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## REPRESENTATION AND SENSATION—A DEFENCE OF DELEUZE'S PHILOSOPHY OF PAINTING

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### ABSTRACT

Deleuze's philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze's philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this article how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze's refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the (non-representational) content of art can be represented. I show that this criticism emerges from a misreading of the place of representation in Deleuze's philosophy. I will argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze's wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz's critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz's criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze's philosophy, and in particular, the place of Deleuze's analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz's phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of *petitio principii*, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach.

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### Introduction

Deleuze ascribes a key place to aesthetics within his philosophical system. Art is central both to his early works such as *Difference and Repetition*, where Deleuze argues that the two meanings of the aesthetic, the sensible and the artistic, must be reunited, as well as in his later programmatic work, *What is Philosophy?*, where art takes an equal place alongside science and philosophy. It has further been argued that Deleuze's specific engagement with the work of Francis Bacon in *The Logic of Sensation* aims not only to provide a means of understanding Bacon's painting, but also aims to provide a critique of the phenomenological approach both to art and to ontology. In this article, I want to look at a recent phenomenological riposte to Deleuze's interpretation of painting formulated by Christian Lotz. This article draws out many of the differences in approach we might find between a phenomenological account of art, and the account Deleuze is proposing. It also shows the dangers in a reading of Deleuze that fails to capture the nuances of his account of our relationship to

phenomena. Lotz's article, *Representation or Sensation?—A Critique of Deleuze's Philosophy of Painting*, is principally divided into two parts. First, he provides an analysis and critique of Deleuze's theory of painting, followed by his own positive phenomenological analysis. While I have some sympathy with Lotz's defence of phenomenology against Deleuze's philosophy, I want to argue that by failing to take account of some of the key features of Deleuze's wider ontology, such as the importance of both the virtual and the actual for his analysis of objects, Lotz's critique proves unsuccessful. In particular, I want to show that Lotz's criticisms rest on a failure to attend to the systematic nature of Deleuze's philosophy, and the place of Deleuze's analysis of Bacon within the system as a whole. I will further show that Lotz's phenomenological defence commits the fallacy of *petitio principii*, assuming the validity of the phenomenological method in order to justify the phenomenological approach. I will begin by showing how Lotz's "decisive" criticism of Deleuze rests on a failure to attend properly to Deleuze's texts, and thus amounts to a misreading of Deleuze's work on Francis Bacon. In dealing with Lotz's further criticisms, however, I will bring in Deleuze's own positive account of the relationship between representation and sensation. In order to avoid being sidetracked by too many technicalities, I will look at an argument by Deleuze's predecessor, Henri Bergson, that foreshadows Deleuze's approach. The aim will be to show that Deleuze's philosophy of aesthetics (as well as his philosophy more generally) does not involve a rejection of representation, or figuration, but rather a reworking of the grounds of both representation and our phenomenological experience of the world.

### The place of representation in Deleuze's aesthetics

In this first section of the article, I want to look at the first of Lotz's criticisms of Deleuze, which focuses on Deleuze's supposed rejection of representation. Whilst this characterisation of Deleuze's position is problematic, it is a reasonably common one, and can also be found, for instance, in Peter Hallward's study of Deleuze, where he similarly claims that "Deleuze's fundamental idea, in short, is that if being is creativity, it can only fully *become* so through the tendential evacuation of all actual or creaturely mediation."<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Žižek argues that Deleuze's aim is to push us towards "a field of experience beyond (or, rather, beneath) the experience of constituted reality."<sup>2</sup> In these two cases, the readings of Deleuze open out onto criticisms of his political thought, since if our aim is to return to a form of being prior to the individual, then it is hard to see how we can understand the subject of politics, or even sympathise with its suffering if it is merely an epiphenomenon of a deeper process. As John Mullarkey notes,<sup>3</sup> this tendency to privilege the virtual is not only present in those who are critical of Deleuze's thought, but also in those supportive of his project. James Williams, for instance, while recognizing that there is a substantial role for the actual in Deleuze thought, nonetheless extols us at one point to "leave all actual things behind (forget everything)."<sup>4</sup>

