In the first half of the 19th century, as most Latin American countries achieved political independence from Spain or Portugal, a new generation sought further intellectual and cultural emancipation from their colonial past and its accompanying philosophical framework of scholasticism. In the second half of the 19th century, many Latin American intellectuals came to identify with the philosophy of positivism, which originated in Europe with the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1859). Positivism made an especially powerful and lasting impact on Mexico and Brazil. Brazil’s flag continues to bear Comte’s motto *Ordem e Progresso* (“Order and Progress”). But philosophers across Latin America adapted positivism to address the pressing problems of nation-building and respond to the demands of their own social and political contexts, making positivism the second most influential tradition in the history of Latin American philosophy, after scholasticism.¹

Since a comprehensive survey of positivism’s role across Latin American and Latinx philosophy would require multiple books, we will narrow our scope to the history of positivism and its transformations in Mexican and Chicanx philosophies, proceeding chronologically and focusing on these representative thinkers: Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Gabino Barreda (1818–1881), Justo Sierra (1848–1912), José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), Antonio Caso (1883–1946), and Gloria Anzaldúa (1942–2004). We will pay special attention to how positivism was used to build the Mexican nation and reconstruct Mexican identity through education, creating philosophical debates about the relationships among science, religion, morality, education, race, economic progress, and national development. These debates continue to resonate as we think critically about the respective roles of scientific education—then called “positive” education, now “STEM” education—and moral education in the curricula used to educate a country’s youth while reconstructing their ethnoracial and national identities.

**Auguste Comte: The French Founder of Positivism**

Auguste Comte’s *Course on Positive Philosophy*, published in six volumes from 1830 to 1842, provided a philosophical treatment of both the natural sciences and the social sciences, which were in their infancy. Comte’s goal was to coordinate all
scientific knowledge and establish sociology as the final science that would provide knowledge of social phenomena, which were previously considered to be so complex that there could be no science of them. Comte’s philosophy of science also went hand in hand with a sweeping philosophy of history and a grand narrative of human progress, reflected in Comte’s most famous idea, the law of the three stages: “Each of our leading conceptions,—each branch of our knowledge,—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive.” In the theological stage, humans searched for the first and final causes of phenomena and explained anomalies as the work of supernatural agents. The metaphysical stage replaced supernatural agents with abstract entities or elements as causes. In the scientific or positive stage humans limit themselves to studying the laws governing natural phenomena, i.e., “their invariable relations of succession and resemblance” (PPAC, 1:2).

It is a considerable historical and geographical leap to the 21st century United States, but in Comte’s desire to make all knowledge “positive” or “scientific” we find early roots of the recent push towards STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields in education. However, Comte believed that philosophy and the social sciences were more universal and ought to reign supreme because only they could achieve a genuinely human (i.e., social) view and direct the knowledge provided by STEM fields to achieve morally or politically progressive ends. This brings us to a crucial question explored by all the philosophers discussed in this chapter: what is education for? For the early Comte, education ought to promote the orderly progress of both the individual and society by advancing the whole of knowledge, which makes the study of philosophy and the social sciences necessary because “the last biological degree, the intellectual and moral life, [borders so closely] upon the social” (PPAC, 2:545).

Comte advocated for a universal education (compulsory education was not established in France until 1881) that would attend to both the intellectual and moral development of children by introducing them to the natural and social sciences while developing their personal, familial, and social morality. Comte believed that theological philosophy had subordinated real life to an imaginary life, and metaphysical philosophy had sanctioned egoism, whereas positivism’s scientific philosophy “connects each of us with the whole of human existence, in all times and places” (PPAC, 2:555). Comte defined morality in terms of “altruism” (a term he coined) and “the purely disinterested affections” while conceiving of education as a “special and permanent exercise” to develop the moral sense so that individual happiness would come to depend upon altruistic actions, social progress, and sympathetic feelings toward the whole human race (PPAC, 2:555).

**Gabino Barreda’s Positivism and the Mexican Education System**
Gabino Barreda (1818–1881), a Mexican physician and philosopher, was most responsible for spreading positivism in Mexico. He encountered positivism while studying medicine in Paris and attending Comte’s lectures from 1847 to 1851. After more than a decade of teaching in Mexico’s National School of Medicine, Barreda’s 1867 “Oración cívica” (“Civic Oration”) caught the attention of President Benito Juárez. Barreda delivered his speech on Mexican Independence Day, just three months after Mexico had successfully defeated the French military and executed Emperor Maximilian I, whose three-year monarchy had interrupted Juárez’s presidency (1858–1864; 1867–1872). Against the backdrop of this political chaos, Barreda aimed “to extract, according to the counsel of Comte, the great social lessons offered by all these painful collisions that anarchy, which currently reigns over our spirits and ideas, provokes all around us.”

Barreda adapted Comte’s positivism to Mexico by using Comte’s law of the three stages to provide an interpretation of the “incoherence and frenzy in our national history” and to articulate his generation’s sense of duty. Barreda rolled three and a half centuries of Mexican history into a grand narrative of Mexico’s emancipation, first from Spain “after three centuries of quiet domination under a system that perfectly combined education, religious beliefs, politics, and administration in order to endlessly prolong a situation of domination and continuous exploitation” (OC, 83). After national emancipation came “mental emancipation” from the foreign tutelage represented by Emperor Maximilian I. Now the time was finally ripe for a “triple emancipation”—simultaneously scientific, religious, and political—whereby Mexico would escape its history of political crisis by rebuilding the nation upon a solid positivist foundation: “Let our motto be Liberty, Order, and Progress; Liberty as a means; Order as a base, and Progress as an end” (OC, 105). Barreda envisioned a bright future whereby the Mexican revolution would finally be over, and the Mexican nation would “walk forever along the florid path of progress and civilization” (OC, 105).

Amidst the recent social and political chaos, President Juárez was especially receptive to three aspects of Barreda’s speech: 1) his diagnosis: “anarchy reigning in the spirit and ideas of our age”; 2) his suggested cure: “to gather all wisdom and intelligence into a common synthesis”; and 3) his overarching positivist vision: “progress and civilization” as the key to Mexico’s future (OC, 82). Juárez therefore appointed Barreda to undertake a major project of national educational reform. Like Comte, Barreda understood social disorder to be a direct consequence of intellectual and spiritual disorder, but he showed little interest in the later Comte’s desire to inculcate altruism via the religion of humanity, in part because Catholicism was so thoroughly entrenched in Mexico. Instead, Barreda sought to achieve the same end through educational reform. He envisioned an educational system founded upon positivist principles that would cultivate a new elite to guide Mexico both scientifically and morally in the positive era.

