**ARENDT ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

 **I. Introduction**

Hannah Arendt's fundamental philosophical theme was an examination of the political element of human action, and of its implications. She was especially concerned with the causes of totalitarianism and its historical evils. Early in her academic life, she believed that these themes were best pursued in analyses of the public sphere, but her later works concentrated on the workings of the mind, and politics increasingly became for her the prerogative of the solitary contemplator rather than the public actor.

 This change in focus led her to an increasingly Kantian analysis of political action, culminating in a 1970 lecture series on Kant's political philosophy. Arendt argued that the connection between thought and politics in Kant's overtly political works was too abstract, and that it could be made stronger if explored in the light of themes in some other of Kant's works. Thus her focus is on the Kant of the Critique of Judgement rather than the Critique of Practical Reason, which is more often cited as a source of Kant's political thought. This focus served to both help her overcome difficulties in her other work[[1]](#footnote-1) and allow her the use of her own conception of "the public realm" (which largely coincided with Kant's) in examining the nature of political experience:

The Critique of Judgement is the only [of Kant's] great writings where his point of departure is the World and the senses and capabilities which made men fit to be inhabitants of it. This is perhaps not yet political philosophy, but it certainly is its condition *sine qua non*. If it could be found that in the capacities and regulative traffic and intercourse between men [there is] an *a priori* principle, then it would be proved that man is essentially a political being.[[2]](#footnote-2)

 Arendt claims to find such a principle in the faculty of Judgement. In setting out Arendt's arguments toward this claim, and in highlighting difficulties and proposing resolutions, this paper indicates a successful appropriation of Kant's work on judgement which broadens certain of his themes. It also highlights the narrowness of Arendt's intentions in undertaking this appropriation.

 **II. Arendt's Rejection of Kant's Historico-**

 **Political Philosophy**

 Arendt has a unique conception of the political. It consists first of political *thought*, which does not occur *a priori* outside the political field, but which rather "grows from within it." Political thought is "the free play of an individual mind round politics, making sense of political events and placing them within an unfolding understanding."[[3]](#footnote-3)

 These political events are the evidence of political *action*, which some commentators believe constitutes Arendt's political realism.[[4]](#footnote-4) Herein she is concerned with political activity as an expression of human freedom in terms of the outcome of moral decisions about what *should* be done: "The *raison d'etre* of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action."[[5]](#footnote-5) Arendt applies strict standards in determining those acts which are truly "political," but they are usually actions that fit within the common conception of politics; as involving government and other institutions, war and conflict, international relations, legislation, and domestic self-interest. But she rails against this being the *principal* means of understanding politics, arguing that such constructs disguise the importance of human freedom in political activity.

 Arendt argues that the political is best understood in terms of appearances - aesthetically - as will be elucidated later. And: "In the work of no other philosopher has the concept of appearance ... played so decisive and central a role as in Kant."[[6]](#footnote-6)

 Kant's political philosophy is usually considered to be found in essays such as "Perpetual Peace"[[7]](#footnote-7) and the "Doctrine of Right," and in the Critique of Practical Reason. Arendt argues, however, that Kant fails to present a viable political philosophy in these works. This argument serves as a justification for her reconstruction of an unwritten political philosophy which she finds 'latent' in the first part of the Critique of Judgement, and in the themes of various other of Kant's works.

 Her reasons for rejecting Kant's overtly political works are several-fold: she contends that his essays on history and politics "cannot compare in quality or depth with [his] other writings,"[[8]](#footnote-8) and that Kant "himself called some of them a mere 'play with ideas' or a 'mere pleasure trip',"[[9]](#footnote-9) a fact borne out, she suggests, in the "ironical tone" of "Perpetual Peace". They are generally more concerned with history than with political philosophy (thus Kant, like others, had "substituted a philosophy of history for a political philosophy"),[[10]](#footnote-10) and the "Doctrine of Right" is, she suggests, "boring and pedantic."[[11]](#footnote-11) Arendt notes that the essays date largely "from Kant's last years and ... the decrease of his mental faculties ... is a matter of fact."[[12]](#footnote-12)