Rather than explore the political implications of this view of Deleuze's thought, Lotz criticizes Deleuze's aesthetics. Given the centrality of aesthetics to Deleuze, who wrote works on Bacon, Kafka, Proust, as well as a two volume study of the philosophy of cinema, the claim that Deleuze's metaphysical assumptions leave him unable to adequately theorise the art work would be especially damning for his philosophy. Lotz's formulation of these criticisms of a "virtualist" Deleuze are especially clear, and he draws out the implications of this kind of reading well. As such, he provides a useful foil for developing the implications and

interrelations of Deleuze's thought with more phenomenological accounts of the nature of the artwork. Before looking at Lotz's criticism, however, we will begin with a summary of the account he gives of Deleuze's aesthetics. Lotz's account of Deleuze's reading of Bacon highlights Deleuze's attempt to provide a non-intentional interpretation of Bacon's work. As Lotz notes, this is a radical break with a phenomenological approach to art, a difference which can be seen in Deleuze's claim that painting "directly attempts to release presences beneath representation, beyond representation,"<sup>5</sup> whereas a phenomenological account would focus on the relation of the painting to the absent signified object. Thus, Deleuze's account of the work of art is to be radically non-representational, or in Deleuze's terms, non-figurative. As Lotz notes, Deleuze attempts to achieve this non-intentional interpretation through two premises: "First, Deleuze deals with the status of sensation as a pre-representational realm as such; second, he works out a different conception of the body, which follows his interpretation of sensation in experience in general and in painting in particular."<sup>6</sup> Lotz takes Deleuze to be introducing a notion of sensation as a pre-individual realm which lies beneath or beyond representation. The object of painting is to somehow render visible this pre-representational level of the world. Lotz's account of Deleuze's theory is so far reasonably accurate, although, as he admits, it does involve some simplification of Deleuze's account. In order to prepare the ground for the positive account of Deleuze's philosophy of painting which I will give later in this article, I want to reintroduce a couple of terms which Deleuze introduces in his characterisation of art in *What is Philosophy?*. In particular, rather than representation purely being opposed to sensation, we find three categories at play: the monument, the sensation, and force. The work of art for Deleuze and Guattari is a monument or a bloc of sensations.<sup>7</sup> In describing this block of sensations, Deleuze and Guattari give the following characterisation of the project of the artist:

By the means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations.<sup>8</sup>

This bloc of sensations, therefore, is "a compound of percepts and affects."<sup>9</sup> Deleuze takes the notion of affect from Spinoza. Spinoza defines a body in terms of how "a body affects other bodies, or is being affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality."<sup>10</sup> Deleuze himself uses the notion of an affect to provide an alternative account of the definition of bodies to that provided by a representational schema that might operate in terms of subjects and properties, or essences. Instead, bodies are defined by the different ways in which they participate in being—their affects. For instance, Deleuze presents Uexküll's account of a tick's three affects

(the first has to do with light [climb to the top of a branch]; the second is olfactive [let yourself fall onto the mammal that passes beneath the branch]; and the third is thermal [seek the area without fur, the warmest spot]<sup>11</sup>)

as a definition of its form of life. It therefore provides a way for Deleuze to talk about the nature of beings without having to see them as defined in terms of essences or properties. While it is natural to talk of bodies as being affected by one another, for Deleuze and Guattari, the artist is interested in the affect itself, rather than its instantiation in any particular body.<sup>12</sup> When we ask after the nature of the affect itself, we are told that it is force.<sup>13</sup> Force, therefore, being affective, generates sensations, which when composed form the work of art as monument. It is this affective aspect of the work of art which Deleuze uses to differentiate his theory from a figurative, phenomenological theory.