The resulting Ley Orgánica de Instrucción Pública (Organic Law of Public Instruction) sought to reorganize Mexico’s educational system in its entirety, unite the nation, and restructure Mexican society by bringing education under a
single secular authority while making it both free and compulsory at the primary level. Like Comte, Barreda believed that an encyclopedic unification of all the various fields of knowledge could, if implemented as part of a national education system, provide a foundation for order and progress. And as the idea of grounding the country’s well-being in childhood education grew, so too did the idea of Mexican nationhood and a vigorous pride in *mexicanidad* (Mexcianness). Indeed, many of the questions of Mexican identity that came to preoccupy Mexican and Chicana/o philosophers over the next century grew out of Barreda’s positivist project of national education. According to the Organic Law of Public Instruction, “Enlightening the people is the most reliable and effective method of raising the standards of morality and establishing liberty as well as respect for the Constitution and the laws.” In other words, philosophers following in the footsteps of Barreda came to answer the question “What is education for?” with “To make good Mexicans.”

Mexican positivism is often caricatured as a form of scientism, but as Barreda’s essay “De la educación moral” (“On Moral Education”) makes clear, positivism initially sought to place all education in the service of moral, social, and even spiritual progress. Barreda’s system of public education replaced the Catholic catechism (the foundation of colonial education) with the subject of “morals”:

> Morality is generally confused with religious dogmas, so much so that for many they are not only inseparable but even amount to the same thing. But when we reflect upon the immense variety of religions in contrast to the uniformity of moral rules [...] we cannot help but recognize their independence. Religions continue changing across the distinct phases of humanity [...] but the fundamentals of morals remain the same even though their practical consequences march towards perfection with the progress of civilization. This unequal and independent progress of morals and religions prove that they are not the same thing. Moreover, the fact that a multitude of atheists across history have left us, as Littre says, “indisputable testimonies of a profound morality” proves beyond a shadow of a doubt their thorough and complete separation.⁴

Like Comte, Barreda believed that we could discover the origins of morality in human nature rather than in religious dogma and the supernatural. Psychology could scientifically study human morality in naturalistic terms and sociology could place altruism and the common good on a “scientific foundation that was nobler and simultaneously more magnificent, efficient, and secure in its results than the paltry individual interest whose egotistical tendencies the religions have always resolved to exploit in favor of the common good” (*EM*, 110).

Echoing Comte’s criticism of theological and metaphysical explanations of morality, Barreda wrote: “What the Apostle Paul placed outside of us—i.e., the benevolent inclinations of love, veneration, kindness, and humility—*science*, after eighteen centuries of laborious ascension, has come to find in our own
being” (EM, 114). By taking these moral phenomena as given in our experience, moral philosophy should aim to give a rational, scientific explanation of morals. The question of moral education then becomes eminently practical: how can we further develop the moral conscience of the individual, and even the human species as a whole?

Barreda’s answer was that we should allow our immoral tendencies to atrophy while actively exercising our altruistic tendencies:

It is an uncontested and uncontestable axiom of the science of biology that all organs develop with exercise and atrophy with inaction [...] If we now apply these same principles to the intellectual and affective organs, the same result will undeniably obtain using the same means. And if we direct education in such a way that sympathetic acts (or altruistic acts, as Comte called them) are frequently repeated while also avoiding destructive and egotistical acts as far as possible, we cannot doubt that after a certain period of these moral gymnastics [...] the good instincts will predominate over the bad. (EM, 111–112)

Like Aristotle who viewed ethics as an art of living, Barreda continued:

Here is the final and positive object of the moral art that will be achieved with the practice of good actions and the incessant repression of bad ones [...] And with the examples of morality and true virtue that will be presented artfully in the schools, exciting in the pupils the desire to imitate them, we are doing nothing more than allowing the spontaneous and imperceptible birth of moral desires. (EM, 112)

While Barreda believed that the minds of students should be prepared through the study of science, their moral education should not ultimately rest upon intellectual precepts or fear of punishment but rather the gradual cultivation of sympathetic instincts until “love becomes the irresistible guide of all our actions” (EM, 113). Barreda’s overarching educational objective was thus identical to that of the later Comte who sought “the essential purpose of true philosophy, to systematize human life as a whole on the principle of the subordination of the intellect to the heart.”

Admittedly, there were differences between Barreda’s positivism and Comte’s. For example, Barreda interpreted Mexican liberalism as an expression of the positive spirit, whereas European liberalism represented a negative spirit for Comte. More dramatically, Barreda seemed to reject the religion of humanity, at least in its cultic form. Barreda’s educational reforms attempted to shift responsibility for moral instruction from the priesthood to the educational agencies of the State. In terms of political expediency, Barreda understood that de-catholicizing Mexico was virtually impossible, so he emphasized religious freedom of conscience while seeking to mold the moral conscience of the people into something more uniform using positivism, altering Comte’s motto to read: “Liberty as the means; order as the base; progress as the end.” By changing the
first part of Comte’s formula—“Love as the principle”—Barreda left pupils free to their own private Catholic beliefs while nonetheless insisting that they learn the public lessons of a unifying social ethics by studying the lives of the great moralists. In other words, Barreda did not depart from the general thrust of the religion of humanity: educating people into altruism. And even though he made no room for Comte’s secular priesthood, Barreda followed Comte’s principle of the wise subordination of the intellect to the heart by treating love as the ultimate end of a positivist education: “The heart, improved and perfected through the cultivation and growth of benevolent inclinations, should command; the mind, fortified by science, should obey.”

