

ARISTOTLE AND THE PROBLEM OF NEEDS

Patricia Springborg

I

The concept of need as it has been employed in social theories since Marx has problematic, and in some cases mutually incompatible, implications. Justice 'according to need' is a much heralded goal, but central problems turn on an antinomy between needs as a metaphysical concept in terms of which an essential human nature is spelled out, and needs as an empirical category which can be given a high degree of specification based on aggregate data analysis, etc.—notions which are often invoked simultaneously.

As a philosophical concept 'need' is usually overburdened, for the general lack of precision of the term equips it poorly for the task of defining human properties, powers, and potentialities, as it has frequently been used to do. There are thus fundamental disagreements among philosophers of need on the question whether needs are essentially good, or whether it is possible to have evil needs; a dispute grounded in the ambivalence between needs as a metaphysical and empirical category. The corpus of literature on the problem of needs in analytic philosophy divides rather neatly along these lines between the Pelagians, who believe that needs are essential human requirements and therefore good, having 'a *prima facie* right to be satisfied' (Kai Nielsen, Charles Taylor, Christian Bay, etc.¹) and the Manicheans (Anthony Flew,

¹ The assertion that 'any given need has a *prima facie* right to be satisfied' is an explicit feature of Kai Nielsen's position on needs, as well as that of Charles Taylor and Christian Bay. See Kai Nielsen, 'On Human Needs and Moral Appraisals', *Inquiry*, Vol. 6 (1963), pp. 170-83; Kai Nielsen, 'Morality and Needs', in *The Business of Reason*, ed. J.J. McIntosh and S. Coval (London, 1969), pp. 186-206; Kai Nielsen, 'True needs, Rationality and Emancipation', in *Human Needs and Politics*, ed. Ross Fitzgerald (Sydney, 1977), pp. 142-56; Charles Taylor, 'Neutrality in Political Science', in *Philosophy Politics and Society*, ed. Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, 3rd series (Oxford, 1969), pp. 25-57; Christian Bay, 'Needs, Wants and Political Legitimacy', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (September 1968), pp. 241-60; Christian Bay, 'Human Needs and Political Education', in *Human Needs and Politics*, ed. Fitzgerald, pp. 1-25. For a critique of this position see Patricia Springborg, *The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation* (London, 1981), Appendix: ' "Needs" as a Concept', pp. 252-74.

Paul Taylor, Ross Fitzgerald, etc.²), who believe that, human nature being what it is, needs can be good and bad, demonstrating this empirically by pointing to Hitler, sado-masochists, etc.

The particular appeal of the concept of needs to the Pelagians is that while permitting a specification of human nature, it does so in such a way that an agenda for the future is built in. Human needs are negative capabilities requiring responsive social conditions and, therefore, in most instances, social change for their fulfilment. It is no accident, I think, that needs as a philosophical category made a rather late debut in the era of Enlightenment rationalism. A vision of society which describes a fraternal and harmonious community governed by 'justice according to need' is a hallmark of the Enlightenment programme, striving to transcend all confining and limiting primordial and historical bonds, spurning structures and institutions of the present and orienting itself to the society of the future. What this particularly non-terrestrial world view presupposes is 'the myth of the *Gemeinschaft*'. For the belief that the problem of needs is primarily a philosophical problem, or a problem of determining their essence, gives rise to the view that the problem posed by needs is that of stripping back from human nature the layers of accretions imposed by history and culture that produce conflict as a social and artificial product.

Thus, in a curious way, Pelagian confidence in the *a priori* duty-worthiness of human needs has produced a theory of true and false needs which would seem to be its opposite and which figures importantly in the history of Marxist revisionism as an explanatory vehicle for the prolongation of capitalism past its expected demise.³ False needs belong to the contingency of historical systems, according to this theory, being in many cases deliberately promoted for the self-maintenance of the system and are, at any rate in principle, eradicable. True needs are those irreducible necessities for survival that life on a small planet might be limited to.

Disagreement with this line of argument should not be read as an insensitivity to the ecology of the environment, or an attack on the welfare

² For a statement of the position that needs are heterogenous with propensities for good and evil see Paul Taylor, '“Need” Statements', *Analysis*, Vol. 19 (1959), pp. 106–11; Anthony Flew, 'Wants or Needs, Choices or Commands', in *Human Needs and Politics*, ed. Fitzgerald, pp. 213–28; and Ross Fitzgerald, 'The Ambiguity and Rhetoric of “Need”', in *ibid.*, pp. 195–212.

³ See in particular the theories of Wilhelm Reich, Eric Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Ivan Illich and William Leiss, where the notion of true and false needs is successively developed. (Springborg, *Problem of Human Needs*, Chs. 8–12.)

state and those social systems which have tried faithfully to mitigate the anarchy to which the 'free play' of market forces gives rise.⁴ To criticize the doctrine of true and false needs and command economies based on it (referred to by Agnes Heller and others more bluntly than by me as 'the dictatorship over needs'⁵), on the one hand, does not inevitably reduce one to embracing the worst excesses of *laissez-faire* economics, on the other. In fact, the myth of the *Gemeinschaft*⁶, or the harmonious fraternal community, and the myth of the free market share obvious common ground as products of the same Enlightenment assumptions: human nature is essentially good and if social and historical impediments are minimized a spontaneous harmony emerges in which all needs are satisfied.

It is symptomatic of this rationalist approach to the problem of social justice that those traditional social institutions, family, clan, tribe, church, state, etc., whose processes of arbitration, conciliation and habituation were essential for the production of socially compatible needs, are the first to be abolished. But the assumptions on the basis of which they are dismissed are facile, for no human needs, even the most basic, come in a pure or culturally unmediated form. The concept of purified human needs as a spontaneous and

⁴ Gregory Claeys in his review of Springborg, *ibid.* (*History of Political Thought*, Vol. 3, no. 1 (1982), pp. 171–6) believes her argument fails to take seriously enough the problem of scarcity 'particularly from an ecological perspective' (p. 174), as well as being an attack on the welfare state that leaves 'the resolution of the problem of needs largely in the hands of the needy' (p. 174). 'Seen from this perspective', he concludes, 'Springborg's book is a sophisticated critique of the value-premises not only of Marxism, but of every form of welfare politics and economics which is not confined to responding to *expressed demands*' (p. 175). Christian Bay in his review of the book (*Political Theory*, Vol. 11, no. 1 (1983), pp. 140–3) sees it as a defence of ethical relativism and representative of the 'prevailing liberal-pluralist paradigm', more generally. Other reviewers do not read Springborg's argument this way; see in particular those of R.S. Downie (*Times Higher Educational Supplement*, 20 November 1981), Robert Sutherland (*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, no. 3 (September 1983), pp. 384–5) and J.H. Veit Wilson (*Journal of Social Policy*, Vol. 12, no. 3 (July 1983), pp. 413–16).

⁵ Agnes Heller et al., *The Dictatorship over Needs* (London, 1982).

⁶ I refer of course to the *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* distinction made famous by Ferdinand Tönnies, but to be found in different formulations in earlier thinkers such as Henry Sumner Maine (status to contract), Lewis Henry Morgan (*societas to civitas*), Marx (communal as opposed to exchange-based society), and probably derived from Aristotle and his distinction between *oikonomia* (economic management based on needs) and *chrematistike* (economic activity geared to accumulation). The distinction in its nineteenth-century forms postulates a radical contrast between communal society based on the satisfaction of needs, as a spontaneous and natural social form from which social conflict is absent and politics, therefore, unnecessary (the *Gemeinschaft*), as compared with exchange-based society, characterized by acquisitive individuals and mediation of their conflicting interests by the state and its structures (the *Gesellschaft*).

authentic human expression undistorted by historical accretions belongs to the myth of the *Gemeinschaft* in an obvious way, postulating social agreement on limits to needs and their satisfaction as a function of the organic community unmediated by *political* processes.

This is a misguided theory on at least two counts: it takes no account of the everyday world in which expressed wants are submitted to the articulation, conciliation and arbitration of interests that constitutes politics, thus making the problem of needs more, and not less, difficult to solve, by failing to relate it to the practical forms in which they are expressed. And, secondly, even if the problem of need does indeed involve more than expressed demands (and also concerns questions of human nature and optimum conditions for life and its flourishing on a planet of limited resources), nevertheless the problem of expressed wants cannot be considered unrelated or unimportant. One of the semantic peculiarities of 'needs' as a term is that, like 'wants', 'necessities', 'interests' and 'desires', they must in principle be capable of being expressed by the subject to whom they are ascribed—so we speak of the 'needs' of a car or of inorganic objects generally only metaphorically, ascribing to them wants or desires not at all.