 Her alternative view is that Kant

expounds two political philosophies which differ sharply from one another-the first being that which is generally accepted as such in his Critique of Practical Reason and the second that is contained in his Critique of Judgement. That the first part of the latter is, in reality, a political philosophy is a fact that is seldom mentioned in works on Kant; on the other hand, it can ... be seen from all his political writings that for Kant himself the theme of 'judgement' carries more weight than that of 'practical reason'. In the Critique of Judgement freedom is portrayed as a predicate of the power of the imagination and not of the will, and the power of imagination is linked most closely with that wider manner of thinking which is political thinking par excellence.[[13]](#footnote-13)

 It seems that Arendt might have underestimated the importance of Kant's overtly historico-political work. Russell contends that Kant exhibits "vigor and freshness of mind" in "Perpetual Peace" in his advocation of federation and his argument that reason utterly condemns war.[[14]](#footnote-14) Assessments of Kant's work point out the importance of his dictum linking lawfulness and the establishment of a constitution,[[15]](#footnote-15) his tying together of the institutions and functions of republican government with his moral philosophy, and his observations that accords between states *must* depend on different principles than those for peace within states, that the impossibility of achieving a permanently secure international system is independent of the moral and rational compulsoriness of such action, and that aid for this task is to be found in mankind's "unsocial sociability."[[16]](#footnote-16)

 In light of such important insights, Arendt's dismissal of these works seems to rest on shaky grounds. But there are two defenses. The first is that Arendt's project can validly continue as an *addition* to these works of Kant's even if her rejection of them is judged as unreasonable (indeed, Arendt successfully ties Kant's political philosophy to both aesthetic judgement and Pure Reason, whereas Kant provides links only to his moral philosophy).

 The second (and stronger) defence is that Arendt is more concerned with an *appropriation* of Kant's philosophy than with a faithful reading or sympathetic critique. She admits that her reading of Kant is liberal,[[17]](#footnote-17) and that her interest is not in Kant's political philosophy at all, but in the implications of developing *certain* of his ideas systematically.[[18]](#footnote-18) She notes that, because of the traditional identification of politics with rule and instrumentality, Kant himself would not have realized that the Critique of Judgement belonged to political philosophy.[[19]](#footnote-19) But because her reading is an appropriation, this issue is inconsequential.

**III. Actor and Spectator**

 In her selective interpretation of that in Kant's work which is important for political philosophy, Arendt turns to certain of his philosophical themes, and especially to the portion of the Critique of Judgement on aesthetic judgement, for it is here that can be found "something about [the] essential character and amazing range in the realm of human affairs".[[20]](#footnote-20)

 Arendt points out that Kant considers human affairs from three different perspectives: that of the human species and its teleological progress (in the historical essays and in the second part of Critique of Judgement), man (sic.) as individual moral being and end in himself (in Critique of Practical Reason), and humankind as social and sociable - that is, as a political creature (in the first part of Critique of Judgement).

 None of these perspectives is capable of operating independently either in Kant's analyses, or in the workings of society. The sociability of humans indicates that, as an individual moral being, one likely cannot live alone. This is because of the interrelatedness of one's needs and cares with the provisions of community, and because the highest faculties of the human mind are unable to function outside human society. Kant suggests that "company is indispensable for the *thinker*"[[21]](#footnote-21) because, without open and public examination of one's thought, thinking and opinion formation are impossible. Also, humankind inevitably seeks after an explanation for its teleology, and each individual exhibits this trait, thus relating the teleological and the individual realms.

 It is this interlocking, tripartite world view that links Kant's politics with his other philosophical concerns. Arendt thus summarizes the political as embodied in the equation: "Men = earthbound creatures, living in communities, endowed with common sense, *sensus communis*, a community sense; not autonomous, need each other's company even for thinking ("freedom of the pen") = first part of the Critique of Judgement."[[22]](#footnote-22)

 Arendt argues that, because Kant's philosophy places an emphasis on worldly human affairs, he breaks down the usual tension between politics and philosophy. This is evidenced in two ways: in Kant's argument that philosophers need to live amongst their fellow humans rather than amongst philosophers, and in his contention that the evaluation of life with respect to pleasure and displeasure can be expected of "every ordinary man of good sense."[[23]](#footnote-23)

 In his writings on the French Revolution, Kant recognizes two possible viewpoints. From that of the moral *actor*, revolution is forbidden regardless of the *status quo* because it will inevitably involve just *and* unjust actions. But from the viewpoint of the *spectator*, the Revolution evokes a sympathy for the revolutionaries. The latter standpoint reveals a predisposition in human morality to welcome progress toward "global recognition of the rights of man," these rights principally relating to freedom of opinion. But from which of these perspectives *should* political actions be judged, and how?