The Evolving “Positivism” of Justo Sierra and the Científicos

Barreda passed positivism on to the next generation through both the National Preparatory School, which he established and directed from 1868 to 1878, and the Asociación Metodófila Gabino Barreda ([Scientific] Method-Loving Association of Gabino Barreda) founded in 1877. However, this new generation’s positivism differed from Barreda’s due in large part to an interest in the British philosopher Herbert Spencer’s positivism and the application of Darwinian theory to social problems. Despite Barreda’s misgivings, they did not shy away from Social Darwinism. For example, Miguel Macedo published an essay arguing that wealth was a form of social superiority that easily led to moral superiority, and Manuel Ramos linked evolutionary biology to sociology using Spencer’s concept of “survival of the fittest.” This chapter refers to this second generation as Mexican “positivists” to mark the fact that they abandoned much of Comte’s and Barreda’s moral idealism, and we reserve the terms positivist and positivism (without quotation marks) for the philosophies of Comte and Barreda.

The terminology gets muddled because “positivism” gained increasing political traction as it came to function as an ideology for the elite interests supporting the regime of the Mexican President Porfirio Diaz whose rule from 1876 to 1911 is generally considered a dictatorship. His advisors called themselves “positivists” and were referred to pejoratively as científicos (scientists) because they claimed that science legitimated their positions. By emphasizing the importance of the positivist method, this new generation of “positivists” could set aside substantial elements of Comte’s and Barreda’s positivist doctrines. Not just the religion of humanity, but much of Comte’s ethical and political doctrines were ignored, alongside Barreda’s dream of educating Mexicans into altruism. The original ethics and politics of positivism, which subordinated the interests of the individual to those of society, simply did not suit the interests of the Mexican bourgeoisie. Whereas Barreda’s motto was “Liberty as the means; order as the base; progress as the end,” the second generation of “positivists” or científicos became so fixated on order that they supported a dictator for decades and reconceived liberty in terms of the economic
liberty of the wealthy.

Justo Sierra (1848–1912) gave the clearest expression to his generation’s attempt to establish order from roughly 1880 to 1910. His most famous work, *Evolución política del pueblo mexicano* (*Political Evolution of the Mexican People*), was published at the turn of the century. While it echoed Barreda’s positivist philosophy of Mexican history, Sierra’s “positivism” was almost completely recast in terms of Spencer’s theory of evolution:

Society is a living being and consequently grows, develops, and undergoes transformations; these transformations are continuous, and their celerity is in ratio to the internal energy with which the social organism reacts to external elements, assimilating them and utilizing them in the course of its growth. Science, converted into an amazingly complex and efficient tool, has accelerated a hundredfold the evolution of certain peoples. (*PEMP*, 343)

By “scientifically” studying the history of the Mexican people, Sierra and the other científicos sought to accelerate their evolution through a kind of social engineering.

Comte’s sociology, like Spencer’s, had also prescribed an evolutionary course for humanity understood as a social organism, but there was a fundamental difference in how each understood this evolution. Comte, who coined the term *altruism* and claimed that positivist morality could be summarized in the motto “live for others,” would never have invoked Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest.” Likewise, Barreda argued that it was necessary to “humanize the rich” through moral education, since “society has put wealth in their hands for the common good and common progress.” But the científicos twisted free from positivism’s supposedly outdated moral injunctions in the name of science and social engineering. Social progress and the advancement of the political state were often reduced to a matter of “economic evolution” understood in terms of the investment of foreign capital, new technological infrastructure like railroads, and a growing export economy.

Like Barreda, Sierra still believed that a free, public, and compulsory educational system was the key to the future of Mexico, but his evolutionary “positivism” was more overtly racist:

We need to attract immigrants from Europe so as to obtain a cross with the indigenous race, for only European blood can keep the level of civilization that has produced our nationality from sinking, which would mean regression, not evolution. We need to bring about a complete change in the indigenous mentality through education in the school. [...] To blend [the indigenous] spirit and ours in a unification of language, of aspirations, of loves and hates, of moral and mental criteria, to place before him the ideal of a strong and happy country belonging to all—to create, in sum, a national soul—is the goal assigned to the future, the program of our national education. (*PEMP*, 368; bold added)
Sierra’s view was nevertheless less racist than many of his contemporaries who held that Indians were not educable and had nothing to contribute, since they were deterministically “inferior” (this recalls the “The Indian Problem” discussed in chapters 1, 2, and 9). But in contrast to those who argued for the racial superiority of the criollos, Sierra held that the real agents of progress in Mexico were the mestizos, whom he also identified with the bourgeoisie.

Sierra and the other científicos judged that Porfirio Díaz was needed to secure the order necessary to make progress possible, since he founded “the political religion of peace” amidst Mexico’s chaotic history (PEMP, 359). As the embodiment of the mestizo middle class, Díaz appeared as the nation’s savior in Sierra’s narrative. Supported by “the submission of society in all its active elements” to create a “social dictatorship,” only Díaz could make Mexico strong enough to avoid being economically dominated by the United States (PEMP, 366). Barreda’s ordering of terms—“Liberty as the means; order as the base; progress as the end”—was subtly but fundamentally altered as political liberty was deferred until the future, transformed from a means into a utopic end. In short, the economic and political order that Díaz made possible was presented as the next step in the natural, social, and political evolution of Mexico.

Although Díaz’s rule conferred material advantages upon the Mexican bourgeoisie, it became increasingly difficult to argue that this constituted progress for the Mexican people as a whole. There was growing criticism of the científicos’ “positivism,” and even Sierra publicly moved towards what has been called anti-positivism in a 1908 address in honor of Gabino Barreda. But this term is misleading insofar as Sierra was also following in the positivist footsteps of both Comte and Barreda by questioning the assumption that scientific knowledge was everything. Like his positivist predecessors, Sierra came to believe that science must ultimately be transmuted into positive sentiment because “the good fortune of ideas is and always will be to convert themselves into sentiments, the only means of moving the heart of peoples” (PEMP, 359).