This does not mean of course that needs are therefore nothing but expressed demands, or that they are an essentially empirical phenomenon—a case that cannot, in my view, be sustained. For 'needs', although expressing fundamental 'facts' about human existence and its requirements (i.e. that an irreducible amount of nutrition, warmth and protection is essential to survival) nevertheless do so from the point of view of a scale of preferences on the part of a needing subject. What is contentious about needs is not the factual element (that there are basic necessities that cannot be denied) but the extensions of the concept (quite legitimate and appropriate semantically, as priorities that may be ranked above irreducible necessities for subsistence) to include specifications as to the form and quality of such items, and symbolic and cultural goods that are psychologically but not physiologically necessary.

A path can, I think, be steered between the Scylla of needs as *a priori* metaphysical requirements and the Charybdis of needs as nothing but expressed demands, by referring back to a much older tradition in which needs played an important, if rather more neutral, role. I refer to the theories of Plato, and of Aristotle in particular. For 'need', Aristotle maintained following Plato, is that 'which holds everything [in the city] together'.⁷ The

⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V, v. 11, 1133a25–30. (Loeb edition, trans. H. Rackham (London, 1956), p. 285). (In the case of Aristotle all references are to the Loeb edition, but I have preferred the Penguin edition of Plato's *Republic* to the Loeb for accuracy and succinctness.)

concept of needs intimates a 'lack', scarcity, in its very structure, as Hegel and Jean-Paul Sartre, among others, have pointed out.⁸ Forms of social organization and political processes rest ultimately on needs, as Plato, Aristotle and subsequently Marx maintained, due to individual insufficiency and the necessity of being able to call on the surplus product of others in order to satisfy this lack. In none of these thinkers are needs considered to be 'objective'—i.e. philosophically validated—and Aristotle, like Marx, refers to needs 'real or imagined',⁹ considering political justice and specific mechanisms of exchange to be necessitated by the natural tendency of individuals to overrate their needs and over-value their products in the transfer of goods and services that constitutes society as a corporate entity. To conceive of social relations in this way is to emphasize the adversary relationship of the contenders and the factor of scarcity as that which enforces the moderation of original claims to environmental goods.

Aristotle, long before Gracchus Babeuf, who coined the phrase, and Marx, who gave it currency, was the first to formulate a theory of 'justice according to need', although not in this form of words. A careful study of the concept of needs in Aristotle provides a clue to the concept in Marx, who acknowledged his indebtedness to 'the greatest thinker of the ancient world' in several places.¹⁰ As recent scholars have noted, it is significant that Aristotle's translators have frequently translated *chreia*, 'need', by 'demand', which

⁸ G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Ch. 4, section A, 'Autonomy and dependence of self-consciousness: mastery and slavery', on the relation between organic life, needs, scarcity, desire and dependence. Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, is an extended disquisition on these themes as they were transmitted to him through the commentaries on Hegel of his contemporary, Alexandre Kojève (see Springborg, *Problem of Human Needs*, Ch. 7, pp. 118–24).

⁹ 'A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants (*Bedürfnisse*) of some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference' (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, (Moscow, n.d.), p. 43) and Marx cites an obscure source for this view: "'Desire implies want; it is the appetite of the mind, and as natural as hunger to the body . . . The greatest number (of things) have their value from supplying the wants of the mind.'" Nicholas Barbon: "A Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter. In Answer to Mr. Locke's Considerations," etc., London 1696, pp. 2, 3' (*ibid.*). It is perhaps significant that Marx refers to a source in the empiricist tradition of Locke and political economy, since his earlier treatment of the problem of need (*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3 (London, 1975), esp. pp. 295–322) did imply a distinction between true and false wants in the distinction between human and inhuman needs, which Marx employed as explicitly ontological categories (*ibid.*, p. 322).

¹⁰ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 384. See also *ibid.*, pp. 64–5, where Marx refers to 'the giant thinker who was the first to analyse so many forms, whether of thought, society, of Nature and amongst them also the form of value. I mean Aristotle', which prefaces Marx's exposition and critique of Aristotle's discussion of the problem of exchange and of finding a conventional measure for qualitatively different and incommensurable use-values as objects of need, in the *Nicomachean*

would put him with the marginalists rather than with Marx.¹¹ The liberal legacy has been pervasive enough for Aristotle's argument that needs, and the processes of production and exchange developed to satisfy them, constitute the foundation of society, to be read, and even translated, as axioms of *laissez-faire* economics.

But Aristotle's economic theory is innocent of the divergent paths of development it has subsequently endured. Aristotle neither implied that exchange mechanisms were governed by divine design, or a hidden hand, so that their free play was privileged, producing a spontaneous social justice; nor, to take up the view of socialist opponents of free trade doctrine, did he see exchange as itself anathema and symptomatic of corruption, even though his strictures against *pleonexia*, the unlimited accumulation of material possessions and the pursuit of wealth for its own sake, might seem to suggest it. Aristotle believed, indeed, that society was based on exchange, a phenomenon, like needs, with no intrinsic moral properties, whose use for good or evil was determined by human goals and purposes, or teleologically. A careful reading of Aristotle on the subject might be the basis for a rehabilitation of the concept of social exchange, so long stigmatized in political theory as a liberal notion and yet of increasing importance in the anthropological theories of structuralists and others who appreciate the social complexity of its symbolic and material aspects.¹²

Ethics, V. v. In the 'Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy' compiled for his doctoral dissertation of 1839, Marx had already referred to Aristotle 'as the acme of ancient philosophy' (*Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 424).

¹¹ See Joseph Soudek 'Aristotle's Theory of Exchange, an Inquiry into the Origin of Economic Analysis' (*American Philosophical Society Proceedings*, Vol. 96, no. 1 (1952), pp. 45-75), p. 60 where he notes of *N.E. V*, 5 1133a25-30: 'The Equating factor is "need". The word *he chreia* has been persistently translated with "demand". Although Aristotle has been conscious of the inter-relation between need and demand i.e., the need backed up by purchasing power, here he meant unequivocally "need" only'. (I have accordingly amended the Loeb translation, which frequently translates *chreia* by 'demand'.)

On the relation between Aristotle and Marx see also Karl Polanyi, 'Aristotle Discovers the Economy', in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*, ed. K. Polanyi, C.M. Arensberg, and H.W. Pearson (Glencoe, 1957), pp. 64-94; M.I. Finley, 'Aristotle on Economic Analysis', (*Past and Present*, Vol. 47 (1970), pp. 3-25); B.J. Gordon, 'Aristotle on the Development of Value Theory' (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 78 (1964), pp. 115-28); Cornelius Castoriadis, 'From Marx to Aristotle, From Aristotle to Us' (*Social Research*, Vol. 45 (1978), pp. 667-738); Scott Meikle, 'Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis' (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 99 (1979), pp. 53-73).

¹² See the structural anthropologists, Claude Levi-Strauss, Jean Baudrillard, Claude Meillassoux. Pierre Bourdieu among others on the symbolic and linguistic significance of exchange, gift and other related forms of 'transformation': in particular Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked*, trans. J. and D. Weightman (New York, 1969), on the symbolic aspects of ritual and

The neutrality of the concept of needs in Aristotle is perhaps a function of historical innocence. It is only in subsequent philosophical systems that the concept has been given the theoretical payload it bears with such difficulty. Linguistically, in classical Greek, as in French and German hitherto, no attempt was made to drive a definitional wedge between needs and wants. *Chreia*, like *besoin* and *Bedürfnis*, may be translated either way, depending on context. The question of true and false desires, to which both Plato and Aristotle in their discussions of the hedonic life, pleasure, hedonic friendships, etc., give extended discussion, allows for a more precise formulation of the problem that has been broached under the needs/wants umbrella. So to say that the needs/wants distinction was not made as such in these languages is not to say that this is because the philosophical point that the distinction expresses was not appreciated, but rather that for linguistic and historical reasons philosophers in these languages found other, and perhaps more efficacious, ways of expressing it. One might even suggest that the weight placed on the needs/wants distinction in English is indicative of a general caginess about departing from semantic distinctions for fear of entering the murky metaphysical depths that a full treatment of the problem of legitimate, as opposed to illicit, desires would require.

The strength of the utilitarian tradition militated against raising this dreadful question anyway. For if the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain were the primary human motivation, why fight it? The problem of evil, the corruptible will, temptation and the lure of pleasure were seen as shibboleths of an outmoded world view, the sort of metaphysical humbug that had been dispatched by Locke and his successors. When Freudian psychology threw its scientific weight behind utilitarianism so that hedonic drives were seen as constitutive of the instinctual structure (*id*), moral impediments (internalized in the *superego*) to the satisfaction of these needs/drives, came to be seen as the relics of antiquated religious systems. Ethical solutions to the problems of social conflict and economic scarcity were then seen to lie in strategies to optimize the enjoyment of pleasure and avoidance of pain for others in ways that would not prejudice one's own interests.

