CHAPTER 6

STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL VIOLENCE IN RELIGION AND PEACEBUILDING

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Recent work in religion, conflict, and peacebuilding demonstrates the vast resources that scholars and practitioners working within religious traditions and institutions can contribute (and have contributed) to transforming conflict, conceptualizing and cultivating justice, and building sustainable peace. What happens when this important engagement between religious peacebuilding and peace studies more generally becomes intentionally bidirectional? What insights, lenses, and approaches emerge from peace studies that uniquely fit the purposes and practices of religious peacebuilding?

This chapter explores ways that the analytical lenses of structural and cultural violence that have emerged in peace studies debates since the 1980s aid in illuminating and addressing religious and cultural dimensions of conflict, violence, and peacebuilding that are of specific interest to religious peacebuilders. These analytical lenses have been powerfully applied across cases pertaining to poverty, development, gender, and race. Yet their application to concerns about religion and peacebuilding are comparatively underdeveloped. I argue that they are equally incisive when applied to religious identity-based forms of violence and injustice, and the social, spiritual, emotional, and psychological effects of those forms. Critical attention to the processes and debates by which these analytical lenses emerged in peace studies will illuminate an array of theoretical points of contact, overlap, and possibilities for mutual enrichment between peace studies as a still emerging field, and the flourishing literature on religion and peacebuilding.

In what follows I demonstrate two ways that developing analytical lenses of structural and cultural violence, and incorporating them into religion, conflict, and peacebuilding, importantly expands and deepens that field. First, I argue that integrating these lenses into the conceptual framework of religion and peacebuilding requires critically revising that subfield's temptation toward an overly narrow focus upon "deadly violence." This correction makes possible multifocal forms of critical analysis in religion and peacebuilding, thereby rendering more sensitive and fine-grained the identification and assessment of the manifold forms that violence may take, and the compound and multi-layered effects those forms may
produce. Such multidimensionality eludes the prevailing conceptions of violence in religion and peacebuilding insofar as those are conceived primarily (or perhaps exclusively) as physical and/or deadly. At one level, then, the resulting analytical framework becomes more encompassing in the simple sense that it now aims to assess multiple types of violence. It is deepened in the sense that this expansion results in greater nuance and precision both in detecting frequently acute distinctions between forms of violence, and diagnosing the sometimes tacit or non-explicit modes by which those different forms of violence mutually reinforce one another or relate symbiotically.

Second, I demonstrate that achieving analytical command of the lenses of structural and cultural violence is particularly imperative for those who are critically conversant with, or who draw upon and utilize the resources of, religious traditions, practices, and institutions for the purposes of peacebuilding. This is the case for three reasons. First, these lenses illuminate manifestations and effects of violence to which scholars and practitioners laboring in religion and peacebuilding are likely to be particularly attuned and motivated or potentially well-equipped to understand and constructively respond. These forms of violence surface in the account below as deprivation of “identity needs” and “well-being needs.” To this end, the second portion of this chapter examines some thinkers and activists who demonstrate in their work the ways that religious peacebuilding has been (can be) uniquely attuned to structural and cultural violence. I make the case that, in the instances I examine, this attunement derives from the incisiveness, sensitivity, and self-reflexivity afforded by the religious knowledge, religious orientation, and/or religious character of the peacebuilding effort.

At the same time, by no means are “identity” and “well-being” needs exhaustive of the forms of violence with which religious peacebuilders will be concerned, and may find themselves especially well-appointed to address. Neither are these forms of needs-deprivation exclusively the jurisdiction of those who work within or evince a critically reflective grasp of the resources provided by religious traditions. Nor, for that matter, are participants within religious traditions adept at such modes of reflection by default. As these provisos indicate, I deploy the conception of “religious peacebuilder” in a sense that is broader than what one may find in other chapters of this volume. While the figures I examine in this chapter are motivated and informed by their own religious commitments and identification with religious traditions, as I use the term, one need not be motivated by personal religious commitments nor identify or affiliate with a religious tradition to be a “religious peacebuilder.” I include in this category activists, practitioners, and thinkers who acquire proficiency in a religious tradition in order to work with the resources available there—for both critical and constructive purposes—in the interests of reducing violence in its various forms, and cultivating conditions for a just and sustainable peace. Such figures need not be participants in (i.e., self-identifying “insiders” to) the tradition(s) in question in order to be what Max Weber called “religiously musical” in their scholarship and activism. Rather, they may acquire an intimate grasp of a religious tradition, and develop the skills necessary to engage and deploy its features and elements, for ad hoc purposes, and in the interests of developing a conception, or pursuing conditions, of justpeace (which may be consistent or overlap with that of the tradition in question). ¹

These provisos lead to the second reason that analytical lenses of structural and cultural violence are imperative for so-called religious peacebuilders. Inclusion of structural and cultural violence lenses in religion and peacebuilding is indispensable because structures and cultures interweave to shape many of the most broadly occurring features of historical
religious traditions, for example, symbolic and linguistic practices, rituals, exercises of identity- and self-formation, textual interpretive practices, and institutional arrangements. Lenses that draw light to the ways that violence may embed and exert itself (whether visibly or tacitly) in these forms—even as they strive to contribute to peacebuilding processes—are crucial for those who work in peacebuilding with particular attention to the challenges raised by, and resources especially available to, religious traditions, institutions, practices, and identities. Thus, lenses of structural and cultural violence afford indispensable forms of critical self-reflexivity that are frequently absent from conceptions of inter-religious peacebuilding engagement and dialogue.4

A correlate of this second reason forms the third basis on which I claim that analytical lenses of structural and cultural violence are of particular value for religion and peacebuilding. These forms of critical self-reflexivity aim to facilitate constructive and practical work at the same time that they persist in diagnostic self-inventory and, ideally, self-correction. They emerged out of concerns surrounding peacebuilding. They were fashioned in order ultimately to contribute to the positive processes of cultivating and fostering the conditions of just and sustainable peace. I make the case that these lenses facilitate an equilibrium between self-reflexive critical analysis, on one hand, and constructive objectives of cultivating conditions of justice and peace, on the other, that are uniquely tailored to the purposes of peacebuilding. This sidesteps temptations to subvert such constructive reflection and practice through interminable systemic analysis of power and domination (a temptation, I demonstrate, to which analyses of power and domination in critical theory are prone). Insofar as peacebuilding initiatives born of, or drawing upon, religious traditions and institutions aim to build constructive alternatives to violence and injustice, lenses of structural and cultural violence serve to critically chasten their efforts at the same time that they facilitate those efforts in indispensable ways.

**The Structure and Claims of This Chapter**

In Part I of this chapter, I set forth a genealogical account of the emergence of analysis of structural and cultural forms of violence in peace studies. Here I account for the central concepts in and around structural and cultural violence, and provide a critical narrative of their emergence. I examine their theoretical roots and objectives in order to illuminate both their strengths and liabilities in comparison with analytical options with which they share influences and family resemblances (e.g., critical theory, reflexive sociology). I identify the concerns and purposes in response to which these lenses were derived, and reexamine the arguments by which they were contested and refined over ensuing decades. This genealogy culminates in demonstrating how these lenses illuminate the indefensibility—and, in fact, debilitating deficiency—of materialist-reductionist conceptions of peace research, and the security studies orientation that ensued therefrom.

As we will see, the emergence of these lenses challenges peace researchers with the need to recognize and attend to forms of violence and injustice "that work on the soul." Moreover, they illuminate the necessity of studying and addressing the ways that organized religious traditions, and the array of institutional orders, language and symbol systems, ritual and textual practices, and modes of identity formation that constitute them, may be lived out in
ways that enforce, conceal, and perpetuate such violence. Yet they raise a converse possibility that these same complex practices, systems, institutions, and traditions might also be conceptualized, embodied, and deployed in ways that foster peace and combat injustice. As we will see, religiously conversant and religiously motivated scholars and practitioners can be especially well-positioned to identify and address certain forms and effects of violence that the lenses of structural and cultural violence disclose, and the possibilities for peace they intimate.

To substantiate these characterizations, in the second portion of this chapter I examine the work of two figures whom I position within the ambit of religion and peacebuilding: Martin Luther King Jr. and Cornel West. I demonstrate how each of these thinkers and activists has formulated and deployed modes of criticism that anticipate or parallel those lenses that peace studies scholars theoretically articulated. In each case, the respective thinker critically identifies and constructively responds to what are, in effect, structural and cultural forms of violence. Moreover, the respective interventions are compelled, and rendered especially discerning and incisive, in virtue of the religious commitments and traditions from which their analyses derive. Their analyses anticipate, largely parallel—and in important ways, surpass—the accounts of structural and cultural violence as articulated by peace studies scholars. Each figure accomplishes this separately from the genealogical emergence of those concepts as formal lenses within peace studies proper. And yet the instructive family resemblances are there to be explored and developed. In fact, identifying and developing these resemblances enriches both sets of resources, and contributes to a more integrative vision of the relation between religion and peacebuilding, on one hand, and peace studies more broadly.

