascription of the succession theory to Durand should not come as a surprise. It might only confirm the intellectual affiliation between James of Metz and Durand that has been highlighted by Koch.⁸⁹ Since James probably lectured on the *Sentences* in Paris in 1300-01, Durand, who started around that time the three-year lectorate program (see below), may well have attended his lectures and paid heed to his criticism of the Thomist conception of intensification and his move in favor of Godfrey's solution. However, let us note that a long passage of Durand's early version of his commentary on the *Sentences* that was not included in the final version shows that Durand knew first hand Godfrey's *Quaestio ordinaria* 18, which he analyzes and criticizes at length as far as the indivisibility of forms is concerned (Durand, instead, admits the existence of degrees in forms).⁹⁰ Besides, we saw there were at the time other supporters of the succession theory. Thus, even if James did not hand down to Durand this theory, the latter had other possible sources of information.

What may seem to pose a problem, however, is that Durand's succession theory as presented by Bernard Lombardi is not straightforwardly identical to Durand's solution in the last and "official" redaction of his *Commentary on the Sentences*.⁹¹ Furthermore, no theory at all can be found in the extant manuscripts of the earlier version(s) of book I either, as they do not tackle at all the question of how intensification takes place ("quomodo augeatur"). They contain a single question on intensification: "Utrum caritas augeri," which only discusses in which forms intensification can take place. So, isn't Lombardi mistaken when he presents Durand as a proponent of the succession theory?

In fact, this discrepancy can be explained. But first, let me summarize the *status quaestionis* concerning the stages of the writing of Durand's *Sentences* commentary.

89. J. KOCH, "Jakob von Metz, O.P., der Lehrer des Durandus de S. Porciano, O.P."

90. Book I, d. 17, q. 3, ed. M. PERRONE – F. RETUCCI, *Scriptum super IV Libros Sententiarum. Distinctiones 4-17 primi libri*, Leuven 2017, pp. 236-245. How this acknowledgement of degrees in the essence of qualities is compatible with some variant of the succession theory will become clearer below. On the other hand, the explanation of why only qualities can be intensified or remitted (*ibid.* pp. 246-249) is borrowed from Godfrey. Additionally, this early version contains (pp. 227-236) a presentation and refutation of Giles of Rome's theory, which was also left out in the final version.

91. See below p. 339.

According to the reconstruction of Durand's early career provided by William Courtenay,⁹² Durand received at the Dominican *studium generale* in Paris, probably from 1300 to 1303, the three years training required for being a conventual theology *lector*, and then returned to the vicariate he was coming from, that of Burgundy, probably in the convent of Lyon. He was sent back to Paris to follow the curriculum leading to the theology doctorate. He was there in 1307 for a preparatory year,⁹³ and lectured on the *Sentences* as *baccalaureus sententiarum* in the academic year 1308-1309.⁹⁴ Whether he had already commented on the *Sentences* in a provincial convent⁹⁵ (if so, probably in Lyon), or simply had prepared his lecture notes in 1307-1308,⁹⁶ there was a first version of his commentary, named redaction A by Koch, when Durand began lecturing in Paris. However, Durand's teaching came immediately under attack by Hervaeus Natalis, who was since 1307 the Dominican regent master. As Koch has shown, Hervaeus, in several questions of his *Quodlibet* II, held during Advent 1308 or Lent 1309, criticizes ideas contained in Durand's book I.⁹⁷ Moreover, in 1309 (Sept. 17)

92. W.J. COURTENAY, "Durand in his educational and intellectual context," in A. SPEER – F. RETUCCI, T. JESCHKE – G. GULDENTOPS (eds.), *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences commentary. Historical, Philosophical and Theological Issues*, Leuven 2014, pp. 13-34.

93. His name appears in a document related to the Templars affair, dated October 26 of that year, but after the names of those presented as doctors and bachelors in theology, which means he was not yet *baccalaureus*.

94. 1308-1309 only, if one accepts Duba's and Schabel's conclusion that the lectures on all the books of the *Sentences* spanned a single academic year (see above, fn. 23, and in particular W. DUBA – C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the myth of the two-year *Sentences* lecture at Paris," p. 157; see also C. SCHABEL, "James of Metz's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*," p. 355). Courtenay's chapter, which predates Duba's and Schabel's paper, proposes 1308-09 and 1309-10.

95. As it is believed by R.L. FRIEDMAN, "The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250-1320," in: G.R. EVANS (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, Leiden 2002, p. 71.

96. See COURTENAY, "Durand in his educational and intellectual context," pp. 28-30. The second hypothesis, Courtenay notes, fits better with Durand's famous remark, in the conclusion of his "official" version, that his early version had been circulated prematurely and without his consent: "Scripta super quatuor Sententiarum libros iuvenis inchoavi, sed senex complevi; siquidem quod in primis dictaveram et scripseram fuit a quibusdam curiosis mihi subreptum, antequam fuisset per me sufficienter correctum (...)" (*In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentarium libri IIII* [= *Sent. C.*], 2 vols., Venice 1579; repr. Ridgewood, NJ 1964, f. 423rb). It would be hard to make sense of this, Courtenay thinks, if Durand had already lectured in a provincial convent, that is, publicized his views. On the other hand, let us keep in mind that Durand left in the final redaction a hint about the fact he gave several *lecturae*, since he speaks of his "first lecture": "Unde quod dixi alias in fine secundi libri sententiarum primae lectionis..." (*II Sent. C.*, d. 44, q. 5, n. 10, f. 208 ra).

97. See J. KOCH, *Durandus*, pp. 60-72, 214-215 and B. DECKER, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Münster in W. 1967, pp. 85-88, who showed that Hervaeus' qq. 3, 7 and 8 respectively attack d. 36 q.

Hervaeus was elected provincial of France (he will become general master of the order in 1318), and the same year the General Chapter of the order at Saragossa required Dominicans not to hold positions opposed to what was generally taken to be Aquinas's doctrine.⁹⁸ Under this pressure, and probably in view of securing his chances to be promoted to the doctorate, Durand soon started to modify his commentary. This revision process, carried out before 1312, resulted in redaction B, in which Durand mitigated his criticism of and departure from Thomas Aquinas.⁹⁹ Later, when he entered an episcopal career (from 1317 on), and was thereby free from the jurisdiction of the Dominican order, Durand wrote a third and final version of his commentary (redaction C), in which he returned to many of his original views, modified at times on the basis of criticisms he had received.¹⁰⁰

Let us now go back to Bernard Lombardi. As I said, the succession theory he ascribes to Durand is not that of redaction C and is nowhere to be found (as, for that matter, any theory whatsoever on the "how" of the intensification/remission) in the manuscripts we have of Durand's early versions of his commentary. However, as far as book I is concerned, all those manuscripts transmit the same redaction. This means that one of the two pre-1317 versions, either redaction A or redaction B, has disappeared. It is quite possible, then, that Lombardi discloses an otherwise unknown stage of Durand's thought.

In which version might he have presented this theory? Koch believed that the extant non-C manuscripts of book I contain redaction

3, d. 33 q. 1, and d. 27 q. 2 of Durand's book I. For q. 7 and his attack on Durand's conception of relation *in divinis*, see I. IRIBARREN, *Durandus*, pp. 149-155.