It is perhaps ironic that the problem of evil, shunned by utilitarianism, could not lie buried for long and when the spectre of capitalism and its economic injustices seemed to require its resurrection, very secular Freudian Marxists, in the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism of which utilitarianism was a part, brought it back in the form of a theory of true and false needs.

exchange associated with the need for food; and Jean Baudrillard's two works, *The Mirror of Production*, trans. Mark Poster (St. Louis, 1975), and *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis, 1981), specifically on needs, desires and the symbolic aspects of exchange.

All this lay in the future for the concept of needs as Aristotle approached it. Among later theoretical uses of the concept Aristotle's most closely approximates Hegel's notion of a 'system of needs'.¹³ To find a definition for needs in this sense, 'expressed demands' casts too shallow a net, needs as metaphysical requirements a net that lies too deep to catch the prey. The needs/wants that motivate men to create and maintain forms of human association for the mutual exchange of economic and social goods are sometimes expressed, sometimes tacit. They also include wider metaphysical considerations about the good life, without being *ipso facto* of a metaphysical status. Were it the case that needs were as such essential human requirements with a *prima facie* right to satisfaction, moral problems, and specifically the problems of justice and the nature of the good life, would be obviated. (Introduction of the distinction between needs and wants spoiled the simplicity of this ethical short cut.)

Human needs, wants and desires constitute a system in Aristotle, as in Hegel, not because they are themselves systematic, but because they define a realm: that of everyday life, or 'civil society', in which individuals pursue characteristic goals and interests. Needs thus constitute the raw material of justice, by comprising spontaneous and ungoverned aspirations and desires, bound to conflict in a community of scarce resources. At the same time needs describe the motivation and direction of human pursuits as they have been formed within the limits of a specific social system with peculiar historically developed structures for the production and distribution of goods and services. The heterogeneity and incompatibility of individual needs was what in the eyes of both Aristotle and Hegel (and the contractarians, of course) necessitated the state and its institutions of conciliation, arbitration, and where these fail, government.

The conception of civil society as a system of needs originates in fact with neither Aristotle nor Hegel, but with Plato, who maintained that 'society originates . . . because the individual is not self-sufficient (*ouk autarkes*), and has many needs (*allou chreia*) which he can't supply himself'.¹⁴ The exchange of goods and services to satisfy basic needs is what constitutes society as such:

¹³ G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Part III 'Ethical Life', Section ii 'Civil Society', Sub-section (A) 'The System of Needs', comprising (a) 'The Kind of Need and Satisfaction', (b) 'The Kind of Work', and (c) 'Capital and Class-Divisions', as further subdivisions of the subject. (Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, revised 1st edn., 1967), pp. 122-34.) All citations are to the Knox edition.

¹⁴ Plato, *Republic*, II, xi, 369B (Penguin edition, trans. H.D.P. Lee (Harmondsworth, 1967 edn.), p. 102).

'The origin of the city, then,' said I [Socrates], 'in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things. Do you think any other principle establishes the state?' 'No other,' said he. 'As a result of this, then, one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helpers, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state. do we not?' 'By all means,' 'And between one man and another there is an interchange of giving, if it so happens, and taking, because each supposes this to be better for himself.' 'Certainly.' 'Come then, let us create a city from the beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs.'¹⁵

Society is born in the 'realm of necessity' as Marx was later to describe it, because 'men must be in a position to live in order to "make history"', and that means 'eating . . . drinking . . . clothing, and many other things'.¹⁶ A principle derived from Plato and Aristotle, therefore, the latter of whom is recorded as remarking that 'without the necessities even life, as well as the good life is impossible'.¹⁷ There is, indeed, an analogue for Marx's distinction between 'the realm of necessity' (defined by basic needs) and 'the realm of freedom' (freedom from want) to be found in the distinction made by Plato and Aristotle between a subsistence economy¹⁸ and the requirements of the good life. Plato was the first to give an account of the origins of society in subsistence needs, and a description of its development in terms of the growth of needs and corresponding complexity of forms of social interaction and dependence developed to meet them; an account of the progress of civilization that successive political thinkers, Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel systematized, and that Marx gave his stamp of identity in the notion of a mode of production.

Important elements of the Marxian conception are already evident in the accounts of Plato and Aristotle, as Marx himself acknowledged. (See Marx's discussion in *Capital* of Plato's theory of the division and specialization of

¹⁵ Plato, *Republic*, II, xi, 369B-C (Loeb edn. pp. 149-51).

¹⁶ *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 41-2.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, I, ii, 3-4, 1253b20-25 (Loeb edition, trans. H. Rackham (London, 1932)).

¹⁸ Glaucon's 'city of pigs', Plato, *Republic*, II, xiii, 372D.

labour and of his indebtedness to Aristotle's labour theory of value.)¹⁹ One can find in the accounts of these classical writers of the development of society around human needs and their changing form, concepts of property, use-value, exchange-value, the introduction of money, and a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of economic activity, those elements crucial to the Marxist critique of capitalism as an aberrant system which fails to meet characteristically human needs, goals and purposes, and whose priorities are instead its self-maintenance as a system.

Society as a corporate entity, or community (*koinonia*), both Plato and Aristotle agree. 'springs from our needs',²⁰ its composition and size being determined by the criterion of self-sufficiency. Plato listed these needs quite explicitly: the first is food, the second shelter, the third clothing,²¹ raising immediately the question of the division and specialization of labour implicit. 'How will our state supply these needs?', he asks. 'It will need a farmer, a builder and a weaver, and also, I think, a shoemaker and one or two others to provide for our bodily needs. So that the minimum state would consist of four or five men' [*sic*].²² But how will these four or five men divide their labour?

... should each of these men contribute the product of his labour to a common stock? For instance, should the farmer provide enough food for all four of them, and devote enough time and labour to food production to provide for all their common needs? Or, alternatively, should he disregard the others, and devote a quarter of his time to producing a quarter the amount of food, and the other three quarters one to building himself a house, one to making clothes, and another to making shoes? Should he, in other words, avoid the trouble of sharing with others and devote himself to providing for his own needs only?²³

¹⁹ Marx cites Plato 'who treats division of labour as the foundation on which the division of society into classes is based', arguing that 'Plato's Republic, in so far as division of labour is treated in it, is merely the Athenian idealisation of the Egyptian system of castes' (*Capital*, Vol. 1, pp. 345-6). In a note (p. 345) Marx observes the link between the division of labour and needs in Plato pointing out that 'with Plato, division of labour within the community is a development from the multifarious requirements, and the limited capacities of individuals' and citing *Rep.* 1.2. in the Greek. His discussions of Aristotle's economic theory are to be found in *Capital*, Vol. 1, pp. 65-6, 89, 150-1, 162 and 384-5.

²⁰ Plato, *Republic*, II, xi, 369C-D.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, II, xi (Penguin edn., p. 103).

²³ *Ibid.*, II, xi, 369-70 (Penguin edn., p. 103).

A loaded question. Plato, like Aristotle and Hegel, and unlike Rousseau and Marx, views exchange, cooperative labour and the bonds of mutual dependence created thereby, favourably, referring to the community as that in which 'all mutual exchanges are made with the benefit of the partners in view'.²⁴ The division and specialization of labour based on individual aptitudes and the principle 'one man one job' become the necessary but not sufficient condition of Justice, as at once the disposition of society to ensure the satisfaction of basic needs, as well as the attainment of higher goods to which humans characteristically aspire.

Aristotle's account of society founded on needs but surpassing them, as a collectivity which takes on a life of its own, makes some theoretical advances on Plato's in the concepts of use-value and exchange-value, by means of which good and corrupt forms of life can be appraised. Aristotle approaches the problem of subsistence needs under the more abstract aspects of property and the creation of wealth. 'Wealth-getting (*chrematistike*) is not the same art as household management (*oikonomike*)', he points out, 'for the function of the former is to provide and that of the latter to use'.²⁵ Rudiments of a concept of different modes of production are already present in his appreciation of the systemic relations between the form of basic needs (e.g. food) and the modes of procurement designed to meet them. The differences between modes of production are seen to originate in spontaneous systems of adjustment between needs and the environment: 'there are many sorts of food, owing to which both animals and men have many different modes of life; for it is impossible to live without food, so that the differences of food have made the lives of animals [and men] different'.²⁶

Aristotle refers to the division between those animals who are 'solitary' and those that are 'nomadic' as differences in 'modes of life to suit their facilities and their predilections for [certain] articles of food'.²⁷ The same is true for humans for whom there are 'wide differences [in ways] of life'. Aristotle lists the nomadic form, where food is procured from domesticated animals requiring 'no toil or industry', fishing, hunting and brigandage as methods of procurement, along with agriculture which comprises the mode of subsistence of 'the largest class of men'.²⁸ This, he observes, 'virtually completes the list of

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 369C (Penguin edn., p. 102).

²⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, I, iii, 2, 1256a10-15 (Loeb edn., p. 33).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 3, 1256a20-25 (Loeb edn., p. 33).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 25-30 (Loeb edn., pp. 33-5).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 4, 1256a30-40.

the various modes of life . . . that have their industry sprung from themselves and do not procure their food by barter and trade',²⁹ allowing of course for the fact that some 'live pleasantly by combining these pursuits, supplementing the more deficient life where it happens to fall short in regard to being self-sufficing . . . in such a combination of pursuits as their need compels'.³⁰

'Property', under these spontaneous modes of acquisition, 'seems to be bestowed by nature herself upon all, as immediately upon their first coming into existence, so also when they have reached maturity', and Aristotle refers to the naturalness of these simple forms of subsistence as extensions of the same provisions of nature that give mammals milk for their offspring in their early days.³¹

There is a major divide between these spontaneous systems of procurement, in which barter and trade are absent, and the exchange-based forms of existence of a corporate community. Aristotle distinguishes between household management (*oikonomia*), whose 'kind of acquisition . . . in the order of nature is a part of the household art, in accordance with which either there must be forthcoming, or else that art must procure to be forthcoming, a supply of those goods capable of accumulation, which are necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household';³² and *chrematistike*, concerned with the creation of wealth as such. Appropriate forms of acquisition for a city, as for a household, are governed by the twin criteria of needs and self-sufficiency. Acquisitiveness and wealth-getting always have a propensity for getting out of hand when valued for their own sake, and it is on the criterion of moral appropriateness that the difference between legitimate and illegitimate forms of economic activity turns: 'the amount of . . . property sufficient in itself for a good life is not unlimited . . . for a limit has been fixed, as with the other arts, since no tool belonging to any art is without limit whether in number or in size, and riches are a collection of tools for the householder and the statesman'.³³

Aristotle compares *oikonomia*, as the 'art of acquisition belonging in the order of nature to householders and . . . statesmen', to *chrematistike* 'another

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 5, 1256b1–10 (Loeb edn., p. 35).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 6–7, 1256b10–25 (Loeb edn., p. 37).

³² *Ibid.*, 8, 1256b25–30 (Loeb edn., pp. 37–9).

³³ *Ibid.*, 9, 1256b30–40 (Loeb edn., p. 39).

kind of acquisition that is specially called wealth-getting, and that is so called with justice', for with this kind 'there is thought to be no limit to riches and property':

Owing to its affinity to the art of acquisition of which we spoke [*oikonomia*], it [*chrematistike*] is supposed by many people to be one and the same as that; and as a matter of fact, while it is not the same as the acquisition spoken of, it is not far removed from it. One of them is natural, and the other is not natural, but carried on rather by means of a certain acquired skill or art.³⁴

Caution is now required in interpreting Aristotle's use of the term 'natural'. In fact he does not mean here natural in the earlier sense of forms of subsistence that are extensions of instinctual or physiological provisions for self-preservation, although the contrast between art and convention to which he alludes might suggest it. Rather, *oikonomia* is natural (*kata physin*) by corresponding to the order of things ordained by nature, according to which an appropriate limit is set to the acquisition of property and riches by human needs and the requirement of self-sufficiency. It is this which sets it apart from *chrematistike*, the art of wealth-getting which has no natural limit and may be promoted for its own sake regardless of individual needs or communal requirements.

With this in mind Aristotle's subsequent distinction between use-value and exchange-value should be read with close attention. The argument here too turns on the natural/unnatural distinction, which has to be taken in the special sense referred to above. A starting point for the difference between *oikonomia*, the mode of acquisition which is 'natural', and *chrematistike*, which 'is not far removed from it' but is 'unnatural', is to be found, Aristotle observes, in the following consideration:

with every article of property there is a double way of using it: both uses are related to the article itself, but not related to it in the same manner—one is peculiar to the thing and the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a shoe—there is its wear as a shoe and there is its use as an article of exchange; for both are ways of using a shoe, inasmuch as even he that barter a shoe for money or food with the customer that wants a shoe uses it as a shoe, though not for the use peculiar to a shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for the purpose of barter. And the same also holds good about the other articles of property; for all of them have an art of exchange related to them, which began in the first

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 10, 1256b40–1257a5 (Loeb edn., p. 39).

instance from the natural order of things, because men had more than enough of some things and less than enough of others.³⁵

Exchange itself is not unnatural—barter was a natural process in both senses of the term natural, by being both a spontaneously developed process and one geared to the satisfaction of needs by allowing individuals to draw on the surplus of others to supply their deficiencies. Thus 'the art of trade is not by nature (*kata physin*) a part of the art of wealth-getting (*chrematistike*), for the practice of barter was necessary only so far as to satisfy men's own needs'.³⁶ Exchange, it was true, was unnecessary in the 'primitive household' where individual property was unknown and commodities were shared, but as soon as the community as an association (*koinonia*) of several households developed, the 'group divided into several households participated also in a number of commodities belonging to their neighbours, according to their needs for which they were forced to make their interchanges by way of barter'.³⁷

Aristotle notes explicitly that 'exchange on these lines therefore is not contrary to nature, nor is it any branch of the art of wealth-getting (*chrematistike*), for it existed for the replenishment of natural self-sufficiency: yet out of it the art of business in due course arose', a corrupt form of the art of wealth-getting that emerged only with the introduction of money.³⁸ However, even money is not in itself intrinsically corrupt, as Marx argued at length in several works, but only by virtue of facilitating accumulation beyond one's needs which barter in kind, as trade in perishable goods, did not easily permit.

Aristotle's dissertation on money is highly reminiscent of that of Marx in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, as being a medium of exchange that permits the conversion of human needs into their opposite, confounding human powers and producing a world turned upside down in which wealth confers satisfactions on those who have no need for them, while allowing genuine needs to go unsatisfied.³⁹ 'Money', Aristotle notes, 'is of no use for any of the necessary needs of life

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 11, 1257a5–20 (Loeb edn., pp. 39–41).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 11–12, 1257a15–25 (Loeb edn., p. 41).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 13–15, 1257a30–1257b10 (Loeb edn., pp. 41–3).

³⁹ See Marx's reflections on 'the power of money', *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (*Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 322–6).

and a man well supplied with money may often be destitute of the bare necessities of subsistence, yet it is anomalous that wealth should be of such a kind that a man may be well supplied with it and yet die of hunger, like the famous Midas in the legend, when owing to the insatiable covetousness of his prayer all the viands served up to him turned into gold.⁴⁰

But wealth-getting (*chrematistike*) is not confined to money-making, and it is only commercial activity which is geared to cumulative profits beyond the requirements of communal and individual needs that is 'unnatural', and bad:

natural wealth-getting belongs to household management, whereas the other kind belongs to trade, producing goods not in every way but only by the method of exchanging goods. It is this art of wealth-getting that is thought to be concerned with money, for money is the first principle and limit of commerce. And these riches, that are derived from this art of wealth-getting, are truly unlimited.⁴¹

All legitimate forms of wealth-getting have a tendency to turn into their opposite, for various reasons. Firstly, because of 'the close affinity of the two branches of the art of business': 'their common ground is that the thing that each makes use of is the same; they use the same property, although not in the same way'. One aims at the self-sufficiency of the household (or state) and meeting the needs of its members; 'the aim of the other is an increase in property'. But household management has a propensity to slide into wealth-getting without limit by virtue of a confusion about its proper purpose:

Consequently some people suppose that it is the function of household management to increase property, and they are continually under the idea that it is their duty to be either safeguarding their subsistence in money or increasing it to an unlimited amount.⁴²

Secondly, for these and other reasons, commerce did develop historically out of legitimate forms of exchange, through the introduction of money as a necessary medium for interstate trade:

For when they had come to supply themselves more from abroad by importing things in which they were deficient and exporting those of which they had a surplus, the employment of money necessarily came to be devised . . . So when currency had been now invented as an outcome

⁴⁰ Aristotle, *Politics*, I, iii, 16, 1257b10–20 (Loeb edn., pp. 43–5).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 17, 1257b20–25.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 18, 1257b (Loeb edn., p. 47).

of the necessary interchange of goods, there came into existence the other form of wealth-getting; trade, (*kapelike*) which at first no doubt went on in a simple form, but later became more highly organised as experience discovered the sources and methods of exchange that would cause most profit.⁴³