An even greater continuity lies in the fact that Comte, Barreda, and Sierra each sought to transform the ethical and political lives of their peoples (and humanity as a whole) by instituting a better system of education, which would include not just scientific or technical instruction but moral instruction. In the words of Sierra:

By perseverance in the efforts of acquiring knowledge, one feeds and develops the faculties, thus organizing the training of the will, the exteriorization of character. By the practice of method, one acquires the notion of the necessity of order, as well as the love of truth, by way of one’s scientific initiation. And by loving truth, one is prepared to love the good. (PEMP, 394)

This passage shows that it is too simplistic to say that Sierra came to oppose positivism. Rather, he came to realize that its vision stood in opposition specifically to the ideologies of Porfirism and Social Darwinism.
Sierra’s speech at the opening ceremony of the National University of Mexico in 1910, delivered just two months before the Mexican Revolution, went even further: “At the bottom of every problem—already social and political, taking these words in their widest senses—is a pedagogical problem, a problem of education.”¹¹ Like both Comte and Barreda, Sierra had come to see the heart of education as moral, arguing directly against those who claimed that the university should be a mere knowledge factory or simple producer of science:

The essential element of a character is in the will; to make the will evolve intensely, by means of physical, intellectual, and moral cultivation from boy to man is the sovereign role of elementary school, of school par excellence. Character is formed when the mysterious magnetism of the good is impressed upon the will. Cultivating wills in order to reap egotisms would bankrupt pedagogy. It is necessary to magnetize character with love, to saturate man with the spirit of sacrifice, to make him feel the immense value of social life, to convert him into a moral person in the full and beautiful sense of the word, to perpetually navigate the course of that ideal, making it more real day by day, minute by minute. This is the divine mission of the teacher. (IA, 112)

Eight years earlier in the Political Evolution of the Mexican People, Sierra had argued that the higher goal of all education was to produce a Mexican soul. He now added that this required the Mexicanization of knowledge:

I imagine this: a group of students of all ages combined into one—the age of full intellectual ability, forming a real personality by force of solidarity and consciousness of their mission, and drawing upon all sources of culture—breaking out [...] and resolving to nationalize science, to Mexicanize knowledge. (IA, 113; bold added)

To Mexicanize knowledge was to make knowledge mestizo by:

raising one national language over the dust of all the indigenous strains, thus creating the primordial element of the nation’s soul. The school, which systematically prepares the citizen in the child, initiating him into the national religion, into the cult of civic duty; this school forms an integral part of the state. (IA, 126)

Comte’s religion of humanity had become the religion of Mexican nationalism, which only two months later would explode in the form of the Mexican revolution. But Sierra’s intentions were anything but revolutionary. Much like the aims of almost all universities today, they were ostensibly middle-class and gently reformist:

The university is in charge of the national education at the upper-middle and ideal levels; it is the summit where a crystal-clear fountain emerges
to irrigate the homeland’s newborn plants and raises the soul of the people to its level. (*IA*, 97)

Less poetically put, the National University of Mexico should house the concrete and practical disciplines that maintain the actual life of the nation through commerce and industry, “all that is necessary to persistently protect in the economic order” (*IA*, 97).

**Mexico’s Athenaeum of Youth: More Anti-Porfirist than Anti-Positivist**

According to most scholars, anti-positivism was well established in Mexico by 1909, when the *Ateneo de la Juventud* (Athenaeum of Youth) was founded by a group of young intellectuals responding to the decadence of the Díaz regime and seeking to re-envision Mexico, Mexican identity, Mexican thought, and the Mexican education system. These *atenéístas* are commonly believed to have revolted against positivism by drawing upon other philosophers like Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, William James, and José Enrique Rodó. Given this influx of non-positivist intellectual influences and the unfolding revolutionary political landscape in Mexico, the reign of positivism as a semi-official ideology undoubtedly ended with the *atenéístas*. Nevertheless, there are striking continuities between positivism and their two leading philosophers José Vasconcelos (1882–1959) and Antonio Caso (1883–1946). Both were eager to establish themselves as part of a new and original generation of philosophers, but they also acknowledged their intellectual debt to Barreda and the initial activities of the *Ateneo* were made possible by Sierra. In any case, as the Porfiriato neared its end, positivism was no longer positively defined by Comte, Barreda, or even Sierra. Positivism increasingly came to be defined negatively by its opposition, not just in Mexico but across most of Latin America.

The *atenéístas* sought to philosophize for themselves, but they could not completely escape their early philosophical training in positivism, nor did they aspire to do so. For example, Antonio Caso’s 1909 series of lectures in the National Preparatory School harkened back to the “method-loving” society of Barreda in a way that fit Comte’s own description of the positivist method:

> In order to understand the true value and character of the Positive Philosophy, we must take a brief general view of the progressive course of the human mind, regarded as a whole, for *no conception can be understood otherwise than through its history.*

Caso’s lectures offered a historical panorama of positivism in order to clarify what could be saved, what should be supplemented, and what ought to be thrown out. This method of criticism demonstrated the legacy of Barreda’s positivist philosophy of education, as institutionalized in the National Preparatory School where Caso had studied history under Sierra.
Jose Vasconcelos’ 1910 lecture “Gabino Barreda and Contemporary Ideas” also returned to Barreda in order to repudiate the bases of Spencerian evolutionism that the científicos had used to justify the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz as a necessary evil. Vasconcelos interpreted Barreda’s attempt to cultivate a national spirit by way of a positivist education as a necessary historical stage that moved Mexico beyond the philosophy of scholasticism. Although he acknowledged that “Barreda and positivism did not give us everything we longed for,” Vasconcelos nevertheless claimed that Barreda’s Comtean positivism had salutary moral effects upon Mexico and described the “abyss between the ideas of yesterday and today” in terms of the revolt against the Spencerian philosophy of the científicos. This more nuanced and specific anti-positivism (which we prefer to call anti-Porfirismo for the sake of clarity) also explains Vasconcelos’ remark that it was Spencer (not Comte) who up until very recently “was the official philosopher among us” (GBIC, 102). Simply put, Vasconcelos found positivism to have been necessary but not sufficient for his generation’s intellectual growth.

Vasconcelos ends his lecture with a method for judging whether a philosophical system should be accepted in terms of three meta-theoretical norms to guide the philosophical quest for truth: 1) “The fundamental intuition of the philosophical system must never be in disagreement with scientific laws”; 2) “The synthesis must never infringe upon the formal laws of logic”; and 3) “The moral consequences of the system are ... a confirmation of its vitality” (GBIC, 111). Once we recognize that all three of these meta-theoretical norms were shared by Comte, Barreda, and the later Sierra, Vasconcelos’ closing reflections—often cited as evidence of his “anti-positivism”—appear in a different light:

With the prudence suggested by the norms just studied, we have attempted to receive new ideas. The positivism of Comte and of Spencer could never contain our aspirations. Today, since it is in disagreement with the data of science itself, we find it lacking in vitality and reason. (GBIC, 112)

To say that positivism could not contain the aspirations of the ateneístas is perfectly compatible with their aspirations having been shaped by positivism, especially since they launched an assault on the ideology of Porfirismo and the social Darwinism of the crasser científicos by claiming that they were “in disagreement with the data of science itself.”

