Beyond the actual works of nature a poet may now go; but beyond the conceived possibility of nature, never. I can allow a Geographer to make in the Sea, a Fish or a Ship, which by the scale of his map would be two or three hundred mile long, and think it done for ornament, because it is done without the precincts of his undertaking; but when he paints an Elephant so, I presently apprehend it as ignorance and a plain confession of Terra incognita.

Hobbes's Answer to Sir William Davenant's Dedicatorial Preface to Gondibert, 1651, 81.

(1) HOBBES'S BEAST, THE BIBLICAL LEVIATHAN

In Hobbes's little discussed published response to Davenant's preface to Gondibert, dedicated to him, Hobbes reproves Davenant, the rigorous acolyte who claims to have learned his epistemology from Hobbes. Ghosts and spooks are one thing, Hobbes suggests, but to abandon the entire Western fabulous tradition of rhetoric and poesy was to abandon what distinguished civilization from the rude culture of the Americas. Civilization is the work of the imagination, "fancy," and the only restrictions on its exercise were those of appropriateness. There is, as we shall show, symptomatic irony in Hobbes's choice of the metaphor of the elephant. In the seventeenth century, Leviathan was taken for a great ship, a crocodile, or a whale, and Behemoth for an elephant. The Oxford English Dictionary credits Hobbes with lexical innovation, as the first to use the term Leviathan—the biblical serpent or sea monster, a huge ship or person of immense power and the "great Satan" of Isaiah 27:1—as the synonym for a commonwealth.1 Hobbes's Leviathan is
indeed a work of the imagination, a creature of artifice rather than nature, a
mortal God, and scripture vouches for it.

Commentators have focused considerable attention on the iconography of
the engraved frontispiece to Leviathan, believed to have been produced by
the printer Andrew Crooke, under Hobbes’s supervision, and perhaps the
work of Hobbes’s acquaintance and Charles’s former tutor in drawing, the
engraver Wenceslaus Holler. The frontispiece depicts an image of Leviathan,
a kinglike figure wielding sword and crozier, his gigantic body composed of
the small bodies of the people of his realm. Overhead flies the banner headline
from the Book of Job 41:33-4, “There is no power over earth than compares
to him,” the conclusion of which is reserved for the text: “a creature without
fear . . . king over all the sons of pride.” Much less attention has been focused
on the significance of the biblical names Leviathan and Behemoth, in what
would, in the seventeenth century, have been a most startling usage. Hobbes,
in choosing Leviathan and Behemoth as his titles, drops enough hints to make
it clear to his audience that he refers to none other than the beasts of the
Apocrypha, familiar from the Hebrew Theogony and associated in chiliastic
thought with the Second Coming. How does he mean the names then? And
what is their significance for his religious doctrine?

In a recent article, Tracy Strong argues, correctly I believe, that “God-
given geometry is [Hobbes’s] model of and for power to which none on earth
compare,” because men cannot only read it but see it. He cites Job 38:1-7,
the beginning of the passage that leads to Hobbes’s headline epigraph:

Then the Lord answered Job out of the tempest: who is this whose ignorant words cloud
my design in darkness? Brace yourself and stand up like a man: I will ask questions, and
you shall answer. Where were you when I laid the earth’s foundations? Tell me, if you
know and understand. Who settled its dimensions? Surely you should know. Who
stretched this measuring-line over it? On what do its supporting pillars rest? Who set its
corner-stone in place, when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God
shouted aloud? (Job 38:1-7)†

The invention of geometry is credited to the ancient Egyptians as a rapid
method to recalculate property boundaries washed away by the annual
innundation of the Nile. It was appropriate that God should have used the
language of geometry in the Hebrew theogony to establish his proprietorship
in an antediluvian world—and trump the Egyptians. It was equally appropri-
ate that Hobbes should have taken geometry as proof of his epistemology. If
gometry, which laid the foundations of the world, belonged to the designs
of God that could be seen, the Bible belonged to a dispensation of sacred texts
that could be read, rendering superfluous the interventions of philosophers
and theologians. So even Job 41:9-11 can be given a more optimistic reading. The divine show of strength is a show and tell:

Behold, the hope of him is in vain: shall not one be cast down even in the sight of him? None is so fierce that dare stir him up: who then is able to stand before me? Who hath prevented me, that I should repay him? whatsoever is under the whole heaven is mine.

Leviathan may be an image of the absolutist state, projected as a necessary, almost natural, work of creation. But as a work of creation it is not self-generating and, like Job, we must turn to its author for the source of its power. Absolute governments, the Leviathans of this world, from their archetypes in ancient Egypt and Babylon to their early modern types in the papacy, Spain, and France, were also constructed. Let us see how they were built, Hobbes says, and then ask the question whence their power derives. Leviathan and Behemoth, as perhaps God's answer to Job was intended to imply, are mortal Gods who have a role in the scheme of the immortal God. They have their own cycles of generation and decay and their maintenance is also a work of art.

Leviathan is the state, created by man in his image as man is created in the image of God, with divine sanction, indirectly as a continuation of the work of creation, or directly as an extension of the original Fiat, by which the world was made. Hobbes embroidered the metaphor, focusing on the "artificiality" of the state by creating a figure for the state as a species of Automata, with a spring, string, and wheels as heart, nerves, and joints, and Soveraignty as the "Artificiall Soul," "giving life and motion to the whole body." In the important first chapter of part 2 of Leviathan, chapter 17, "Of the Causes, Generation and Definition of a COMMON-WEALTH," Hobbes noted of the covenants by which the artificial unity of the state is created and its sovereign authorized: "the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence." At this point, Leviathan is no longer the body politic but the sovereign who personifies it. Returning in chapter 28 to the image of the automaton and "the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth," Hobbes concluded:

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man... together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud. There is nothing, saith he, on earth to be
compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride. But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.\(^9\)

This is a startling innovation in the reading of the biblical Leviathan, especially in an age in which allegorical interpretations were eschewed in favour of a literal reading of the bible. How precisely did Hobbes expect his audience to receive his Leviathan? And how was it received?