As Lotz further notes, if Deleuze is to understand sensation as in some sense pre-individual, or pre-representational, then he will also require a new understanding of the body. Sensation, as pre-individual, cannot be understood through the structures of an already individuated consciousness, or even through a body already understood as organised. In this sense, Deleuze's philosophy of painting makes a departure from the work of Merleau-Ponty, for whom the body, as flesh, remains at the centre of the artist's relationship to the world.<sup>14</sup> Instead, Deleuze takes up a notion of Artaud's, the body without organs. This is the body understood on a level prior to its formation into the co-ordinated structures of the actual. It is on this pre-individual level that the artwork operates; in this, Deleuze follows Bacon's distinction between paint which "comes across directly onto the nervous system and other paint [which] tells you a story in a long diatribe through the brain."<sup>15</sup> It is worth noting here that while Lotz focuses on the body without organs as an interpretation of the body itself, it has a much broader function for Deleuze. Thus, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari write that "The Earth is a body without organs. This body without organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles."<sup>16</sup> The body without organs is not simply a different interpretation of the body, but instead a different plane of description of the world as a whole.

Lotz's first criticism, which he takes to be "the decisive argument against Deleuze,"<sup>17</sup> revolves around this notion of the pre-individual in Deleuze's work. By focusing purely on the work of art as generating sensation, Deleuze is unable to distinguish a work of art from something which is not a work of art, such as, in Lotz's example, a piece of wallpaper. This results from the fact that whilst sensation gives us the "pure presence" and materiality of an object, what is definitive of a work of art is a certain moment of absence. Sensation, as pure presence or positivity, cannot distinguish the work of art from something which is not a work of art, as both the painting and the wallpaper elicit sensations from us. Thus, if our description of what makes a work of art is couched purely in terms of the work's affectivity, we must note that to sense is to be affected, and hence all sensible objects will elicit sensations. Instead of basing one's account on this pure moment of positive effect, Lotz argues that what is required from the artwork are two moments of negativity. He writes that:

There are two reasons for why not only Bacon's, but all painting, is representative: [1] any form of sign or image presupposes a form of negativity if we want to differentiate it from objects such as wallpapers. In order to mean something, a sign must point to something it is not (external negativity). In order to present something, an image must let something be seen in it (internal negativity). If we simply perceive something in front of us that neither points to something external (signifier-significant), nor to something in itself (image-presentation), then we will only see a surface structure.<sup>18</sup>

We should note here that Lotz is not putting forward the view that a painting must be a representation of something naively concrete, such as a plant or a table, but simply that it must allow us to see something in it. Clearly, if this argument were successful, it would be very serious for Deleuze's philosophy of painting, and in fact for Deleuze's ontology even more generally, as the sensible and artistic meanings of the aesthetic are intertwined for him. Indeed, key Deleuzian terms throughout his works such as sense, virtuality, and force, are articulated through a theory of the sub-representational. In responding to Lotz's argument, I want to show that in fact there is a misunderstanding in Lotz's reading of Deleuze, and furthermore, that Lotz's own position presents problems which Deleuze is able in turn to solve.

Clearly Deleuze is concerned to provide an analysis of the sub-representational aspects of the world, and in the *Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze writes that the aim of art is to “capture forces.”<sup>19</sup> Likewise, in *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze writes that abstract painting “make[s] invisible forces visible in themselves.”<sup>20</sup> If this is the aim of Deleuze’s philosophy of painting, does it not require a rejection of the representationalist aims of art? Here we find the ambiguity in Lotz’s position, Deleuze does indeed reject an understanding of the aim of art as representing, but he does not, on this basis, argue that art does away with the representationalist moment. Rather, this moment remains as a necessary but practical feature of the work. In his study of Francis Bacon, Deleuze quotes Bacon approvingly as follows:

When we’ve talked about the possibility of making appearance out of something which was not illustration, I’ve over-talked about it. Because, in spite of theoretically longing for the image to be made up of irrational marks, inevitably illustration has to come into it to make certain parts of the head and face which, if one left them out, one would then only be making an abstract design.<sup>21</sup>