**Positivism and Jose Vasconcelos’ Raza Cósmica**

Vasconcelos published *La raza cósmica (The Cosmic Race)* in 1925 after the armed conflict of the Mexican Revolution was over and while serving a seven-year term as Mexico’s first Secretary of Public Education. It was Vasconcelos’s most influential work, especially in terms of its impact on the later Chicanx
movement in the United States. Vasconcelos reimagined and reinvigorated positivist themes to develop the thesis that “the various races of the earth tend to intermix at a gradually increasing pace, and eventually will give rise to a new human type.”

As Didier T. Jaén notes:

“Order and progress,” the motto of Positivism, did not cease to be the motto of Mexican society after the Revolution. What the Revolution did was to change the basis of that order and to widen the field of social progress [...] beyond economic welfare: Order and progress were not ends in themselves but the basis for an ideal future development. (CR, xv)

The fact that Vasconcelos’s vision culminated in a new “Aesthetic Age” challenged the values of the científicos by drawing upon non-positivist philosophical vocabularies, but Vasconcelos nevertheless envisioned a refigured humanity governed by love, effectively recapitulating the classical positivist’s vision but replacing Comte’s chief protagonists—France, Europe, and whites—with Mexico, Latin America, and mestizos:

[Latin America’s] predestination obeys the design of constituting the cradle of a fifth race into which all nations will fuse with each other to replace the four races that have been forging History apart from each other. The dispersion will come to an end on American soil; unity will be consummated there by the triumph of fecund love [...] The so-called Latin peoples, because they have been more faithful to their divine mission in America, are the ones called upon to consummate this mission. (CR, 18)

As this passage demonstrates, Vasconcelos’ philosophy of history was no less sweeping or utopic than Comte’s, Barreda’s, or Sierra’s. Like Comte, Vasconcelos sought to be a great synthesizer with a cosmopolitan vision; like Barreda, he saw an overarching, transnational purpose flowing through the stages of Mexican history; and like Sierra, he saw the mestizo as the chief protagonist with “the mission of fusing all peoples ethnically and spiritually” (CR, 19).

Vasconcelos claimed that this mission would be accomplished by “the law of the three social stages” (CR, 28). When he explained that the phrase “is not to be taken in the Comtian sense, but much more comprehensively,” Vasconcelos was not rejecting Comte so much as rolling him into a larger philosophical vision. Both thinkers imagined the world moving from the material/warlike, to the intellectual/political, to the spiritual/loving. Moreover, Vasconcelos’s refigured Humanity, the “cosmic race” that is able “to live joy grounded on love” as it is “ruled by sympathy,” could only be reached through a long process of moral education like the one that Comte inspired Barreda to develop. Sierra’s blending of philosophy of education with a “scientific” racial logic was also evident:

Inferior races, upon being educated, would become less prolific, and the better specimens would go on ascending a scale of ethnic improvement, whose maximum type is not precisely the White, but that new race to
which the White himself will have to aspire with the object of conquering the synthesis. (CR, 32)

Like Comte’s original positivism, Vasconcelos’s prophecy culminated not “in the triumph of a single race” but rather in “the redemption of all men” (CR, 35). In contrast, “The official policy and the Positivists’ science, which was directly influenced by that policy, said that the law was not love but antagonism, fight, and the triumph of the fittest” (CR, 36).

Clearly, Vasconcelos’s criticism of the “Positivists’ science” was not directed at Comte’s or Barreda’s positivism, since they claimed that only love is capable of producing a new Humanity. Vasconcelos directed his criticism against the científicos and “the vulgarity of Spencerian Darwinism” by citing new scientific discoveries in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. But like Sierra, Vasconcelos modified Comte’s philosophy of history by claiming that Latin America’s mestizos would lead the creative evolution of the cosmic race:

Only the Iberian part of the continent possesses the spiritual factors, the race, and the territory necessary for the great enterprise of initiating the new universal era of Humanity ... We have all the races and the aptitudes. The only thing lacking is for true love to organize and set in march the law of History. (CR, 38–39)

**Positivism and Antonio Caso’s Reflections on Existence as Charity**

Vasconcelos and Caso grew up during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and later witnessed the violence of the Mexican Revolution and two world wars. They were therefore somewhat mystified by the appearance of the generous act, which “in the midst of the meanness of the universe, is the strangest contradiction of the facts” (GBIC, 106). In contrast to Vasconcelos, Caso gave up on notions of collective progress and sought to understand progress at the level of the individual. Like his positivist forbearers, Caso believed that altruistic acts were the highest pinnacle of human achievement and worked practically to implement an educational system that would shape moral individuals. He served as director of the National Preparatory School founded by Barreda and as rector of the National University of Mexico.

The crux of Caso’s thinking is expressed in *La existencia como economía, como desinterés y como caridad* (Existence as Economy, as Disinterest, and as Charity). First published as a brief essay in 1916, Caso expanded it into a book in 1919, and substantially revised it in 1943, noting that the essay had constituted his life’s preoccupation. Caso wanted to plumb the depths of the ruthless struggle for existence in which human beings find themselves as biological animals while nevertheless making more visible the aspects of human experience that are disinterested and meditating upon the human capacity for altruism. His 1916
preface to “Existence as Economy and as Charity” explained that he was inspired by “the most important event in the evolution of humanity: the development of evangelical ideas and feelings over time” as expressed not by theologians but rather in “the moral biography of some great Christians” (EEDC, 28). Caso’s “worship of heroes and the heroic in history” was reminiscent of Comte’s system of social worship based on the lives of great historical individuals, with its pedagogical counterpart in Barreda’s system of moral education.