And thirdly, wealth-getting (*chrematistike*), as it legitimately serves household management (*oikonomia*), by producing the goods which the latter can distribute and utilize, may easily give rise to illegitimate trade (*kapelike*), because the ground that separates the two forms of activity requires a philosophical appreciation of what the good life constitutes and how it relates to the other arts:

for just as the art of medicine is without limit in respect of health, and each of the arts is without limit in respect of its end (for they desire to produce that in the highest degree possible) . . . so also this wealth-getting has no limit in respect of its end, and its end is riches and the acquisition of goods in the commercial sense.⁴⁴

What the analogy between wealth-getting (*chrematistike*) and the other arts (medicine, etc.) overlooks, is that it is strictly an instrumental good, valuable only in so far as it furnishes articles of use to satisfy needs. The art of household management is concerned with deploying these goods and 'the household branch of wealth-getting [thus] has a limit, since the acquisition of commercial riches is not [its] function'.⁴⁵ It is failure to understand this relation between ends and means that accounts for the easy slide from an economy geared to use-value to one based on the production of exchange-values. The corruptible will is related by Aristotle to ethical confusion:

The cause of this state of mind is that their interests are set upon life but not upon the good life; as therefore the desire for life is unlimited, they also desire without limit the means productive of life. And even those who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied in the business of

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 13–15, 1257a30–1257b5 (Loeb edn., p. 43).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 17, 1257b25–30 (Loeb edn., p. 45).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 18, 1257b30–35 (Loeb edn., p. 45).

getting wealth; and owing to this the second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen. For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to discover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess; and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means, employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way. For it is not the function of courage to produce wealth, but to inspire daring; nor is it the function of the military art nor of the medical art, but it belongs to the former to bring victory and the latter to cause health. Yet these people make all these faculties means for the business of providing wealth, in the belief that wealth is the end and that everything must be directed to the end.⁴⁶

Aristotle goes on to specify skills and branches of activity that are put to the service of money-making as an end in itself: they include commerce, subdivided into the branches of shipping, the carrying trade more generally and retailing; money-lending; and the employment of labour for hire, whether skilled or unskilled. (Aristotle speaks of the evils of enslaving the body of the worker for profit as a violation of human *praxis*, in terms evocative of Marx's attack on the alienation of labour by diverting it from its characteristic end: individual needs and self-fulfilment.) Legitimate forms of economic activity comprise those arts which furnish the requirements of the household and state compatible with appropriate human goals, while permitting the supply of goods for exchange in kind: stock-rearing, corn-raising, fruit-growing, bee-keeping, bird-raising and fish-farming being the most important.

II

Needs, as the 'facts of existence' on which society is predicated, have an inescapable ethical dimension. When in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he is less concerned than in the *Politics* with the systemic aspects of social problems, Aristotle raises the question of needs, he does so in the context of his theory of justice and his critique of Plato's conception of that central problem. To Aristotle what is interesting about justice, like needs, is not its universal and uncontentious aspect, that it is synonymous with virtue or things absolutely good. He believed that Plato over-emphasized this to the exclusion of the more problematic aspects. Nor is justice synonymous with irreducible necessities for survival. Aristotle's interest is rather in the relative or political aspects of these problems. For justice, leaving aside this universal aspect,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 19–20, 1257b40–1258a15 (Loeb edn., pp. 47–9).

specifically concerns participation in societal goods or property: and what is just may be summarized as fair shares in the distribution of divisible goods, on the one hand, and equal access to communal goods that are indivisible, on the other.⁴⁷ Aristotle emphasizes, moreover, that fair shares will always be assessed from the point of view of the individual seeking to satisfy his/her needs, that this assessment will reflect value priorities and preferences, and show a tendency to overvalue one's own wants and underrate those of others. Thus:

as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These though always good in the absolute sense, are not always good for a particular person. Yet these are the goods men pray for and pursue . . .⁴⁸

In other words, injustice arises not because the goods pursued are not good in themselves, or because the needs they serve are not real needs, but because in a situation of scarcity an individual wants more than his/her share. Justice in the absolute sense is 'perfect virtue', Aristotle concedes with Plato,⁴⁹ but 'with a qualification, namely that it is displayed to others . . . for there are many who can practise virtue in their own private affairs, but cannot do so in their relations with another'. 'Justice', Aristotle insists, 'alone of the virtues is "the good of others", because it does what is for the advantage of another, either a ruler or associate'.⁵⁰ This is what is so problematic about justice, for it requires a strenuous attempt to set aside one's own quite legitimate needs and priorities, the full satisfaction of which can only be achieved at the expense of another. Thus there are two related aspects of "the just", namely, the lawful and the equal or the fair'.⁵¹ Justice as 'the lawful' accords with laws laid down for the transfer and protection of property; and 'the equal' or 'the fair' concerns mechanisms for apportioning shares of communal goods.

Justice as specifically concerned with the exchange of goods and services within a community has three branches. The first is distributive justice, 'exercised in the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other divisible assets

⁴⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V, i, 9, 1129b1-5 (Loeb edn., p. 257).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 15, 1129b25-35 (Loeb edn., p. 259).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 17-18, 1130a1-6 (Loeb edn., p. 261).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ii, 8, 1130b5-10 (Loeb edn., p. 265).

of the community, which may be allotted among its members in equal or unequal shares'.⁵² And the second is 'corrective justice' which concerns private transactions and 'has two subdivisions corresponding to the two classes of private transactions, those which are voluntary and those which are involuntary'. Aristotle distinguishes as voluntary transactions those which are the product of mutual agreement between the parties, giving as examples 'selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging [as in marriage], lending without interest, depositing, letting for hire'.⁵³ Those which are involuntary are transactions or transfers of property in which one party is victim, and he gives as examples 'theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness . . . assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, maiming, abusive language, contumelious treatment'. It is significant that Aristotle should conceptualize these transgressions as contractual miscarriages or misadventures, drawing, as he admits, on exchange, 'which measures everything in terms of "gain" and "loss"', as an analogue for social interaction.⁵⁴

The third form of justice, commutative, directly concerns justice in exchange and the just as a mean between loss and gain, and it is not difficult to see how the idiom of the market place dominated Aristotle's theory of distributive justice too, which he sums up as follows: if the just is fair, and 'if then the unjust is the unequal, the just is the equal—a view that commends itself to all without proof; and since the equal is a mean, the just will be a sort of mean too'.⁵⁵ Aristotle claims, therefore, 'not only (a) that the just is a mean and equal, and relative to something and just for certain persons', i.e. that it corresponds to particular needs; 'but also (b) that, as a mean, it implies certain extremes between which it lies, namely the more and the less', involving a bargaining situation in which both parties tend to overestimate their needs and where conciliation is necessary; 'and (c) that, as equal, it implies two shares that are equal', but, as we shall see, not arithmetically equal but proportionate or according to worth; 'and (d) that, as just it implies certain persons for whom it is just', for Aristotle does not support equality for all but 'equality for equals, inequality for unequals'⁵⁶ as a general rule.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 12, 1130b30-35 (Loeb edn., p. 267).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 13, 1131a1-10 (Loeb edn., p. 267).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, iv, 13, 1132b10-15.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, iii, 1-5; 1131a10-20 (Loeb edn., p. 269).

⁵⁶ Aristotle, *Politics*, III, vii, 1, 1282b16-22 (Loeb edn., p. 231).

To conclude: justice in the specific sense, of 'political justice'—for justice obtains only *in situ* as a function of communal existence in the *polis*—'means justice between free and (actually or proportionately) equal persons, living a common life for the purpose of satisfying their needs'.⁵⁷ Hence, he points out, 'between people not free and equal' (like wives and slaves) 'political justice'—and this means any practical form—'cannot exist, but only a sort of justice in a metaphorical sense. For justice can only exist between those whose mutual relations are regulated by law.' Moreover, 'law exists among those between whom there is a possibility of injustice' as the presupposition on which justice is founded, 'to act unjustly meaning to assign oneself too large a share of things generally good and too small a share of things generally evil.'

How in fact 'fair shares', this mean between gain and loss, are arrived at in practice is a complicated business, and differs between the three types of justice: distributive, corrective and commutative. 'Justice in distributing common property'—i.e. distributive justice—'always conforms with proportionality', rather than arithmetical equality ('since when a distribution is made from the common stock, it will follow the same ratio as that between the amounts which the several persons have contributed to the common stock').⁵⁸ This was the formula for distributive justice made famous in the nineteenth century by Saint-Simon and attacked by Marx. Aristotle draws on the distinction made famous by the Pythagorean, Archytas of Tarentum, Plato's source in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, for this distinction between two types of equality, arithmetical, or strict equality and 'geometrical proportion', related as it is to concepts of relative deprivation and relative needs.⁵⁹ (Plato in the *Gorgias* maintained that it was ignorance of geometric proportion that accounted for greed, or *pleonexia*, on the grounds that only an idiot would take more where a formula for arriving at fair shares was generally known.)

