

Enacting Education

ABSTRACT. Education can transform our cognitive world. Recent use of enactivist and enactivist-friendly work to propose understanding transformational learning in terms of affective reframing is a promising first step to understanding how we can have or inculcate transformational learning in different ways without relying on meta-cognition. Building on this work, I argue that to fully capture the kind of perspectival changes that occur in transformational learning we need to further distinguish between ways of reorienting one's perspective, and I specify why different ways are differently valuable. I propose that recent approaches to Confucian ritual provide a clue to what is missing in characterisations of perspective transformation and the resultant transformed perspective. I argue that focussing on ritualised interpersonal interactions (as-iffing-the-other) provides a further clue as to what's missing from a mere appeal to the ritual-based inculcation of new perspectives, namely the kind of lightness and flexibility that some ritualised interactions encourage participants to have, and the deepening of perspective associated with that lightness. I argue that a case study of a project implementing a highly ritualised philosophical practice with prisoners in Scotland shows how these constraints, seemingly paradoxically, function so as to actually deepen the perspectival spaces of those agents. This case study provides a proof of concept for the proposal that certain forms of ritual engagement can reliably bring about the kind of transformation of perspective that is the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory.

KEYWORDS. Transformational learning; Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI); Perspective-enlargening; Perspective-deepening; Ritualing; As-iffing; As-iffing-the-other.

Introduction

When we talk about “education” rather than learning, training, or skill development what is it that we are trying to express? What do we care about when we care about educating people? What changes do we want them to undergo? The German concept of “Bildung” somehow manages to capture this a little better than the English words. Bildung is education of the person; a personal as well as intellectual development. It is a maturing that is supposed to come about by appropriate engagement with the humanistic disciplines such as philosophy and literature. A widely shared intuition that I will be working with and trying to elucidate over the course of this paper is that, as philosophy educators in further and higher education, it is something like this that we are motivated to bring about in our students and to continue to put ourselves in positions in which it can continue to be brought about in ourselves. While we teach for the internalisation of facts about the history of, and current issues in, philosophy as well as for increasing capacities in logic and informal reasoning (so called “critical thinking”), we hope for our students that they will leave us with more than the sum of this knowledge and selection of skills. We hope that they somehow become wiser, that they grow as people and as thinkers; that their perspectives are “transformed”. Such outcomes are hard to phrase in terms of the kinds of “learning outcomes” required by institutions in their course descriptions and syllabi because there is not a particular ‘goal’ state that we are trying to get the students’ perspectives to transform into. We are not aiming for them to internalise and regurgitate our point of view and way of engaging with the world (at least not completely - there are of course aspects of our ways of thinking that we do hope to impart over the course of our teaching). Rather, we are hoping for them to develop their own ways of thinking to be more inclusive, more discriminating, and freer from the particular biases that they bring to thought either by virtue of natural temperament or upbringing. I suggest that as philosophers

teaching others to ‘philosophise’ this is one of the key, if not *the* key, end. But, what do we do to bring about this end? Differently from teaching facts about history or current issues, or skills in formal and informal reasoning, there is no clear methodology that assures you that if you follow a particular pedagogical path you will acquire the hoped for maturation of thought and perspectival changes. Instead we, as philosophy teachers, tend to act on faith that by introducing the right kind of thinking in class, by modelling the kinds of discussions that philosophers have, by getting students to question and discuss for themselves, this will somehow bring about these kinds of perspective transformations in (at least some of) our students. And indeed, it does seem to at times. But, as difficult as this is to measure in the students we are teaching, we know even from our own experience as learners within academia that perspective transformation is not reliably induced in the majority of students. Where it is, or where it is felt to be, reliably induced this is often as a result of a class being led by a particularly charismatic teacher. Although I don’t doubt that charisma can at times be a helpful means of shifting other’s perspectives, it is of course also not without its dangers, and is certainly not the principle means by which philosophers generally (at least in their better moments) wish to bring about perspective changes in our students. I believe that this phenomenon of perspective transformation in a pedagogical context is a phenomenon that is worthy of investigation in order to better understand what it consists in and in order to explore ways of reliably bringing it about. As we will see through the attempt to unpack the phenomenon and distinguish it from other kinds of perspective changes, this would be a valuable outcome not only for philosophical pedagogy but also for philosophy. This paper is a first step towards both of these aims.

I start the paper by introducing a project in which learners in a prison context were taught to philosophise by means of a particular pedagogical method. Reports about and from the prison learners as well as my own observations throughout the project convince me that something akin to perspective transformation was reliably induced in at least some of the learners in each instantiation of the project. The project is therefore presented here to both help the reader to start to get a grasp on the phenomenon that is the focus of this paper, and to subsequently consider what it might be about that methodology that is the means by which these kind of perspective transformations were reliably brought about. In order to unpack the phenomenon of interest and to distinguish it from other kinds of perspective changes that are related to and may be conflated with it I summarise how this has been approached in the field of adult education studies under the moniker of ‘transformational learning theory’. In doing so, I make explicit the different kinds of perspective changes that are only implicitly described in that literature whose focus is rather on viewing these phenomena through “kinds of learning” rather than the phenomenological and epistemological changes that this learning consists in. Given both this difference in focus and the recent valuable critique of this approach from the enactivist perspective by Michele Maiese, I move towards understanding the phenomenon in a different way. This new approach draws on contemporary ideas in Confucian philosophy from Michael Puett which reveals some more subtle distinctions that may be present in the phenomenon of interest. It also highlights an important interactional aspect of the phenomenon in action, what I call “as-iffing-the-other”. It is, I propose, this particular character of interaction that is at play in the prisons case. This therefore serves as a case study to show that transformational learning may at least sometimes consist in, and can be reliably brought about by, engaging in interactions in a particular way.

Transforming Perspectives in Prison

Putting your finger on exactly what it is that constitutes a perspective transformation is tricky. What does it look like? What does it feel like? How can we reliably bring it about in our teaching when the answers to both of these questions tend to be along the lines of “you know it when you see it” rather than a checklist of objective measures that one can tick off. While the phenomenon may be somewhat fuzzy, and perhaps sometimes prone to confusing or conflating with other kinds of perspective changes, I do think that we have a general grasp on what it is for a perspective to be transformed. We know what it is, for example, to experience the world quite differently from how we did when we were a child or teenager. Furthermore, we can, at least sometimes, recognise this in ourselves and others either as it happens or in the recent past. I believe that this is exactly what we see from the transcripts of interviews with learners in several prisons after they took part in a short philosophy course run by Edinburgh University. While these learners were given access to video material introducing them to some topics in philosophy, the principle pedagogical methodology used in person was weekly tutorials using Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI).

The term CoPI is used in various ways in the literature on Philosophy in Schools and Philosophy with/for Children to capture a very general way of engaging in philosophical dialogue with learners, but I here refer to the specific version of it that was formalised and set out by Catherine McCall in her (2009) book *Transforming Thinking: Philosophical Inquiry in the Primary and Secondary Classroom*. Catherine McCall’s version of CoPI (henceforth simply ‘CoPI’), is a community of philosophical inquiry—in the broad sense—in that together the participants work together to enquire about philosophical questions that are raised by the stimulus given to the group (which may be verbal or pictorial), or by participants within the discussion itself. But it is importantly also a highly formalised way of running a philosophical discussion, which I will describe below. In contrast to many other methodologies of teaching philosophy, there is no goal of the session apart from the discussion itself, in that there is no attempt to come to a collective conclusion on the question, and the chair/teacher does not try to guide participants towards one. A version of this practice was used by an Edinburgh University project doing philosophy in prisons run by Duncan Pritchard (Philosophy) and Mary Bovill (Education) between 2014 and 2018. I participated in this project in 2017 and 2018 and here refer to how CoPI was practiced in the prison sessions led by Mary Bovill during this time.