I. VIOLENCE: THE MISSING DIMENSIONS OF RELIGION AND PEACEBUILDING

In a pivotal essay in the religion and peacebuilding scholarship, subtitled "The Promise of Religious Peacebuilding in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict," David Little and Scott Appleby make the case that religious peacebuilding contains unique resources capable of transforming conflict and restructuring societies in the wake of deadly violence. Religious peacebuilding consists of "the range of activities performed by religious actors and institutions for the purpose of resolving and transforming deadly conflict, with the goal of building social relations and political institutions characterized by an ethos of tolerance and nonviolence."5 The authors position religious peacebuilding as a multidimensional and multi-phase process in which practices of conflict transformation unfold across moments of conflict management ("the replacement of violent with nonviolent means of settling disputes") and conflict resolution ("removing, to the extent possible, the inequalities between the disputants, by means of mediation, negotiation, and/or advocacy"), which merge into processes of structural reform ("efforts to build institutions and foster civic leadership that will address the root causes of the conflict and develop long-term practices and institutions conducive to peaceful, nonviolent relations in the society").6 Attending to—and, ideally, reforming—the social and political structures that mark out the context of conflict is what Little and Appleby refer to as a "post-deadly conflict phase of the process."7
Clearly, these seminal passages advance a multidimensional conception of peacebuilding, with particular attention to how religiously identified or motivated actors and religious traditions have contributed, and might contribute, to intervening in circumstances of explicit (or direct) violence, resolving the violence in question, and cultivating sustainable conditions of peace. Little and Appleby are not content to conceive of peacebuilding in terms of what peace researchers and practitioners have come to call "negative peace"—peace understood as the absence of war or visible, deadly conflict. They focus on the sustainability and quality of the peace that is built, the cultivation of institutions and sociopolitical structures necessary to maintain and promote such peace, and simultaneously, to address the root causes of the conflict that had to be contained in the first place.

At the same time, however, forms of conflict that are deadly provide the orienting concern for Little and Appleby—the focal point around which the other parts of their account orbit. So, for instance, attention to the structures and root causes of the conflict in question occurs during—indeed, largely constitutes—the "post-deadly conflict phase" of the process of peacebuilding. Concern for the impact of structural conditions and causes of violence prior to the eruption of deadly conflict is not prohibited on this approach. In fact, it is to be encouraged. And yet, in their approach, attention to such causes and conditions would, nonetheless, be motivated by the liability of those to give rise to conflict that is deadly. In this pivotal sense (and perhaps others), deadly conflict presents a conceptual center of gravity—an orientational spin—for the analytical attention and practical interventions of religious peacebuilding.

On the one hand, there is an important reason for their emphasis on deadly conflict. If deadly violence erupts, analyses and interventions that aim to assuage or contain it may be, at that particular point in time, the most pressing item on the peacebuilding agenda. And yet, on the other hand, an orientation to physically deadly conflict, while crucial, risks limiting the scope of religious peacebuilding, which Appleby and Little actually aim to develop and expand. It is at this point that efforts to integrate religion and peacebuilding set the stage for a mutually instructive engagement with peace studies more broadly, as well as with resources afforded by critical theory and discourse analysis.

A Genealogy of Violence in Peace Studies Since the Sixties

Questions over the extent to which deadly conflict ought to provide the impetus and orientation for peace theory, analysis, and practice have fueled wide-ranging debates among peace scholars since the 1960s. This question has, at once, sustained disagreement about, and inspired innovation and development of, some of the most pivotal analytical tools that peace studies has to offer to the related concerns of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding.

In his 1964 essay on the subject, sociologist and peace researcher Johan Galtung identified "negative peace" as "the absence of violence, the absence of war," and positive peace as "the integration of human society." He later sharpened the concept of "negative peace," defining it as "the absence of organized violence between such major human groups as nations, but also between racial and ethnic groups because of the magnitude that can be reached by internal wars." Positive peace he further positioned as "a pattern of cooperation and integration between major human groups."
Negative peace (peace understood as the absence of explicitly violent conflict) is, on its own, an inadequate conceptualization of the aims and objectives of peacebuilding. At the same time, however, it remains indispensable as a concern. In other words, to conceptualize and pursue peace in its “negative dimension” (i.e., containment, reduction, cessation of direct and physical forms of violent conflict) is still necessary and, in many cases, urgently so. And yet, however compelling the pursuit of such objectives, at no point could it be sufficient by itself. Rather, negative peace must be embedded within, and pursued in tandem with, positive peace. “How narrow it is to see peace as the opposite of war, and limit peace studies to war-avoidance studies, and more particularly avoidance of big wars or super-wars (defined as wars between big powers or superpowers), and even more particularly to the limitation, abolition, or control of super-weapons,” Galtung wrote. “Important interconnections among types of violence are left out, particularly the way in which one type of violence may be reduced or controlled at the expense of controlling another.”

Such claims aim not simply to expand the scope of peace studies and practice beyond the debilitatingly narrow boundaries of security studies and international relations. The more fundamental conceptual point is that addressing immediate conflict situations and presenting forms of direct and personal violence must be combined with the simultaneous pursuit of social justice. “Peace” conceived or pursued in the absence of an intentional and sustained, simultaneous pursuit of justice (understood relationally, in terms of mutual recognition, reciprocal accountability, protection against the violation of basic rights, even integration between persons and groups) limits itself to the cessation or suppression of direct violence or overt conflict. Holding explicit and direct forms of violence in abeyance—keeping order or “keeping the peace”—is entirely compatible with and often accompanies conditions of injustice, repression, disenfranchisement, exploitation, and myriad other forms of dehumanization. The latter constitute what Mohandas Gandhi described as akin to “the seeds of war”—often precursors to explicitly violent conflict but also, simultaneously, warfare of its own kind. Moreover, insofar as such conditions become normal and are institutionalized, attending only to direct and explicit forms of violence in pursuit of negative peace is most assuredly to leave the roots of the violent conflict extensively in place.

There are further lessons to derive from this formulation. Even to mis-order the relation of positive to negative peace—to give an orientational emphasis to “negative peace”—risks making peace studies “crisis-driven.” It risks raising concern for justice and attention to the deeper causes and conditions of peace only after the fact; after attention-demanding direct violence has erupted in some particular circumstance. The analytical lenses emerging in peace studies challenged this imbalance. “There is no temporal, logical, or evaluative preference given to one or the other,” Galtung argued. “Social justice is not seen as an adornment to peace as absence of personal violence, nor is absence of personal violence seen as an adornment to peace as social justice.” Peace researchers and practitioners would need to combine and promote both dimensions of peace—“(the absence of personal violence with the fight against social injustice) [sic].” This gestured toward the symmetry—indeed, the conceptual interdependence—and orientational normativity that peace scholars and practitioners would strive to convey with the neologism justpeace several decades on.

This bidimensional account of negative and positive peace necessitated a multifocal lens for re-conceptualizing and identifying violence. The term structural violence came to refer to indirect, unintentional, or nonphysical forms of violence. At its most general level, the term denoted the causes and conditions of the gap in human functioning and
flourishing between the potential and the realized or actual—“those factors that cause people's actual physical and mental realizations to be below their potential realizations.” Calling such forms “structural” identified a form of violence that is perpetrated apart from the purposeful or goal-directed action of a particular actor or group, but rather, occurs through the normal functioning of the social system. Usually, traces of such violence show up as vast differentials of power, agency, need-fulfillment, or well-being (among other indicators). The causes of these differentials are inscribed in social structures that result in drastic deficits in “life chances.” “Individuals may do enormous amounts of harm to other human beings without ever intending to do so, just performing their regular duties as a job defined in the structure,” Galtung argued, “...[or] as a process, working slowly in the way misery in general, and hunger in particular, erode and finally kill human beings.” He elsewhere explained:

Thus, when one person beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper class as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are not concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another.¹⁶

So formulated, structural violence lenses aim to detect and analyze violence that does not manifest itself physically or visibly ("to the naked eye"). In part, it aims at violence “that works on the soul”—"lies, brainwashing, indoctrination of various kinds, etc. that serve to decrease mental potentialities."²⁷ Its conceptualization of such processes is indebted to appropriations from critical theory. And while this debt is not frequently recognized, it is actually important to understand. For precisely what is appropriated from critical theory, and what is refused, sheds light upon the crucial difference between structural violence and analyses of power and domination that often fall under the heading of “critique.”

The Virtue of “Under-Theorizing” Peace Studies?: Critical Theory and the Roots of Structural Violence

Critical theory appeared as a mode of social and political analysis in the inter-war years in Germany. It emerged from the complex integration of Karl Marx's analysis of capitalist political economy, Freudian psychoanalytic theory, Max Weber's account of the ascendency and predominance of the “legal rational” (Zweckrationalität) administration of society and “dis-enchantment” of the modern world (e.g., the extirpation of religious understanding as a necessary ingredient in the working of the natural and social world, and its relegation to the sphere of private and personal life), among other analytical resources. Though different, these resources overlapped in their capacity to lay bare the fact that the emergence of the modern world presented itself as—and was widely presumed to embody—the triumph of reason over archaic superstition, science's mastery of the natural world through experimental methods of prediction and control, modern industry's manifestation of that scientific mastery, and the liberation of the sovereign, self-determining individual from the shackling duties imposed in previous epochs by roles dictated within religious and cultural traditions and communities.
Yet these (purportedly) fulfilled promises of the Enlightenment actually concealed insidious forms of un-freedom, self-alienation, and repression. Thinkers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Walter Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse distinguished “critical theory” from “traditional theory” in virtue of its basic objective of “human emancipation”—seeking to unfetter people from their captivity to the illusion that Enlightenment forms of knowledge (e.g., the predominance of scientific positivism and instrumental means-ends and cost-benefit forms of rationality) and modern modes of life had made them rational and set them free within an increasingly rational and free society. In overcoming archaic vestiges of history, the Enlightenment had actually internalized and insidiously re-instantiated much of what it believed it had eliminated.