98. "(...) inhibemus districte quod nullus frater legendo, determinando, respondendo, audeat assertive tenere contrarium eius quod communiter creditur de opinione doctoris praedicti (...)" (*Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, ed. B.M. REICHERT, *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica* 3 and 4, Rome 1889-1899, t. II, p. 38). See IRIBARREN, *Durandus*, p. 182, fn. 3, for whom the Saragossa regulation specifically targets Durand.

99. As a result, he received the doctorate and was appointed *magister actu regens* in 1312, probably thanks to the intervention of pope Clement V. Nonetheless, Durand was subjected to an investigation of the Dominican order, entrusted to a commission presided by Hervaeus, in 1313-1314 (decision of the General Chapter of Metz in 1313), and again in 1316-1317 (decision of the General Chapter of Montpellier in 1316). See KOCH, *Durandus*, pp. 68-72, 200-207, 410-417, and *id.*, 'Philosophische und theologische Irrtumslisten von 1270-1329: Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der theologischen Zensuren', in *Kleine Schriften*, Rome 1973, t. II, pp. 439-41; C. SCHABEL - R.L. FRIEDMAN - I. BALCOYIANNOPOULOU, 'Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents,' pp. 184-215. Cf. the reflections on this censure in IRIBARREN, *Durandus*, pp. 182-186.

100. Probably between 1318 and 1328. Cf. KOCH, *Durandus*, p. 16 sqq.

A. Moreover, he believed that Durand did not issue a second redaction of book I. However, in their recent edition of the early version of distinctions 4-17 of book I, Massimo Perrone and Fiorella Retucci have reached the opposite conclusion: all the extant non-C manuscripts of book I contain redaction B (in two different stages of revision), and even for book I redaction A was different from redaction B.¹⁰¹ Redaction A of book I, therefore, is no longer accessible to us. Thence, we can surmise that what Bernard Lombardi reports is the content of a question of the now lost redaction A of distinction 17 in which Durand was adopting the succession theory.¹⁰²

As a matter of fact, the reversal of Koch's conclusion gives grounds for a very plausible scenario. It would be only logical that the young Durand, while he was first studying in Paris between 1300 and 1303, under the influence of James of Metz, adopted the succession theory. When he came back to Paris to comment on the *Sentences*, at the beginning of the academic year 1308-09, he held the same position while lecturing on d. 17 of book I and immediately clashed with Hervaeus on the topic of intensification among others. As noted above, Hervaeus' *Quodlibet II* was probably disputed either during the Advent of 1308,

101. Pp. 20*-75* (see summary in Andreas Speer's "Vorwort," pp. 10*-11*). See also F. RETUCCI, "Selected Problems in Books I-II of Durand's *Sentences* Commentary," in A. SPEER – F. RETUCCI – T. JESCHKE – G. GULDENTOPS (eds.), *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences commentary*, pp. 71-96, and M. PERRONE, "Alcune osservazioni sulle fasi redazionali del *Commento al I libro delle Sentenze* di Durando di San Porciano (1270/75-1334)," *Studi Filosofici* XXXIX (2016), pp. 49-68. On pp. 59-60 of this article, Perrone shows that, because of an implicit quote from the second redaction of Alexander of Alexandria's commentary on the *Sentences*, Durand must have revised book I after 1308.

102. I should add that Lombardi does not always report the content of redaction A. Immediately after this passage, art. 2 of the same question ("Quae est causa precisa suspensionis magis et minus") is nothing but a transcription word for word of q. 6 of Durand's redaction C (probably because in this final version, Durand criticizes the explanation he had given earlier—i.e., redaction B, book I, d. 17, q. 3, ed. PERRONE – RETUCCI, pp. 246-249—about the reasons why certain forms are intensifiable and remittable). I'll comment more on this fact in the conclusion. For now, let me just emphasize that Bernard had access to different redactions of Durand's commentary (Durand's concern over leaving a definitive version that would be clearly recognizable probably shows that he feared that the earlier drafts were still in circulation—see above, fn. 96, the quote from the conclusion of Durand's *Commentary*, which is to be completed by these words: "propter quod hoc opus solum, quod per omnes libros incipit 'Est Deus in caelo revelans etc.' tanquam per me editum et correctum approbo"). Incidentally, this means that, for the discussion of the "how" of intensification/remission (art. 1), Lombardi chose Durand's solution in redaction A, while he knew redaction C (in which Durand has somehow modified his view; see below p. 339). Why? Probably because Bernard, who rallies to Hervaeus' solution in *Quodlibet II* which he copies extensively in art. 1, wanted to give the whole context of Hervaeus' question 13, in which Durand was involved.

or Lent of 1309. Admittedly, Hervaeus, in the question on intensification (q. 13), first addresses a more important adversary: Thomas of Bailly, as I noted above. But recall the peculiar structure of the question: towards the end of the second part, it appears that an opponent (or several opponents) raises a series of twelve new objections that favor the succession theory. Now, eight of these objections are arguments for the succession theory that Bernard Lombardi ascribes to Durand (from the corresponding question in redaction A, if my hypothesis is correct). So it is not too far-fetched to imagine that Durand himself, or perhaps a student of his who had taken notes on his recent lecture on the intensification and remission of qualities, might have intervened in the discussion of Hervaeus' quodlibetal question and put forward these objections. It wouldn't be the only time that Durand would have debated with Hervaeus: together with an important question on cognition from Durand's early version of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Koch has edited a disputed question presided over by Hervaeus in which, Koch says, Durand, defending the same theses as in his *Commentary*, played the role of the opponent.¹⁰³ And as we know, a number of other questions of Hervaeus' *Quodlibet* II were specifically targeting Durand.¹⁰⁴ To these questions that reveal the increasing tension between Hervaeus and Durand, it seems permissible, therefore, to add the end of q. 13.

Furthermore, as said above, Durand had to modify his commentary on the *Sentences* to align it more with Dominican orthodoxy, that is to say, with Thomas Aquinas's teachings. During this process, which resulted in redaction B, Durand omitted whole questions that were too controversial, with the consequence that redaction B is generally a shortened text compared to the initial version.¹⁰⁵ That is exactly what happened with the question on the "how" of the intensification, where Durand had to criticize Aquinas in order to promote the succession theory: he purely and simply eliminated it from redaction B, with the result that, as noted above, redaction B does not offer any explanation about the manner in which an intensification or remission takes place.

103. DURANDUS DE S. PORCIANO, *Quaestio de natura cognitionis (II Sent. [A] D. 3 q. 5) et Disputatio cum anonymo quodam nec non Determinatio Hervei Natalis OP. Altera editio emendatio*, ed. J. KOCH, Münster in W. 1935.

104. See above, fn. 97.

105. See PERRONE's and RETUCCI's introduction to their edition of book I d. 4-17, pp. 20*-26*.

One manuscript of redaction B mentions this disappearance. BnF lat. 14454, f. 62 vb, at the end of d. 17 (after the question “Utrum caritas possit minui”), has in the lower margin, apparently from the same hand as the main text, the following note: “due questiones deficiunt hic, scilicet utrum caritas augeatur per additionem aut alio modo et utrum possit augeri in infinitum.” This note does not result from a comparison made by the scribe with the text of redaction C, for the latter includes not just two more questions on the increase of charity than the non-C (i.e. redaction B) manuscripts have, but four more—and indeed many more as far as the whole distinction 17 is concerned.¹⁰⁶ The annotator of BnF lat. 14454, therefore, had a source of information other than a redaction C manuscript. Like Bernard Lombardi, he probably had access to redaction A and reported that these two questions were missing in Durand’s revised version. It seems that all the elements fit nicely in the scenario I have proposed.