Although there is not a specific goal state that CoPI aims at in terms of an answer to a philosophical question, its methodology is nevertheless very rigid and much stronger constraints are imposed upon the activity than is normal even in philosophical practices designed for children. In fact, it appears at first glance much more like a game than a method of engaging in serious philosophical discussion. As we shall see however, this game-likeness should not be conflated with non-seriousness or ineffectiveness. The rules of CoPI, though strict, are simple: Participants must not draw on personal experience/talk about their own history (this is aided by them each taking a pseudonym such as ‘Anakin’, ‘Frodo’ or ‘Messi’ to be called during the sessions); participants must not appeal to authority i.e., in the form of people, books, documentaries etc. to back up their statements; they must raise their hands to indicate to the chair that they wish to speak (the chair may or may not accommodate this request depending on the flow of discussion); and when called on to speak they must do so within the constraints of the following template: “I agree/disagree with x when they say y because z ”. Taken together, the practice is a highly constrained way of doing philosophy, for both students and teacher. For the student not least because of having to shape one’s thoughts to fit into this template in order to express them. But the teacher is also highly constrained in their fulfilling of their role. The teacher/chair is bound not to interfere in the discussion or

guide the discussion towards what they might think are the “good” questions or some kind of goal such as what they might want the students to learn from the discussion. Moreover, the teacher must not ‘teach’ in that they are bound to not lecture, explain, or take over discussion. In line with this they must also be careful to not reveal their own judgements on the arguments presented by the students, even so far as not revealing which one’s they think are worth pursuing by e.g., praising or even repeating someone’s point. This is not to say that the role of the teacher is unimportant however. On the contrary, good chairing is crucial for the practice to work and to be effective, and it is an extremely difficult practice to master. One of the key skills of the teacher/chair in this practice that is noticeable when it is implemented effectively, is in being a strong enough *presence* to act as a focal point that the students gravitate towards so that the chair entrains them in the game, yet at the same time being personally *absent* enough so that their ego/personality/charisma not only does not dominate the discussion but is so present in its absence that it acts somewhat like a vacuum, drawing out the students into the space so that *they* can be fully present. In addition to enabling the space for discussion in this way, another key skill that is very difficult to implement well is reading the room well and following along with the discussion carefully so that one can call on participants who want to contribute who fit with the current line of discussion. Moreover, the master chair will also be able to remember and categorise previous contributions in line with their philosophical relation to each other and - at appropriate times - call on those whose contribution can therefore be likely to interestingly counter an argument just proposed. It should be seen then that although the teacher/chair should be absent in a sense they are nevertheless required to exhibit a high amount of attention, knowledge, insight and skill to run a session optimally.

The main element of this practice that I want to highlight here is the high level of constraints upon the student participants imposed both by (1) the rules of the practice and the power the chair has in enabling and holding the discussion space and (2) in calling on participants according to their judgement. This means that the possibilities for the way that participants can answer is reduced. Moreover, the game-likeness and the seeming lack of autonomy and self-direction combined with being forced to express their thoughts in a strictly prescribed manner would make it reasonable for someone to think that the thoughts, the development of these thoughts, intellectual autonomy and open-mindedness would be inhibited. I believe however that we have good reason to think that this is not only not the case but that in fact, rather than these constraints limiting you to a subset of your normal possibilities they in fact change what possibilities are now available by opening up new abilities and sensitivities in the subject.¹ Over time, (note that this normally occurs gradually and not in one transformative ‘aha’ moment) engaging in this practice actually enables these kinds of qualities of mind, develops perspective-taking skills, and results in a kind of perspective transformation which is akin, I suggest, to the target phenomenon of transformational learning theory.

Duncan Pritchard (2019), viewing the transcripts through the lens of intellectual virtue theory, has argued that the feedback from the participants and prison educators after the pilot of the Edinburgh project (2014-15) indicates that there were noticeable differences in: ability to express; ability to listen; ability to be critically self-aware; and ability to see the world

¹ Claire Cassidy and Gavin Heron (Cassidy & Heron 2018; Heron & Cassidy 2018) have likewise argued that the young people in secure accommodation that they have been using the CoPI practice with in the Strathclyde projects respond extremely positively to the structure that CoPI imposes, although their analysis focusses on collaborative engagement and behavioural self-regulation.

from a different point of view and that these map on to important intellectual virtues. Viewed instead through the lens of transformational learning theory, I think that the changes reported and described strongly suggest that the learners not only developed a set of skills that might map on to the intellectual virtues but, more than this, a *transformation in the learners' perspectives* had been induced.² The ritual of formalising the practice of speaking and listening and purposefully putting in constraints seems to force changes in the habitual regularities with how people both engage in and respond to that speaking. Somewhat paradoxically these constraints do not function as limits that constrain thought and speech. On the contrary, their presence forces open new possibilities. They not only make available possibilities for the practice of speaking, they also enable a change in the participants' perspective on themselves - they are no longer trapped within one perspective. Consider the following extracts from the interviews with prison educators and prison learners reported in Pritchard (2019). In the first, one of the prison educators describes the attitudes of the women learners in the prison at the start of the project and then describes the changes they saw in these learners by the end:

“The women will come in and just assume that nobody’s going to do anything for them and that they’re not capable of doing anything.” [Prison Educator]

“[...] that’s what made it so glorious in that last one [the last tutorial ...] and you were hearing comments like, I didn’t know I could have opinions on these sort of things. [...] It was really quite astonishing. Or somebody else saying, this has helped me in interviews with my social worker or lawyer to listen and to argue, and to, you know, stick up for myself.” [Prison Educator]

And, along similar lines:

“I saw a difference, not just in their confidence, but in the way that they learned how to argue and debate as well. Right before the end they, sort of, were clicking onto the idea of just being a devil’s advocate, because when they first came into it, it was like, no, I must argue my viewpoint and I can’t disagree with that, because I need to stick to what I believe. Whereas quite a few times [we ...] explained to them, look, you don’t need to say what you think and also you don’t need to take it personally when someone else disagrees with you. And I was very impressed that they didn’t take really any of it personally, even when a few times students that I know are quite religious spoke about their religious beliefs with regard to philosophy, because that’s always a little bit, like, what’s going to happen here.” [Prison educator]

The changes were also keenly felt by the prisoner learners themselves, as can be seen by some of their responses to the interviewer:

“Yes, because the skills not just useful in a CoPI [tutorial], these are skills that are useful when you’re back in the block, when you’re dealing with officers, when you’re having to go to ICMs [integrated case management meetings ...]. They’re skills that are transferable to everything [...]. I’ve actually found myself watching more news and things that are of interest and topics that are quite current, so you can do these sort of things, maybe secretly practising it and not telling other people you’re practicing on them, you know what I mean?” [Prison-learner]

“Not just with listening, with a whole load of things, with looking at things. You know, do we always accept everything that we hear? Do we always believe that that’s right or do we look at the person that’s telling this or how do we think about what the papers say? You know, politicians, anything, you name it, you know. You listen and you look and you start to develop a whole way of changing your

² To what extent some or all of the intellectual virtues might map on to the kinds of transformation discussed in the transformational learning literature is an interesting question that is worth exploring. I won’t do that here as the main purpose of this paper is to be engaging with transformational learning theory on its own terms and using its concepts to help us understand what transformational learning might consist in.

thought and thinking and everything, and this has helped.” [Prison-learner]

(Interviews conducted by Mary Bovill and colleagues, quotations reported in Pritchard, 20019, pp.255-256).³

A few extracts from interviews with the prison learners can, of course, only do so much to motivate the proposal that many of these learners not only developed some useful intellectual skills/virtues but also underwent a transformation of perspective over the course of the project. However, my experience within the project: taking part in the sessions, observing the sessions, informal interactions before and after the sessions, and talking informally to the prison learners and prison educators, convinces me that profound changes occurred in the learners who attended all or most sessions. These changes were wider than a mere addition of a (or some) critical thinking skill(s) to their intellectual toolkit. They changed the way that learners viewed themselves, each other, the interactional space itself, and (as can be seen in the extracts above) even spaces and interactions outside of the classroom. This, I therefore propose, is a helpful example of transformational learning in action.

Transformational Learning Theory

The example of the perspective transformation in prison learners given above should go some way to generating in the reader a sense of what is meant by “transformational learning”: A change in one’s perspective on the world that is in some sense deep and fundamental. However, there are many interesting and important kinds of changes of perspectives, some of which might be considered to be “transformations” that can easily be confused or conflated with each other. The target phenomenon of this paper is one particular kind of transformation that is discussed in the adult education literature in terms of “transforming habits of minds” or “enlarging perspectives”. In order to clearly see how, and in what way, this is distinct from other kinds of learning and other kinds of perspectival changes it is worth reviewing some of this literature.

The field of transformative learning in adult education stems from a seminal study of college re-entry programs for women by Jack Mezirow in 1978. During the 1970’s a number of programs were developed for women to return to education as the custom, at least among the middle-classes, up until then had been for women to leave college or university to become housewives and/or mothers. Mezirow identified that these programs, though diverse in what and how they taught, were enabling powerful personal development in these women. Rather than merely learning additional facts and skills (which of course they also did) these programs enabled the women engaged in them to undergo a “perspective transformation”. This perspective transformation occurred, Mezirow proposed, when the learners became aware of the habits of mind through which they were implicitly viewing the world, and learned to reconstruct their individual frames of reference (Mezirow, 1978a).