Critical theory sought to expose people’s alienation from their true interests. What people (mis)recognized as forms of freedom actually manifest forms of social repression and domination to which those people were subject, but were less and less equipped to recognize. One aspect of critical theory’s emancipatory impulse was relentless “ideology critique.” Such critique deploys modes of criticism (sociological, economic, psychotherapeutic, political, and so forth) that seek to expose the ways that seemingly given and stable attitudes, ideas, practices, and institutions actually mystify and conceal the relations of power that constitute them, and normalize the forms of social domination in which they result. Critical theory, thus, aimed to expose modern and allegedly enlightened forms of social organization and individual identity as, in fact, forms of false consciousness or “ideological illusion” (processes in which “the real motive forces impelling [a thinker] remain unknown to him”)

The critique of ideology aimed to unmask concealed modes of domination and repression in the present in hopes of redeeming the seeds of utopia that the Enlightenment had actually contained.19

The subtle influence of critical theory on early developments in peace studies has significant implications. First, these resources enabled recognition that forms of structural violence may manifest as negative constraints that are not readily visible (e.g., psychological, spiritual, and emotional conditioning that delimits and prohibits whole ranges of potentialities). At the same time, and more importantly, insights from critical theory enabled recognition that structural violence may also exert itself in the social processes in and through which individual consciousness is positively shaped and formed (where, for example, persons are seemingly rewarded for participation and cooperation, thereby cultivating the kinds of habits, desires, dispositions, personalities, and consciousness valued by the influencers or influencing structures). This illuminated the need for powerful and systemic critiques of, for instance, consumer societies’ capacities to form and cultivate desires, and to generate perceived needs and ideals that only that form of society purports to be able to fulfill.20

Of course, the impulses of critical theory that fuel criticism of these forms are prone to characterize structural repression and systemic domination as so pervasive as to produce a form of practical paralysis in the critic herself. Typically, this results from either a critical-analytical refusal to speak constructively and practically at all (for fear of implicating oneself—however inevitably—in some version of the very thing one is subjecting to relentless analysis), or finding violence and domination so pervasive that it becomes, in effect, impossible to identify (or perhaps even conceive of) circumstances that are not saturated by it in multiple varieties. To make the move from “the relentless criticism of all existing conditions”21 to constructive—and ostensibly practicable—prescription would be to open oneself to the relentless interrogation of critical theory itself.22 Thus, on one hand, incorporating
elements of critical theory into structural violence ensures rigorous analysis that cuts deeply beneath surface-level appearances, and into the social and historical processes by which apparently fixed realities are constituted. At the same time, concern for practical results and constructive applicability required newly enriched—even newly imagined—conceptions of peace and justice that could steer clear of the Pandora’s box of analytical temptations to which critical theory and its heirs are prone (namely, fetishizing critique, and ultimately, forms of practical impotence that quickly ensue therefrom).

Is Structural Violence Really “Violent” If It Is Not Deadly?

From their inception, the lens of structural violence faced criticisms of being too vast, too encompassing, and allegedly, too normative. Is there some particular benefit in identifying a particular form of injustice as a type of violence? Or is this simply a case of the peace researcher and peacebuilder projecting her preconceptions onto the world around her? “From many points of view,” wrote one critic, “an explicit recognition of the notion of ‘violence’ as a normative concept, with a meaning varying according to the value structure of the user, would have its advantages. It would at least reduce the possibilities for semantic manipulation, resulting in quasi-scientific propositions about what violence ‘really is’. It would be clear that ‘violence’ is simply the cause of what the user of the term does not like.”

Kenneth Boulding—economist, peace researcher, and Galtung’s key critical interlocutor—complained of the attenuation of analytical precision and the practical clumsiness that typically follow when one’s critical lenses become overly holistic, as he claimed that Galtung’s multi-variant account of violence had. Boulding wrote:

The metaphor [of structural violence] is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectation of life, a condition in which more than half the human race lives, is ‘like’ a thug beating up the victim and taking his money away from him in the street, or it is ‘like’ a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth to the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty… There is a very real problem of the structures which lead to violence… Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing something to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a ‘threshold’ phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot… The [structural violence] concept has been expanded to include all the problems of poverty, destitution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormously real and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to the structures which produce violence.

Boulding argued that attending to processes of dehumanization, poverty, and sociopolitical exclusion should not be the objectives of peace research unless they are deployed so as to lead directly to explicit violence that is intentionally perpetrated by some actor or group against another. Without such identifiable parameters, the analytical purposes of structural violence—while certainly noble—were far too vast and, at best, only tangentially related to “actual” violence (i.e. agent-originating, intentional, objective-directed, and deadly). The result was researchers’ asking important questions, but questions conceived and articulated in a way that obscured the possibility of answering them.
One response to such charges is to answer them on their own terms, delineating precisely whose interests and purposes structural violence serves, and how its manifestations contribute to the "threshold conditions" for direct violence of which Boulding spoke. So, for instance, the sociologist Peter Uvin rearticulated the category of structural violence to entail "the joint occurrence of high inequality, social exclusion, and the humiliation characteristic of symbolic violence." This account avoids the unwieldy diffusion of violence as (allegedly) anywhere and everywhere, for instance, by acknowledging the unavoidability of some inequalities in a world characterized by finite resources. Only when material inequality becomes viciously disproportionate, and is concurrent with forms of exclusion and humiliation, do those conditions amount to structural violence.

Exclusion may take more visible forms in discrimination based on racial, sexual, ethnic, and other characteristics. These may occur through processes, structures, and actions that "actively deny rights and entitlements to certain categories of marginalized people," either officially or informally. At the same time, exclusion may exert itself in seemingly more justified or inevitable forms (e.g., legal forms of exclusion). This latter frequently occurs as a predicate of unavoidable inequalities. High inequality (e.g., some living in abundance and super-abundance while many others go hungry) raises difficulties on its own. However, if some having more is predicated upon others having less—if it is a condition achieved and maintained in virtue of others having less—then that inequality is induced owing to the structure of the relationship, and simultaneously imposes a form of exclusion. High inequality and exclusion—distinguishable for analytical purposes—are likely to emerge interdependently and to reinforce one another. Economic inequality that manifests itself in political and socioeconomic structures (either officially or in effect) quickly devolves into exploitation.

To take but one possible example, insofar as vast economic disparity translates into vastly greater social and political access, influence, and public voice for those who possess resources, and that disparity in resources is used to protect and augment the power of those in power (thereby further perpetuating disparities), such conditions of inequality amount to de facto exclusion of those who have less. These high inequality—exclusion dynamics result in political influence and governance being dominated by a highly enfranchised, wealthy few. In such cases, what is, in fact, oligarchy and plutocracy may be justified or disguised by the fact that the political context in question remains "democratic" in name (and in certain of its surface-level operations). Though impoverished, marginalized, and incapacitated, people recognized as citizens in such circumstances have, in principle, rights of free expression, political participation, and a vote. While these rights may be invoked as indicators of the justness of the political context, they actually camouflage—and aid in perpetuating—massive structural violence (extreme inequality that is structurally interlocked with exclusion) masquerading as substantive justice and democracy.

Uvin's third ingredient of structural violence reaches beyond the explicit violation of rights. It encompasses the myriad of processes through which denials of dignity and attribution of self-worth and self-respect, sometimes subtly or tacitly, occur (i.e., psychological, spiritual, or emotional effects that can be categorized as "humiliation"). This treats the effects of poverty (for example) in the form of identifiable effects and experiences of social inferiority, isolation, physical weakness, vulnerability, powerlessness, and the psychological effects of poverty. "Poor people are acutely aware of their lack of voice, power, and independence, which subject them to exploitation. Their poverty also leaves them vulnerable
to rudeness, humiliation, and inhuman treatment by both private and public agents.”

Such an example makes evident how this lens illuminates dynamics and forces that may exert themselves in contexts in which human and civil rights are legally in place, and in some cases, even where a seemingly theoretically robust and much-discussed account of “justice” is in force.30

Answering Boulding’s criticisms on their own terms (in effect), Peter Uvin parsed the ways that structural violence promotes, and is liable to lead to, direct or “acute” violence. The constitutive features of structural violence contribute directly to the “threshold conditions” of direct violence along four primary vectors.32 First, those who are structurally subjugated are liable to use explicit forms of violence, such as rioting, violent protest, or revolutionary or insurgent activity, in attempts to challenge and change the structures that oppress them. Second, those who benefit from the structures are liable to use violence to preserve them (police or military enforcement of unjust laws involving the use or threat of violent force to preserve “law and order,” “keep the peace,” and hold the status quo in place). Third, where certain resources are scarce or unavailable due to conditions held in place by structural violence, competition for those resources is liable to lead to direct violence between marginalized groups. Fourth, rather than generate solidarity among subjugated groups by, for instance, fueling efforts to challenge and alter oppressive structures, structural violence tends to highlight and balkanize the identity boundaries of structurally subordinated groups, harden those boundaries, and turn the groups against one another. Structural violence is prone to produce scapegoating of purportedly inferior groups, a process which often results in explicit violence.