 The two viewpoints evidence a clash between the principle according to which one should judge and that according to which one should act. Arendt argues that Kant provides the tool to reconcile this clash in his "Transcendental Principle of Publicness," whereby the appropriateness of a moral position could be determined:

All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity ... [for a] maxim which I cannot divulge publicly without defeating my own purpose must be kept secret if it is to succeed; and, if I cannot publicly avow it without inevitably exciting general opposition to my project, the ... opposition which can be foreseen a priori is due only to the injustice with which the maxim threatens everyone.[[24]](#footnote-24)

 Thus: "Morality means being fit to be *seen*, and this not only by men but, in the last instance, by God".[[25]](#footnote-25) But such public utterance is not pursued in practice. Rather, just as one stands in singular and private relation to Kant's Categorical Imperative, consulting nothing but reason to determine what is morally right, one must decide for oneself whether one's moral stance meets this other principle. To properly test one's position, therefore, one must be able to assume the position of others by adopting a "communal sensibility":

By the name *sensus communis* is to be understood the idea of a public sense, that is, a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weight its judgement with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, ... . This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgements of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of every one else.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Kant calls this the "enlargement" of one's mentality, so that one takes on the role of a "citizen of the world." But, Arendt asks,

does this easy phrase of idealists, 'citizen of the world', make sense? To be a citizen means among other things to have responsibilities, obligations, and rights, all of which make sense only if they are territorially limited. Kant's world citizen was actually ... a world spectator.[[27]](#footnote-27)

 For Kant, what made the French Revolution a "public event of world-historical significance" was "'the wishful participation bordering on enthusiasm' that caught the spectators ... and 'the exaltation [of] the uninvolved public' looking on in sympathy 'without the least intention of assisting'."[[28]](#footnote-28) One's initial inclination is to consider the role of moral actors to be primary because, without them, there would be no spectacle to assess. But, Arendt points out, "no one in his right mind would ever put on a spectacle without being sure of having spectators,"[[29]](#footnote-29) given the need for public approval of one's aesthetic opinion. Thus, in the case of any other political action,

[t]he importance of the occurrence ... is for [Kant] exclusively in the eye of the beholder, in the opinion of the onlookers who proclaim their attitude in public. Their reaction to the event proves the 'moral character' of mankind.[[30]](#footnote-30)

 Further, "the judgement of the spectator creates the space without which no such [aesthetic] objects would appear at all. The public realm is constituted by the critics and spectators, not by the actors or the makers".[[31]](#footnote-31)

 Philosophy has long recognized the importance of the spectator, and Arendt notes two factors which underlie this recognition. The first is the ability of the spectator to impartially consider and know the whole, an ability which, because of his very participation, the actor lacks: he or she cannot "rise above" the action for a disinterested, panoramic view, as it were. The second is that the principle concern of the actor is with fame, which depends on the assessment of his actions by spectators. This means that the actor is not autonomous, and "does not conduct himself according to an innate voice of reason but in accordance with what spectators would expect of him".[[32]](#footnote-32) Thus the spectator provides the standard for behavior, and this standard is autonomous.

 There is the hint of a contradiction in Arendt's position. If a moral actor begins to act *for* spectators, she ceases to be an actor in the sense that Kant uses the term. It is rather because the judgmental responses of the spectator somehow exhibit a "moral disposition" that Kant focuses on them. These responses are formulated using, and in terms of, individual freedom rather than public assessment.