Importantly, transformational learning theory is a theory of adult - and not child - learning. While childhood is the period in which the first meaning perspective is *formed*, adulthood is when the possibility of *transforming* this meaning perspective into another one arises (Mezirow et al. 2000, xii). The development of the ability to become aware of the context, i.e. the assumptions and biases, in which that meaning perspective has developed and thereby understand that that meaning perspective is shaped and biased as a result of that context is

³ For more on the Edinburgh projects see also Bovill, M. and Anderson, C. (forthcoming). *Changing the Subject: A Community of Philosophical Inquiry in Prisons*.

what is key. This understanding is supposed to enable the learner to be then able to construct a new meaning perspective that is not subject to the biases and faulty assumptions that the learner has identified. It is assumed by Mezirow and colleagues (Mezirow 2000, p.26) that this ability to become critically reflective of one's own assumptions (rather than merely critically reflective of the assumptions of others, an ability that may be present in children and adolescents) is a capacity that develops as one matures into the adult stages of life (*ibid*). Given what we now know about the development of the adolescent brain this distinction in capacities between adults and adolescents seems very plausible as it is generally accepted that the brain undergoes significant neural rewiring up until the end of adolescence at about 24 years of age and it is only then that the pre-frontal cortex, the part of the brain that is critical for executive functioning, is fully mature and efficient (Arain, Haque, and Johal et al., 2013).

The Mezirow Model

According to Mezirow, transformational learning is the process of moving from one frame of reference (or "meaning perspective") to another that more accurately (or helpfully) reflects the world that the adult now finds themselves in. It is worth considering Mezirow's particular model in order to get a better grasp of the kinds of learning and perspective changes that might be similar to, or associated with, transformational learning but that nevertheless need to be distinguished from it. However as can already be seen, the terminology used in the transformative learning theory literature can be somewhat opaque to the uninitiated. I therefore think it helpful to explore these distinctions in some detail here and spell out what I take to be the important and relevant aspects of this model.

A "frame of reference" or "meaning perspective" is, according to Mezirow, a set of assumptions and biases which shape one's view of the world. Transformational learning for him consists in moving from one frame of reference to another as a result of recognising that one's previous assumptions and biases were contingent upon (although most likely adaptive to) the context in which they had developed and may not accurately (or helpfully) reflect the world that the adult now finds themselves in. Mezirow views frames of reference as being composed of "habits of mind" and "points of view". Habits of mind are the more general, overarching assumptions that may be either implicit or explicit, learned or developed, but either way they usually operate outside of awareness (Mezirow, 2000, p. 18) shaping how we view the world and ourselves until we become aware of them. Mezirow gives the following as examples of habits of mind:

"Habits of mind include conservative or liberal orientation; tendency to move toward or away from people; approaching the unknown fearful or confident; preference to work alone or with others; ethnocentricity (seeing people different from your group negatively or as inferior); tendency to respect or challenge authority; thinking like a scientist, soldier, lawyer, or adult educator; interpreting behavior as a Freudian or a Jungian; approaching a problem analytically or intuitively; focusing on a problem from whole to parts or vice versa; introversion or extroversion; patterns of acting as a perfectionist, victim, or incompetent; fear of change; thinking conventionally about one's roles; occupational, disciplinary, religious, educational, capitalist, Marxist, or postmodernist; and many other orientations and worldviews" (Mezirow, 2000, p. 18).

We can see from this list that habits of mind may map on to what we might consider aspects of our temperament; they are structures through which we view the world and ourselves without necessarily being aware of them (indeed we typically are *not* aware of them, which is

what gives them their power).⁴ Or as Mezirow phrases it: “A habit of mind is a set of assumptions--broad, generalised, orienting predispositions that act as a filter for interpreting the meaning of experience” (*Ibid*, p. 17). The sets of specific beliefs, feelings, judgements etc. that we form through this filter, and which guide our individual thoughts and action—again usually without our awareness of them—are what Mezirow refers to as “meaning schemes”, and are the “specific manifestations of our meaning perspectives” (Mezirow, 1994, p. 223).

I take his model to work as follows: If I have the habit of mind of being distrustful of authority, even if I do not realise it, then when confronted by a seemingly authoritarian figure I will have certain expectations about that person’s behaviour, such as that they will try to dominate, hurt, or humiliate me, and feelings about them such as fear, anxiety, or dislike, none of which I may be aware of reflectively in the moment, but are nevertheless shaping the thoughts and beliefs I am having in this moment of interaction with this person, such as interpreting a mild suggestion as an order, a throwaway remark as a criticism, or a neutral or ambiguous facial expression as expressing dislike, disapproval, or threat. In this way we can see what Mezirow means when he says that, “[a] habit of mind becomes expressed as a *point of view*” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 18). For him, a ‘point of view’ is the perspective on the world that one has (with all its beliefs, thoughts, and feelings, but not reducible to these) that is partially enabled, or constituted by, our temperamental pre-dispositions. Those parts of my mentality that I am aware of, and consciously take to be my ‘point of view’ in the ordinary way that we use the phrase “from my point of view...”, such as my reflective assessment of the character of a person or thoughts about a topic, and my evaluation of how my interactions are going and what they mean, are functions of our engaging with the world through these dispositions and are only a subset of the contents of Mezirow’s ‘point of view’.

On this model, learning is supposed to occur in one of four ways: “...by elaborating existing frames of reference, by learning new frames of reference, by transforming points of view, or by transforming habits of mind” (*ibid*, p. 19).

Mezirow’s terms for types of learning	Perspectival effects
Elaborating existing frames of reference	Perspective-broadening
Learning new frames of reference	Perspective-taking
Transforming points of view	Perspective-shifting
Transforming habits of mind (= “transformative learning”)	Perspective-enlargening

The four types of learning that Mezirow distinguishes along with the perspectival changes that I take to be the outcomes of this learning (or rather, what that learning consists in). When you elaborate your existing frame of reference you broaden your perspective in terms of adding beliefs or making current one’s more discriminating. Whatever is added however, is consistent with, and does not trigger reflection upon, your fundamental assumptions. I therefore refer to this perspectival change as “perspective-broadening”. Learning a new frame of reference is to become aware that your perspective on the world is one perspective among others and others may operate using different frames of reference, some of which you may be able to comprehend. This strikes me as at least partially akin to what we generally refer to as “perspective-taking”. The transformation of a point of view is the change in beliefs, thoughts, feelings etc. through which you make sense

⁴ In this respect there is a clear convergence with the concept of "implicit bias" (or perhaps more accurately here "implicit cognitions"), though see Holyrood & Sweetman (forthcoming) for considerations about what is, and should be, captured by the term 'implicit bias'.

of the world and so entails a genuinely different view (what I refer to as a shift in perspective) to the one preceding the transformation. The transformation of habits of mind is the change of (typically) unconscious assumptions and biases such that the new perspective on the world that is enabled through this change is more open, more discriminating and is more accurately/helpfully attuned to the world in which you now find yourself. This perspective is therefore referred to in the literature as having been enlarged⁵. The transformation of habits of mind and the resultant enlarged perspective is what is referred to in the literature as “transformative learning”. This is the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory.

We might think of the first, ‘elaborating existing frames of reference’ as a form of *perspective broadening* of the kind that we typically engage in in schools and families. As children grow up within a particular culture and time, their elders around them tend not to make them question their basic assumptions about the world and themselves, but rather guide them in discovering and learning new details about the world that are consistent with these overarching assumptions (that they themselves have taught or affirmed), and correcting faulty inferences made on the basis of these.⁶ Expanding or “broadening” perspectives in this way is the learning of new meaning schemes. These will be updated beliefs, feelings, and judgements in virtue of correction, refinement, or development of previous ones. But, in addition to this, another way my perspective is broadened is by learning that other people have different perspectives from me (i.e., they operate through a different frame of reference to me), and learning to be able to imagine or anticipate that they will view the world through a different reference frame and different meaning schemes than me. Importantly, engaging in either perspective taking or perspective broadening does not imply changing one’s point of view (in Mezirow’s sense of the term), nor one’s habits of mind (even though these changes may be the mechanisms by which these transformations occur (see Mezirow, 1978b, p. 104)). In perspective broadening one is adding new elements to one’s meaning schemes, or unpacking coarse elements into more fine-grained (discriminating) ones so that one can understand the world in which one finds oneself a little better. But it is the *same* world (read ‘*umwelt*’) as one was operating in before, just gotten to know a little better or a little more subtly. Similarly, in perspective-taking, one is not stepping out of one’s world and into another’s, but rather from within one’s own worldview, attempting to bracket one’s own meaning schemes, i.e. the ones you are aware of and that you think might conflict with those of another, to allow for different kinds of inferences or responses to come about than the normal collection of your meaning schemes would enable.