According to Archytas' distinction, as Aristotle adopts it, strict equality is expressed arithmetically as a series of numbers in which the differential is in each case exactly the same. But 'geometrical proportion . . . is one in which the sum of the first and third terms will bear the same ratio to the sum of the

⁵⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V, vi, 4, 1134a25–1134b5 (Loeb edn., pp. 291–3).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, iv, 2, 1131b25–35 (Loeb edn., p. 273).

⁵⁹ For an excellent study of the legacy of Archytas in the thought of Plato and Aristotle see F.D. Harvey 'Two Kinds of Equality' (*Classica et Mediaevalia*, Vol. 26 (1965), pp. 101–40). Soudek discusses the distinctions of Archytas of Tarentum ('Aristotle's Theory of Exchange', pp. 54–8), referring to the lost works by Aristotle on the philosophy of Archytas recorded by Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, V, 25.

second and fourth as one term of either pair bears to the other term'⁶⁰—i.e. it establishes ratios of equal value.

Thus the just also involves four terms at least, and the ratio between the first pair of terms is the same as that between the second pair. For the two lines representing the persons and the shares are similarly divided; then, as the first term is to the second, so is the third to the fourth; and hence, by alternation, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth; and therefore also, as the first is to the second, so is the sum of the first and third to the sum of the second and fourth. Now this is the combination effected by a distribution of shares, and the combination is a just one, if persons and shares are added together in this way.⁶¹

This is Aristotle's specification of the axiom that 'the just is a mean between two extremes that are disproportionate',⁶² for what is disproportionate is the value or worth of the individuals involved in the distribution and, therefore, the shares assigned to them (according to worth). When, at the outset, Aristotle explains the concept of the mean, he does so by drawing on Archytas' distinction between two types of equality, referring to arithmetical equality as equality 'with respect to the thing itself' and geometrical proportion as equality 'relative to us', making it clear that 'need' or 'value' is the standard by which proportion is measured. For strict equality 'with respect to the thing' denotes 'a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody'; but 'the mean relative to us' denotes 'that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody';⁶³ and he gives an example:

Let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6; since $6 - 2 = 10 - 6$, and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. Suppose that 10lb of food is a large ration for anybody and 2lb a small one: it does not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6lb, for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo, but a large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V, iii, 13, 1131b10–20 (Loeb edn., p. 273).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 10–12, 1131b1–15 (Loeb edn., p. 271).

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, II, vi, 4–7, 1106a25–1106b10 (Loeb edn., pp. 91–3).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

In other words, 'the mean relative to us' is denoted not by the quantities into which things divisible can be equally apportioned, but rather by the needs of the individuals to whom a share is due. Aristotle's example is perhaps the source for the references in the writings of Rousseau, the early socialists and Marx, to the way in which structured inequality consistently disregards the fact that the rich man's stomach is no bigger than the poor man's, his share being disproportionate to his needs.⁶⁵

There is in fact some ambiguity in Aristotle's account, for while here the criterion for distributive justice is 'according to need', at *N.E. V*, iv, 1-3, 1131b25-35, p. 273, it seems to be 'according to one's contribution to the common stock', and at *N.E. V*, iii, 7-8, 1131a25-35, p. 269, 'according to desert', *kat'axian*, or more precisely 'according to value', a measure which is also relative, depending on how value is assigned. Aristotle notes that 'democrats make the criterion free birth', oligarchs 'wealth, or in other cases birth', and 'upholders of aristocracy make it virtue', *arete*, or more precisely excellence, a technical term for the deeds of the noble caste of *agathoi*.⁶⁶

Aristotle maintains the relativity of needs and value, even though he is not terribly consistent about what criteria apply in any given case. What is certain, however, is that needs may pose, but do not solve, the problem of justice. The very existence of the polity and the context in which the problem of justice arises, are set by the fact of the multiplicity and mutual incompatibility of human needs. Dealing with them involves more than setting up criteria by which to legislate some needs true, some false, as Marcuse and others believe. Marx did not ultimately lend this view his support (being closer to Aristotle in his position) and it gained strength only with the advent of the positivistic behavioural sciences, which its advocates paradoxically profess to abhor (Marcuse, Fromm, etc.).

The problem of needs, as I have suggested, is in its specifics a political problem, the foundation and self-maintenance of the polity depending on the successful arbitration of needs—Aristotle's explicit position and Marx's by implication. Thus, when Marx talks about fixed and variable needs being wholly system-relative, he means simply that basic and irreducible needs for survival take different forms under different regimes, but that variable needs are those out of a vast array of possibilities promoted by a cultural system; possibilities that have passed the test of fitness or political and economic

⁶⁵ Springborg, *Problem of Human Needs*, pp. 61-8.

⁶⁶ On the *agathos* and his *arete* see particularly A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 31-61.

acceptability.⁶⁷ While variable needs can in principle be eliminated, therefore, without jeopardizing survival, the promotion or subjugation of needs is a complex political process of mediation and persuasion that involves more than a philosophical judgment on the duty-worthiness or not of the needs in question. This is indeed the substance of politics. If the process can be shortcircuited it can only be done by the elimination of politics as such, which Marx certainly was known to advocate, but not all proponents of the doctrine of true and false needs would wish.

Aristotle, who appreciated perhaps more than any theorist the diversity and complexity of human needs, goals and purposes and the structures and institutions that are created to satisfy them (reflections on which Marx elaborated with his concept of a mode of production as a tissue of structures and practices spun off from the creation and satisfaction of needs) was of course peculiarly attentive to the specificity of forms designed to arbitrate needs. Distributive justice, or justice according to 'need', or 'worth', involves systems for the division of communal goods that employ the principle of geometrical proportion in order to arrive at a mean between 'gain' and 'loss' acceptable to the parties, as we have already discussed. Corrective justice, the second specific (or political) form, which concerns private transactions, 'although it is the equal in a sense (and unjust the unequal), is not the equal according to geometrical but according to arithmetical proportion'.⁶⁸ Corrective justice is concerned with the just as lawful and the law is no respecter of persons:

For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating the parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has done and the other has suffered in justice, whether one inflicted and the other has sustained damage.⁶⁹

Thus the 'impartial judge' is concerned not with justice according to needs or worth, but with a strict application of the law to strike a balance, or mean,

⁶⁷ Marx foreshadows a version of the doctrine of true and false needs in his differentiation in *The German Ideology* between 'fixed' and 'variable' desires, the former being 'desires which exist under all relations, and only change their form and direction under different social relations'; variable needs being 'those originating solely in a particular society, under particular conditions of [production] and intercourse' (*Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 256n). However, it should be noted, that this passage, on which such weight has been laid, is crossed out in the original and relegated to a footnote in the published editions.

⁶⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V, iv, 3, 1132a1-10 (Loeb edn., p. 275).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

between the litigants, compensating 'by the penalty or loss he imposes, taking away the gain', for the damage inflicted by one party on another:

Thus the just is a sort of mean, inasmuch as the judge is a medium between the litigants. Now the judge restores equality: if we represent the matter by a line divided into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater segment that portion by which it exceeds one-half of the whole line, and adds it to the lesser segment. When the whole has been divided into two halves, people say that they 'have their own', having got what is equal. This is indeed the origin of the word *dikaion* (just): it means *dicha* (in half), as if one were to pronounce it *dichaion*; and a *dikast* (judge) is a *dichast* (halver). The equal is a mean by way of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less.⁷⁰

Aristotle admits, interestingly, that the 'terms "loss" and "gain" when applied to involuntary transactions, i.e. crimes, 'are in fact borrowed from the operations of voluntary [i.e. economic] exchange':

There, to have more than one's own is called gaining, and to have less than one had at the outset is called losing, as for instance in buying and selling, and all other transactions sanctioned by law; while if the result of the transaction is neither an increase nor a decrease, but exactly what the parties had of themselves, they say they 'have their own' and have neither lost nor gained. Hence Justice in involuntary transactions is a mean between gain and loss in a sense: it is to have after the transaction an amount equal to the amount one had before it.⁷¹

Turning then to the third sphere of justice, that of economic exchange, Aristotle once more draws on the Pythagoreans for the formula for arriving at the mean, which is in this case 'reciprocity' and does not coincide either with distributive or corrective justice, constituting its own class, commutative justice:

... in the interchange of services Justice in the form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of equality. The very existence of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity; for men demand that they shall be able to requite evil with evil—if they cannot, they feel they are in the position of slaves—and to repay good with good—failing which no exchange takes place, and it is exchange that binds them together.⁷²

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 7–10, 1132a20–35 (Loeb edn., p. 277).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 13–14, 1132b10–20 (Loeb edn., p. 279).