 This possibility of contradiction arises because Arendt reads Kant from her own, purely aesthetic, standpoint, without considering the alternatives presented in "mainstream" interpretations of the link between his moral and aesthetic philosophies. This suggests that Arendt might be somewhat dogmatic, but not that her appropriation has failed. It is possible that "Arendt's aesthetic view of politics is too narrow to take full account of the complexity of political life",[[33]](#footnote-33) but to the extent that her discussion is an interpretation of Kant from a *particular* perspective, it remains valid.

 **IV. Judgement of the Aesthetic, and of the Political**

 What mental faculty is employed by the spectator in the assessment of political activity? Arendt contends that it is judgement,[[34]](#footnote-34) very similar to that exercised in the assessment of aesthetic subjects. It is, she argues, the most distinctively political of our faculties. Although Kant extends the role of judgement to the determination of what is morally right and good for the individual, Arendt restricts her interpretation to the case of the aesthetic and the communal.[[35]](#footnote-35)

 The link between the political and the aesthetic occurs at two levels. At the first, there is, according to Kant, an element of the sublime aesthetic in soldiery, war and revolution:

[W]hat is that which is, even to the savage, an object of the greatest admiration? It is a man who shrinks from nothing, who fears nothing, and therefore does not yield to danger ... Even in the most highly civilized state this peculiar veneration for the soldier remains ... because even [here] it is recognized that his mind is unsubdued by danger. Hence ... in the comparison of a statesman and a general, the aesthetical judgement decides for the latter. War itself ... has something sublime in it... [to the eyes of the spectator].[[36]](#footnote-36)

 But this link is incidental; Arendt argues that the operation of judgement provides the more important one.

 Judgements of the social/political exhibit elements of publicness which operate in the same way (the way that Kant sets out in the first part of the Critique of Judgement) as in those about art works and the like. While neither has any direct implications for action under the terms of Arendt's reading (it is, for instance, moral-practical reasons that veto war), both involve assumption of the enlarged, "general" and "communal" standpoint in place of the one that determines one's individual existence.[[37]](#footnote-37) Herein, Arendt has determined that Kant's unwritten political philosophy gives up the usual goal of guiding political action, and instead focuses on the mental activity of judging it. If this assessment is correct, then "judgement in its proper perspective ... implies a political rather than a merely theoretical activity".[[38]](#footnote-38)

 In determining one's opinion on a matter of aesthetics, Kant asserts that one relies largely on 'taste', which, like the taste of the physical senses, is private and incommunicable rather than objectively verifiable and demonstrable in public. Taste is the vehicle of judgement because it is discriminatory "by its very nature," dealing with each particular *qua* particular, "whereas all objects given by the objective sense share their properties with other objects, that is, they are not unique".[[39]](#footnote-39) Because taste is subjective - an inner sense that enables me to be *directly* affected - it leaves no room for dispute about whether one is right or wrong, but implies inter-subjectivity.

 Taste relies on the operation of imagination:

Imagination, that is the faculty of having present what is absent, transforms an object into something I do not have to be directly confronted with but that I have in some sense internalized, so that I now can be affected by it as though it were given to me by a non-objective sense [enabling me to reflect on the subject].[[40]](#footnote-40)

 But there is more to the operation of judgement. Man is a social beast, and so "... is not contented with an object if he cannot feel satisfaction in it in common with others".[[41]](#footnote-41) "In matters of taste we must renounce ourselves in favor of others,"[[42]](#footnote-42) and this involves thinking in the place of others by "enlarging" one's mentality (as previously described), rather than just making peace with oneself. Thus, Arendt notes, judgement always "reflects upon," and takes account of, the taste and judgements of others: "I judge as a member of [a] community and not as a member of a supersensible world".[[43]](#footnote-43) The role of the spectator must always be communal, taking political judgement into the public realm via both its operation and its content.

 For Arendt, therefore, judgement fails to extend beyond the political, leading to a clear disjunction between morality and politics:

Judgement as described by Kant strikes ... Arendt as being a peculiarly *political* capacity because it involves thinking (actually or in imagination) in the presence of others, considering their viewpoints as well as one's own, and seeking acceptance of one's judgement.[[44]](#footnote-44)

Arendt realizes that there is a significant difference between Kant's views of aesthetic and political judgements. The former is "reflective" in that it derives concepts from particulars instead of subsuming the particular under a pre-existing general concept, whereas the latter is not reflective in this sense: Kant argues that political actions should be judged against a general concept or goal of social progress. Arendt avoids a potential difficulty for her parallel between the two by not pursuing the issue, which, while not invalidating her project, does suggest an even more liberal interpretation of Kant than is normally adjudged her.