The ‘transformation of a point of view’ is a little more radical; it is the changing of a substantial portion of one’s world in virtue of changes in the thoughts, feelings and judgements that (whether we are aware of them or not) give rise to our feelings, behaviours, and assessments of the world and ourselves. That is to say, I equate it with what I will refer to as *perspective shifting*. Take for example the kind of learning that students often undergo in school or college, such as about a particular period in history. Learning that there were squadrons of female fighter pilots in the second world war will broaden a student’s perspective, they have learnt new information about a period. But in addition, this may also

⁵ The term “enlarging” or “enlargening” in respect to the perspective that is transformed when “transformative learning” has occurred comes from the Transformative Learning literature. Though, as I will discuss below, I think that this term does not adequately capture the phenomenon of interest, or distinguish it appropriately from the perspectival effects of the other kinds of learning. I will therefore later rename this effect, which I take to be the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory “perspective deepening”.

⁶ If children within a mono-culture *are* led to question basic assumptions about the world, this is perhaps prompted by their reading literature, engagement in philosophy classes, or in psychotherapy rather than in their day-to-day school and family experience. Such questioning is seldom encouraged (apart from by those inclined towards literature, philosophy, and psychology) and is not a goal of most education. Indeed, the very questioning of these basic assumptions itself can even land the child in psychotherapy or counselling (either secular or religious) if the questioning leads them to overtly contradict the tenets of the frames of reference that the adults around them in power have.

have the effect that the student thereby changes their judgements about what kinds of contributions women have made to history, and the ways that women have played powerful ‘non-feminine’ roles throughout history and subsequently about what women are capable of and what it means to be a woman. These are not merely new individual thoughts (though they may be experienced as such), but more than that they are structural changes in the way that related subsequent ideas and thoughts will be processed. Structural changes like this will have a cascading effect through the web of beliefs that are related to that meaning scheme such that we no longer make sense of the world through the previous meaning scheme and now have a different point of view (a different outlook on the world) in respect to related topics than before.

Transforming a points of view can look very much like the kind of perspective change that we have identified as the target phenomenon of this paper. We must be careful however to distinguish these two phenomena. One can change one's thoughts, feelings and judgements about things even while remaining with the same habits of mind. So, in respect to the example above a student who already had positive views about women and their capabilities, might as a result of learning about the female fighter pilots change some of their thoughts, feelings and judgements. This will of course open up new ways of thinking about things and therefore the potential for different experiences. But these experiences are nevertheless limited by the “worlds” that their habits of mind enable and constrain. However, a student who has a deeply sexist habit of mind might, as a result of this same lesson, find themselves in a conflict of beliefs that triggers a kind of crisis that enables the creation of a new (or reformed) habit of mind. While changes in meaning schemes resulting in transformation of points of view (what I am calling “perspective shifting”) is a kind of transformation, by itself it is not the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory. Rather, the transformations that transformative learning theory is concerned with are those of the habits of mind: the deep, fundamental meaning perspectives that are ordinarily hidden from us, and that make possible the meaning schemes that subsequently shape the way we create and process thoughts and feelings. To highlight this difference, Mezirow cites an example taken from Cohen (1997):

Cohen (1997) describes how an educator can help adult students with negative experiences in school to feel more secure as learners in doing classwork. Over time, a series of these transformations in point of view about oneself as a learner (“I *can* understand these ideas”) may cumulatively lead to a transformation in self-concept (“I am a smart, competent person”)--a habit of mind.

We change our point of view by trying on another’s point of view. We are unable to do this with a habit of mind. The most personally significant and emotionally exacting transformations involve a critique of previously unexamined premises regarding one’s self [...]. (Mezirow, 2000, p. 21/2)

Transformational learning thus refers to the process of changing these deep (temperamental) habits of mind that we are not normally aware of and which it is difficult to provoke one to question, but which, when shaken, provide the basis for us to not merely think differently but to experience the world differently, to live differently. In more 4E terms, they are changes in the very conditions of possibility of experience, and therefore result in a transformation of the individuals very *umwelt*, or “landscape of affordances” (see Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). This deep structural change in one’s phenomenological and cognitive architecture might happen suddenly in a dramatic fashion (what Mezirow refers to as “epochal” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 21)), and be accompanied by an experienced “aha” moment or epiphany, what we

might think of as a *transformative experience*. However, this is neither necessary, nor perhaps the most common form of transformative learning. Rather, these transformations may be incremental, “involving a progressive series of transformations in related points of view that culminate in a transformation in habit of mind” (*Ibid.* p.21). This is worth highlighting: even though a transformation in point of view does not entail a change in habits of mind, it (or its cascading influence) may lead to the transformation of habits of mind. And of course, changes in habits of mind will typically (though not necessarily) effect differences in one’s point of view. Presumably transformations of habits of mind might even happen without one’s awareness, though of course it will have consequences for the experiences that are made possible through these habits (and thus for awareness in general). It is also not the case that any-and-all changes in our habits of mind constitute transformative learning. The term ‘transformational learning’ is reserved for the transformations of frames of reference that are in some way problematic into one’s that are “more dependable in our adult life” (*Ibid.*p. 20). The transformational learning literature therefore describes the result of this kind of transformation (what I refer to as the target phenomenon of transformational learning theory) as “enlarging” the perspective or understanding.

I do not suggest that there are sharp boundaries between each type of learning proposed by Mezirow or the perspectival effects that I have mapped on to these above. Indeed perspective-broadening, perspective-taking, and perspective-shifting may well all feed into and generate each other. What is important is that perspective enlarging is different from and not implied by the other three even though they may be involved in the process of perspective enlarging or be the mechanisms by which it is brought about. However, while the enlarged perspective is not reducible to any of these other kinds of perspectival changes (either individually or as a concatenation of all three) these kinds of changes are likely to be brought about as a result/in the process of transformations of habits of mind, irrespective of whether changes in these are the primary trigger for these transformations. Indeed, as I will propose later in the paper, part of what I take to be a key characteristic of the enlarged perspective is that these more basic perspectival changes are effected in a more flexible and adaptive manner.

Affectively Transforming Perspectives

Transformative learning theory is not without its critics (see Howie & Bagnall, 2013, for a summary). For the purposes of this paper however, it does not matter whether it e.g., really counts as a theory. This is because I am principally concerned with its target phenomenon—perspective-enlargening and the ways in which it is distinct from the other perspectival effects outlined above. Although my analysis is motivated by (and I take to capture) the intended concepts in Mezirow’s model it may nevertheless be considered in isolation from his particular theoretical and pedagogical paradigm. Regardless of whether his theory stands up to criticism we can appreciate that Mezirow is pointing towards a valuable educational outcome that warrants further investigation in order to understand what it is, how to distinguish it from other related phenomena and how to bring it about. There is however, a relevant criticism that has been pitched at this project in a recent paper by Michelle Maiese (Maiese, 2017): that Mezirow's proposal for transformational learning, and the enlarged-perspective that it gives rise to, are on his account overly reliant on meta-cognition. This is relevant to us because the example I have given of transformative learning in action in the CoPI prison tutorials seems to not be primarily based on inducing meta-cognition, at least in the sense that the term is ordinarily used in education studies; consciously reflecting on one’s

own thoughts. Rather, what seems to be bringing the transformation about is something to do with engaging with others within the CoPI structure. I will elaborate on exactly how I think this may be working later on.

Mezirow, rather typically for current pedagogical theory, does focus very much on explicitly cognitive (rather than affective) means by which transformation is enacted. These means are: critical reflection; meta-cognitive reasoning, and the questioning of assumptions and beliefs. We can see the roles that these are supposed to play in the transformation process in Mezirow's ten "phases of meaning becoming clarified" (from Mezirow, 2000, but appearing throughout the literature):

1. A disorienting dilemma
2. Self-examination with feelings of fear, anger, guilt, or shame
3. A critical assessment of assumptions
4. Recognition that one's discontent and the process of transformation are shared
5. Exploration of options for new roles, relationships, and actions
6. Planning a course of action
7. Acquiring knowledge and skills for implementing one's plans
8. Provisional trying of new roles
9. Building competence and self-confidence in new roles and relationships
10. A reintegration into one's life on the basis of conditions dictated by one's new perspective

Maiese grants that transformation involves an important shift in reference frames, but responds to Mezirow's characterisation of the transformation and the cognitive methods of inducing transformation in learners by criticising (i) the lack of emphasis on affect and the body in transformative learning theory, (ii) the emphasis on acquiring information, and (iii) the reduction of transformative learning to a metacognitive process of reassessing reasons. Of course, we can see that phase (1), disorientation, is going to involve some kind of affective engagement (as we see in (2)), whether this is with the content of the subject at issue or the way we come to know this subject. However, the strong emphasis on discourse, and meta-cognitive reasoning in the form of (3) "critical assessment of assumptions" make it clear that according to the mainstream of transformative learning theory the methods of inducing this affective engagement and the means by which this subsequent shift in engagement occurs are predominantly (meta-)cognitive in nature.

