William O. Stephens

Professor Schmidt further develops the original topic of his dissertation by considering more closely the circle of the Epicurean school and incorporating the secondary literature published since 1975. His aim is to investigate what Lucretius’ sources were for De rerum natura and this study is certainly a solid scholarly contribution to that end. The book is divided into a brief introduction, two main parts, a final remark, an index of source passages, an index of ancient names and subjects, an index of contemporary authors, and an extensive bibliography of collected editions, text editions (e.g., commentaries), and secondary literature. In the first main part Schmidt examines the problem of establishing the sources of Lucretius’ poem. In the second part he offers interpretations of selected sections of De rerum natura in order to support his case. His main thesis is that Lucretius did not exclusively use the writings of Epicurus in composing De rerum natura, and that it is emphatically doubtful that Epicurus was even his principal source. Rather, Schmidt argues that it is virtually certain that early Epicurean writings are used in several passages, and that they are the most probable sources for the whole poem.

In the introduction Schmidt observes that since the didactic poem of Lucretius is the only work from the school of Epicurus that is almost completely preserved, it is of great interest for understanding the historical development of the Garden to learn which sources Lucretius used (5). He cautions that no hasty conclusions about Epicurus’ works as the sources of De rerum natura can be drawn from the praise that Lucretius heaps on Epicurus. ‘Er konnte dessen aurea dicta mindestens ebenso gut in jungepikureischen Vorlagen oder gar in eigenen Vorlesungsmitschriften finden’ (11). He makes the unobjectionable assumption that Lucretius’ Vorlagen are to be searched for within the Garden, and that sources outside the school are to be assumed only as exceptions. ‘Zu entscheiden wäre demnach vor allem, ob der Dichter nur Schriften des Schulgründers oder nur solche von jüngeren Epikureern benutzt hat oder wie sich, wenn er sowohl diesen als auch jenen gefolgt ist, diese Vorlagen anteilmässig in seinem Gedicht verteilen’ (11; Schmidt’s emphasis).

In part 1, after presenting a chronological overview of the previous discussion, Schmidt argues against those who regard Epicurus as the sole source of Lucretius by claiming that their thesis implies that Lucretius’ doctrines, at least on all important points, are identical with Epicurus’ doctrines. He contends that no one has yet produced such evidence. He also observes first that the Epicureanism of
Lucretius would be of a purely academic nature if he had had no contact with contemporary Epicureans, but had only reproduced the views of Epicurus and not paid attention to the addressee of his poem. Secondly, he claims that a concrete reference to a source used by Lucretius from the time after Epicurus would be established, if the letter to Pythocles had not been written by Epicurus himself. He also questions how the ‘orthodoxy’ of the Garden introduced itself. He suggests, and reasonably so, that if there is no indication that Epicurus’ ‘pure’ doctrine was kept unchanged in his school up to the days of Lucretius such that Lucretius could thereby reproduce the same ‘pure’ doctrine, then this too supports his case for early Epicurean sources. He adds that the repeatedly adopted anti-Stoic polemic of Lucretius points to early sources, in so far as the Stoics were not yet attacked by Epicurus himself (23).

His critical treatment of the positions of other scholars is methodical and generally fair. For example, against Furley’s thesis concerning the sources of Lucretius he raises the following objections: (i) that Epicurus only had knowledge of the ‘lost’ Aristotle is improbable. There is no evidence of attacks of Epicurus on any of the early writings. ‘Überhaupt scheint Polemik gegen Aristoteles bei ihm eher singular gewesen zu sein’ (111); (ii) it would be highly doubtful that the early writings at the time of Lucretius would have yet been a suitable target and would have been current enough to achieve the protreptic influence aimed at by Lucretius; (iii) an attack on the positions of the early writings would be pointless if Aristotle had later abandoned them. Connected with this is the question of whether the Peripatetics still held those early views of Aristotle at the time of Lucretius, and so would have offered a worthwhile target for him; (iv) the undeniable historical fact that the Stoics, since the second century C.E., were the chief opponents of the Epicureans, whereas for Epicurus and his immediate disciples they had no importance (111).

Schmidt favors De Lacy’s approach of attending especially to the elements of academic-skeptical origin that are characteristic of the dispute of the early Epicureans with the Stoics. Schmidt reasons that such elements belong in the time after Epicurus and are, if they are found in the poem of Lucretius, to be attributed only to early Epicurean sources. In part 2 Schmidt proceeds to argue that the targets of Lucretius’ polemics against the anthropocentric teleology (ii 167-82) and the divinity of the world (v 110-234) are indeed the Stoics, and that this is further evidence that Lucretius must be following, at least in part, early Epicurean sources.

In part 2 Schmidt uses his interpretations of selected passages of *De rerum natura* to offer plausible support to his conclusions. For example, in his account of Lucretius’ description of and attack on the Stoic theory that all matter tends to a center he argues that: (i) this theory that Lucretius discusses is a position neither presented by, nor to be inferred from, other philosophers, such as Aristotle; (ii) Lucretius points out in the doctrine of his opponents the contradiction that arises from the fact that despite the general tendency of matter to move towards a central point, centrifugal elements are also posited. Such a contradiction can be
interpreted solely from the Stoic position; (iii) Lucretius’ opponents posited an infinite vacuum outside the world, like the Stoics defended, whereas Aristotle explicitly rejected it; (iv) the criticism of the properties of the central point in his opponent’s cosmology is advanced in a way similar to Plutarch’s objections advanced against the Stoics; (v) the opponents of Lucretius believed, like the Stoics, in a nourishing of the celestial bodies, whereas Aristotle described such a supposition as ridiculous; (vi) the theory of growth that Lucretius discusses in connection with the nourishing of the stars also stands in close connection with that subject in the Stoics. Schmidt sees Lucretius as closely caught up with the current polemics between the Stoic and Epicurean schools of his time.

Schmidt is, I think, broadly successful in making his case that Lucretius did not exclusively follow Epicurus, but also had early Epicurean sources. The indices are helpful, and Schmidt’s survey of competing views is scrupulously inclusive. This book deserves to be seriously considered by future researchers into the sources of De rerum natura inasmuch as it has certainly advanced the discussion.

Department of Philosophy
Creighton University
Omaha NE 68178


Paul MacKendrick

This book’s aim, in my opinion successfully achieved, is to use Cicero to expound Stoic tenets, for Latinists who are not philosophers, and for philosophers who are not Latinists. As an aid to both, the editor supplies paragraph headings, a commentary, and a glossary of Greek, Latin, and English equivalents throughout. The result is the reader’s enhanced understanding of the concentration and richness of thought that Cicero found in his Hellenistic sources, and so successfully transmitted that he supplied a philosophic vocabulary for medieval and modern times.

It might have helped still further to supply a rhetorical analysis: Sects. 1-9 are *Proem*; 10-16a, *Propositio*. Then follows a *Confirmatio*, divided four ways: (a) 16b-29: on self-preservation as a primary instinct; moral action as being according to Nature; on there being only one supreme God; on the happy life as the good life. (b) 30-50a: virtue as choice; the superior importance, in a moral act, of