A word of caution might be introduced here about the distinction between a literal and an allegorical reading of the Bible. In his survey of Protestant writing, Tracy Strong in “How to Write Scripture,” rightly points out the epistemic significance of the Reformers’ claim to “know” the Bible and not merely to “interpret” it.\(^10\) Interpretation as an epistemic rule is post-Kantian, or more accurately, post-Buber. It rests most generally on the claim that we can never know how far our perceptual categories and limitations skew our ideas. Following a line of thought initiated by Hobbes to explain how we can posit the existence of God, as Strong rightly points out, thinkers from Locke to the present claimed that we may infer the existence of something if we can name it.\(^11\) However, the faith—for that is what it was—that we can know the Bible lay undisturbed by these considerations, which represented precisely a philosophic extension of the Protestant epistemic posture, until the great hermeneutical watershed introduced by Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr, members of the German critical school of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (It is an open secret that current hermeneutical and phenomenological schools owe their insights once again to a seachange in biblical criticism, once again from the German school.)

A final word of caution: to claim that Reformation commentators believed that one could “know” the Bible is not to suggest that they lacked sophistication about what they were doing—which was essentially a work of “reinterpretation.” Reformation exegetes, including Hobbes, knew exactly what they were doing because for the most part they were activists and their methodology was institutionally driven. Up to and including Locke, their epistemology was designed to cut the Church in general, and the clergy in particular, out of the loop between the authorized version and the authorizing civil authority.\(^12\) For this reason, particularly problematic exegesis of obscure and ancient texts, like the Book of Job, was eschewed; texts where, ironically, Hobbes, whose purposes were not so different, found his best proving ground for the new Leviathan.
(2) REFORMATION COMMENTARY
ON LEVIATHAN AND BEHEMOTH

If Hobbes had spun his construction of the mechanical Leviathan out of the Book of Job, among the most cited and most glossed books of the Old Testament in the Reformation, it was surely not done innocently. He must certainly have been aware that the purpose of Reformation retranslation and reinterpretation was to reject allegorical in favour of a literal reading of scripture. The Book of Job was favoured precisely because it addressed the theodicy problem: how a beneficent God may be reconciled with the power of evil. It provided, at the same time, a text enjoining patience on those afflicted or persecuted. But commentators cautioned against making too much of the more difficult parts of the book, allegorical as they clearly are.

Job Expounded by Theodore Beza, partly in manner of a Commentary, partly in manner of a paraphrase (1589?) is addressed to Queen Elizabeth on behalf of the French Protestants who sought her protection. It is therefore one of the most political readings. It very bluntly states Behemoth to be an elephant and Leviathan to be a crocodile. Beza, conceding the peculiar difficulties of the Book of Job, makes the case for a literal reading by referring to appropriate standards of biblical criticism: “But this booke, then the which there is none in all the Bible, if I be not deceived, no not Moses himselfe, of greater antiquitie, is in manie places made verie obscure to vs and hard to be vnderstood, partly by reason of the profoundnes of the thinges themselues here debated among most wise men, and not to be conceaued of euery one, partly by divers straunge words & also phrases differing from the pure Hebrue.” He cautions against presuming “to be ouer wise . . . wise aboue that which is meete,” expressing the view that: “the wise men of other nations, whome the Greekes call Philosophers, haue, touching the true vse, mervielouslie prophaned it.” Striking a dark note, he observes: “moreouer . . . the abuse of this Science hath bred that detestable Art Magick, which is the welspring of al mischeife, as also that false divining Astrologie, which havin broken the bounds of true Natural knowledge, entreth into the very secrets of God, and at this day hath bewitched the whole world.”

Beza, one of the most sophisticated and well read of the Reformation biblical commentators, is as committed to the abandonment of the allegorical interpretation of scripture as the most fundamentalist preacher. And for just the reasons that Hobbes would otherwise endorse: because allegorical constructs were abstractions, they created a host of monsters and phantasms inhabiting the dark regions of superstition and magic, the terrain of the papacy, the Spanish, heretics, and relics of gentilism.
Herbert of Cherbury, in a pioneering English study of "Gentilism," had included the enigmatic statement: "As far as I can find, the great Leviathan was known to the Jews only, tho' I question whether the Rabbins have left us any Description of it. There are several Reasons may be given, why Fish should exceed all other Animals in Magnitude." Quite plainly in this work, written by an antiquarian and diplomat whom Hobbes knew and admired, Leviathan was a monster and nothing more.

Others agreed with him. Nathaniel Culverwell, in his Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature of 1646, addressing the question whether the Laws of Nature are binding on beasts, had asked "What are those Lawes that are observed by a rending and tearing Lion, by a devouring Leviathan?"—like Herbert, plainly taking Leviathan for a beast, and no extraordinary one in this case. Reformation commentaries on the books of Job and Isaiah are uniformly condemnatory of allegorical interpretations, in particular of these passages of scripture, insisting that Leviathan and Behemoth are simply beasts, although often differing on what beasts they might be. Beza stated flatly "I omit that custome which hath continued euer since Origenes time, I say not of inuerting the natural sence of the sacred text to the framing of certaine straunge allegories, but euen of marring and perueriting it."

The beasts of the Book of Job were regularly interpreted as demonstrations of divine omnipotence and nothing more. So George Abbott simply exhorts, "Consider the Elephant [Behemoth]. . . . consider well the Whale [Leviathan]." John Oecolampadius (Halschein), to whom Beza refers, heads up his comments on Job 40:10, "Voici l'elephant." He hopes to lay alternative possibilities to rest with a review of the Hebraists as well as the Reformers on the subject of Job's beasts, finding no exception to their treatment as animals, even by such diverse figures as the Hebraists Rabbi Aben Ezra, Rabbi Levi, Rabbi Moshe, Moshe the Egyptian, Zwingli, Luther, and Thomas Aquinas. Oecolampadius makes certain observations on the use of the Hebrew plural, Behemoth, for the elephant, singular, noting the derivation of Leviathan from the Hebrew verb "Lauah," signifying "addition." He is one of the few to comment on Behemoth's "tail stiff like a Cedar," attributing the metaphor, rather unconvincingly, to a "hyperbolic mode of speaking."