Maiese argues instead that the cognitive shifts that are involved in transformative learning are fundamentally also affective, and furthermore, that this bodily affectivity helps to explain the change to a subject's concerns and perspective. This is because for Maiese, the shift in perspective involves that:

"[...] subjects become receptive to new information and more able to appreciate the salience of factors that previously had remained obscure....a subject's new "openness" and attunement to certain features of their surroundings involves a shift that is simultaneously both cognitive and affective; and this change in cognitive-affective orientation brings with it a transformation of a subject's habits of mind, which I will maintain can be understood as a dramatic shift in what I call "affective framing patterns." (*ibid*, p. 200)

We can see from this that Maiese is highlighting the importance of affectivity not only in virtue of its potential role in inducing transformational shifts, but also as part of what that shift consists in. This notion of "affective framing" draws on Colombetti's (2014) notion of *primordial affectivity*, which is the idea that the way that organisms (ourselves included) interact with the world is always deeply affective in virtue of this interaction being the

activity of an organism with what is of value to it (i.e., that “sense-making” is always simultaneously cognitive *and* affective). It also draws upon Ratcliffe’s (2008) notion of *existential orientation* (often utilised by enactivists due to its conceptual fit with the notions of sense-making, *umwelts* and affordances). This is the idea that we have a background set of bodily feelings that we don’t experience *as feelings* but rather provide us with a way of finding oneself in the world. These existential feelings give us, for example, a sense of reality, a sense of unreality, a sense of belonging, and so forth, in virtue of the sense of possibilities that are available to us.

Why might we think that this kind of affectivity is an important aspect of transformational learning and the resultant enlarged perspective? We might think that affectivity is overtly salient in the experience of the person undergoing transformational learning. As discussed in the last section however, it is not necessary for the person undergoing transformational learning to experience it *as* a transformational experience. Nevertheless, the affectivity is implicitly (or rather pre-reflectively) present in virtue of its changing the colour through which the world is experienced: what kinds of thoughts and feelings are available to one, the possibilities for one that are perceived and how one feels about oneself in that world. The very kinds of changes that we see reflected in the quotes from the prison learners presented in the first section. This integral role that affect plays in perspectives and the way in which it pervades the character of the transformed perspective is helpfully illustrated by a quote from Bartky (1996) that Maiese cites:

When feminists of colour take white feminists to task for racial bias, I understand them to mean more than that white feminists acquire additional information or that they abandon assumptions that once seemed self-evident. What they are demanding from white women and what women, particularly feminists, demand from many men, I venture, is a knowing that transforms the self who knows, a knowing that brings new sympathies, new affects as well as new cognitions and new forms of intersubjectivity. The demand, in a word, is for a knowing that has a particular affective taste (179). (Bartky, cited in Maiese, 2017, pp. 207-8).

It should be clear that Maiese’s concept of *affective framing patterns* is an elaboration of Mezirow’s *frame of reference* or *meaning perspective*. And, just as Mezirow describes a frame of reference as being constituted by *habits of mind*, Maiese expands this to incorporate *habits of the body*, which will have affective consequences on the thoughts, feelings, and judgements (and potentially perceptions) that are enabled through these structures. The result of this is that points of view and all the cognitions and experiences that arise from within these points of view are suffused with affect (whether or not this is experienced *as* affect) which contributes to the *meaning* of their meaning perspective. Her term “affective framing patterns” thus maps onto (or rather, should overwrite) Mezirow’s term “frame of reference”.

Perspective Shifting and Perspective Enlargening

Maiese's use of enactivist (and enactivist-friendly) work to understand transformational learning in terms of what she calls "affective framing" is a promising first step to understanding how transformational learning (and thus perspective-enlarging) might occur without the over-reliance on meta-cognition present in Mezirow's formulations and why it is that the transformed perspective gives us the kind of powerfully different way of engaging with the world that we saw occurred in some of the prison learners through participating in the philosophy project. Perspective transformation considered (following Maiese) as affective reframing certainly does seem to capture some of the qualitative shift in both bodily and

affective engagement that occurs when we are triggered to consider (parts of) our world with “new eyes”. The person who has undergone affective reframing now lives in a different *umwelt*; they may be attuned to different parts of the world than they were before, and those parts they remain attuned to may be perceived differently. The instance, or period surrounding, this transformation may be experienced *as* a shift in perspective, in which case the person will undergo a “transformative experience”. But this is not required for the transformation to take place. If the person is focussed outwards, rather than inwards, if the transformation happens subtly, or over time, etc. then they may not notice it happening at all. But, nevertheless their experiential world has changed and so their experiences from now on will (in general) be different as they will be structured through this different “affective frame” (of course there is still the possibility that some experiences that were enabled through structure A can also be enabled through structure B, so not all experiences are necessarily different).

On Maiese’s model affective reframing is a re-characterisation of the kind of learning that Mezirow is primarily concerned with in transformative learning theory: transforming habits of mind. She broadens the notion of “habits of mind” by including bodily and affective habits with the consequence that the resultant perspective difference that occurs when these habits are transformed are fundamentally also bodily and affective differences. This is an important development, however it might not yet fully characterise the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory, i.e., the state that the transformation of habits of mind is supposed to bring about: *perspective enlargening*. While it does characterise the bodily and affective *shift* in perspective that is implied, it is not always the case that a perspective shift will also be a *perspective enlargening*. It is perfectly feasible that a perspective shift might, for example, be a shift to a narrower, more biased perspective. For example, people may shift their perspective from a more inclusive one to one in which racist or homophobic biases are triggered or tinderred, as can happen when the society around them starts to encourage these habits of mind e.g., under fascist regimes. More benignly (perhaps), we might see this in the common occurrence of people to become less open-minded and more rigid in their thinking as they age, along with a tendency to become more conservative in their attitudes (as captured in the adage “If you’re not a socialist at twenty, you have no heart, and if you’re not a conservative at forty, you have no brain.”). If this is right, then we can see that not all perspective shifts that result from transforming habits of mind are equally valuable in respect to developing an enlarged perspective. Moreover, it may not be inevitable that as one matures in age, one enlarges one’s perspective: the existence of “wise elders” may be matched by the existence of “old fools”. Maiese’s model of affective framing therefore, though an important contribution to the literature in transformational learning theory, does not yet fully provide us with the tools to differentiate between all of the kinds of perspective changes outlined above and the perspective enlargening that is the target phenomenon of transformational learning theory. To do this I suggest that we move to thinking more explicitly in terms of the concepts of adaptivity and flexibility.

The idea of an enlarged perspective is supposed to capture the notions of being more inclusive and discriminating and that the perspective is more dependable in the current situation. In this sense it is an instance of a subset of perspective shifts in that it is of course a shift in perspective, but not just any shift: it is a shift in a positive direction i.e., it enables one to be more adaptive to one’s current environment. It allows us to adapt (or rather it is the very process of adapting) to a new situation rather than being relegated to experiencing that situation through the lens of old habits of mind. This positive perspective shift is, of course, also a form of perspective broadening as it implies seeing the world in a more fine-grained

way than previously. To be more than superficially adaptive to a situation (in which one might get away with only being coupled to coarser-grained aspects) one needs to be attuned to, and able to respond to, more subtle aspects of situations. Then one can resonate with and appropriately respond to these rather than risk them instigating a disintegration of the perspective.

Characterising Mezirow's concept of perspective enlargening only in terms of adaptivity however, does not seem fully satisfactory. Perspective enlargening is not merely a kind of perspective shifting. While adaptivity captures this sense of being more discriminating and dependable, it's not clear that it can quite capture what is hinted at by inclusivity. I suggest that we start to unpack this by considering why it is that Mezirow focuses so strongly on dialogue as a means for bringing about transformational learning rather than on the disorientation and subsequent emotional responses to this disorientation that, on his model trigger the meta-cognition that brings about transformation and on Maiese's model trigger or constitute the perspective transformation itself. As can be seen in his ten "phases of meaning becoming clarified" listed above, critical reflection, meta-cognitive reasoning, and the questioning of assumptions and beliefs, are the means by which transformation (i.e. perspective enlargening) is supposed to come about for Mezirow. All of these can be thought of as meta-cognitive activities (broadly construed). Dialogue provides the means by which meta-cognition can come about by providing a space in which thoughts, perspectives etc. can be observed, both by the speaker after (or as) they express them, but also by others. Indeed, the observation of others' perspectives might be even more effective as it is easier to see the biases in others' perspectives without becoming defensive and rigidifying one's own perspective in response. Furthermore, the act of holding another's perspective in mind without entering into it fully so as to consider it but not take it as one's own (what we think of as perspective-taking) seems to be a first developmental step towards being able to perspective-take one's own thoughts.