These are indices of how structural violence relates directly to forms of acute and deadly violence. In each case, the diagnostic lens of structural violence aims to identify and lay bare the complex, subterranean root systems from which direct violence is likely to spring. The objective and unique contribution of this analysis is to identify, assess, and thereby aid in addressing acute violence at the levels of its causes, conditions, complex background, and histories.

But what if structural violence does not lead to direct or deadly violence? Is it no longer a primary concern of the peacebuilder? In such cases, one responds to Boulding’s behaviorist (agent-specific and objective-directed) constraints upon violence not by striving to meet the challenge on its own terms, but rather, by further expanding and enriching the multifocal conceptualization of violence, and its role in articulating peace interwoven with justice. Positive peace—the reduction of direct violence and simultaneous pursuit of justice—cannot be limited to treating physical violence and deadly conflict at its roots (addressing its causes and conditions). It requires more.

Thus, Galtung expanded his earlier appeal to the somatic basis for conceptualizing violence (the differential between the potential and actual in physical functioning) to include a “spiritual/mental” focus as well. In fact, it was necessary to overcome the deficiencies of the “materialist bias”—or tendency toward material reductionism—to which both peace studies and development studies gravitated.33 This required recalibrating the definition of violence to refer to the deprivation of basic needs—“Avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible”—in four basic categories: survival, well-being, freedom, and identity.34
“How difficult I find it to see what is right in front of me”: The Emergence of Cultural Violence

Recasting the definition of violence illuminates the arguably more insidious layers of structural violence, namely, its normalizing functions. In many cases, the power of structural violence consists precisely in its capacity to hold exploitative, repressive, and dehumanizing conditions in place without producing direct or deadly violence. In fact, frequently, it is in virtue of not leading to direct violence or deadly conflict that structural violence avoids drawing attention to itself in ways that direct forms of violence typically do, thereby attracting the recognition and intervention of those concerned to understand and combat direct violence (or structural violence identifiably related to direct violence). Direct violence may be resolved, successfully managed, or held at bay in ways that actually contribute to maintaining, perpetuating, or even increasing structural violence.

For instance, direct violence is only one reaction to being deprived of basic needs. Other reactions to structural violence, not involving direct violence, are all the more insidious and destructive because the possibilities of active resistance and explicit violence are pre-empted or seemingly resolved. Such reactions may include quiet acquiescence to conditions of poverty, exclusion, and humiliation. They may entail the subjugated groups' complicity in and even active perpetuation of the very structural processes, practices, and institutions by which they are exploited, incapacitated, and enmeshed in misery. “[Direct violence] is not the only reaction [to needs deprivation],” Galtung came to explain:

There could also be a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation/frustration syndrome that shows up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal. Given a choice between a boiling, violent and a freezing, apathetic society as reaction to massive needs-deprivation, topdogs tend to prefer the latter. They prefer 'governability' to 'trouble, anarchy.' They love 'stability.'

Galtung came to be persuaded of the analytical insufficiency of the structural violence lens for these purposes. Detecting the violence diffused in impersonal, sometimes unintended, even anonymous operations of social, political, and economic structures was important, but insufficient. In fact, a greater danger—the cunning of structural violence, as it were—is not that the conditions, causes, and effects of such forms of violence are normalized, but that they contribute to processes of normalization. They come to appear, to present themselves, as “natural,” even “necessary” or “inevitable.” They become accepted within—interwoven with—average, workaday, normal perceptions; in effect, they colonize the common sense of both the people benefitting from them and those harmed by them.

Structural violence is sometimes rendered invisible—camouflaged and difficult to recognize—precisely by its apparently uncontroversial, inconspicuous diffusion throughout the routinized functioning of society. Moreover, to illuminate and lay bare the structures in question—and the fact that well-meaning people are complicit in, indeed, often beneficiaries of, those structures—is liable to inspire denial, refusal, rejection of structural analyses by those many well-intentioned and concerned people. Efforts to lay bare structural violence risk hitting too close to home.

The realities of structural violence are not merely neglected because of their everydayness, or denied because they are seemingly uncontentious or necessary. They are also
positively justified and legitimized by conceptions of "the way the world is." Thus, the great challenge presented by thinking in terms of structural violence is not merely tracking it in the operations of social, political, economic structures, but figuring out how to denaturalize its operations—to render it visible and expose its effects. One analytical challenge particularly important for peacebuilding, then, is to re-conceptualize or counter-conceptualize such dynamics and processes as forms of violence needing to be addressed as such. This re-conceptualization struggles against the grain of what presents itself as the natural, necessary—and, perhaps most significantly, seemingly innocuous—ways it has been conceptualized or unrecognized heretofore. For these purposes, Galtung derived a further analytical lens—that of cultural violence.

Cultural violence Galtung defined as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science, that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.

He continued, "Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right, or at least not wrong... The study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society." This development expanded and linked the earlier critical-theoretical dimensions of the account—particularly those addressing consciousness formation—to the "spiritual effects" of structural violence. He wrote:

A violent structure leaves marks not only on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit. [These] can be seen as parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure. They... [impede] consciousness formation and mobilization, two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. Penetration, implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak, combined with segmentation, giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on, will do the first job. And marginalization, keeping the underdogs on the outside, combined with fragmentation, keeping the underdogs away from each other, will do the second.

This account retrieves and further develops the much earlier incorporation of consciousness formation and enculturation, but aims to further expand these in terms of psychological, emotional, and spiritual impact. These correlate with two importantly different forms of exploitation.

"Exploitation A," as Galtung termed it, occurs when those subjected to structural violence are so disadvantaged that the effects of the exploitative relationship result in premature or unnecessary mortality, that is, "the underdogs die" (starve, waste away from disease). This form of exploitation is justified or rendered uncontroversial by forms of cultural violence that construe it as (however sadly) "unavoidable," "tragic," or perhaps "self-inflicted," or that let it go unrecognized.

Exploitation B occurs when some person or group is left in a permanent, unwanted state of misery. This may include malnutrition and illness, but may not, in these instances, lead identifiably to premature or unnecessary mortality or deadly conflict. Moreover, the invisibility or perceived legitimacy of this form of exploitation may be augmented by that very fact (that such conditions are not "deadly"). One example would be gender-identified violence, in which, statistically, women may have lower morbidity and mortality rates than men (provided that they evade gender-specific perils manifest across many cultures and societies such as gender-specific abortion and infanticide, gender-preferential prenatal care and treatment in the first years of childhood, and so forth), but live subject to arbitrary treatment, lack
of voice in decisions directly affecting their life chances, strictly delimited social status, and cultural conditions that promote and perpetuate attenuated self-respect, destructive forms of self-abnegation, and reduced emotional well-being.\(^4\)

One vector along which Exploitation B manifests itself is a form of "spiritual death." In this condition life is experienced as having little or no meaning, engendering apathy and passivity, disengagement, and an abiding sense of hopelessness. This is related to—but importantly distinct from—what Galtung termed a "silent holocaust" (in contrast to a holocaust that aims explicitly to exterminate) by which violent structures gradually exploit, causing hunger and illness that "erode and finally kill human beings."\(^4\) The miseries born of physical (somatic) incapacitation are horrific. Yet conditions of spiritual misery—apathy, passivity, self-hatred, abiding hopelessness, the fatigue of despair, and Sisyphean struggle for bare survival—would tend not to show up in statistics concerned with deadly conflict or direct violence, as they would not be explicitly linked to premature mortality. This form of spiritual deprivation he called "alienation."

From Analysis to Engagement: Summary of Part I

So far I have traced the historical emergence and conceptual development of structural and cultural violence in peace studies. At the same time, I have described how these lenses empower multidimensional forms of critical analysis. Such multidimensional analysis, I argued, renders the identification and assessment of violence more sensitive and fine-grained; it enables detecting the manifold forms of violence as well as their modes of interrelation and the different levels at which the effects of violence take hold. I have also demonstrated how these lenses facilitate critical analysis and self-reflexivity that serve constructive objectives, sidestepping temptations to subvert such reflection and practice through interminable systemic analysis of power and domination (the paralysis of analysis).

The upshot is that nonphysical and non-deadly structural forms of violence must become (where they are not already) central concerns of the peacebuilder. These are forms of violence categorized as deprivation of "identity needs" and "well-being needs." As we have seen, they take forms of alienation and exploitation that "work on the soul." Under this heading we find categorized forms and effects such as:

- processes of consciousness- and self-formation in which "the topdog is implanted inside the underdog" (i.e., "penetration"), and ensuing experiences of inferiority, self-devaluation, self-abnegation, shame, humiliation, and stigmatization;
- internalized and self-directed aggression, rage, and despair;
- invisibility or negligibility through social and legal marginalization and voicelessness (civic or social death);
- diminished agency, disempowerment, and isolation through exclusion, segregation and partition ("segmentation");
- the denuding of nurturing communal bonds and nourishing relationships ("fragmentation");
- stereotyping and/or scapegoating, and the ensuing experiences of being terrorized, hunted, or endangered; existential angst resulting from pariah status;
• Sisyphean conditions void of care and compassion, and interlaced experiences of abiding hopelessness, purposelessness, and lovelessness; misery-induced apathy and passivity;
• the effects of efforts to anesthetize spiritual, emotional, mental suffering (substance abuse, alcoholism, dependency and addiction, and so forth).