⁷² *Ibid.*, v, 6, 1131 1–10 (Loeb edn., p. 281).

It is clear from his references to requiring good and evil that Aristotle has more than the exchange of commodities in mind, including also the doing and repaying of services and the bestowing of benefits. Reciprocity in exchange, however, is the analogue for all contractual obligations, describing an advocacy situation in which the satisfaction of one man's need is always another man's loss. Aristotle in fact illustrates the dynamics of the transaction from the example of commodity exchange:

Now proportionate requital is effected by diagonal conjunction. For example, let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, and D a shoe. It is required that the builder shall receive from the shoemaker a portion of the product of his labour, and give him a portion of the product of his own. Now if a proportionate equality between the products be first established, and then reciprocation takes place, the requirement indicated will have been achieved; but if this is not done, the bargain is not equal, and intercourse does not continue.⁷³

Arriving at a process by which the commodities to be exchanged can be equalized in this way involves measuring the incommensurable, as Marx was later to observe, just because exchange brings together individuals with widely varying talents, needs and capacities. For this reason the relationship between the exchangers themselves cannot be that of equality. Aristotle notes that 'an association for the interchange of services is not formed between two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, and generally between persons who are different, and who may be unequal, though in that case they have to be equalized'.⁷⁴ 'Need (*chreia*) . . . is what holds everything together',⁷⁵ and exchange is built on men's different and incommensurable needs: 'if men cease to have needs or if their needs alter, exchange will go on no longer, or will be on different lines'.⁷⁶

Equalizing the incommensurable is the feat accomplished in the act of exchange itself. For while 'if there were no exchange there would be no association', or community, 'there can be no exchange without equality and no equality without commensurability'.⁷⁷ And 'though . . . it is impossible for things so different to become commensurable in the strict sense, our needs

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 8, 1133a10–15 (Loeb edn., pp. 281–3).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 9–10, 1133a15–20 (Loeb edn., p. 283).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 11, 1133a25–30 (Loeb edn., p. 285).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 14, 1133b15–20 (Loeb edn., p. 287).

furnish a sufficiently accurate common measure for practical purposes'.⁷⁸ Aristotle makes a nice point of the philological significance of money (*nomisma*) as the representation of a standard, arrived at by convention (*nomos*), to equalize commodities. In reality that standard is need, 'but need has come to be conventionally represented by money'.⁷⁹

What makes both needs and need-satisfying products incommensurable is their qualitative difference: no quantity of shoes will substitute for needed food. The skills by which shoes and food are produced are also qualitatively different; it is to find a common measure for the skills of the shoemaker and the farmer that money is introduced: for 'money ensures that exchange will be possible when a need arises, [meeting] the requirement of something we can produce in payment so as to obtain the thing we need'.⁸⁰ The qualitative incommensurability of commodities as the products of labour and objects of needs dictates that their equalization be based on reciprocal proportion. Need is thus the necessary but not the sufficient condition for exchange to take place. That it is need which, by serving as a single standard, holds such an association together, 'is shown by the fact that, when there is no demand for mutual service on the part of both or at least one of the parties, no exchange takes place between them'.⁸¹ What more is needed for exchange to be successful is a process by which 'inequality of need [can] be equalized'.⁸²

There will be reciprocal proportion when the products have been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, so may the shoemaker's product be to the farmer's product. And when they exchange their products they must reduce them to the form of a proportion, otherwise one of the two extremes will have both the excesses; whereas when they have their own, they then are equal, and can form an association together, because equality in this sense can be established in their case (farmer A, food C, shoemaker B, shoemaker's product equalized D); whereas if it were impossible for reciprocal proportion to be effected in this way, there could be no association between them.⁸³

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 11, 1133a25–35 (Loeb edn., p. 285).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 14, 1133b10–15 (Loeb edn., p. 287).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 13, 1133b5–10 (Loeb edn., pp. 285–7).

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 12, 1133a30–1133b10 (Loeb edn., p. 285).

That Marx, who took so much from Aristotle (his distinctions between theory, praxis and production; his theory of class struggle and rule of the wealthy, as opposed to rule of the many (poor), as the great divide among forms of government) should also have taken his theory of exchange is not surprising, nor does it go unacknowledged.⁸⁴ Thus Marx's theory of alienation may be seen as a full elaboration of Aristotle's distinction between *oikonomia*, economic activity geared to communal needs and the production of use-values, and *chrematistike*, money-making in a society governed by *pleonexia* and oriented to the production of exchange-values.⁸⁵ The more Marx in his later writings became preoccupied with the processes of production, exchange and circulation, the closer his concept of needs approximates that of Aristotle, as the necessary but not sufficient condition for exchange: all commodities must have use-value, the capacity to satisfy needs real or fictitious, as well as exchange-value. Needs are deemed the basis for a mode of production whose structures and institutions are a reflection of, as well as mutually conditioning, the form of these needs.

Individual human needs, as well as posing the problem of justice by virtue of their heterogeneity and potential incompatibility, also set the range and limits within which it can be solved. The principle of 'justice according to need' rules out a distribution of societal goods on the basis of strict equality, for instance, as taking insufficient account of individual differences of need and capacity. In this way the concept of needs once again reveals its normative as well as its empirical dimensions, as both including the 'facts of existence' on which the foundations of society are laid, and providing a principle to govern the distribution of goods and services that society undertakes to furnish.

The slogan 'to each according to his needs' advocated by Marx as an alternative to strict equality as a formula for social justice in *The Critique of the Gotha Programme*, is thus in the spirit of Aristotle's own theory. Indeed, both Hegel and Marx reproduce the distinction between strict (arithmetical) equality and proportionate equality (according to needs/value) in sus-

⁸⁴ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, pp. 65–6, 89, etc. Castoriadis discusses Marx's judgment on Aristotle's theory of exchange that, as a conventional measure based on 'the expedience of practical needs', it overlooks the underlying common 'substance' of value: labour power. Castoriadis, like Marco Lippi in his book *Value and Naturalism in Marx* (London, 1979), criticizes the 'essentialism' or 'naturalism' of Marx which, in the post-Hegelian tradition, must find a real, material underlying common denominator for exchange, thus down-playing the functions of symbolic and societal mediation and needs as their basis.

⁸⁵ Marx, *Capital*, 1, pp. 150–1, note 2, discussed at some length Aristotle's distinction between *oikonomia* and *chrematistike*, citing passages from the *Politics*, I, 8, 9, *passim*, and pointing out its relation to the use-value, exchange-value distinction already acknowledged as deriving from Aristotle, in the context of his general formula for capital.

piciously Aristotelian terms. In the *Philosophy of Right*, in the course of his discussion of property, Hegel addresses himself to claims for 'an equal division of the land and other available resources' made in the name of social justice. But equality in this context is inappropriate, he argues, for as such it could refer only to individuals as abstractions to be arithmetically aggregated. As soon as the individual is particularized, his/her characteristic qualities and capacities and specific contingencies of existence enter into consideration, so that 'one's share' can only be determined *in situ*:

'Equality' is the abstract identity of the Understanding: reflective thought and all kinds of intellectual mediocrity stumble on it at once when they are confronted by the relation of unity to a difference. At this point, equality could only be the equality of abstract persons as such, and therefore the whole field of possession, this terrain of inequality, falls outside it.⁸⁶

Like Aristotle, Hegel concedes that in respect of their common human nature, men are equal: 'but this is an empty tautology, for the person, as something abstract, has not yet been particularised or established as distinct in some specific way'.⁸⁷ But should proportional justice on the basis of needs be taken as a warrant for redistribution of the land to correct 'the injustice of Nature', then things have been taken too far, as Aristotle would agree. (Plato in *The Laws* put it nicely: "'Hands off fundamentals" is the slogan everybody uses to attack a legislator who tries to bring in that kind of reform'.⁸⁸) Hegel had his own way of putting it: 'That everyone ought to have subsistence enough for his needs is a moral wish and thus vaguely expressed is well enough meant, but like anything that is only well meant lacks objectivity'.⁸⁹ To put the most favourable construction on this aphorism, Hegel reserved the concept of needs for a systemic rather than a moral function, referring to civil (economic) society in fact as a 'system of needs', by which he meant that needs were those requirements for mutual self-sufficiency on which the division of labour and exchange were predicated—and here, of course, he followed Plato and Aristotle, his classical mentors.

Marx was more benign than Hegel on social redistribution, but he did not believe that it should be on the basis of equality either. He too invokes a

⁸⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Knox edn., 1967), remark on para. 49, p. 44.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Plato, *The Laws*, Book 3, 684 (Penguin edn., p. 130).