John Calvin, in his Sermons of Maister Iohn Calvin, vpon the Booke of Job, addressing the question of Behemoth, noted also that "the worde Behema signifieth simply a Beast, and vnder that name are Oxen and all other beastes comprehended"; Behemoth is simply the plural of Behema. "Neuertheles it cannot be coniectured what kinde of beast it is that hee speaketh of, except it bee an Elephant, by reason of the hugenesse of that beastes body." The
hugeness serves a purpose: "if we were wise ynough, we needed not to goe out of our selues to behold the maiestie of God: howbeit men must be sent to the beasts because of their vnthankfulnesse, in that they know not God as he sheweth hymselfe vnto them"; for this reason the unregenerate "haue need of suche mirrours as are set before vs here in respect of the Elephants & other like beasts." Calvin, like other Reformation commentators reads Leviathan and Behemoth as simple demonstrations of unfathomable divine power: "it is purposely said, that these Elephants were created with us . . . so as men must be rauished besides themselues when they thinke thereon." He adds, Leviathan is simply another "like beast," in this case a whale. It is a reading of the Book of Job on which Hobbes's extrapolation to the secular sovereign Leviathan depends, as we have argued here.

Calvin quickly forestalls any other possible interpretation, with a lengthy discursus on the necessity of a literal interpretation. There is one peremptorie reason to shewe vs that we must take this text simply as it standeth, & not shiftingsly. For we have seen heretofore how it was Gods intent to teach men after a grosse and homely maner, according to their owne small capacitie, and that his doing thereof is to the end that his mightie power should be the better proued vnto them.

About Leviathan he is even more emphatic: "As touching the worde Leuiathan, through the whole scripture it signifieth a Whale." But he makes some concession to allegorical interpretation, in allowing men to infer the power of the devil from the strength of these beasts.

Calvin certainly concedes that allegorical interpretations abound, but so strongly was the new Protestant biblical criticism committed to disposing of them, as relics of Catholicism and the power of the Church to interpret scripture, that he enjoins his congregation to reflect on the whale, "is it not an incredible thyngye to see so huge a creature, liuing in the water? Who were able to fashion the moulde of so great, huge, and strong a beast?"

In fact, in his Commentary vpon the Prophecie of Isaiah, dedicated to Henry, Prince of England, son of James I, and Princess Elizabeth, his wife, and perhaps intended for a different audience, Calvin does give an allegorical interpretation, making of Leviathan not only a figure for the Devil but also for the King of Egypt. Commenting on Isaiah 27:1 ("In that day the Lord will visit Leuiathan that pearcing Serpent, and Leuiathan that crooked Serpent, with his sore and great and mightie sword: and will kill the Dragon that is in the sea"), he remarks: "For mine owne part I make no question but by way of Allegorie he speakes here of Satan and his whole kingdome, describing it
under the figure of some monstrous beast." The signification of Leviathan as a figure for tyrants, Egypt, and Satan is quite explicit:32

The Prophet speakes heere of Gods iudgement in generall, and so comprehends the whole kingdom of Satan. For hauing spoken before of the vengeance of God against tyrants and vnbeleeuers which had shed innocent blood, he now passeth on further, and publisheth the edict it selfe. The word Leviathan is diuerslie expounded, but generallie it signifies a serpent, or the whales and fishes of the sea, which are as monsters in regard of their excelliue greatnes. Now howsoever this description agrees to the king of Egypt, yet vnder this one he meant to comprehend all the enemies of the Church.

Martin Luther understood full well the allegorical force of Leviathan and Behemoth. In his Magnificat,33 he shows how the Bible demonizes “the proud, those “forlorn people” of the Book of Job: “Sometimes it calls them adders who stop their ears lest they hear;34 sometimes stubborn unicorns,35 sometimes roaring lions;36 sometimes great immovable rocks;37 sometimes dragons;38 and much else besides.” Leviathan and Behemoth are demonizations too: “Equally well are they depicted in Job 40 and 41, where the same kind of people are called Behemoth [Job 40:10ff, 41:10ff]. Behema means a single animal, but behemoth means a number of such animals, in other words, a race which has an animal mind, and does not allow the spirit of God in it.”39 In the sixteenth century, Luther had already given a racial reading of the terms: “The Bible describes them [Behemoth] as having an eye like the red of dawn, for there is no measure to their cunning, and their skin is so tough that they only scoff at a stab or a sting.” Referring now to Leviathan, he continued: “the monsters” scales overlap, and leave no intervening space; for these people hold closely together, and the spirit of God cannot enter them.”40 (A famous sexual harrassment case at the University of Pennsylvania in 1993 turned on whether the Hebrew word for “water-buffalo” constituted a racial slur; the word in question was “behema.”)

It seems then that Reformation commentators were well aware of the allegorical referents for Leviathan and Behemoth in the powerful states of ancient Egypt and Assyria. But perhaps because these allusions implied an immanent critique of secular nation states—already alarmingly fragile, and the reader to persecute, the more fragile they were—or because the Reformers discouraged apocalyptic speculation—and these were apocryphal texts—they found it politic to play them down. This Hobbes was not willing to do, finding fertile material in the Book of Job for his mortal commonwealth, personified by the sword-wielding sovereign, a work of artifice both fearsome and fragile, mandated by God to reign in historical time, that sliver of temporality created in the interstices of eternity.
(3) BRAMHALL CATCHING LEVIATHAN

It was quite a sheer perversity on Hobbes’s part to make such play of the beasts of the Book of Job, and, true to form, he seemed to intend it as a provocation. When, in a series of exchanges with Bishop John Bramhall, Hobbes challenged Bramhall to put in print his objections to his religious doctrine, he offered him the title “Behemoth against Leviathan.” Bramhall, whose systematic rebuttal of the theological chapters of Leviathan has never been surpassed, and who referred to that work as “Monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum,” countered with, “The catching of LEVIATHAN, or the Great Whale.” The irony was not lost on Bramhall that Hobbes, who argued so systematically against phantasms, should have resorted to a mythical monster to characterize his commonwealth. Bramhall was not the only critic to remark on this peculiarity, the subject of Alexander Ross’s, Leviathan Drawn out with a Hook (1653), but he was certainly the most thorough. He dared Hobbes to show that he himself was not Leviathan—a possibility on which subsequent commentators, pointing to the resemblance that Leviathan’s head in one of the versions of the frontispiece bears to the author, have speculated. Bramhall taunts Hobbes, whose Leviathan, he says, is a man-fish, like the Palestinian idol Dagon, rather than a whale-fish, the biblical original:

his Leviathan, or mortal God, is a meer phantasme of his own devising, neither flesh nor fish, but a confusion of a man and a whale, engendered in his own brain: not unlike Dagon the Idol of the Philistims, a mixture of a god and a man and a fish. The true literall Liviathan is the Whale-fish.