Deleuze calls this the “first figuration” of which something “is always conserved.”<sup>22</sup> This first figuration, however, is only a means to give us access to the true subject of the painting, the field of forces. It is “the inevitable preservation of a practical figuration at the very moment when the Figure asserts its intention to break away from the figurative.”<sup>23</sup> In this sense, the Figure, in being isolated from its context, as in Bacon’s paintings, opens the way to a move beyond the figurative paradigm of representation. Lotz’s error here is in seeing Deleuze’s search for the pre-individual to involve a rejection of the individuated itself. Instead, Deleuze argues that both moments need to be given their place if we are to give an adequate account of the work of art. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze rejects two possible delimitations of aesthetics. It should not be founded on “what *can* be represented in the sensible,” but neither should we “attempt to withdraw the pure sensible from representation and to determine it as that which remains once representation is removed.”<sup>24</sup> Instead we need to “apprehend in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being *of* the sensible.”<sup>25</sup> Similarly, in *The Logic of Sense*, although Deleuze argues that reference can only operate due to a sub-representational sense, sense itself can only be manifested through the proposition. This is what makes Deleuze’s project transcendental. In seeking to understand the *constitution* of representation, he recognises that we cannot do without representation itself. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze claims that there are “two languages which are encoded in the language of philosophy and directed at the divergent exercise of the faculties.’ Deleuze explains this claim with a reference to a passage from Leibniz, where Leibniz discusses the notion of micro-perceptions that together constitute our perception of the world of objects we find around us:

To give a clearer example of these minute perceptions which we are unable to pick out from the crowd, I like to use the example of the roaring noise of the sea which impresses itself on us when we are standing on the shore. To hear this noise as we do, we must hear the parts which make up this whole, that is the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises makes itself known only when combined confusedly with all the others, and would not be noticed if the wave which made it were by itself.<sup>27</sup>

Deleuze is here taking up Leibniz’s distinction between the clear-confused and the distinct obscure. For Descartes, the paradigm form of knowledge is governed by clear and distinct ideas. With a clear and distinct idea, the nature of a thing (its clarity) is the same as the elements that compose it (its distinctness). In effect, Descartes’ position is that to represent

something adequately is to capture its essential structure. Leibniz's analogy presents an alternative account. Here, we can either perceive the sound of the wave clearly, but when we do so, we lose track of the noises that together constitute it, or we can instead focus on understanding the tiny waves that together make up the sound, but then we lose track of the constituted object. Deleuze's essential claim here is that there is a difference in kind between the structure of representation, and the structure of the transcendental field that is the condition for representation. The two forms of determination that Deleuze introduces determine the structure of two fundamental categories of his philosophy: the actual and the virtual. While the actual is structured in terms of bodies and properties, the virtual essentially maps out the processes responsible for constituting the object. It is this difference in kind that allows Deleuze to explain the genesis of the field of objects without presupposing the kinds of determinations that those objects rely on. To understand the object is therefore to operate on both levels simultaneously. We can tie this back into the theory of affects by noting that in effect, the representation of an object is generated by the various subliminal affective relations we develop with the object. As we will see, in order to investigate the way in which bodies are constituted, we need to retain some notion of figuration within the painting itself in order to allow the artwork to work with both levels simultaneously. In fact, we can see the last sentence of Bacon's comment as fully anticipating this criticism by Lotz, and Deleuze's citation of it as a full recognition of the need for figuration, or representation. Deleuze differs from Lotz, however, in arguing that while all art must have a representative moment, the aim of art is not to represent.

Lotz's formulation raises a further issue about the nature of the artwork, however. This time, the issue is not how we are to distinguish it from other sources of sensation, but how we are to distinguish it from other signs. The difficulty is that whilst Lotz has given a necessary condition for the work of art, representation is by no means sufficient. Indeed, by his criteria, many things that we would not take as works of art fall into the domain. We may be able to differentiate the work of art from a piece of wallpaper, but how do we distinguish it from a newspaper (Bacon's "long diatribe"<sup>28</sup>)? Just as the work of art exhibits Lotz's two moments of negation, so, likewise, the newspaper article both points to that which it is not (external negativity/the subject matter), and negates itself to allow something to be seen in it (internal negativity/the transparency of the photograph or text). Further, if Ricoeur is right, then we may not even be able to limit the domain to works of artifice, as natural objects may be capable of signification.

Whilst this may be a problem for Lotz's account, Deleuze has some resources for dealing with these difficulties. As well as representation, Deleuze has another principle in the form of sensation, "which is transmitted directly, and avoids the detour and boredom of conveying a story."<sup>29</sup> Deleuze's account of the work of art will therefore focus on its ability to relate this pre-representational level to representation. If Deleuze is to present an account of the work of art, he must therefore be able to show how these pre-representational elements can be related to representation. As we saw, the work of art is a "bloc of sensation," that is, it is a composed collection of affective elements. As well as maintaining its ties to representation, the work of art must, for Deleuze, successfully compose these elements of sensation in order to attain a degree of affective consistency. As this feature of the work precedes representation, Deleuze's description of this consistency will not be in terms of the logic of representation. Instead, as its title suggests, Deleuze's book on Bacon attempts to set out this alternative

type of structure through an analysis of the logic of sensation itself. We can here deal with Lotz's second, and related, set of criticisms of Deleuze.

### The place of sensation in Deleuze's aesthetics

The first of Lotz's second set of criticisms of Deleuze is that Deleuze talks about sensation as being pre-representational, as something which is intensive and "not qualitative and qualified,"<sup>30</sup> but he also talks about it as being the "original unity of the senses,"<sup>31</sup> as being determined as rhythm. Determining sensation as rhythm, however, means "differentiat[ing] sensation from what is not sensation by determining it as rhythm."<sup>32</sup> This surely involves attributing a quality to sensation. The second criticism is summed up by the question, "what else should the claim that the painter makes these forces *visible* mean, if not that these forces become at some level represented (=put in some *form*) by the painter?"<sup>33</sup> The first of these criticisms is essentially ontological—it enquires about the structure (or indeed the logic) of sensation, the second is instead epistemological—it enquires about how we have access to the sub-representational. In looking at these two questions, I will consider this second question first, as my answer will hopefully prepare the ground for an answer to the first.

In order to understand Deleuze's answer to the question of how the non-representable is represented in painting, I want to note first of all that, as we saw in the first part of this article, representation is a necessary condition according to Deleuze's account. As he writes, "the monument [work of art] does not actualize the virtual event but incorporates or embodies it; it gives it a body, a life, a universe."<sup>34</sup> What follows from this is that Deleuze's account will involve attempting to show that the artist in some sense subverts representational structures in order to allow non-representational content to manifest itself in the painting. In this sense, Deleuze follows Klee's famous maxim, "not to render the visible, but to render visible,"<sup>35</sup> a maxim which Lotz must also surely reject. As the precondition for the rendering visible of the sub-representational is the subversion of representation, art is a constant struggle against cliché. This is because clichés threaten to reincorporate the sub-representational into the field of representation. In a sense, Deleuze's book on Bacon as a whole is an attempt to answer Lotz's question, and, indeed, it is a question which he explicitly raises: "Bacon's Figures seem to be one of the most marvellous responses in the history of painting to the question, how can one make invisible forces visible?"<sup>36</sup> What is the role of the Figure in Bacon's work? Deleuze writes that "[Bacon] says that the form related to sensation (the Figure) is the opposite of the form related to an object that it is supposed to represent (figuration)."<sup>37</sup> The person or Figure<sup>38</sup> is described by Deleuze as escaping representation in several ways throughout Bacon's work. Although we will not provide an analysis here, Deleuze, for instance, notes the importance of the spasm in Bacon's work, through which "the body attempts to escape from itself *through* one of its organs in order to rejoin the field or the material structure,"<sup>39</sup> or even the absence of the Figure entirely in Bacon's later work, where "the wiped-off zone, which used to make the Figure emerge, will now stand on its own, independent of every definite form, appearing as a pure Force without an object."<sup>40</sup> In both of these cases, Deleuze describes Bacon as attempting to break down the fundamental structures of representation through dissolving the figure-background structure. Deleuze also notes the "athleticism"<sup>41</sup> visible in the poses of his figures, whereby their strained postures render visible the forces acting upon them. "The extraordinary agitation of [Bacon's] heads is not derived from a movement that the series would supposedly reconstitute, but



rather from the forces of pressure, dilation, contraction, flattening, and elongation that are exerted on the immobile head.”<sup>42</sup>

Deleuze’s approach to painting is therefore similar to his approach to literature, where he talks of the effect of stuttering to open up access to the sub-representation through the failure of representation. In what sense, therefore, are forces rendered visible in Deleuze’s account? For Lotz, as he only holds to the representational paradigm, to render visible must mean to allow something to show up in representation. In fact, Deleuze criticises abstract art for failing to escape representation, and merely providing ‘a simple symbolic coding of the figurative.’<sup>43</sup> For Deleuze, instead, we have two ontological planes to work with, and it is the relation between these planes which explains Deleuze’s use of visibility. Although it is within the representational work that force is rendered visible, it is not rendered visible *as representation*. Instead, it is on the affective level that Deleuze argues that force is rendered visible. Whilst this ‘piggybacks’ on the representational level of the work, it does so precisely by subverting it. Thus, it is *through* the Figure’s struggle to disappear that the field of forces is rendered visible, or the lack of movement which shows the play of forces across the body in Bacon’s work. In equivocating between the two levels of analysis, Lotz’s account finds contradiction where there is none.

As we saw, Lotz notes that Deleuze appears to ascribe properties to sensation, but at the same time declares that sensation falls outside of the categories of representation. Lotz argues that sensation is in some sense differentiated, but that to be differentiated involves in some sense being individuated, and thereby participating in representation. This criticism in fact occurs in a number of places in Lotz’s paper in various forms. As well as criticising Deleuze for characterising pre-representational sensation, Lotz argues that the only alternative to representational art is its refusal (as a moment of negation), and that this in turn must be formulated in terms of representation. Further, Lotz concludes by writing that “what Bacon had in mind here is not that ‘sensational violence’ is the condition for the possibility of order, as Deleuze tries to show; but rather, that violence is the effect of how chaos *and* order are *interrelated*.”<sup>44</sup> In each of these cases, we have the implicit assumption that there is only one notion of order or structure, that provided by representation, and that the negation of this structure is chaos. For Deleuze, this is an unwarranted assumption, and in a sense, Deleuze’s philosophy emerges from his attempt to provide a transcendental account whereby the conditions of experience are not to be understood in terms of experience itself. That is, Deleuze argues that there can be more than one notion of structure at play at the same time. To illustrate this point, I want to quote an argument from Deleuze’s predecessor, Henri Bergson:

If I choose a volume in my library at random, I may put it back on the shelf after glancing at it and say, “This is not verse.” Is this what I have really seen in turning over the leaves of the book? Obviously not. I have not, and I never shall see, an absence of verse. I have seen prose.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, Bergson replaces the notion that the opposite of a type of structure is the negation of structure with the notion that the opposite of a type of structure is a different type of structure. Just as it makes no sense to posit a formless language prior to the prose, or poetry, Bergson argues that the rejection of representation (in his case, extension), does not lead us to chaos or the absence of determination, but instead to a different kind of order to that found in representation. In Bergson’s case, that order is the order of duration, while Deleuze instead frames the claim by noting that chaos itself has the structure of the virtual, rather than being an “undifferentiated abyss.”<sup>46</sup> Lotz’s position is similar to that of the man who

claims to see the absence of verse. This is clear in the first case. Here, Lotz moves from the absence of representational determinations to the absence of all determinations of sensations. In fact, Deleuze is here working with two different sets of determinations. On the one hand, we have the determinations of physical bodies, the ‘qualities’ which qualify the bodies of representation. On the other, we have the pure becomings which cannot be understood in the substance/quality structures of representation. Deleuze uses the term ‘rhythm’ to determine this second kind of non-objectival structure, in order to emphasise the fact that these determinations are not tied to bodies, but exhibit the ‘nomadic singularities’ which are, for Deleuze, the conditions for the formation of bodies. Neither of these two levels can be understood without the other, as “every relationship of forces constitutes a body.”<sup>47</sup> The problem of Deleuze’s aesthetics is therefore badly posed if it is understood through the disjunction ‘representation or sensation’, as both these structures are at play in his philosophy. This leads us to one of the crucial distinctions in Deleuze’s philosophy: the unformed is not synonymous with the unstructured. Lotz’s second argument is that our only response to representation is the negative refusal of representation, and finally, in criticising Deleuze’s transcendental account of representation, he argues that a transcendental level which is different from representational order must be the negation of representational order, that is, chaos. In fact, in Deleuze’s account of the work of art in *Difference and Repetition*, he gives a very different picture of the work of art: “when it is claimed that works of art are immersed in a virtuality, what is being invoked is not some confused determination but the completely determined structure formed by its genetic differential elements, its ‘virtual’ or ‘embryonic’ elements.”<sup>48</sup>