Let us now turn to the arguments ascribed to Durand by Bernard Lombardi.

The first argument is the 8th final objection in Hervaeus’ *Quodlibet* II q. 13. It is formally identical to Godfrey’s third argument (**G3** above), and James’s third argument too (**J3** above):

DBL1: In all processes, the *terminus a quo* disappears when the *terminus ad quem* is reached.¹⁰⁷

This argument is the cornerstone of Godfrey’s position, and it is used by all of his followers, who also believe that intensification and remission are processes like any other process. These limited alterations obey the laws that apply to all natural changes, therefore they must be seen

106. See the chart in PERRONE’s and RETUCCI’s introduction, pp. 71*-73*. One should note, however, that the content of what is q. 6 in redaction C is part of q. 3 in redaction B. The count of the number of questions, by the way, may provide another confirmation that the extant non-C manuscripts of book I carry its redaction B version, not the redaction A version: see the Appendix, below.

107. LOMBARDI, *I Sent.*, d. 17 q. 1, a. 1, mss. Leipzig Univ. 542 f. 37 ra, Erfurt CA 2° 368, f. 91 va-vb: “Primo sic: secundum Aristotelem 5° Physicorum, habito termino ad quem *terminus a quo abiicitur in omni motu*. Tunc sic: motus alterationis est unus motus, sed *in isto motu forma remissa habet rationem termini a quo*, forma intensa rationem termini ad quem; ergo adueniente gradu intenso *remissus abiicitur*.” HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, f. 60 va, 8°: “*in omni motu abiicitur terminus a quo; sed in motu intensionis terminus a quo est forma remissa; igitur in tali motu forma remissa abiicitur, et per consequens non manet eadem cum intensa*.”

as a succession of transitory states between the initial and final states of rest, which are contrary to each other and mutually exclusive. However, the conclusion of **DBL1** talks of *degrees*, rather than forms, replacing each other. Recall that Durand, contrary to Godfrey, affirmed that essences are divisible in degrees. This is why his theory is that of a succession of degrees, strictly speaking, instead of forms. The nuance is not always perceptible in Lombardi's account, but it will become much clearer in redaction C, as we'll see below.

Next, Lombardi ascribes to Durand a confirmation of the previous argument, which is identical to the 4th final objection in Hervaeus' *Quodlibet*:

DBL1': Either a new degree succeeds to the previous one (instead of being an addition), which was to be demonstrated; or the previous one stays, and thus the form remains unchanged, which is false.¹⁰⁸

The next argument of Durand reported by Lombardi, related to Godfrey's second argument (**G2** above), is identical to the 1st final objection in Hervaeus' *Quodlibet*:

DBL2: An agent that intensifies heat in a patient either acts and actualizes ("imprints") something in the patient, or not. The second alternative is impossible, because this would mean that nothing happens in reality. However, if the agent does act, it imprints something that was not there already, otherwise there would be no change either. But if what is imprinted is a new degree or form, the degree or form that was previously in the patient cannot subsist.¹⁰⁹

108. LOMBARDI, Leipzig f. 37 ra, Erfurt f. 91 vb: "Et confirmatur: *si intensum habet plus quam remissum, aut hoc est succedente gradu gradui, aut manente forma. Si primo modo habetur propositum quod sunt diuerse. Si secundo modo nulla erit uariatio, quod est falsum.*" HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, f. 60 va, 4^o: "*si intensum habet plus quam remissum, aut est hoc succedente forma forme, aut manente eadem forma. Si primo modo, habetur propositum, scilicet quod intensum et remissum sunt diuerse forme. Si secundo modo, tunc nulla est ibi variatio.*"

109. LOMBARDI, Leipzig f. 37 ra, Erfurt f. 91 vb: "Secundo sic: *intendens calorem aut aliquid imprimit aut nihil. Non potest dici quod nihil, quia per nihil calor non dicitur augmentari; ergo aliquid imprimit. Sed non illud quod iam erat. Ergo aliud.*" HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, f. 60 rb, 1^o: "*agens intendens aut imprimit aliquid diuersum a precedente, aut non. Si non, igitur nulla variatio est in intensione, quod est contra sensum. Si sic, igitur forma intensa quam imprimit est diuersa a precedente, et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod ista remissa corrumpitur, quia due forme eiusdem speciei non simul sunt in eodem subiecto.*"

This argument is followed by a variant, which should be compared to James of Metz's 4th argument (J4 above), and is identical to the 7th final objection in Hervaeus' *Quodlibet*:

DBL2': Suppose that something cold diminishes heat in something else. Either the first thing imprints something, or not. The second is impossible, because the agent does act. But what it imprints can only be a diminished heat, which cannot coexist with the initial heat.¹¹⁰

However, as we saw above, James eventually found that this argument entailed an unsolvable problem: it is impossible for the property actualized in the patient to be the opposite of that possessed by the agent, and both the *Correctorium fratris Jacobi* and Hervaeus in his *Sentences* commentary exploit the concession made by James (**NO2** and **CR4/NR4** above). The same objection to the succession theory figures also at the beginning of the second part of Hervaeus' *Quodlibet II* q. 13 (before the twelve final objection),¹¹¹ with the discussion of counter-arguments. One of these counter-arguments is that there is an order in which forms have to appear, with the consequence that a subject cannot change immediately from one extreme to the other but has to go through intermediaries. Thus, in the example above, cold cannot be introduced immediately in the patient; a less intense heat must be first imprinted by the agent. This counter-argument seems to echo the second solution envisioned by James, as we saw above, to solve the "ratio difficilior" (the example given was that of the semen).¹¹² Hervaeus gives immediately three replies to this counter-argument:

110. LOMBARDI, Leipzig f. 37 ra, Erfurt f. 91 vb: "Vel potest sic formari ratio: *frigidum remittens calidum aut aliquid imprimit aut nihil. Si imprimit aliquid, hoc non potest esse nisi calor remissus*, quia si imprimeret intensum, tunc non remitteret primum sed intenderet, *vel duo calores simul essent intensi*, quod est falsum, sic autem non maneret calor intensus. *Si autem nihil imprimeret, ergo nihil ageret* quod est falsum." HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, f. 60 va, 7^o: "*frigidum remittens calidum aut aliquid imprimit aut nihil. Si aliquid, hoc non potest esse nisi calor remissus*, nec potest de nouo imprimere calorem remissum <corr. ex intensum> nisi remouendo calorem intensum <corr. ex remissum>, quia *aliter duo calores simul essent*. Si dicatur quod nihil imprimit, contra : quia *si nihil imprimit, nihil agit*, et sic agens remittens nihil agit."

111. Ff. 59vb – 60ra.

112. See above p. 304.

- A univocal agent must be proportioned to its effect; but cold is not suited to actualize heat, albeit a diminished heat at the first stage of its action.
- Is the more intense heat expelled in an instant or progressively? If the second, then some of the intense heat remains together with the less intense heat that is being introduced; but these forms belong to the same species and therefore cannot be numerically different and be in the same subject at the same time; therefore, they are in reality one and the same form. If, on the contrary, the more intense heat is expelled in an instant, then the diminished heat is introduced in an instant too, and this alteration is not continuous.
- Likewise, is the very introduction of the lesser degree of heat successive or not? If not, this is contrary to empirical evidence. But if it is successive, does this lesser degree of heat, while it is being introduced, remain equal (*equae remissa*) or not? If yes, this again is contrary to empirical evidence. If not, then this means that the intensity of one and the same form can diminish. Therefore, why couldn't this be extended to the whole process of remission (or intensification), from lesser heat to lesser heat?