 To reinforce her assertion of spectatorial judgement as the supreme political virtue, Arendt expands her analogy from Kant's aesthetic theory. She points out that, in it, the "taste" of the critic takes priority over the "genius" of the artist:

Abundance and originality of ideas are less necessary to beauty than the accordance of the imagination in its freedom with the conformity to law of the understanding [which is called taste]. For all the abundance of the former produces in lawless freedom nothing but nonsense; on the other hand, the judgement is the faculty by which it is adjusted to the understanding.

 Taste, like judgement in general, is the discipline (or training) of genius; it ... brings clearness and order[;] it makes the ideas susceptible of being permanently and generally assented to, and capable of being followed by others ... . If, then, in the conflict of these two properties in a product something must be sacrificed, it should be rather on the side of genius.[[45]](#footnote-45)

 Arendt's singular focus on the judgement of the spectator presents potential difficulties for her position. First, does she mean that the political actor possesses no judgement at all, and that the spectator has a monopoly on it? Second, is the disinterestedness of the spectator the single decisive criterion for judgement, or are others (like social inclination, passions and prudence, which Kant calls "empirical interests")[[46]](#footnote-46) also relevant? Third, what is the nature of the relationship between aesthetic and purposive judgement? Can *political* judgements somehow abstract from practical ends?

 On the first issue, she clearly holds to the affirmative despite the peculiar implications (some commentators disagree with this reading of her, but their grounds for so doing are sketchy).[[47]](#footnote-47)

 On the second, Arendt makes no claims for the relative importance of any factor other than disinterestedness, which she claims is so important and dominant as to determine the relative status of actor and spectator in her theory. Suffice it to say that Arendt "holds fast to the classical distinction between theory and practice; practice rests on opinions and convictions that cannot be true or false in the strict sense."[[48]](#footnote-48) Because she is primarily concerned with locating judgement within the political sphere, Arendt requires theoretical certainty, which relies upon disinterestedness. Perhaps her unwritten work on Judgement would have fleshed out the details.

 On the third, the question becomes, in Arendt's appropriation, whether judgement participates in the *vita activa* or is confined to the *vita contemplativa*, where its exercise is, by definition, a solitary reflection upon the social. Arendt argues that the latter position is *exclusively* true, even though judgement is the faculty that operates *most closely* to the world of actions.[[49]](#footnote-49) This means, of course, that her conception of judgement is much narrower than Kant's.

 In making explicit these connections between standards of acting and those of judging, Arendt rescues Kant's theory of revolution from the vacillation between the perspectives of actor and spectator which are often said to afflict it. Some commentators argue that this tension is inherent to Kant's ethics, and that to overcome the tension would require a change in his ethical position.[[50]](#footnote-50) Arendt clearly does not agree, arguing that Kant's position *can* be reconciled according to her reading.

 **V. Conclusion**

 How is one to assess Arendt's reading of Kant? Is it a "good" one to apply in the interpretation of political activity? A determination according to objective criteria is out of the question because of the difficulty of deciding what such criteria might be (although, in informed public debate, it might be decided that her focus on the aesthetic would emphasize values such as "courage, boldness, and imagination, at the expense of moderation and justice,"[[51]](#footnote-51) and that such values are not good ones to employ in assessing political action).

 Arendt's entire, unique reading of Kant is concerned with political *thought* rather than action, and with appearances rather than purposes. The fact that she defines judgement in these terms and from the point of view of spectator reflects her own focus on the public realm and on the aesthetic nature of Judgement, rather than Kant's.

 The question then becomes, "Is Arendt *too* liberal in her appropriation of Kant?" Is her interpretation a *mis*-appropriation? Does she take undue liberties with Kant's texts?