Caso began with the powerful forces of biology and economics even though he was ultimately more interested in the aesthetic, moral, and religious values that exist alongside and sometimes despite endless biological strife and economic struggle. The biological and economic processes described by Darwin and Spencer appear where organisms obey the law of life that is characterized by conscious or unconscious egoism aiming to achieve “maximum gain with minimal effort” (EEDC, 31). This is the “real world” of existence as economy, but to claim that this is the only aspect of existence, as many of the científicos did, is ideology masquerading as science. In contrast, Caso sought to philosophize on the basis of all experience, which includes existence as disinterest and existence as charity. He held to the utilitarian, pragmatic, or positivist principle that knowledge generally serves the will, that “intelligence is the faculty of creating tools, instruments of action” (EEDC, 32), but Caso also insisted that our being is not fully expended in being tool-using animals, that “the surplus of human energy makes man into a possible instrument of disinterested action and heroism” (EEDC, 35).

Like Vasconcelos, Caso outlined three historical stages and placed Comtean positivism in the second stage, holding on to Comte’s vision of a humanity transformed by love but giving art a greater role to play in accomplishing this transformation. Drawing upon Arthur Schopenhauer and Henri Bergson, Caso presented art in terms of disinterest: “Art is an opposition to material life, an idealism or immaterialism, a clear attitude that renounces possessing in order to consecrate oneself to contemplating” (EEDC, 36). Insisting that all human beings engage in at least some art or disinterested contemplation of the universe, Caso wrote: “When compared to the biological imperative of minimum effort, art appears to be a shocking waste, a violent and mysterious antithesis” (EEDC, 37). Caso believed that positivism could not understand art or charity because it negated the metaphysical competence of reason. He recognized that Comte did this not to condemn human intelligence to ignorance, but rather “to liberate it forever, obligating it to adhere to scientific, positive investigations where it could always achieve success in proportion to its energy” (SPP, 3:66). Yet precisely what Comte believed to be positive, Caso described as negative: “The error of positivism consists in having arbitrarily selected the data of experience. True positivism, which complies with pure experience, will have to admit [...] the ultimate data of intuition” (SPP, 3:67).

The remainder of Caso’s essay meditates on the world as charity, or the fact that “heroic altruism” is possible. He claimed that positivism’s scientific orientation could not give a satisfactory philosophical account of the very
altruism it recommended. But Caso still agreed with the classical positivists that loving action, rather than scientific knowledge, constituted the height of human existence:

Like struggle, charity is a fact. It is not demonstrated, it is practiced, it is made, like life. It is another way of life. You will never have the intuition of an order that is opposed to biological life, you will not understand existence in its profound richness, you will mutilate it beyond remedy, if you are not charitable. Fundamental intuitions must be lived. (EEDC, 41)

Setting aside intricate questions about Caso’s doctrine of intuition or his metaphysics, Caso described charity as follows: “It is the fundamental religious and moral experience. It consists in going out of oneself, in giving oneself to others, in offering oneself, in making oneself available and lavishing oneself without fear of exhaustion” (EEDC, 39). This fundamental moral intuition lined up with Comte’s later attempts to “place the intellect in its proper place; adjusting it in that wise subordination to the heart which forms the condition of all harmonious growth.” In turn, Comte would have agreed with Caso’s words: “Reader: what you read here is only philosophy, and philosophy is an interest of knowledge. Charity is action. Go and commit acts of charity. Then, more than sage, you will be saint” (EEDC, 45).

Of course, Caso understood that charity required more than exhortations, which led him to respond to Barreda’s philosophy of education while directing the National Preparatory School: “Educated in positivism, we will honor the memory of our educator [Barreda]. It will always have been good for us to have substituted the Comtean doctrine for scholasticism.” However, Caso criticized Barreda’s educational system for failing to live up to Comte’s aim of “subordinating the intellect to the heart”:

Our “National” Preparatory School, just as Barreda envisioned it, did not form anything but the intellect (and even this imperfectly, because human understanding without metaphysical culture will always be a diminished understanding), never sentiment and the will! (CW, 6:299)

Caso believed that the goal of moral education was to steer each individual toward altruism and moral sainthood. Like Barreda, Caso was not disposed to accomplish this via the cultic apparatus of Comte’s religion of humanity but sought to integrate its moral aims into a system of education that would recognize that “there is no manner of forming a perfect man with primers and formulas, but there does exist a mode of integrating the spirit by sympathy and by conviction” (OC, 4:11). In contrast, “The man educated intellectually, only intellectually, only by pure thinking, is a profound egoist” (CW, 4:13).

Caso did not explicitly tie this point to the way that Barreda’s National Preparatory School had inadvertently produced the científicos, who lent intellectual legitimacy to porfirismo, an ideology of “existence as economy.” But Caso did insist that education must cultivate the other aspects of human
existence, i.e., disinterest and charity:

If we wish, then, to make men in the schools, let us form individual souls, form good animals, improve the race, forming men who are beautiful and ready for action. But at the same time ... let us make man charitable. Let us make him artistic. ... Then we will then have achieved the ends of education. (CW, 4:16–17)

In sum, Caso’s educational aims with respect to morality were very close to Comte’s and Barreda’s, just as his views on scientific education were quite close to Sierra’s.

The difference was in their philosophical understandings of freedom. Barreda’s attempt to reconcile individual freedom with social necessity unintentionally paved the way for the abuses of Porfirism: “Liberty, far from being irreconcilable with order, consists, in all phenomena, both organic and inorganic, in submitting fully to the laws that determine those phenomena” (EM, 113). Caso’s metaphysics of freedom turned Barreda’s logic on its head: “The artist sacrifices the economy of life to the objectivity of innate intuition, whereas the good man sacrifices egoism to come to the aid of the neighbor, to prevent his pain, and such a sacrifice is free” (EEDC, 38). Simply put, the biological and economic laws of animal life command egoism, whereas disinterest and charity constitute the rejection of these laws. But since altruism must be freely chosen, Caso wrote:

The good is like music that captivates and charms [...] the most intimate part of the soul. It is the coercion of neither pure reason nor external life. It is neither deduced, nor inferred, nor admitted; it is created. The good is freedom, personality, divinity. It is, to sum up with the expression of an illustrious Mexican thinker [Justo Sierra], “the supernatural that feels like the most natural thing in the world.” (EEDC, 39)

In Caso’s philosophy, we thus return full circle to Comte’s summary of the subjective principle of positivism as “the subordination of the intellect to the heart.”

Chicanx Identity, the Chicano Movement, and Gloria Anzalduá’s Mestiza Consciousness

The legacy of the Mexican philosophers discussed in this chapter clearly transcends national borders and extends to the history of the Chicano Movement, evolving conceptions of Chicanx identity, and Chicanx education. From Barreda to Caso, a central aim of Mexican philosophy was to build the Mexican nation or recreate the Mexican people by means of education. This same concern emerged in the 1960s along with a new way of being Mexican during the Chicano Movement, which was concentrated in the U.S. Southwest,
i.e., the lands of Northern Mexico that were annexed by the United States as a result of the Mexican-American War, and which many Chicanxs began referring to as Aztlán, the place of origin of the pre-Columbian Mexican civilization commonly referred to as the Aztecs. The term was popularized by Alberto Baltazar Urista Heredia (1947–), better known by his pen name Alurista. Born in Mexico City, Alurista moved to San Diego, California when he was thirteen. In 1969, he attended the First National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference and read a moving poem that was adopted as the preamble to *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán*, one of the most famous political manifestos of the Chicano Movement, which Alurista also helped to draft:

In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but also of the brutal “gringo” invasion of our territories, we, the Chicano inhabitants and civilizers of the northern land of Aztlán from whence came our forefathers, reclaiming the land of their birth and consecrating the determination of our people of the sun, declare that the call of our blood is our power, our responsibility, and our inevitable destiny.¹⁹

*El Plan* also referred to Chicanos as “a bronze people with a bronze culture” or more simply as La Raza de Bronze, one of the ways that Vasconcelos had named *la raza cósmica*. It boldly declared “the independence of our mestizo nation,” and called for “total liberation from oppression, exploitation, and racism” (*PEA*, 27).

Attempting to transcend “all religious, political, class, and economic factions or boundaries,” *El Plan* claimed that nationalism “is the common denominator that all members of La Raza can agree upon” (*PEA*, 27). Despite being contentious, especially for many indigenous people reluctant to endorse a sweeping narrative in which their race and culture seem to disappear into a “higher” mestizo identity, it is a claim that Barreda, Sierra, Caso, and Vasconcelos would have endorsed in their own Mexican contexts. Consider these quotes from the “Organizational Goals” section of *El Plan* alongside some suggested parallels in brackets:

UNITY in the thinking of our people ... all committed to the liberation of La Raza [cf. Barreda’s claim that the time was finally ripe for a “triple emancipation” of the Mexican people to be achieved by positivism weaving “all the intellects into a common synthesis.”]

EDUCATION must be relative to our people, i.e., history, culture, bilingual education, contributions, etc. [cf. Sierra’s call to “nationalize science, to Mexicanize knowledge.”]

CULTURAL values of our people strengthen our identity and the moral backbone of the movement. Our culture unites and educates the family of La Raza towards liberation with one heart and one mind. We must insure that our writers, poets, musicians, and artists produce literature and art that is appealing to our people and relates to our revolutionary culture. Our cultural values of life, family, and home will serve as a powerful
weapon to defeat the gringo dollar value system and encourage the process of love and brotherhood. [cf. Vasconcelos' claim that la raza cósmica would initiate an Aesthetic age when “unity will be consummated ... by the triumph of fecund love.”] (PEA, 28–29)

Like the classical Mexican philosophers, El Plan's authors believed these problems could be solved with a new education system. The second of six action items thus read:

September 16, on the birthdate of Mexican Independence, a national walk-out by all Chicanos of all colleges and schools to be sustained until the complete revision of the educational system: its policy makers, administration, its curriculum, and its personnel to meet the needs of our community. (PEA, 29)

To give a rough idea of how badly the educational system was failing Chicano youth, consider the fact that in 1967, Mexican American students across the Southwest had a 60% high school dropout rate and exceedingly few were able to attend institutes of higher education. Inequalities like this were the focus of the 1968 East Los Angeles Walkouts, which demonstrated the profound ability of el movimiento to mobilize youth.

A month after the first National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference drafted El Plan Espiritual de Aztlan, more than 100 Chicanx youth gathered at the University of Santa Barbara to flesh out their vision for a completely revised system of higher education. El Plan de Santa Barbara served as a blueprint for Chicano/a Studies programs across the United States, and some of its features are clearly related to the legacy of Mexican positivism and its transformations. The first page of the 155-page document visually represented la causa (the cause) as a continuation of the Mexican revolution playing out in the struggles of the United Farm Workers, followed by another drawing with two textual areas of focus that read “LIBERACIÓN” and “POR MI RAZA HABLA EL ESPIRITO.” We can read the first as a continuation of Barreda’s Civic Oration, which called for the “triple emancipation” of Mexicans as people who had suffered “centuries of quiet domination under a system perfectly designed to endlessly prolong a situation of domination and continuous exploitation by way of education, religious beliefs, politics, and administration” (OC, 83). The second text was a variation on the motto that Vasconcelos coined for the National Autonomous University of Mexico: “Por mi raza hablará el espíritu” (“Through my race the spirit will speak”), which El Plan de Santa Barbara brought into the present as “The spirit is speaking through my race.” After the drawings, the “Manifesto” chapter opened with these words:

For all people, as with individuals, the time comes when they must reckon with their history. For the Chicano the present is a time of renaissance, of renacimiento. Our people and our community, el barrio and la colonia, are expressing a new consciousness and a new resolve.
Recognizing the historical tasks confronting our people and fully aware of the cost of human progress, we pledge our will to move. We will move forward toward our destiny as a people. We will move against those forces which have denied us freedom of expression and human dignity. [cf. Barreda trying to “reckon with history,” Sierra trying to “recognize the historical tasks confronting our people,” and the Atheneum of Youth “moving against those forces which have denied us freedom.”] (PSB, 9)

Chicanismo draws its faith and strength from two main sources: from the just struggle of our people and from an objective analysis of our community’s strategic needs. We recognize that without a strategic use of education, an education that places value on what we value, we will not realize our destiny. Chicanos recognize the central importance of institutions of higher learning to modern progress, in this case, to the development of our community. But we go further: we believe that higher education must contribute to the formation of a complete man who truly values life and freedom. [cf. classical Mexican philosophers who linked the destiny of the Mexican people to strategic education, built educational institutions to foster modern progress, and developed a vision of complete education.] (PSB, 9–10)