Now, the same discussion re-occurs at the end of Hervaeus' question, since, as we just saw, the 7th objection to Hervaeus' position (identical to **DBL2'** in favor of the succession theory) reactivates James's argument (**J4**). This reappearance of the problem confirms, I believe, that the series of the twelve final objections is superadded and that a new opponent has entered the lists.¹¹³

The next argument attributed to Durand by Bernard is, like the 5th and 6th final objections in Hervaeus' *Quodlibet*, a direct attack on his own theory. Since Hervaeus thinks that degrees do not succeed each other, and do not add up cumulatively either (as in the addition theory), he has no other avenue left but saying that, in an intensification process, the degrees acquired do not complement the previous degrees like parts added to parts in order to constitute a new whole, but, rather, include them "virtually" (this is also true of remission: the initial, higher degree being virtually contained in the lower degree too). As we saw, this notion of "virtual inclusion" was already the linchpin of Hervaeus' solution in his *Sentences* commentary. All his responses to arguments supporting

113. Hervaeus gives in the *Quodlibet* (f. 60 vb) the same response to this objection as in his *Sentences* commentary (p. 98b), namely, **CR4/NR4** above.

the succession theory hinge on it too.¹¹⁴ As already explained, the model Hervaeus offered is that of nutrition: the nutrients are assimilated, but they remain distinct virtually or by *habitus* from the body, in the sense that they still could exist apart.¹¹⁵ In his *Quodlibet III* q. 15, Thomas of Bailly challenged the appropriateness of this model, probably in reaction to Hervaeus' lecture on the *Sentences*. Nevertheless, in his *Quodlibet II* (before the final twelve objections), Hervaeus retains the same solution. The intensified differs from the remitted, he says, as being the same entity plus something else, not as if these were two actually distinguishable parts, but as a more perfect whole comprises a plurality.¹¹⁶

From **DBL3** and the 5th-6th final objections in Hervaeus' *Quodlibet II*, we learn that Durand questioned the very principle of Hervaeus' solution, namely, that because their relation is a virtual inclusion, the initial degree and the final degree of a quality do not differ really as two distinct entities do:

114. See above, pp. 310, 317, at fn. 49 and 68. The same notion is also part of Hervaeus' defense against arguments in favor of the addition theory. For instance, the first objection in *I Sent.*, d. 17 q. 5, p. 96b, contends that if A is "more" than B, A can be divided into two parts, the part that is equal to B and the part by which A exceeds B; but what can be divided into two parts must be constituted by the addition of these two parts. The conclusion, Hervaeus responds (*ad I^m*, p. 98a), is true only when the two parts can be distinguished in actuality, either by their subject or by their *situs*; not so in the case of qualities, where the parts differ only *virtualiter*.

115. See above **CR1** and **CR1'**, in the discussion of James of Metz by the *Correctorium*. HERVAEUS, *Sent.*, p. 98a: "(...) si non fuisset praecedens habitus gradus, agens fecisset qualitatem aliam: sicut quando alimentum est conversum in illum qui nutritur, materia alimenti facta conversione, non est aliquid distinctum actu ab ista materia, sed habitu potest alia dici, quia si per se fuisset, habuisset per se distinctum." See also HERVAEUS, *Quodl. VI* q.11, f. 135 vb: "materia alimenti, facta conversione eius in nutritum, non distinguitur a reliqua materia nutriti et essentialiter, sed habitu potest dici distincta pro tanto quia fuit uel potuit esse alia. Ita dico de illo gradu acquisito in forma intensa quod est quidem distinctus habitu a forma preexistente, in quantum si agens inuenisset subiectum carens illa forma, causasset ibi gradum quemdam qui non fuisset illa forma sed alia, sed presupposita ibi consimili forma actu non potuit distingui ab ea."

116. F. 60 rb: "Qualiter autem praecedens et sequens sint unum vel etiam differant, dico sicut alius dixi, quod ipsum intensum differt a remisso precedente sicut ipsum habens et plus, non secundum partes singulares ita quod una possit signanter distingui ab alia, sed sicut totum perfectionale comprehendens aliqua, non sicut partes signabiles distinctas. Et de hoc posui duo exempla alibi. Primum est de conversione materiae alimenti in nutritum, ubi materia adveniens non potest signanter distingui a precedente. Et similiter quando pellis efficitur maior per extensionem, maioritas adveniens non potest distingui a precedente, et idem est si hoc fiat per rarefactionem, quia corpus rarefactum fit maius, et maioritas adveniens non potest distingui secundum quantitatem." Note that Hervaeus says that he has already offered two examples elsewhere. The first one, nutrition, is in his *Sentences* commentary, as I just said. I don't know where else he offered the example of the stretching of a skin. However, this model is akin to that of rarefaction he used in his *Sentences* commentary (see above, fn. 49), because in both cases what is added cannot be distinguished in actuality from what it is added to.

DBL3: What is virtually included in a thing is really distinct from that thing. For instance, an effect, which is virtually contained in its cause, is really distinct from the latter; such is obviously the case for creatures with respect to God.¹¹⁷

Then, Bernard Lombardi ascribes to Durand an argument that is related to the 10th final objection in Hervaeus' *Quodlibet* based on the notion of "incompatible changes." Whereas the phrasing of **DBL4** is obscure, though, the thrust of the 10th objection is clear:

DBL4: Incompatible changes are linked to incompatible forms, given that a change is defined by the form that is acquired at the end of the process. But intensification and remission are completely incompatible changes. Therefore, the remitted form and the intensified form must be incompatible too. As a consequence, they cannot be the same form.¹¹⁸

The next argument too appeals to the principle of non-contradiction:

DBL5: In an intensification, one goes from the "non esse intensum" to the "esse intensum," which are the two extremes of the change. If the lower and the higher degree were the same form, the "non esse intensum" and

117. LOMBARDI, Leipzig f. 37ra, f. Erfurt f. 91vb: "Tertio sic: si forma remissa et intensa sunt eadem, aut intensa remanet virtualiter in remissa aut formaliter. Non formaliter quia falsum est quod intensum sit remissum formaliter; nec virtualiter quia *illa que continentur in aliquo virtualiter differunt realiter ab illo, sicut patet de effectu qui realiter differt a causa in qua continetur*. Et sic habetur propositum, scilicet quod remissum differt ab intenso." HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.* II q. 13, f. 60 va, 5°: "si forma remissa manet in intensa, aut manet in propria forma, aut non. Si manet in propria forma, non manet virtualiter in intensa, quod est contra me. Si autem non manet in propria forma, igitur differt realiter a forma intensa in qua non manet secundum propriam formam." *Ibid.*, 6°: "et est confirmatio precedentis, quia *quod continetur virtualiter in aliquo differt ab eo realiter, sicut patet de creatura et deo in quo continetur virtualiter creatura*, et de miscibilibus et mixto in quo continentur virtualiter miscibilia; sed, ut videtur, secundum me remissum remanet virtualiter in intenso; igitur, etc."