These are examples of forms and effects of violence that the lenses of structural and cultural violence bring to light. All of them deprive people of basic needs. None of them need be deadly. In fact, some of these forms of violence are more widespread and persistent precisely because they are not deadly. The cultural violence lens illuminates cultural practices, perceptions, and convictions that camouflage, justify, or normalize these forms and effects, making them seem natural, necessary, or right—or “at least not wrong,” if not altogether invisible.

In what ways are these analytical lenses especially fit for the interests and purposes of religiously informed or religiously motivated peacebuilders? How is it that they are acutely effective in illuminating manifestations and effects of violence to which those working in religion and peacebuilding are likely to be particularly attuned to and motivated or well-equipped to understand and constructively address? I answer these questions by turning to specific examples in which religious peacebuilders have demonstrated acute awareness of, critically diagnosed, and provided constructive prescriptions for structural and cultural forms of violence.

II. STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL VIOLENCE IN RELIGIOUS PEACEBUILDING: PARALLELS AND PRECURSORS

As is often the case, the analytical lenses and insights developed by theorists follow on the heels of the insights and experiences of practitioners on the ground. In many ways the most seminal studies of structural and cultural violence are but analytically articulated footnotes to the work that activists and practitioners already firmly grasped and powerfully articulated. In this second section I examine two examples of such activists: Martin Luther King Jr. and Cornel West. My examination will seek to answer two questions in each case: 1) How are his efforts to combat injustice and to cultivate justpeace consistent with and describable in terms of the above accounts of structural and cultural violence? 2) How does his work as a “religious peacebuilder” (his knowledge of, engagement with, and motivation born of religious traditions) equip him to be acutely attuned to the forms and impact of such violence?

Martin King: From Racial Inequality to Cultural Homicide

Central threads of my genealogy of the emergence and development of structural and cultural violence in peace studies find robust antecedents in the life and work of Martin Luther King Jr. In fact, some years before Galtung first invoked the field—demarcating distinction between negative and positive peace (1964), King had deployed such a distinction to explain
and justify to Southern moderates and liberals the tactics of civil disobedience used by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (e.g., boycotts, sit-ins, freedom rides, and so forth) in 1961. The white moderates and liberals he addressed were sympathetic to the movement’s aims, but were decidedly gradualist in their ideas about how racial segregation should be altered. Many such Southerners claimed that race relations had been peaceful for many years and that explicit forms of Jim Crow segregation needed measured reform, but ultimately that “only time can solve this problem.”

King acknowledged the surface-level appearance of tranquil race relations, but explained that the student movement was intentionally in revolt against the “negative peace” that had suffused the Southern United States for many decades. The movement aimed not at desegregation, but at the full-fledged integration of black people in American life. Anything less would be cosmetic integration, and, as a result, superficial democracy. In revolting against negative peace, the movement aimed to dramatize repressed tension and deploy that tension—nonviolently, but disruptively—in order to bring latent conflict out into plain view, to illuminate the full depths of injustices and confront them directly so as to transform them constructively. King describes the absence of explicit tensions, conditions under which black people quietly accepted their plight, using the term “negative peace.” The movement aimed to struggle for “positive peace.” Peace of this sort was not merely the absence of hostility and conflict. It would be “the presence of justice and brotherhood.”

Though Galtung never cites King’s use of the “positive/negative” distinction and the “presence of justice and integration of groups” as a source, the similarity of their terms is startling. Galtung is credited by many peace researchers as the originator of these ideas, but clearly he is not. From where does King derive these concepts? Working as a Christian theologian and Baptist preacher, King derives them from his interpretation of Jesus’s claim that he has “come not to bring peace but a sword” (Matthew 10:34–39). King reads this as Jesus’s rejection of negative peace, with its characteristic complacency and impassiveness that typically gets portrayed as tranquility. As King has it, whenever Jesus comes, “conflict is precipitated between the old and new...[and] struggle takes place between justice and injustice, between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.” In this, Jesus’s coming precipitates the struggle for positive peace: the pursuit of justice, brotherhood and sisterhood, and the kingdom of God. In short, King derives his integrated account of positive and negative peace from Christian Scriptures. This exemplifies what King’s fellow civil rights activist Andrew Young refers to as his use of “biblical critique.”

The implications of King’s articulation of the student campaign as a “revolt against negative peace” and “struggle for positive peace”—its explicit confrontation of latent tension, suppressed conflict, and repressed injustices—meant that, eventually, he would have to take up what peace researchers would come to identify as violence perpetrated structurally and culturally. Here again, King derived a conception of structural change from Christian Scripture, specifically, the story of Jesus and Nicodemus (John 3:1–21). King interprets Jesus’s instruction to the lawyer Nicodemus that in order to be saved he must be born again to indicate that his “whole structure must be changed.” The structural implication for King’s context meant that the “thing-ification” of black people under 244 years of slavery continues to exert itself through the economic exploitation of people of color, and of poor people more generally. Moreover, economic exploitation at home relates to international investments and interests that must be preserved and protected militarily. King’s point is that these strands of oppression are tightly interwoven (related structurally) and must be addressed in tandem.
As a result, he declared—echoing Jesus's instruction to Nicodemus—"America, you must be born again!" On these bases, King came to expand and deepen his interests and purposes beyond the pursuit of equality in the face of racist and discriminatory laws—beyond what he called as late as 1966 the "racial revolution to 'get in,'" and receive a fair share economically, educationally, and in social opportunities.

By August of 1967, King realized that positive peace required training his attention on the structures and cultural conceptions that held discriminatory dispositions, habits, manners, and mores in place long after discriminatory laws had been wiped from the books. He spoke of the pursuit of justice that is available only by coming to the full recognition of—and struggling to transform—the systemic injustices that hold discriminatory and prejudicial structural relationships and patterns in place. To transverse this into terms of my genealogical account in Part I, "Violence: The Missing Dimensions of Religion and Peacebuilding," King recognized the depths that were obscured by the meagerness of what the words "discrimination" and "prejudice" had come to signify. He recognized the necessity of addressing the cultural processes, dispositions, and symbolic practices that prop up and perpetuate the forms of exclusion, humiliation, and subter (but no less radical) inequalities that persisted even after the revolution of equal rights and legal recognition effected by the civil rights movement.

Several years after receiving the Nobel Prize for Peace, and standing alongside President Johnson as witness to the signing of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the passage of the Voting Rights Act one year later, King called for mobilizing against the persistence of what he identified as the "cultural homicide" of black people. With this phrase, he illuminated the forms of violence that exert themselves through language, embodiment, and consciousness formation. He pointed to the fact that average, workaday ways of speaking—as as well the meanings of words held firmly in place by Webster's Dictionary and Roget's Thesaurus—were laced with, and perpetuated, abiding forms of inferiority and self-abnegation layered into the consciousness and inscribed across the bodies of people of color in the United States after several hundred years of slavery and Jim Crow.

Dynamics of humiliation could not be isolated only in the socioeconomic marginalization or in the legalized inequality and exclusion of groups of people. Rather, the psychological and spiritual dimensions of such types of humiliation provide a kind of cultural mortar holding the elements of structural and direct violence firmly in place. This point of analysis does not simply address the adverse impact of white supremacy that shaped the everyday operations of culture and society. It also lays bare the various examples of what peace studies categories described as processes of "penetration" by which "top dogs" become "implanted" inside the "underdogs" (exemplifying what Galtung would only much later came to call cultural violence). They make forms of structural and direct violence appear natural or necessary—to look, to even feel, right; or at least not wrong. They are manifest in the forms of psychological and spiritual self-abnegation that King described as the results of "cultural homicide."

In effect, such cultural forms of violence are as debilitating as direct forms of violence. Exposing and challenging them is even more fundamental to pursuing freedom from domination and to developing the capacities by which to cultivate positive conditions of a just and sustainable peace. And yet, cultivating self-respect and self-love was a task that could not be measured by the standards firmly entrenched in a society that had suffered from the cultural effects of white supremacy for so long. Certain forms of subjugation were already inscribed
in established standards and ideals. Such work required challenging and transforming the less visible and often internalized metrics of value and beauty by which prevailing structures both legitimized and asserted themselves. These metrics had come to be written, as it were, upon the bodies and shot through the personalities, the unreflective self-conceptions, of people of color subject to cultural violence. They had come to be acculturated and habituated, and inscribed through dynamics of consciousness-formation.

To describe these culturally articulated, seldom reflected-upon metrics of value as internalized is not to suggest that they are impervious to being recognized and illuminated through social-analytical lenses and other tools of redescription, and then critically interrogated and revised. In fact, this is precisely the kind of analysis that lenses of structural and cultural violence facilitate. King brought such analysis to bear by way of his training in and the resources of the Christian theological tradition.

As we saw in the genealogical account above, structural/cultural violence lenses’ sensitivity to the inscription of person-diminishing violence in and through consciousness formation has roots in the tradition of critical social theory (Herbert Marcuse and his Frankfurt School forebears). From where did King derive his equally incisive analysis of violence in and through consciousness formation? Again, in this case, we must look to the analytical resources he drew from the Christian theological tradition and Jewish philosophy.