Perspective Holding and Flexibility

I take the key reason for Mezirow's emphasis on metacognition to be this: that stepping out of the perspective that one is entrenched in - or rather unentrenching oneself from it so that one sees it as contingent upon biases (even if these biases are not identified) - one holds it in such a way that one now sees it *as* a perspective and thus as generated through sets of habits of mind that may not be fully adaptive. Doing this can enable us to *take more perspectives* as we are not entrenched in a single one. The idea of inclusivity in this context then, is tracking this ability to hold both our own and other's perspectives in such a way that one is able to see both their consequences (and so in a sense "taking" that perspective) but also the habits of mind that generate it (and so in a sense taking a "meta" perspective on it). As this involves not being entrenched in one's perspective but rather taking this distance from it, let us refer to this as "perspective holding".⁷ Perspective holding, as I define it, is holding one's own perspective in a similar way to how one holds another's when one perspective-takes well, i.e., without full commitment to the consequent thoughts and beliefs that perspective generates, and being aware of the assumptions and biases that go into creating that perspective (or at

⁷ My notion of "perspective holding" here, and the dynamicism of the perspective space outlined below are strongly influenced by my reading of discussions in Chinese Philosophy of perspective transformation and the "course-axis" (Ziporyn, 2005) and second-order observation and genuine pretending (Moeller, 2017; Moeller & D'Ambrosio, 2017).

least being aware that there *are* assumptions and biases that go into creating it). When I take the perspective of a small child or a person with dementia I do not - nor do I try to - enter fully into that perspective, taking it for myself. Rather, I attempt to understand why it is that they are thinking the things that they do and why they want the things they want so that I can adequately communicate with or help them. If I fully entered that perspective I would become childish or delusional myself and cease to be of help to the person with whom I am trying to communicate. Similarly, when I *hold* my own perspective, whilst I am in it and thus experience the world through it (as one must always experience the world through some perspective) I do this with an awareness that the thoughts, feelings and judgements that arise in my mind are a result of various habits of mind that may or may not be optimally adaptive to my current situation and/or developmental level. This awareness enables a level of intellectual humility in respect to whether those thoughts, feelings, and judgements are the appropriate one's for the situation.

Although perspective holding, as with perspective-taking, provides a kind of distance from the perspective being held (or taken), this is not adequately characterised as a meta-cognitive stance. This is not a case of one mental state taking another as its object in a kind of introspective manner. Rather, this is a case of experiencing the world through a kind of awareness that at the same time engenders an awareness of its own contingency. On this view, perspectives are Janus-faced with one face towards that which the perspective enables, and one face towards that which enables the perspective. In this sense the perspective space is broader than one which does not encompass this Janus-faced perspective in that there is more experienced as part of the perspective: both the forward and backwards aspects. And, this backwards facing (or “meta”) aspect may allow us to see more finer-grained distinctions in the forward-facing aspect. But more than this, I suggest that we can think of the perspective space as now having “depth”. It is no longer a two-dimensional perspective space, i.e., a space A within which some aspects of one’s own point of view can be bracketed out to enable one to simulate (as much as possible) the perspective of another, and which can shift into a perspective B with a change of meaning schemes or habits of mind, or if the shift is to a perspective that is more adaptive to the current situation and thus more discriminating, to an enlarged perspective C. Rather, the double aspect of the Janus-faced perspectives gives rise to (or rather constitutes) a layered effect in which (at least some parts of) perspectives are taken within perspectives: a perspective space that can be thought of as three dimensional, encompassing perspectives holding other perspectives.

As I have cashed it out therefore, the enlarged perspective is not merely the concatenation of perspective-taking, perspective shifting, and perspective broadening. Using the metaphor of multidimensionality, we can see that the enlarged perspective encompasses a depth to its perspectival space. This depth consists in the holding of one's own perspectives (as well as those of others) with an awareness that they are formed by potentially unhelpfully-biased habits of mind. This awareness then may result in triggering shifts to perspectives that are more inclusive and discriminating (and thus are better attuned to the current situation). This thus generates a heightened adaptivity and (most importantly) flexibility of perspective, as the pervasive awareness of the contingency of each perspective opens up the space to skip from one to another over the course of coupling with the perceived world. This characteristic of perspective holding that yields a depth of the perspective space and the flexibility that it engenders is what I propose that the enlarged perspective consists in. That is to say, it is what characterises the enlarged perspective as distinct from other kinds of positive perspective

shifts.⁸ Given how important this idea of depth is to the perspective that results from transformational learning, let us re-characterise the target phenomenon of transformational learning theory from "enlarging perspectives" to "deepening perspectives". Understanding the enlarged perspective in this way as a "deepened perspective" allows us to view the same target phenomenon that Mezirow thinks is brought about through meta-cognition, with its characteristic meta-cognitive aspects (i.e., an awareness that habits and biases are shaping our thoughts), but without relying on explicit metacognition as a means of bringing this awareness about. We can thus accommodate other means of bringing about transformational learning, such as the affective shifts that Maiese highlights, and the experiential differences that are gestured towards by her concept of affective reframing. Furthermore, we can now identify how this affective reframing might be importantly different in the case of perspective enlarging as compared to perspective shifting.

Deepening Perspectives through "As-Ifing"

I take perspective deepening (previously referred to as "perspective enlarging") to be a worthwhile educational aim. We have seen however, that Mezirow's understanding of the phenomenon may be too restrictive because it is too dependent on meta-cognition and Maiese's understanding looks too permissive because it does not adequately distinguish between perspective shifting and perspective enlarging/deepening. I think that it can be seen that there are other ways of triggering perspective deepening (and thus instantiating transformational learning) than using the orthodox dialogue induced meta-cognitive tactic promoted by Mezirow. To show this let us consider an example of inducing different perspectives from the field of classical Chinese philosophy. In a recent book that explains Chinese Philosophy to newcomers in the area, Michael Puett explains how important the function of rituals is in Confucian philosophy. Contrary to our stereotyped notions of rituals as rigid practices to be followed that control our behavior (and perhaps thought), Puett explains that there is an important aspect to rituals in the Confucian tradition that actually functions so as to break up patterns of behaviour so that one can step out of automatic responses. To see this (and this is worth quoting at length), consider his example of an ancestor worship rite:

"The power of the ritual lay in how patently distinct it was from the real world. Consider one variation of the rite in which three generations exchanged roles. A grandson would personify his deceased grandfather, while his own father would personify him. Each living descendant was made to take on the perspective of the person with whom he often experienced the most tension in the world outside.

This was clearly an as-if world: there was no way the participants could possibly mistake the roles they were playing for roles they could ever assume in real life; a father is not being trained to be the son of his son. But through this rite, the living would not only develop a different relationship toward the deceased. Those left behind would also be brought together into new relationships.

Of course, the ritual always ends. Family members walk out of the ritual space, and the moment they do, they are in the messy world again. Over time the fragile peace falls apart once more. Siblings squabble, cousins rebel, the father and son are still at odds with each other.

This is why families returned to the ritual repeatedly. The fragile peace might crumble once they left the temple, but gradually, by doing the rituals again and again and re-creating these healthier connections, the improved relationships among the family members would begin to manifest more in daily life.

⁸ Given how I have unpacked this here, it can also be seen to trigger subsequent perspective transformations but I do not make the claim that it is the only way of bringing about the kind perspective transformations that are the target phenomenon of transformational learning theory. It is, I believe, an open question as to what other means might trigger these.

The ritual does not tell anyone how to behave in the real world. The perfectly ordered world inside the ritual could never replace the flawed world of real-life relationships. It works because each participant plays a role other than the one he inhabits normally. That “break” with reality is the key for allowing the participants to begin to work on their relationships. A father’s pretending to be his son helps him to understand his child and become a better father and a better person.” (Puett & Gross Loh, 2016, pp.33-34).

So, for Puett, ritual allows you to create a new reality. Instead of passively responding to what goes on in the world one acts “as if” the world were different, thereby cultivating different mental, bodily, and emotional habits so that we can then respond to others and the world in a different way. While the example above is from what might be considered a “religious” rite, and is somewhat similar to the kinds of rituals we are familiar with in the religious traditions that we might be acquainted with, Puett suggests—in line with the Confucian tradition—that we also understand more mundane activities as rituals and thereby also see how our engagement in them has this “as if” characteristic. Take Puett’s example of playing hide and seek with a small child. Both you and the child are aware that the child is not truly hidden, and that you are not truly seeking, yet the pretence of both of you that you *are* allows you both to engage in the game and enjoy it. Furthermore, paralleling the ancestor rite above, Puett argues that this act of the adult pretending to be vulnerable and findable, and of the child pretending to be powerful and capable enables a growth in both:

“This role reversal breaks their usual pattern. The child gets to experience a feeling of competence that she will remember even after the game is over. The adult, usually an infallible being (at least in the eyes of a child), has now played at being fallible and vulnerable. He isn’t really becoming a befuddled adult, but the role reversal helps him to develop more complex, nuanced sides of himself that he, too, can take with him into other situations: vulnerability, connection, levity, and the ability not to cling to power too tightly.” (*Ibid.* pp. 35-36).