Bramhall challenges Hobbes the rhetor, who tried to summon into existence a polity by persuasion, invoking classical heroes, Hercules, Pericles, and the proverbial Pythagoras. No one saw more clearly than Bramhall the brazen-ness of Hobbes’s heresy. He who in work after work had damned the opinionated philosophers of the Greek schools for contaminating early Christianity with their teachings, dared himself to offer an opinion on the Christian commonwealth that convicted him as an heresiarch—“a second Pythagoras, at least.” Hobbes himself was the monster, among all the children of pride, the great Leviathan incarnate:

And for a metaphorical Leviathan, I know none so proper to personate that huge body as T. H. himself. The Leviathan doth not take his pastime in the deep with so much freedom, nor behave himself with so much height and insolence, as T. H. doth in the Schooles, nor domineer over the lesser fishes with so much scorn and contempt, as he
doth over all other authors, censuring, branding,contenting, proscribing whatsoever
is contrary to his humour; bustling and bearing down before him whatsoever cometh in
his way, creating truth and falsehood by the breath of his mouth, by his sole authority,
without other reason; A second Pythagoras at least. There have been self-conceited
persons in all Ages, but none that could ever King it like him over all the children of pride.
(Job 41.34.) Ruit, agit, rapit, tundit & prosternit.46

Bramhall has Hobbes’s measure and knows that he can convict him of
inconsistency:

I have provided three good harping irons for my self to dart at this monster, and am
resolved to try my skill and fortune, whether I can be as successful against this phantastick
Leviathan, as they are against the true Leviathan.47

Bramhall’s discursus on the whale-fish Leviathan is shaped to the structure
of theological rebuttal, each line of argument a harpoon with which to spear
Hobbes, more vulnerable than he thinks to the small fry who assail him. The
passage may also be read as an elaborate allegory of the threat posed to the
unitary state by nonconformists, namely the Protestant sects. Hobbes’s
heterodoxy opens the door, ironically, to the very proliferation of opinion he
is most concerned to forestall. Bramhall paints frightful images of the
consequences in the little mouse that “stealeth up thorough the Elephants
trunke to eat his brains, making him die desperately mad”; the Indian rat that
“creepeth into the belly of the gaping Crocodile, and knaweth his bowels
asunder”; and the sword-fish and the thrasher-fish that join forces with the
Greenland fishermen to overwhelm Leviathan, “at last to draw this formida-
ble creature to the shore, or to their ship, and slice him in pieces and boile
him in a Cauldron, and tun him up in oil.”48 The metonymy of Leviathan was
the synecdoche of the state.

Hobbes had offered to his critics the intolerable provocation of an alle-
gorical interpretation of scripture, against which they so heavily enveighed—
even as he denied the spiritual and ghostly beings to which they, inconsistent
by turn, subscribed in notions of the soul, angels and demons.49 Leviathan’s
point was the spectre of countervailing power. The ghostly powers of the
pope, as King of Fayrieland, were real enough; just as real had been the
demonized power of pharaonic Egypt and Assyria to the fledgling Israelite
state. Is the commonwealth then a Leviathan by inversion to render the
papacy anti-Leviathan? Perhaps Hobbes saw himself as Leviathan with
respect to the Church, fish-man and demon in the service of the state, and
revelled in it, just so long as it did not cost him his head. In the Historia
Ecclesiastica, his enchiridion in elegaic prose, he nicely turns the metaphor
of Leviathan. The ancient imperial states, those mighty beasts, Egypt,
Assyria, and Rome, have all been hooked; and snares are being prepared for the rest. The *Historia Ecclesiastica* includes a long discursus on the serpent and the ensnaring arts of the papacy, its hooks and lures of many colours:50

But now the Pope his end compleatly gains,
And leads the People, and their Prince, in Chains:
Now vast *Leviathan* the Hook receives,
And *Behemoth* his wounded Nostrils grieves:
All gently own the Pope's Imperial Sway
Where'r the Roman eagles wing their Way.

No crafty Angler will his Art despise,
Though in his Nets a scanty Profit lies;
And ever busy'd in his small Affairs,
He mends his Nets, or strictly views his Wares,
His Lines new models, or his Hooks surveys,
And ev'ry Thing in decent Order lays;
Gay gaudy Flies of ev'ry Sort are seen,
The bright Carnation and the lovely Green.

The inversion of *Leviathan* was now complete: the Papacy usurps the role of ancient Israel, "draw[ing] out *Leviathan* with an hooke or his tongue with a corde," piercing the nostrils of *Behemoth*. Those pitiable (but Satanic) monsters personifying the ancient Egyptian and Assyrian states, respectively, have given way to the great whale, the Christian commonwealth, and now the Pope acts the role of God the Father. Hobbes's play on the beasts of Job goes far beyond allegory and enters the realm of blasphemy. Is it any wonder the man was accused of heresy?

(4) *LEVIATHAN AND THE GALlic HERCULES*

But perhaps we are looking in the wrong place to establish the meaning of *Leviathan*. The kingly figure wearing the four-arched crown, wielding scepter and sword, naked, his body composed of the many persons of his realm, may not be "the coiled one" at all. Presiding almost benignly over a model town spread out before him, the spires of churches and the orderly streets a model of civility, *Leviathan*, if that is who this figure is, would seem a guardian of civilization and no monster.51 Arrayed under the insignia of power civil and ecclesiastical, respectively, are symmetrical cameos. A castle is juxtaposed to the ark as seat of power; the crown versus the mitre, potent symbols. Over against the canon stands the divine thunderbolt; and the
banners and battle standards of jostling civil powers are pitted against the three pronged, Trinitarian forks, and the two horned dilemmas of ecclesiastical controversy. The dénouement is in each case different: war, the outcome of civil strife; the court of excommunication, the outcome of doctrinal malfeasance. Who is the guardian of cities, villages, shires, and fields, shown in the frontispiece? Is it the Godly Prince, and if so, how could he be Leviathan?52

The depiction of Leviathan in the frontispiece is counterintuitive. Neither a ship nor a whale, it is much more an image drawn from medieval organic theories of kingship than a biblical image. There is a more obscure tradition to which Hobbes may be appealing, one to which he makes allusion in the body of the text, and that is the Gallic Hercules, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus,53 alluded to by Apuleius, and of whom the Syrian Rhetor Lucian tells such a strange story.54 Named by the Celts “Heracles Ogmios,” he was old, bald, naked except for lion’s skin, wrinkled, and “burned as black as can be, like an old sea-dog.” But he carries the equipment of Heracles, the club and the quiver, and “is Heracles from head to heel as far as that goes.”55 He differs from the classical Heracles in a surprising respect: “That old Heracles of theirs drags after him a great crowd of men who are all tethered by the ears” to his tongue.56 Lucian reports a Celtic stranger, fluent in Greek, who offered to “read [him] the riddle of the picture”:57

We Celts do not agree with you Greeks in thinking that Hermes is Eloquence: we identify Heracles with it, because he is far more powerful than Hermes. . . . In general, we consider that the real Heracles was a wise man who achieved everything by eloquence and applied persuasion as his principal force. His arrows represent words, I suppose, keen, sure and swift, which make their wounds in souls.