King’s conception of human personhood, the ultimate origins of human dignity in the personhood of God, and what these conceptions necessitated of justice were based upon his commitment to theological and philosophical personalism. Thus he invoked St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas in appealing to the moral law to which all human laws are accountable for their justness (“An unjust law is no law at all”). At the same time, to give concrete content to the implications of this principle, he employed the terms of personalism. Laws that degrade human personality are unjust, and those that protect and honor its dignity are just. On this basis, all segregationist laws are unjust because they “distort the soul and damage the personality” of all the people affected by them. Those who benefit from segregation are endowed with the false perception that they are superior. Those who are subjugated by segregationist laws absorb a false sense of subordination and inadequacy. King borrowed the terms of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber to make the point that such personality-degrading laws “substituted an ‘I-it’ relationship for an ‘I-thou’ relationship.”3 This consigns persons to the status of things, or at least to the status of “less than fully human.” As King had it, the degradation of human personality “distorts the soul.” This is consistent with what peace researchers later came to refer to as “violence that works on the soul.”

From King’s Christian theological perspective, such violence obscures or attempts to deny the reality that the human person bears the image of God, and that, in virtue of this image, his or her dignity and inestimable value inheres in his or her personhood by default. Such violence “distorts the soul” by projecting as real the unreality, or promoting internalization of the lie, that the person is not born out of God’s extravagant agapic love (and thus is not created with intrinsic dignity), when in fact, he or she is. This nature and basis of personhood mean that persons have been created for the purposes of giving and receiving forms of love through mutual recognition and mutual respect, reciprocal accountability, and humanizing and constructive relationships that derive therefrom. Laws, social and political structures, and cultural processes consistent with this reality will protect and promote human dignity and value, and protect against all forms of arbitrary and dehumanizing treatment. Moreover,
King’s understanding of agapic love meant that, in the fight for justice, even one’s enemy was to be recognized as a bearer of dignity, to be respected, and whose well-being was to be pursued. To pursue his opponent’s well-being through nonviolence meant that the struggle for justice should promote the liberation of King’s opponents from the blinding, spiritual sickness of white supremacy, in the hope of opening possibilities for reconciliation. Most importantly, agapic love impelled King to call for loving the person who participates in evil (i.e., loving one’s enemy), while simultaneously hating and struggling against the evil in which that person participates.53

In virtue of these insights, King recognized dehumanizing cultural formations as violence that must be combatted and positively countered in order to build positive peace interwoven with justice and the integration of human groups (“brotherhood and sisterhood”). As King addressed these motifs, structural and cultural forms of violence pertain to the condition of the human soul, inseparable as it was (as he understood it) from the psychological, emotional, and physical. Such a position refuses the possibility of construing “the spiritual” in abstraction from (as somehow wholly separable and discrete, or secreted away within or transcending) the mundane.

In re-describing these elements of King’s work in terms of religious peacebuilding, we find further support for my central claim that modes of consciousness formation are central to the concerns of peacebuilding not simply insofar as they might relate to direct violence or deadly conflict. Rather, the forms and effects of cultural violence are, in themselves, just that: forms of violence. They hold injustice and humiliation in place at the same time that they hold forms of deadly or direct forms of violence in abeyance. They render populations docile, and by generating psychological and spiritual apathy, those people accept their own marginalization—their having been rendered invisible, negligible—as normal.

**Cornel West: Nihilism as a Spiritual Condition**

We are now in a position to see how the lenses of structural and cultural violence, as they make visible dimensions of consciousness formation, relational needs, and identity needs, may illuminate the spiritual impact of cultural violence. Just such analytical motifs inform the criticism of the structural impact of poverty and culture of consumption deployed by the philosopher, social critic, and activist Cornel West. Once the parameters of religious peacebuilding are expanded to include structural and cultural (in conjunction with direct) forms of violence, West’s work can be seen to fall squarely within the category of religious peacebuilding.

Among contemporary thinkers and activists, it is West who perhaps most clearly carries forward the legacy of Martin Luther King Jr. He takes prophetic streams of the Christian tradition as indispensable for analyzing and responding to the catastrophic conditions that compel activists and practitioners to strive for justice and decrease violence in all its forms. His reasons for drawing upon religion are both political and grounded in his existential commitments. “The culture of the wretched of the earth is deeply religious,” he explains. “To be in solidarity with them requires not only an acknowledgment of what they are up against but also an appreciation of how they cope with their situation. This appreciation does not require that one be religious; but if one is religious, one has wider access into their life-world.” At the existential level he explains that Christianity is, for him, an enabling tradition. It provides the
ground for hope in the face of the tragic realities against which he struggles. And yet, he does not advocate an uncritical and undiscriminating reliance upon Christian tradition. It must be persistently subjected to self-reflexive analysis and critique.54

It is the prophetic dimensions of the Christian tradition that compel West to seek solidarity with the wretched of the earth. The prophetic also provides resources by which he assesses the causes and conditions of the wretchedness in question. This entails a struggle for justice and the reduction of violence. In his critical and self-reflexive retrieval of resources from the Christian tradition—motivated and normatively oriented by Jesus's instruction for any who would follow him to live and work in solidarity with the oppressed (e.g., Jesus's words, "Just as you have done it to the least of these, you have done it unto me," Matthew 25:31–46)—West models a form of "religious peacebuilding."

What do West's "religiously musical" solidarity and profound personal conviction enable him to identify that reflects the distinctive fit between the aims of a religiously informed or motivated critic and activist, and the uses of structural and cultural violence lenses? Religious resources form West's diagnosis, his prescription for change, and the grounds of his hope in the midst of catastrophic conditions that are dismissed as self-inflicted or tragically unavoidable, or else are casually ignored.

In the wake of the 2008 economic collapse and ensuing "great recession," West points out, "The catastrophic conditions and circumstances right now, in light of corporate elites and financial oligarchs, with greed running amok, looting billions and billions of dollars, when 21 percent of America's children live in poverty—that's a crime against humanity."55 And yet, to identify as forms of violence the savagely and disproportionately high rates of incarceration, infant mortality, unemployment, and crime among people hovering around and beneath the poverty line, and people of color more generally, is to diagnose only one part of the relevant violence. As West has it, these conditions must be addressed in terms of their spiritual dimensions—insight afforded him uniquely in virtue of his recognition of the role of religion and the existential nature of his own religious commitments. It is in virtue of his religious commitments, as well as his use of the prophetic streams of the Christian and Jewish traditions, that West sees that these conditions cannot be accounted for solely in terms of poverty, racial inequality, and material destitution. Rather, adequate diagnoses require recognition that these conditions are interwoven with and interdependent upon a form of the spiritual condition of nihilism. West explains:

I am not just talking about the one out of five children who live in poverty. I am not just talking about the one out of two black and two out of five brown children who live in poverty. I am talking about the state of their souls. The deracinated state of their souls. By deracinated I mean rootless. The denuded state of their souls. By denuded, I mean culturally naked. Not to have what is requisite in order to make it through life. Missing what's needed to navigate through the terrors and traumas of death and disease and despair and dread and disappointment. And thereby falling prey to a culture of consumption. A culture that promotes addiction to stimulation. A culture obsessed with bodily stimulation. A culture obsessed with consuming as the only way of preserving some vitality of a self. You are feeling down, go to the mall. Feeling down, turn on the TV. The TV with its spectator passivity. You are receiving as a spectator, with no sense of agency, no sense of making a difference. You are observing the collapse of an empire and feeling unable to do anything about it... A market culture that promotes a market morality. A market morality has much to do with the unprecedented violence of our social fabric... You need market forces as necessary conditions for the preservation of liberties in the economy. But when the market begins to hold sway in every sphere of a person's life,
market conceptions of the self, market conceptions of time, you put a premium on distraction over attention, stimulation over concentration, then disintegrate [sic] sets in... We are talking about larger cultural tendencies that affect each and every one of us. It takes the form of self-destructive nihilism in poor communities, in very poor communities. The lived experience of meaninglessness and hopelessness and lovelessness. Of self-paralyzing pessimism among stable working-class and lower working-class people.55

These lines offer a glimpse of what it looks like to identify and assess the impact of poverty in terms of spiritual deprivation. As West illuminates these effects, they can neither be reduced to terms of social psychology, nor socioeconomic class. Rather, "nihilism" gets repositioned as something more fundamental than a philosophical doctrine. In light of my genealogy in Part 1, we can describe it in terms of the spiritual effects of structural and cultural violence. As West has it, nihilism is "the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most importantly) lovelessness... Nihilism is a disease of the soul."57

How does this vision inform West's prescription? "Nihilism is not overcome by arguments or analyses; it is tamed by love and care," he responds. "Any disease of the soul must be conquered by a turning of one's soul. This turning is done through one's own affirmation of one's worth—and affirmation fueled by the concern of others. A love ethic must be at the center of a politics of conversion."58 Like King, West is quick to point out that the love ethic he prescribes has nothing to do with sentimental emotion, or being kind and gentle. An adequate conception of Christian love—and its implication that Christians must take responsibility for the justness of the structures and conditions in which they live here and now—recognizes the indispensability of seeing the complex interrelation of love with justice and power. "Power without love is reckless and abusive, and love without power is sentimental and anemic," King wrote. "Power at its best is love implementing the demands of justice, and justice at its best is power correcting everything that stands against love."59 Such an analysis opens horizons for the peacebuilder whose conceptualization of violence needs to be deepened and broadened. It opens necessary horizons for the work of peacebuilders addressing not only physical violence, but violence in all its forms.

What Does "Religious Peacebuilding" Accomplish that Social Psychology Does Not?