## Conclusion

To conclude, I want to draw attention to the way in which Lotz’s argument against Deleuze ultimately is guilty of the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Lotz presupposes in his paper that all order is representational, and then concludes that Deleuze’s philosophy, in going beyond representation, is invalid. Ultimately, this is a difficulty with any phenomenological criticism of Deleuze’s philosophy. Given the centrality of intentionality to the method of phenomenology, and the fact that intentionality is individuating, any account of the pre-individual is *ex hypothesi* out of reach of the phenomenological account. To criticise Deleuze for developing a philosophy of the (inaccessible) pre-individual is thus to simply presuppose the validity of the phenomenological approach at the outset. It is to presuppose at the outset that sensation can be “assimilated to an original opinion, to *Urdoxa* as the world’s foundation or immutable basis.”<sup>49</sup> Therefore, whilst one should be sympathetic to Christian Lotz’s attempt to provide a phenomenological rebuttal to Deleuze’s theory of painting, such a project is ultimately indefensible without a more immanent approach to Deleuze’s philosophy. The situation is made more complex by the fact that Deleuze himself accepts the phenomenological description of the world, merely arguing that it is incomplete. In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze writes that “flesh is only the thermometer of a becoming.”<sup>50</sup> What Deleuze means is that, as phenomenology is tied to intentionality, it is only able to order the world according to one set of categories—the individuated. This means on Deleuze’s account that if the transcendental conditions of representation manifest a structure different in kind from representation itself, they are necessarily out of reach of the phenomenologist. For Deleuze, therefore, the contradictions which Lotz claims to find in Deleuze’s account

of Bacon would not show a confusion in Deleuze's own ontology, but rather a fundamental limitation in the phenomenological method itself. This does not close the possibility of a phenomenological response to Deleuze, but such a response will need to recognise that Deleuze's aim is to show the ontological dependence of phenomenology on the virtual, rather than to reject the insights of phenomenology absolutely.

## Notes

1. Hallward, *Out of the World*, 2.
2. Žižek, *Organs without Bodies*, 4–5.
3. Mullarkey, "Forget the Virtual," 469–71.
4. Williams, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 13.
5. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 45.
6. Lotz, "Representation or Sensation," 61.
7. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 164.
8. *Ibid.*, 167.
9. *Ibid.*, 164.
10. Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 123.
11. *Ibid.*, 124.
12. Jeffrey Bell provides a helpful summary of Deleuze and Guattari's aesthetics. See *Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?*, 214–237.
13. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 181.
14. Merleau-Ponty argues, for instance, in "Eye and Mind," that "The painter takes his body with him...by lending his body to the world, the artist changes the world into paintings." (162) For an account of the relationship between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, see Somers-Hall, "Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Aesthetics of Difference."
15. Bacon and Sylvester, *Brutality of Fact*, 18.
16. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 40.
17. Lotz, "Representation or Sensation," 63.
18. *Ibid.*, 64.
19. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 48.
20. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 182.
21. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 160.
22. *Ibid.*, 79.
23. *Ibid.*, 34.
24. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 56.
25. Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 57.
26. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 266.
27. Leibniz, *New Essays on Understanding*, 54.
28. Bacon and Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact*, 18.
29. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 32.
30. *Ibid.*, 39.
31. *Ibid.*, 37.
32. Lotz, "Representation or Sensation," 65–66.
33. *Ibid.*, 66.
34. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 177.
35. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 48.
36. *Ibid.*, 49.
37. *Ibid.*, 32.
38. *Ibid.*, 5.
39. *Ibid.*, 16.
40. *Ibid.*, 28.
41. *Ibid.*, 14.

42. Ibid., 49.
43. Ibid., 109.
44. Lotz, "Representation or Sensation," 72.
45. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 220.
46. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 28.
47. Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 40.
48. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 209.
49. Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 178.
50. Ibid., 179.

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