Not by chance, Hobbes invokes the image of the Gallic Hercules to describe his “Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth,” tied by “Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which [citizens] themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears.”58 With this allusion, Hobbes demonstrates not only his classical knowledge but also his acquaintance with traditions of monarchy learned at first hand in France. Henry II, for his carefully scripted triumphal entry into Paris in 1549, had chosen the Gallic Hercules as an effigy of the king. Clad only in an animal skin, his pediment was a ship, flanked by two naked men raising a cartouche with the legend: “trahimur, seqvimurque volentes.”59 Referring to the four accompanying statues that personified the
Estates, their ears chained to the lips of the king, it translated: "we are pulled and we follow freely."60

The message that rhetor Lucian reports: "you know the kinship between ears and tongue,"61 is one that Henry II had learned well. Eloquence was the lesson that the Renaissance rhetoricians and authors of mirrors taught. Gaullaume Budé had first proposed the model of the Gallic Hercules to Francis I in his 1518 *Institution du Prince*.62 Jean Bodin, who in the *Methodus* observed that "before the time of Henry II . . . we never used the word 'Majesty' in addressing the king,"63 in *De la République* declared, "there is nothing more natural, than for the subjects to conforme themselves unto the manners, unto the doings and sayings of their prince . . . having their eyes, their senses, and all their spirits, wholly bent to the imitation of him."64 He then took the liberty of advising the prince on his proper comportment:

> Wherefore a prince that is wise is, so oft as he should show himself unto the people (which he should most seldom do) should so prepare himselfe, as that he may unto all men seeme even in his face and countenance to carry with him a certaine state and majestie yet still mixt with modestie, but especially in his speech, which should always be maiesticall and sententious.

The Heracles who taught by eloquence forsaking the club, his arrows words, became a Renaissance image for *lex animata*, the king as animate law. While Petrarch spoke of "healing speech," and Francis I aspired to "douce eloquence et royal bonte," the eloquence of which Bodin was mindful was the language with which Francis I had in fact dealt with the rebels of La Rochelle: "with the maiestie of his speech [he] terrified them" into obedience.65

Nor was eloquence the only lesson the Gallic Hercules taught. The classical hero took over the characteristics of his rival Hermes, as the civilizer of peoples, who taught agriculture, protected cities. His Eastern provenance crept back in Geoffrey Troy's 1510 edition of the false Berosus [Babylonicus]; and in 1529 Champfleury made him "not only King of Gaul but also a great magician, astronomer, and even founder of Paris."66 Henry II himself at his 1550 ceremonial entry into Rouen had been greeted by a pageant depicting the Christian king as the antique Hercules, slaying the hydra, accompanied by Orpheus and the nine muses.67 The bestiary of the Book of Job relates etymologically to the hydra and other monsters of the East Mediterranean myth cycle, Leviathan among them.

Hercules' nakedness, as portrayed in the 1649 royal entry statue, at first a potent classical pagan symbol, was both an evocation of the medieval doctrine of the King's Two Bodies and a satire upon it. It evoked the man, as
distinct from the king, who in the classical “double funeral” was represented quite simply as an old man’s body in a shroud. In France, the persona of the king, decked out in royal regalia, represented the office of kingship under a special aspect: the king-in-parlement as opposed to one man rule. It was to this ideal of the robed king that the ceremonial statue of the naked king Henry II, drawing the four estates in tow, bound by their ears to the lips of the king, was a direct affront. It suggested a rupture of traditional patterns of consultancy, of listening and speaking, between king and people, and a turn to government based upon imperial edicts and fear associated with Hispano-Papalism, the courts of Charles V and Philip II.

What could the Gallic Hercules have meant to Hobbes, whose only mentions of the classical hero by name are disparaging? In book 1 chapter 12 of Leviathan on Religion, Hobbes refers to Hercules with Bacchus as “mongrill Gods,” added by the “Legislators of the Gentiles” for the benefit of the ignorant to the panoply of “ministeriall Gods,” anthropomorphized and “endowed . . . with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenuues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols.” Hercules appears again in book 2 chapter 30, devoted to the “Office of the Sovereign Representative,” in a discussion of the psychology of rewards and punishments as levers of power that might well have been written by the great commentator on the Roman Empire, Polybius. Preferment and benefices are signs not “of Gratitude, but of Fear: [nor] does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Publique”.

It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischief, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of Manufacture, so also Malice increaseth by being vendible.

Although apparently observations in passing, Hobbes’s references are reliable clues to the Gallic Hercules as celebrated in sixteenth century France. His career did not end with Henry II, who aspired both to unfettered one-man rule of Polybian monarchia and the territorial ambitions of civilizing Hercules, who turned swords into plough shares and spears into pruning forks. Henry IV, the former Protestant Henry of Navarre, who, judging Paris worth a Mass, converted to Catholicism, fathered the Catholic Henrietta Maria, Queen consort of Charles I, and later, with Sully, authored the Edict of Nantes, could be said to demonstrate the sort of religiosity of which Hobbes approved. Succeeding Henry III (1551-89), whose reign oversaw bitter civil war between Protestants and Catholics, the latter united in a holy
league under the Duc de Guise, Henry IV, in the failing days of the Emperor Rudolf II, harboured ambitions to become King of the Romans and take up the cudgels of Christianity against the Turks, whose success in the Balkans at the battle of Kanizsa had shamed the Hapsburgs.\textsuperscript{75} Henry's marriage to Maria de' Medici brought with it vistas of a Christendom, from the dominions of Austria to Italy and Spain, united against Islam, seen to herald a \textit{renovatio} of Christian empire in which the Gallic Hercules was radically redeployed. Henry IV, who in 1594 had entered Paris as Perseus, who slew the dragon Spain, the Medusa, as it threatened to devour a chained virgin, was portrayed variously as Caesar, Alexander, Augustus, Constantine, and Charlemagne.\textsuperscript{76} But his most symptomatic personifications were as the Gallic Hercules, just because of the symbolic complexity that the legendary progenitor of so many princely lines permitted.\textsuperscript{77}