118. LOMBARDI, Leipzig 37ra, Erfurt 91vb: "Quarto sic: si intensum et remissum essent idem, tunc sequeretur quod *motus impossibiles* essent simul, scilicet intensionis et remissionis. Sed per nullam potentiam motus impossibiles possunt esse simul; ergo. Maior patet quia tunc motus intensionis et remissionis essent simul." HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.* II q. 13, f. 60va, 10°: "*motus impossibiles* debent esse secundum formas impossibiles; sed motus intensionis et remissionis sunt impossibiles secundum se totos; ergo et forma intensa et remissa sunt impossibiles, et per consequens non potest esse eadem forma."

the “esse intensum,” which are opposites, would be the same thing. This would violate the principle of non-contradiction.¹¹⁹

A variant of this argument is identical to the 9th final objection in Hervaeus’ *Quodlibet II*:

DBLS’: A remission unfolds in the direction of the non-being of the form that is diminished. Correspondingly, an intensification moves away from this non-being. But this non-being precisely is the remitted form. The latter, therefore, cannot be the same form as the one that is acquired by the intensification.¹²⁰

The correspondence between these eight arguments in the total ascribed to Durand by Bernard Lombardi, and eight of the objections met by Hervaeus Natalis in his quodlibetal question shows sufficiently,

119. LOMBARDI, Leipzig 37ra-rb, Erfurt 91vb: “Quinto sic: quando in motu intensiois receditur a non esse intenso, fit accessus ad esse intensum. Si ergo idem essent intensum et remissum, idem essent non esse intensum et esse intensum, quod implicat contradictionem.”

120. LOMBARDI, Erfurt f. 91vb: “Vel formatur sic: *sicut in remissione tenditur ad priuationem et ad non esse forme que remittitur, ita in intensione receditur a priuatione et a non esse forme que intenditur. Sed in remissione tenditur ad non esse forme que remittitur*, ergo in intensione forme tenditur ad esse forme que acquiritur; *et per consequens illa que acquiritur per intensioem non preexistebat*. Sed huius<modi> non esse est forma remissa, ergo ipsa per intensioem non est que acquiritur.” HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, f. 60va, 9^o: “*sicut in remissione tenditur ad priuationem et non esse, ita in intensione receditur a priuatione et non esse. Sed in remissione tenditur ad non esse forme que acquiritur, et per consequens illa forma que acquiritur per intensioem non preexistebat*, nec est eadem cum preexistente, nec per consequens cum forma remissa.” This argument may help illuminating the strange opening of John (Quidort) of Paris’ *Quodlibet I* q. 8 (ed. A. HEIMAN, “The First *Quodlibet* of Jean Quidort,” in: J.R. O’DONNELL (ed.), *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers. A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts*, Toronto 1955, pp. 284-286). The question asked is: “Utrum aliquid positivum possit produci a non ente.” John begins his reply with the explanation that the real question that was hiding behind the formulated question is whether a quality intensified is numerically the same as the remitted quality (“Ex verbis argumentis non apparebat ejus intentio; sed, ut dictum fuit mihi, intendit quaerere utrum qualitas intensa et remissa sit eadem numero vel diversa.”) At first sight, the connection is not obvious (all the more that John does not directly respond to the question as formulated, but only to the background question and the classical arguments for the succession theory), but in the light of Durand’s argument against Hervaeus, it makes sense that someone who roots for the succession theory would launch an attack on John by asking him whether the being of an intensified form can come from the non-being of that same form, assuming that numerically the same form remains along the process of intensification. Given that John’s *Quodlibet* was held in 1304 or 1305, and clearly replies to Thomas of Bailly’s *Quodl. III* q. 15 and his response to the infinity objection, this shows that the argument was in circulation before Durand’s Parisian lectures on the *Sentences*.

I think, that Durand was involved in the debate, and that his take on the intensification/remission problem before and around 1308 was close to the succession theory, even though Durand gave it a twist of his own. Lombardi's report points to Durand as the source of opposition at the end of Hervaeus' dispute; conversely, the historical plausibility of Durand disputing with Hervaeus validates Lombardi's report of Durand standing for the succession theory. The two presumptions reinforce each other, so to speak. This stage of Durand's thought can be known only indirectly (so far), and must have been contained in a question of the lost redaction A, that was left out of redaction B.

6. DURAND'S REDACTION C

Now, Hervaeus Natalis did perhaps not argue totally in vain. The final version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary seems to indicate that he somewhat changed his mind on the topic. Following Koch's conclusions, it is generally held that in redaction C, bishop Durand, freed from the Dominican order's control, went back to the boldness of redaction A and reasserted his controversial theses. This may be mostly true, but it is not always the case. One example is Durand's position on the generation of the Son in the Trinity (book I, dist. 5).¹²¹ The way in which intensification or remission occur is another case in point. Q. 7 of dist. 17, in redaction C, "Utrum eadem forma possit esse intensa et remissa," begins with five *quod non* arguments for the succession theory, which are exactly those ascribed to Durand by Lombardi; but Durand is going to respond in the affirmative and maintain that the same form remains along the process. Moreover, the *sed contra* repeats nearly word for word some of Hervaeus' arguments in his *Sentences* commentary and his *Quodlibet* II!¹²² This is why Bernard Lombardi's report on Durand's position cannot have been derived from redaction C: in the final version, the arguments have been reshuffled.

Nonetheless, in the end Durand still defends a form of the succession theory. But he has made a major adjustment—or clarification. Let us see how.

121. See F. RETUCCI, "Selected problems..." p. 95, fn. 51.

122. The second argument of the *sed contra* comes from *Quodl. II*, f. 59 vb, the first one is the infinity problem (see **NO1** above), the third one is the cooling down problem (see **NO2** above).

Durand breaks down the discussion into three questions: 1. Does an intensified form remain numerically one (nn. 10-12)? 2. If it remains numerically one, is it one because of a unity of indivisibility, or because of a unity of continuity (nn. 13-15)? 3. If it is because of a unity of continuity, are its parts distinguishable (*signabiles*) or not (nn. 16-39)?

1. Durand immediately concedes that if the alteration by which a form is intensified is a real, *i.e.* continuous change, necessarily this form is numerically one. As a matter of fact, within one and the same process of change, four parameters, namely, the mobile, the duration, the form in flux (*forma fluens*), and the end point of the change, must each be numerically the same. Otherwise, the alleged change would actually be a series of mutations. Thus, Durand clearly distances himself from Godfrey's or James's thesis of numerically distinct forms replacing each other. This is the essential modification introduced in redaction C, unless it is only a clarification, since, as we saw above, there was in redaction A some ambiguity (at least according to Lombardi's report) on whether the degrees that succeed each other are taken to be distinct forms. Nonetheless, even if it is a mere clarification, it amounts, from Godfrey's perspective, to a major concession to the opponents of his theory: one and the same form remains through the whole change.

2. Next, however, Durand specifies that indivisibility is not the reason why the intensified form is one. Rather, the form is one by continuity. He argues that the intensified form cannot be indivisible because an indivisible cannot be acquired successively, but only at once ("tota simul"), whereas it is clear that an intensification or remission is progressive. Therefore, an intensifiable form must allow for parts or degrees that are actualized progressively. Nonetheless, the numerical unity of this form is guaranteed by the continuity of the progress. The unity of the *forma fluens* is the same as that of the change itself (*fluxus formae*); but change is one by the continuity of its parts; therefore, the same must apply to the form that is acquired.

3. So far, Durand has manifested not so much his disagreement with Hervaeus as with the older Thomist view (*i.e.*, that of Giles of Rome and Godfrey), on which all forms are simple and indivisible entities. But how are these forms divisible? Here the difference with Hervaeus becomes visible. For the latter, these forms are divisible into degrees that contain each other virtually, as we know. For Durand, they are divisible into degrees that succeed each other.