⁸⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Knox edn., remark to para. 49, p. 44.

distinction between two kinds of equality, harking back to Archytas of Tarentum as it does, in order to show that the maxim justice 'according to needs' spells out a form of proportional equality which stands in stark contrast to the principles of exchange which the capitalist, market-based system establishes. Under capitalist exchange individuals are viewed as abstractions, functionally substitutable, to be arithmetically aggregated, Marx argues. In exchange in the capitalist system 'three moments emerge as formally distinct', he maintains in the *Grundrisse*:

the subject of the relation, *the exchangers* . . . [then] the objects of their exchange, exchange values, *equivalents*, which not only are equal but are expressly supposed to be equal, and are posited as equal; and finally the act of exchange itself, the mediation by which the subjects are posited as exchangers, equals, and their objects as equivalents, equal.⁹⁰

In the exchange situation, needs are seen to be merely what bring the exchangers together. Far from differentiating and particularizing them, needs permit the equalization of persons which disregards their uniqueness and individuality. Needs are in this context no more than systemic functions, representing at once the incentive to exchange and the underlying necessity on which the illusion of freedom of the market is predicated. The irony of exchange is that those very differences between individuals which bring them together as exchangers so that 'individual A exists as the owner of a use value for B, and B as owner of a use value for A'⁹¹ are ignored in the outcome so that the other's 'equality with me and his freedom' arise from 'his indifference to my need as such, to my natural individuality'.⁹²

individual A serves the need of individual B by means of the commodity *a* only in so far as and because individual B serves the need of individual A by means of the commodity *b*, and vice versa. Each serves the other in order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his means.⁹³

The reciprocal needs which bind together the exchangers under capital, bespeak, perversely, not only their 'equality', but also their 'freedom'. For it is true that 'although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he does not appropriate it by force, nor vice versa, but rather they

⁹⁰ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, Nicolaus edn., p. 251.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

recognize one another reciprocally as proprietors; as persons whose will penetrates their commodities'.⁹⁴ And this fact of ownership and free disposal on one's property are where 'the juridical moment of the Person enters . . . as well as that of freedom':⁹⁵

Equality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based on exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of all *equality* and *freedom*. As pure ideas they are merely the idealized expressions of this basis; as developed in juridical, political, social relations, they are merely this basis to a higher power.⁹⁶

Equality and freedom as juridical expressions of the exchange relationship which is the foundation of the bourgeois mode of production, are contrasted by Marx with 'freedom and equality in the world of antiquity, where developed exchange value was not their basis, but where, rather, the development of that basis destroyed them'.⁹⁷ It is an irony of exchange-based society geared to the accumulation of wealth, rather than the satisfaction of needs; that the juridical person is defined by his function as an exchanger, by virtue of which he is equal and undifferentiated from any other bringing his/her goods to market, and not by those unique needs and capacities which characterize the individual. The concepts of freedom and equality in the ancient world recognized these peculiar differences without which, of course, exchange would be nonsensical. A universal human nature is not incompatible with individual differences of need and capacity, as the ancients saw. Marx's reference to freedom and equality in the ancient world is elliptical but it can be reconstructed with the help of Hegel and Aristotle.

Hegel, like Aristotle, believed that equality as such was an inappropriate measure for distributive justice, without denying that men share a common human nature. 'Of course men are equal', he insisted, 'but only *qua* persons, that is with respect to the source from which possession springs'.⁹⁸ 'If you wish to talk of equality', he maintained, 'it is this equality which you must have in view [i.e. equality of worth]. But this equality is something apart from the

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Hegel, Addition 29. Knox edn., p. 237.

fixing of particular amounts, from the question of how much I own'.⁹⁹ Marx too suggests that equality as a principle for the distribution of societal goods is a false inference from shared species-being. Capacity for exchange on the basis of natural differences can be construed differently, and here Marx seems to refer directly to Aristotle's concept of reciprocal proportionality. For regarded from the standpoint of their 'natural differences', partners to exchange stand to one another, 'not as equal (*nicht gleichgültig gegeneinander*), but in a reciprocal relationship in which they integrate with one another, have need of one another (*sondern integrieren sich, bedürfen einander*)':¹⁰⁰

The fact that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of producing the object of the need of the other, and that each confronts the other as the owner of the object of the other's need, this proves that each of them reaches beyond his own particular need etc., as a *human being*, and that they relate to one another as human beings and that their common species—being (*Gattungswesen*) is acknowledged by all.¹⁰¹

Compare this relationship, predicated on needs and designed for their realization, with the economic relation where 'equivalents are the objectification (*Vergegenständlichung*) of one subject for another; i.e. they themselves are of equal worth, and assert themselves in the act of exchange as equally worthy, and at the same time as mutually indifferent'.¹⁰²

Marx took seriously Aristotle's distinction, made in book one of the *Politics*, between *oikonomia*, forms of economic activity geared to communal needs and the production of use-values, and *chrematistike*, money-making for its own sake, an expression of *pleonexia*, or unlimited desire and the refusal to consider the needs of others as a restraint on the appetitive individual. Marx's theory of community, and his resort to the classical *polis* as a model for the perfected community of socialism, compared with the impersonal and acquisitive capitalist system, are ramifications of Aristotelian theory. But Marx takes Aristotle's word on commerce, seriously underestimating the significance of money-making in antiquity, and at the same time underestimating the degree to which all social relationships were contractually construed. In this

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ Marx, *Grundrisse*, Nicolaus edn., pp. 242–3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 241–2.

ARISTOTLE AND THE PROBLEM OF NEEDS

Patricia Springborg

I

The concept of need as it has been employed in social theories since Marx has problematic, and in some cases mutually incompatible, implications. Justice 'according to need' is a much heralded goal, but central problems turn on an antinomy between needs as a metaphysical concept in terms of which an essential human nature is spelled out, and needs as an empirical category which can be given a high degree of specification based on aggregate data analysis, etc.—notions which are often invoked simultaneously.

As a philosophical concept 'need' is usually overburdened, for the general lack of precision of the term equips it poorly for the task of defining human properties, powers, and potentialities, as it has frequently been used to do. There are thus fundamental disagreements among philosophers of need on the question whether needs are essentially good, or whether it is possible to have evil needs: a dispute grounded in the ambivalence between needs as a metaphysical and empirical category. The corpus of literature on the problem of needs in analytic philosophy divides rather neatly along these lines between the Pelagians, who believe that needs are essential human requirements and therefore good, having 'a *prima facie* right to be satisfied' (Kai Nielsen, Charles Taylor, Christian Bay, etc.) and the Manicheans (Anthony Flew,

¹ The assertion that 'any given need has a *prima facie* right to be satisfied' is an explicit feature of Kai Nielsen's position on needs, as well as that of Charles Taylor and Christian Bay. See Kai Nielsen, 'On Human Needs and Moral Appraisals', *Inquiry*, Vol. 6 (1963), pp. 170-83; Kai Nielsen, 'Morality and Needs', in *The Business of Reason*, ed. J.J. McIntosh and S. Coval (London, 1969), pp. 186-206; Kai Nielsen, 'True needs, Rationality and Emancipation', in *Human Needs and Politics*, ed. Ross Fitzgerald (Sydney, 1977), pp. 142-56; Charles Taylor, 'Neutrality in Political Science', in *Philosophy Politics and Society*, ed. Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, 3rd series (Oxford, 1969), pp. 25-57; Christian Bay, 'Needs, Wants and Political Legitimacy', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (September 1968), pp. 241-60; Christian Bay, 'Human Needs and Political Education', in *Human Needs and Politics*, ed. Fitzgerald, pp. 1-25. For a critique of this position see Patricia Springborg, *The Problem of Human Needs and the Critique of Civilisation* (London, 1981), Appendix: 'Needs' as a Concept', pp. 252-74.

respect Marx was a captive of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* distinction which he, on the authority of Aristotle, helped to create. But that is another story.¹⁰³

Patricia Springborg

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

¹⁰³ For a more extensive discussion of Marx's and Hegel's versions of the difference between arithmetical and proportional equality, see Patricia Springborg 'Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting and Equality', *Political Theory* Vol. 12, no. 4, November 1984, pp. 537. For Marx's preoccupation with the social forms of antiquity more generally, see P. Springborg, 'Marx, Democracy and the Ancient Polis', *Critical Philosophy*, Vol. 1, no.1, March 1984, pp. 47-66. And on the myth of the *Gemeinschaft* and a further chapter in this story see P. Springborg, 'Politics, Primordialism and Orientalism: Marx, Aristotle and the Myth of *Gemeinschaft*', *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming.