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“HIS MAJESTY IS A BABY?”

A Critical Response to Peter Hammond Schwartz

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IN A MAGNIFICENTLY ECLECTIC ESSAY, Peter Hammond Schwartz draws on the Freudian concept of narcissism to account for the power of monarchy in the early stages of cultural development. He draws an analogy between the sense of “magical hallucinatory omnipotence” experienced in “the earliest stages of childhood – in which the needs of the well-cared-for infant are met almost unceasingly by its mother” and the sense of cosmic comfort induced by beneficent kings on the model of Moses, “the nursing father” of sacral kingship.¹ He cites the “‘oceanic feeling’ to which Freud referred in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, that inability of the infant at the breast to distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing upon him,” as symptomatic of a failure by the child to distinguish its identity from that of the mother.²

The upshot is a “megalomania induced by this transubstantiation of personal identities from discrete, self-contained unities into one vast, throbbing organism [which] confers upon each individual the sense of possessing an omnipotent ego.”³ It is this form of megalomania which sacral leadership induces, calling on “the authority of the omnipotent mother of earliest infancy, whose seductive siren song to the child that he or she need not grow up” is invoked. Not surprisingly, Schwartz takes the analogy all the way, suggesting that the deconsecration of monarchy and perhaps, necessarily,

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regicide mark “the ego’s definitive triumph over the narcissistic self” and measure the distance “between royal subjection and democratic citizenship”; it is a passage from dependency on kings, as ultimate “death objects,”⁴ to individual autonomy and self-development.

Schwartz thus reinterprets Kantorowicz’s notion of “the King’s Two Bodies” as proof positive of royal megalomania: “[T]he colossal body” of the king is a figment of the would-be omnipotent ego of cultural infancy. He suggests that the “numinous awe and religious sanctions” attaching to the patriarchal “nursing father” were generated out of “cultural disintegration, a sense of relativism, uncertainty and moral drift” that marked the transition from the medieval world to the modern nation-state. James I claimed to be “married to his realm,” and Elizabeth I was the “wife” and “mother” of the Commons, a new *Astraea*, the eternally returning virgin queen.⁵

Schwartz thus draws on a well established Freudian tradition of extrapolation from the psychogenesis of the individual to the psychogenesis of a nation. It is an approach urged by Freud in “On Narcissism” and later practiced in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, and, more controversially, in *Moses and Monotheism*. The maverick Wilhelm Reich (*The Mass Psychology of Fascism*) and the more orthodoxly Freudian Erich Fromm (*The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*) represent more radical exponents of this methodology. The approach still tacitly informs many contemporary studies of national culture.⁶ I wish to call into question some of the assumptions involved in applying this general methodology to monarchy and, on the basis of the work of recent scholars, suggest alternative interpretations of the specific forms of sacral kingship.

Schwartz assumes that republicanism and democracy represent regime normalcy, and alternative or substitute forms, deviance. It is true that most people, East and West, value free elections and economic freedoms and aspire to individual and collective self-determination. But these ideals are very far from suggesting, as Schwartz implies, that republicanism and democracy correspond to the maturation of individual and national egos. Recent feminist psychologists have, at the very least, called into question the proposition, which Schwartz affirms, “that separation from the mother dictates that the young child exchange ‘some of his magical omnipotence for autonomy and self-esteem.’”⁷ The gender determinative is a giveaway. As Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan have suggested, it is not psychogenesis in general which dictates separation from the mother as the trial by fire of normalcy and rationality but specific processes of acculturation and socialization. Nor are these paths to normalcy universal within a culture — it is sons, specifically, who must undergo the painful separation from, and self-assertion against, the

mother to establish the social distance from women necessary to perform the sex roles required of them as adult males. In our culture, daughters typically maintain a closer attachment.⁸

Approaching the analogue between ego development and democratic citizenship from the other end, the work of feminist classicists has called into question the assumption that democracy could historically be associated with the all-round promotion of individual self-development and political participation. Ancient Greek democracy was built on the male warrior hoplite soldier, whose freedom from "work" — other than fighting — was predicated on the subjugation of women and foreigners. Early modern, like ancient, democracy was founded on slavery; full, participatory democracy — which we no longer know — may only be founded on slavery.

Second, the psychoanalytic analysis of monarchy presupposes that the mind-set of both monarchs and their subjects is accessible to us. At the conclusion of a study of surprising parallels in the iconography and official propaganda of ancient Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Greek, Roman, medieval European, and modern African kingship,⁹ I still have to say that this is an assumption requiring proof. I am not, of course, making the contrary assertion that the minds of those from distant or foreign cultures are forever closed to us but, rather, insisting that we cannot know a priori what they think. The presence of institutions and artifacts apparently familiar to us is not in itself sufficient to deduce familiar meanings. We need evidence better than that, which in some cases we have.

Take, for instance, the notion of the immortality of office expressed as "gemination," or "twinning," as Kantorowicz terms it, and which Schwartz refers to as "the king's colossal body." This notion has striking parallels in the form of the pharaoh and his *ka*, the Greek *daimon*, the "ghost" of ancient Mesopotamian and modern Bugandan kings, and the Roman Emperor and his *genius*.¹⁰ The presence of these parallels does not of itself presuppose a continuity of *concepts*, however, or any particular *theorization* of monarchy, unless further evidence is adduced. They may simply be relics or icons transmitted haphazardly by processes of cultural diffusion and interpreted anew each time, like certain motifs in myth and ritual which are vestigial and sometimes syncretized or transposed because they have lost their original meaning.¹¹

The case of "the King's Two Bodies" throws light on the central tenets of Schwartz's approach as well as that of Freud himself. The concept of the king's "immortal body" as a case of gemination or "twinning" represents an iconographic depiction of what we now understand to be the institutional life of corporate entities. Drawing, as it did on the Church's claim to be the

“Mystical Body of Christ” and, further back, of Roman corporations and sodalities to be “fictitious persons,” the monarch’s legal status as a “corporation sole” permitted the Crown to enjoy all the legal rights and immunities enjoyed by corporations down to our own day.¹² So intimate was the relation between the Crown, as corporative representative, and the people, as represented, that kings, and queens who designated themselves as kings, claimed to be “married to the Commons” in the same way that bishops, according to Gratian’s decree, claimed to be “married to the Church” — Elizabeth I claiming simultaneously to be the bride and mother of her parliaments.

Although such grandiloquent language might appear to be an instance of royal infantile gigantism, this is not necessarily so. The ancient Egyptians expressed “twinning” much more explicitly than subsequent royal propagandists, except for the contemporary Buganda. From depictions of the divine conception and birth of Queen Hatshepsut and of Kings Amenhotep III and Ramses II on the walls of Luxor Temple, we know the king’s “other” was indeed portrayed as a still-born twin, born with the “king” — queens too referred to themselves as male in their kingly persona — only to vanish from the scenes in which the mortal king is suckled by the life-giving cow goddesses, washed, and presented to the ennead, later to be crowned and apotheosized. The recent work of Egyptologists has suggested that Luxor Temple functioned as the cult center of the royal ka, the king’s immortal double, being the place to which the king came for the annual renewal of his divine powers. It has also been established that the inner sanctum of the temple, where the apotheosis of the pharaoh took place, known also as the “Roman vestibule,” marked the spot where the Romans established their *castrum* and lodged their standards.¹³ Still visible on the walls of the Roman vestibule are mosaic portrayals of the two Augusti — representations of the emperor and his *genius*.

Further associations between the cult place of the divine pharaoh and those of Hellenistic and Roman divinized kings are easily found. Alexander the Great, pronounced divine by Amun-Re at Siwa Oasis, personally oversaw the refurbishing of the barque chapel in Luxor Temple, later adopting the pharaonic crown of twisted rams’ horns, ureiai, and solar disks sacred to Amun, as did subsequent Hellenistic kings. Emperor Tiberius is to be seen as Roman pharaoh, like the Ptolemies outwardly indistinguishable from the indigenous Egyptian kings, parading on the walls of the Upper Egyptian temple at Kom Ombo. Caracalla actually had a statue cast of himself as pharaoh.¹⁴ Various Ptolemaic and Roman emperors were responsible for the continuous rebuilding and restoration of the pharaonic temples that now stand only in their Greco-Roman cladding, the original mud-brick construc-

tions having long since given way to the ravages of time. Moreover, the structure of Roman imperial funerals, in which a distinction was made between the effigy of the emperor, which was burned, and the eagle which was released simultaneously marking the moment of apotheosis, while the body was buried, follows the structure of Egyptian internment. There, *two* statues of a dead officer would be interned, one arrayed in a loincloth and wig, the insignia of office, and the other, "the man," bald and wrapped in a long cloth. Such similarities, which Kantorowicz points out in the Egyptian and Roman cases, extend to the case of medieval European kings and high officials who are laid out in the great cathedrals in double-storied tombs: On the upper level, the king or bishop in his regalia rests in effigy; on the lower, "the man" in his shroud.¹⁵

Egyptologists are divided over whether these parallels do or do not indicate the very early development of a notion of the eternity of office expressed as "twinning." But it is clear that we cannot pretend from the armchair to have penetrated the mind-set of ancient Egyptians, or indeed of Greeks and Romans, to understand what *they* meant by the rituals, much less to diagnose pathologies. Freud himself is clearly uneasy about the relationship between "speculative theory and a science founded upon constructions arrived at empirically."¹⁶ While several times expressing the opinion that libido theory, of which the theory of narcissism is a specific instance, "receives reinforcement . . . from the observations we make and the conceptions we form of the mental life of primitive peoples and of children," Freud is nevertheless more reluctant than Schwartz to press the analogue between children and primitives all the way. "In the former," he says,

we find characteristics which, if they occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania: an overestimation of the power of wishes and mental processes, the "omnipotence of thoughts," a belief in the magical virtue of words, and a method of dealing with the outer world—the art of "magic"—which appears to be the logical application of these grandiose premises.¹⁷

But he says in another context that "it is possible that this primordial identity has as little to do with our analytical interests as the primordial kinship of all human races has to do with a testator required by the Probate Court."¹⁸ Further empirical work will provide the basis on which to decide.

As his investigations in *Totem and Taboo* and *Moses and Monotheism* suggest, Freud's fascination with ancient monarchy and its sacral aspects concerns the complex and deeply rooted nature of our own institutions and practices as elaborate cultural artifices built on libidinal energy. No mere reduction of these phenomena to "infantilism"—which Marx was also known

airily to express¹⁹ – does justice to the lifelong infatuation with antiquity that both authors exhibit. And contemporary scholars are even less willing to refer so easily to “the primitive mind.”

Now, to give an etiology of “the King’s Two Bodies” as originating in pharaonic practice and, at the same time, deny that the concept expresses infantile fantasies may seem capricious on my part, given that ancient Egyptian monarchy would seem to be the last word in gigantism. But, in fact, I take it as my best case. Pharaonic monarchy is symptomized by colossal statues of the king – ka statues perhaps²⁰ – by inflated claims of the king to rule for “millions of years,” and by a titulary that would embarrass even the gods, full of boasts of potency – “bull of his mother” – androgynous names – “Two Ladies,” “Golden One,” and “Lady of the Two Lands.” Temple inscriptions abound in royal iconography and signs of divinity that extend from fans, signifying the royal “shadow,” or “shade,”²¹ to trampling lions, sphinxes, baskets, boxes, and other divine birth symbols,²² and endless royal festivals and jubilees. These extravagances, however, have been interpreted as signs of *weakness* rather than of omnipotence.²³ Not only were kings patently not accepted as gods but the grandiloquence of royal claims seems to rise and fall with the insecurity or security of the regime. Thus, under New Kingdom monarchs, trying to establish themselves in the wake of the troubled Second Intermediate Period of Hyksos rule – among them a woman (Hatshepsut) and a commoner (Horemheb) – we have a veritable crescendo of grandiosity, as we have again under the Ptolemies – Greeks trying to be Egyptian. There is no question that the ancients ever mistook kings for gods – the absence of a single ex-voto petition is evidence of that.²⁴ Nor, it appears did kings mistake themselves for gods: They always saw their rightful place to be the worldly palace and not the celestial realm, to which they were transported only with a lot of assistance after death, ferried there by the *ba* bird, like the eagle which carried skyward the soul of the apotheosized Roman emperor.²⁵ Moreover, in the quite substantial pharaonic literature that has survived, we have instances of kings pleading with gods, supplicating to the gods, and pleading to tell the truth, all of which is remarkably ungodlike behavior. When they boasted to be sons and daughters of various gods, it was only, it would seem, to make a claim on them.

Indeed, Paul Veyne, the great Roman scholar, maintains that divinization represented precisely attempts to put a claim on the emperor or pharaoh. Divinization was a double bind. Declared a god, one had to act like one. Spontaneous ruler cults – the more spontaneous, the further they were removed from the imperial seat – represented attempts by remote communities to lay claim to the beneficence of the emperor. As such divinization was a

species of international relations, not dissimilar from modern ruler cults, in which the personality of the leader receives an amplification of powers and is offered the fealty of subjects or satellites in exchange for aid and protection.²⁶ The Roman mobs, closest to the seat of power, were also the most disrespectful, which is why Roman emperors spent so long away from home. In Bulgaria, too, portraits of Soviet leaders more gigantic than in Russia itself express distant fealty, while in Iran, a new and insecure regime is symptomized by gigantism of a similar sort.

Beneficence is, indeed, a clue to the whole institution of divine kingship, explaining the massive public works undertaken by Egyptian kings—built not, as is popularly believed, by slaves but by contract laborers who belonged to corporations and guilds and received state rations, but also cash bonuses and incentives.²⁷ These public works, demonstrating a constant frenzy to build, represent the means by which kings vindicated their creative powers to gods and people. The relation between the eternal realm of the gods and the finite world of kings is close in Egypt, as it was generally in the ancient world. This is why the genealogies of kings always begin with the creation of the gods.²⁸ What the Egyptian theogonies recount is neither a prophylactic displacement of libidinal energy nor pretensions to godly creative power on the part of kings, but rather something more humble. When the sky god Nut and the earth god Geb drew apart, they created a small envelope of finite space in which the creatures to which they subsequently gave birth could dwell. That space, the world of earthly time, has a beginning and an end, unlike the celestial world of eternal recurrence, the realm of the gods. The world exists so that the gods, whose existence in turn could not otherwise be vindicated, can play out their creative powers. Kings represent intermediaries between the celestial world of the gods and the human terrestrial world, mediating divine beneficence and ferrying the prayers and supplications of small folk.²⁹ Such a role in the interface between the celestial and terrestrial worlds requires of kings that they be both godlike in their deportment to their subjects and human in their deportment to the gods. If the most common formula for royal intercession with the gods began with the words "I pray . . .," on the other hand, when the harvest failed or the weather turned bad, the blame was laid at the door of kings. Bound to be godlike in their manifestations to their subjects, kings at the same time consumed their days in the constant round of libations and rituals necessary to keep the gods in being.³⁰ Roman emperors and medieval kings, as Veyne has so well demonstrated, were not much different.³¹

Schwartz diagnoses a "feminine principle" in what he deems the "infantilism" of monarchy (something to which Plutarch and Gibbon also pointed).

Republicanism is "hard"; monarchy is "soft" (as we know from Gibbons's repeated remarks about the "slothfulness and effeminacy of the Syrians and Egyptians" and the "fierce independence" and "manly vigour" of the Caledonians and Teutons). Freud's theory of narcissism, the context for his discussion of infantilism and his remarks about "His Majesty the Baby," lends itself to such a distinction. He points to male narcissism as a deviant, usually homosexual type of libido-object separation, where the libidinal energy is directed back into the self. In the woman, however, narcissism is endemic. The same deflection of energies typically occurs after puberty, producing "probably the purest and truest feminine type," who, mesmerized by her own awakening sexuality, develops "a certain self-sufficiency (especially when there is a ripening into beauty) which compensates her for the social restrictions upon her object-choice."³²

The "beautiful woman" and her threat to the male order may be a motif as old as time. Ancient Egyptian literature records³³ one of the first instances of it in the form of the goddess Hathor, who is also the subject of the first Narcissus story. Dispatched as the avenging Eye of Re to bring folk back to reverence for the creator god, grown old, this goddess, whose etiology is said to be that of an anthropomorphized fertility symbol,³⁴ launches her attack on the desert peoples.³⁵ Hathor performs her role with such obvious relish that the creator god Re takes fright and bethinks himself a ruse to draw off the queen of the killing fields. He has beer mash made, red ochre quarried, and 7,000 jars of red beer stored at the ready. Then, at dawn, Re arose and ordered the Nile valley flooded "three palms high." When the avenging goddess awoke and beheld the valley, she saw her own face reflected in the blood-like lake "and her gaze was pleased by it." Mesmerized by her own image, she forgot humanity. "She drank and it pleased her heart," returning drunk to Re who addressed her: "Welcome in peace, O gracious one!" after which the narrator records, "Thus beautiful women came into being in the town of Imu."³⁶

In this, the first known instance of the "mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?" motif, we have an archetype to which Freud's diagnosis of female narcissism would seem to refer. Freud, characteristically, does not see female narcissism as a "normal" development or as generally positive. The renunciation of primary (infantile) narcissism is deemed by him to represent healthy ego development, while adult female ("the beautiful woman") and male (homosexual) narcissism represent regression. Pointing to the way in which narcissistic self-fixated powers emanate outwards, Freud notes the importance of "the beautiful woman" in the erotic life of men:

Such women have the greatest fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule they are the most beautiful, but also because of certain interesting psychological constellations. It seems very evident that one person's narcissism has a great attraction for those others who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are seeking after object-love; the charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-sufficiency and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and the large beasts of prey. In literature, indeed, even the great criminal and the humorist compel our interest by the narcissistic self-importance with which they manage to keep at arm's length everything which would diminish the importance of their ego. It is as if we envied them their power of retaining a blissful state of mind—an unassailable libido-position which we ourselves have since abandoned. The great charm of the narcissistic woman has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the dissatisfaction of the lover, of his doubts of the woman's love, of his complaints of her enigmatic nature, have their root in this incongruity between the types of object-choice.³⁷

While Freud notes that in his focus on the infantile nature of female narcissism, he has no intention "to depreciate women" and "that these different lines of development correspond to the differentiation of functions in a highly complicated biological connection," subsequent remarks are highly revealing.³⁸ He speaks of "countless women who love according to the masculine [anaclitic] type" where, curiously, the sort of other-regarding love associated with the "the woman who tends" and "the man who protects" is deemed archetypal. Freud concedes that even women whose attitude toward men "remains cool and narcissistic" remain open to complete object-love in the form of a child:

Other women again do not need to wait for a child in order to take the step in development from (secondary) narcissism to object-love. Before puberty they have had feelings of a likeness to men and have developed to some extent on masculine lines; after this tendency has been cut short when feminine maturity is reached, they still retain the capacity of longing for a masculine ideal which is really a survival of the boyish nature that they themselves once owned.³⁹

Although Freud is willing to postulate secondary narcissism of both female and homosexual types as regression to the primary narcissism of infancy, nowhere in his works is there any suggestion, to my knowledge, that "the King's Two Bodies," or any other manifestation of *majestas* for that matter, represents narcissism. One cannot infer from the throwaway epithet, "His Majesty the Baby," that "His Majesty is a baby"—rather, the phrase refers, once again, to the curious power emanating from narcissistic persons, which inclines them

to suspend in the child's favour the operation of all those cultural acquirements which their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew in his person the claims for privileges which were long ago given up by themselves. The child shall have things better than his parents; he shall not be subject to the necessities which they have recognized as dominating life. Illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will, are not to touch him; the laws of nature, like those of society, are to be abrogated in his favour; he is really to be the centre and heart of creation, "His Majesty the Baby," as we once fancied ourselves to be. He is to fulfil those dreams and wishes of his parents which they never carried out, to become a great man and a hero in his father's stead, or to marry a prince as a tardy compensation to the mother. At the weakest point of all in the narcissistic position, the immortality of the ego which is so relentlessly assailed by reality, security is achieved by fleeing to the child. Parental love, which is so touching and at bottom so childish, is nothing but parental narcissism born again and, transformed though it be into object-love, it reveals its former character infallibly.⁴⁰

Whatever analogy may obtain between His Majesty and the baby can only come in terms of their being libidinal objects for those who have completed the passage from primary narcissism to secondary. Monarchs, like babies, take on a larger-than-life function in *the emotional life of subjects* as objects of devotion. We need admit no particular megalomania on the part of the libidinal object—although the supreme self-confidence of the baby does induce a nostalgia for infantile narcissism on the part of the caring other. There is, in fact, no evidence to suggest that monarchs are narcissistic at all—rather than evincing "oceanic feelings" of "magical hallucinatory omnipotence," monarchs, as a long line of political theorists has told us, tend to demonstrate the characteristic insecurity of one-person rule, due to their exposed position. The narcissism of the child is fortunately temporary, sloughed off in the passage to maturity achieved by ego development, which, as Freud suggests, comes about by the formation of "*conscience*" at the instigation of parental criticism. Conscience is that "special institution in the mind which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic gratification is secured from the ego-ideal and . . . constantly watches the real ego and measures it by the ideal."⁴¹

Whether there is a corresponding function in state formation processes is not clear. The revolt against this *censorial institution* springs from the desire of the individual to throw off parental restrictions and tends to the self-assertiveness of the adult ego. But is there an analogue here for the sloughing off of monarchy in favor of democracy? Perhaps, where the tendencies were toward socialism, Freud would agree. It is interesting to note, however, that the beneficent, caring state which he had in mind much more closely resembles those welfare states which grew up under the wings of the old monarchies than does the competitive, combative, male-warrior, classical republican *polis*—believed to be the prototype of modern democracies. It is

clear that Freud did not believe that the conflict between the libidinal and the ego instincts was ever ultimately resolved. In both the individual and nation-states more broadly, the wellsprings of narcissism and egoism remain deeply embedded in the substratum of individual and national personality. Democracy represents the way of the modern world, but it is not immune from the normal moral and psychic vicissitudes of human institutions. Moreover, most of the great democracies of our day are constituted as classical republics with a strong monarchical element transferred to a presidency which draws still on the symbolism, iconography, and *majestas* of royal office.⁴²

NOTES

1. Peter Hammond Schwartz, " 'His Majesty the Baby': Narcissism and Royal Authority," *Political Theory* 17 (May, 1989): 273, citing Moses, who in Numbers asks himself: "Have I conceived all this people? have I begotten them, that thou shouldest say unto me, Carry them in thy bosom as a nursing father beareth the sucking child, unto the land which thou swarest unto their fathers?" See also Aaron Wildavsky, *The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984); I thank Professor Wildavsky sincerely for a private discussion of this topic in Berkeley in 1988.

2. Schwartz, " 'His Majesty the Baby,'" 274, citing Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 1962), 11-15.

3. Schwartz, " 'His Majesty the Baby,'" 275.

4. *Ibid.*, 269.

5. *Ibid.*, 276, 281.

6. Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York: Vintage, 1967); Wilhem Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975); Erich Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973). For contemporary social science analyses of national character along these lines, see Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962); Rafael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Scribner, 1976, rev. ed. 1983); John Laffin, *Arab Mind: The Need for Understanding* (London: Cassell, 1977).

7. Schwartz, " 'His Majesty the Baby,'" 274, citing Margaret Mahler, "On the First Three Subphases of the Separation-Individuation Process," in *Essential Papers on Object Relations*, pp. 204, 206.

8. Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

9. Patricia Springborg, *Royal Persons: Patriarchal Monarchy and the Feminine Principle* (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1990).

10. Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 497-98, n. 6.

11. In a similar study, but of parallels in motif among ancient Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and classical Greek myth, interpreted as the founding epics of totemistic and tribal kings, one finds convincing continuities among cultures that were contiguous and sometimes historically suc-

cessive. But in late mythologies, the assembly of elements is sufficiently incongruent to suggest that some of these relics are no longer understood or theorized at all; instead, they are thrown in merely for form's sake. So we have the stories of Cadmus, the Phoenician founder of Greek Thebes, and Danaus, the Egyptian founder-king of the Peloponnese, explicitly recognized in a series of founding epics from Aeschylus' *Suppliants* (*Hiketides*) to Hesiod's *Theogony*, and Apollodorus', Pindar's, and Pausanias's versions of the eponymous founding kings. But when we come to Pandora, for instance, we seem to have the epiphany of an apotheosized queen whose identity has been lost—Hathor? Hatshepsut? We can only hazard a guess. See M. L. Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1966), 66-67; Patricia Springborg, "Pandora and Hatshepsut" (submitted paper participant, International Political Science Association Convention, Washington, 1988). For the "method of relics" as a methodology for the interpretation of recurrent motifs in mythology, see Michael Astour, *Hellenosemitica: An Ethnic and Cultural Study in West Semitic Impact on Mycenaean Greece* (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 70-71; Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

12. Frederic W. Maitland, "The King as Corporation" and "Moral Personality and Legal Personality," in *Selected Essays*, edited by H. D. Hazeltine et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936).