 In ignoring the political philosophy that Kant *did* write, Arendt might well have underrated the important political insights which they contain. But because her's is an appropriation conducted from a particular (and original) viewpoint, it is difficult to argue against her position from neutral ground; Kant himself wrote that posterity often "understands an author better than he understood himself"![[52]](#footnote-52)

 Although Arendt is not "scientific" in her approach, she is able to maintain a logical cohesiveness in her work. She is "successful" to the extent that she provides both a cohesion between perplexing portions of Kant's work, and a new starting point for the consideration of political philosophy.

1. Although her work on the faculty of judgement was incomplete at the time of her death, several commentators (see especially the interpretative essay by Beiner in Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) pp. 89-156) argue that this work would have helped Arendt overcome anomalies arising from her analysis of Willing. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Cited by Beiner in his "Interpretative Essay", *ibid.*, from Arendt's lecture course on "Kant's Political Philosophy" at University of Chicago, 1964, recorded in the Hannah Arendt Papers of the Library of Congress. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See, for instance, Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking Press, 1961), p. 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind - Vol 1 Thinking (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Immanuel Kant, Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 93-130. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Arendt, Lectures, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Ibid.*, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Ibid.*, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Arendt, "The Crisis in Culture" in Between Past and Future pp. 219-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 684. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Kant contends that "... the problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution is dependent upon the problem of a lawful external relations between states" (Kant, Kant's Political Writings, p. 47). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Arendt, Lectures, pp. 31, 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Cited by Beiner in his "Interpretative Essay", *Ibid.*, p. 141 from Arendt's lecture course on "Kant's Political Philosophy." [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 232. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Immanuel Kant, "Letters to Marcus Herz (24 November 1776 and 20 August 1777) in Philosophical Correspondence, ed. and trans. Arnuf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Arendt, Lectures, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. "Do you really require that a kind of knowledge which concerns all men should transcend the common understanding, and should only be revealed to you by philosophers? ... [In] matters which concern all men without distinction nature is not guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and ... in regard to the essential ends of human nature the highest philosophy cannot advance further than is possible under the guidance which nature has bestowed even upon the most ordinary understanding" (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Norman (London: Macmillan, 1990), Sect. B859). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Kant, "Perpetual Peace - Appendix II" in Reiss, Kant's Political Writings, pp. 125-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Arendt, Lectures, pp. 49-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1968), Sect. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Arendt, Lectures, p. 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *Ibid.*, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Ibid.*, p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Arendt, Lectures, p. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. *Ibid.*, 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Ibid.*, p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Bhiku Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Kant defines 'judgement' as "the capacity for subsumption of the particular under the universal" (Immanuel Kant, First Introduction to the Critique of Judgement, Section II, cited by Paul Guyer in Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 35). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Further, Arendt writes:

"Where human pride is still intact, it is tragedy rather than absurdity which is taken to be the hallmark of human existence. Its greatest representative is Kant, to whom the spontaneity of acting, and the concomitant faculties of practical reason, including force of judgement, remain the outstanding qualities of man ... ." (Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 235). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Sect. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Arendt, Lectures, p. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Arendt, Lectures, p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Ibid.*, 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Sect. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Kant, "Reflexionen zur Anthropologie", No. 767 in Gesammelte Schriften, Prussian Academy ed., 15:334-5 quoted and translated by Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Arendt, Lectures, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Canovan, Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Sect. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Ibid.*, Sects. 13-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. See Arendt, Lectures, pp. 53-60 and, for example, Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Jurgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power", Social Research 42 (1977), p. 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Habermas argues that, in this move, Arendt retreats form her own concept of praxis, which is grounded in the rationality of practical judgement (*Ibid.*, p. 24). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Both Seyla Benhabib (in "Judgement and the Moral Foundations in Arendt's Thought", Political Theory, 16 (1988), pp. 29-51) and Galston argue that the tension arises out of the nature of Kantian morality. Galston writes that this type of morality

is [on the one hand] an ethic of intention in which the consequences of actions are largely excluded from the evaluation of actions [, while, on the other] Kant's morality serves as the foundation for his theory of legitimate government, which must be viewed as the most desirable outcome of political action". (Galston, William A., "Book Review of Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner" in Journal of Politics 46 (1984), pp. 304-5). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Galston, p. 306. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Sect. B370. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)