The destiny of our people will be fulfilled. To that end, we pledge our efforts and take as our credo what Jose Vasconcelos once said at a time of crisis and hope: “At this moment we do not come to work for the university, but to demand that the university work for our people.” (PSB, 11)

The practical substance of the plan consisted of chapters devoted to organizing and instituting Chicano studies programs, designing a curriculum, recruitment and admissions, support programs, political action, campus organizing, and a number of appendices that provide models of Chicano Studies programs at the graduate, bachelor, and associate levels, as well sample syllabi and course outlines, just as daring in scope as the reconstruction of education instituted by Gabino Barreda’s Organic Law of Public Instruction. In short, the authors of both the El Plan Espiritual de Aztlan and the El Plan de Santa Barbara outlined nation-building educational plans for the Chicano nation of Aztlan whose logic and rhetoric bear a substantial resemblance to the nation-building educational plans of Mexicans from Barreda to Vasconcelos.

Of course, the story of Mexican philosophy continued to play out in the United States even after the Chicano Movement waned in the late 1970s. In 1987, the feminist-visionary-spiritual-activist-poet-philosopher Gloria Anzaldúa, who grew up on the U.S. side of the South Texas-Northern Mexico borderlands, published Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza in a mixture of English and Spanish. Dedicated “a todos mexicanos on both sides of the border,” her book drew upon Aztec philosophy (by way of the Mexican philosopher Miguel Leon-Portilla) and Mexican philosophy (by way of Vasconcelos) to articulate a transformed ideal of “mestiza consciousness.” While Anzaldúa’s work was
continuous with the early Chicano movement in terms of her appeal to Aztlán—Chapter 1 is called “The Homeland, Aztlán / El otro México”—her philosophy: 1) widened the sense of *mexicanidad* to include indigenous Mesoamericans and Mexicans on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border; 2) corrected for Vasconcelos’ lack of vision with respect to the gender of the mestizo by calling for a “mestiza consciousness”; 3) broadened Vasconcelos’ concepts of *la raza cósmica* and *mestizaje* by simultaneously appealing to indigeneity and allowing for the possibility mestiza consciousness might be developed by people from any race or ethnicity; and 4) attempted to transcend nationalist discourse by decoupling the linkage between a people and a nation. Here is the beginning of Chapter 7: “La conciencia de la mestiza / Towards a New Consciousness”:  

*Por la mujer de mi raza/ hablará el espíritu.*

José Vasconcelos, Mexican philosopher, envisaged *una raza mestiza, una mezcla de razas afines, una raza de color—la primera raza síntesis del globo.* He called it a cosmic race, *la raza cósmica,* a fifth race embracing the four major races of the world. Opposite to the theory of the pure Aryan, and to the policy of racial purity that white America practices, his theory is one of inclusivity. [...] From this racial, ideological, cultural and biological cross-pollinization, an “alien” consciousness is presently in the making—a new mestiza consciousness, *una conciencia de mujer.* It is a consciousness of the Borderlands. 

A fuller treatment of Anzaldúa’s philosophy exceeds this chapter’s scope, but these selections illustrate how understanding the legacy of Mexican positivism and its transformations is crucial for understanding subsequent developments in Chicanx philosophy.

**Education Today**

To bring together the transformations of positivism explored in this chapter—stretching from Barreda’s mid-19th century attempt to design a national education system for Mexico to the late-20th century attempts to develop Chicanx Studies and reshape Chicanx identities in the United States—let us consider the current status of moral education that Barreda envisioned as the crown of a positivist education, or what Sierra called “moving the heart of peoples.” Whether in Mexico or the United States, we might reasonably complain with Caso that our public schools and universities “[do] not form anything but the intellect.” On the positivist model, the Church was supposed to stop providing moral education and leave this project to the State. On this front, we must judge positivism to have been a practical failure, for while it did occasionally recognize and articulate just how incomplete a merely scientific or technical education would be, it failed to provide any real substitute for moral
reflection and formation, and it was often used as ideological weapon to maintain the rule of the rich and powerful. The philosophical question that the positivists left us—how scientific and moral education are (or ought to be) related—remains alive, important, and unresolved.

Notes

1 The Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea (1912–2004), whose work is treated in subsequent chapters, profoundly shaped the last 75 years of scholarship on Latin American positivism. See Zea, The Latin American Mind and Positivism in Mexico.

2 Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 1:2. Cited in text with the abbreviation PPAC, volume number, and page number.

3 Barreda, “Oración cívica,” 82; italics in original. This and all subsequent translations of works cited in Spanish are ours. Cited in text with the abbreviation OC and page number.


7 Our choice to reserve the term positivism for the philosophies of Comte and Barreda is only stipulative. They are the original positivists in their respective contexts, but our argument does not depend upon the claim that there is something more essentially positivist about their philosophies than the later philosophies of Spencer and Sierra.

8 Sierra, Political Evolution of the Mexican People. Cited in text using abbreviation PEMP and page number.


10 Comte’s positivist doctrine of human progress was also racist. For example, he believed that the religion of humanity would spread from the “white races” of Western Europe to the “less advanced” races across the globe. System of Positive Polity, 1:313–317. Comte nevertheless held that the “highest affection for humanity” was “incompatible with any feeling of hatred towards other races” (1:568).

11 Sierra, “Inaugural Address,” 112. Cited in text using abbreviation IA and page number. Full title: “Discourse at the Inauguration of the National University (September 22, 1910).”

12 See Hurtado, “The Anti-Positivist Movement in Mexico.”

13 Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 1; italics added.

14 Vasconcelos, “Gabino Barreda y las ideas contemporáneas.” Cited in text using abbreviation GBIC and page number.


16 We cite the 1916 essay because it has been fully translated in Sánchez and Sanchez (eds.), Mexican Philosophy in the 20th Century. Cited in text using the abbreviation EEDC and page number.

17 Comte, System of Positive Polity, 1:xxxiv.

18 Caso, Obras Completas, 6:298. Cited in text using abbreviation CW, volume number, and page number.


21 Anzaldúa, Borderlands, 99.
Bibliography