Durand first summarizes Hervaeus' answer: the intensified form differs from what it was previously by being what it was plus something more that it has acquired; however, these parts are not determinable (*signabiles*) parts, such that one can be distinguished from the other.¹²³ Durand harshly criticizes this idea. First, it contradicts Aquinas's doctrine, which it is supposed to defend, as Durand is happy to emphasize (and he certainly has a point, here).¹²⁴ It comes down to admitting that the intensification of the form happens by addition of something new, which is precisely what Aquinas disagreed with. Second, this idea is erroneous. An addition, or even more simply a composition, can happen only between things that are distinct by a distinction stronger than a distinction of reason.¹²⁵ But two accidents of the same kind cannot be in the same subject at the same time. They cannot merge, because all forms are actuality, and actuality separates and distinguishes. There would be a multiplication of qualities, instead of the augmentation of a quality.¹²⁶ Ironically, Durand uses fundamental tenets of Aquinas's ontology against Hervaeus, self-proclaimed defender of the Thomistic orthodoxy. It is worth noting that Thomas of Bailly employs the same argument, and this might have been directed against Hervaeus, or at least against a theory that tries to explain how new degrees could co-exist with previous degrees and somehow merge with them.¹²⁷

Admittedly, all this does not apply to nutrition, but this is precisely why nutrition cannot be a paradigm for the intensification/remission process, contrary to what Hervaeus claims. As opposed to forms, a part of matter doesn't distinguish itself from another part of matter (both being *per se* mere potentiality). This is why the matter of a nutrient can unite to the matter of the body.¹²⁸

123. See above p. 310, and **DBL3**, p. 332.

124. *I Sent.* C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 18, f. 59 va.

125. *Ibid.*, n. 19, f. 59 va: "realis additio est realiter diversorum. Idem enim non additur sibi ipsi, nisi forte secundum rationem."

126. *Ibid.*, n. 20, f. 59 va: "Cum ergo omnis forma sit aliqua actualitas, impossibile est quod transeat in quodcumque nisi per sui corruptionem (...) Et causa est, quia actus distinguit et separat. Et ideo impossibile est quod actus adveniat actui si maneat quin sit res distincta et signabilis aliquo modo." See ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysics*, book VII, chapter 13 (= recensio Guillelmi, 1039a7, AL 25.3.2, p. 159, l. 755): "Actus enim separat"; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* (ed. J. HAMESSE), p. 130, n. 187 ("Actus separat et distinguit").

127. THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodl.* III q. 15, p. 211: "ex pluribus in actu secundum quod huiusmodi, non fit unum." *Id.*, *Quodl.* IV q. 11, p. 285: "actus enim est per se distinguere et separare."

128. *I Sent.* C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 20, f. 59 va.

The other example given by Hervaeus, the stretching of skin, is inadequate as well. A greater extension results from the stretching, but not because a new quantity is added to the previous quantity. As in melting wax, the parts that beforehand were superposed now touch each other by their sides (this is why the skin or the wax become less dense and thinner).¹²⁹

In sum, Durand objects that if the first degrees of the intensified form remain when new degrees are acquired, they will not be able to unite with each other, and the numerical unity of the form will not be preserved (an argument that could be directed against the addition theory as well). On this count too, Durand is on the same line as Thomas of Bailly, against Hervaeus.¹³⁰ The only solution, therefore, is that these parts replace each other in a succession. Paradoxically, the succession theory comes to the help of the numerical unity of the whole form.

How distinct are these degrees of a form? If by *signabiles* one means continuous parts that can co-exist together, then the degrees of a form are not *signabiles*, because it is impossible for the same form to be at the same time less intense and more intense, that is to say, to have simultaneously two degrees. In a broader sense, though, *signabiles* parts are parts that have real differences: one is not the other, even though they are parts of a same whole numerically one—without, naturally, existing simultaneously. In that sense, the successive degrees in an intensification are the *signabiles* parts of one and the same form, which, with respect to the totality of the change process, is one by continuity of these parts.¹³¹ (I am not sure, however, that this notion of parts or degrees of a form is any better defined than in the addition theory.)

Thus, Durand keeps the idea of succession, even though for him there is corruption and replacement not of individual forms, but only of successive degrees within the same, numerically one form. This is why, perhaps surprisingly at this point, he eventually offers three arguments in favor of the succession thesis—two of which are traceable to redaction A, James of Metz, and Godfrey—followed by the answers that Hervaeus had given to each and by a rebuttal of these answers.¹³²

129. *Ibid.*, n. 22, f. 59 va-vb.

130. See THOMAS DE BAILLY *Quodl. III* q. 15, p. 216.

131. *I Sent.* C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 23, f. 59 vb. See *ibid.*, n. 39, f. 60 rb: "Tenendum est ergo quod forma<e> intensa<e> et remissa<e> acquisitae per motum possunt esse partes unius formae numero, et quae non est una indivisibilitate, sed continuitate suarum partium quae non sunt simul, sed successive et una superveniente alia desinit esse et hoc modo signari possunt."

132. *Ibid.*, nn. 26-38, f. 60 ra-rb.

The first argument is identical to **G3/J3/DBL1**: “In omni motu terminus a quo abiicitur et terminus ad quem acquiritur.” Hervaeus had answered that in an intensification the *terminus a quo* is not the form itself, but the privation of the perfection that constitutes the *terminus ad quem*; obviously, this privation is eliminated, but this does not mean that the form is eliminated too and has to be replaced by another.¹³³ This reply, Durand objects, is worthless. His first two objections emphasize the fact that the intensification process acts on the preexisting form, not on the privation.¹³⁴ His third reason is that the *terminus a quo* of an intensification is the *terminus ad quem* of a remission, and this *terminus ad quem* cannot be a privation, but has to be an existing form.

The second argument is identical to **G2/J2/DBL2**: the agent must imprint something other than what existed beforehand. Hervaeus had answered that the agent makes the form that existed beforehand more perfect; the result is only a difference between the less perfect and the more perfect, not of a difference between two forms.¹³⁵ As we saw with **DBL2**, Durand objects that this argument is inconsistent with Hervaeus’ own affirmations. Hervaeus argued that in nutrition, the matter of the nutrient does not just perfect the matter of the body, but is added to it. According to the parallel drawn by Hervaeus himself, the intensified form should likewise not just perfect the previous form, but be added to it (or a new degree be added to the same form in a lesser degree). Moreover, if the agent does not actualize anything new, it makes the patient more perfect while doing nothing, which is absurd.¹³⁶ The perfection is nothing but the form; if some perfection is added, this means that the essence is modified.¹³⁷

The third argument reiterates the fundamental principle that a variation in perfection is a variation of the essence, which entails that an intensified or remitted form is not the same form that existed before.¹³⁸ Hervaeus replied that the form remains what it is, even though the form as more intense contains more perfection than the same form

133. See **CR3/NR3** above, p. 316, and HERVAEUS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, *ad 8^m*, f. 61 ra.

134. *I Sent.* C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 29, f. 60 ra: “motus intensionis non potest esse in non habente formam.”

135. See **CR2/NR2** above, p. 318, and HERVAEUS, *Quodl. II* q. 13, *ad 5^m* and *ad 6^m*, ff. 60 vb – 61 ra.

136. *I Sent.* C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 24, f. 60 rb: “(...) perficit per nihil, et agit nihil agendo (...).”