13. Charles F. Nims, *Thebes of the Pharaohs: Pattern for Every City* (London: Elek Books, 1965), 128, cited by Lanny Bell, "Luxor Temple and the Cult of the Royal 'Ka' ", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 44 (1985): 274.

14. Abd el-Mohsen el-Khachab, "Ho Karakallos Kosmokrator," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 47 (1961): 125.

15. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, 478-79, n. 6, and plates.

16. Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism," in *Collected Papers* (vol. 4), edited by Joan Riviere and James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), 34.

17. Freud, "On Narcissism," 32.

18. *Ibid.*, 36.

19. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, edited by Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 488.

20. Bell, "Luxor Temple," 259, n. 41.

21. Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago University Press, 1948), 113; Lanny Bell, "Aspects of the Cult of the Deified Tutankhamen," in *Mélanges Gamal Eddin Mokhtar* (Cairo: Institut Français d' Archéologie Orientale, 1985), 31-61.

22. Patricia Springborg, *Royal Persons*, ch. 9, "Birth Symbols, Baskets, Boxes, and 'The Beautiful Woman'."

23. Arthur Darby Nock, "Ruler-Worship and Syncretism," *American Journal of Philology* 63 (1942): 217-24; Alan B. Lloyd, "Nationalist Propaganda in Ptolemaic Egypt," *Historia* 31 (1982): 33-55.

24. Arthur Darby Nock, "Deification and Julian," *Journal of Roman Studies* 47 (1957): 115, cited by Paul Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque: Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil), 561 and 736, n. 50. See also Simon R. F. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Georges Posener, *De la divinité du pharaon* (Paris: Cahiers de la Société Asiatique, no. 11).

25. Simon R. F. Price, "From Noble Funerals to Divine Cult: The Consecration of Roman Emperors," in *Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies*, edited by David Cannadine and S.R.F. Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 56ff.

26. Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque*, 570. Veyne notes (p. 545) that even the forms of fealty are the same: the gigantic portraits and the decorated pictures in shops and public buildings in the East Bloc and some Middle Eastern countries today being the closest thing resembling a shrine in such secular regimes as those under the less secular Roman and Byzantine emperors.

27. Jules Baillet, *Le Régime Pharaonique dans ses Rapports avec l'Évolution de la Morale en Égypte*, 2 vols. (Paris: de Blois, 1912, 1913), vol. 2, 587-89.

28. See Hesiod, Homer, Apollodorus, Pindar, Pausanias, and the excellent work on the significance of theogonies and royal genealogies by Paul Veyne, *Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*, translated by Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

29. Posener, *De la divinité*; Erik Hornung, *Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the Many*, translated by John Baines (London: Routledge, 1983).

30. Posener, *De la divinité*, 10-17, 30-32.

31. See Seneca, *De Clementia*, VI. Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque*, 558 and 735 n. 43, cites the historian Ammianus Marcellinus, who noted (28. 5. 14) that "among the Burgundians the custom is to depose the king if fortunes in war turn bad or if the harvest is not bountiful; the Egyptians also attribute the same misfortunes to their sovereigns."

32. Freud, "On Narcissism," 46.

33. Also to be found in Mesopotamian mythology, to which it is related, in the form of the cow-goddess, Ninhursag, and her cognates.

34. Alphonse A. Barb, "Diva Matrix," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 16 (1953): 200-1; Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), and "A Note on the Lady of Birth," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 3 (1944): 198-200.

35. The tale of "The Destruction of Mankind," from "The Book of the Cow of Heaven," recorded in the tombs of Seti I, Ramses II, Ramses III, and Ramses VI, in *Ancient Egyptian Literature*, vol. 2, translated by Miriam Lichtheim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976): 198-99.

36. *Ibid.*, 199.

37. Freud, "On Narcissism," 46-47.

38. *Ibid.*, 47-49.

39. *Ibid.*, 47.

40. *Ibid.*, 48-49.

41. *Ibid.*, 52.

42. On the national symbolism of royal iconography, see Simon Schama, "The Domestication of Majesty: Royal Family Portraiture, 1500-1850," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 17 (1986): 155-84; David Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition,' 1820-1977," in Eric Hobsbaum and Terence Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For republican official iconography, see Eugene F. Miller and Barry Schwartz, "The Icon of the American Republic: A Study in Political Symbolism," *Review of Politics* 47 (1985): 516-43.

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