Puett argues that mundane rituals like greetings and family dinners are likewise playing a similar function. For a discrete period we step out of our automatic responding to people and instead follow the structure that the ritual dictates. Take the example of Sunday lunch. Depending on your country or family culture, you might be more vigilant about politely requesting, and thanking each other for, passing food; you might offer your elders food or wine first; gently tend to the young’s needs and correct their manners; withhold from saying what you really think about a conversation topic so as to allow a flow of conversation to run, to encourage another member of the table to participate, or to prevent someone’s embarrassment. Even if one is so used to this ritual that one no longer thinks about it being different from the rest of life, the different rules by which one behaves when one sits down to a Sunday lunch nevertheless separate it from normal life while still being a part of it. Puett’s point is that this separation allows you to escape, at least temporarily, the mental space you have found yourself in (so for example one might be in the middle of an argument with a sibling or have your mind completely on work matters). Putting these to the side so as to obey the ritual dictates allows you to step out of these ways your mind might be stuck in and be for that period, present in the moment, engaging with others in a different way, so that when the dinner is ended, while you might no longer be on best behaviour, there has been a certain freedom opened up in that you can choose not to automatically return to the habitual state you were in before sitting down to dinner.

What is of paramount importance to this example, and in all Puett’s examples of as-iffing in ritual, is that while playing these roles in the ritual the players are “not really becoming” the roles they are playing. Puett emphasises that:

“The key for the players is to be conscious that they are pretending; that together they have entered an alternate reality in which they imagine different sides of themselves. If they can do this, then not only will experiences like playing hide-and-seek help cultivate a mutually more joyful and respectful relationship, but also these accumulated moments will influence the sort of person each becomes over time. These repeated rituals will develop aspects of each of them that eventually enhance other relationships in both of their lives.” (*Ibid.* p. 36).

I suggest that this consciousness that one is pretending, that one is not really becoming the roles that one is playing, whether this is the role of the vulnerable hider/powerful seeker or the polite and thoughtful family member, maps onto the deep and flexible way that perspectives are held in the model of the deepened perspective outlined in the previous section. The new perspective that is enabled by stepping into this role is inhabited fully—this is not perspective-taking! And yet, if this is to work in the way that Puett envisages one cannot get stuck in this perspective either. The awareness that one is inhabiting a perspective and that one can shift to another when appropriate to do so is what gives the perspective its power. If you are no longer able to step out of it at will, if say the game has taken a troublesome turn *Lord of the Flies* style, and you are really being hunted and do not want to be found, the game will cease to have this “as-if” power of ritual, even if it is still technically a “game”. Or, let us consider a (perhaps) less sinister example: if situations had the power to draw me into them without my being aware of this happening, and so taking away my possibility to not engage with them or to uncouple from them. In such a case I am destined to stay trapped within the dynamic of each ritual until another exerts a stronger pull on me entraining me in its grasp. I am sucked from hide-and-seek with my friend's child, to a formal lunch with relatives, to meeting with my boss, to teaching my students. Even if I amend my behaviour appropriately to each situation, adjusting my vocabulary and demeanour to fit each situation and so from an external perspective am so perfectly abiding by each ritual's script that my behaviour is indistinguishable from someone who is consciously engaging in each ritual in Puett's as-if fashion, this is merely a case of (perhaps virtuoso-like) perspective shifting. While the virtuoso-perspective-shifter certainly does not succumb to the charge of stickiness of perspectives, they are not engaging with the world in a way that allows them to draw the lessons that Puett suggests engaging in an “as-if” way allow us to. The virtuoso-perspective shifter is too heavily engaged in the world and as a result they reel from one earnest situation to another.

What is missing here? Why would the virtuoso-perspective shifter not also be benefiting from the roles they are playing? After all, in playing hide-and-seek the virtuoso-perspective-shifter-adult is also reminded of the feeling of vulnerability, they gain connection, and perhaps are also encouraged (or reminded) to not cling to power too tightly. The virtuoso-perspective-shifter exhibits something akin to the flexibility characteristic of the deepened perspective. He does not get stuck in perspectives, which would result in a restrictive world-view and an inability to flexibly adapt to different contexts and different roles he might need to play. Quite the opposite—his perspectives might even seem to some to be not sticky enough; although his responses are appropriate to the relevant contexts there is a feeling that this appropriateness may not last. The boundaries of contexts are of course fuzzy, and can be perceived differently depending on which part of them one focuses one's attention on. The virtuoso-perspective-shifter may thus come up against a form of the frame problem: which parts of the current situation should be directly responded to, and when should these responses adapt to a new context? Some stickiness, for example, an ability to not just be wildly responsive to any stimulus but rather to remain in one perspective (even if this is a perspective that is itself “holding” others) for a long enough time to be able to interpret things as part of one context rather than fleetingly responding to all changes as if they were changes

in contexts, might therefore be warranted in order to maximise adaptivity and genuine flexibility.

Lack of stickiness however would not be the diagnosis that Puett would give for the malady that the virtuoso-perspective shifter is suffering from: it is not the quantity of perspectives engaged in, or the speed at which they are substituted for each other. Rather it is the quality with which they are held; engaging in the ritual in a way that one is at the same time both fully committed to it, and thus serious about it, but at the same time aware that one is playing a role in that ritual. One is not the role that one is playing; when the ritual ends so will that role-play. There is therefore a characteristic of this kind of “as-if” ritual engagement which I think is helpful to term ‘lightness’. The role is played lightly despite the seriousness of many rituals, and despite the commitment to playing that role in a ritual or game which might also be considered a kind of seriousness. One holds one’s perspective ‘lightly’ in the same way that one holds a violin bow lightly; the hand is relaxed enough to move flexibly and responsively without constant reflective oversight and yet is under control and not merely reactive to any perturbations. The ‘lightness’ with which one plays a role or holds a perspective is not in contrast to taking that perspective or role seriously. Rather, it is ‘light’ because one is aware that one is playing a role and that one could be playing another one (even when this awareness is not the focus of attention). Moreover, I suggest that one must also know that one *will* be in another one. After all being in a situation in which one knows that one is in, and that it is possible to be in a different one, but not having the feeling that one can or will actually get out of it seems to me to bring about the very opposite of a feeling of lightness, but rather a kind of existential dread.

Ritualing and As-iffing-the-other

The moral that I propose we take from Puett’s analysis of the way that Confucian ritual is effective is that by stepping out of the automatic behaviours and only ‘lightly’ stepping into the “as-if behaviours” (in that while you fully participate in the ritual you enter into it in a way that you know that you will come back out of it) you gain a greater perspective and understanding. To return to the enactivist vocabulary that Maiese proposed to characterise transformative learning, we might think of Puett’s ritual as-iffing as nudging participants into new affective frames. It is the very constraints of the ritual that break up the habitual patterns of behaviour and allow other possibilities for socially engaging to emerge. This shakes up the rigidity of the single-perspective outlook and gives the possibility for a little more intellectual (and perhaps moral) humility. Let us refer to the activity of engaging in a ritual in this “as if” manner as “ritualing” to distinguish it from mere rote performance of rituals which may lack this characteristic.

Puett’s position on this is very persuasive, and it is an expression of an influential understanding of the quality and purpose of ritual in the Confucian tradition (see e.g. also Fingarette 1978/1998).⁹ One might however, worry that while the activity of ritualing in this as-if manner may give rise to greater perspective and understanding, this is not inevitable. While it is easy to see that the person who engages in a ritual with utter—heavy—seriousness (perhaps describable as “pomp and circumstance”) might actually rigidify their perspective rather than enlarge it, it is not so clear that even those who “as-if” their ritual will reliably

⁹ Note however that this understanding of Confucianism contrasts with the more orthodox Role-Ethics interpretation (see e.g., Rosemount & Ames 2016).

result in preventing this perspective becoming rigid. The parent who plays hide-and-seek with their child for the 500th time, who may be exhausted and irritated, may also be engaging in an as-if way in the game in that they are pervasively aware that they are not really engaging in the hiding or the seeking. Similarly the religious participant who partakes of their particular ritual behaviours in much the same way as they have for the past 30 years may perform these with the awareness that they are not real life activities and yet it seems plausible that in such cases the as-iffness might not yield its (what Fingarette refers to as) "magic". In these cases the awareness that one is engaging in the as-iffness is not sufficient for the lightness that is so critical to Puett's position on the effectiveness of rituals and my proposal that they result in perspective deepening.