137. *Ibid.*, n. 35, f. 60rb: “(...) quod causat novam perfectionem causat novam formam quantum ad essentiam formae (...).”

138. *Ibid.*, n. 36, f. 60rb: “(...) essentia essentialiter variata non est eadem essentia (...) ergo forma intensa et remissa non sunt eadem essentia.”

as less intense. Durand becomes caustic here. This response is evasive, frivolous, and purely verbal, he says.¹³⁹ Again, the perfection of the form is equivalent to the very essence of the form; modifying one is modifying the other. Here too, Durand may have taken note of Bailly's earlier rebuttal of Hervaeus.¹⁴⁰

However, after this development that might pass for an unconditional defense of Godfrey's theory, Durand takes care to give his considered position on the succession thesis, in response to the opening arguments of the whole question (the five arguments that were reported by Lombardi as being Durand's own and are now in the *quod non*):

"The main arguments submitted to establish that a remitted form and an intensified form are not numerically the same, must be accepted insofar as they prove that the intensified form and the remitted form exclude each other, like the parts of a successive continuity (...) but they do not prove that the total form of which they are parts is not numerically one by continuity."¹⁴¹

In other words, Durand continues to endorse the argumentative core of the succession theory, but makes clear that he places the succession within the same form, as a succession of degrees of intensity of that form (a succession, not an accumulation or addition of degrees), rather than between fully-fledged individual forms. Again, this may be a mere clarification of what he was already writing in redaction A or objecting to Hervaeus at the time of the latter's *Quodlibet II*, although nothing in the extant texts or testimonies clearly confirms this possibility. Alternatively, it may be an important modification, due to Hervaeus' or others' criticisms.

Nonetheless, because he endorses a form of succession, Durand has to respond to the objections raised against the tenets of Godfrey's theory, even though these responses must be understood within the framework of Durand's own solution.

139. *Ibid.*, n. 38, f. 60 rb: "Ista autem evasio et omnes consimiles frivola sunt, et stant in verbis sine re."

140. See THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodl. III* q. 15, *Contra*, p. 208: "(...) essentia caritatis non differt realiter a gradibus eius," and 3rd argument, p. 210: "(...) album in minus albo est idem realiter cum eo; ergo non potest intelligi, cum aliquis mouetur de minus albo in magis album, quod fiat uariatio secundum magis et minus album quin etiam fiat secundum essentiam albedinis (...)."

141. *I Sent.* C, d. 17, q. 7, n. 41, f. 60 va.

1. To the infinity objection:¹⁴² Just as in any motion and any continuum there is an infinity of parts in potentiality, likewise, in a form that is intensified there is an infinity of partial forms which, by their continuity, compose the total form that is acquired by the totality of the motion.

2. To the discontinuity objection:¹⁴³ The remitted form that was in the subject before the beginning of change is expelled in an instant, but the next form is introduced not in an instant, but progressively.

3. To the active agent objection:¹⁴⁴ The cold that diminishes heat does imprint something; it does not do so just by itself, however, but with the heat which co-acts and preserves the diminished degree of heat.

CONCLUSION

The previous pages have depicted the liveliness of some of the debates about the intensification/remission of forms at the very beginning of the 14th century. Even though the topic seems today obscure and idle, it was obviously of great interest to the medievals, since they did not hesitate to return to it tirelessly and were keen on criticizing each other's errors on the matter. The influence of Godfrey of Fontaines has been highlighted. Hervaeus did all he could to push back against it, but James of Metz and Thomas of Bailly, among others, spread his thesis. Durand too defended it against Hervaeus, and I have shown that he probably did so directly as an interlocutor in Nédellec's second *Quodlibet*, in concordance with a question of the first redaction of his *Sentences* commentary, which has now disappeared but is echoed by Bernard Lombardi. Durand's considered position in the third redaction of his *Sentences* commentary, however, is unique. Even though some of his views seem close to Bailly's, in the end his theory is quite different. For Bailly, as for Godfrey, there is no doubt that the intensified form does not remain numerically the same, and that each degree corresponds to a distinct form which is actualized and then eliminated as long as the process goes on.¹⁴⁵ By contrast,

142. See **NO1** above, p. 314.

143. See **CO1** above, p. 314.

144. See **NO2** above, p. 315.

145. See THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodl. III* q. 15, 4th argument, p. 210: "Ergo patet quod illa forma secundum quam est motus est alia et alia realiter secundum diuersas partes motus, que tamen non possunt esse simul; adueniente secunda corrumpitur prima (...)."

Durand offers a sort of compromise, in which he abandons Godfrey's most controversial claim, namely, that the same form does not remain throughout its intensification or remission. He seems to have accepted some of the criticisms that had been addressed to Godfrey's theory. Nevertheless, Durand uses Godfrey's, James's, and Bailly's arguments to support his own view of a succession of degrees in the same form.

In closing, it is worth mentioning a fact that highlights Durand's influence within the Dominican order despite the troubles he ran into. At the end of his account of Durand's position, Bernard Lombardi confesses that the succession theory once strongly appealed to him and that he eventually rejected it only for a theological reason that involves the transubstantiation dogma.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the next article of Lombardi's question (art. 2: "Que est causa precisa susceptionis magis et minus"), is, as I noted above,¹⁴⁷ nothing but the transcription, word for word, of Durand's q. 6 in redaction C.¹⁴⁸ As in the case of James of Lausanne,¹⁴⁹ one of the Dominicans who was supposed to be Durand's nemesis does not hesitate to copy him from start to finish, just short of presenting him as an authority on the question. This fact may encourage us to look more carefully at Durand's very special place in the Dominican order.¹⁵⁰

146. Dist. 17, q. 1, Leipzig f. 38 ra: "Ista opinio que est ultimo posita [i.e. Hervaei Natalis] tenetur propter illam rationem fidei supra predictam de speciebus sacramentalibus adductam alias [contra Durandum *add.* Naples]. Tamen fuit visum mihi oppositum, scilicet quod forma intensa et remissa distinguantur realiter (...)." Bernard refers to an earlier passage of the question (Leipzig f. 37rb): "Istam opinionem [i.e. Durandi] non teneo propter unam rationem que sit de speciebus in sacramento altaris que talis est: variatis speciebus in sacramento altaris secundum numerum desinit ibi esse corpus Christi. Hoc patet per fidem. Sed stante corpore Christi vero in speciebus potest fieri in speciebus raritas et densitas, vel densatio et rarefactio que sunt passionibus quantitatis. Ergo rarum et densum non differunt secundum numerum et per consequens nec intensum nec remissum."

147. Fn. 102.

148. At least in the Erfurt and Leipzig manuscripts. The Naples manuscript purely and simply refers the reader to Durand's text: "vide Durandum et dic sicut ipse."

149. See above, p. 307, at fn. 41.

150. For more remarks in the same vein, see M. BRÎNZEI – R.L. FRIEDMAN – C. SCHABEL, "The Late-Medieval Reception of Durand's *Sentences* Commentary, with Two Case Studies: Peter Auriol († 1322) and Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl († 1433)," in: A. SPEER – F. RETUCCI – T. JESCHKE – G. GULDENTOPS (eds.), *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences commentary*, pp. 295-341, esp. pp. 296-298.

APPENDIX: THE ADDITIONS OF MS. BNF LAT. 15364
AND THE QUESTION OF THE THREE REDACTIONS
OF DURAND'S COMMENTARY ON THE *SENTENCES*.