To those for whom religious traditions are unfamiliar, so much of what these lenses detect may sound like merely social psychology: cultural and structural forms of violence affect the psyche, mental functioning, and emotional health. These interweave with, and are dimensions of, the spiritual, ethical, and emotional concerns of the religious peacebuilder. At one level, this is accurate. These forms of violence admit of varying descriptions, and different descriptions may help illuminate different features and the multiple levels at which response is needed. And yet, they cannot be reduced to social psychology without a loss of their content, without becoming something other than what they are.

The effects of nihilism, meaninglessness, and hopelessness might be anesthetized with Prozac and Wellbutrin, much like some people self-medicate their effects with illegal drugs, alcohol, and other forms of dependency and addiction. And yet, as West and King make the...
case, ultimately, nihilism is a disease of the soul. It can only be countered by lived practices of love, care, compassion, personal integrity, and self- and other-respect. Can these only be provided by the Christian tradition or exclusively by religious traditions more broadly?

As I argued previously, a peacebuilder need not be personally religious to intervene in and respond to violence and despair. However, as the examples of King and West indicate, religious peacebuilders can be especially well-equipped to perceive, diagnose, and respond to these facets of human existence and the forms and effects of violence that “work on the soul.” In the cases I examined, acute awareness of structural and cultural forms of violence comes to light by looking at the inescapability of power through the lens of agapic love. Must one be Christian to agree? In my judgment, the answer must be “no.” While clearly grounded in Christian theological particularity (i.e. irreducibility), King also deployed the concept of love at the level of what may be described as an “intermediate norm”—a normative orientation for practice and analysis that might accommodate (or find analogical agreement with, or overlap for ad hoc purposes with) a number of normative conceptions articulated within other religious, ethical, or cultural traditions. Of course, it is important to note that this conception of analogy (or intermediate normativity) seeks agreement descriptively and provisionally—at an intermediate level, and for ad hoc purposes—rather than reductively. In other words, it is not asserting that particular claims and traditions are “reducible” to a more basic unified conception of, say, “the sacred,” that all of these different traditions are, at their core, “really about the same thing” or are “paths up different sides of the same mountain,” or even that different traditions’ central concepts and claims translate easily into each other without remainder. For example, the conception of agapic love that King and West share is not identical to, yet is in many ways consistent with, Gandhi’s commitment to “ahimsa”—meaning literally “non-injury,” but which Gandhi came to construe as a positive state of non-violence toward the world. At an intermediate level, the relational implications of agapic love, arguably, similarly accommodate the human rights-oriented conception of love as mutual respect and the inviolable implications of human dignity.

At the same time, a strong caution is in order for any who would engage in peacebuilding from religious and theological quarters. These activists and critics must be especially aware of the temptation toward esoteric insider-speak and similar postures and languages directed at a religious or theological “ghetto” to which some intra-traditional or intra-communal religious discourse is prone regarding matters of justice and peace. King and West speak forthrightly—at moments, quite explicitly—from, and in the terms of, their primary tradition-specific, theological motivations. Each is simultaneously eclectic and improvisational, pragmatic, strategic, and multilingual—even while normatively oriented by their commitment to be faithful—in how they articulate their claims, and how they enrich and compound their analyses. These capacities enable them to avoid the great temptation (and, for many, the great pitfall) of religious voices in conflict, war, and peacebuilding: the temptation of preaching to themselves. These powerful exemplars demonstrate that anyone who would approach peacebuilding from within religion-specific traditions, and (in these cases) Christian theological commitments, must hold their theological commitments, understandings, and practices flexibly and conversantly at the same time that they engage and enrich their own accounts with the conceptual tools of non-theological resources and conversation partners. Moreover, on this point, there is a lesson to be taken from Johan Galtung.

Galtung was not a religious peacebuilder. And yet, he stood within the predominantly social-scientific, quasi-positivist, security studies-oriented enterprise of peace research that
was emerging in the middle of the twentieth century, at the same time that he cut deeply against it. He challenged and pressed beyond the deficiencies of the conception of conflict, violence, and peace that prevailed at that time. As my genealogical account above makes clear, this required moving beyond the safety of rigid academic disciplinary boundaries and becoming multilingual and conceptually innovative. Galtung rejected materialist reductionism and opened peace studies to the spiritual, emotional, and psychological dimensions of peacebuilding. In doing so, he opened vistas within peace studies that had long been unfolding and that are ideally suited for the dynamics of religious peacebuilding today.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to identify, genealogically explicate, and juxtapose several analytical tools and research currents within peace studies that are uniquely compatible with the interests and purposes, contents and resources of religiously conversant peacebuilding. I have sought, further, to examine what the idea of “violence” entails when one holds justice and peace together as a normative orientation (“positive peace” or “justpeace”). Those convinced of the necessity of holding justice and peace in tandem (who recognize that each is essential to the other) cannot afford to limit their analytical vision to an exclusive or even orientational focus upon conflict that is deadly. Nor, I have argued, can we risk an easy compartmentalization of these analytical lenses. The assumption that if social structures and cultural understandings and practices have not identifiably contributed to deadly conflict, then they need not be tracked and addressed, ultimately truncates the full scope and interests of positive peace.

Read charitably and with attention to their concern for altering the “roots of the conflict” as those persist in social, institutional, and procedural forms, Little and Appleby set forth an analytical framework that is consistent with the full breadth of concerns that I have brought to light in this chapter. But their pull toward deadly conflict seems orientational—it serves as a conceptual center of gravity—and therefore overly constricts the focus and potential impact of religious peacebuilding. Something weighty is at stake in this point of difference, namely that to the degree that deadly conflict is orientational for peacebuilding practice and theory, the range of concerns that the peacebuilder must take up is delimited. A primary focus on deadly conflict causes peacebuilders to neglect those points at which the forms of violence and its effects take on psychological, emotional, and spiritual dimensions.62

The implication is that structural and cultural forms of violence ought be the objects of peace research and religion and peacebuilding not simply as they are understood to be causes and conditions of direct, deadly violence, but also as equally orientational objects of analysis in themselves. Such analytical tools and practical interventions offer a multi-focal, and expansive analytical conceptions of non-deadly conflict and violence. In this way the lenses and concepts of structural and cultural violence facilitate probing for, attending to, and strategizing about how best to intervene in conditions of structural and cultural forms of conflict which are not explicitly deadly, but are, as such, not only violent, but all the more insidiously so.

Once structural forms of violence are given equally orientational weight to direct and deadly violence, we arrive at a further enriched understanding of the concept of
justpeace—now understood to entail the reduction of violence in all its forms (i.e., direct, structural, cultural, deadly/non-deadly), and the simultaneous pursuit and cultivation of justice in the full range of its varieties (e.g., social, distributive, restorative, reparative, and so on). A risk attendant to overlooking or downplaying the effects of structural and cultural forms of violence is that efforts at peacebuilding will be out of sync with the logic of "justpeace." In short, there is actually much at stake in the seemingly minor semantic difference between focusing upon “deadly violence” as opposed to “violence in all its forms.” Not only does the multidimensional lenses for identifying and assessing violence dramatically expand the scope and validity of peacebuilding, but it also draws upon developments in the peace studies literature which are, arguably, most directly relevant to religious peacebuilding.

NOTES


2. A secondary task of this chapter is to locate and map exemplary studies and texts that deploy analyses of structural and cultural violence toward the ends of peacebuilding (broadly construed). I identify and map the literature on structural and cultural violence primarily in the endnotes throughout this chapter. The relevant entries intend to provide the reader with an overview of works assessing structural and cultural violence across several subfields of peace and justice studies, with specific attention to such studies in the subfield of religion and peacebuilding.

3. While I do not engage any such figures in the present chapter, in my judgment, Jeffrey Stout, Romand Coles, and John Kelsey fall into this category of peacebuilders who are “religiously musical” though not participants in the religious tradition(s) with which each works. To consider a helpfully instructive example, Stout demonstrates command of the features of Christian ethical and theological reflection in order to both criticize and constructively correct deficient currents internal to that tradition insofar as they relate to his work for justice and democratic practice in US contexts. He has demonstrated at length that, on certain readings of the tradition, its institutions and practices are indispensable for pursuing forms of just and sustainable peace that committed Christian citizens in the United States, and citizens of other religious traditions, or no tradition, can, and should, share interests in pursuing by substantive democratic means. Read in the way I propose, his texts Democracy and Tradition and Blessed are the Organized operate in tandem to exemplify the broadly construed conception of "religious peacebuilding" I am articulating here. In Democracy and Tradition, Stout deployed immanent criticism—a form of criticism in which a critic either takes up and uses the reasoning and resources of his or her interlocutor to demonstrate that the interlocutor’s position is self-subverting on its own terms, or conversely, works more constructively by presuming
the premises, reasoning, and resources of his or her interlocutor in order to demonstrate how those move in the direction of the immanent critic's conclusions. Whether deployed critically or constructively, this form of engagement requires a charitable—even intimate—grasp of the tradition, and high proficiency in engaging and deploying its resources and modes of reasoning. This is one sense in which one may be a "religious peacemaker" without holding personal religious commitments or identifying as a practitioner of a religious tradition. In Stout's case, it has led some Christian theologians to identify him as "the church's best secular ally in America." For examples of Stout's "religiously musical" immanent criticism (in its critical mode) see "The New Traditionalism" and "Virtue and the Way of the World," Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), chaps. 5–6, and in a more constructive mode see, among others, "A Prophetic Church in a Post-Constantinian Age: The Implicit Theology of Cornel West," Contemporary Pragmatism 4, no. 1 (2007): 39–45, and Stout's contribution in Jason Springs (ed), Cornel West, Richard Rorty, Stanley Hauerwas, Jeffrey Stout, "Pragmatism and Democracy: Assessing Jeffrey Stout's Democracy and Tradition," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78, no. 2 (2010): 413–448. For Stout's exposition and argument for the indispensability of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious communities, in addition to nonreligious civic groups, in the United States for cultivating justice and reducing violence through grassroots democratic, broad-based community organizing—an account largely inspired by the work of Saul Alinsky and consistent with the aims and approach of strategic peacemaking—see Stout's Blessed Are the Organized: Grassroots Democracy in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), esp. chap. 18.