In 1592 at the height of the civil war, Henry as Hercules, armed with a club, was portrayed "dragging the [three-headed] dog Cerberus up from the under-world with a rope, signify[ing] that by his resplendent virtue the Prince subdues and expels vices from his nation with just and hallowed laws," the Venetian Antonio Ricciardo Brixiano, reported.\textsuperscript{78} His armaments were striking. On medal after medal, Henry IV is portrayed as Hercules-Hermes, bearer of peace, his weapons a caduceus and a club. The caduceus, Hermes' wand surmounted by entwined serpents, conflates images of the serpent staff of Moses and the ecclesiastical scepter, of which it was perhaps the prototype. Of these the equipment of Hobbes's Leviathan is noticeably similar.

By no accident, Henry IV as Gallic Hercules aspired to unite the two heads of the eagle, ecclesiastical and civil, long a dream of the Gallican Church, in which the king was saluted as founder of the Church of France, protector of cities, and "Empereur dans son Royaume."\textsuperscript{79} The imperial \textit{renovatio} was to combine the classical civilizing mission of Heracles-Hermes with a Christian peace in which the French king ruled as priest and prince. Vanquisher of the Medusa and the infidel abroad, he conquered "par la ceduee de sa clemence et vertu" at home,\textsuperscript{80} an image exquisitely crafted by engravers of medals, architects, and designers of royal entries, humanist historians, philologists, and poets. Isaac Casaubon, who dedicated his commentaries on Polybius to Henry IV, hailed him as "mighty author of peace, haven for those who are in danger and sole anchor of a Europe long storm-tossed and blown off her course."\textsuperscript{81} Honoré d'Urfé's famous allegorical-pastoral novel \textit{L'Astrée}, which tells of the Herculean travails of a young prince, finally admitted into the company of the divine Astraea, heralding a new age of civilization and peace, was dedicated to Henry IV, to whom the monumental work of Olivier de Serres, \textit{Le Théâtre d'Agriculture} of 1601, was also dedicated.\textsuperscript{82} These
pastoral and pacific allegories were dedicated to eloquence, rule by the word instead of by the club.

Hobbes’s answer to Davenant’s Preface to Gondibert, dedicated to him and his theories, shows the master much more attuned than his acolyte to French literary and rhetorical trends. For all that he campaigned against fairies and fantasm, Hobbes had no desire to extinguish the imagination: “fancy,” and its works. It is from “fancy,” “whence proceed those grateful similies, metaphors and other tropes, by which both poets and orators have it in their power to make things please or displease, and show well or ill to others, as they like themselves.”83 Leviathan’s success lies in the economy of rhetoric. The sword-wielding Leviathan must combine the emblems of church and state on a mission of peace. If the project of the Gallic Hercules was a Counterreformation imperial dream, Hobbes’s Leviathan was its antithesis: Protestant Prince, vanquisher of the many-headed papal and Presbyterian hydra, who would finally bring peace.

Now we see why Hobbes the materialist and crusader against fantasm dared to invoke images of Job and the Apocrypha, setting allegorical riddles officially ruled out by his theory for his followers to solve. Leviathan walked a tightrope between the Godly prince of protestantism and the God-king of pagan tradition. Multiple in its appeals, this synthetic figure, Gallic Hercules, Old Testament king, evocation of the humanist prince and the Book of Job, was as offensive to one tradition as it was attractive to another. Hobbes had overdone it. If “the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre, and sedition,” the spectre of a French absolute monarch ruling like Pericles, who “by his elegant speeches thundered and lightend, and confounded whole Greece t’selfe,”84 was more than the seventeenth century Englishman was prepared to take.

Hobbes indulged in insolent irony in invoking Lucian the rhetor, author of the notorious Philosophies for Sale.85 He paints “rhetors, a vile race, drawn by greed of money and fanning ears to people proud but poor, who take nothing seriously unless told them by bearded philosophers with austere faces, their whole lives an affront to their own teachings.”86 Lucian, historian of the Gallic Hercules and rhetor who deplores all rhetoricians, is Hobbes, and Hobbes, author of Leviathan, is Lucian. If Leviathan is the French King, the Spanish Emperor, the Pope, and the Counterreformation league, that makes the English parliament, that nest of Presbyterians, Behemoth.

Hobbes had effected a set of startling reversals that only contrived to make him more heretical, more politically dangerous, and more theologically controversial. Given his irrepressible disposition, this could have been more or less intentional. For he had serious philosophical reasons for naming his books the way he did, which controversy sometimes obscured. Memory of the Old Testament creator God, the God of fear, could not be expunged from
the dispensation of the New Testament, he maintained; not only because of the reality of power politics—old states and old scores to settle—but, more seriously, due to the hermeneutics of power. Leviathan, as an aweful figure of might, personated the Old Testament God who had built the world like a temple poised between worlds. Its storm walls and its starry roof were open for all to see. By such a show of strength, the creator God assailed men, who could not deny him or the Leviathans who personified his power—the latter like Beelzebub were beasts, but somehow part of the divine design. That Hobbes should have designated his own Christian commonwealth a Leviathan is as much an expression of his relentless honesty as it is of his desire to provoke. Like the kingdoms of old—as the creation of men no better and no worse—it was the sort of state one might expect a Henry IV to lead or, at one time, a Charles I.

NOTES

1. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 1989 ed., vol. 8, 869) gives several meanings for the term up to and including the seventeenth century including, firstly, a monster, in the seventeenth century meaning of marvel: "the name of an aquatic animal (real or imaginary) of enormous size, frequently mentioned in Hebrew poetry," as in 1382, Wyclif, Job xl[1.] 20 [21] Whether maist thou drawen out leuyethan with an hoc? 1535 Coverdale Ps ciii[1.] 26, There is that Leuiathan, whom thou hast made, to take his pastyme therein. 1555, Eden, Decades, To Rdr. (Arb.) 51 The greate serpente of the sea Leuiathan, to haue such dominion in the Ocean. 1591, Spenser, Vis. World’s Van. 62, The huge Leuiathan, dame Natures wonder; secondly, "a man of wast and formidable power or enormous wealth": 1607, Dekker, Knts Conjur. 60, The lacquy of this great leuiathan promise he should be maister. c. 1630, Sanderson, Serm. II.310, So can the Lord deal . . . with the great . . . leviathans of the world; thirdly, "After Isaiah xxvii.I.) The great enemy of God, Satan": 1382 Wyclif, Isa. xxvii.I, In that dai viseten shal the Lord in his harde sward . . . vp on leuyathan . . . a crookit wounde serpent. c. 1400 Destr. Troy 4423, This fende was the first that felle for his pride . . . that lyuyaton is cald. 1412-20, Lydg. Chron. Troy. II, xvii, The vile serpent the Leuiathan. 1447 Bokenham, Seytnys [Roxb.] 150, By the enyve deceivyd of hys enmy Clepyd serpent behemoat or leuyathan. 1595, B. Barnes, Spir. Sonn. li, Breake thou the jawe of old Levayathan, Victorious Conqueror; and fourthly, "attrib. passing into adj. when sense: Huge, monstrous: 1624, Middleton, Game at Chess, II. ii, This leviathan-scandal that lies rolling Upon the crystal waters of devotion. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) acknowledges that after 1651 the meaning of the term was changed forever, by Hobbes use of it to mean "The organism of political society, the commonwealth" (OED, 1989 ed., 869).

Library and its staff, where I began this work and from whom I was the recipient of a grant-in-aid; to Larry Bryant, Alan Cromartie, Johann and Margaret Sommerville, and Patricia Harris Stublein, my colleagues there, for useful discussion and assistance; to the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., where as a Fellow for the 1993-4 academic year I have had the pleasure of completing it; and to the Editor and anonymous readers of this journal. I am indebted to Alan Cromartie for specific information on Herbert, Culverwell and the biblical commentaries; to Larry Bryant for his excellent work on the Gallic Hercules; and to Patricia Harris Stublein for sources on big fish stories, including her own (unpublished) "No Whale Is an Island."

3. Iconographic investigations are less fruitful. Of the books consulted on monsters and marvellous beasts: Christopher Hill, Antichrist in Seventeenth Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); C.J.S. Thompson, The Mystery and Lore of Monsters (London: Williams and Norgate, 1930); Heinz Mode, Fabulous Beasts and Monsters (London: Phaidon, 1975); Claude Kappler, Monstres et Dénoms et Merveilles à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Payot, 1980), only Mode makes mention of Leviathan or Behemoth. Mode (1975, 118, 119, 120, 153) reproduces the text of Isaiah 27:1, setting it in the context of a brief discussion of Tiamat and dragon figures of earlier Mesopotamian and Near Eastern literature, accompanied by an excellent line drawing of Leviathan (a dragon) and Behemoth (a hippopotamus) by William Blake, 1825, too late for our purposes. Even the compendious work of P. Gaspar Schott, S.J., Physica Curiosa, sive Mirabilia naturae et artis (1667), ranging from angels and demons to biological and astronomical marvels, includes no mention of Leviathan or Behemoth. This despite mention of Egyptian conjurors turning rods into serpents (Schott, 1667, bk. 1, chap. 20, 58); brief mention of Job 1:3 of the Book of the Apocalypse on the precursor to Antichrist (Schott, 1667, bk. 1, chap. 19, 51) and Isaiah 13:5, 20 on the extermination of the Babylonians and their place being taken by dragons (Schott, 1667, bk. 3, chap. 2, 360); and a chapter devoted to Egyptian monsters and deformities (Appendix to bk. 12, chap. 6, 1377-8), matters of related interest to Hobbes.

4. Strong, "How to Write Scripture," 147. Victoria Silver, in her "Critical Response, I: A Matter of Interpretation," Critical Inquiry 20 (Autumn, 1993): 160-71, argues against Strong that the Leviathan is a figure for "the world's fundamental intransigence—its resistance to explanation" (p. 164). This is, I think, quite wrong, if only, as I shall show, on the grounds of anachronism.

5. Quoted in Silver, "Critical Response," 164-5, as evidence of God flexing his muscles in the creation of Leviathan, symbol of the intransigence of the world and resistance to explanation.

8. Ibid., 166, 1991 ed., 220
10. Strong, "How to Write Scripture," 132-3, 149.

11. Ibid. It is important to emphasize that Reformation epistemic revisions to the allegorical tradition of Catholicism represented an institutional challenge in the first instance, and philosophic changes only as a consequence. Allegorical interpretation had opened up a vast terrain of possible meanings, giving the Church the scope it needed to claim institutional authority over the sacred books. The Protestant attempt to claim the scriptures back for the common reader had its analogue in Hobbes's attempt to claim back civil society and its full array of institutions, including philosophy and government, from the domain of an imperial church. It represented at once a democratic appeal to the equality of all believers and an institutional counterclaim against the Church. For this reason, I think that Tracy Strong is right to see the Protestant position on the question of how we can know the scriptures as Hobbes's paradigm for how we can know God and, further, how we can know that civil government is divinely sanctioned. In each of these cases, "know" is the operative word, the "leap of faith" that Silver objects to and that Strong...
reasserts. (See Strong’s “Critical Response II: When Is a Text not a Pretext? A Rejoinder to Victoria Silver,” Critical Inquiry 20 (Autumn 1993): 172-8, esp., 172-4). Seventeenth century propositions concerning matters for which we have even fewer guidelines than for understanding scripture do not lend themselves to redescription as, for instance, “‘interpreting’ the existence of God,” or “‘interpreting’ the legitimacy of the sovereign.” Semantically incongruous and politically dangerous, they offer no warrant for the redescription “‘interpreting’ the Bible,” either, language that exegeses are careful not to use.