I think that implicit in Puett's account are the resources to respond to this worry and fleshing these out can start to give us a way of manufacturing a means of bringing about exactly the right kind of as-if engagement that can yield levity and consequently the flexibility and adaptivity that I have proposed are characteristic of the deepened perspective. In Puett's discussion he is clear in emphasising the importance of acting in a context dependent fashion within the rituals. This is supposed to prevent us getting stuck in any one role and thus not succumb to the potential rigidity of perspective that otherwise engaging in ritualised behaviour might bring about. Context dependence is of course another way of framing the ideas of flexibility and adaptivity. Standing alone, this amount of flexibility and adaptivity may not be sufficient to realise the dimension of depth that I have argued for. We are able—after all—to respond automatically in a context-dependant way to a surprisingly wide range of stimuli, such as when we drive our daily commute home without incident and attention. But, Puett's examples are noticeably very social in nature; they are not merely as-iffing, they are as-iffing others. If we combine this with the importance of the context-dependence that he highlights, I think that we get a very different kind of context dependence; one that is by necessity highly flexible and adaptive because the context which is depended upon is dynamic in nature; changing and responding in not always (and always not completely) predictable ways.

The importance of as-iffing-the-other is that the object of the as-iffing is not static, but rather dynamic - it is continuously changing. The level of flexibility and adaptivity then required to continuously engage in the as-iffing is much more. It becomes much more akin to taking part in an improvisational performance rather than a traditional theatre play (indeed not merely 'akin' - taking part in a joint improvisation may be (one of) the most extreme forms of as-iffing-the-other). One is within the "as-if" world (even if only lightly), and engaging with another who is also in the as-if world. However, this other is also engaging with you in their as-if way, therefore responding to your changes, which then provide the fuel for you to respond to. This is thus a continuous, dynamic process of engaging with another's as-if world that forces one to be present and engaged in the interaction. Of course it is possible for even such an activity to rigidify - when we put people in boxes according to their roles or our stereotypes of who they are, we cease to engage with them and their "live"/"online" as-iffing. Rather, instead taking as the object of our as-iffing some presented or assumed static (or only very slowly/predictably changing) other-as-object. If the other is too predictable, this breaks down the as-iffing, making it instead devolve into rote-performing. It is this very lack of predictability (within bounds that can be accommodated - which of course a ritual provides) that forces the continuous engagement and effort/attentional focus to latch on to the other's as-iffing in order to appropriately respond to it. Just as in the case of an improvisation performance, the constantly changing object of the as-iffing forces the as-iffing to flexibly adapt to those changes or else the game ends (whether the game is hide and seek, an ancestor

ceremony, a Sunday lunch, or a classroom discussion) somewhat unsatisfactorily for all concerned.

While I do not propose that social as-iffing is the *only* way of inducing perspective-deepening I suggest that the examples in which we can see as-iffing *reliably* bringing about the depth and lightness characteristic of perspective deepening are ones which are not merely social, but are necessarily social because the object of the as-iffing is another/others. I propose that as-iffing-the-other is an important and valuable catalyst to perspective deepening, and that it is particularly valuable for helping us understand how perspective-deepening differs from the other kinds of perspective changes that occur through learning. We can see then that whilst ritual might seem to be a set of rigid rules to be obeyed or conformed to, the constraints it sets actually need not constrain one's perspective in terms of shrinking or rigidifying that perspective. While that is indeed a possible outcome of engaging in constrained forms of behaviour, if the ritual is set up to be genuinely social, such that the object of the as-iffing is another as-iffier who is attuned to and responsive to the dynamics of the situation then, somewhat counterintuitively, the ritual constraints actually provide the conditions for the emergence of a broader and deeper perspective in virtue of the heightened adaptivity and flexibility required to entrain them and maintain the coupling. In this sense constraints are enlargening (and deepening!) rather than constraining as they open up possibilities for action rather than shutting them down.¹⁰

Ritual Pedagogy

Let us now return to the realm of the pedagogical. I am primarily concerned in this paper to explore the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory; the process of enlargening/deepening perspectives. To this end, let us consider how the above analysis of how as-iffing-the-other might be used in pedagogical settings to reliably bring about the depth of perspective space, and the lightness with which perspectives are held in that space, that is characteristic of a deepened perspective and that (I have argued) takes the place of Mezirow's concept of meta-cognition in triggering transformative learning through revealing the habits of mind that give rise to these perspectives and thereby leads to a more flexible and adaptive perspective. Educational spaces are of course often highly ritualised in that the participants play the different roles of teacher and student (regardless of their age, status, or occupation outside of the classroom) and along with these roles come ritualised ways of interacting with each other - ways that might differ along cultural lines but nevertheless tend to be stable within cultures or subcultures of academia. In the ideal case, where each participant is engaging in their role fully, being responsive to the teacher and other students, this might, in itself, be enough to trigger perspective deepening. Of course, this is what we hope, as teachers to be bringing about in our classrooms, but what we know to all too rarely occur despite our best intentions. Too often one or more of the students (or indeed the teacher) are tired, distracted, focussed on content over interaction, disengaged or merely passively engaging in the class in "cinema mode". The orthodox educational rituals that we standardly implement in adult educational settings, though they may be sufficient for imparting disciplinary knowledge and teaching norms of academic interaction, do not reliably bring about transformative learning.

¹⁰ Whilst seemingly paradoxical, this idea of constraints as enabling new possibilities for thought and action is supported by theories of sociocultural constraints on affordance spaces (see Bruineberg, Chemero & Rietveld, 2018).

I suggest that the reason that our orthodox academic rituals do not reliably bring about perspective enlarging (and thus transformative learning) is for exactly the same reason as discussed above in respect to Puett's (2016) exegesis of Confucian ritual. Ritual in and of itself is not sufficient for bringing this about. What Fingarette (1972/1998) calls the "magic" in the ritual that imbues it with performative force arises within a performative space between people. To reliably bring about this magic and to trigger perspective-deepening we need to provide a ritual space which strongly tends those within it towards as-iffing-the-other. I suggest that the CoPI model of doing philosophy with learners in prison described at the beginning of this paper is an example of just such a ritual space. The feedback from the prison educators and prison-learners suggests that what Mezirow refers to as "habits of mind" are being changed along with the resultant changes in willingness and ability to take different perspectives. But, notably, these changes are not arising as a result of engaging in critical thinking about their habits of mind. The participants are never guided to scrutinise their core beliefs and critically assess their own assumptions. Rather this process occurs indirectly, through the engagement with the philosophical questions at hand, and as a result of the other's agreeing or disagreeing with the statements that they make and expressing their reasons for the (dis)agreement. This is not the same as being guided to critically reflect on their assumptions as it is by no means inevitable that the participant who is being (dis)agreed with will have the chance to respond directly to the (dis)agree-er. Rather, it seems to be the activity itself of engaging in the game that - indirectly - enables the participants to become disentranced from their perspectives and provide the opportunity to restructure and amend habits of mind. Participants in a CoPI session are forced, in virtue of the strict constraints under which they must operate, to take a step back from the discussion - no matter how strongly they might hold the opinions that they are trying to express. They are, by necessity, operating in an "as-if" world for the duration of the session, and this is clearly designated as such by the way that the session is presented and run, and by the rules that the participants are required to adhere to for the duration of the game. Moreover, for the session to work everyone must be entering this "as-if" reality and to earnestly engage with the others as they also "as-if" their way through the session.¹¹ It is thus a clear example of "as-iffing-the-other" with a principled way of inducing this in a pedagogical context.

I propose that this case study shows that the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory can - in principle - be induced in a pedagogical context using a distinct methodology, namely implementing highly ritualised situations which entrain participants in an as-if world in which they must also engage with others' as-if-ness. This is a highly enactive model of learning; it is the very dynamic of the social interaction (i.e., the activity of as-iffing-the-other) that enables this awareness of our assumptions and biases and their contingency upon previous context. I propose that the inducement in this context to "as-if-the-other" is what forces participants' perspectival space to increase in both depth and lightness, producing a qualitative shift in adaptivity and flexibility of thought. It is this qualitative shift that I argue is both the target phenomenon of transformative learning theory and what we as philosophy educators are seeking to bring about in our students. This model therefore points to a principled way of demarcating the kinds of activity that enable us to become not merely more learned but also genuinely deeper thinkers.

¹¹ It is of course okay if the as-if-ness temporarily breaks down so long as the chair helps guide it quickly back. Indeed it might even be helpful as it is often the cause of a lot of laughter as the self-consciousness of the as-iffing may come to a peak and the tension can be dissolved.

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