Josef Koch has shown that the manuscript kept in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France under the shelf mark Lat. 15364 does not contain the *Additiones* to the first redaction of Durand's commentary on book I of the *Sentences* mentioned by Durandellus¹⁵¹ but that both the main text of book I (f. 2va-66va) and the *Additiones* (f. 67ra-91ra) are part of redaction C.¹⁵² Therefore, for Koch, this manuscript was at most a witness of Durand's composition method: while preparing the third redaction, Durand added a series of additional questions to a first draft of the first book.

However, P.T. Stella has shown that Koch was mistaken when affirming that these *Additiones* were additions to the "new *scriptum* on the first book of the *Sentences*," as the *explicit* of the main text (end of book I) calls it¹⁵³ —which is to say, additions to the third redaction. Rather, as the *explicit* of the *Additiones* themselves states, they are additions to the "lecture" that Durand "copied and composed in Paris."

151. J. KOCH, *Durandus*, pp. 44-49. Cf. NICOLAUS MEDENSIS (DURANDELLUS), *Evidentiae contra Durandum*, ed. P.T. STELLA, Tübingen 2003, vol. 1, p. 56 (NB: W. DUBA, "Aristotle in Hell and Aquinas in Heaven: Hugo de Novocastro, OFM and Durandus de Aureliaco OP," in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 56 [2014], pp. 183-194, has recently proposed to re-identify Durandellus with Durand of Aurillac).

152. See p. 47 the criterion used by Koch: redaction C contains questions taken from the *Quodlibet* held by Durand in Avignon in 1314: *I Sent. C*, d. 17 q. 1 = *Quodl. Aven.* I q. 6; d. 33 q. 1 = in part *Quodl. Aven.* I q. 1. These two questions are present in the first part or main text of BnF Lat. 15364. Therefore, this text offers right away redaction C, and the *Additiones* are not additions to an earlier version. Moreover, the preface of the main text mentions Durand's presence in Avignon as a past fact.

153. F. 65 va: "Explicit novum scriptum super primum Sententiarum compilatum per fratrem Durandum de Sancto Porciano ordinis predicatorum episcopum Meldenensis et doctorem sacre theologie." See P.T. STELLA, "A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In *I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1) : la questione inedita 'Utrum Deus esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari' di Erveo Natalis", *Salesianum* 22 / 2 (1960): 245-325, p. 312.

Here is the full passage:

/91ra/ Expliciunt tituli 61 correctorii qui sunt additiones et declarationes Magistri Durandi ordinis predicatorum doctoris venerabilis, quos super lecturam suam Sententiarum addidit quam Parisius copiavit et compilavit. Unde 100 et 9 et 61 faciunt 170, et tot sunt questiones summatim primi Durandi. Unde primus Durandi habet centum et septuaginta questiones.

Nonetheless, it is correct that the main text, to which the *Additiones* are appended, offers the text of redaction C, minus the said additions. All in all, the total content of the manuscript looks to be that of redaction C, once the additions are inserted in their definitive place. Why, then, are we told that the *Additiones* are additions to an earlier version? It is as if the content of redaction C of book I had been broken down: first the questions that have a match in the questions that Durand had discussed in Paris, then the questions that have on the contrary no match, and therefore are additional questions compared to the Parisian lectures. In other words, the layout dismembers redaction C and distinguishes what corresponds, at least formally, to the Paris lectures, and what is only in redaction C. When one of the questions has its equivalent in the Paris lectures, the main text gives the redaction C version of that question; when one of them has not been discussed in Paris, the main text refers to the *Additiones*, saying that one will find below the text of that question (in its C version too).¹⁵⁴

Let us see what this system reveals about distinction 17. At the end of the main text of book I (f. 65va-66va), one finds the complete list of the questions contained in redaction C, which is repeated at the beginning of the *Additiones* (f. 67ra-vb). I transcribe in italics the titles of the questions of dist. 17 that are present in the first part or main text of the manuscript (f. 28vb to 31ra), that is to say, the topics that had been discussed in the Parisian lectures. I transcribe in normal font the ques-

154. It is worth noting that the manuscript is rather carefully written and amended, once belonged to the College of Sorbonne, and has traces of the *pecia* system. Its peculiar composition must have served a purpose. Perhaps the *Additiones* were first a self-standing compendium of the questions that were in redaction C but not in the Paris lectures, and were available in other manuscripts; then, someone who wanted to have the full text of redaction C had the other questions of redaction C copied and placed first, with references to the already existing *Additiones* as a complement.

tions contained in the *Additiones*, that is to say, the questions that are additional in the third version by comparison with the Paris lectures.

<1> *Utrum necessarium sit caritatem esse habitum creatum in homine ad hoc quod homo sit Deo carus*

<2> Utrum necessarium sit ponere caritatem habitualement ad hoc ut possumus aliquid mereri apud Deum <cf. f. 29ra: Quere infra istam questionem = Add. f. 80ra-80va>

<3> *Utrum caritas detur secundum proportionem naturalium*

<4> Utrum ille qui est in caritate possit cognoscere certitudinaliter se habere caritatem <= Add. f. 80va-vb>.¹⁵⁵

<5> *Utrum caritas possit augeri*¹⁵⁶

<6> Que sit causa suscipiendi magis et minus <cf. f. 30rb: Ista questio patet infra = Add. f. 80vb-81rb>

<7> Utrum eadem forma numero possit esse intensa et remissa sive suscipere magis et minus < cf. f.30rb: Ista questio aliter patet infra = Add. f. 81rb-82rb>

<8> Utrum caritas augeatur per quemlibet actum <cf. f.30rb: Ista etiam invenies infra = Add. f. 82rb-82va>

<9> Utrum possit augeri in infinitum <cf. f.30rb: Istam cum aliis tribus invenies infra secundum ordinem scriptas = Add. 82va-82vb>

<10> *Utrum caritas possit diminui.*

These ten questions are indeed present in redaction C as we know it from other manuscripts and the printed editions. Let us subtract the questions in normal font. This leaves four questions (in italics), which are therefore, according to the *explicit* of the *Additiones*, the only ones that Durand discussed in Paris. These are exactly the four questions that are found in all the non-C manuscripts of book I. Therefore, the non-C manuscripts give us a text that is at least structurally identical to the version that Durand had reworked in Paris, i.e. redaction B. Might

155. The reference to the *Additiones* is missing in the main text.

156. This question is in fact absent in the main text (and is not in the *Additiones* either). Its omission is easily explainable. This question is supposed to be the first of the second part of the distinction ("de caritatis augmento," qq. 5-10). When finishing the first part of the distinction ("de necessitate caritatis," qq. 1-4), the scribe jumped by homoeoteleuton to the "Ad secundum" that introduces the second question of the second part, i.e. q. 6, f. 30rb.

they nevertheless transmit redaction A, in case Durand had not issued a redaction B of book I, as Koch believed? No, because one of the non-C manuscripts indicates that two questions are missing in dist. 17, and this cannot be by comparison with redaction C, since there are six additional questions in redaction C, not two (see above, p. 327). Therefore, it has to be by comparison with redaction A. Thus, redaction A was different from redaction B, since in redaction B dist. 17 has four questions, whereas in redaction A it comprised six questions (the four of redaction B plus the two reported as missing). Conclusion: the non-C manuscripts of book I contain redaction B. As a consequence, we do not have direct access to redaction A of book I.