17. Theodore Beza, Job Expounded, Dedicatorie, 4-5.

18. Hugh Broughton, an Hebraist and scholar, noted in his title the time he expended on interpretation compared with translation: Hugh Broughton, Iob. To the King. A Colon-Argippina studie of one moneth, for the metricall translation. But of Many Yeres, for Ebrew Difficulties. Part 2 is Iob. Brought on to familiar dialogue and paraphrase for easier entendement (n.p., 1610, STC 3868). He skips over Job, chapters 38 to 42, with the general comment that God’s point here is to teach people: on the one hand, that his demonstrations of power are visible; on the other, that probing them too deeply for meaning is a show of pride of just the sort for which Job took our punishment. Broughton’s comment amounts to a confession of failure with this particular set of “ebrew difficulties,” which is to say that he is more open than most of his contemporary commentators (Ibid., 144). This translation, with a political purpose no doubt, had been made for King James I. Earlier, in his translation of The Lamentation of Jeremy (1606, 34), dedicated to “Henry, Prince of Great Britany,” Broughton had cross-referenced the dragon and ostrich of chapter 4:3 of the Lamentations (“Even the Dragons open their breast, they give suck to their whelps: the daughter of my people is like the cruel: as the ostrich in the wildernes”) to the unicorn of Job 39:14, suggesting some unfathomable association between these apocalyptic beasts. The choice of Job and the Lamentations of Jeremiah as texts for royal dedication could, as in the case of Beza, simply be to exhort the Prince to constancy and courage in times of trial, with no particular, or negative, focus on the apocalyptic content, as the Broughton’s subtitle for the Lamentations (1606), which “Stirreth all to attention of God’s Ordered Providence in Kingdomes confusion,” would suggest.


21. Ibid., 488-9. Oecolampadius’ account is one of the most comprehensive surveys of interpretatons of Behemoth and Leviathan in Bible commentaries.

23. Behemoth's tail stiff like a Cedar in the Book of Job, would have been read as a figure for Lebanon.


25. Ibid., 731a, 4-11.

26. Ibid., 731a, 16-21.

27. Ibid., 732b, 33ff.

28. Ibid., 732a, 53ff: “Howbeit before I goe any further, wheras here is so long a discourse vpon the said king of beasts of the land whiche I said was an Elephant, (albeit that it bee named here by the general terme of Behemoth) & also vpon the Leuiathan: we haue to marke therupon how men haue bin of opinion, that by an allegory the diuel is spoken of here, rather than either the Elephant or the Whale, and that they haue gone aboute to prove that fanastical deuise of theirs by this, that in the end is said, that the said whale is the king of the children of pride.”

29. Ibid., 733a, 6-11: “Neuertheles truely, by conueying the discourse from the one to the other, a man might as wel vse this similitude of the Whales and Elephants, to make men perceiue how greatly the power of the Deuil ought to fray vs, seeing he is termed the prince of the ayre and of the world.”


31. Calvin, 1584 ed., 733b, 11ff, 28ff; “If we beare away this singlenes, it will stand vs in better steed then all curious expositions that canne be deuised, as when these Allegorimakers serched out his ribs & backbones, & treated also of his skin & of this & that, & to be short, there was not that peece of him, wherein they found not some toy or other. But this is as it were to make the holy scripture a nose of ware, by transfroming it from the natural sense.”


34. Ps. 58:4.


36. Ps. 7:2.

37. Jer. 5:3.

38. Ps. 74:13.


40. Ibid.

41. Hobbes’s challenge is issued in his “Animadversions upon the Bishop’s Epistle to the Reader,” in The *English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. by Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839-45; 11 vols, referred to as E.W.), vol. 5, 25-6, prefacing *The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, Clearly Stated and Debated between Dr. Bramhall, Bishop of Derby and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury* (1654). It is interesting to speculate at what point Hobbes decided to use the title Behemoth himself, the work that was completed in 1668 and published only in 1679. Hobbes is mute on the significance of its title, at which we can only guess. Did the
Long Parliament in any way resemble Behemoth as a figure for the Assyrians, land of Nebuchadnezzar and the Tower of Babel?


43. Ibid., iii: "I do believe there never was any Author Sacred or Profane, Ancient or Moderne, Christian, Jew, Mahumetan, or Pagan, that hath inveighed so frequently and so bitterly against all feigned phantasmes, with their first devisers, maintainers, and receivers, as T. H. hath done, excluding out of the nature of things the souls of Men, Angels, Devils, and all incorporeal Substances, as fictions, phantasmes, and groundlesse contradictions. Many men fear the meaning of it is not good, that God himself must be gone for company, as being an incorporeal substance, except men will vouchsafe by God to understand nature. So much T. H. himself seemeth to intimate."

44. Brown, "The Artist of the Leviathan"; Strong, "How to Write Scripture."


47. Ibid. Bramhall expands on his image: "My first dart is aimed at his heart, or Theological part of his discourse, to shew that his principles are not consistent either with Christianity, or any other Religion. The second dart is aimed at the chine [OED: backbone], whereby this vast body is united and fitted for aminal motion, that is, the political part of his discourse; to shew that his principles are pernicious to all formes of Government, and all Societies, and destroy all relations between man and man. The third dart is aimed at his head or rational part of his discourse; to shew that his principles are inconsistent with themselves, and contradict one another. Let him take heed, if these three darts do pierce his Leviathan home, it is not all the Dittany [OED: pepperwort, cure for monsters] which growth in Creet that can make them drop easily out of his body, without the utter overthrow of his cause."

48. Ibid.

49. For more detailed studies of Hobbes on these particular religious doctrines see the following pieces by Patricia Springborg, "Leviathan and the Problem of Ecclesiastical Authority," Political Theory 3, no. 3 (1975): 289-303; "Leviathan, the Christian Commonwealth Incorporated," Political Studies 24, no. 2 (1976): 171-83.


51. This is the spirit of Tracy Strong's description of the frontispiece in "How to Write Scripture," 130.

52. Henry VIII claimed a super-king role in medieval mystical body language "We as head and you as members, we are conjoined and bound together in one body politic," cited by Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 228; but even he does not quite qualify for the might and terror of Leviathan.


56. Ibid., 65.


59. For this account of Henry IV as the Gallic Hercules, I am indebted to Lawrence M. Bryant, “Politics, Ceremonies, and Embodiments of Majesty in Henry II’s France,” in *European Monarchy, its Evolution and Practice from Roman Antiquity to Modern Times* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992) 127-54.

60. Ibid., 136-7.


63. Ibid., 136.


69. Bryant, “Politics, Ceremonies, and Embodiments,” 144-5.


71. Ibid., 241.

72. Polybius, 6.7.9-6.9.1.


74. As Tracy Strong has pointed out.


76. Ibid., 179-83.


85. I thank the anonymous reader of this journal for reminding me of the title of Lucian’s other famous work. For the Lucianic tradition more generally, see D. Duncan, Ben Jonson and the Lucianic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).


Patricia Springborg teaches in the Department of Government at the University of Sydney. A Woodrow Wilson International Scholar in 1994-95, she is now a Guest Fellow at the Brookings Institution as the recipient of a MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Grant.