4. For an overview that maps the variety of ways that the field of religion and peacemaking has suffered from a dearth of critical reflexivity, see Atalia Omer's "Religion and Peacebuilding" in the present volume.


11. It was the integrative and holistic conception of nonviolence that Gandhi drew from multiple religious and ethical traditions that led him to see the draconian excesses of commercialization and commodification—in as far as they find their impetus in human greed—as forms of violence. "An armed conflict between nations horrifies us," he wrote, "But the economic war is no better than an armed conflict. This is like a surgical operation. An economic war is prolonged torture. And its ravages are no less terrible than those depicted in the literature on war properly so called. We think nothing of the other because we are used to its deadly effects. Many of us in India shudder to see blood spilled... but we think nothing of the slow torture through which by our creed we put our people... But because we are used to this lingering death, we think no more about it." Gandhi, "Nonviolence—The Greatest Force," The World Tomorrow, Oct. 1926.

22. This is exemplified in how the concept of "utopia" (the ideal of "society made rational") functions in critical theory of Adorno and Horkheimer. In order for critique to remain un-assimilated to the domination that saturates the present, it must remain in a negative mode. One maintains this negative posture only by virtue of one’s perpetual engagement in criticism. The utopian ideal can never be stated discursively, that is, articulated in positive and definite terms. While affording indispensable critical resources, arguably, such conceptions of critique and utopia provide far too slender a groundwork upon which to base the constructive objectives entailed in cultivating peace that is just and sustainable. See Max Horkheimer, "Reason Against Itself," in What Is Enlightenment?, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 359–367; Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 54–56; Benhabib, Critique, Norm, Utopia, 167–171.
27. Uvin, "Global Dreams and Local Anger," 150.

28. To give a textbook example: being convicted of a felony in the US criminal justice system results in "legal discrimination"—exclusion from access to public housing and public assistance benefits (e.g., welfare support, supplemental nutrition assistance), prohibition from voting, exclusion from employment and education opportunities, and more insidious forms of "civic death." See Michelle Alexander's *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: The New Press, 2010), esp. chaps. 4–5.


31. In the final chapter of *The Decent Society*, Avishai Margalit makes the case that John Rawls's principles of justice could be fulfilled, and the society still be characterized by forms of institutional humiliation. See *The Decent Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), esp. chap. 1 and the conclusion. Along these lines, the restorative justice movement is largely predicated on the claim that many retributive models of criminal justice, and the criminal justice system in the United States in particular, inflict wide-reaching forms of humiliation in seeing that "justice is served." For exposition of these themes amid the vulnerabilities of the low-wage working poor in the U.S., see Barbara Ehrenreich's *Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001).

32. Uvin positions these vectors extensively within the literature and documents them at length. "Global Dreams and Local Anger," 155–156. See also Uvin's *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), esp. chap. 6.


36. To take a severe example, this was one of the pivotal—and most controversial—insights brought to light in Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin, 2006). The "banality of evil" exerted itself most insidiously in the Nazis' efforts to make the Jews accomplices to the extermination of their people through various bureaucratic, procedural, and work-a-day ministrations of the Jewish Councils through European communities.


40. Galtung, "Cultural Violence," 299. At this point, the complex interrelation of structural and cultural violence in Galtung's account overlaps with several basic insights in sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's account of "symbolic violence," understood as the complex interaction between the structurally embodied modes of domination that are internalized by both the dominant and the dominated, such that the latter do not recognize the economy in which domination is embodied as domination, turning whatever resultant aggression may emerge among the dominated inward or toward one another in ways that perpetuate the system of domination. For a particularly powerful assessment of structural violence in US inner-city illegal drug economies and cultures conducted explicitly through the
lens of Bourdieu's account of "symbolic violence," see Phillip Bourgois, "U.S. Inner-city Apartheid: The Contours of Structural and Interpersonal Violence," in Violence in War and Peace, ed. Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Phillip Bourgois (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 101–107. The challenge presented by Bourdieu's account is that he so emphasizes the anonymity and structural diffusion of domination that the personal or direct (agent-oriented) dimension gets minimized, if not altogether washed out. As a result, power, domination, and violence become conceived as forces that no one subject to them can really recognize, render explicit, critique, resist, or alter. This difficulty manifests the temptations of critical theory that I mentioned earlier in this chapter. When viewed in terms of the multifocal lens of violence developed here (direct/structural/cultural), Bourdieu's account risks removing altogether the direct vector of the tri-part relationship (i.e., the personal, agent-originating, and directed), thus portraying any slender possibility of resistance as a by-product of reflexive sociological analysis itself. By contrast, as I am construing it here, the tri-focal lens accounts for anonymous and structurally and culturally diffused forms of violence while retaining their interconnectedness with direct and personal (i.e., agential) forms of violence and domination. Representative statements of Bourdieu's category occur in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, "Language, Gender, and Symbolic Violence," in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), esp. 167–173, and Bourdieu, Masculine Domination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), esp. 34–42.

For a treatment of these features of Bourdieu and Michel Foucault and an effort to bring individual agency as a means of critique, resistance, and innovation back to the center of the analysis (in tandem with structural and cultural dimensions), see Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xiv, and especially chap. 4 ("Foucault and Bourdieu"). See also Jason A. Springs, "Dismantling the Master's House: Freedom as Ethical Practice in Robert Brandom and Michel Foucault," Journal of Religious Ethics 37, no. 3 (2009): 419–448. For a clear and sympathetic exposition of the deep tensions in Bourdieu's account regarding the possibilities of constructive change in light of domination illuminated by reflexive sociology (e.g., through the plasticity of the habitus), see David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 114–139.


43. Joshua Price provides a powerful examination of the multiple and mutually interpenetrating layers of various forms of gender-identified violence that mobilizes and applies Galtung's account of structural violence. This text deploys the lens of structural violence both to illuminate the multiple forms of violence ( "Exploitation A" and "Exploitation B") that are rendered invisible by the institutionalized category “domestic violence.” See


55. West, American Evasion of Philosophy, 97–98.

56. West, “Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism,” in Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times (Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1993), 16–19. For a more recent example of West engaging these issues of poverty; cultures of consumption and free market fundamentalism; hopelessness and meaningless as conditions in which spiritual and material deprivation are wholly interwoven, see West and Tavis Smiley, The Rich and the Rest of Us (New York: Smiley Books, 2012).
58. A piece particularly pronounced in West’s corpus along these lines is “Nihilism in Black America,” in Race Matters (New York: Vintage, 2001), esp. 22 and 29.
59. King, “Where Do We Go from Here?,” 172.
60. It was in his articulation of ahimsa that Gandhi reinterpreted the classic passages in the Bhagavad Gita typically invoked to justify the obligations of the caste system, and the necessity of engaging in violent struggle and warfare. This stands out as a powerful example of thinker working within a tradition to read its more orienting values correctively against prevailing readings of passages taken to justify both direct violence and the violent social structures held in place by the Hindu caste system as a whole. “Krishna’s Counsel in a Time of War” of the Gita has long been taken to justify some of the most repellent duties of direct violence (what may become the warrior’s duty to kill even those who nurtured and cared for him). It is also taken to justify and reinforce the Hindu caste system more broadly, and as such, structural violence. Moreover, when deployed for such justifying purposes, the Gita serves as an example of cultural violence. Thus, Gandhi’s efforts to reread and interpret the Gita against the grain of those traditional uses stands as an example of combatting cultural violence from within the particular tradition itself, and with resources (perhaps uniquely) available there. See Gandhi, “Anasaktiyoga: The Message of the Gita,” in The Gospel of Selfless Action or The Gita According to Gandhi, ed. Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1929), 125–134.


62. As is clear in the sample of literature I have referenced throughout (though far from exhaustively), engagement in peacebuilding through lenses of structural and cultural violence requires expanding the attention and efforts of peacebuilders to encompass matters of poverty and development (Scheper-Hughes, Uvin, Farmer, Ehrenreich); gender (Price, Chaudhry, Anglin); race, ethnicity, religious identities and institutions (King, West, see also Jean Zaru’s Occupied with Nonviolence: A Palestinian Woman Speaks (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2008); the interface of religion, ethnicity, and nationalism (Atalia Omer’s When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks About Religion, Nationalism, and Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013) and Michael Sells’s The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); and law, criminal justice, and prison systems (Bourgois, Alexander). It trains attention and efforts of peacebuilders equally upon dimensions of environmental peace and justice, though these have not been addressed above. On this topic, see, for example, Rob

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